

BEFORE THE
FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

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In the Matter of : DOCKET NO. 000907-TP
:
PETITION BY LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, :
LLC FOR ARBITRATION OF CERTAIN :
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF A PROPOSED :
AGREEMENT WITH BELL SOUTH :
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. :

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* AND DO NOT INCLUDE PREFILED TESTIMONY. *
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VOLUME 2

Pages 148 through 324

PROCEEDINGS: HEARING

BEFORE: COMMISSIONER LILA A. JABER
COMMISSIONER BRAULIO L. BAEZ

DATE: Wednesday, December 6, 2000

TIME: Commenced at 9:30 a.m.

PLACE: Betty Easley Conference Center
Room 148
4075 Esplanade Way
Tallahassee, Florida

REPORTED BY: KORETTA E. STANFORD, RPR
Official FPSC Reporter

APPEARANCES:

(As heretofore noted.)

I N D E X

WITNESSES

NAME:

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TIMOTHY J. GATES

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EXHIBITS

NUMBER:		ID.	ADMTD.
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P R O C E E D I N G S

(Transcript continues in sequence from Volume 1.)

MR. ROMANO: Level 3 would call Timothy Gates.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Gates, have you been sworn?

THE WITNESS: Yes, I have.

TIMOTHY J. GATES

was called as a witness on behalf of Level 3 Communications and, having been duly sworn, testified as follows:

D I R E C T E X A M I N A T I O N

BY MR. ROMANO:

Q Mr. Gates, would you please state your name and business address for the record?

A My name is Timothy J. Gates, 15712 West 72nd Circle in Arvada, that's A-R-V- as in Victor -A-D-A, Arvada, Colorado 80007.

Q May I ask by whom you are employed?

A I'm employed by QSI Consulting.

Q And who are you appearing on behalf of today?

A I'm appearing on behalf of Level 3 Communications.

Q Have you prepared and caused to be filed in this docket 78 pages of prefiled direct testimony and 24 pages of prefiled rebuttal testimony?

1 A Yes, I have.

2 Q Do you have any changes, corrections or
3 revisions to either copy of testimony?

4 A Yes, I do. I have three changes for my direct
5 testimony.

6 Q Please, proceed.

7 A The first change is at Page 9, Line 21, please
8 replace the word "transport" with the word "channel" so
9 the line would read, "Please explain the local channel
10 facility."

11 My next change is on Page 18, Line 27. Please
12 strike the first occurrence of the word "the" so that line
13 would read, "It is clear that each LEC bears the..."

14 And finally, on Page 65, Line 7, please replace
15 Ameritech with BellSouth. And my apologies to BellSouth,
16 its management and its employees for that faux pas.

17 COMMISSIONER JABER: They didn't accept your
18 apology.

19 THE WITNESS: I understand.

20 A Those are the only changes I have, thank you.

21 BY MR. ROMANO:

22 Q With that correction and your unaccepted
23 apology, if I ask you the same questions today that are
24 contained in your prefiled direct testimony and in your
25 prefiled rebuttal testimony, would your answers to those

1 questions be the same?

2 A Yes, they would.

3 Q Madam Chair, I would ask that the prefiled
4 direct and prefiled rebuttal testimony of Mr. Gates be
5 inserted into the record as though read.

6 COMMISSIONER JABER: Yes. The prefiled direct
7 testimony of Mr. Gates and the prefiled rebuttal testimony
8 of Mr. Gates will be inserted into the record as though
9 read.

10 BY MR. ROMANO:

11 Q Mr. Gates, also one further question. Have you
12 also prepared prefiled Exhibits TJG-1 through TJG-9?

13 A Yes, I have.

14 MR. ROMANO: Madam Chair, I would ask that
15 Exhibits TJG-1 through TJG-9 be marked for identification
16 at this time.

17 COMMISSIONER JABER: All right. Is there any
18 objection with identifying all of those as a composite
19 exhibit, Staff?

20 MS. BANKS: Staff has no objection.

21 COMMISSIONER JABER: We'll identify TJG-1
22 through 9 as composite Exhibit 7.

23 (Exhibit 7 marked for identification.)

24

25

1 Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS FOR THE
2 RECORD.

3 A: My name is Timothy J Gates. My business address is
4 as follows: 15712 W. 72nd Circle, Arvada, Colorado
5 80007.

6 Q: WHO EMPLOYS YOU?

7 A: I am employed by QSI Consulting, Inc., ("QSI")

8 Q: PLEASE DESCRIBE QSI AND IDENTIFY YOUR POSITION WITH
9 THE FIRM.

10 A: QSI is a consulting firm specializing in the areas
11 of telecommunications policy, econometric analysis
12 and computer aided modeling. I currently serve as
13 Vice President.

14 Q: ON WHOSE BEHALF WAS THIS TESTIMONY PREPARED?

15 A: This testimony was prepared on behalf of Level (3)
16 Communications, LLC ("Level 3").

17 Q: PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR EXPERIENCE WITH
18 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY ISSUES AND YOUR RELEVANT
19 WORK HISTORY.

20 A: Prior to joining QSI I was a Senior Executive Staff
21 Member at MCI WorldCom, Inc. ("MWCOC"). I was
22 employed by MWCOC for 15 years in various public
23 policy positions. While at MWCOC I managed various
24 functions, including tariffing, economic and
25 financial analysis, competitive analysis, witness
26 training and MWCOC's use of external consultants.

1 I testified on behalf of MWCOM more than 150 times
2 in 32 states and before the FCC on various public
3 policy issues ranging from costing, pricing, local
4 entry and universal service to strategic planning,
5 merger and network issues. Prior to joining
6 MWCOM, I was employed as a Telephone Rate Analyst
7 in the Engineering Division at the Texas Public
8 Utility Commission and earlier as an Economic
9 Analyst at the Oregon Public Utility Commission. I
10 also worked at the Bonneville Power Administration
11 as a Financial Analyst doing total electric use
12 forecasts and automating the Average System Cost
13 methodology while I attended graduate school.
14 Prior to doing my graduate work, I worked for ten
15 years as a forester in the Pacific Northwest for
16 multinational and government organizations.
17 Exhibit TJG 1 to this testimony is a summary of my
18 work experience and education.

19 **Q: YOU HAVE TESTIFIED IN 34 STATES TO DATE. DID YOU**
20 **EVER TESTIFY IN FLORIDA?**

21 **A:** Yes, I did. I filed testimony in the Commission's
22 Investigation into IntraLATA Presubscription
23 (Docket No. 92-47). That testimony was filed on
24 behalf of MCI Telecommunications Corporation in
25 1994.

1 **Q: WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY?**

2 **A:** The purpose of my testimony is to address certain
3 issues identified in the Level 3 Petition for
4 Arbitration ("Petition") that was filed on July 20,
5 2000, and identified in the Order Establishing
6 Procedure that was filed on September 15, 2000.
7 Specifically, I will address issues 2 (Conditions
8 under which Level 3 is entitled to symmetrical
9 Compensation), 3 (Compensation for Interconnection
10 Trunks), 6 (Reciprocal Compensation for ISP-Bound
11 Traffic), and 7 (Reciprocal Compensation Based on
12 Location of Customers and the Application of
13 Switched Access Charges to ISP-Bound Traffic).

14 **Q: HOW IS YOUR TESTIMONY ORGANIZED?**

15 **A:** My testimony is organized by issue. The various
16 discussions of the issues can be found on the
17 following pages:

18 Summary of Conclusions	Page 4
19 Issue 2	Page 6
20 Issue 3	Page 14
21 Issue 6	Page 22
22 Issue 7	Page 46

23 **Q: PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE CONCLUSIONS YOU REACH IN YOUR**
24 **TESTIMONY.**

25 **A:** I will provide the summaries by Issue:

1 **Issue 2** - BellSouth's definition of serving wire
2 center and the use of that definition for determining
3 compensation for leased facility interconnection is
4 inappropriate and results in an artificial increase in
5 costs for alternative local exchange carriers ("ALECs").
6 The cost differential is caused, in part, when BellSouth
7 unilaterally locates its interconnection points ("IPs")
8 away from Level 3's switch. BellSouth's proposed
9 language causes Level 3 to incur costs that BellSouth
10 does not incur given the same network configuration.
11 Level 3 proposes language that would ensure that
12 symmetrical compensation is achieved.

13 **Issue 3** - Level 3 opposes BellSouth's attempt to
14 charge for interconnection trunks and facilities on its
15 network. It is each carrier's responsibility to provide
16 facilities on its side of the IP to deliver traffic to
17 the terminating carrier. A recent FCC order confirms
18 that, under the rules of the road for local
19 interconnection, a LEC may not assess charges for local
20 traffic (or facilities) that originates on the LEC's
21 network. To charge for these trunks and facilities would
22 result in double recovery of the LEC's costs. If Level
23 3 is required to pay for interconnection trunks and
24 facilities, the rates must be based on forward looking
25 long-run economic costs, not upon BellSouth's access

1 tariff or other prices that have not been scrutinized for
2 compliance with the requirements of the
3 Telecommunications Act.

4 **Issue 6** - The public policy and economic
5 considerations associated with ISP-bound traffic have
6 resulted in numerous decisions by state commissions,
7 including the Florida Public Service Commission
8 ("Commission"), concluding that ISP-bound calls should be
9 considered local calls for purposes of reciprocal
10 compensation.

11 **Issue 7** - The use of NXX codes in the manner
12 currently employed by Level 3, other ALECs, and even
13 BellSouth itself, allows consumers efficient access to
14 ISPs that would otherwise be impossible if such calls
15 were treated as toll calls or anything other than local.
16 Placing contractual restrictions on calls to certain NXX
17 codes would inappropriately allow BellSouth to avoid
18 payment of reciprocal compensation and give BellSouth a
19 competitive advantage over ALECs. BellSouth's proposal
20 would increase the cost of Internet access and reduce
21 competition to the detriment of consumers, even though
22 its own costs do not differ in handling these calls
23 versus any other locally-dialed call. The Commission
24 should deny BellSouth's attempt to eliminate this type of
25 local call from reciprocal compensation, and to apply

1 switched access charges to ISP-bound and other kinds of
2 virtual NXX calls.

3 **ISSUE 2 -- SHOULD LEVEL 3 RECEIVE SYMMETRICAL**
4 **COMPENSATION FROM BELLSOUTH FOR LEASED FACILITY**
5 **INTERCONNECTION?**

6 **Q: WHAT IS THE DISPUTE BETWEEN BELLSOUTH AND LEVEL 3**
7 **ON THIS ISSUE?**

8 A: Under the terms of the Agreement (Section 1.2 of
9 Attachment 3), the party originating local traffic
10 has the option to interconnect by purchasing
11 dedicated interoffice transport ("DIT") from its
12 "serving wire center" to the other party's "first
13 point of switching." BellSouth has proposed a
14 complicated rate structure for this form of
15 transport that could, in some circumstances, result
16 in BellSouth charging higher rates than Level 3 for
17 physically identical transport facilities,
18 depending on which party's traffic is being
19 transported. Level 3 has proposed to add a
20 paragraph, Section 1.2.6, to ensure that Level 3
21 may charge BellSouth for facilities in an amount
22 equal to that which BellSouth may charge Level 3
23 for traffic on the same route.

24 **Q: PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW BELLSOUTH'S PROPOSAL CAN LEAD TO**
25 **UNEQUAL TRANSPORT RATES.**

1 A: BellSouth's rate structure for leased facility
2 interconnection includes two different components:
3 the "Local Channel Facility" ("LCF") and the DIT
4 facility. The LCF extends from the IP of the
5 carrier ordering the transport service to the
6 "serving wire center," while the DIT extends from
7 the "serving wire center" to the first point of
8 switching on the other party's network. The
9 asymmetry arises from the proposed definition of
10 "serving wire center."

11 **Q: PLEASE DEFINE A SERVING WIRE CENTER.**

12 A: Generally speaking, a serving wire center is
13 synonymous with a central office. By central
14 office, I am referring to a "class 5"¹ central office
15 where the local exchange company terminates the
16 subscriber outside plant. Nevertheless, a carrier
17 could designate a tandem switch location as its
18 serving wire center. Essentially, a serving wire
19 center is the central office with entrance
20 facilities for the ALEC.

21 **Q: DOES THE DEFINITION OF SERVING WIRE CENTER VARY BY**
22 **CARRIER?**

¹ A "class 5" office is the lowest level in the hierarchy of local and long distance switches. The class 5 switch is the closest switch to the local end user.

