BEFORE THE 1 FIORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 2 3 : DOCKET NO. 971337-EJ In the Matter of 4 Petition of Duke Energy, L.P., 5 and INC-Agrico Company for a declaratory statement concerning: 6 eligibility to obtain determination of need pursuant 7 To Section 403.519, F.S. 8 : DOCKET NO. 971446-EU In the Matter of 9 10 Petition for declaratory statement by Duke Energy New 11 Smyrna Beach Power Company, L.L.P. concerning eligibility to: obtain determination of need 12 pursuant to Section 403.519, F.S., Rules 25-22.080 and .081, : 13 || Power Plant Siting Act. 14 15 AGENDA CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS: 16 ITEM NO. 5 and 6 17 CHAIRMAN JULIA L. JOHNSON BEFORE: COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON 18 COMMISSIONER SUSAN F. CLARK COMMISSIONER DIANE K. KIESLING 19 COMMISSIONER JOE GARCIA 20 Tuesday, December 16, 1997 DATE: 21 Betty Easley Conference Center PLACE: Rcom 148 22 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 23 DOL MENT NO. REPORTED BY: ROWENA NASH 13185-97 24 Official Commission Reporter (904) 413-6736 12/24/9 25

PARTICIPATING: MARY A. BANE, FPSC Deputy Executive Director/Technical. RICHARD BELLAK, FPSC Division of Appeals. JOSEPH A. McGLOTHLIN, Representing IMC-Agrico Company. ROBERT SCHEFFEL WRIGHT, Representing Duke Energy New Smyrna Beach Power Company, L.L.P. GARY SASSO, Representing Florida Power Corporation. CHARLES A. GUYTON, Representing Florida Power & Light Company. LEE L. WILLIS, Representing Tampa Electric Company. BILL L. BRYAMT, JR., Representing Enron Capital and Trade Corporation.

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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: If everyone could settle
3	down, we're going to go back on the record and begin
4	Item 5. I think we are prepared for Item 5.
5	Staff.
6	MR. BELLAK: Commissioners, Item 5 concerns
7	the petition of Duke Mulberry Energy and IMC-Agrico
8	Company for a declaratory statement concerning their
9	ability to be applicants pursuant to the Power Plant
10	Siting Act. And the Commission the Staff
11	considered various pleadings that have come in since.
12	The recommendation has been filed, and so as
13	a preliminary matter, I wanted to mention them to you,
14	that the Staff is taking the position that the motions
15	to strike and motions to dismiss should be denied,
16	because even though the Staff recommends that
17	intervention not be permitted in this docket and in
18	this item and in the following item, which is kind of
19	a parallel item to this, still those pleadings that
20	have been filed can be used as briefing for the
21	purposes of informing the Commission. So, therefore,
22	we recommend that those motions to strike and motion
23	to dismiss be denied.
24	In general, the Staff is recommending that
25	there not be intervention in this item based on the

1 fact that the standing of those who seek to intervene 2 will more properly be present under the Agrico test. 3 If and when an actual application for determination of 4 need is filed by an applicant, at that time it's felt 5 that the would-be intervenors here would have standing 6 to participate in that process.

So this, then, they cannot show under the 7 Agrico test sufficient immediacy of any injury for 8 them to meet the test for intervention at this point. 9 However, we do recommend that they be permitted to 10 address the Commission. And to the list of those 11 permitted to address the Commission, if the Commission 12 so finds, should be added Mr. Bryant who filed the 13 petition of Enron to participate as amicus after the 14 Staff recommendation was filed. 15

Beyond that, the Staff recommends that the petition for declaratory statement be granted, and if the Commission is willing to listen to the participants, then the staff will respond at that time to any comments that are made.

21 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I have one quick 22 question for Staff, first of all. You've indicated 23 that those that seek intervention don't meet the test 24 and that there's no immediacy of harm, and that would, 25 if there is an application filed by the applicant

1 then, they perhaps could make that showing and could 2 intervene. When during this process do they have an 3 opportunity to litigate or address the questions of 4 whether the applicant is truly an applicant under the 5 statutes and the various decisions by the Commission?

MR. BELLAR: Well, that goes back to the 6 nature of a declaratory statement. What's happened in 7 these petitions -- and this is with full recognition 8 that declaratory statement procedures have an element 9 of artificiality about them -- but these petitioners 10 only are seeking to know if under these facts and 11 circumstances, and based on current law, they are 12 proper applicants. And, in fact, there are parts of 13 their petition which could be read more broadly than 14 that, where they say tell us that we, as a merchant 15 plant, can be an applicant, and those have been 16 totally -- those parts of the petition have been 17 ignored in the recommendation. There's no 18 recommendation that the Commission grant any kind of 19 statement that is that broad, because that would be 20 the kind of declaratory statement that would be 21 improper under the cases. 22

But instead, the recommendation is simply to address whether they, in the particular facts and circumstances that they allege under the current

1 status of the law are, in fact, applicants.

COMMISSIONER CLARE: Mr. Bellak -COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I guess my
question is even if it's just a question of law, is
today when we are going to get the argument as to
whether, under the law, they do meet the definition of
an applicant?

8 MR. BELLAK: Well, there's -- under the 9 declaratory statement, they normally would not have an 10 opportunity to address you on that. The reason that 11 we are recommending participation is because of the 12 complexity and importance of the issue. But it 13 doesn't change their status from an intervention 14 standpoint.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Commissioner Deason, 15 maybe I can help this process a little bit. I was 16 struck by the fact that these two declaratory 17 statements ask the same thing. Don't they? If we are 18 an EWG under the Federal Power Act, are we entitled to 19 be an applicant. There's no particular set of 20 circumstances that are unique. It is going to be a 21 statement of general applicability, and for that 22 reason it should be done through rulemaking. 23 And in my view, it is entirely inappropriate 24

25 to issue these declaratory statements. And that if

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1	the companies want to come in and ask that we adopt a
2	rule that says, "If you are a regulated utility under
3	the Federal Power Act, you are entitled to be an
4	applicant," then we get everybody in and we make the
5	decision. And it affords them the opportunity that if
6	we're wrong, they can take it over to DOAH and get it
7	declared invalid. That's my view.
8	COMMISSIONER DEASON: What's wrong with that
9	view?
10	MR. BELLAK: Well, I think they still have a
11	right to find out if I think they do not have a
12	right to find out if any EWG is an applicant, although
13	they could certainly derive that implication from how
14	we handle their petition.
15	COMMISSIONER CLARK: But I guess, Richard
16	MR. BELLAK: But that's the problem with the
17	declaratory statement.
18	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Richard, what I'm
19	saying is even between the two, they don't suggest any
20	unique circumstances. All they are saying is we
21	qualify as the regulated utility because we are
22	regulated by FERC under the Federal Power Act. To me,
23	all they are asking for is a general statement of
24	applicability, and that being under the definition of
25	regulated utility, are EWGs entitled to be applicants.
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1 And to me, that's rulemaking.

