

176 Florida adjacent to the attractive Georgia market, should complement
177 Carolina Power & Light's generating assets, located in North Carolina
178 and South Carolina, and should provide the combined company with
179 greater access to these competitive markets. (Page 48)

180 (iii) The combined company's greater generation assets and customer base
181 should provide the combined company with the size and scope to
182 compete in the increasing competitive utility markets. (Page 49)

183 (iv) Greater scale should result in significant cost efficiencies and lower per
184 unit costs, resulting in the improvement of the utility businesses'
185 competitive position in a deregulating and increasingly competitive
186 industry with resulting benefits to utility customers. (Page 49)

187 (v) The resulting lower cost structure for CP&L Energy's regulated
188 businesses should reduce potential customer and margin loss that could
189 occur due to the effects of deregulation. (Page 49)

190 In a Finance Committee presentation to CP&L given on August 4, 1999, page 7, "Wall Street
191 Highlights" listed several anticipated benefits, including the strengthening of the competitive
192 position of the expanding generation asset base and the expansion of business diversification.
193 These reports, along with several analysts' reports also indicated that the merger was
194 anticipated to be accretive in the first full year after closing.

195 In a merger announcement which was published on August 23, 1999, Mr. William
196 Cavanaugh, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of CP&L recognized that the
197 acquisition would enhance CP&L's competitive position. The press release further

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198 recognized that the combined companies' non-utility businesses were a strong supplement to
199 utility earnings growth and that non-utility revenues will represent approximately 15% of the
200 revenues of the combined company.

201 In CP&L's August 20, 1999 Minutes of Meeting of Board of Directors, it was noted that Mr.

202 Cavanaugh said:

203 the proposed acquisition would give us a potential to grow earnings more
204 rapidly, provide substantial generation capacity strategically located on each
205 end of the lucrative Georgia and South Carolina markets, and gives us the
206 size necessary to thrive in a deregulated industry.

207
208 In the CP&L Board of Directors Strategic Planning Retreat 1999 Background Materials, page
209 6, CPL indicated that its acquisition of Florida Progress was the next logical step toward
210 achieving a sustainable competitive advantage. It further noted that plans were in place to
211 reduce every aspect of the cost of operations to be at or below market.

212 Q: HAS THE COMPANY PROVIDED ANY INFORMATION REGARDING ITS
213 INTENTIONS TO EXPAND ITS COMPETITIVE GENERATION BUSINESS?

214
215 A: In a review of the Power Operations, Power Trading and Term Marketing functions, the

216 Company provided several key considerations as the basis for revenue enhancements. These
217 key consideration included increased experience in adjoining market regions, portfolio
218 management practices, use of the automated information management system, and
219 development of an improved risk management program. It was noted that the use of the
220 FPC's portfolio management practices would "identify more uncommitted generation for
221 sale, reduce production cost uncertainty and maximize the use of 'below market' assets.
222 (OPC 010178). Lastly, the Company noted that:

223 Combined, CP&L and FPC Trading Centers will generate revenue in

224 excess of \$250 million in 1999, producing an expected total margin of
225 \$60 million. (\$40 million benefit to shareholders and \$20 million to
226 ratepayers). An increase in performance of at least 5% is anticipated
227 due to the above considerations, thereby resulting in a minimum
228 increase of \$2 million in shareholder value and \$1 million in retail
229 customer value. (OPC 010178)

230
231 The report also noted that the firm transmission path from FPC to CP&L could be used to
232 move power between regions for profit, when it is not being used to deliver power from FPC
233 to CP&L. The benefits of this utilization were estimated at \$2 million; however, the
234 Company did note that the ownership of the transmission could require that these benefits go
235 to customers. Attachment 4 of the report discusses the basis for revenue synergy from
236 retaining existing business and penetrating other markets. This attachment indicated that
237 wholesale term business was being “exited” at the fastest contractual rate and that it was
238 assumed that approximately one-half, or 320 MW, would be retained, apparently under
239 market-based, unregulated contracts. Further, the Company assumed an additional 320 MW
240 from additional expansion opportunities in Florida. It was noted that the “Generation
241 Expansion Team has the pro-forma and all financial documents to support the 5.0 million
242 dollar revenue enhancement. (OPC 010181)

243 Q: WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMPANY’S GOALS TO ENHANCE ITS
244 COMPETITIVE POSITION AND PARTICIPATE MORE ACTIVELY IN THE
245 GENERATION MARKET?