1 A. Yes, it may. As a new entrant into the local
2 exchange telecommunications market, Level 3
3 utilizes state-of-the-art digital technology,
4 typically installing only a single switch in a
5 single building that serves an entire LATA. This
6 single switch would be considered BellSouth's
7 serving wire center for purposes of terminating
8 traffic originated by BellSouth subscribers. (In
9 the BellSouth contract, the "BellSouth serving wire
10 center" is the wire center on Level 3's network from
11 which service is provided to BellSouth, and vice
12 versa. This terminology is confusing, but I use it
13 to be consistent with the contract language.)
14 BellSouth, however, has multiple central offices
15 and/or wire centers per LATA. The BellSouth switch
16 closest to the Level 3 switch is normally
17 designated as Level 3's serving wire center. Let's
18 assume that Level 3 customers are originating
19 traffic that is terminated on the BellSouth
20 network. Level 3 would purchase DIT (which is
21 charged on a per mile basis) between its serving
22 wire center (the BellSouth central office or
23 tandem) and BellSouth's first point of switching.
24 The diagram attached as Exhibit __ (TJG-1) (Diagram

1) shows the DIT charged to Level 3 in this scenario.

Now, assuming the same network configuration, let's see how these terms and definitions impact the parties if BellSouth originates traffic that terminates on the Level 3 network. Diagram 2 attached as Exhibit __ (TJG-2) shows the same network configuration as Diagram 1.

In this scenario, however, according to BellSouth's definitions and proposed language, BellSouth would purchase DIT between its serving wire center (the Level 3 central office) and Level 3's first point of switching (the same Level 3 central office). In other words, BellSouth would not purchase DIT from Level 3, or it would purchase it at dramatically less than what Level 3 would have to pay. The fact that Level 3 is a new entrant with a single switch in the LATA results in dramatically different costs under BellSouth's proposed language.

21 **Q: PLEASE EXPLAIN THE LOCAL ^{CHANNEL} ~~TRANSPORT~~ FACILITY ("LCF")**
22 **AS INDICATED IN DIAGRAMS ONE AND TWO.**

23 **A:** The LCF is a flat-rated, non-mileage sensitive
24 switch transport facility between the IP and the
25 originating party's serving wire center. Although

1 the LCF appears longer for BellSouth when it
2 originates local traffic, that rate element is
3 flat-rated. As such, unlike the DIT, the mileage
4 or distance of the LCF does not impact the cost.

5 **Q: BUT DOESN'T THIS DIT PROPOSAL REFLECT THE**
6 **ADDITIONAL COSTS THAT BELL SOUTH MUST INCUR TO**
7 **PROVIDE FACILITIES FROM LEVEL 3'S SWITCH TO THE**
8 **INTERCONNECTION POINT?**

9 A: No. This example highlights the anticompetitive
10 impact of its proposal to unilaterally designate
11 IPs for BellSouth-originated traffic. If
12 BellSouth designates IPs at end offices some
13 distance from Level 3's point of presence, the
14 intercarrier compensation will not be symmetrical.
15 Indeed, BellSouth's proposal confirms the FCC's
16 conclusion that --

17 Because an incumbent LEC currently
18 serves virtually all subscribers in
19 its local serving area, an incumbent
20 LEC has little economic incentive to
21 assist new entrants in their efforts
22 to secure a greater share of that
23 market. An incumbent LEC also has
24 the ability to act on its incentive
25 to discourage entry and robust
26 competition by not interconnecting
27 its network with the new entrant's
28 network or by insisting on
29 supracompetitive prices or other
30 unreasonable conditions for
31 terminating calls from the entrant's

1 customers to the incumbent LEC's
2 subscribers.² (footnote omitted)

3 **Q: IT IS LEVEL 3'S CHOICE TO PLACE ONE IP PER LATA.**
4 **SHOULDN'T BELLSOUTH BE ALLOWED TO PLACE ITS IP AT**
5 **ITS DESIRED LOCATION?**

6 **A:** No. The Act and FCC orders clearly allow new
7 entrants to interconnect at any technically
8 feasible point. The single IP per LATA allows new
9 entrants to grow their business economically
10 without having to duplicate the ILECs existing
11 network.

12 If Congress had wanted ILECs to have the
13 ability to designate IPs and ALECs to bear the same
14 duty in establishing IPs as incumbent LECs bear, it
15 would have specifically stated that outcome, rather
16 than separating out the interconnection obligations
17 to apply only to incumbent LECs under Section
18 251(c)(2).

19 **Q: HAS THE FCC INTERPRETED SECTION 251 IN A SIMILAR**
20 **MANNER?**

² In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996; **FIRST REPORT AND ORDER**; CC Docket No. 96-98; Released: August 8, 1996; at ¶ 10. *Local Competition Order*.

1 A: Yes, it has. In the FCC's First Report and Order
2 it addressed technically feasible points of
3 interconnection as follows:

4 Section 251(c)(2) does not impose on
5 non-incumbent LECs the duty to provide
6 interconnection. The obligations of LECs
7 that are not incumbent LECs are generally
8 governed by sections 251(a) and (b), not
9 section 251(c). Also, the statute itself
10 imposes different obligations on
11 incumbent LECs and other LECs (i.e.,
12 section 251(b) imposes obligations on all
13 LECs while section 251(c) obligations are
14 imposed only on incumbent LECs).³
15

16 As such, BellSouth does not have the same right as
17 ALECs to identify a technically feasible IP.

18 **Q: DOES THE FACT THAT THERE IS NO PROHIBITION AGAINST**
19 **ILECS DETERMINING TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE**
20 **INTERCONNECTION POINTS GIVE THEM THE RIGHT TO DO**
21 **SO?**

22 A: No. As noted above, the interconnection
23 obligations of LECs and ILECs are specifically
24 identified in the Act. BellSouth may not assume
25 some authority that is not provided for in the Act.
26 As such, BellSouth is wrong to suggest that each
27 party may determine the IP for its own originating
28 traffic.

³ Id. at ¶220.

1 Q: ARE THERE PUBLIC POLICY REASONS TO DENY BELLSOUTH
2 THE ABILITY TO ESTABLISH IPS FOR TRAFFIC IT
3 ORIGINATES TO ALECS?

4 A. Yes. The FCC correctly noted in the First Report
5 and Order at paragraph 218 that "...the LEC has the
6 incentive to discriminate against its competitors
7 by providing them less favorable terms and
8 conditions of interconnection than it provides
9 itself." It is for this reason that the FCC
10 rejected the ILECs' suggestion that they impose
11 reciprocal terms and conditions with respect to
12 interconnection obligations on ILECs and ALECs. If
13 BellSouth were allowed to identify IPs for
14 originating traffic it would be able to
15 disadvantage ALECs and impose additional and
16 unwarranted costs on new entrants. Such a result
17 is not in the public interest and would severely
18 impede the development of competition. Indeed, if
19 BellSouth were allowed such discretion, it may
20 force ALECs to essentially duplicate the
21 incumbent's network, thereby eliminating the social
22 benefits of the one IP per LATA rule. Such a
23 result has been regularly rejected by regulators as
24 not in the public interest.

25 Q: WHAT IS THE SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM?

1 **A:** The solution is to adopt Level 3's changes to
2 Section 1.2 of Attachment 3, which ensures
3 symmetrical compensation. Level 3 recommends the
4 following language for Section 1.2.6:

5 Notwithstanding the foregoing
6 definitions, to ensure that
7 symmetrical compensation is
8 achieved, Level 3 may charge
9 BellSouth for Local Channel and
10 Dedicated Interoffice Transport
11 facilities in an amount equivalent
12 to that which may be charged by
13 BellSouth to Level 3 for traffic on
14 the same route.

15
16 This language ensures that Level 3 and other ALECs
17 are not disadvantaged by BellSouth's unilateral placement
18 of IPs and the different network architectures.

19 **ISSUE 3 - SHOULD EACH CARRIER BE REQUIRED TO PAY FOR THE**
20 **USE OF INTERCONNECTION TRUNKS ON THE OTHER CARRIER'S**
21 **NETWORK? EVEN IF SO, SHOULD LEVEL 3 BE REQUIRED TO PAY**
22 **RECURRING AND NONRECURRING RATES BASED UPON BELL SOUTH'S**
23 **ACCESS TARIFF FOR THE USE OF INTERCONNECTION TRUNKS?**

24 **Q: IS IT APPROPRIATE TO IMPOSE ANY CHARGES FOR LOCAL**
25 **INTERCONNECTION TRUNKS?**

26 **A:** No. It is inappropriate to impose any charges for
27 local interconnection trunks (and the facilities
28 upon which those trunks ride), as these are
29 co-carrier facilities and trunks provided for the
30 mutual benefit of the parties in exchanging
31 customer traffic, and both parties must deploy

1 matching capacity on their side of the IP.
2 Further, as both parties have already agreed in
3 Section 1.1.1 of Attachment 3, it is each carrier's
4 financial and operational responsibility to supply
5 and maintain the network on its side of the IP to
6 deliver traffic to the terminating carrier, so a
7 requirement that each party then pay the other for
8 trunks and facilities on its network is
9 inconsistent with other resolved sections of the
10 contract.

11 **Q: WHAT DOES SECTION 1.1.1 OF THE INTERCONNECTION**
12 **AGREEMENT STATE?**

13 **A:** Section 1.1.1 of the Interconnection Agreement
14 states in pertinent part, "Each party is financially
15 and operationally responsible for providing the
16 network on its side of the IP." This responsibility
17 includes the interconnection trunks used to deliver
18 traffic to the interconnection point or IP. To the
19 best of my knowledge, this language is not being
20 disputed by either BellSouth or Level 3. As the
21 language indicates, BellSouth has agreed to be both
22 financially and operationally responsible for its
23 network on its side of the IP.

1 Q: WHAT DO YOU MEAN WHEN YOU SAY THE TRUNKS AND
2 FACILITIES ARE FOR THE "MUTUAL BENEFIT" OF THE
3 PARTIES?

4 A: The interconnection trunks and facilities are as
5 valuable to BellSouth as they are to Level 3 or any
6 ALEC. They are used by BellSouth to ensure that
7 calls between its customers and Level 3 customers
8 are completed. Without such trunks, BellSouth
9 would not be able to provide the level of services
10 demanded by its own customers.⁴

11 Q: DOES LEVEL 3 HAVE TO PROVIDE INTERCONNECTION TRUNKS
12 AND FACILITIES AS WELL?

13 A: Yes. For every trunk that BellSouth sets up to
14 handle Level 3 traffic, Level 3 must ensure that
15 the appropriate level of capacity is available on
16 its own side of the IP so that calls coming over
17 the BellSouth trunks can then flow over the Level 3
18 network to their intended destination (and vice
19 versa). Thus, it should be in both carriers'
20 interest (or at least in both carriers' customers'
21 interest) to have an adequate amount of co-carrier
22 trunks and underlying facilities in place.
23 Requiring each carrier to pay the other for

⁴ By "level" of service, I am referring to the amount of blocking experienced by consumers.

1 co-carrier trunks and the underlying facilities on
2 the other party's network is therefore
3 inappropriate and contrary to the principles
4 underlying cooperative reciprocal interconnection.

5 **Q: ON THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE, WE ARE TALKING ABOUT**
6 **TRUNKS AND FACILITIES USED TO INTERCONNECT THE TWO**
7 **NETWORKS. HAS THE FCC ISSUED ANY RECENT OPINIONS**
8 **ON THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CARRIERS IN THIS**
9 **REGARD?**

10 **A:** Yes, it has. There has been some debate about FCC
11 Rule 51.703(b), which states, "A LEC may not assess
12 charges on any other telecommunications carrier for
13 local telecommunications traffic that originates on
14 the LEC's network." In a recent case before the
15 FCC, several ILECs argued that this rule would
16 apply only to "traffic," and would not prevent a
17 carrier from charging an interconnecting carrier
18 for the cost of "facilities" used in originating
19 traffic. The FCC flatly rejected that argument::

20 Defendants argue that section
21 51.703(b) governs only the charges
22 for "traffic" between carriers and
23 does not prevent LECs from charging
24 for the "facilities" used to
25 transport that traffic. We find
26 that argument unpersuasive given the
27 clear mandate of the *Local*
28 *Competition Order*. The Metzger
29 Letter correctly stated that the
30 Commission's rules prohibit LECs
31 from charging for facilities used to

1 deliver LEC-originated traffic, in
2 addition to prohibiting charges for
3 the traffic itself. Since the
4 traffic must be delivered over
5 facilities, charging carriers for
6 facilities used to deliver traffic
7 results in those carriers paying for
8 LEC-originated traffic and would be
9 inconsistent with the rules.
10 Moreover, the Order requires a
11 carrier to pay for dedicated
12 facilities only to the extent it
13 uses those facilities to deliver
14 traffic that it originates. Indeed,
15 the distinction urged by Defendants
16 is nonsensical, because LECs could
17 continue to charge carriers for the
18 delivery of originating traffic by
19 merely re-designating the "traffic"
20 charges as "facilities" charges. Such
21 a result would be inconsistent with
22 the language and intent of the Order
23 and the Commission's rules.⁵
24 (footnotes omitted; emphasis in
25 original)

26
27 It is clear that ~~the~~ each LEC bears the
28 responsibility of operating and maintaining the
29 facilities used to transport and deliver traffic on
30 its side of the IP. This responsibility extends to
31 both the trunks and facilities as well as the
32 traffic that transits those trunks and facilities.
33 Likewise, an interconnecting terminating LEC will
34 bear responsibility for the facilities on its side

⁵ In the Matters of TSR WIRELESS, LLC, et al, Complainants, v. US WEST COMMUNICATIONS, INC. et al, Defendants; **MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER**; File Nos. E-98-13, E-98-15, E-98-16, E-98-17, E-98-18; Released June 21, 2000; ¶25; (TSR Order)

1 of the IP, but then recover the costs of
2 transporting and terminating traffic over those
3 facilities from the originating LEC, in the form of
4 reciprocal compensation.