2	MR. BELLAK: Well, if they did ask that and
3	we responded to it, it would be an improper
4	declaratory statement. But keep in mind the Monsanto
5	motto. Monsanto wanted to know if under the facts and
6	circumstances lease financing would cause a retail
7	sale. It's easy to broaden that out and say that
8	that's an improper petition for a declaratory
9	statement. Because anyone who wants to engage in
10	lease financing will now have a rule that says you can
11	do a lease financing arrangement, and you will not be
12	regulated by the Florida Public Service Commission.
13	But that's not what they asked, and that's
14	no what we granted. So it comes down to a formality,
15	and it's artificial. It comes down to the formalism,
16	whether you're looking at the Monsanto case or the
17	Seminole case. There's nothing particularly unique
18	about Monsanto. All Monsanto says was we want a lease
19	finance in order to do self-generation.
20	COMMISSIONER CLARE: Yes. But, Richard,
21	they said here's the deal, we want a structure, it's
22	between these two parties, here's how it's going
23	forward. And the guestion was asked is it
24	self-generation. Here what they're saying is if we
25	are an EWG under the Federal Power Act, are we also a

regulated --1 MR. BELLAK: Electric company. 2 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Yeah. 3 -- such that we are entitled to be an 4 applicant. To me, there's nothing unique about what 5 they've asked for, therefore, they are not entitled to 6 a declaratory statement, but they are entitled to find 7 out. And they are entitled to find out through a 8 request for rulemaking. 9 MR. BELLAK: Right. Well, I'm not sure that 10 I perceive the difference, but I understand what your 11 saying. 12 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, there is a 13 difference in how you have to fight --14 MR. BELLAK: In other words the 15 declaratory --16 COMMISSIONER CLARK: If there is a 17 difference in standing to intervene. 18 MR. BELLAE: Correct. Well, the declaratory 19 statement petition statute, as I understand it, does 20 not say anything about unique circumstances. All it 21 says is, "Any substantially effected person may seek a 22 declaratory statement regarding an agency's opinion as 23 to the applicability of a statutory petition, or of 24 any rule or orders of the agency as it applies to a 25

petitioner's particular set of circumstances." 1 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, I guess 2 "particular" is in there, and it also seems to me if 3 it isn't unique, then it's general. And if it's a 4 statement of general applicability, then it ought to 5 be a rule. 6 MR. BELLAK: Well, the Staff is not 7 recommending that you issue any statement of general 8 applicability. All the Staff is recommending is that 9 you consider for a grant a statement as to the -- how 10 these statutes apply to this petitioner's particular 11 set of circumstances. 12 COMMISSIONER CLARK: But I guess what I'm 13 saying is their circumstances aren't particular, they 14 are general. 15 MR. BELLAK: Well, as far as the legal 16 analysis of any -- I hate to use the word 17 "particular," but as far as the legal analysis of any 18 petitioner, the legal analysis may include aspects 19 that are generic. The EWG is generic. The lease 20 financing arrangement in Monsanto is generic. But all 21 the statement declares is the application of the law 22 to the particular set of circumstances of the 23 petitioner. But I certainly could see where you would 24 have a different view of that. 25

1	COMMISSIONER CLARE: Well, I guess it gets
2	down to the fact that there aren't always bright
3	lines. And it just seems to me that in this case it
4	is, in fact, more appropriate for rulemaking. And I
5	think it is inappropriate to go the declaratory
6	statement route in these two instances.
7	COMMISSIONER RIESLING: Well, let me ask one
8	other thing, I mean, I concur with you that it is
9	inappropriate for a declaratory statement, but why
10	can't they also resolve this question by filing an
11	application for a determination of need, hear whatever
12	motions we get
13	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Right.
14	COMMISSIONER KIESLING: and if we decide
15	that or if this Commission decides that, you know,
16	they are not an applicant, then you dismiss their
17	petition. If they are an applicant, then it goes
16	forward that way. I mean, that's another avenue.
19	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Didn't we follow that
20	procedure a few years back, and it was denied? Isn't
21	that one of these cases that has been cited before?
22	COMMISSIONER CLARE: Yes, Commissioner.
23	COMMISSIONER MIESLING: Okay.
24	COMMISSIONER CLARE: I don't know why they
25	didn't want to answer that.
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COMMISSIONER DEASON: It seems like I 1 vaguely recall that case. 2 COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Well, I think it's 3 the case that one of the parties handed out. 4 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Is that what this is? 5 COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Well, I don't know 6 what that is. This is what I've got. It was the Ark 7 Energy --8 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Any other questions, 9 Commissioners? Should we proceed then with --10 COMMISSIONER CLARE: I don't think it is, 11 because --12 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Do you want to address 13 this, Susan? 14 COMMISSIONER CLARK: No, that's fine. 15 I guess the reason I sort of made that No. 16 statement to begin with was to perhaps shorten this, 17 but you may want to hear from parties. 18 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, my concern is 19 similar to the concern in the previous item, is that I 20 think this is a very significant issue. I want to 21 hear from everyone, get input, try to make an 22 informed, reasoned decision. I'm not comfortable that 23 a declaratory statement is the way to do that. 24 What I'm hearing my Staff tell me is that, 25

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1	well, we are willing to declare they're applicants,
2	and then when they file an application, then people's
3	substantial interest are affected and they can
4	intervene. But we've already jumped the hurdle.
5	We've already declared them an applicant, and they
6	haven't had an opportunity to tell us whether they
7	legitimately are or are not an applicant. And that
8	concerns me. And I want to have that input.
9	CONNISSIONER CLARE: And I guess I would
10	like to have it settled once and for all in the sense
11	that we go to rulemaking. And it's not a continuation
12	of motions in individual proceedings. I don't see
13	what's going to be different. And I know the
14	legislature is interested in this, in terms of they're
15	interested in the policy implications of it, when you
16	do policy through rulemaking.
17	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Perhaps we can I
18	mean, I would appreciate some input. But perhaps we
19	can limit the discussion to just where we are
20	procedurally and not get in, perhaps, into all of the
21	nitty-gritty of whether they are or are not an
22	applicant at this point. Just to discuss whether this
23	is the appropriate vehicle and who has a right to
24	participate and how they participate. And maybe if we
25	limit it to that, we can at least get over that
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hurdle, and we will know whether we need to devote 1 more time today --2 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: I would agree. 3 COMMISSIONER DEASON: -- to some of the more 4 substantive issues. 5 COMMISSIONER CLARK: That sounds good. б CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: That's how we'll -- oh, 7 I'm sorry, Commissioner Kiesling. 8 COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Are we going to hear 9 argument once on Item 5 and once again on Item 6, or 10 are we rolling them in together? 11 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, they are so 12 similar ---13 COMMISSIONER RIESLING: I think we should 14 roll them in together. 15 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Roll them in. 16 COMMISSIONER RIESLING: Roll them in as one 17 to be --18 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Where should we start? 19 We are going to take argument from the 20 parties. Do we start -- where should we start, 21 Mr. Bellak? Should we start --22 MR. McGLOTHLIN: Chairman Johnson, if 23 there's going to be a discussion on the pending 24 petitions to intervene, I think the petitioners should 25

go first, and we should be allowed to respond. If 1 there's going to be discussion beyond that point as to 2 the -- whether IMC and Duke Mulberry are entitled to 3 go through the declaratory statement, then I think we 4 should go first. 5 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Personally, I would 6 rather address the second question, whether this, the 7 declaratory statement, is the appropriate vehicle that 8 we need to proceed. So whosver is seeking declaratory 9 statement, I think probably needs to go first, and 10 let's address that question. 11 NR. McGLOTHLIN: I'm Joe McGlothlin. I'm 12

12 here on behalf of IMCA, and I'll share the time with 14 Schef Wright who's representing Duke Mulberry.

