1 BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 2 3 In the Matter of DOCKET NO. 920199-WS 4 Application for rate increase in Brevard, Charlotte/Lee, Citrus, Clay, Duval, Highlands, Lake, Marion, Martin, Massau, Orange, Osceola, Pasco, Putnam, Seminole, Volusia, and Washington Counties by: 7 Southern States Utilities, Inc.; Collier County by Marco Shores Utilities (Deltona); Hernando County by Spring Hill Utilities (Deltona); and Volusia County by Deltona Lakes Utilities (Deltona). 10 11 **VOLUME 2** 12 Pages 159 through 251 13 PROCEEDINGS: SPECIAL AGENDA CONFERENCE 14 CHAIRMAN JULIA L. JOHNSON BEFORE: COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON 15 COMMISSIONER SUSAN F. CLARK COMMISSIONER DIANE K. KIESLING 16 COMMISSIONER JOE GARCIA 17 Monday, December 15, 1997 DATE: 18 Commenced at 1:00 p.m. TIME: Concluded at 7:00 p.m. 19 20 PLACE: Betty Easley Conference Center Room 148 21 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 22 REPORTED BY: H. RUTHE POTAMI, CSR, RPR 23 Official Commission Reporter PARTICIPATING: 24 25 (As heretofore noted.)

FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(Hearing reconvened at 5:10 p.m.)
3	(Transcript continues in sequence from
4	Volume 1.)
5	CHAIRNAN JOHNSON: Ladies and gentlemen,
6	we're going to reconvene the hearing. It is now 5:10
7	and we're going to reconvene the hearing. Staff
8	counsel?
9	MS. JABER: Commissioners, we are at
LΟ	Issue 3. That is Staff's recommendation on the
11	appropriate action the Commission should take in light
L2	of the Southern States decision. This is a good time
13	to hear from the parties on the merits of the issue.
۱4	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. We're going to
15	hear from the parties on the merits of the issue.
16	We'll be voting on Issue 3.
۱7	At this point in time I will be limiting the
L8	parties to five minutes. The customers have been
L9	waiting patiently and participating in this process,
20	and we're going to limit the parties strictly to their
21	five-minute presentations.
22	Where do we begin? Company?
23	MR. ARMSTRONG: Thank you, Madame Chair,

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: If you'd like to save

24 | Commissioners.

25

some of your time for rebuttal, you might want to do
that up front; otherwise, you'll only be able to
answer Commissioners' questions.

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wr. Armstrong: Thank you. The PSC ordered uniform rates in 1993. When was the first time Florida Water informed the Commission that if its uniform rate structure was reversed, the only necessary remedy was to change rates prospectively? The first time was in 1993.

When was the first time Florida Water informed the PSC that it could not require a refund 1993? When was the next time the PSC ignored Florida Water advice that to require refunds without surcharges would be illegal? In 1995.

The PSC ignored us and issued a one-sided refund order in October 1995. If the PSC had researched the issue first, it would have known Florida Water was right. No refund could be made without surcharges when a rate structure is reversed.

If the PSC had listened to Florida Water, it would have realized that when a rate structure is reversed, the remedy used by every other regulatory Commission in the country during the 100 years or so of utility ratemaking regulation would solely be a prospective change in rates, not refunds and

surcharges.

Even after the PSC issued its one-sided refund order in October of 1995, the Supreme Court of Florida confirmed what Florida Water has maintained all along; that fairness and equity applies to the utility as well as its customers.

A majority of this Commission repeatedly ignored that fact and continued to ignore fairness by attempting to distinguish the Supreme Court's GTE decision for reasons which the 1st Court of Appeals concluded, and I quote, "did not hold water."

Staff on two separate occasions, in October 1995 and again in August of 1996, argued and recommended that no refunds and no surcharges should be made.

Staff recommended that a prospective change in rates is all that is required, and Staff argued that Florida Water did not assume a risk by placing the uniform rate into effect and asking the Commission to vacate the Citrus County automatic stay.

Now Staff argues that this Commission's one-sided refund order, which was reversed, has made the refund part of the order the law of the case.

The Black's Law Dictionary defines "to reverse" as "to vacate or set aside". Black's Law

···′ 7578

Dictionary defines "to vacate" as "to set aside". The terms are interchangeable from a legal perspective.

Staff's argument is purely a cop-out.

Another fact that must be remembered, this
Commission never even issued a final order
establishing an alternative rate structure in this
case other than uniform rates until August of 1996,
and the appeal by the City of Keystone Heights created
an automatic stay of that order in its entirety.

No party lifted that stay or requested that that stay be lifted. No alternative to the uniform rate structure was available to Florida Water Services as a result of that stay. The result? The PSC's prior mistakes in October 1995 and August 1996 and the implementation of the automatic stay caused the accumulation of potential refunds and surcharges, and Florida Water Services could do nothing to avoid it.

Staff's recommendation also ignores the fact that this Commission first ordered Florida Water to include Spring Hill in a 1995 rate case, but then, on the Commission's own motion, removed Spring Hill from the rate case while the Commission fought with Hernando County over jurisdiction. It is wrong to try to hold Florida Water accountable for such activities.

Why did Florida Water do nothing in 1996

regarding the Spring Hill rates? Because in 1993
Florida Water acted by vacating an automatic stay so
that Florida Water could receive the higher revenues
this Commission had authorized it to collect and to
stop an increasing refund liability.

what did this Commission do? The majority of this Commission tried to hold Florida Water accountable for the Commission's rate structure mistakes suggesting that Florida Water had assumed the risk of a one-sided refund when it asked the Commission to vacate the automatic stay.

The Court of Appeals rejected the Commission's novel assumption of the risk argument, but not until June of 1997. Prior to June of 1997, all that Florida Water knew was that the request that an automatic stay be vacated was to risk further retribution from this Commission. So we did nothing.

Incredibly, now Staff is suggesting to this Commission that Florida Water be held accountable for not vacating or otherwise acting in an manner contrary to the automatic stay of Keystone Heights, which arose when the Commission issued its August 1996 refund order, and Keystone Heights appealed.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: You have 30 seconds.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Staff suggests that because

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1	the Commission modified a stay which had been awarded	
2	to Florida Water, the City's automatic stay magically	
3	was modified. This is a preposterous legal	
4	proposition.	
5	One party's statutory right to a stay cannot	
6	be modified just because some other party's stay is	
7	modified. The Commission's August 1996 order,	
8	including that part of the order imposing a modified	
9	stand-alone rate structure, was on appeal.	
10	We could only imagine how this Commission	
11	would have punished Florida Water if we had moved to	
12	vacate the City's automatic stay, put modified	
13	stand-alone rates in effect, and then a uniform rate	
14	structure was upheld by the Court of Appeals.	
15	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Armstrong, your time	
16	is up.	
17	MR. ARMSTRONG: I have one more comment	
18	regarding this issue, Madame Chair.	
19	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: I'm sorry. You have	
20	what?	
21	MR. ARMSTRONG: I have one more comment	
22	regarding this issue on the stay, which Mr. Shreve had	
23	unrestrained time and ability to address. (Audience	
24	comments.)	7581
		POOT

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Your time is up.

MR. HANRATTY: Joseph Hanratty here on behalf of potential surcharge victims.

We have filed our brief in this matter alleging that the PSC has no authority to issue surcharges in this case. If you review the statutory authorities that create the Public Service Commission and authorize it to regulate water and wastewater matters, you will find nowhere in those statutes does the word "surcharge" even appear, much less is it discussed.

But I think further beyond that, before you even answer whether or not is a surcharge appropriate in this instance, why don't you question whether or not a refund is even appropriate in this instance.

The statutes go into great detail outlining the procedures under which refunds will be required when a rate increase is requested. And those instances — in the provisions of the statutes under which you are authorized to act, the only provisions for refunds are when there is an error in the revenue requirement.

Staff has brought this matter to your attention on numerous occasions during this procedure throughout the years that this is not an appropriate manner in which a refund to be -- in which to order a

refund. They're now arguing in their recommendation that it's now a matter of law of the case.

Essentially, I would submit to you that that goes to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. The subject matter jurisdiction of this board cannot be waived or cannot be subject to the law of the case. You do not have jurisdiction in this instance to order a refund.

The Legislature would not have gone through such explicit details in describing the matter and the method in which you could issue a refund only to have you or Staff say, we're authorized to do refunds under the broad powers that are granted us under the other provisions of the statutes.

The statutes are specific when refunds are allowed and required, and this is not one of those instances.

I would go further to say that there is no provision in the statutes that provide for surcharges in a situation such as this.

Prospective ratemaking concepts have created a process whereby errors are handled by allowing utilities to collect the rates subject to them being required to make refunds. That did not happen in this instance. The error that is claimed here does not

trigger the statutory powers that enable the PSC to collect refunds.

We're simply saying that you do not have authority to act in this situation, and it would be appealable error for you to require a refund in this situation, and there is no authority for this board to issue surcharges.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you.

## Mr. McGlothlin?

a matter of law in this case, and when one takes into account all the equities, the better course is to order neither a refund nor a surcharge.

The one rationale that has been put forward by those who contend that the Commission must order a refund is the doctrine of the law of the case. The law of the case doctrine applies to bar reconsideration of questions that were actually considered and decided on a former appeal involving the same action.

I've just read from the Commission's brief in the most recent appeal before the 1st DCA. In that case Florida Water was contending that because the matter had been to court earlier, it was entitled to have its entire revenue requirements undisturbed.

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The Commission, my clients, and Citrus

County and the others who contend for the refund all

opposed that interpretation of law of the case,

because the only point in that earlier appeal had been

the ratemaking disposition of a gain on the sale of

one asset.

Here's what the brief of Citrus County and Sugarmill Woods Civic Association said about the law of the case at that point: "The law of the case doctrine does not apply to protect SSU's revenue requirements in this case. There was no issue in the prior appeal concerning SSU's combined or individual revenue requirements in that sense. Only an issue concerning whether the gain from sale of a nonjurisditional system should be included in the county." And based on that they adopted the arguments presented by the Commission and by my clients.