5 **Q: DID THE FCC FURTHER EXPLAIN ITS LOGIC FOR REQUIRING**
6 **THE ORIGINATING CARRIER TO BEAR THE COSTS OF**
7 **DELIVERING ORIGINATING TRAFFIC TO THE TERMINATING**
8 **CARRIER?**

9 **A:** Yes. In the *TSR Order* the FCC further clarified
10 its logic as follows:

11 According to Defendants, the *Local Competition*
12 *Order's* regulatory regime, which requires
13 carriers to pay for facilities used to deliver
14 their originating traffic to their
15 co-carriers, represents a physical occupation
16 of Defendants property without just
17 compensation, in violation of the Takings
18 Clause of the Constitution. We disagree. The
19 *Local Competition Order* requires a carrier to
20 pay the cost of facilities used to deliver
21 traffic originated by that carrier to the
22 network of its co-carrier, who then terminates
23 that traffic and bills the originating carrier
24 for termination compensation. In essence, the
25 originating carrier holds itself out as being
26 capable of transmitting a telephone call to
27 any end user, and is responsible for paying
28 the cost of delivering the call to the network
29 of the co-carrier who will then terminate the
30 call. Under the Commission's regulations, the
31 cost of the facilities used to deliver this
32 traffic is the originating carrier's
33 responsibility, because these facilities are
34 part of the originating carrier's network.
35 The originating carrier recovers the costs of
36 these facilities through the rates it charges
37 its own customers for making calls. This
38 regime represents "rules of the road" under
39 which all carriers operate, and which make it
40 possible for one company's customer to call

1 any other customer even if that customer is
2 served by another telephone company.⁶
3 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)

4 By this reasoning, Level 3 should not have to pay
5 BellSouth for the interconnection trunks and
6 facilities that transport BellSouth-originated
7 traffic to Level 3 for termination.

8 Q: PLEASE ADDRESS THE SECOND PART OF THIS ISSUE - IF
9 LEVEL 3 IS REQUIRED TO PAY RECURRING AND/OR
10 NONRECURRING RATES, SHOULD THOSE RATES BE BASED
11 UPON BELLSOUTH'S ACCESS TARIFF?

12 A: Before I respond to that question, let me be clear
13 about Level 3's position - as a preliminary matter,
14 the FCC's *Local Competition Order* and subsequent
15 orders interpreting that decision make clear that
16 one LEC should not be required to pay another LEC
17 for facilities on the second LEC's network. Under
18 the FCC's reasoning, reciprocal compensation for
19 terminating traffic covers any use of the other
20 carrier's network. That being said, it is also
21 worthwhile to examine and critique the underlying
22 cost basis of BellSouth's proposed rates.

23 Before discussing specific concerns about
24 BellSouth's proposed rates, I should also note that

⁶ *Id.* at ¶34.

1 there has been some confusion about BellSouth's
2 rates for interconnection trunks.⁷ Even though the
3 language in Attachment 3 of the contract refers to
4 the parties paying recurring and nonrecurring rates
5 for interconnection trunks and facilities, the
6 pricing schedule provided by BellSouth only sets
7 forth a nonrecurring trunk charge, and does not
8 contain a recurring trunk charge. The pricing
9 schedule does state, however, that if a price is
10 not specified in that schedule, it will be assessed
11 pursuant to BellSouth's tariffs. Level 3 has
12 therefore been concerned that the recurring trunk
13 charge to be imposed by BellSouth would come from
14 the access tariff. Recently however, despite what
15 the pricing schedule leaves open, we have been told
16 by BellSouth that *there is no recurring charge for*
17 *trunks*, so it would appear that the focus from a

⁷ We understand that BellSouth's rates for unbundled transport - which would presumably be the rates that BellSouth seeks to impose for interconnection facilities - have been approved by the Commission. Therefore, Level 3 is not challenging the manner in which those rates have been set. Rather, as noted above, we question why those approved rates should apply for the payment of facilities on BellSouth's side of the IP - where it has already pledged to bear the financial responsibility of those facilities under Section 1.1.1. Instead, the unbundled transport rates should apply where Level 3 is seeking to lease facilities from BellSouth to reach a mutually-agreed Interconnection Point, not for the facilities on BellSouth's side of that point.

1 rate-setting perspective will be on the
2 nonrecurring trunk charges. These nonrecurring
3 charges should be rejected for several reasons.

4 First, as noted above, it is the
5 responsibility of the originating carrier to
6 transport the traffic to the terminating carrier.
7 The terminating carrier is not responsible for
8 paying for the traffic or the facilities associated
9 with transporting that traffic to the IP.

10 Second, imposing these costs on ALECs would
11 result in double recovery. The FCC has found
12 that "The originating carrier recovers the
13 costs of [its] facilities through the rates it
14 charges its own customers for making calls."⁸
15 The FCC reiterated that statement in the very
16 next paragraph of the *TSR Order* when it stated
17 "Defendants possess other options for
18 recovering these costs, such as recovering
19 these costs from the end users that originates
20 [sic] the calls."⁹ This finding is consistent
21 with the principle of cost causation in that
22 the end user originates the calls that result

⁸ Id.

⁹ Id. at ¶35.

1 in the traffic and facilities handled and
2 deployed by BellSouth.

3 **Q: PLEASE EXPLAIN.**

4 **A:** The FCC has found that Section 252(d) of the Act,
5 which addresses local interconnection pricing,
6 requires that "prices for interconnection and
7 unbundled elements . . . should be set at
8 forward-looking long-run economic cost."¹⁰ The FCC's
9 rules also require rates based on forward-looking
10 economic costs. FCC Rule 51.705(a)(1) states, "An
11 incumbent LEC's rates for transport and termination
12 of local telecommunications traffic shall be
13 established, at the election of the state
14 commission, on the basis of: (1) the
15 forward-looking economic costs of such offerings,
16 using a cost study pursuant to §§ 51.505 and 51.511
17 of this part." As this Commission is well aware,
18 FCC Rule 51.505 defines "Forward-looking economic
19 cost" and total element long-run incremental cost
20 study requirements. FCC Rule 51.511 develops the
21 forward-looking economic cost per unit.

22 If the Commission requires Level 3 to pay
23 charges for co-carrier trunks (a concept to which
24 Level 3 strenuously objects), BellSouth must at

¹⁰ *Local Competition Order* at ¶672.

1 least be required to set forward-looking,
2 cost-based rates for those trunks in accordance
3 with the Act, rather than relying upon rates that
4 may contain additional subsidies to support
5 BellSouth's earnings, subsidized service and
6 foreign ventures.

7 **Q: IS IT CLEAR WHERE BELLSOUTH'S PROPOSED RATES FOR**
8 **INTERCONNECTION TRUNKS COME FROM?**

9 A. Not at all. As I explained above, the contract
10 language provided by BellSouth indicates that the
11 rates for interconnection trunks are to be
12 specified in the pricing schedule, or if they are
13 not listed in the pricing schedule, the rates will
14 be as set forth in BellSouth's (presumably
15 intrastate) access tariffs. If the Commission
16 decides that ALECs should pay BellSouth a
17 nonrecurring charge for interconnection trunks, the
18 Commission should require BellSouth to provide
19 cost-studies supporting its rates. The parties
20 should then be allowed to scrutinize those studies
21 and associated rates through discovery and a
22 contested hearing process. Only through such a
23 process can the Commission assure itself that
24 BellSouth's rates are just and reasonable.

1 Still, in the end, even if the rates are
2 cost-based for all elements, Level 3 opposes any
3 charges for interconnection trunks and facilities
4 between the carriers. Such charges are contrary to
5 the "rules of the road" for local interconnection as
6 identified in FCC orders, inconsistent with the
7 agreed-upon principle that each party should bear
8 its own costs of bringing facilities to the
9 Interconnection Point, and could lead to double
10 recovery of the costs of the trunks and facilities
11 in question.

12 **ISSUE 6 - SHOULD THE PARTIES BE REQUIRED TO PAY**
13 **RECIPROCAL COMPENSATION ON TRAFFIC ORIGINATING FROM OR**
14 **TERMINATING TO AN ENHANCED SERVICE PROVIDER, INCLUDING AN**
15 **INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDER ("ISP")?**

16 **Q: PLEASE DESCRIBE THE DISPUTE ON THIS ISSUE.**

17 A: Level 3 argues that parties should compensate one
18 another at the reciprocal compensation rate for
19 ISP-bound traffic, just like any other local call.
20 BellSouth argues that traffic originating from or
21 terminating to an enhanced service provider,
22 including an ISP, is not local traffic and should
23 not be subject to reciprocal compensation. Indeed,
24 BellSouth recommends in Sections 5.1.8 and 5.1.9 of
25 Attachment 3 that ALECs be required to identify all

1 ISP-bound traffic and submit the results to
2 BellSouth so that BellSouth can charge ALECs
3 switched access charges for such calls.

4 **Q: IS IT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST TO BREAK-OUT SUCH**
5 **ISP-BOUND CALLS FROM THE UNIVERSE OF LOCAL CALLS?**

6 A: No. There are several reasons why the Commission
7 should not establish a separate class of service
8 for ISP-bound traffic. First, the Commission has
9 determined repeatedly that ISP-bound calls are to
10 be treated as local. Dial-up Internet traffic uses
11 the same public switched network facilities used by
12 other local calls. Likewise, the costs to carry
13 this traffic are largely identical to other local
14 calls exhibiting similar calling characteristics
15 (i.e., time of day, duration, etc.). Hence, to
16 segregate ISP-bound traffic from the larger
17 population of local-billed calls (thereby
18 separating it from some group of calls that largely
19 match its calling characteristics, and costs)
20 provides an artificial distinction between two
21 types of traffic that are actually very similar.

22 **Q: HAS THE FCC SAID ANYTHING ABOUT RATE SETTING BASED**
23 **ON CLASSES OF CUSTOMERS?**

24 A: Yes. FCC Rule 51.503 (c) states: "The rates that an
25 incumbent LEC assesses for elements shall not vary

1 on the basis of the class of customers served by
2 the requesting carrier, or on the type of services
3 that the requesting carrier purchasing such
4 elements uses them to provide." To do so would be
5 to discriminate against a particular class of
6 customers or type of service being provided, based
7 on something other than cost. Such discrimination
8 is not in the public interest.

9 **Q: WILL CREATION OF THIS ARTIFICIAL DISTINCTION HARM**
10 **THE PUBLIC INTEREST?**

11 A: Yes. Artificially distinguishing between these two
12 types of calls (*i.e.*, ISP-bound calls and other
13 local calls) skews the resource allocation
14 decisions of the consumer, residential and business
15 alike. Specifically, it skews the consumer's
16 economic decision-making as to what level of each
17 type of call to consume (*i.e.*, if prices for
18 Internet-bound calling are higher than for other
19 types of local calling, the consumer will
20 undoubtedly suppress his/her demand for Internet
21 calling in comparison to the level demanded absent
22 such a price differentiation). For example, under
23 BellSouth's proposal, a customer who makes a large
24 number of local voice calls (or calls of longer
25 than average length) will pay less than a customer

1 who uses the same level of local usage for
2 accessing the Internet. Obviously, under a
3 situation like that described above, even though
4 both customers consume the same level of local
5 calling resources and generate equal costs on the
6 network, the Internet subscriber will be required
7 to pay more. This is problematic in that it
8 provides consumption incentives that do not match
9 the economically efficient incentives that would
10 result from pricing identical or similar services
11 at the same rate.

12 **Q: CAN YOU EXPLAIN IN GREATER DETAIL YOUR CONCERN**
13 **REGARDING A SEPARATE CLASS OF SERVICE FOR ISP-BOUND**
14 **TRAFFIC?**

15 A: My primary concern in this area is that this
16 approach doesn't encourage efficient
17 decision-making on the part of local callers. This
18 results from the fact that even though both
19 voice-grade local calling and calls to the Internet
20 use the same network in almost exactly the same way
21 (thereby generating largely identical costs), local
22 callers would be faced with two different pricing
23 structures for these two identical or similar types
24 of calling. If the Commission were to introduce
25 such a pricing structure, it would be arbitrarily

1 distinguishing between two types of traffic that
2 are largely identical. For example, one hour of
3 local calling from your computer to the Internet
4 generates exactly the same level of cost on the
5 network as does one hour of calling from your home
6 to your best friend who may live across town.
7 Efficient economic results are generated when
8 consumers are faced with the marginal costs of
9 their decisions. Only when consumers are faced
10 with a situation where the more local calling
11 resources they use the more they pay (whether those
12 be for local voice calls or Internet calling), will
13 they ever be encouraged to make sound economic
14 decisions with respect to how much local calling to
15 use.