15 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Hold on one second. Did 16 you want to limit the time?

17 COMMISSIONER DEASON: That's to you're 18 discretion.

19 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Yeah, we're going to 20 limit the time. Each side, or each party, let's try 21 to do it in five minutes. You may get a lot of 22 questions, but --

23 MR. McGLOTHLIN: Am I to share five minutes,
 24 or - 25 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: No, five minutes. Speak.

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1	MR. MCGLOTHLIN: All right. If I could just
2	try to respond to the questions and the comments that
3	have been put forth so far. Commissioner Clark, the
4	reason why the declaratory statement is appropriate is
5	that, even though as you and Mr. Bellak discussed, the
6	EWG aspect of the proceeding is not unique. The
7	particular proposal is a particular plant to be built
8	by a particular development and a particular business
9	structure by two particular entities.
10	COMMISSIONER CLARK: But how does that
11	affect their status as an applicant?
12	NR. MoGLOTHLIN: As an applicant?
13	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Right.
14	MR. McGLOTHLIN: It means that we can
15	describe a specific fact situation and ask the
16	Commission to apply the law to it. And the
17	declaratory statement statute and your rule
18	contemplates exactly that.
19	And there was some discussion in the prior
20	item, docket, about the fact that once that's done
21	there is some precedential effect in that one would
22	expect that if somebody else has the identical
23	situation and you have the same law applied to it, you
24	can expect some similar results. But that doesn't
25	detract from the fact that as entities who come to you
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1 with a particular fact proposal and ask you how the 2 law applies to them, we are entitled to a statement if 3 we can satisfy the other aspects of the statute and 4 the rule.

Now, in this case, we have -- I think it's 5 worth noting and without getting too far into the 6 merits of it, that we have identified some aspects of 7 our proposal that are different than things that 8 you've seen before. And at some point along the way 9 that the first QF who applied for a determination of 10 need was the first of its kind. But, as I recall, the 11 Commission didn't say, woops, that has never been done 12 before, we need a rule; instead you acted on what was 13 pending before you. 14

Now, someone pointed out that it's available 15 to us to go ahead and file the complete application. 16 I don't deny that's the case, but think about what's 17 involved in an application for determination of need. 18 It's a time consuming process. It requires a lot of 19 resources. And I think it is legitimate for us to put 20 to you the legal question of whether under our 21 situation we are entitled, under the law, to be an 22 23 applicant.

We've also pointed out in our petition 25 that -- we've put it to you in the alternative. We've

asked you to rule that we are entitled to ask for a 1 determination of need, but, alternatively, if you 2 think that's not the case, then the alternative should 3 be that no determination of need is required for our Δ. project, because we want to avoid the catch 22 that 5 the utilities want to put us in. And there are some 6 constitutional implications of that that Enron has 7 addressed in a amicus brief. And I will leave the 8 particulars to them. 9

But by and large, we fall within the ambit 10 of the statutes. We have a specific fact situation. 11 We want that. We ask the Commission to apply the law 12 to it and take into account, first of all, that unlike 13 things you've seen before, this project would impose 14 no capital investment, no operation risk on the 15 ratepayers. It is not contingent upon the prior 16 agreement by contract or order of any ratepayers to be 17 responsible for the cost. And it's going to be in the 18 form of an exempt wholesale generator, which under the 19 federal law is a public utility, and so qualifies as a 20 regulated electric company within the meaning of the 21 statute. 22

23 CONMISSIONER CLARK: I guess that's where 24 you lose me. It seems to me the essence of what you 25 are asking is if we are a regulated entity under the

Federal Power Act, are we entitled to be an applicant.
 And that's really the only facts that need to be
 alleged or that you are alleging that qualifies you to
 come under this. And to me, you are asking for a
 statement of general applicability.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: There's more than that. 6 There's the factual aspect of it which is that we are 7 contemplating the possibility of a power plant that 8 exceeds 75 megawatts in terms of steam capacity. So 9 there's more than just the EWG component on it. And 10 so the EWG is certainly part and parcel of it, but the 11 fact that we are asking the Commission to interpret 12 the definition of "applicant" and "electric utility," 13 within the meaning of the Power Plant Siting Act, 14 doesn't detract from the fact that we are legitimately 15 asking for a declaratory statement. That's no 16 different from any other situation in which a 17 petitioner asks the Commission to apply the law to the 18 19 facts. CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Would you say that again? 20 I didn't hear you. 21 MR. McGLOTHLIN: This is no different from 22 any other situation of which a petitioner asks the 23 Commission to apply law to the specific facts 24

25 presented and issue a declaratory statement. The EWG

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1	component is one factual aspect of the totality to
2	which we ask you to apply the definition of
3	"applicant" and "electric utility," as within the
4	meaning of the Power Plant Siting Act.
5	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. Mr you are
6	finished?
7	MR. MoGLOTHLIN: Yes, ma'am.
8	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Wright.
9	MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, Madam Chairman.
10	Robert Scheffel Wright, law firm of Landers and
11	Parsons, appearing on behalf of Duke Mulberry Energy,
12	L.P. and Duke Energy New Smyrna Beach Power Company,
13	L.L.P. Since we are taking both dockets together
14	here, Mr. Ron Vaden, who is the Director of the New
15	Smyrna Beach Utility's Commission, has some
16	correspondence for you that supports the granting of
17	the request of declaratory statement that's he's going
18	to pass out at this time. This will be filed later
19	today in the correspondence section of the docket.
20	COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Mr. Wright, why
21	don't you go on with your argument while he's doing
22	that.
23	MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, Commissioner
24	Kiesling, I'd be delighted to. Regarding the
25	procedural questions, issues that have been raised,
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we're asking you for a determination of our rights and 1 status with respect to the laws that you administer. 2 We have proposed particular plants at particular sites 3 under particular structures. In the IMCA case, our 4 project involves a self-generation joint venture. In 5 the Duke New Smyrna case, it involves an agreement to 6 provide both power pursuant to a participation 7 agreement to the Utility's Commission of New Smyrna 8 Beach. 9

We believe that we are entitled to a 10 declaration as to the applicability of your laws to 11 our facts. We have not asked you for a rule, your 12 order won't be a rule. As Mr. Bellak explained, your 13 order won't say "Every EWG is an applicant under the 14 act." Your order would say, if granted as recommended 15 by the Staff, that Duke Mulberry is a proper applicant 16 and Duke New Smyrna is a proper applicant based on the 17 facts that they allege. 18

Now, you could also do rulemaking if you
want, but I certainly think that our asking for
declaratory statements as to the applicability of
facts, to our applicability of the law, to our
particular facts, and granting those statements is
well within incipient policy -- the scope of incipient
policy development under MacDonald. And I think it's

1	well within your authority to grant the request of
2	declaratory statement. And if you feel the need to go
3	on to rulemaking, you could go on to rulemaking.
4	Regarding the prospect of our filing
5	petitions for our determination of need and then go
6	through a process where others might be allowed to
7	file motions to dismiss, and so on, we could do that.
8	Frankly, the cost of doing that is not insignificant.
9	The cost of preparing the petition/application
10	materials, the testimony, etcetera, is not
11	insignificant, and it is to avoid that cost that we
12	have come to you well, part of it, because we are
13	already working on the permitting, frankly, for both

14 of these.