But in this case the same parties have taken a very different position. At Page 9 they say "The Commission's goal, therefore, must be the full and complete implementation of the 1st DCA's mandate reached through full compliance with the controlling appellate court decisions, as well as the holdings of the Commission's prior orders in this docket to the extent these orders have not otherwise been reversed."

The controlling appellate decisions are GTE Florida, Inc., the Clark and Southern States, Inc. v. Public Service Commission.

"The unaltered provisions of the Commission's previous final orders that must now be observed are those mandating refunds within 90 days and, most importantly, the payment of interest pursuant to Commission rule."

So we have a complete flip-flop. Instead of arguing that only those points actually considered in the same case are the law of the case, they first of all bring in GTE, which isn't the same case, and they also contend that even details such as a refund within 90 days and with interest are somehow law of the case, even though it's clear that those were not points on appeal.

Furthermore, neither was the issue of a refund, a point decided on in the earlier appeal as is evident by the language in the 1st DCA's opinion which said in the course of directing the Commission to consider petitions to intervene by my clients, "These people are exposed to potential surcharges."

If there was such a thing as a potential surcharge in a case in which the court had ordered refunds, the word "potential" would not have been in

its vocabulary. That's also true because of the way the appealing entity, the utility, posed the question on appeal.

In its prayer for relief, it asked the court to either order a refund with surcharges or, alternatively, to order neither a refund nor a surcharge. So it's clear, based upon the way the question was presented and by the language in the court's order, that the refund was not a matter that was adjudicated by the reviewing court; therefore, it's not law of the case. So it isn't required as a matter of law. What do the equities say?

Well, bear in mind that at the point in time when you made the decision to refund, you Commissioners regarded the possibilities -- the surcharge as a legal impossibility. And I think it's for that reason in part that you were willing to go in the direction of a refund.

Now the court has told you that that's not the case, and like the commercial on TV, "This changes everything." And it's exemplified by numerous customers who have appeared to tell you some of the practical impacts of the implementation. There are some very serious competing equities, and I won't go into repeating those, but I want you to consider one

more point. 1 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: You have about 30 2 3 seconds. MR. McGLOTHLIN: All right. In the Staff's 4 recommendation, at this point they are already looking 5 forward in time and anticipating such things as those 6 customers who can't afford to pay the surcharge, the 7 possibility that the Commission may -- that the 8 utility may move to discontinue service for the refusal or inability to pay a surcharge. 10 And so it's clear to me, and it should be 11 clear to you, that at this point in time to order a 12 refund and surcharge would not be a resolution of this 13 matter, it would be an escalation of the matter; and 14 15 instead of achieving justice, you're simply creating worse problems. 16 The mayor from Keystone Heights said it well 17 when he says --18 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Your time is up. 19 20 -- cut your losses, because MR. McGLOTHLIN: sometimes the best course in order to achieve equity 21 is to avoid worse inequities in the future. 22 Thank you. 23 Susan Fox on behalf of Sugarmill 24

25

Woods.

I believe four of you were here in the fall of 1993 when Southern States Utilities moved to lift the stay, and I believe you remember your promise to the customers of Sugarmill Woods at that time that they would be protected in the event of a reversal.

I'd like to remind you, also -- I don't want to dwell on this -- but I would like for you to discount what Southern States Utilities has to say today, and let me read what they said to you when they asked you to reconsider your prior refund order.

"Southern takes no position on refunds for customers. The Commission is free to provide refunds for those who overpaid pending appeal and whose efforts secured prospective benefits through the implementation of modified stand-alone rates so long as the Commission draws the revenues for any refunds from those who underpaid during the period of time that the refunds were calculated."

That's the position that they've taken all along. Now, you've already ordered a refund. It went up on appeal. SSU raised a point on appeal that said "no refunds, no surcharges". You have an order from the 1st District that disposes of that issue. It says "affirmed in part, reversed in part."

The court's opinion says "We reverse that

part of the order -- and I don't want to quote at

length -- we reverse that part of the order that -
let's see -- the PSC erred in its consideration of GTE

with regard to the issue of whether SSU may surcharge

the customers who underpaid under the erroneously

approved uniform rate."

They reversed as to that issue. They said
"The PSC in this case has allowed those customers who
underpaid for services they received to benefit from
its erroneous order. As a legal proposition this will
not hold water." That was the proposition that did
not hold water.

We've cited the cases over and over again.

Restitution is required here. We paid money. The customers of Sugarmill Woods paid money that they shouldn't have had to pay. They're entitled to get it back. The refund portion of the order still stands.

As to the authority to surcharge, it's in the GTE case. It says that when the money has changed hands erroneously, then a surcharge is appropriate.

It's in the Southern States case. I mean, the 1st

District remanded --

**COMMISSIONER CLARK:** You need to get closer. They can't hear you.

MS. FOX: Okay. Can you hear?

there.

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COMMISSIONER CLARK: I can. They can't back

MS. FOX: All right. Now, just very briefly on the fairness issue.

This case has been extremely painful and expensive for all of us, no less so for the customers of Sugarmill Woods who suffered all the same kind of hardships that were talked about earlier today during the period that they were paying about \$500 a year more than -- than they should have been paying under modified stand-alone rates.

We don't think you have any choice but to order the refund here. It's unfortunate that we're in the situation that we're in, and I hope the Legislature comes up with a solution that avoids surcharges, but given the present legal status of the case, I don't see what other choice you have.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you. Mr. Jacobs?

MR. JACOBS: Thank you, Madame Chairman.

I'm sure everybody can hear me fairly well.

I'd like to think that there is a solution that people could go home tonight and feel good about, and I would offer you the following: In your Staff analysis on Page 33 in their conclusion of no refund/no surcharges, they say "In conclusion,

Staff believes that the Commission can reasonably infer that the refund portion of its order has been affirmed by the court and/or that the Southern States decision requires refunds and surcharges to be made, because to do otherwise would result in one group of customers receiving a windfall."

Then they go on to say on Page 53 -- and I think that your Staff deserves a lot of credit for having a crystal ball. Myself, when I predict the future, I just do it often. That way I'm successful.

But they have, in their wisdom, placed in here on Page 53, they say "Therefore, Staff does not believe that the Commission should nor can, absent statutory vision, utilize funds generated by regulatory assessment fees to refund to those FWSC's customers who overpaid under the uniform rate structure."

It seems to me that -- I don't disagree at all with Susan or Mike's remarks about what the law is, and I think your Staff agrees that a refund is an order on the customers; and I guess logically and legally you have to order a surcharge in order to get that done.

However, if you're going to do that, why not place that surcharge to begin being paid back so that  $75^\circ$ 

a rebate can happen on or about August 1st of 1998, which gives the Legislature plenty of time -- it gives it to past July 1, which is the fiscal year of the state, because if they put in the appropriations bill that you're authorized to expend your trust funds in the appropriations bill, then you have plenty of time to get that put together. They may try to do a general act, and a general act would certainly have plenty of time to be done by August 1st.

So I'd submit to you that I think that folks that are here today would rest easier knowing that there is that solution out there.

I would also suggest that you might want to place in this order that the Public Service Commission would recommend that the Legislature do this so that we know we have all of your support. And so then, from what I hear today, everybody is in agreement that this ought to be done, and we move forward. And we ought to all work together for a change, instead of just pulling at each other to try to find the solution. That's all I have.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you. Mr. Twomey?

MR. TWOMEY: Thank you, Madam Chairman,

Commissioners.

Let me say first that I think Mr. Jacobs'

comments, to the extent that I understand them, if I understand them correctly, are excellent in terms of the timing.

Mr. Hanratty says that he finds no statutory authority for the Commission to do surcharges. As suggested by Ms. Fox, he hasn't read the case law.

Apparently case law is controlling as well as statutes. The courts interpret the statutes, and that's why we're here.

As we discussed before, you're here on remand from a reversal by the 1st District Court of Appeals. It's the Southern States decision.

Southern States decision tells you you must do certain things. We all disagree about what it says. Don't take my word for what it says. Listen to what your Staff has to say that it says.

They say essentially that if it's law of the case -- if it's not law of the case, that is, on the refund, Southern States, you've got two choices; no refunds/no surcharges, refunds/surcharges.

They say if it is law of the case -- and they say this strongly in the recommendation -- if it's law of the case on the refund issue, then you must choose the refund surcharges. That's what they say. I hope they will tell you again.

GTE decision speaks to surcharges. You don't need a statute. GTE made you give back customer money to the telephone monopoly company. With interest, by the way.

The GTE decision says that it would be inequitable for one side to have a windfall as a result of an erroneous order. We clearly have an erroneous order here. We have a couple of them. The uniform rate order was reversed. The order in Southern States was reversed.

Was there a windfall? We know there was a windfall. The \$15 million we're talking about didn't come out of the thin air. SSU has established who will get refunds, who will pay surcharges. People that underpaid got windfalls, and the court recognized that.

And the court, as quoted by your Staff, said -- and I think Ms. Fox said it a minute ago -- the 1st District said, "Contrary to this principle, the PSC in this case has allowed customers who underpaid for services they received under the uniform rates to benefit from its erroneous order adopting uniform rates. As a legal position, this will not hold water."

What they're saying is, is you can't let

those people underpay, especially at the expense of those that overpaid.

Southern States is law of the case on the refunds. Your Staff said, at the middle of Page 25 of their excellent recommendation, "It's law of the case. Staff believes the 1st District's statements, specifically the issue on remand as to whether SSU can charge its customers, has limited the Commission's options on remand to the implementation of a surcharge, a concept used in GTE, which the 1st District expressly has stated is applicable in this case."

They go on -- this is the most important part -- they say "Staff believes that this language constitutes an implicit affirmance by the court of the Commission's decision to require refunds. In fact, the only portion of the order that the court criticized and found to be in error was the Commission's failure to require surcharges, not the decision to require refunds."

Your Staff says the court opinion says the only error was not to require surcharges, and not the part that says you had to do refunds.