16 Separating ISP-bound traffic from all other
17 types of local-billed traffic and subjecting only
18 ISP traffic to this system will serve only to
19 depress demand for Internet usage. At the same
20 time, allowing voice grade traffic to remain under
21 the same pricing structure it currently enjoys will
22 result in an incentive to "over-use" voice grade
23 local calling. In essence, the Commission would be
24 using its regulatory authority to favor one type of
25 local-billed traffic (voice traffic) over another

1 type of local-billed traffic (ISP-bound traffic).
2 This would undoubtedly cause market distortions
3 that could have long-term effects on the growth of
4 Internet traffic and the efficient allocation of
5 resources to Florida's telecommunications
6 infrastructure. One such unfortunate result could
7 be an increase in the gap between those consumers
8 who can afford to use the Internet at these
9 artificially higher rates, and those that cannot
10 (the so called "digital divide").

11 **Q: WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO SEPARATE THE ISP-BOUND**
12 **CALLS FROM OTHER LOCAL CALLS?**

13 A: It would be very difficult and imprecise to
14 break-out ISP-bound calls from other local calls.
15 Two separate, and equally ineffective, methods of
16 segregating ISP-bound traffic from other local
17 calls have emerged to this point. First, ILECs
18 such as BellSouth have asked that interconnecting
19 carriers identify the specific NXX-XXXX telephone
20 numbers that are assigned to ISP providers as
21 dial-up access numbers. Then, the traffic that is
22 terminated to these specified dial-in numbers would
23 be measured and identified as ISP-bound traffic
24 (and BellSouth would impose switched access charges
25 on the traffic and refuse to make reciprocal

1 compensation payments to the ALECs for carrying
2 this traffic). Second, ILECs have argued that by
3 measuring the average call duration (holding time)
4 for traffic passed between two carriers, it is
5 possible to estimate the percentage of that traffic
6 that is bound for an ISP (ILECs generally have
7 argued that calls longer than 15 - 20 minutes
8 exhibit characteristics similar to ISP-bound
9 traffic and should therefore be removed from
10 reciprocal compensation obligations).

11 **Q: DO YOU BELIEVE THAT EITHER OF THESE OPTIONS IS AN**
12 **EFFECTIVE MECHANISM FOR "DISTINGUISHING INTERNET**
13 **TRAFFIC" FROM OTHER TYPES OF LOCAL TRAFFIC?**

14 **A:** No. First, there is no technical or economic
15 distinction between ISP-bound traffic and other
16 types of local traffic, other than the fact that
17 ISP-bound calls generally tend to have longer
18 holding times than do average local calls (and,
19 dial-up ISP-bound calls typically take place in the
20 evening whereas the majority of voice calls occur
21 during the business day). However, as I described
22 above, distinguishing between an Internet call and
23 a local voice call of the same length is
24 nonsensical. A twenty-minute voice call has
25 exactly the same cost characteristics as does a

1 twenty-minute Internet call. Hence, distinguishing
2 between these two types of calls is an artificial
3 distinction that can lead to poor rate design and
4 consumption decisions.

5 Further, both methods described above for
6 purposes of distinguishing between ISP-bound calls
7 and other types of local traffic have major
8 shortcomings. The first method (i.e., identifying
9 ISP dial-in numbers) requires a carrier to maintain
10 separate records of the telephone numbers used by
11 its ISP customers for dial-up capability.¹¹ To the
12 extent an ISP customer regularly expands or changes
13 the dial-up numbers it uses for this purpose (many
14 ISPs may have hundreds of dial-up numbers), it
15 becomes difficult to ensure that all such numbers
16 are captured effectively and/or that only dial-in
17 numbers are identified (as opposed to numbers used
18 by the ISP for its own business uses). The
19 shortcomings of the second alternative described

¹¹ Indeed, this ILEC attempt to identify the phone numbers of ALECs' ISP customers is potentially anti-competitive. By forcing ALECs to provide customer information to the ILEC, this enables the ILECs to have key information about competitors and their customers. Taken to its logical conclusion, then, the ILEC position is to strip away ALEC compensation for the cost of serving ISP customers, while at the same time using the identification of ISP telephone numbers as a tool to market to these same customers.

1 above are even worse. Simply assuming that calls
2 of greater than 15-20 minutes (or even 25-30
3 minutes) are dial-up calls to the Internet is, by
4 definition, going to provide inaccurate results.
5 (Going beyond voice calls, think for example of the
6 corporate LAN, where a customer dials in but does
7 not go to the Internet. The telecommuter could be
8 dialed in all day to her office, but never reach
9 the Internet. In that case, such a call would show
10 up as ISP-bound notwithstanding the actual
11 destination.) Obviously, a good number of local
12 voice calls (and other non-Internet calls) last
13 longer than 15-30 minutes. Under the second
14 approach above, however, any call with duration
15 greater than 15-30 minutes is generally considered
16 to be an ISP-bound call. Using the second method
17 generally tends to overestimate the volume of
18 ISP-bound calls and underestimate the volume of
19 other local calling on the network.

20 **Q: PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR POSITION ON BREAKING OUT**
21 **ISP-BOUND CALLS AND APPLYING SWITCHED ACCESS**
22 **CHARGES TO SUCH TRAFFIC.**

23 A. As shown above, it is not technically feasible to
24 identify "ISP-bound" traffic. Nor is it necessary,
25 since such calls impose absolutely no additional

1 costs on BellSouth. ISP-bound calls have been
2 treated as local calls by this Commission and they
3 should continue to be treated as such. Applying
4 access charges to local calls is completely
5 inconsistent with the reciprocal compensation
6 requirements I described earlier in this testimony.

7 **Q: HOW DOES BELLSOUTH'S REFUSAL TO PAY RECIPROCAL**
8 **COMPENSATION IMPACT LEVEL 3 AND OTHER ALECS?**

9 A: Level 3 has been successful in attracting ISP
10 providers and other customers requiring advanced
11 telecommunications services to its network.
12 BellSouth's attempt to exclude these types of local
13 customers from reciprocal compensation obligations
14 unfairly targets Level 3's customer base and
15 threatens to leave Level 3 in the untenable
16 position of delivering a large number of calls,
17 originated by BellSouth customers, without any
18 payment from BellSouth. In essence, Level 3 is
19 being asked to carry large volumes of BellSouth
20 traffic without any ability to charge BellSouth for
21 its carriage.

22 **Q: DO YOU HAVE ANY IDEA WHY LEVEL 3 AND BELLSOUTH HAVE**
23 **NOT BEEN ABLE TO REACH CONSENSUS ON THIS ISSUE?**

24 A: While I would never suggest to speak for BellSouth
25 as to why it finds this issue to be of such

1 importance, I think it is safe to say that
2 BellSouth is oftentimes a "net payor" of reciprocal
3 compensation. This is due primarily to the fact
4 that ALECs appear to be more successful in
5 attracting ISP providers to their local service
6 offerings than BellSouth has been in retaining
7 them. Consider that although the vast majority of
8 services and prices included in an interconnection
9 agreement between BellSouth and a ALEC govern the
10 rates, terms and conditions by which the ALEC will
11 pay BellSouth for service, this is one area where
12 BellSouth may actually, in some circumstances, be
13 required to pay the ALEC for services the ALEC
14 provides to BellSouth. It is likely for that
15 reason that BellSouth is acutely interested in the
16 rates that will be paid for reciprocal compensation
17 and the terms and conditions under which they will
18 be assessed.

19 **Q: HASN'T THE FCC ALREADY ADDRESSED THIS ISSUE AND**
20 **FOUND THAT CALLS TO ISPS ARE INTERSTATE CALLS?**

21 **A:** It did, but two aspects of that decision must be
22 noted.¹² First, that decision no longer stands. On

¹² In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996; **Declaratory Ruling in CC Docket no. 96-98 and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 99-68**; Released: February 26, 1999; (ISP Order)

1 March 24, 2000, the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the
3 FCC's Declaratory Ruling in CC Docket No. 96-98.
4 *Bell Atlantic v. FCC*, Case No. 99-1094 (D.C. Cir.).
5 Second, while the FCC had stated at paragraph 18 of
6 its *ISP Order* that "a substantial portion of
7 Internet traffic involves accessing interstate or
8 foreign websites," the FCC clarified its position
9 with respect to the intercarrier compensation of
10 ISP calls at paragraph 25:

11 Even where parties to interconnection
12 agreements do not voluntarily agree on an
13 inter-carrier compensation mechanism for
14 ISP-bound traffic, state commissions
15 nonetheless may determine in their
16 arbitration proceedings at this point
17 that reciprocal compensation should be
18 paid for this traffic. The passage of
19 the 1996 Act raised the novel issue of
20 the applicability of its local
21 competition provisions to the issue of
22 inter-carrier compensation for ISP-bound
23 traffic. Section 252 imposes upon state
24 commissions the statutory duty to approve

1 voluntarily-negotiated interconnection
2 agreements and to arbitrate
3 interconnection disputes. As we observed
4 in the Local Competition Order, state
5 commission authority over interconnection
6 agreements pursuant to section 252
7 "extends to both interstate and
8 intrastate matters." Thus the mere fact
9 that ISP-bound traffic is largely
10 interstate does not necessarily remove it
11 from the section 251/252 negotiation and
12 arbitration process. However, any such
13 arbitration must be consistent with
14 governing federal law. While to date the
15 Commission has not adopted a specific
16 rule governing the matter, we do note
17 that our policy of treating ISP-bound
18 traffic as local for purposes of
19 interstate access charges would, if
20 applied in the separate context of
21 reciprocal compensation, suggest that
22 such compensation is due for that
23 traffic. [emphasis added, footnotes
24 removed]

1 Thus, even if one overlooks the fact that the FCC's
2 *ISP Order* has been vacated, the text of that order
3 would have supported a decision that reciprocal
4 compensation is owed for ISP-bound traffic.

5 **Q: HOW WOULD YOU SUGGEST THE QUESTION OF COMPENSATION**
6 **FOR ISP-BOUND TRAFFIC BE CONSIDERED SINCE THE *ISP***
7 ***ORDER* HAS BEEN VACATED?**

8 A: I would suggest that the Commission look to its own
9 prior decisions in this area as well as to public
10 policy and economic considerations in determining
11 how to address the present dispute.

12 **Q: PLEASE EXPLAIN WHY SOUND PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC**
13 **REASONING SUPPORT RECIPROCAL COMPENSATION PAYMENTS**
14 **FOR ISP-BOUND TRAFFIC.**

15 A: The Commission's decisions in this regard will have
16 a substantial impact on the Internet marketplace
17 and the investment required to realize the
18 potential of electronic communication and
19 e-commerce as a whole. The list below provides an
20 overview of the public policy and economic
21 rationales that support requiring payments for
22 ISP-bound traffic via the application of transport
23 and termination charges (*i.e.* reciprocal
24 compensation):

1 (a) ISP providers are an important market segment
2 for all carriers - both ALECs and ILECs - and making
3 it more costly to serve them is likely to distort
4 one of the only local exchange market segments that
5 appears to be well on its way toward effective
6 competition. ISPs have been drawn to ALECs like
7 Level 3 in large part because these ALECs have been
8 more willing to meet their unique service needs
9 such as collocation of facilities and short
10 provisioning intervals. Allowing ILECs to direct
11 calls to the ISPs by using the ALEC network without
12 paying anything for its use penalizes the ALEC for
13 attracting customers via innovative and customer
14 service focused products.

15 (b) Despite complex legal arguments and historical
16 definitions, the simple fact remains that calls
17 directed to ISPs are functionally identical to
18 local voice calls for which BellSouth agrees to pay
19 termination charges. Applying different
20 termination rates or, even worse, compensating a
21 carrier for one type of call and not for the other,
22 will generate inaccurate economic signals in the
23 marketplace, the result of which will drive firms
24 away from serving ISPs. This result could have a

1 dire impact on the growing electronic communication
2 and e-commerce markets.

3 (c) Requiring carriers to pay reciprocal
4 compensation rates for the termination of ISP-bound
5 traffic is economically efficient. Indeed, because
6 termination rates must be based upon the
7 incumbent's underlying costs, BellSouth should be
8 economically indifferent as to whether it itself
9 incurs the cost to terminate the call on its own
10 network or whether it incurs that cost through a
11 reciprocal compensation rate paid to Level 3. The
12 fact that BellSouth is not economically indifferent
13 stems from its incentive to impede Level 3's entry
14 into the marketplace instead of an incentive to be
15 as efficient as possible in terminating its
16 traffic.