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But part of the reason for coming to you for 15 a declaratory statement is to avoid incurring that 16 cost if when we get there, you know, a few months down 17 the road, you are going to shut us out on the grounds 18 that we're not proper applicants. And the question I 19 would say is -- well, what I would say is it doesn't 20 make sense when you've got the issue before you 21 today -- we believe and Staff agrees -- properly 22 23 framed is a petition for declaratory statement. You've got probably every interested party in the 24 state present, ready to argue it. Why make us go 25

through the hoops of filing an application and having a whole bunch of hearings on motions to dismiss, in which the pleadings are going to look almost identical to what you've got before you now when you can address the issue today through what we, I believe, is a properly framed petition for declaratory statement?

You know we strongly support the Staff's 7 recommendations, both procedurally and substantively. 8 We think the analysis as to why we are proper 9 applicants is straightforward. We will be regulated 10 electric companies under the Act. We will be engaged 11 in the generation of electricity. If you put those 12 two things together, you are an applicant under the 13 Act. We'll be a public utility under the Federal 14 Power Act. 15

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Mr. Wright, can I ask 16 you, could we possibly grant one and not the other? 17 Say, yes, under one, you are entitled to apply; and on 18 the other, you're not. What particular fact in each 19 case would allow us to make that distinction? 20 MR. WRIGHT: Well, of course, I think the 21 law as it applies would require that both be granted. 22 I think you could say hypothetically, since the New 23 Smyrna Beach Utility's Commission is involved in the 24 one and they're a retail utility, that's sort of like 25

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1	what we've seen before, and we can grant that.
2	Since the other involves self-generation,
3	that's still up for grabs. Based on the previous
4	discussion of Item 4, we are not so sure about that,
5	maybe we need to consider that later. Now, I wouldn't
6	agree with that, I think you ought to grant both of
7	them, but
8	COMMISSIONER CLARK: But am I mistaken that
9	they both basically ask for authority to be an
10	applicant on exactly the same grounds.
11	MR. WRIGHT: As to the Duke entities, yes,
12	ma'am. But that doesn't make the statement that we've
13	asked you to give a rule.
14	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay.
15	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Let me ask the question
16	in a different way. If the petitions solely allege
17	that we are an EWG regulated under the Federal Power
18	Act are we an applicant, what if that had been the
19	question. Is that appropriate for a deck statement?
20	MR. WRIGHT: Yes.
21	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. Well, that's what
22	I thought you were saying. That's, to me, the crux of
23	your argument, is that question. That narrowly
24	defined, even though it would have general
25	applicability, you're still saying that that is

1 appropriate for a deck action.

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2	MR. WRIGHT: It's appropriate for a deck
3	action because it applies to us only. We have not
4	asked you for a rule. We have not asked you for a
5	statement of general applicability. Your declaratory
6	statement, if you would grant it, would have the
7	normal language that declaratory statements always
8	have.
9	Everyone should be aware here that the
10	declaratory statement herein granted applies to this
11	petitioner and his facts and circumstances only,
12	period. And any variance from that may result in a
13	different outcome. And Mr. Bellak addressed this very
14	well in his recommendation with respect to Issue 1
15	where he cites to Regal Kitchens and the Mental Health
16	District Board versus Florida Department of HRS.
17	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Where are you reading
18	from?
19	MR. WRIGHT: Staff recommendation at 2,
20	Staff analysis under Issue 1. The review in courts in
21	these cases upheld and these were cases,
22	apparently, where the orders granted by the agencies
23	involved said, "Yeah, you have this status under the
24	law and so does everybody else." And what the court's
25	went on to say was the statement is okay and not
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1 overturned, to the extent that it applies to the 2 petitioners only. To the extent that it purports to 3 be broader than that, it's that part of it, is carved 4 away and that part of it is overruled.

It's my understanding that folks who 5 practice in the tax area cite Regal Kitchens as 6 precedent, notwithstanding the fact that it's 7 expressly limited to the court, and in parallel 8 limited by the court, to Regal Kitchen. And in 9 parallel to the situation here, it was a deck 10 statement as to the applicability of some tax rules or 11 tax statutes to one entity that went too far. 12

The part that went too far was excised. The 13 part that applied to Regal Kitchen only was allowed to 14 stand. And that's what we've suggesting to you, it's 15 what Mr. Bellak's suggesting to you. You can grant 16 the statement. He's actually crafted his 17 recommendation, you know, in my opinion, extremely 18 tightly to make it clear that all you're doing is 19 granting -- all the Staff are recommending that you do 20 is grant a deck statement based on our facts only and 21 applicable to us only. There's no rule inherent 22 23 there.

24 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: How can something as 25 broadly as I just phrased it be applicable to you

only? 1 MR. WRIGHT: Well, maybe I misunderstood 2 you, Chairman Johnson. If what you asked is I'm an 3 EWG, may I be an applicant, then I think that would 4 probably be a rule. But that's different from saying 5 I'm Duke Mulberry Energy, L.P., and this is the plant 6 I propose to build, and this is the structure and this 7 is da-ta-da, am I an applicant. 8 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. Well, maybe you 9 misunderstood me when I first asked the question. 10 MR. WRIGHT: I apologize. 11 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: And I interrupted you. 12 MR. WRIGHT: Well, I'm afraid I've gone over 13 my five minutes. I did want to address a couple of 14 the substantive points because I thought this was the 15 only opportunity we were going to have to present 16 argument. 17 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: You may have an 18 opportunity to present argument on the substantive 19 points later, but I think this is limited to just the 20 procedural. 21 MR. WRIGHT: Thank you. 22 MR. SASSO: Hi, I'm Gary Sasso with Carlton 23 Fields, representing Florida Power Corporation. We 24 respectfully disagree with the Staff's position on 25

this issue and would urge that this is guite
 definitely not the type of proceeding that may be
 disposed of through a declaratory proceeding vehicle.

4 Let me begin briefly by talking about the 5 law because I think there may be some confusion here. 6 Mr. Bellak suggested that there is really no basis to 7 conclude that a declaratory statement can never be 8 issued, that the prescription by the case law is 9 simply that it be tailored to the particular 10 circumstances involved.

We have cited in our motion to dismiss the
petitions, the Tampa Electric Company versus the
Florida Department of Community Affairs case. And let
me just read some salient portions of that decision.