"Therefore, Staff believes that the refund portion of the Commission's order may have been

decided by the court and, accordingly, has become law of the case.

That's your Staff speaking. It's not me. I happen to agree with what they've said. They have recommended to you that it's law of the case. They say at the outset of their excellent recommendation that if it's found to be law of the case, you can't do the refund; no refund/no surcharge. You don't have a choice.

They say if it's law of the case, you're bound by the court's determination. You can't go back and make other determinations on functional relatedness and those type things. If it's law of the case, which they say it is, and I agree, Ms. Fox and Mr. Jacobs, I think, then you can only go with the refund and surcharges.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you. I'm sorry,
Mr. Marks. I forgot you were sitting over there.

MR. MARKS: I'm stuck over here in the

corner.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Sorry about that.

MR. MARKS: Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.

You know, two words come to mind when I look  $759^\circ$ 

at the Staff's recommendation and I look at the matters associated with that case, and those two words are equity and fairness.

You've heard lot of legal arguments so far this afternoon, or this evening. I think there's another doctrine that's worthy of your consideration, and that doctrine in the law is equity and fairness. I realize that you're not a court of equity, but I also realize that on many occasions you consider equitable positions.

And as a matter of fact, in the Staff's recommendation on Page 40 it states quite clearly this: "What is legally correct may be impossible to implement in any reasonable and equitable manner." early on, Commissioner Garcia espoused essentially the same comment.

No matter what you do today -- and there are going to be some winners and there are going to be some losers, and I don't know how you're going to get around that -- but I would submit to you that it's time to stop the bleeding, and you've been bleeding for a long time, and the customers of these utilities have been bleeding for a long time, and it's time to move forward. And I think equity is the key.

A former colleague of mine used to say it in 7598

another way. He used to say "What's always legal ain't always right," and that's the case here.

And again, as I said, in the Staff's recommendation they're saying the same thing. And it's an excellent, an outstanding Staff recommendation, although it's not the only one that I've seen in my 20-odd years being associated with this Commission. But it's time to get to reason. It's time to think about what we have here and what these circumstances are.

And in the comments by Mr. McGlothlin on behalf of his people, I had to agree with him, the people that he represents; and there were a number — and his arguments primarily dealt with equity and what's fair and what's equitable under these circumstances, and I would urge you to consider that.

Now, in addition to that, if you remember earlier the mayor from Keystone Heights, Mr. Archie Greene, spoke. And I think Mr. Archie Greene said the same thing. In essence he says "It's time to cut your losses." And it is time to cut the losses.

And it's time to act again, as I said before, in an equitable manner; and we believe, and I believe on behalf of Charlotte County, that will require you to impose no refund or no surcharge, and I

think you legally can do that.

I don't think that the cases that have been cited would preclude you from reaching that conclusion, and I would urge you on behalf of the utility, I would urge you on behalf of the customers of this utility that that would be the appropriate solution under these circumstances.

Thank you very much. (Applause)

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: There may be questions.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I would like to ask

Staff something and also inquire of Commissioner

Deason. I think one of the things that keeps -- I

think we have to go forward and make some decisions,

but leave the option of the Legislature addressing the

funding of refunds a viable option.

And I am concerned that if we make a decision that if there is going to be surcharges, we're not going to order refunds, if that's our final decision, I'm concerned it will go up to the court and the court will say, you're wrong again, and you've got to do both; and we're that much further down the line.

And what I want to suggest is that we take Staff's recommendation with respect to an evidentiary hearing on how we would implement a refund and a surcharge so that it is clear what the impact would

be, so that both the Legislature and the court, hopefully, will get a clear picture of what this means. Because I have frankly been frustrated with what I think is the court's not looking at what these rates mean.

Even these stand-alone rates, as some people have indicated, create enormous economic pressure on them, and that's exactly why I think the Staff recommended uniform rates besides the other arguments that were supportive of that.

And I appreciate there's a debate on uniform rates, but I want you all to know that we pursued that because we thought it was in the best interests of all customers. And, yes, we made a mistake, but I want to assure you that we were thinking of you all who have to pay high rates. (Audience comments.)

I'm telling you what we did. I appreciate the fact we're here now. What I want to suggest is that we go ahead and hold that evidentiary hearing; we also make -- allow the parties to address -- that there be three issues; basically Issues 3, 4 and 5; but that we focus most of our attention on how to implement the refund and the -- refund and surcharge and the ramifications of that, and that one of the options we would pursue in a final order that I hope

would be issued -- I hope we would hold that
evidentiary hearing in January, issue that order,
hopefully in February, and then the order would take
the view that -- or it would make a decision on
issuing refunds and surcharges.

Let me just -- I'm thinking on my feet. But order refunds if it does not require a surcharge. And in there mention the fact that the Legislature has suggested there may be an opportunity to use other funds to make that.

Then make a decision on whether or not -- if it is not so funded by the Legislature, would our decision be not to order the refunds because it requires a surcharge. And then say "If the court tells us that we cannot not order a refund, here's how we think the refund and surcharge have to be done."

So the whole thing is before the Legislature and the whole thing is before the courts, and we don't extend this anymore. (Audience comments.)

We can't continue to leave this in abeyance, and that's why I didn't think the continuance. But I want to leave open the option of having a legislative solution, and that's how I think we should proceed.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Let me make --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: That order would be - 760

final --

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Susan, let's --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Let me say that order would be final, but it would not be effective until after the legislative session, so that by being final, it can be taken up on appeal immediately and, hopefully, the courts will be prompted to act as expeditiously as possible.

One thing that has been difficult is that we think we know the law. We thought we knew the law on intervention, we thought we knew the law on rate structure, and we've been frankly surprised by what they have said the law is.

MS. JABER: I need to make sure that I understand.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: You're going to have to speak directly into the microphone, Ms. Jaber.

MS. JABER: Commissioner Clark, I need to make sure that I understand what you're thinking about.

Basically you're saying, "Go to hearing as we recommend, but not limit the issues." And you see three main issues; the first being can refunds be ordered without a surcharge because --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: The first one --

MS. JABER: -- there is a legislative

option.

not going to order refunds if it requires a surcharge?

That leaves open two options. The Legislature decides to fund the refund. If it decides not to, then there's no refund; and if the court says it doesn't matter what the Legislature does -- (Audience comments.)

I'm just trying to expedite it and get information from the court, and if the --

hold on, Susan. Ladies and gentlemen, you're going to have to contain yourself and not make any statements. We have a court reporter who is trying to record these statements so that this record can be used for whichever party decides to take this up on appeal. So if you could please just sit and listen to the comments and the statements and the dialogue that's occurring, we're all trying to reach an appropriate resolution to help protect everyone here in the fairest manner possible, but we do need the opportunity to have that dialogue.

So if you could just -- I know this is an emotional issue. It's emotional for all us, but if

you could, just try to restrain yourself and allow us to deliberate.

is if the court says it doesn't matter what the
Legislature does, or if it says the law of the case is
that you will order refunds, and that we can't order
refunds without surcharges, they will know how we
intend to implement it; and they could also rule on
that.

Here's what I'm concerned about; is that we do something and the court says, no, you're wrong, and we have to do it again; and it is -- extends the process and it extends the uncertainty and it extends interest accruing.

MS. JABER: It sounds, though, to me that what you may be attempting to do is to recommend something in the version of a final order and have that appealed and have the court come back and tell you whether what you're contemplating is going to work --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: No, no, no. What we would say is "If you tell us in fact the law of the case was you have to do a refund and you have to do a surcharge, here's how we would implement it."

MS. JABER: And you would --

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commissioner clark: You know, we may decide that that's appropriate, but Commissioner Deason seems -- if I understood his comments, he suggested the notion of -- that we would not order a refund if it required a surcharge.

Now, if the Legislature steps in and says it's going to be funded elsewise and it doesn't require a surcharge, "That answers the question. But if the court says, that's not an option for you, no refund," then they have before them how we would do the refund and surcharge. One of the advantages of that is the court to see exactly what the impact is.

MS. JABER: So you would have alternatives built into your order, basically?

commissioner clark: Yeah, and it would be a final order; that when the court acted, it would -- there would be no further steps to take.

MS. JABER: "If, court, you say we're wrong, here's what we'll do"? And that would be in the form of an order --

commissioner DEASON: It seems to me we're answering questions that aren't legitimately before us if we do that. Now, I share Commissioner Clark's concern that the court be fully informed of all of the ramifications and complexities and perhaps inequities

that could result from any type of a refund, because it's just impossible to do it.

sometimes it's easy to sit on the bench and make a decision; do it this way, it sounds fair and equitable. And then when you try to implement it, you think of all kinds of problems and uncertainties and concerns and inequities that make it very, very difficult from a practical standpoint to do what sounds fair and, quote, unquote, legal.

But it seems to me that we can include in our order all of the complexities that our Staff has delineated for us in their very complete recommendation here.

A number of problems arise in trying to make any type of a refund. That makes it difficult, time-consuming, and also questions of equity arise in any type of a refund. And I think it's very critical that -- I tend to agree with the arguments of Mr. Marks.

I think we've got to look at GTE, what it stands for, and not read any more into it than is absolutely necessary. It seems to me that the paramount thing GTE is saying to this Commission is "be fair and equitable," and it doesn't dictate to us how we have to be fair and equitable.

And I think it's reading too much in the 1st DCA opinion to say that we have to do refunds, we have to do surcharges, because to me it is more inequitable to surcharge these customers who had no ability to change their consumption, or even choose to remain a customer of Southern States at the time, and now to go back to them and tell them that they're obligated to pay back an amount that they had no control over, and then on top of that, perhaps to make up the difference for those customers who have left the system.

That is a double inequity, and there's no way around that inequity, and that is what GTE is saying to us, "be fair, be equitable".

Now, my heart goes out to those persons that have overpaid. I have from day one advocated, first of all, against uniform rates. But that's all water under the bridge now. And I didn't argue against uniform rates because I thought they were illegal, I argued against uniform rates because I thought they were bad public policy.