17 (d) Because BellSouth is required to pay, as
18 well as receive, symmetrical compensation for local
19 exchange traffic based upon its own reported costs,
20 its payments to other carriers in this regard are
21 an important check on BellSouth's cost studies used
22 to establish rates for the termination of traffic.
23 Unless BellSouth is required to pay the costs that
24 it itself has established via its own cost studies,
25 it has every incentive to over-estimate those costs

1 for purposes of raising barriers to competitive
2 entry. By removing large traffic volume categories
3 such as ISP-bound traffic from BellSouth's
4 obligation to pay terminating costs, the Commission
5 would be removing an important disciplining factor
6 associated with ensuring that BellSouth's reported
7 termination costs are reasonable.

8 **Q: PLEASE EXPLAIN IN GREATER DETAIL YOUR CONTENTION**
9 **THAT BECAUSE ISP PROVIDERS ARE AN IMPORTANT MARKET**
10 **SEGMENT FOR ALECS, ELIMINATING AN ALEC'S ABILITY TO**
11 **RECOVER COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH SERVING THEM IS**
12 **LIKELY TO DISTORT THE MARKET.**

13 **A:** Transitionally competitive markets, like the local
14 exchange market, have shown that new entrants are
15 usually most successful in attracting customers
16 that (1) are unsatisfied with the services or
17 quality offered by the incumbent, (2) have
18 technological, capacity or other specific
19 requirements that are not easily met by the
20 incumbent's oftentimes inflexible service
21 offerings, and/or (3) don't have a long history of
22 taking service from the incumbent. ISP providers
23 fall directly into all three of these categories as
24 many of them have been unable to reach agreement
25 with ILECs in areas such as pricing for high

1 capacity lines, provisioning intervals, collocation
2 of their equipment in ILEC central offices or even
3 in some circumstances, the ability to purchase
4 service in sufficient quantity to meet their own
5 end-user customer demands. Likewise, most ISP
6 organizations are fairly new and have begun their
7 enterprise at a time when competitive alternatives
8 for local exchange services are available. Hence,
9 it is reasonable to expect that these types of
10 businesses are less restricted by long term or
11 volume agreements, a long business relationship or
12 other circumstances that often breed loyalty to the
13 incumbent. The fact that these customers are far
14 more likely to explore competitive opportunities
15 than more traditional residential and/or business
16 customers has made them an extremely important
17 customer base for ALECs.

18 Likewise, ALECs, like Level 3, because of
19 their new track record and non-existent customer
20 base in new markets, are naturally more likely to
21 serve customers that require services specifically
22 tailored to their strengths (i.e. customer service,
23 new technology deployment and substantial spare
24 capacity). Given these characteristics, ISP
25 providers and ALECs are effectively "made for one

1 another" and ISPs have flocked to new entrant ALECs
2 in increasing numbers. Likewise, ALECs have worked
3 with ISPs to design new and innovative services and
4 have provided ISPs the capacity they need to meet
5 their customers' increasing demands.

6 **Q: IS THE LIKELIHOOD THAT ALECS SERVE ISPS IN GREATER**
7 **PROPORTION THAN A MATURE INCUMBENT LIKE BELLSOUTH**
8 **THE RESULT OF A MARKET FAILURE?**

9 A: Not at all. The relationships between ALECs and
10 ISPs, as described above, are the direct result of
11 how a competitive market is meant to work.
12 Carriers who are unwilling to meet the demands of
13 their customers, lose those customers to carriers
14 who are more accommodating. Carriers who are
15 attempting to build market share tend to be more
16 accommodating than carriers who are attempting to
17 merely keep market share. Likewise, carriers who
18 provide customer focused services and supply the
19 capacity required to meet their customers' demands
20 are rewarded. The fact that relatively new
21 customers who require specific technological
22 support have embraced new ALECs is one of the most
23 promising outcomes of the local exchange market's
24 transition to competition. Indeed, ISPs and other
25 technologically reliant customer groups are, in

1 many cases, providing the revenue and growth
2 potential that will fund further ALEC expansion
3 into other more traditional residential and
4 business markets.

5 **Q: IF THE COMPETITIVE MARKETPLACE FOR ISP CUSTOMERS**
6 **APPEARS TO BE WORKING WELL, WHY IS LEVEL 3 ASKING**
7 **THE COMMISSION FOR ITS ASSISTANCE IN THIS**
8 **ARBITRATION?**

9 A: Within the interconnection agreement at issue in
10 this proceeding, BellSouth is refusing to pay going
11 forward, under the new contract, for traffic that
12 originates on its network and is directed to a
13 local ISP customer served by Level 3. Simply put,
14 BellSouth is asking through its proposed contract
15 language that Level 3 provide its facilities for
16 the use of BellSouth's customers without
17 compensation. Traffic originated on the BellSouth
18 network and directed to Level 3's local ISP
19 customers is no different than other types of
20 traffic for which BellSouth has agreed to provide
21 reciprocal compensation. Given this, and the fact
22 that Level 3 has agreed to pay BellSouth for
23 traffic originating on the Level 3 network and
24 directed to a BellSouth local ISP, the Commission

1 should require BellSouth to compensate Level 3 for
2 transporting and terminating such calls.

3 **Q: EARLIER YOU MENTIONED THAT ALLOWING BELLSOUTH TO**
4 **ABBROGATE ITS OBLIGATION TO COMPENSATE LEVEL 3 FOR**
5 **TRAFFIC DIRECTED TO ITS LOCAL ISP CUSTOMERS WOULD**
6 **DISTORT ONE OF THE ONLY LOCAL EXCHANGE MARKET**
7 **SEGMENTS THAT APPEARS TO BE WELL ON ITS WAY TOWARD**
8 **EFFECTIVE COMPETITION. CAN YOU EXPLAIN THIS**
9 **CONCEPT IN GREATER DETAIL?**

10 **A:** Yes. As I described above, ALECs have been more
11 successful in attracting a number of ISP customers
12 because they have offered those customers
13 innovations and reasonably priced advanced services
14 at a level of customer care that BellSouth was
15 unable or unwilling to provide. As such, BellSouth
16 has lost a number of these customers to Level 3 and
17 other ALECs, resulting in this particular market
18 segment exhibiting some of the most competitive
19 characteristics of any segment in the local market.

20 It is no coincidence that BellSouth wishes to
21 avoid paying reciprocal compensation going forward
22 for calls directed to this particular customer
23 group. If BellSouth can successfully remove itself
24 from an obligation to compensate ALECs for calls
25 directed to their ISP customers, BellSouth will

1 have accomplished two tasks inimical to the
2 competitive marketplace.

3 First, BellSouth will have been successful in
4 branding ISP customers as "unattractive" customers
5 from a local provider's standpoint because ISP
6 customers will generate costs for their local
7 service provider without providing any reciprocal
8 compensation revenues. By branding ISP customers
9 as unattractive customers, BellSouth will have
10 significantly diminished the hard-earned victories
11 made by its competitor ALECs.

12 Second, a failure to provide any reciprocal
13 compensation revenues associated with the function
14 of transporting and terminating traffic to ISPs
15 could disrupt the ISP marketplace. If ALECs need
16 to raise prices to ISPs because BellSouth does not
17 pay for call termination, this is likely to send
18 many ISPs back to BellSouth where its vastly larger
19 customer base can be used to offset the costs of
20 terminating the ISPs' traffic without raising ISP
21 local rates. Further, if their local exchange
22 rates are increasing, ISPs who do not return to
23 BellSouth would have little choice but to raise the
24 rates charged to their individual end users. This
25 will in turn make BellSouth's ISP retail service

1 more attractive to individual end users, further
2 stifling competition in the ISP market.

3 All of these circumstances are disruptions to
4 a competitive segment of the local exchange
5 marketplace that seems to be operating more
6 effectively than most other more traditional
7 segments. The fact that each of these disruptions
8 happens to benefit BellSouth should not be lost on
9 the Commission when it considers BellSouth's
10 rationale for refusing to pay reciprocal
11 compensation for ISP bound traffic.

12 **Q: WOULD THERE BE NEGATIVE ECONOMIC RESULTS FROM**
13 **ALLOWING BELLSOUTH TO PAY NOTHING FOR CALLS**
14 **DIRECTED TO ISPS YET PAY A HIGHER RATE FOR ALL**
15 **OTHER CALLS?**

16 **A:** Of course. Given the option of receiving an amount
17 greater than zero for carrying a non-ISP call and
18 nothing for carrying an ISP call, any reasonable
19 carrier would fill its switch with non-ISP calls to
20 the extent possible. Likewise, any carrier that
21 currently served a larger proportion of ISP
22 customers would be a less profitable network than a
23 network that served a smaller proportion of ISP
24 customers. In effect, allowing BellSouth to skirt
25 its obligation to pay for the use of an

1 interconnecting carrier's network to terminate its
2 local customers' calls to ISP providers will skew
3 the supply substitutability of ISP services versus
4 other local services, thereby making other local
5 exchange services relatively more attractive
6 production alternatives. This may in turn raise
7 ISP prices in relation to other local exchange
8 services thereby impairing an ISP's ability to
9 receive services at rates comparable to other local
10 end users. Not only is this in direct conflict
11 with the FCC's intentions with respect to offering
12 ISPs an access charge exemption so as to place them
13 on a level playing field with other local
14 customers, it also is likely, all else being equal,
15 to suppress ISP communication demand versus other
16 types of non-ISP communication.¹³ This price
17 discrimination effect will mean electronic
18 communication and e-commerce demand will
19 undoubtedly grow at a slower pace than if there
20 were no discrimination. Any difference between the
21 unrestricted growth of electronic communication and
22 the suppressed growth caused by the uneconomic
23 price discrimination described above would result

¹³ See, *ISP Order* at ¶20.

1 in a net welfare loss due to the inefficient market
2 consequences of BellSouth's failure to pay
3 reciprocal compensation rates.

4 **Q: PLEASE EXPLAIN IN MORE DETAIL YOUR CONTENTION THAT**
5 **BECAUSE TERMINATION RATES MUST BE BASED UPON THEIR**
6 **UNDERLYING COSTS, BELLSOUTH SHOULD BE ECONOMICALLY**
7 **INDIFFERENT AS TO WHETHER IT ITSELF INCURS THE COST**
8 **TO TERMINATE THE CALL ON ITS OWN NETWORK OR WHETHER**
9 **IT INCURS THAT COST THROUGH A RECIPROCAL**
10 **COMPENSATION RATE PAID TO LEVEL 3.**

11 **A:** Assume that a BellSouth customer calls another
12 BellSouth customer within the same local calling
13 area, as described in Diagram 5 *infra*. The call
14 will travel a similar path to the case described
15 above in which a BellSouth customer is dialing a
16 customer served by Level 3 or another ALEC, except
17 that both end offices will now be owned by
18 BellSouth.

19 In such a circumstance, BellSouth incurs costs
20 associated with originating, transporting and
21 terminating the call for which it is paid, by its
22 originating customer, a local usage fee (either a
23 flat fee per month or a per message or per minute
24 charge, or both).

1 When compared to the scenario discussed above,
2 in which the terminating customer is served by
3 Level 3 or another ALEC, it is easy to see that the
4 only difference between a call made between two
5 BellSouth local customers and the call made from a
6 BellSouth customer to a Level 3 customer is that
7 the Level 3 network provides the terminating
8 transport and switching function that was
9 originally performed by the BellSouth network. In
10 this way, BellSouth avoids those costs of
11 terminating the call. Hence, if BellSouth has
12 accurately established its terminating reciprocal
13 compensation rate based upon its own costs of
14 terminating a call, it should be economically
15 indifferent with respect to whether a call both
16 originates or terminates on its own network or
17 whether a call terminates on the Level 3 network.
18 BellSouth will either incur the terminating cost
19 via its own switch or it will incur that cost via a
20 cost-based rate paid to Level 3 for performing the
21 termination function. Either way, the extent to
22 which a particular call is directed to a particular
23 kind of customer is irrelevant to the economics and
24 engineering of the call.

1 Q: WHY IS THIS POINT CRITICAL TO UNDERSTANDING THE
2 DISPUTE REGARDING PAYMENT FOR ISP-BOUND TRAFFIC AT
3 ISSUE IN THIS PROCEEDING?

4 A: This point is critical for two reasons. First,
5 assume that neither Level 3 nor any other ALEC
6 existed and that BellSouth provides local services
7 to 100 percent of the customer base. Assume
8 further that ISP traffic is occurring at today's
9 levels with future growth expected to be even
10 greater. In such a circumstance, BellSouth would
11 be responsible not only for originating every call
12 but also for terminating every call, including
13 calls made to ISP providers. BellSouth would
14 undoubtedly need to reinforce its network to
15 accommodate the additional capacity requirements
16 associated with this increase in traffic. It is
17 highly unlikely under such a circumstance that
18 BellSouth would be arguing that terminating traffic
19 to an ISP provider should be done for free.
20 However, that is exactly what BellSouth is asking
21 this Commission to do in this case.

22 The arbitration issue before the Commission
23 differs from our hypothetical above in that instead
24 of only BellSouth investing in its network to meet
25 the capacity requirements of the traffic volume

1 increases that have occurred over the past few
2 years, new entrants have also invested capital and
3 have deployed their own switching capacity to
4 accommodate this growth. Likewise, as BellSouth
5 would have undoubtedly argued in our hypothetical
6 above that it should be compensated for its
7 additional investment to meet this growth, ALECs
8 should also be compensated for terminating that
9 traffic such that their investments can be
10 recovered.