Citing Regal Kitchens, the First District in 15 that case said, "An administrative agency may not use 16 a declaratory statement as a vehicle for the adoption 17 of a broad agency policy or to provide statutory or 18 rule interpretations that apply to an entire class of 19 persons." That, of course, is what is going on here. 20 The court went on to say, "When an agency is 21 called upon to issue a declaratory statement in 22 response to a question which is not limited to 23 specific facts and a specific petitioner and which 24

25 would require a response of such a general and

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1	consistent nature as to meet the definition of a rule,
2	the agency should either decline to issue this
3	statement or comply with the provisions of Section
4	120.54 governing rulemaking."
5	This case calls upon the Commission and the
6	courts to basically inquire what's really going on
7	here. Is this case being used as a vehicle for the
8	adoption of a broad policy, and is it being used as an
9	attempt to obtain a ruling that applies to an entire
10	class of persons?
11	In the Regal Kitchens' decision, the court
12	did talk about the idea of limiting a declaratory
13	statement, but made clear that a declaratory statement
14	may be affirmed in part to the extent that it is
15	proper, if the improper parts are severable.
16	We would submit to you that in the
17	circumstances of this situation, it would be
18	impossible to sever the policy issues from the
19	particular circumstances of these petitioners because
20	as already has been identified, there are only two.
21	The petitions in the New Smyrna case and in
22	the Duke Mulberry case ask for relief on the ground
23	that the plants will exceed 75 megawatts, which is the
24	threshold, of course, for the Power Plant Siting Act,
25	and that the plants will qualify for EWG status.
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1 That's it. That is the ground on which the 2 petitioners in both cases seek relief.

In the request to address the Commission, 3 Duke and IMC describe their own petition as follows, 4 "duke Mulberry and IMCA submit that their petition 5 presents a case of first impression that raises 6 significant issues with respect to the statutory basis 7 for and policy implications of granting competitive 8 wholesale power producers, such as Duke Mulberry as an 9 exempt wholesale generator, access to the Commission's 10 need determination process pursuant to Section 11 403.519." That, in a nutshell, is what both of these 12 petitions are all about. 13

Now, as both Mr. Bellak has said and as 14 Mr. Wright has said, even with the intention of 15 narrowly limiting a recommendation in this case, Staff 16 has attempted to craft a recommendation that does not 17 transgress on the notion that a declaratory statement 18 should not exceed the particular circumstances of the 19 petitioners. But I would point to the Staff's own 20 recommendation to indicate that despite that intention 21 and those best efforts, they did not succeed in doing 22 so. 23

24 The Staff makes a recommendation to grant 25 the petitions, and then says, "Staff believes that

1 such a case-by-case determination has more potential 2 benefit for the state than foreclosure of that 3 determination based on a more restrictive reading of 4 Section 403.503(13)."

What Staff has essentially done here is used 5 this recommendation to make policy. And if we were 6 granted the opportunity to address the Commission in 7 appropriate circumstances, we would demonstrate that 8 that policy decision has already been made by the 9 legislature, which is essentially already determined; 10 who ought to be an applicant and who shouldn't be an 11 applicant and who has foreclosed EWGs from 12 participating. 13

The recommendation goes on to say, "Staff's 14 recommendations concerning Duke Mulberry likewise 15 reflect its view that a rigid imposition of procedural 16 requirements applicable to so-called nonutility 17 generators would be inappropriate where with the 18 filing and consideration of the merits in full of Duke 19 Mulberry and IMCA's petition, that category is no 20 longer limited to cogenerators and other nonutility 21 generators which seek a determination of need based on 22 a utility's need." 23

24 So Staff's own recommendation is making 25 categorical determinations of who's in and who's out,

receding from Florida Supreme Court precedent and this
 Commission's own prior precedent. And if that's not
 policy, it's hard to determine what is.

We are not in a gray area here. As 4 Commissioner Clark pointed out, there may be 5 situations where there may be room for debate about 6 whether a particular petition presents an appropriate 7 occasion for declaratory statement. This is not such 8 a petition. The vehicle is created for a situation, 9 perhaps where a regulated entity wants to clarify its 10 obligations before proceeding at its peril. Here Duke 11 and IMC are not even regulated entities. They could 12 have filed a need petition and attempted to get 13 applicant status. It would have been evident from the 14 get go that they wouldn't even be able to fill out the 15 form necessary to initiate that proceeding. 16

So instead of doing that, they chose to come 17 to this Commission and present a very broad and 18 abstract proposition; can an entity that is an EWG and 19 building a plant in excess of 75-megawatts basically 20 break into this closed regulatory and legislative 21 scheme that heretofore has been limited to utilities 22 and independent power producers in a contract with the 23 utility. And we would submit that that is plainly an 24 effort to call upon this Commission to make a policy 25

through a proceeding that is designed to cut out of 1 the loop the utilities that have the most direct 2 standing and stake in a current regulatory regime. 3 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Sasso, you need to 4 5 wrap up. MR. SASSO: Thank you. 6 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Guyton. 7 MR. GUYTON: Commissioners, my name is 8 Charles Guyton. I'm with the law firm of Steel, 9 Hector and Davis, and I represent Florida Power & 10 Light in this proceeding. I think Mr. Sasso has 11 adequately addressed the law. This is a very clear 12 legal issue for your resolve, and I think he's hit the 13 nail squarely on the head. I want to bring --14 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: You're going to have to 15 speak closer. 16 MR. GUYTON: I want to bring three factors 17 to your attention which I think clearly demonstrate 18 that you are being asked to give a declaratory 19 statement as to a matter of general applicability, or 20 in the alternative, a matter of general statement of 21 22 policy. First, is look at the Duke/IMCA petition 23 itself. Buried in the middle of it is the following 24 sentence, "The issue posed by this petition is simply 25

whether a merchant plant developer may pursue the 1 permitting for its project using the processes of a 2 siting act in Section 403.519." They want a 3 declaratory statement as to an entire class of 4 entities, merchant plant developers. 5 Second thing, it's a subtle, but I think yet 6 another good example. We are arguing two declaratory 7 statement proceedings before you right now, Items 5 8 and 6. We've rolled them together because the issues 9 are virtually identical. This is a matter of general 10 applicability, as you recognize, in structuring the 11 agenda and the argument. 12 And three, if you look at the Staff 13 recommendations before you, all you have to do is 14 substitute one party for the other, otherwise they are 15 identical. This is a matter of general applicability, 16 a declaratory statement should not be issued. Thank 17 you. 18 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Willis. 19 MR. WILLIS: I'm Lee Willis representing 20 Tampa Electric Company. Commissioners, it's very 21 important for the Commission to be cautious in setting 22 policies which could have a dramatic effect on the 23 power supply of this state. The requested declaratory 24 statement that's before you would fundamentally change 25

1 Commission-stated policy adopted in generic

2 proceedings and set forth in numerous orders of this 3 Commission and has been affirmed in two cases of the 4 supreme court: in Nasau Power versus Beard a...] Nasau 5 Power Company versus Deason.

Declaratory statements are simply not the 6 appropriate type of proceeding to establish or to 7 change policy. The decision sought by a petitioner in 8 this docket will be used as a matter of general 9 applicability. They have cleverly styled this as a 10 petition for declaratory statement, but that's really 11 wrong. The relief they seek is a major change in 12 policy and the rejection of prior Commission policy 13 and Supreme Court precedence. And declaratory 14 statements are not the appropriate types of 15 proceedings for those kinds of actions. Now, the only 16 reason that they decided this was to try to avoid 17 input and participation by those that are directly 18 affected by it. 19

Now, as you said at the outset of this, there is nothing unique in this petition. It's not limited to the particular circumstances of the applicant, and you can't avoid making a statement of general applicability in this case so, therefore, it should be dismissed.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you, Mr. Willis. Staff?