The court in essence agreed, but disagreed.

They said they were illegal. I still think this

Commission had a valid order that was legal. Those

were the rates that were in effect. I thought that a

better rate structure could have been implemented, but I didn't ever say that the uniform rates were illegal.

Now, I think in the best of all situations there should be a refund, but if the 1st DCA says the only way we can do a refund is with a surcharge, I think that is trying to cure one inequity with a much worse inequity to the surcharge customers. We're in a no win situation. I think that is the only way we can treat this. (Applause)

Now, I think it is very important that if there is to be some type of a legislative fix, that that be given full opportunity to be proposed, discussed and perhaps come to fruition, and if we can do in any way to provide information and expedite that, I'm not opposed to doing that.

I think there are some very real problems when you come to the amount of the money. I'm not so sure there's that amount of money in our regulatory trust fund to start with, and I guess there could be some arguments about its constitutionality and things like that. I'm not trying to throw cold water on it. There's going to be a very serious debate in the Legislature about this, but I don't want to do anything that would preclude that opportunity.

But I think this Commission -- I also agree

1	with Mr. Marks that this Commission has an obligation
2	to make a decision and that we need to make it today,
3	and if anything that we can do to shed light on all
4	the complexities in our order and share that with the
5	court so that perhaps before they make a decision,
6	they understand some of the things that we have to
7	deal with, I say by all means include it
8	COMMISSIONER GARCIA: So what you're
9	suggesting is that we deny Staff?
10	COMMISSIONER DEASON: My suggestion is we
11	deny our Staff. It
L2	COMMISSIONER GARCIA: We deny Staff, and we
L3	do no surcharge/no refund.
L4	COMMISSIONER DEASON: No surcharge/no
15	refund, but we leave the door open.
L6	(Applause)
L7	COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Let me just
L8	(Applause)
L9	COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Let me
20	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Commissioner Garcia,
21	let Commissioner Deason finish his thought on leaving
22	the door open.
23	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I think we need to
24	leave the door open. I think that we need to make the
25	decision. Under our interpretation of what is fair

and equitable, there can be no surcharges. That to me is I don't see how you can call it anything else but retroactive ratemaking.

If there is a way that refunds can be funded by some means other than surcharging the customers, we're open to that; and the only way I know to do that is through a legislative action. I think everyone here has expressed, if not outright support, at least the hope that perhaps that is a solution.

I think I have a hope that that's the solution, and if it can come to fruition, I would say by all means, refund those moneys, because I think those folks have overpaid. But I cannot in good faith, and in trying to reach a fair and equitable judgment here, say that those refunds while they should be made, have to be funded by surcharges. That, to me, is a greater inequity.

commissioner GARCIA: Let me just say that if that's a motion, I'll second it; and I'll go further. I think what the court has asked us to do is impossible. They can ask us to turn water into wine all they want. We just can't do it here.

The issue before us -- and -- is where we get in money from, and I just don't see any way to do it; and, further, I don't see any way to do it

equitably.

It is unjust and unfair for us to ask those people who paid a lower rate, not knowing it, to come up with more money for that service, and on top of that, to pay for those that are not in the system because they've left.

You add to that the fact that I think it is, again, impossible for the company, if we put this burden on the company, to fine these people, and to somehow encumber those who aren't even on the system, and it becomes that much more ludicrous.

I know that this Commission -- and let me speak for myself. I know we made an error here, or at least the court has told us we made an error. But to try to do refunds and surcharges would be a far worse error, because it's just not -- it doesn't meet what the court was talking about, which is fairness and equity in these cases.

So with that, I have a few questions to ask some of the parties here, Madam Chairman, but I'll second that motion.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: One other thought before we go on -- and we can have as much discussion as we like -- but I think one of the things that we're going to have to concentrate on if we go forward with

this decision is try to somehow -- and we've tried it before when it was not successful -- but try to distinguish GTE from what is happening here presently.

And to me it is very important that what the Commission did in GTE was that there was a one-time surcharge on all customers, not one segment of the customer group versus another, generally all customers who subscribed to local service, and it was not a usage based surcharge.

The customers that were on the system paid the surcharge. It was a one-time thing, and it wasn't in any way related to number of toll calls they made or anything; so that it was that, a one-time flat charge on every customer.

If we do a surcharge here, one of the gross inequities is applying it to customers who cannot now go back and change their consumption. If they had known what those rates would have been back then, perhaps their consumption would have changed. Perhaps they would have chosen not to even be a customer of Southern States if they knew what the rates were. But now we're precluding that option from them, and how you cannot call that retroactive ratemaking is beyond me.

But I want to distinguish that what we did

in GTE was no usage based surcharge whatsoever; what's being proposed here is a usage based surcharge.

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commissioner GARCIA: And I also think that in GTE it was easier to do equity because the amounts were smaller, and you were only dealing with one system and one base of customer. At least on that ground, this is nowhere near that.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And I think it's important that GTE was just to the question of equity between customers and --

**COMMISSIONER GARCIA:** Exactly.

**COMMISSIONER DEASON:** -- not a question of equity between one customer group versus another customer group.

## CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: There --

commissioner GARCIA: Mike, I wanted to ask you some questions. Mike, you -- I want to hear from you what you think in terms of equity and how we do equity.

I don't know how we do it, and perhaps you know a way to do it, but I just can't see it. And I know Staff is trained to do it, and I think that it was a good recommendation on what they had before them; but if you look at the broader picture, I just don't see how we can meet the refund with surcharges

while I want to keep that option open of a legislative fix.

MR. TWOMEY: Commissioner, first I would ask you to seriously consider giving your Staff the courtesy of explaining their explanation before you vote on this. I would implore you to do that.

Now, you are not a court of equity. I don't care what anybody else at these tables says, you are not a court of equity. This is not a determination of first impression. You are here on a remand.

Now, all I can say, Commissioner Garcia, is as your Staff said, the court said they seemed to think I know or believe that the court said that -- two things; you have to do two things. You have to make refunds and you have to make surcharges.

They didn't ask you to weigh any equities involved in it. I don't care what that surplusage language is. It's dicta.

Now, it's not just that opinion,

Commissioner. GTE -- and GTE didn't have any

problems. I don't -- there's differences. GTE didn't

have any problem whatsoever. The court made you take

customer money and give it to the utility, made you

take more than they, on an individual basis, received

the benefit of and give back more plus interest on

top

So it's not a question of equity. You have to look closely at what the court said that you had to do to follow those directions. And don't -- again, don't take my word for it. Please listen to what your Staff has to say in this. It is an excellent recommendation.

Now, as far as the mechanics and the practicalities of this, SSU gave you that great big box that has -- you made them do it. They did it wrong the first time. I didn't -- I shouldn't say wrong. They didn't give you what you wanted the first time. They gave you back 5,000 sheets of paper.

And what you decided a long time ago, I think, was is that if there was going to be refunds and there were going to be surcharges, it wouldn't be on an average basis, it would be based upon the consumption of each person during the 28 months involved; and they went and calculated that.

I don't know if it's right. I haven't audited it. It's beyond my abilities to do that. But they used their computers and they calculated a bill, and they said, somebody got paid this too much and somebody paid that.

Now, in terms of the mechanics of it, they

implement it; order surcharges over whatever time period you would decide they pay it back; pay back refunds over whatever period you decide. So I hope that answers your question.

I understand the difficulty that you all are facing in trying to deal with this, because there are a lot of people out here who genuinely -- I don't doubt anybody that's testified --

none of these people here -- let's say it's just you and I. And I want to you tell me how I figure out, how I can in some rational way figure out how to get these people's money back to them, taking it from this group in the changing reality that that is a consumer base.

Let's say we give each of the parties two years to pay this back. We surcharge one group and we credit one group for the same amount until eventually we reach that balance. What do we do when people move away? What do we do when people die? What do we do when people have disputes? I mean, all these things are going to be happening.

And some of these are such huge amounts, like the church where you can actually show up -- and I'm sure that you can attach something -- but when

you're talking about a few hundred dollars, I mean, the costs involved in getting that money back from that client, what do I do with a client who simply says, I'm no longer at this address, and puts the bill in his wife's name? I just don't know how I can do that, and that's what I'm asking, for some guidance because --

MR. TWONEY: Yes, sir. I --

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COMMISSIONER GARCIA: -- you've seen that
problem.

MR. TWOMEY: I understand. And my response to that is, is that that's the area I think your Staff suggested that you needed to have the evidentiary hearing after you made your decision on this; and that's where you decide these things.

I think they're all capable of being resolved. If you're asking me what kind of answer I can give you to make you feel better about not taking money away from these people by depriving my clients of it, keep in mind out of every dollar that these folks -- I'm saying the ones that were undercharged under the rate structure -- every dollar, every penny that there was a person that was undercharged, there was somebody that was overcharged.

And I think it was incorrect for you all, if

you're assuming this, to assume that the people that were forced to overpay over the course of 28 months were any less financially disadvantaged or economically disadvantaged than the ones that have to pay it back. (Applause)

And what's your decision that it appears you're on the verge of making is saying that what's done is done, and the people that were overcharged, they're out of luck. So I can't give you an easy solution, because it is clear there is not an easy solution to this problem. I appreciate your asking.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Twomey, listening to your comments and to Mr. Marks and to the other Commissioners here, in a lot of ways you are correct.

When we talk about the GTE opinion, and perhaps even the Southern States opinion, and we talk about equity and fairness, certainly the court said we had to look at the ratepayers and the company and make sure that what we did was equitable and fair.

But as it relates to the customers, certainly I agree that it is not fair to make customers who perhaps paid less than they will be required to pay under the new regulatory regime, it's not fair to go back and say, oh, even though you didn't know how much your water costs, and it cost

more than you thought, you've got to give us that money.

But on the other hand it's not fair to make the customers who thought they were paying too much, who filed all of these appeals, who said from the beginning, no, we shouldn't have to pay this, but they were forced to pay it or their water would have been turned off. So the fair — it is a very, very, very difficult predicament to be in, because there is no way for this Commission to come up with a decision that is equitable and fair to everyone.