11 The second reason is of paramount importance
12 because it is at the heart of the dispute between
13 the parties in this case. As I have shown above,
14 BellSouth should be indifferent as to whether it
15 terminates the traffic or it avoids the costs of
16 termination and pays someone else, namely an ALEC,
17 to do so. Yet we know that BellSouth is not
18 indifferent because it has refused to agree to such
19 a compensation framework as part of the new
20 interconnection agreement. The question is: Why?
21 The answer lies in one of two reasons. Either (1)
22 BellSouth's current rate for call termination is
23 not representative of its actual underlying costs
24 and it realizes that paying an ALEC for terminating
25 traffic actually makes it economically "worse off"

1 than terminating the traffic itself, or (2) it has
2 a competitive interest in not providing a cost
3 recovery mechanism for its competitors regardless
4 of the extent to which it is economically
5 indifferent on any given call.

6 **Q: DO YOU BELIEVE THAT EITHER OF YOUR SCENARIOS ABOVE**
7 **IS LIKELY TO BE AT THE ROOT OF BELL SOUTH'S REFUSAL**
8 **TO PAY COMPENSATION FOR CALLS DIRECTED TO ISP**
9 **PROVIDERS SERVED BY AN ALEC?**

10 **A:** Obviously, I can't speak to what motivates
11 BellSouth's position in this respect. However, I
12 can speak to the economic incentives that are at
13 work in the local exchange marketplace and how
14 participants within that marketplace react to them.
15 And, in this case, it would make sense that any
16 ILEC has an incentive (though an incentive steeped
17 in self-interest) to avoid payment for traffic
18 directed to an ISP served by an ALEC for both of
19 the reasons described above.

20 **Q: IN COMMENTS TO THE FCC, AND IN A NUMBER OF OTHER**
21 **DOCUMENTS, ILECS HAVE ARGUED THAT IT IS UNFAIR TO**
22 **FORCE THEM TO PAY ALECS FOR TERMINATING TRAFFIC TO**
23 **ISPS WHEN THEY ARE UNABLE TO RECOVER THOSE**
24 **RECIPROCAL COMPENSATION PAYMENTS EITHER THROUGH**
25 **ACCESS CHARGES ASSESSED ON THE ISP OR FOR USAGE**

1 CHARGES ASSESSED TO THEIR OWN LOCAL CUSTOMERS. DO
2 YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS REGARDING THIS ISSUE?

3 A. Yes, I do. First, I've already discussed the fact
4 that calls to ISPs are really indistinguishable
5 from calls to any other local customer. Hence, the
6 fact that a call is directed to an ISP or to any
7 other kind of customer is irrelevant to this
8 argument. This argument does not support
9 BellSouth's position that it will pay termination
10 charges for calls made to certain customers yet not
11 for calls directed to a business customer who
12 happens to be an ISP provider.

13 Second, however, there seems to be some
14 indication in this argument that ALECs are to blame
15 for the increased costs the ILECs contend they are
16 facing in meeting calling volume requirements
17 associated with electronic communication and
18 e-commerce. This simply isn't accurate. It is the
19 public's seemingly unquenchable thirst for Internet
20 access and other electronic communications media
21 that have caused the increased calling volumes that
22 generate costs associated with carrying local
23 traffic to the Internet. And, it is important to
24 note that companies like BellSouth are on the front

1 lines marketing these services to feed the public's
2 demand.

3 **Q: PLEASE SUMMARIZE LEVEL 3'S POSITION ON RECIPROCAL**
4 **COMPENSATION FOR ISP-BOUND CALLS.**

5 A: Reciprocal compensation is required under the 1996
6 Act and the FCC rules. BellSouth's proposal would
7 result in Level 3 carrying large volumes of
8 BellSouth traffic without any compensation. This
9 position is inconsistent and anticompetitive.

10 BellSouth has agreed to pay reciprocal
11 compensation for local calls dialed to an ALEC
12 residential or business customer. Consistent with
13 public policy and economic objectives and the
14 Commission's decision in other arbitration cases,
15 BellSouth should also pay Level 3 reciprocal
16 compensation for calls to those customers who
17 happen to be ISPs. Charging different rates for
18 what are identical types of calls would result in
19 significant negative impacts in the market place
20 and to BellSouth's competitors. Finally, the FCC
21 has enforced the ESP exemption such that enhanced
22 service providers, including ISPs, should not pay
23 access charges. At paragraph 20 of the *ISP Order*,
24 the FCC states as follows:

25 Our determination that at least a
26 substantial portion of dial-up ISP-bound

1 traffic is interstate does not, however,
2 alter the current ESP exemption. ESPs,
3 including ISPs, continue to be entitled
4 to purchase their PSTN links through
5 intrastate (local) tariffs rather than
6 through interstate access tariffs. Nor,
7 as we discuss below, is it dispositive of
8 interconnection disputes currently before
9 state commissions.

10
11 **Q: HAS THIS COMMISSION RULED ON THE JURISDICTIONALITY**
12 **OF ISP-BOUND TRAFFIC?**

13 **A:** Yes. To the best of my knowledge, this Commission
14 has addressed the reciprocal compensation issue for
15 ISP-bound traffic in at least three proceedings in
16 the last year. The proceedings were arbitrations
17 between BellSouth and ITC^DeltaCom Communications,
18 Intermedia Communications, and Global NAPS.

19 **Q: WERE THE RULINGS IN THOSE PROCEEDINGS SIMILAR?**

20 **A:** Yes, they were. The Commission recognized that the
21 FCC's Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed
22 Rulemaking (referred to herein as the *ISP Order*)
23 does not have a final rule governing inter-carrier
24 compensation for ISP-bound traffic and that states
25 are allowed to determine whether reciprocal
26 compensation is due for the traffic. Indeed, in
27 the Delta^Com Order the Commission stated,

28 We agree with ITC^DeltaCom witness
29 Rozycki that state commissions may

1 determine that reciprocal compensation is
2 due for ISP-bound traffic.¹⁴

3
4 Consistent with that ruling, the Commission
5 has ordered the continuation of inter-carrier
6 agreements pending the FCC's final rule on the
7 treatment of ISP-bound traffic. In the order cited
8 above, the Commission stated:

9 Upon consideration, we find it reasonable
10 that the parties shall continue to
11 operate under the terms of their current
12 interconnection agreement regarding
13 reciprocal compensation until the FCC
14 issues its final ruling on whether
15 ISP-bound traffic should be defined as
16 local or whether reciprocal compensation
17 is otherwise due for this traffic.¹⁵

18
19 **Q: PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR POSITION ON ISSUE 6.**

20 **A:** Calls to ISPs are handled and processed in the same
21 manner as any other local call and reciprocal
22 compensation should be paid on those calls.
23 BellSouth should not be allowed to avoid reciprocal
24 compensation for these calls as it would result in
25 ALECs carrying calls originated by BellSouth
26 customers without any compensation. Further,
27 BellSouth has failed to show why calls to ISPs

¹⁴ Before the Florida Public Service Commission; FINAL ORDER ON ARBITRATION; Docket No. 990750-TP; Order No. PSC-00-0537-FOF-TP; Issued March 15, 2000; at 33.

¹⁵ Id. at 34.

1 should be treated any differently from other local
2 calls. Finally, this Commission has determined in
3 other proceedings that its decision on the
4 jurisdictionality of ISP-bound calls may be
5 impacted by the FCC's final rule. As such, the
6 status quo should be maintained unless and until
7 the FCC issues a decision that definitively
8 addresses this issue.

9 **ISSUE 7 - SHOULD BELLSOUTH BE PERMITTED TO DEFINE ITS**
10 **OBLIGATION TO PAY RECIPROCAL COMPENSATION TO LEVEL 3**
11 **BASED UPON THE PHYSICAL LOCATION OF LEVEL 3'S CUSTOMERS?**
12 **SHOULD BELLSOUTH BE ABLE TO CHARGE ORIGINATING ACCESS TO**
13 **LEVEL 3 ON ALL CALLS GOING TO A PARTICULAR NXX CODE**
14 **BASED UPON THE LOCATION OF ANY ONE CUSTOMER?**

15 **Q: PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE DISPUTE ON THIS POINT.**

16 A: BellSouth argues that it should not be required to
17 pay reciprocal compensation for any call
18 terminating to a customer who is physically located
19 outside of the local calling area where the call
20 originates. Further, BellSouth argues that it
21 should be able to charge originating access charges
22 for all calls to customers physically located
23 outside the local calling area. BellSouth provides
24 no evidence that such calls increase its costs as

1 compared to other local calls in any way such that
2 additional cost recovery is justified.

3 BellSouth does not incur any additional costs
4 in delivering traffic to Level 3's switch based on
5 the location of Level 3's customers. Further, it
6 would be inconsistent and anticompetitive to allow
7 BellSouth to evade reciprocal compensation and then
8 to charge Level 3 originating switched access
9 charges for calls going to a particular NXX code.
10 Finally, the FCC's ESP Exemption specifically
11 prohibits the imposition of access charges on
12 enhanced service providers, including ISPs.

13 **Q: WHAT ARE NXX CODES?**

14 **A:** NXX codes are the fourth through sixth digits of a
15 ten-digit telephone number. These codes are used
16 as rate center identifiers, but it is not uncommon
17 for NXX codes to be assigned to customers who are
18 not physically located in that rate center. This
19 type of arrangement has at times been referred to
20 as "Virtual NXX" because the customer assigned to
21 the telephone number has a "virtual" presence in the
22 associated local calling area. This flexible use
23 of NXX codes allows carriers to offer valuable
24 services to their customers. For instance,
25 so-called virtual NXX arrangements enable ISPs to

1 offer low cost dial-up numbers throughout Florida,
2 including the more isolated areas of the State.
3 Access to the Internet is affordable and readily
4 available in all areas of the state because virtual
5 NXX arrangements allow ISPs to establish a small
6 number of points of presence (POP) that can be
7 reached by dialing a local number regardless of the
8 physical location of the Internet subscriber
9 (within the LATA).

10 **Q: IS IT UNLAWFUL OR AGAINST ANY RULES FOR ALECS TO**
11 **PROVIDE VIRTUAL NXXS TO THEIR CUSTOMERS?**

12 A: No. The use of virtual NXX codes is not unlawful
13 or in any other way improper. BellSouth provides a
14 virtual NXX service to ISPs called foreign exchange
15 service. Indeed, nobody complained about such uses
16 of NXX codes until ALECs had some success in
17 attracting ISP customers and the ILECs began
18 looking for any means possible to avoid paying
19 ALECs for terminating calls to ISPs.

20 **Q: CAN YOU DESCRIBE THE IMPACT OF BELLSOUTH'S PROPOSED**
21 **LANGUAGE WITH RESPECT TO THE CUSTOMER'S PHYSICAL**
22 **LOCATION, IN MORE DETAIL?**

23 A: Yes, as noted above, the language proposed by
24 BellSouth would have at least three significant
25 negative impacts in Florida. First, if the

1 Commission adopted BellSouth's proposed language,
2 BellSouth would be able to evade its reciprocal
3 compensation obligations under the 1996 Act.

4 Second, and also contrary to one of the
5 fundamental goals of the 1996 Act, BellSouth's
6 proposed language would have a negative impact on
7 the competitive deployment of affordable dial-up
8 Internet services in Florida.

9 Finally, BellSouth's proposed language would
10 give BellSouth a competitive advantage over Level 3
11 in the ISP market.

12 **Q: HOW WOULD BELLSOUTH EVADE ITS RECIPROCAL**
13 **COMPENSATION OBLIGATIONS TO LEVEL 3 BY LIMITING**
14 **RECIPROCAL COMPENSATION TO CALLS ORIGINATING AND**
15 **TERMINATING IN THE SAME LOCAL CALLING AREA?**

16 **A:** Placing limitations on reciprocal compensation by
17 referring to a customer's physical location would
18 give BellSouth the ability to re-classify local
19 calls as toll calls. This is because according to
20 BellSouth's proposed language, it would be nearly
21 impossible and much more economically burdensome
22 for Level 3 (or any other ALEC in a similar
23 situation) to utilize virtual NXXs in the provision
24 of service to its customers. Virtual NXXs are
25 often used by carriers to provide a local number to

1 customers in local calling areas in which the
2 customer is not physically located. Customers who
3 are physically located (both ILEC and ALEC
4 customers) in that area are then able to place
5 calls to the virtual NXX customer without incurring
6 toll charges. If BellSouth precludes Level 3 or
7 any other ALEC from using virtual NXXs for local
8 calls to ISPs, not only would BellSouth customers
9 no longer be able to reach many of their ISPs by
10 dialing a local number, but because calls to the
11 ISP have been re-classified as toll calls,
12 BellSouth would no longer be obligated to pay the
13 reciprocal compensation associated with local
14 calls. One must consider the implications in both
15 the competitive telecommunications market and the
16 Internet access market - if a carrier cannot use
17 virtual NXXs to serve ISPs without paying BellSouth
18 a high per-minute charge for originating each call
19 and then also loses the ability to collect any
20 compensation from BellSouth in terminating the
21 call, what incentive will any carrier have to serve
22 ISPs? And who then will the ISPs turn to in order
23 to ensure that their own customers in Florida don't
24 have to dial a toll call to reach the Internet? I
25 will discuss later in this testimony how these

1 considerations could affect the Florida
2 telecommunications and Internet access markets.