246
247 A: While cost savings were a major driving factor for the merger, these cost savings goals are
248 not just to provide benefits to the customers. The cost savings are also intended to place
249 CP&L and FPC in the best competitive position to capture a larger market share when
250 deregulation occurs. In addition, the Companies expect to become a major “player” in the

TABLE 1 SUMMARY OF FPC EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND SEVERANCE PACKAGES			
Title	1999 Compensation	Severance Package	Multiple of Compensation Paid in Severance
President/CEO	\$835,320	\$8,099,799	9.7
VP and General Counsel	\$366,557	\$1,691,176	4.6
VP, Human Resources	\$304,721	\$1,495,931	4.9

276 As shown in Table 1, the severance packages provided in the Transition Expenses ranged
 277 from approximately 5 times to almost 10 times the executive's annual compensation. In
 278 addition to these three positions, FPC also paid an additional \$13,760,863 to 11 executives,
 279 which is an average of \$1.25 million per executive.
 280

281 These payouts do not appear reasonable for the retail customers to absorb. The Commission
 282 should review the reasonableness of these expenses prior to establishing the appropriate
 283 regulatory treatment of FPC's Transition Expenses.

284 Q: HOW DID WITNESS CICCHETTI ALLOCATE THE TRANSITION EXPENSES AND
 285 TRANSACTION COSTS TO FPC?

286
 287 A: Witness Cicchetti allocated the Transition Expenses and Transaction Costs to FPC based on
 288 the relationship between the estimated merger savings of \$58.7 for FPC and the total
 289 estimated merger savings of \$175 million.

290 Q: DID THE TOTAL SAVINGS INCLUDE ANY SAVINGS THAT WOULD ACCRUE TO
 291 THE SHAREHOLDERS?

292
 293 A: Yes. The total merger-related savings included approximately \$31.5 million in merger-
 294 related generation revenue synergies which would accrue to the shareholders. The allocation
 295 of the Transition Expenses and Transaction Costs would thus recognize this level of merger-

296 related synergies attributed to the shareholders. Unfortunately, however, the allocation does
297 not recognize that the generation revenue synergies are supported by the production function
298 and that additional Transition Expenses and Transaction Costs should be allocated to the
299 shareholders to recognize this support. Further, since the production function is supported by
300 the Shared Services, the allocation of Transition Expenses and Transaction Costs should
301 again recognize that the shareholders benefit from the costs which are borne by the FPC and
302 CP&L retail customers.

303 Q: DO YOU HAVE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO ISOLATE THE COSTS THAT
304 SUPPORT THE COMPANY'S EFFORTS TO INCREASE ITS PRESENCE AND
305 PROFITABILITY IN THE WHOLESALE GENERATION MARKET?
306

307 A: No. However, the Commission should recognize that this support is provided in making its
308 determination on the appropriate treatment of the Transition Expenses and Transaction Costs.

309 Q: DID THE TOTAL SAVINGS INCLUDE ANY SAVINGS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE
310 NON-REGULATED BUSINESSES?
311

312 A: Apparently not. In response to several data requests, the Company provided a detailed
313 breakdown of the merger-related synergies. The total synergies shown on OPC 009781 were
314 \$147 million. Several other versions of this document were developed, showing different
315 levels of merger-related synergies; however, to date, we have not seen a corresponding
316 breakdown of the \$175 million. The breakdown of the merger-related synergies does include
317 revenue synergies related to generation, but does not include any savings attributable to
318 Florida Progress' non-regulated businesses, including Electric Fuels or Progress Telecomm.

319
320
321
322

698 expanded competitive wholesale sales.. It is not clear whether the Power Marketing expenses
699 included in the Test Year sales expenses include costs associated with the Company's
700 attempts to expand its competitive wholesale business. In the preliminary issues summary,
701 October 29, 1999 (OPC 010159), it was noted that, at that time, FPC was projecting in
702 excess of \$4 million per year in "below the line" profits from off-system trading.

703 On Attachment 5 of the November 30, 1999 synergies report for Power Operations, Power
704 Trading and Term Marketing (OPC 010182), the Company indicated that FPC Trading
705 Center costs were borne by the shareholders and trading margins that involved FPC's
706 regulatory assets go to the customers, while at CP&L, trading margins are retained by the
707 shareholders and retail customers are "made whole". The noted desired outcome was for
708 FPC to get treatment similar to CP&L. The "fallback outcome" was that FPC could recover
709 all of its Power Marketing costs and keep a portion of its trading margin. As noted above,
710 FPC has already accomplished a portion of the fallback outcome through the Commission's
711 Order No. PSC-00-1744-PAA-EI allowing the sharing of increased margins. In this case,
712 FPC is attempting to achieve the remainder of its fallback outcome by recovering all of the
713 Power Marketing costs from the retail customers.

714 Q: WHAT METHOD OF ALLOCATION ARE YOU PROPOSING FOR THE POWER
715 MARKETING EXPENSES?
716

717 A: Although it appears that the Power Marketing expenses may include expenses related to
718 expansion of FPC's non-regulated wholesale sales, I do not have sufficient information to
719 verify this or to provide a breakdown the Power Marketing expenses of \$4.897 million into
720 the various services provided by this department; therefore, I am limiting my adjustment to