So I'm sympathetic to your arguments about what do these people do that overpaid, and we've been trying to get that rectified. But we've got to do something. You know, you send one order up that said require refunds but don't surcharge, and they sent that back to us. So what are our other solutions?

MR. TWONEY: Commissioner, I implore you, listen to your Staff explain their -- give them a chance to explain their recommendation.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: Excuse me. Chairman

Johnson and Commissioner Garcia, before you all go

further down the road, could I --

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Yeah. Hold on a second. This gentleman, Mr. Jacobs, he raised his hand a long

time ago, and I'm going to allow him to speak first, and I did -- I acknowledged him. And I'll allow you to speak.

MR. JACOBS: Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I would submit to you I think there is a way to solve this problem. And I stated earlier, you know, I'm not very good at predicting the courts, but I'm a fair predictor of the Legislature. Fair; fair as anybody can be. I've been involved in both processes over 30 years.

And I would submit to you that today you had a senator and a representative here who said "I know where the money is. The money is in your coffers."

Y'all didn't object to them coming after your money in your coffers. And they said, "We'll get that authority for you to spend that money and then you can do equity, you can be fair, and you can pay back to those folks who have been overcharged."

Both those representatives of the

Legislature said they thought that folks who overpaid

ought to be rebated. They just said that the people

who are going to be surcharged ought not to be

surcharged. And they offered you a solution. It's a

win/win for everybody.

I would submit to you that if you vote to

1	have no rebate and certainly incumbent with that is
2	no surcharge that that's going to be in the courts;
3	it's going to be appealed. We're going to be dragging
4	it out again, and then it's up to us who are
5	representing the folks that ought to be rebated to go
6	out and get busloads of folks and drive them all over
7	the place and show up and get everybody aggravated and
8	upset and we go on with another year or so. The
9	millennium is close upon us. I'd like to see the end
٥.	of this prior to that date.
.1	And I submit to you that you have the money,
.2	the money is there. You didn't object to them talking
.3	about taking your money.
.4	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Jacobs, that's not
.5	our money.
ا 6	MR. JACOBS: Okay. I mean
.7	commissioner deason: It's regulatory trust
18	fund
9 ا	MR. JACOBS: Who's
20	COMMISSIONER DEASON: We have no control
21	whatsoever
22	MR. JACOBS: Who's everyone
23	COMMISSIONER DEASON: that fund unless
24	the Legislature appropriates it
	MD TAGORGE T know you don't have

control --

(Simultaneous conversation.)

MR. JACOBS: I know you don't have control.

If I misstated that, I'm sorry. Some people call it a slush fund. I know it's not a slush fund. So you didn't object to that, so I didn't think you'd object to this. (Laughter)

But I would submit to you --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I asked Mr. Ward where our slush fund was. He assured me that there's no such --

MR. JACOBS: I was going to say I hadn't seen a whole lot of slush around here, so I -- but I would submit to you that there is a solution out there, and if you take what I consider to be precipitous acts, and you vote and then it's again a confrontation and we go forward, to me the idea of waiting a couple months, a few months -- and I represent folks who are supposed to get money back, and if we don't mind waiting to see if the Legislature can't solve this problem with your cooperation, with our cooperation, the utility company is not opposed. I don't know anybody who is opposed to that at all all day long.

And so I submit to you, why raise another

issue which has to be confronted in the courts for more delay, more cause to be concerned by everybody and the machinations of all kinds of folks and the anguish over it, why not just let's just wait through the process and see if the Legislature won't fund this thing? I believe they will.

I think if you took the energy that I've seen in this room today and you put it behind that issue before the Legislature, it's going to pass. And I'm a guy that's supposed to receive money.

So I would submit to you that I think that's an equitable way to move. Everybody here can go home and enjoy Christmas, not worry about it. But if you make a decision tonight that's going to cause one side or the other to appeal you, you know, you haven't served anybody, and that's -- I firmly believe that.

I think you have been given an opportunity here today to solve this problem in an equitable and a fair way and so it has an end. And there's a certain equality that this project finally coming to some conclusion --

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Let me just -
COMMISSIONER DEASON: There's two thoughts.

First of all, we're under a remand from the court. I

think we have an obligation to affirmatively go

The second thing is I don't want to give 2 false hope out there that there's going to be a legislative fix to this thing and solve everybody's problems.

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If there is a legislative solution, great, but I don't want this Commission's decision to give false hope to customers that they're going to get a refund via legislative action.

MR. JACOBS: May I respond?

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Yes.

MR. JACOBS: I submit to you, Commissioner Deason -- and I want you to know I agreed with everything you said about all these processes except right now -- and I submit to you that you're giving them false hope when you vote tonight to say no refund/no surcharge, because that's going to be appealed and you don't know what the court is going to do.

I would also submit to you that the court has not said, do this in six months, do this in eight months, or do it in ten months.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: So what would you suggest we do, Mr. Jacobs?

MR. JACOBS: I would suggest that you defer this matter until after the Legislature meets --

(Audience comments.)

MR. JACOBS: -- that the pressure is on the Legislature to solve the problem.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Hold on, Mr. Jacobs.

MR. JACOBS: In that way -- and again --

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Ladies and gentlemen in the audience, we cannot hear his comments, and we need to do that as a part our deliberative process. If you could hold down the noise.

Mr. Jabobs?

MR. JACOBS: I'm not here to ride the wave of popularity up and down. I just would submit to you that there are both sides of this issue. There are folks who have paid overly over 28 and a-third months. They deserve to have the money returned. You agree with that. The senator agreed with that and the representative agreed with that. I don't think anybody in this room would disagree with that.

All right. How do you solve that problem?

Well, I submit to you the way you solve it is that you have this -- excuse me -- there's a trust fund out there that the Legislature has to give you authority to spend, so let them give you that authority; and I submit to you I think the chances are very, very excellent that that will be done.

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I think there also -- I can almost guarantee you if you vote tonight -- and I'm not -- that's not a threat on anybody's part. There's just lawyers out here -- but if you vote tonight no rebate, you know that's going to be tied up in the courts, and you know we're going to be back here at some further juncture. And I think our chances of winning are better than the other side because we have some real good indicia from the court as to how they would rule.

So I think the best path for everybody to have security that this is going to be done, and one that's within their control, one that's in the control of the people in this room tonight, is to have your elected representatives pass this measure in the Legislature. And they have a lot more control over that than they do over the 1st District Court of Appeals, and their best forum for their resolution and our resolution is in the Legislature, not in the 1st DCA.

And so I would submit to you that if we move forward tonight to defer this matter beyond the legislative session, I think you have an opportunity for a win/win, and if we would utilize the energy the company had committed, that they would support that.

The other lawyers in this table have

from the Legislature's authority to spend that money.

I would submit to you we're all better served, we have an end in sight and it's over, and there is control by the people to see that that does get done; and I offer that to you as, I think, a solution for everybody.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Madam Chair?

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: One moment.

Mr. McGlothlin is next.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: This is not in response to the last comments, but in response to the dialogue between Commissioner Garcia and Mr. Twomey. And so that you have the full picture of the issue of law of the case, including your Staff's view of law of the case -- and I'm certain they will speak for themselves -- but there was the suggestion that goes beyond the assertion that you have no discretion, which has always been Mr. Twomey's argument.

His suggestion now is that even the Staff sees this as a hard and fast situation. I'm reading from Page 27 of the Staff recommendation. "However, consistent with the positions of Keystone-Marion, Derouin et all and FWSC, it can reasonably be argued that since the refund issue was a material issue

before the 1st District, the court would not impliedly affirm by silence such a core issue. If the court intended to affirm the refund portion of the Commission's order, it could have expressly done so. Further, courts do not always reach all issues presented to them, answer only those questions that need to be answered to dispose of a matter. Thus, a good faith argument can be made that the Commission should review not only the issue of surcharge, but the issue of refund also."

Commissioners, my view is that the stronger legal analysis is that the 1st District Court did not give you a decision that you have to require refunds. And that being the case, Commissioners, you needn't feel badly before about the fact that you're wrestling with fairness and equity, because if there is no legal requirement that a refund be made, then the whole case is what is fair and what is equitable, and your focus is where it should be.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you. Mr. Marks?

MR. MARKS: Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Twomey indicated that this is not a court of equity. I think that's correct, but that does not preclude you from imposing an equitable solution.

This Commission has done that on many, many occasions

in the past.

I want to comment also on Mr. Jacob's comments related to the legislative solution. I know he represented that all the attorneys at this table -- and I'm not at that table right there -- would not disagree with that legislative solution. But I have not conferred with my client on that. So I cannot stand here or sit here this afternoon and tell you that I would agree with that legislative solution.

And I'm not sure whether or not that legislative solution would be appropriate in the first place, because as I understand it, obtaining those funds from the regulatory trust fund will require all of the ratepayers in the state of Florida to fund that surcharge to fund those refunds. And I'm not so sure if there's an equitable solution for all other ratepayers to do that, to be very honest with you. It may be, and it may be that the Legislature can do that.

Now, as far as the courts are concerned, I think that if this matter is approached in an appropriate manner, as we have suggested here, and that there not be any refunds or a surcharge, I'm inclined to think the courts can resolve that issue and take a very, very close look at it. And I think

it would stop, as I indicated earlier, stop the bleeding in this matter and we can all move forward. Thank you.

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CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Marks, I have a question for you. Understanding your argument and your position as it relates to equity, how is it equitable for us to not provide those customers with the refunds?

There are two issues that we need to resolve; one, the law of the case and how it should be applied. I've heard the arguments as to why it's not really applicable here. But we also have the standards of fairness and equity. How will we be able to argue -- because I'm certain if we don't allow the refunds, this will go up -- how do we argue that this is consistent with GTE, that this is consistent with the DCA opinion?

MR. MARKS: First of all, I guess we all can be convinced if you say no surcharges and no refunds, that it will be appealed. I'm not absolutely convinced of that. I think that if the parties take a look at that, maybe they will see the wisdom in that kind of a decision in not taking this up on appeal.