3 **Q: DO THE COSTS INCURRED BY BELLSOUTH DIFFER WHEN ONE**
4 **OF ITS CUSTOMERS DIALS A VIRTUAL NXX NUMBER AS**
5 **OPPOSED TO A PHYSICAL NXX, THEREBY PROVIDING**
6 **JUSTIFICATION FOR BELLSOUTH TO AVOID PAYING**
7 **RECIPROCAL COMPENSATION AND BEGIN IMPOSING SWITCHED**
8 **ACCESS CHARGES?**

9 **A:** No. There is no additional cost incurred by
10 BellSouth when a virtual NXX is provided to an ALEC
11 customer, because BellSouth carries the call the
12 same distance and incurs the same costs regardless
13 of whether the call is terminated to an ALEC
14 customer with a physical location in the NXX rate
15 center, or an ALEC customer with a virtual
16 presence. BellSouth's obligations and costs are
17 therefore exactly the same in delivering a call
18 originated by one of its customers, regardless of
19 whether the call terminates at a so-called "virtual"
20 or "physical" NXX behind the ALEC switch. At a time
21 when regulators and the industry are looking to
22 move to more competitive market models by
23 eliminating implicit subsidies in
24 telecommunications rates and intercarrier payments,
25 it would seem contrary to reason to suddenly now

1 foist switched originating access charges on a
2 certain type of customer traffic when the costs of
3 originating that traffic do not differ from any
4 other local call.

5 **Q: DOES THE USE OF VIRTUAL NXX CODES IMPACT THE**
6 **HANDLING OR PROCESSING OF A CALL TO A LEVEL 3**
7 **CUSTOMER?**

8 A: No. BellSouth would always be responsible for
9 carrying the call to the IP on its own network and
10 then paying for delivery of the call over the same
11 distance (from the IP to the ALEC switch). The
12 use of a virtual NXX does not impact BellSouth's
13 financial and/or operational responsibilities such
14 that it should be eligible to avoid paying any
15 compensation to the terminating LEC or collecting
16 additional compensation itself.

17 **Q: PLEASE EXPLAIN IN GREATER DETAIL YOUR CONTENTION**
18 **THAT CALLS DIRECTED TO ISPS ARE FUNCTIONALLY**
19 **IDENTICAL TO LOCAL VOICE CALLS FOR WHICH BELLSOUTH**
20 **HAS AGREED TO PAY TERMINATION CHARGES.**

21 A: Let's begin with a quick review of the technical
22 requirements of reciprocal compensation. This
23 drawing attached hereto as Exhibit __ (TJG-
24 3) (Diagram 3) depicts one way that BellSouth may

1 route and terminate local calls on its own network,
2 to and from its own customers.

3 The customer on the left calls the customer on
4 the right. The call is switched at the central
5 office to the tandem where is it routed to the
6 terminating central office and finally to the
7 called party.¹⁶ In this scenario, ~~Ameritech~~ ^{BellSouth} is
8 financially and operationally responsible for both
9 originating and terminating the call.

10 **Q: HOW DOES THE FINANCIAL AND OPERATIONAL**
11 **RESPONSIBILITY CHANGE IN A MULTIPLE PROVIDER**
12 **ENVIRONMENT?**

13 A: In an environment with multiple providers, the
14 parties share the responsibility for carrying this
15 call. Interconnection and reciprocal compensation
16 agreements define carrier responsibilities in a
17 multiple provider environment. See Diagram 4
18 attached as Exhibit __ (TJG-4).

19 In comparing Diagram 3 and this diagram
20 (Diagram 4), there is a point of interconnection or
21 "POI" in a multiple provider situation. The POI is

¹⁶ This is just one example of how a call might be routed. There are other possible routes a call could take that would not include the tandem. Direct trunking between central offices is possible and so is an intra-office call. These different scenarios do not impact the point of this discussion.

1 the physical interconnection between the two
2 networks and represents the point where financial
3 and operational responsibility for handling local
4 calls changes. The POI is sometimes referred to as
5 the interconnection point or IP. I use these terms
6 interchangeably in this testimony.

7 **Q: PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW A CALL IS ROUTED IN THIS**
8 **MULTIPLE CARRIER ENVIRONMENT.**

9 A: Assuming a BellSouth customer originates a call to
10 the Level 3 customer, BellSouth is responsible for
11 getting the call to Level 3's POI. BellSouth
12 switches and transports the call to the POI. From
13 the POI, Level 3 is responsible for terminating the
14 call for BellSouth - again, switching and
15 transporting the call to the called party. In
16 return, BellSouth pays Level 3 for terminating the
17 call. The originating carrier is compensated for
18 its portion of the call through local rates,
19 vertical features (i.e., call waiting, call
20 forwarding, star codes), EAS arrangements and other
21 subsidies, such as access charges, that support
22 local rates. The routing and compensation
23 responsibilities are reversed if a Level 3 customer
24 calls a BellSouth customer. Hence the term
25 "reciprocal."

1 **Q: DO YOU AGREE WITH BELLSOUTH'S ATTEMPT TO LIMIT ITS**
2 **OBLIGATION TO PAY RECIPROCAL COMPENSATION?**

3 A: No. BellSouth insists on language that would limit
4 the reciprocal compensation obligations by defining
5 local calls as only those calls originating and
6 terminating to customers located physically within
7 the same local calling area. BellSouth also
8 excludes traffic destined for Internet Service
9 Providers, or ISPs, from the reciprocal
10 compensation obligation. These positions are
11 anticompetitive and should be rejected by this
12 Commission.

13 **Q: PLEASE PROVIDE SOME EXAMPLES THAT SHOW THE FLAWS IN**
14 **BELLSOUTH'S POSITION.**

15 A: BellSouth's definition of local calls subject to
16 reciprocal compensation would eliminate reciprocal
17 compensation for terminating BellSouth customer
18 calls to an entire class of customers who purchase
19 local exchange service. A few diagrams will show
20 that ISP-bound calls served through a virtual NXX
21 arrangement are no different than other local calls
22 and they will show the inconsistency of BellSouth's
23 arguments.

24 In the diagram attached hereto as Exhibit __
25 (TJG-5) (Diagram 5) I show a call that both

1 originates and terminates within the same local
2 calling area.

3 BellSouth is responsible for carrying the call
4 from its customer to the POI. Level 3 is
5 responsible for terminating the call to the Level 3
6 customer for BellSouth.

7 **Q: DOES THE PHYSICAL LOCATION OF THE CUSTOMER IMPACT**
8 **BELLSOUTH'S COSTS AND/OR RESPONSIBILITIES?**

9 A: No. The importance of this comparison rests in the
10 fact that BellSouth's costs of transporting and
11 terminating traffic are not impacted by the
12 location of the customer to whom the call
13 terminates and/or the extent to which the
14 terminating customer is either a residential,
15 business or Internet Service Provider.

16 In the diagram attached hereto as Exhibit __
17 (TJG-6) (Diagram 6), the called party (Level 3
18 customer) is physically located in another local
19 calling area. For purposes of discussion, let's
20 assume it's not an EAS area, or an adjacent
21 exchange toll-calling plan.

22 Level 3's customer has an NXX associated with
23 Calling Area 1 - a service option I have described
24 above as a virtual NXX. In short, this service

1 allows the customer to have a local telephone
2 number in calling area 1.

3 BellSouth's customer calls the Level 3
4 customer in local calling area 2 using a virtual
5 NXX number. As in our prior example, BellSouth is
6 still responsible for getting the call to the POI.
7 Again, Level 3 is responsible for terminating the
8 call. The location of the called party does not
9 change the handling of the call by BellSouth or
10 Level 3, nor does it change BellSouth's costs of
11 handling the call.

12 **Q: HOW DO BELLSOUTH'S RESPONSIBILITIES CHANGE IF THE**
13 **BELLSOUTH CUSTOMER CALLS THE LEVEL 3 CUSTOMER IN**
14 **LOCAL CALLING AREA 1?**

15 **A:** Again, referring to Diagram 6 above, if the
16 BellSouth Customer calls the Level 3 customer in
17 the same local calling area, the routing and
18 handling of the call is no different than if the
19 call was made to the Level 3 customer in local
20 calling area 2 with a virtual NXX. BellSouth is
21 responsible for getting the call to the POI and
22 Level 3 terminates the call. So, as you can see,
23 the location of the called party has no impact on
24 BellSouth's responsibilities or costs. Further,
25 whether the BellSouth customer dials a physical NXX

1 (to the Level 3 customer in local calling area 1)
2 or a virtual NXX (to the Level 3 customer in local
3 calling area 2) the responsibilities and costs for
4 BellSouth do not change.

5 Now, let's look at a situation where the POI
6 and the called party are in another local calling
7 area.

8 In this situation (Diagram 7) attached hereto
9 as Exhibit __ (TJG-7), BellSouth is still
10 responsible for getting the call to the POI. The
11 fact that the called party is in a different local
12 calling area does not impact BellSouth's
13 responsibility or costs. There is therefore no
14 rational cost basis for allowing BellSouth to
15 assess originating access charges on this call or
16 avoid paying terminating compensation on this call.

17 **Q: PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR POSITION ON THIS POINT.**

18 **A:** A call originated on the BellSouth network using a
19 physical or virtual NXX and directed to any ALEC's
20 network travels exactly the same path and requires
21 the use of exactly the same facilities as any other
22 local call would. Calls to physical or virtual
23 NXX numbers use the same path and the same
24 equipment to reach the Interconnection Point and
25 the terminating carrier's switch. To single out the

1 virtual NXX calls to ISPs and suggest that no
2 compensation should be paid for purposes of
3 carrying that particular call ignores the simple
4 economic reality that both kinds of calls are
5 functionally identical and should be subject to
6 reciprocal compensation.

7 **Q: PLEASE EXPLAIN WHY IMPOSITION OF ORIGINATING ACCESS**
8 **CHARGES ON LEVEL 3 FOR VIRTUAL NXX CALLS IS**
9 **INAPPROPRIATE.**

10 A: BellSouth's proposal to limit its reciprocal
11 compensation obligations and to collect originating
12 access from Level 3 based upon customers' physical
13 location has no basis in law or fact. Indeed, the
14 *TSR Order* at paragraph 34 specifically notes that
15 "The Local Competition Order requires a carrier to
16 pay the cost of facilities used to deliver traffic
17 originated by that carrier to the network of its
18 co-carrier, who then terminates that traffic and
19 bills the originating carrier for termination
20 compensation." In that same paragraph, the FCC
21 states, "This regime represents 'rules of the road'
22 under which all carriers operate, and which make it
23 possible for one company's customer to call any
24 other customer even if that customer is served by
25 another telephone company." (emphasis added)

1 As I have shown, ISP-bound calls are handled
2 and processed in exactly the same manner as any
3 other local call. Further, this Commission has
4 found repeatedly that, at least on an interim
5 basis, ISP-bound calls shall be treated as local
6 calls for purposes of reciprocal compensation.
7 Deciding now that virtual NXX calls should somehow
8 be treated differently would effectively render
9 meaningless any decision that reciprocal
10 compensation is due for ISP-bound traffic, since
11 ISPs are often served through such arrangements.

12 BellSouth's proposal is especially egregious
13 given that BellSouth's costs do not change
14 depending upon the location of the called party.
15 Regardless of the customer's location, BellSouth's
16 responsibility for carrying originating
17 locally-dialed traffic on its own network will
18 always end at the IP, where its network ends and
19 Level 3's network begins. Its responsibility for
20 paying reciprocal compensation to Level 3 will
21 always end at the Level 3 switch, regardless of
22 where the customer is served beyond that switch.
23 Thus, BellSouth's costs and obligations in
24 originating a locally-dialed call from a particular
25 BellSouth customer cannot differ because of where

1 Level 3's customer is located. Given that there is
2 no cost difference, it would seem arbitrary to then
3 impose a different rate structure on these virtual
4 NXX calls.