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MR. BELLAK: Yeah, I'd like to respond to 3 that. It seems that as you listen I'm reminded of the 4 Opticians case. In the Opticians case, the claim was 5 made that the statement was improper because it asked 6 for a statement that as an optician one could do the 7 following with respect to certain prescription drugs, 8 as an optician. Substitute for that as a merchant 9 plant one could do the following, perhaps be an 10 applicant. Those kinds of petitions for declaratory 11 statement are too broad. Not because, as the 12 commenders think, you can take subject matter and look 13 at it and weigh it in your hand, judge its importance, 14 look at the shape or the outline, think about what 15 other people are going to conclude about it, and 16 decide that's just not declaratory statement material. 17 And that's the argument you've just heard. That's all 18 you've heard. They have no case that says that. 19 And what's wrong with that is that means you 20 shouldn't have issued the Monsanto opinion because 21 that has abstract legal reasoning in it which could be 22 applied generically. You shouldn't have entered the 23

PW Venture's opinion because that has abstract legal

reasoning in it. And you shouldn't actually do

1 anything in terms of a declaratory statement.

What the cases say is don't issue a 2 statement that says as an optometrist, you can do the 3 following, because that sets policy for the entire 4 profession of optometry. What you should do, you 5 could take the same subject matter and issue a proper 6 declaratory statement which would say Mr. so-and-so, 7 in his particular facts and circumstances, here's how 8 the law applies to him. 9

Now, others may draw a conclusion from it --10 and I think there's an artificial conclusion being 11 driven because there are two petitions for declaratory 12 statement. Suppose there were only one, would that 13 look not like a declaratory statement? I submit to 14 you that it would look exactly like a declaratory 15 statement, and all you've heard are the arguments for 16 why there are never second and third petitions along 17 the same subject matter. Because the first petition 18 answers it for a lot of other people, but that does 19 not make it an incorrect or improper petition. 20 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Mr. Bellak, is issuing 21 a declaratory statement within our discretion to do or 22

24 MR. BELLAK: I think it is not within your 25 discretion to fail to respond to the petition, but I

not?

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1 think that you would have certainly within your 2 discretion to either grant or deny. But I think your 3 denial would have to be for reasons that could be 4 sustained on appeal.

Now, I think that the Opticians case 5 demonstrates the difference between setting policy for 6 all of the opticians in the state and the difference 7 between applying the facts and law to one optician 8 from which petition for declaratory statement others 9 may draw conclusions. And I think that once you issue 10 a statement, you can then go on to rulemaking or you 11 can then seek to have the law changed. Or the 12 legislature could then do what they want to do, but I 13 don't think you have discretion to say this is too 14 important, this is too weighty, this has too many 15 policy implications, because all of the implications 16 that they choose to draw, that's their choice. That 17 can't be the standard. 18

19 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Madam Chairman, you
20 know, I guess at some point I would be willing to
21 listen to more arguments on this, but I am mindful of
22 the fact that we are only on five and six and time is
23 marching on. And it's my view that we should deny the
24 declaratory statements in both these cases. I
25 believe -- there's nothing black and white. If

everything were black and white, all the lawyers would 1 be out of business. 2

It was one of my surprises upon getting out 3 of law school that people didn't come into your office 4 and say, well, this is a tort action and that you had 5 to actually figure out where it fits. And in this 6 case, I don't think if fits a declaratory statement. 7 I think what it more appropriately fits is a 8 rulemaking. 9

But I would say it is perhaps broader than 10 that. Because I think as a Commission, we need to 11 explore what the law says and perhaps what it should 12 say if it doesn't allow for merchant plants. And let 13 me just outline my concerns. We don't have 14 jurisdiction over wholesale competition, FERC does. 15 And my reading of FERC Order 888 is that there will be 16 wholesale competition. And the indication we have 17 gotten with respect to the ten-year site plans is 18 there's an anticipation on the part of regulated 19 retail entities that will be a competitive market. 20 And as Mr. Dennis indicated yesterday, we 21 have got to build in Florida if we're going to have a 22 competitive market, because there is a limited ability 23 to import from Georgia. So we need to determine how

do we facilitate that. 25

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And if the law says the only people that can apply under Chapter 403, or whatever it is, is a regulated retail utility, does that mean that other merchant plants can go under the local? In other words, they can go through all the local siting and get a certificate that way.

And then the question becomes is that how we 7 want to set public policy? Or should all those plants 8 over 75 megawatts at least get some review by this 9 Commission that they are needed to serve load or 10 they're needed to make the competitive market so that 11 we don't have a lot of excess capacity? But maybe 12 that would be a good idea because it would drive down 13 the price. 14

But it seems to me that we need to address 15 this. And we need to address not only what the law 16 says, but what should it say. And it concerns me that 17 our ten-year site plans indicate that they are going 18 to be purchasing power and that there will perhaps be 19 merchant plants, but Florida doesn't allow merchant 20 plants because you can't be an applicant and perhaps 21 you can't go locally. 22

And if we do that, will FERC preempt us and say that your local laws are invading our jurisdiction with respect to wholesale, and how do we reconcile

1 that. If we win the battle, we risk losing the war, 2 and FERC will take over everything. And I think we 3 need to think about that.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: We have one last speaker.
 I'm sorry, Mr. Bryant.

MR. BRYANT: Bill Bryant. Yes, Madam 6 Chairman, thank you. Bill Bryant with the local law 7 firm of Katz Kutter Haigler representing Enron Capital 8 and Trade Corporation. We filed a memo of law as 9 amicus. It goes to precisely the last point, and I 10 realize the time is an issue, so I will jump over scme 11 of my comments to say, the point that we're making in 12 our memo is that the one impermissible outcome is for 13 the Public Service Commission to say you cannot 14 compete. 15

I think the issue that you have to face is to what extent do these petitioners have access to the Siting Act. The Siting Act has certain benefits. If they don't have access to the Siting Act, can you then say you cannot build. Because without being -- and that, I believe, is the position that the utilities are urging.

And the position I believe the utilities are urging is that they are the gatekeepers of competition and that unless they have a plant specific need, then