But, nevertheless, having said that and realizing that it might draw a few snickers through

this crowd, let me address the second part of that. I think you have to look at --

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Just in case you don't know, we're in appeal now, if I'm not mistaken, with the modified stand-alone rates, correct? We're before the court. So we could get even that --

## MR. MARKS: That's --

commissioner GARCIA: -- as we went forward with a refund -- if we went forward with a refund surcharge, then we'd have to look at what outcome the court deciding against this Commission on that would have and how that would play out with what we have.

wr. Marks: Madam Chair, equity, as I understand it, generally will impose some inequitable solutions on some parties, and I don't think you can get around that. I think it's quite clear that if you, under these circumstances, do not allow a refund, that some people are going to lose as a result of that. And there are going to be some winners, because they don't have to -- they won't have to provide a surcharge.

I really honestly believe that under those circumstances, I don't think equity would allow you to get around that particular result.

The fact of the matter is you might want to

look at this in terms, as I think it may have been said, in terms of a rate case proceeding, and prospectively go forward.

Those persons who had to pay more, unfortunately had a rate increase. Those persons who had to pay less, fortunately had a rate decrease. But I would suggest to you that probably the appropriate solution is just to move forward at this point in time, and that would resolve a lot of the problems that we have. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Did you have a question?

COMMISSIONER CLARK: There's a motion. Can you restate your motion? And I know you indicated you wanted to give some accommodation to the possibility of the Legislature acting, and I was just wondering how we could do that, given the idea that there might be a problem with ex post facto, although I don't see it, but how would we --

commissioner DEASON: It seems to me that we can include in our order, we can order Southern States or Florida Water Services to keep all the information intact to provide a refund if there is a funding source obtained and have the mechanism in place, or at least the concept that it's going to be funded from that source, not surcharges, and for them to have the

necessary information to identify these people who are entitled to a refund and to implement that refund.

Now, if that is the decision that's made by the Legislature, we may have to have some type of further proceeding to further define and refine the actual process that's going to take place. I can't at this point envision all that may be involved in that. A great deal of that may depend on actually the way the legislation is written and adopted.

But I think that in our order we can require that information to preserve so if that were the decision of the Legislature, to go ahead and have that implemented. I think we can have language in the order doing that.

I also think it's important to have language in our order describing all of the different, various scenarios that we considered if there were to be a refund and surcharges, and that that, all of the complexities and the inherent inequities within each one of those options, is one of the reasons we factored in in coming to our ultimate decision that the most equitable solution -- not saying that it is pure 100% equitable to every individual customer -- that the most equitable solution is

order.

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**COMMISSIONER CLARK:** Thank you. I understand it now.

MS. JABER: Commissioners, may I ask a question in the event this is moved?

Your motion is no refund/no surcharge, but you want the utility to maintain all of the records in the event the Legislature does do something in the interim while there's an appeal pending?

is no surcharge, which under the 1st DCA means there can be no refund, okay; unless there is another source, that the source of the refund cannot be -- under our interpretation of equity, which the court may overturn -- but under our interpretation of equity that the source of the refund cannot be surcharges on these customers.

A lot of the reasons which I've tried to describe are reasons contained in your own recommendation and some things, I think, that distinguish this case from GTE.

MS. JABER: And I need to ask you about that, too. I understand the impossibility of implementing some sort of mechanism that's feasible.

We all recognize that. That's not a problem. I think

I can write an order that says you reject the legal analysis of the no refund part, and you're moving no 2 surcharge because of the new inequities that arise. 3 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Absolutely. MS. JABER: As Staff counsel, I need to 5 caution you against trying to find a distinguishing 6 factor between GTE and this case again. I think that 7 that part of the opinion is very clear. I think that 8 they are saying GTE is applicable. So in writing the 9 order, I know I would have difficulty writing that order. 11 COMMISSIONER DEASON: It's applicable, but 12 only to the extent that the company has to be made 13 whole from customers. It doesn't say a word about customer to customer inequities or a way to try to 15 eliminate --16 MS. JABER: But actually it does. 17 18 **COMMISSIONER DEASON: --** to rectify that. 19 MS. JABER: Actually it does. It --20 COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Ms. Davis maybe could help us with formulating that, because I believe that 21 Noreen, I think, agreed with the position of no refund/no surcharge, and so maybe she could lend --23 COMMISSIONER CLARK: While she's coming up, 24

Lila, would you say what it is that you have concern

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with?

MS. JABER: It's just that the Southern States opinion in talking about GTE does recognize that you have three interests. They've been there. They've done that. They've said, yeah, we know that in GTE it was the customers versus the utility, so to speak.

But in Southern States you've got three groups, and you've got to keep the interests of all three groups in mind, and where you erred was that you only took the interests of the refund people into account and, of course, the surcharge people because you didn't order a surcharge.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: You can't say "and of course the surcharge people."

MS. JABER: Well, the potential --

commissioner CLARK: Because they told us to hold a hearing and consider the potential refund charges, and I think what Commissioner Deason is saying is that while GTE considered it between two parties, you recognized yourself, court, that there were three parties, and now we have looked at the equities from a surcharge standpoint. I think that's what he's saying --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: We've done exactly

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what the court told us to do. We have listened to those persons that we have given intervention status to, and they have informed us about what they consider to be the inequities of a surcharge. And I think that's exactly what the court decision wanted us to do.

See, I'm not -- but I'm not at the point of interpreting that that says there must be refunds and surcharges and the only question is what mechanism we put in place.

MS. JABER: And, again, I go back to say I can understand that. That's not what I'm cautioning you to be careful about. I'm cautioning you to be careful about looking for a distinction between the two cases that might not be there.

This is Lila two years ago saying SSU didn't assume the risk. That's not a distinct -- a distinguishing factor. I'm doing it again. I'm saying, be careful in looking for a distinguishing factor that may not be there.

I think that the Southern States decision is very clear in that regard. They've taken every factor in your order for saying no surcharge previously, and they've said it didn't work, it didn't work, it didn't work. SSU didn't assume the risk. The notice wasn't

a problem. The lack of representation was a problem.

I can write an order that says "We the Commission as a body can't implement any sort of surcharge mechanism because it's practically impossible."

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Do you disagree that the GTE decision was not a usage based surcharge and what is contemplated here is a usaged based surcharge, and you think that is not a distinction --

MS. JABER: No, but here's --

commissioner deason: -- has any
importance --

was an order -- was an opinion that recognized that the clear -- that the Commission issued an order that was clearly erroneous; the same thing with this case. What the court has said is this was a clearly erroneous order. GTE is applicable in that regard. They don't get to the facts and the circumstances of the case. It's more -- it's broad.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: But, Lila, I think you're talking past each other, because what Commissioner Deason is saying is you sent it back to us and said we need to consider the equities between the three parties, and they also said to us, you

better hear from potential surcharges. Why would we
hear from them if it wasn't an option to say if it's
inequitable to the -- either refund?

MS. JABER: What if they just wanted you to hear from them to determine what the mechanism should be or what the period of time should be, or whether there were other --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, I agree with you, Lila, that that may be, in fact, what they said, but for you to conclude right now that it isn't one of the -- they specifically precluded that, I'm not sure they have.

should be part of the rationale that it can't be done.

I mean -- and obviously you said you have no problem in stating that part of it; and I think that's part of the reason that it should be included, because -- Commissioner, you're an accountant. You probably know that there's only a certain way you can do things, and I just don't see that we can do this, and that's, I think, something that has to be included in this Commission's order so that the court understands -- and I'm not saying it didn't when it made this decision -- but so that the court understands the complexities involved here and the impossibility of

what we were trying to do.

commissioner deason: To me, there's a distinction between a one-time surcharge on every customer not based upon any type of consumption level or any choice that the customer had, other than they were just signed up as a customer, they had to pay it.

To me, here was a very different situation, and, again, along with the fact that there's a huge difference in the amount of the refund, or surcharge rather, the fact that that surcharge as it is proposed would be based upon consumption that took place years ago, and to me it is fundamentally unfair; and it goes backs to the whole equity concept of what is in GTE.

It said, "Commission, you've got to do what's fair and equitable," and, in GTE, said it wasn't fair to GTE not to have their revenue requirements met.

And we've tried to devise a way to try to do it the most fair way that we could, and that's what we did. I think we're under the same obligation here, and I think that we have an obligation to weigh what did we think is most equitable, and I'm coming down on the side that there is no 100% equitable treatment for everybody involved.

What is the -- to coin a new phrase, what is

the least inequitable? And to me the least inequitable is to have no surcharges, and if that means no refunds, so be it; even though I think that's still inequitable.

MS. DAVIS: Commissioner, I think you've nailed the issue right on the head. It seems to me that we're not necessarily -- if you do decide to go the no surcharge route, you're not necessarily distinguishing GTE. You've applied GTE in your analysis in that you have now looked at the interests of all three of the players; the utility, the two customer groups. And in applying the equity concept enunciated in the GTE decision, you've come to the conclusion that the only equity is to not make the situation even worse by surcharging, because that would have an iniquitous result by trying to do the formula kind of equity that GTE seems to say.

strategy to try to further distinguish GTE, I'll remove that from my motion, because I think it's still -- my motion is valid, I think, for the reasons I've stated; that it is my interpretation of what I consider to be equity is. And I think GTE stands for the proposition that we have to infuse equity in our decisions.

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## MS. DAVIS: Yes.

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COMMISSIONER DEASON: And that we do have some discretion, and I don't think that the 1st DCA opinions mandated refunds and rebates -- I mean, sorry -- and surcharges.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: Mr. Deason, could I offer just one thought on the discussion?

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Hold on. Hold --

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Hold on --

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: -- on. There's a motion and a second. Did the Commissioners -- do you have any more --

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: I just wanted -- I want our rationale to include what you discussed earlier, Lila, which is the impossibility -- and I hope that the Commissioner isn't precluding that with his distinction of GTE.