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1	you cannot build as a generator. I think that that
2	runs directly into conflict preemption problems, and
3	that decision is subject to attack on those grounds.
4	The real issue that the PSC is facing is to what
5	extent are you going to permit potential applicants,
6	situated like these petitioners, go through the
7	process of applying for a certificate of need.
8	Enron believes that, as a general matter, I
9	mean, you can do either one. You have broad
10	discretion. You can say don't darken our doorstep,
11	don't come here, you don't need a certificate of need,
12	go build. Because the merchant plant, cr whoever is
13	doing the constructing, is taking all of the risk.
14	There is no ratepayer risk. That person has to go to
15	every single state agency that has regulatory
16	authority, whether it's the DCA for land use, or DEP
17	for environmental concerns, all the local concerns,
18	they have to run every gauntlet. The issue that you
19	have to face is to what extent are you going to permit
20	them to go through the Siting Act.
21	It would seem to me and to Enron beneficial
22	for everyone who's going to build generating capacity
23	to go through the Siting Act. For this reason, they
24	should be in front of you. They should be telling you
25	what their plans are. You should have, and your Staff
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1	should have, formally presented, even if it's 100%
2	their risk and they may never sell the first kilowatt
3	hour of electricity because they screwed up and priced
4	it wrong. Or they couldn't build it as efficiently as
5	they wanted to. Or somebody else comes along with a
6	more efficient form of fuel and consequently they're
7	out of business. That's their risk.
8	But it seems to me, that those are things
9	that you should know about formally.
10	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: But, Mr. Bryant, I
11	apologize for cutting you off, and I would agree with
12	you on the statements that you've made. But the
13	question before us is the proper forum. Do we
14	address and how do we get to those issues. It's my
15	understanding that the applicants filed or the
16	individuals filed to determine whether or not they
17	were applicants and which process they would to the
18	extent that they are applicants. And they'd have that
19	comprehensive process. To the extent that they are
20	not, then they might have to go through the local
21	government process.
22	So my question for you goes to the process
23	by which we determine whether or not they are
24	applicants, this process or the rulemaking process?
25	MR. BRYANT: And I appreciate that, and I
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1 think there's a subsidiary question that may, in fact, 2 overwhelm that, which is whether or not they can go 3 through the Siting Act. Is it the position of the 4 Public Service Commission that only those that go 5 through the Siting Act can build electric generating 6 facilities no matter what? Now, what's the proper 7 forum for that?

I think that I agree with Staff, I agree 8 with Mr. Bellak. Everything you do is being listened 9 to by someone. This is a recorded proceeding. They 10 are going to take guidance. Based upon what you do, 11 whether or not you intend it that way. So reaching 12 that decision -- all I am suggesting is I think it's 13 appropriate for the Commission to decide you can go 14 locally if you want to, but then reserve if you're 15 going to decide on who can be an applicant under the 16 Siting Act, reserve that for some more expansion 17 discussion. One last comment, if I may. 18

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CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Quickly.

20 MR. BRYANT: Senator Scott's letter, which I 21 don't have copies of, I'm sorry, the expression of 22 legislative interest and the actions of the Public 23 Service Commission, simply one point to that. He says 24 when the Florida Electric Power Plant Siting Act was 25 enacted during the 1970s, no one contemplated the

possibility that might some day apply to electric companies that do not directly serve retail customers in Florida. Of course, he's exactly correct, which is why the legislature gives a body, such as this, broad discretion, to deal with circumstances that could not have been foreseen at the time that their Staff wrote the law which ultimately passed.

8 So you have the broad discretion to deal 9 with all these issues, and we would urge you to do so 10 simply because those people who are looking to invest 11 in Florida are trying to figure out if Florida is an 12 environment where they, in fact, can invest. And we 13 all have an interest in a quick outcome there.

14 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you. Any other 15 questions, Commissioners?

16 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Yes. Mr. Bryant, what 17 say do we have whether an entity can go before a local 18 authority to get a site certified?

19 MR. BRYANT: None if you decide you don't. 20 We are here asking -- we have one question, can we 21 come before you and ask and for determination of need 22 or not? And if not, then is it the case that no 23 determination of need is necessary, you go take your 24 chances at the local level. What these petitioners 25 are asking is, can they come before you and ask, not

will you give them a determination of need. 1 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Commissioner Clark, you 2 made some statements and one was regarding the need 3 for us to look at what the law says and what the law 4 should say. But are you suggesting that the rule 5 making forum would be a more appropriate forum to have 6 that kind of discussion? 7 COMMISSIONER CLARK: I don't know if we 8 should do it through rulemaking or a generic 9 proceeding. But I do recall that in telephones, prior 10 to having the authority to allow pay telephones to 11 compete, we held a hearing to see if it was in the 12 public interest to do that. 13 And I guess what I am suggesting is that at 14 this point we need to explore what the law is with 15 respect to merchant plants and what it ought to be. 16 And my reason for making that statement is we are 17 blessed today with having so many people who are 18 desirous of being players in that market here. And I 19 think you need to be talking to each other. 20 I think probably the best outcomes are those 21 where all the participants can agree to them. And I 22 was just laying out for you my thoughts on you may be 23 absolutely correct that the law didn't contemplate 24 this. But given the fact that FERC has jurisdiction

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over wholesale sales and given the fact that they have 1 stepped to require competition, what changes do we 2 need to make to facilitate that that still protects 3 the interests of the people of the state of Florida. 4 Because if we don't, do we run the risk of FERC 5 stepping in and saying you no longer have authority to 6 determine if and when power plants will be built and 7 that they will preempt it. Senator Murkowski has 8 suggested that they preempt transmission line siting. 9 And it will be presented to the Federal Government 10 that Florida is --11

Depending on how you approach this issue, it may be presented that Florida is opposed to wholesale competition, and I have concerns about that. And it is becoming more acute based on the fact that you all are telling us we need power.

17 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let me say that 18 I think that you've hit upon an issue that needs to be 19 considered, this needs to be a policy issue. It seems 20 to me declaratory statements are not conducive to 21 discussing policy issues.

It seems to me -- and this is not an attempt on anyone's part, but it appears that declaratory statements seem to be kind of exclusive instead of inclusive of everyone's participation. And it seems

to me that the law was written a long time ago, and we 1 still have an obligation to interpret the law. But it 2 may be that that law needs to be changed, it needs to 3 be removing the ambiguities, I don't know. And 4 perhaps there needs to be some policy considerations 5 of the legislature in this process as well. But that 6 doesn't mean that we shirk our responsibilities here 7 8 either.

It seems to me that -- well, I guess, I 9 don't know if a declaratory statement is the 10 appropriate vehicle or not. I have concerns about it. 11 I want to get to a resolution of the issue and have it 12 to be inclusive for everyone and try to make -- even 13 address policy considerations if we need to. To gc 14 beyond just a mere interpretation because it is, maybe 15 we may find ourselves recommending changes to the law 16 to the legislature or at least providing input to that 17 process if it evolves to that. And we need to be 18 informed on what type of input, if asked, that we give 19 to the legislature on this. Because it is a very 20 serious question, very serious. And I think it does 21 have implications for the long-term energies applied 22 for this state. 23

And so, whatever the process is, I don't want to feel like I'm too overly constrained in

looking at this very critical issue. That's what my
 concern is. So maybe you attorneys can help me out
 and tell me what I need to do.

COMMISSIONER CLARE: I guess, Madam 4 Chairman, I would move that we deny the request for 5 declaratory statements in both of these dockets. But 6 then I would move that we go, I guess at this point, 7 to a genaric proceeding. I suppose we could go to 8 rulemaking on the narrow issue and get that addressed. 9 And then once having that addressed, open a generic 10 proceeding as to -- assuming we conclude they can't 11 apply. 12

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: They can or can't? 13 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Cannot. -- should we 14 go to a generic proceeding as to whether they should. 15 I guess to answer you, Commissioner Deason, 16 I think it's appropriate to deny the requests because 17 I don't think that they're appropriate for a 13 declaratory statement. But I can't give you a 19 definitive answer on how to approach it, but I would 20 say that I feel there's a need to approach it, to 21 22 answer it quickly.