I just think that we have to go beyond that so that when we make the -- I'm sorry -- so that when this order comes out, we address this, because I think it is central, at least to my thinking.

We've been asked to do something that cannot be done. We tried to do it. That's why we heard from the customers, and we can't do it. And I think that's also got to be part of the rationale that we use in

1	arriving at this decision.
2	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Did you have a question,
3	commissioner Clark?
4	COMMISSIONER CLARK: No, I have no more
5	questions.
6	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, if I can indulge
7	the Commission for a moment, I'd like to hear from
8	Mr. McGlothlin. I thought he had a comment in
9	relation to the motion, and I would like to hear that.
10	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Mr. McGlothlin?
11	MR. McGLOTHLIN: It's very brief.
12	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: One of the attorneys is
13	getting ready to respond to Commissioner Deason.
14	(Audience comments.)
15	Mr. McGlothlin, if you could continue.
16	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Briefly.
17	MR. McGLOTHLIN: It will be very brief. On
18	the subject of the applicability or distinction
19	distinguishing of the
20	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Speak loudly.
21	MR. McGLOTHLIN: As to the GTE case, one
22	observation is that in that case a surcharge was
23	necessary in order to make the utility whole because
24	the utility had been disallowed the collection
25	expenses. That's not true here, but in addition to $76^{\circ}$

that, there's this language in the opinion.

"Finally we address the structure of the current surcharge. The PSC has acknowledged it has the ability to closely tailor the implementation of refunds and to accurately monitor refund payments to ensure that the recipients of such refunds truly are those who were overcharged. While no procedure can perfectly account for the transient nature of utility customers, we envision that the surcharge in this case can be administered with the same standard of care afforded to refunds," et cetera.

So it appears to me that the GTE court viewed the implementation of a refund and surcharge, or that type of a step, as manageable with a certain degree of precision. And I think what you Commissioners have discussed today is the very different circumstances you have here.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. There's a motion and a second. The Commissioners don't have any other questions and we've heard from all the attorneys. Any further discussion? (Audience comments.)

COMMISSIONER DEASON: The motion is no refunds/no surcharges, and the only way there could be a refund, if there's a source of funding that refund other than surcharging customers. (Applause)

1 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: There's a motion and a 2 second. Any further discussion? Seeing none, all 3 those in favor signify by saying aye. Opposed? (Audience comments.) 4 5 The motion passes on a three to two vote. 6 (Applause and audience comments.) 7 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Madame Chair, the only -- I guess it's not -- (Audience comments.) 8 9 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: We'll go off the record 10 and let them leave. 11 COMMISSIONER CLARK: I just wanted to 12 indicate that I voted in favor of it. I would go one 13 step further --14 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Susan, wait. Let's wait. 15 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay. 16 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: We're going to go off the record until the room settles down. If you'd like to 17 sit and hear the rest of our proceeding, that's fine. 18 I 19 If not, if you could as quickly as possible exit the 20 room, that would be helpful. (Pause) 21 We'll go back on the record. Commissioner Clark? 22 23 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Madam Chair, I voted for the motion. The only thing I would have done was

also have said, you know, if the court tells us we

have to do it, I would have gone ahead and had the hearing and gotten a method to do that, because I'm 2 just concerned about it coming back to us when we 3 think we've done the right thing. But there seemed to be no sentiment for that, and --5 COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Madame --6 COMMISSIONER CLARK: -- that's -- and I am 7 supportive of what was moved. 8 COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Commissioner --9 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: We need to vote again, 10 because she couldn't even record the vote and then we 11 can go through the explanations of the vote. 12 She recorded the motion. So I can go back 13 to all those in favor -- she recorded the motion and 14 the second. 15 All those in favor, signify by saying aye. 16 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Aye. 17 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Aye. 18 COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Aye. 19 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Opposed, nay. 20 COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Nay. 21 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Nay. The vote passes on 22 23 a three to two vote. COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Let me just say, 24 Commissioner Clark, while I thought your idea had 25 7647

merit, I just don't know how you give the court a suggestion in case you overturn us, and God knows what 2 3 they're going to have in that decision. We've been surprised several times throughout this proceeding in 4 5 how they interpreted what we had done before. 6 But let me ask Staff. Issue 4 doesn't have 7 to be addressed now? 8 MS. JABER: No. 9 COMMISSIONER CLARK: But Issue 5 does. COMMISSIONER GARCIA: But Issue 5 does. 10 MS. JABER: Right. 11 COMMISSIONER GARCIA: And in Issue 5 are we 12 going to listen to the parties, or can we just move 13 it? 14 15 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: We can move, I think. Wait. Let me make sure I know what it is. Oh. 16 17 this --18 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Spring Hill. CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: This is Spring Hill 19 issue. We did say we would give the parties five 20 I minutes to address it. 21 22 MS. JABER: Commissioners, I believe that 23 II OPC has already addressed it. 24 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: They've waived.

Fine. Do you have any additional comments, or it's

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been waived?

MR. ARMSTRONG: Madame Chair, we do have some additional comments regarding this issue. As I indicated in my prior comments -- and I won't re-address it -- but the facts and circumstances that existed put Southern States in a -- or Florida Water in a quandary as to whether or not we can go ahead and modify an automatic stay which applied as a result of the Keystone Heights appeal.

And since we had been in the position at that time and had an order of this Commission before the court of appeals that said "You moved to modify an automatic stay, therefore, we're holding you accountable for the ramifications of that," we couldn't do anything, because we knew, as I said before, if we had appealed the Commission's determination to change the rate structure of -- to a modified stand-alone rate; if we had vacated that had automatic stay, come in and said put in the modified stand-alone rates, and then found that the court of appeals affirmed and upheld our appeal, then what would happen?

**COMMISSIONER KIESLING:** Could I ask you a question to help me clarify these arguments?

MR. ARMSTRONG: Sure.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: And my question is really a very simple one. We know what revenue requirement you are entitled to collect, and we know now what you collected from while the uniform rates were in effect and while the modified rates were in effect. Did you collect from the Spring Hill customers more than was -- than should have been -more than the modified stand-alone rates during that time period that we're talking about from January to June? MR. ARMSTRONG: During that period of time the company collected more under -- because the uniform rates remained in effect and we had no other alternative structure to go to. COMMISSIONER KIESLING: I don't need to hear your arguments. All I want to know is follow the dollars. MR. ARMSTRONG: We collected more than we would have collected under the modified stand-alone rate structure.

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COMMISSIONER KIESLING: So you collected more than what we had designed as it related to your revenue requirement?

MR. ARMSTRONG: No. And that's the crux of

the matter; that this Commission never did design modified stand-alone rates for Spring Hill, because where you designed the modified stand-alone rates was in January of 1996 in another docket for those other facilities. It wasn't until August of 1996 that you designed anything that had to do with Spring Hill.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Yes. And at that time didn't we say you need to reduce the rates?

we needed to reduce the rates. At that time the issue was pending before the court of appeals as to whether or not we will be held accountable if you move to vacate a stay that applied when Keystone Heights appealed the decision.

commissioner clark: Well, I guess what it boils down to me what was -- we had adjusted the revenue coming in for the other systems to the stand-alone, so you recovered your rates.

I felt like you should have on your own adjusted the Spring Hill rates. And I know that you also entered into an agreement on rates with them, and it seems to me at that time you should have addressed the issue; and I feel like the refund is due.

MR. ARMSTRONG: And in answer to that, there's no evidence before this Commission that we

were overearning at any time during the period of time these rates were in effect.

commissioner CLARE: Yes. But then we would have a whole new rate case to see what you were doing otherwise to not overearn. What you're saying to me, Mr. Armstrong, is the only reason you didn't overearn is the rate structure.

MR. ARMSTRONG: What I'm saying is we did not overearn, period. And I think before -- if you're going to say no refunds and no surcharges regarding the other issue, I don't see how it's even possible to suggest that now the company can be held accountable for what happened in another docket, irrespective of this docket, what happened in another docket when rates changed there.

Now we get held accountable even though we were not overearning at any point in time. I don't think that's the fairness that we're talking about. What the Staff recommendation says is use the cudgel of not — these aren't guaranteed rates of return; these are just allowed rates of return.

The company was not overearning during that period of time, and yet we are told "You should have reduced rates to underearn, and by the way, you only could have reduced those rates if you modified a stay,

and by the way, we just nailed you and extracted retribution against you for modifying a stay before; so should you be successful on your appeal, don't come and ask us to give you back that uniform rate and give you those -- when people come and claim, why did you switch me from modified stand-alone rates to something else, don't come back and talk to me about it."

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Let me ask the question this way: Did we address all the other rates to the necessary stand-alone rates for your revenue requirement?

MR. ARMSTRONG: In another docket in the 1995 rate case --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Don't tell me about dockets. Did we do that?

based on other facts and circumstances, based on an docket where you first said bring in Spring Hill, then you said let them out, which wasted a lot of time and money and effort, and denied us a rate relief for another period of time based on the Hernando County board having taken back jurisdiction, the Hernando County Board now having come in and spoken with us and we reached a settlement, and no counsel at this table participated in that settlement other than I and the

Hernando County Board, and we reached a settlement where we agreed that we would take \$1.6 million less than our cost of service through the year 2,000.

And we all acknowledged this was a give-back because the -- Spring Hill had paid higher rates. And we said, and specifically in that agreement, "Let's let the Commission decide the refund issue." But there we knew if there was going to be a determination of refunds for this company, we're going to appeal that, and it's going to go on for three years.

And I would like to caution as well, if
we're going to have the legislative solution based on
the ex post facto prohibitions, if you make a
determination of refunds in this case, the ex post
facto prohibition probably would say that the
Legislature can't take care of that situation. So,
Spring Hill won't get the refunds, because we'll
appeal and we'll be successful there as well.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Well, I'm willing to test that.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Public Counsel?

MR. SHREVE: Thank you, Madame Chairman.