23 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let me say that 24 I agree with that. Because I think that there are 25 plans out there, evaluations have been made, and I

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1	would anticipate that perhaps they are time sensitive,
2	most economic decisions are. And I would anticipate
3	that these probably are, too. And I would hate that
4	our process by the fact that I believe that we
5	should be cautious and deliberative, but I would hate
6	that process taking so long as to basically void what
7	otherwise would be a good economic decision on
8	someone's part to do business in the state of Florida.
9	COMMISSIONER KIESLING: And let me just add
10	that if that's the case, they can always file an
11	application.
12	COMMISSIONER CLARK: I agree with that. But
13	I think that Mr. McGlothlin and Mr. Wright have
14	brought up an excellent point. That's a lot of money
15	to spend to answer that question.
16	COMMISSIONER EIESLING: I agree.
17	COMMISSIONER CLARK: And we ought to answer
18	the question.
19	COMMISSIONER RIESLING: I'm not disagreeing
20	with that. But that is another mechanism by which
21	they can get that question answered. That's my only
22	point.
23	COMMISSIONER GARCIA: My question is where
24	does it leave the company with the issue that it
25	brought before us today?
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1 COMMISSIONER CLARK: One of the things they 2 can do is file a request for rulemaking, that we adopt 3 a rule that says the term, "regulated entity" -- is 4 that what it is in the -- includes entities regulated 5 by the Federal Government. Because that's what I 6 understand your requirement to be.

And then we can answer that issue, and it's 7 available for parties who are on the opposite side to 8 challenge our rulemaking. And it's also available for 9 the legislature to step in and make their 10 determination. One advantage I think it does have is 11 that we will have a full discussion and that the 12 policy implications, regardless of what we decide, are 13 very clear for the legislature, and they don't have 14 to, in effect, do the fact finding. 15

16 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: And that's a suggestion 17 of them petitioning us for rulemaking.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: They could do that, but 18 I guess what I -- at this point let's get through what 19 we need to. I would recommend we deny the petitions, 20 that we instruct our Staff to come back to us. It may 21 be not the next agenda, but the next agen_1, as to 22 what should the policy be with respect to merchant 23 plants being able to apply for a certificate of need. 24 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Now, the last part just 25

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1	threw me off, Susan. You said for the Staff to come
2	back with a recommendation of what the policy
3	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, they could talk
4	to you, actually, about opening up a docket.
5	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay.
6	COMMISSIONER CLARK: And I suppose they
7	don't need to come back to the agenda. But I'd
8	certainly like information about what they are
9	planning. And the applicants can come back with a
10	request for rulemaking. Isn't that still available
11	under the APA, or have they changed that? And we have
12	to respond to that request within a certain period of
13	time.
14	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Yeah. My only concern
15	and the reason I ask the question is that I'd like to
16	see this issue addressed as quickly as possible. And
17	even if we needed to do something on our own motion,
18	like opening the generic docket, because this is an
19	issue that is not just facts specific to the
20	individuals that are here today; but there are other
21	merchant plants and other industry groups that are
22	looking at our state and they need the direction, too.
23	So I'm just looking for the appropriate
24	forum to address it. I wouldn't even want to
25	necessarily wait on them to petition for rulemaking.
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We may want to open something generic so that we can
 have the deliberations and the debates and get the
 information that we would need.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, I guess my motion 4 is this, that we deny the request for declaratory 5 statement for both Item 5 and Item 6, and that we 6 direct Staff to come to you, Madam Chairman, and 7 recommend an appropriate proceeding for us to follow 8 to review the policy on the law and the policy with 9 respect to merchant plants being applicants for a 10 certificate of need. And that's sort of generally 11 what I would do. 12

And having said that, recognize that it is always open to the two applicants in this case to file a request for rulemaking. That's my motion.

16 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: There's a motion. Is 17 there a second?

18 There's a question?

19 COMMISSIONER KIESLING: I'm happy to second, 20 but I just looked up 403.519. And what this means, I 21 don't know, but it says, "On request by an applicant 22 or on its own motion, the Commission shall begin a 23 proceeding to determine the need for" --

24 So it does seem to me that we can open 25 something generic.

1 COMMISSIONER CLARK: I guess I view that as 2 a determination of need and we would do that -- maybe 3 we are going to need to do that if we are concerned 4 about where the power is coming from. But I don't see 5 that as giving us authority. Well, I don't know that 6 we need to use that.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Well, I guess I'm 7 thinking, let's figure out what it's in there for. If 8 we never can begin a proceeding on need without an 9 application, then why are the words "on its own 10 motion" in there? It seems to me that it can be 11 interpreted that on "its own motion" may mean that 12 there's a way for people to get the question before us 13 without having to file a full-blown application. 14

CONDISSIONER DEASON: Well, I always 15 interpreted that to mean back in the more traditional 16 full -- utilities that we fully regulated, that if we 17 felt there was a capacity shortfall, we could order 18 them to build a power plant. But we would have to go 19 through and make a determination that there was a need 20 for the plant before we could order them to build a 21 plant. That's what I thought that was for. 22

23 COMMISSIONER RIESLING. And I don't know. I 24 am willing to second that motion.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Joe, did you have a

25

1 question?

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Yeah. Well,
 Mr. Wright seemed to be wanting to say something.
 MR. WRIGHT: Madam Chairwoman, with your
 permission, I just wanted to respond to Commissioner
 Kiesling's question and the colloquy between her and
 Commissioner Deason.

8 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: If you could, briefly.
9 MR. WRIGHT: Very briefly, thank you. I
10 don't think there's anything in 403.519 that
11 constrains the Commission to do any particular
12 scenario as to how it might begin a need datermination
13 proceeding. And I would just submit to you that it
14 would be well within your authority.

Given to live power plant proposals where 15 we've got the sites under -- nearly under control, and 16 live projects that we have come to you with, and so 17 on, for you to begin need determination proceedings 18 sua sponte with respect to these two power plants 19 themselves. I just wanted to though that out in 20 response to Commissioner Kiesling's remarks. Thank 21 you. 22

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you. And I can
 tell you, and really for the benefit of the
 Commissioners, if Staff were to present that to me, I

would make sure that the full Commission had an opportunity to review and make a determination as to whether that's how we want to proceed. There is a motion and a second. Any further discussion or questions? Seeing none, all those in favor signify by saying aye. COMMISSIONER DEASON: Aye. COMMISSIONER CLARE: Aye. CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Aye. COMMISSIONER RIESLING: Aye. CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Those opposed? COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Nay. CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Show it approved on a 4 to 1 vote. Was that Issue -- whose motion? Was it your motion? Was it Issue 5 and 6? In toto. MR. BELLAE: Thank you. CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you.

STATE OF FLORIDA) 1 CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER COUNTY OF LEON 2) I, ROWENA NASH Official Commission Reporter, 3 DO HEREBY CERTIFY that the Agenda Conference 4 in Docket No. 971337-EU, 971446-EU and was heard by the Florida Public Service Commission at the time and 5 place herein stated; it is further 6 CERTIFIED that I stenographically reported the said proceedings; that the same has been 7 transcribed under my direct supervision; and that this transcript, consisting of 56 pages, constitutes a true 8 transcription of my notes of said proceedings 9 10 DATED this 22nd day of December, 1997. 11 12 13 ROWENA NASH Official Commission Reporter (904) 413-6736 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25