I'll be very brief. I think all of you know what the situation is here. You ordered -- after the court made their finding, you ordered modified stand-alone

rates for the company across the board while Spring
Hill was still in. Spring Hill did not implement
those rates, so Spring Hill's rates were not lowered
at that point.

Then you granted, at their request, an interim rate increase which was calculated without Spring Hill. So the company was made whole at that time. To make the company totally whole with Spring Hill, all you really would have had to give them is stand-alone rates.

The modified stand-alone rate is still a little bit higher, but that's the order that was out there. They're getting a windfall of that amount of money anyway.

As far as their legislative decision, here we're talking about not a situation where you had one group of customers subsidizing another group of customers. So it's totally different. If GTE stands for anything as far as the company being able to make a surcharge against a customer, surely it also means that equity applies to the customers and not just to the company.

Thank you.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Brief rebuttal, Madam Chair?
MR. TWONEY: Let me go first, please, Madame

Chair. I represent Spring Hill Civic Association.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Is your mike on?

MR. TWOMEY: Yes, it is.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: I'm sorry.

MR. TWOMEY: I represent Spring Hill Civic Association, and Mr. Morrey Miller and Senator Ginny Brown-Waite who, if I didn't mention it earlier, is ill today and couldn't be here.

As Mr. Shreve said, this is pretty clear-cut, or it should be pretty clear-cut. After the uniform rates were found unlawful and reversed, you went ahead and waited for the rest of the systems, and you changed over by adopting modified stand-alone rates, as I recall, in the interim rates in the new rate case. You ordered at that time that all the uniform rates would be eliminated.

Hernando County had taken back jurisdiction from the Commission, and SSU did not lower the rates from the uniform rates. They were still charging the uniform rates which contained massive subsidies.

Because the rest of the systems at your direction and order had gone to modified stand-alone rates, which eliminated the vast majority of the subsidies amongst the customer groups, the difference was no longer; that is the massive subsidy inherent in

the Spring Hill uniform rate which is still being charged didn't go anyplace else.

It couldn't go anyplace else, because that system was now on a stand-alone basis truly in the sense that it was regulated by Hernando County and not this Commission.

it. That's my term. I like it. They took the difference and they pocketed it for the benefit of their shareholders until -- and they slipped through the crack; and until you all came along later and said, hey, wait a minute -- Mr. Shreve brought it to your attention and said, "There's been a mistake here, fix this," and you all do.

**COMMISSIONER CLARK:** You agree with Staff's recommendation on this one?

MR. TWOMEY: Yes, I do; I do, indeed. And I'll be brief. And now they come along and what they're suggesting to you is they start -- they say, let's look at earnings, okay. And that's totally disingenuous. You don't look at earnings of anything. What you look at is, is what the difference between what the unlawful uniform rate was and what the modified stand-alone rate was, which is still too much, as Mr. Shreve pointed out. But you look at the

difference and you make them give that back.

And the last failing they had when they were arguing about earnings is, if I understand it correctly, is they want you to drag in -- they want you to look at earnings on a company-wide basis, and they want to drag in systems beyond your jurisdiction that are included in Hillsborough County and other places so they can say whatever the failings are -- regulation in there, the operation of our systems -- overall we weren't earning our return; therefore we should keep it.

So I would urge you to adopt your Staff recommendation and make them -- make the refunds.

Thank you.

MR. ARMSTRONG: The brief rebuttal is, there is absolutely no windfall to the company. The rate filing we made with the Hernando County Board indicated a revenue requirement of \$7.9 million. We agreed to \$6.3 revenue requirement on the basis that the Spring Hill customers had paid more under uniform rate for a period of time. So that the continuous allegations of windfalls to the company are totally inaccurate.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. Commissioners, any

1	questions? Is there a motion?
2	COMMISSIONER CLARK: I move Staff.
3	COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Second.
4	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: There's a motion and a
5	second. Any further discussion?
6	Seeing none, all those in favor signify by
7	say aye.
8	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Aye.
9	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Aye.
10	COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Aye.
11	COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Aye.
12	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Aye. Opposed? Show it
13	approved unanimously.
14	MS. JABER: Commissioners, in Issue 6 I need
15	to modify the recommendation now. It should read that
16	the docket should be closed upon expiration of the
17	appeal time. I do want to clarify also that we will
18	be doing an order during the normal course of the 20
19	days.
20	COMMISSIONER KIESLING: I'm probably going
21	to write a dissent, and so I'll need to coordinate
22	that with you.
23	MS. JABER: No problem.
24	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Twomey, you had one
25	question?

MR. TWOMEY: Yes, ma'am. I don't mean to belabor this, Madame Chairman, but, I mean, you voted and everything. I don't understand the -- which -- what the impossibility is, and I don't know if your Staff attorneys understand, but if it's at all possible, I would request that you specifically, or more specifically, state what the impossibility is that you find in carrying out any refunds and surcharges that led you to decide that you can't do this.

I mean, I don't know if it's a mechanical impossibility, accounting impossibility, the impossibility to do equity both ways. I mean, there's a difference. And rather than just let your Staff wander about trying to -- maybe they understand it better than I do, but I would ask you to state what is the impossibility. Is it equity impossibility, ease of administration of the refunds, or what is it?

impossibility is 100% equity to every customer involved. That, to me, is the impossibility. Now it's highlighted by a lot of the other practical considerations which were considered in the issue which we did not vote on, but Staff has a very, under your own words, a very excellent recommendation under

your own words concerning that. That's what my concern is.

I think there's no way to be 100% equitable to every customer. That's where the impossibility lies. Now, the people that voted with that motion may have further amplification. I don't know. But that's the basis of the motion.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Are there any further issues?

MR. ARMSTRONG: Madame Chair and

Commissioners, I hate to be the last one with notice,
but Mr. Pino introduced the documents regarding the --

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Inaudible comment.)

MR. ARMSTRONG: I just -- clarification just for the record. I believe -- and I don't have the exact numbers -- but I know that the assets of -- the water assets of MP, possibly about 14%. As he mentioned, five cents per share was the earning. The total earnings for Minnesota Power that year was in the neighborhood of \$2.30.

The electric assets constitute about 44%, I believe you indicated. The total earnings per share coming from electric was somewhere in the neighbor of \$1.30. So it's a \$1.30 for 40%. 16% came up with five cents a share.

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CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you for the clarification.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Thank you.

favor and not let him be last, and just would offer to you that as you're writing up this final order, I hope that -- see, I'm quite concerned you've now closed the door for the legislative solution and that we're going to go to court and be back here without a solution through the Legislature, and that's what I'm about here today.

And I would just suggest to you that
whenever you write up this order, if you do make some
remarks, that there perhaps is a solution with the
Legislature to do equity to both sides. And you might
amplify that a bit more in obiter dictum, or however
you call it up here, in writing that order, because
I'm concerned that now we won't see any legislation to
try to get the rebate folks taken care of.

So as you write that, if you would kind of give that some eye, I'd appreciate it.

chairman johnson: I think that that was encompassed in the motion. The Commissioner did state that to the extent that that's where the refund could be found, then that that would be wonderful. So we'll

make sure that Staff considers that.

And, Mr. Jacobs, I share your concern, and that was one of the reasons why I voted -- and I didn't speak earlier because the audience was pretty rowdy, but that's one of the reasons why I voted against it.

And the other was the issue of whether or not we could, indeed, do refunds and surcharge; and to me it wasn't necessarily clear in our record. There were issues raised, but it wasn't definitive as to the impossibility of doing that.

MR. JACOBS: All right. Thank you very much.

ahead. You're right, they were a little rowdy, and we didn't have a chance to -- I'm quite willing to explain why I voted the way I did, and I will amplify on that.

I believe that the refund and a surcharge is the appropriate outcome, and I think that the equitable problems would be best addressed in the mechanisms that we use to implement these things in order to reduce, to the maximum extent possible, the inequities that could result.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: I think we were in the

	same place, then. Certainly Stall had raised several
2	concerns, but that went to implementation.
3	COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Let me just ask. I'm
4	sorry. I wanted just to understand. You believe that
5	we should have gone and had a hearing so that
6	COMMISSIONER KIESLING: No. I believe we
7	should have ordered refunds and surcharges today and
8	not done a hearing. We never got to the issue on the
9	hearing or I would have addressed that. But I don't
LO	think that the hearing was necessary. I think that we
11	can fashion the mechanics without the need for a
L <b>2</b>	hearing. Could have.
L3	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: I would have gone for the
4	hearing, but it would end up in the same place.
ا5.	COMMISSIONER GARCIA: I just wanted to
۱6	clarify that for the record.
.7	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: I think with that, we are
.8	adjourned. Oh, I'm sorry.
.9	MS. REYES: Did you take a vote on Issue 6?
0:0	COMMISSIONER KIESLING: I don't think so. I
:1	move it.
2	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Oh. Go ahead. There's a
3	motion. Is there a second?
4	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Second.
5	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Show it approved
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unanimously. Thank you. Any other issues?
              COMMISSIONER KIESLING: No, that's it.
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             CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: We're adjourned.
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              (Thereupon, the hearing concluded at
 4
    7:00 p.m.)
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STATE OF FLORIDA) CERTIFICATE OF REPORTERS 2 COUNTY OF LEON 3 We, JOY KELLY, CSR, RPR, Chief, Bureau of Reporting and H. RUTHE POTAMI, CSR, RPR, Official Commission Reporters, 5 DO HEREBY CERTIFY that the Special Agenda Conference in Docket No. 920199-WS was heard by the 6 Florida Public Service Commission at the time and place herein stated; it is further 7 CERTIFIED that we stenographically reported the said proceedings; that the same has been transcribed under our direct supervision; and that this transcript, consisting of 250 pages, Volumes 1 and 2, constitutes a true transcription of our notes of said proceedings. 11 DATED this 19th December, 1996. 12 13 JOY KELLY, Chief, Bureau of Reporting 14 (904) 443-6732 · 15 Let 8 H. RUTHE POTAMI, CSR, RPR 16 Official Commission Reporter (904) 413-6732 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

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