5 **Q: HAS THIS COMMISSION FOUND THAT APPLYING ACCESS**
6 **CHARGES TO ISP-BOUND TRAFFIC IS INAPPROPRIATE?**

7 A: Yes, it has. In the Global NAPS arbitration
8 proceeding, the Commission stated,

9 In considering other possible compensation
10 options for ISP-bound traffic, we find GNAPS
11 witness Selwyn's argument compelling, wherein he
12 states:

13 [w]hile one could make a case in the
14 abstract for the notion that ISPs should
15 pay access charges, as opposed to being
16 allowed to connect to the public switched
17 network just like other end users, not
18 only is such an arrangement not in place
19 today, it is affirmatively banned today
20 by the operation of the [FCC's] ESP
21 exemption.¹⁷

22
23 Increasing the cost of Internet access through
24 the introduction of access charges and the denial
25 of reciprocal compensation would be inconsistent
26 with the Act's mandate for Internet services.
27 More specifically, Section 230(b)(2) (47 U.S.C.

¹⁷ Before the Florida Public Service Commission; FINAL ORDER ON ARBITRATION; Docket No. 991220-TP; Order No. PSC-00-1680-FOF-TP; Issued: September 19, 2000; at 13.

1 230) of the Act states "It is the policy of the
2 United States to preserve the vibrant and
3 competitive free market that presently exists for
4 the Internet and other interactive computer
5 services, unfettered by Federal or state
6 regulation." To the extent BellSouth's proposal to
7 distinguish Internet usage from other local usage
8 depresses demand for Internet usage, it is not in
9 the public interest.

10 **Q. WHY IS IT IMPORTANT FOR LEVEL 3 TO PROVIDE ITS**
11 **CUSTOMERS WITH VIRTUAL NXXS?**

12 A: Level 3 and other ALECs provide (and, as discussed
13 below, seemingly BellSouth itself provides) a
14 valuable service to customers by providing them
15 with virtual NXXs. For example, Level 3 may
16 attract ISP customers by providing virtual NXXs.
17 The virtual NXX allows the ISP's subscribers to
18 access the Internet by calling a local number, even
19 though the ISP's POP may be further away.

20 A key competitive advantage - indeed, a
21 practical business necessity - for any ISP is having
22 a local dial-up for a prospective customer.
23 Because Internet-bound calls are often longer in
24 duration than other calls, avoiding toll charges
25 associated with accessing an ISP's POP that is not

1 located in the user's rate center dramatically
2 reduces the user's Internet costs. Therefore, ISPs
3 will often choose their carrier based on the
4 carrier's ability to provide local dial-up
5 capability via the virtual NXX.

6 **Q: HOW WOULD THE COMPETITIVE DEPLOYMENT OF AFFORDABLE**
7 **INTERNET SERVICES BE IMPACTED IF BELLSOUTH**
8 **RESTRICTS ALECS USE OF NXX CODES?**

9 A: By contractually inhibiting the use of NXXs in such
10 a manner that Level 3 and other ALECs cannot offer
11 virtual NXXs without facing additional charges, the
12 costs associated with accessing the Internet would
13 increase. By using virtual NXX assignments, Level
14 3 and other ALECs have been able to provide
15 services that allow ISPs to provide low cost
16 Internet services throughout Florida, by allowing
17 ISP customers to access the Internet by dialing a
18 local number. Eliminating the ability to provide
19 virtual NXX codes - or refusing to pay reciprocal
20 compensation for these local calls -- would be a
21 step in the wrong direction in the deployment of
22 affordable Internet services in Florida, as the end
23 result would be a decrease in usage of Internet
24 services by Florida citizens facing the prospect of

1 toll charges or other increased costs to access
2 their ISPs.

3 This would be in direct conflict with the 1996
4 Act, which calls for consumers in all regions of
5 the Nation, including those in rural, insular, and
6 high cost areas, to have access to
7 telecommunications and information services at
8 just, reasonable, and comparable rates. (Sec.
9 254(b)) 47 U.S.C. § 254(b).

10 **Q: WOULD BELLSOUTH'S PROPOSED LANGUAGE GIVE BELLSOUTH**
11 **A COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE IN THE ISP MARKET?**

12 **A:** Yes. BellSouth markets certain products to ISPs.
13 These service offerings appear to be no different
14 from what ALECs such as Level 3 offer their own ISP
15 customers using a virtual NXX arrangement. If
16 ALECs are prohibited from receiving reciprocal
17 compensation for virtual NXX calls to prospective
18 and current ISP customers through BellSouth's
19 proposed contract restrictions, ISPs would either
20 have to establish multiple POPs in order to allow
21 their subscribers to access the Internet via a
22 local number or to contract with BellSouth and
23 subscribe to BellSouth's ISP products. Because
24 each POP requires a significant investment in
25 hardware and leased line connections, and because

1 provisioning services in new areas may cause delays
2 in ISP service offerings, the ability to offer ISP
3 customers local dial-up and single POP capability
4 is a critical competitive consideration. More
5 importantly, forcing ISPs and CLECs to deploy these
6 facilities - when, as described above, such
7 deployment is not at all necessary - would encourage
8 inefficiency and a wasteful allocation of limited
9 ALEC resources. Only BellSouth, with its
10 ubiquitous network developed with the support of
11 decades of subsidies, could likely offer ISPs the
12 kind of presence required in each local calling
13 area to avoid a virtual NXX situation. Moreover,
14 by precluding Level 3 from receiving reciprocal
15 compensation for these services, and then
16 threatening to impose higher access charges on each
17 call, BellSouth is creating an economic barrier to
18 any other carriers providing service to ISPs, and
19 is giving itself a significant competitive
20 advantage. This clear advantage for BellSouth
21 would not only stifle the ability of ALECs such as
22 Level 3 to provide service to ISPs in Florida, but
23 would essentially eliminate the prospect for
24 competition in this market.

1 **Q: PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR POSITION ON ORIGINATING**
2 **ACCESS RECIPROCAL COMPENSATION FOR CALLS UTILIZING**
3 **VIRTUAL NXX CODES.**

4 A: The use of virtual NXX codes allows consumers
5 efficient access to ISPs and Internet services that
6 would otherwise be impossible if such calls were
7 treated as toll calls. Further, treating calls to
8 virtual NXX numbers as something other than local
9 would inappropriately allow BellSouth to avoid
10 payment of reciprocal compensation and give
11 BellSouth a competitive advantage over ALECs in the
12 ISP market. For all these reasons, the Commission
13 should adopt Level 3's position and delete
14 BellSouth's proposed language that would impose
15 originating access charges and eliminate reciprocal
16 compensation for local calls based on the physical
17 location of the ISPs, and the Commission should
18 specifically find that calls to ISPs should be
19 treated as local calls since there are no
20 additional costs or responsibilities borne by
21 BellSouth.

22 **Q: DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?**

23 A: Yes, it does.

24

1 **Q: PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, TITLE, AND ADDRESS FOR THE**
2 **RECORD.**

3 A: My name is Timothy J. Gates. I am a Senior Vice President of QSI
4 Consulting. My business address is as follows: 15712 W. 72nd
5 Circle, Arvada, Colorado 80007.

6 **Q. ARE YOU THE SAME AS TIMOTHY J. GATES WHO FILED DIRECT**
7 **TESTIMONY IN THIS PROCEEDING?**

8 A. Yes, I am.

9 **Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?**

10 A. The purpose of my testimony is to rebut certain statements made
11 by BellSouth witness Cynthia K. Cox in her direct testimony filed in
12 this Docket on October 5, 2000, with regard to Issues 1, 3, 6 and 7.

13 ***ISSUE 1 – How should the parties designate the***

14 ***Interconnection Points (“IPs” or “POIs”) for their networks?***

15 ***ISSUE 3 – Should each carrier be required to pay for the use of***

16 ***interconnection trunks on the other carrier’s network? Even if***

17 ***so, should Level 3 be required to pay recurring and***

18 ***nonrecurring rates based upon BellSouth’s access tariff for***

19 ***the use of interconnection trunks?***

20 **Q. PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE DISPUTE ON THESE**
21 **POINTS.**

1 A. BellSouth has created a fiction in order to support its position that
2 Level 3 should be required to collect traffic from each BellSouth
3 local calling area. That fiction is that each local calling area is a
4 distinct, stand alone local network to which the FCC and the
5 Telecommunications Act (“Act”) requirements apply. If BellSouth’s
6 position is accepted, the effect would be to require new entrants
7 such as Level 3 to build or lease facilities to transport traffic
8 originated by a BellSouth customer on the BellSouth side of the
9 point of interconnection with Level 3. This is completely
10 inconsistent with the FCC rules and the incumbent LEC (“ILEC”)
11 requirements identified in the Act.

12 **Q: DID THE FCC RECOGNIZE THAT NEW ENTRANTS WOULD**
13 **LIKELY DEVELOP THEIR NETWORKS WITH ONLY ONE POINT**
14 **OF INTERCONNECTION (“POI”) PER LATA?**

15 A. Yes. Mr. Rogers addresses this issue in some detail. It is clear,
16 however, that the FCC recognized that most, if not all, new entrants
17 would initiate service with a single POI per LATA. In its order on
18 the SBC 271 application filed in Texas, the FCC stated in pertinent
19 part:

20 Section 251, and our implementing rules, require
21 an incumbent LEC to allow a competitive LEC to
22 interconnect at any technically feasible point.
23 This means that a competitive LEC has the

1 option to interconnect at only one technically
2 feasible point in each LATA.¹

3 Consistent with the FCC's approach, and recognizing that
4 many LATAs in BellSouth's network are served by more than one
5 access tandem, this Commission has, where requested by an ALEC,
6 found that it is technically feasible to require a single POI per LATA.²

7 **Q. BELLSOUTH SUGGESTS THAT LEVEL 3 "SHOULD BEAR THE**
8 **FULL COSTS OF ITS NETWORK DESIGN CHOICES."**
9 **(TESTIMONY OF COX AT 3) PLEASE COMMENT.**

10 A. What Ms. Cox refers to as a "design choice" is not a choice at all. To
11 suggest that a choice is available is to suggest that Level 3 would be
12 indifferent to either outcome. This is certainly not the case in network
13 deployment. Instead, the economic reality of network development
14 is that it is accomplished one piece at a time, not all at once. The fact
15 that an ALEC starts its business with one switch and not two or 20,
16 reflects the business reality that new entrants must grow their
17 business (market share) to justify the purchase of additional network

¹ *In The Matter of Application of SBC Communications, Inc. Pursuant to Section 271 to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in Texas*, CC Docket No. 00-65, Memorandum Opinion And Order, ¶¶78 (rel. June 30, 2000) (*Texas 271 Order*).

² *Petition by Sprint Communications Company Limited Partnership d/b/a Sprint for arbitration with BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. concerning interconnection rates, terms, and conditions, pursuant to the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996*, Docket No. 961150-TP, Final Order on Arbitration, Order No. PSC-97-0122-FOF-TP, 9 (Feb. 3, 1997).

1 facilities. What BellSouth is really trying to do is penalize ALECs for
2 not deploying more switches at the time of market entry.

3 Successful companies are guided by the economic
4 ramifications of their decisions. As such, telecommunications
5 companies do not replace switches or network facilities until they are
6 outdated or near exhaust. They do not add additional switches or
7 remotes until there is a traffic forecast to justify the cost of such
8 deployment. The same is true of new technology. BellSouth will
9 deploy SONET rings in such places as Jacksonville and Orlando
10 before they deploy them in Lake City or Sanford. As such, the
11 decision to add new switches or facilities are not mere design choices
12 as suggested by Ms. Cox, they are rational resource allocation
13 decisions based on the ability of the carrier to attract various levels of
14 business and the amount of traffic a carrier expects to handle.

15 **Q. MS. COX CLAIMS THAT "BELLSOUTH HAS A LOCAL NETWORK**
16 **IN EACH OF THE LOCAL CALLING AREAS IT SERVES IN**
17 **FLORIDA." (TESTIMONY OF COX AT 4) PLEASE COMMENT.**

18 **A.** This is the fiction I referred to earlier. BellSouth is using this play on
19 words in an attempt to justify its proposal that Level 3 be financially
20 responsible for delivering BellSouth's originating traffic from each of
21 these purportedly separate networks to the POI. As noted above in

1 the *Texas 271 Order*, the ALECs are allowed one technically feasible
2 point per LATA, not per local calling area.

3 BellSouth uses the definition of “interconnection” – the physical
4 linking of two networks – in an attempt to justify its proposal.

5 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN.**

6 A. Ms. Cox cites the definition of interconnection as being a connection
7 between two networks, and then proceeds to suggest that each local
8 calling area is a separate and distinct network. For instance, at page
9 18 of her testimony she states, “When Level 3 interconnects with
10 BellSouth’s local network in Jacksonville, it is not interconnecting with
11 BellSouth’s local network in Lake City.” This is simply not true.

12 The local networks Ms. Cox is referring to are not stand-alone
13 networks – they are an integral part of the larger BellSouth network.
14 To use Ms. Cox’s approach, BellSouth would have anywhere from
15 100 to 200 or more local networks in Florida alone. Ms. Cox says that
16 BellSouth has “...as many as 10, 20, or more such local networks in
17 a given LATA.” (Testimony of Cox at 4) Thus, under BellSouth’s
18 theory, an ALEC could have to interconnect with BellSouth up to 200
19 times in its Florida serving area – and thereby duplicate the historical
20 development of the BellSouth network – just so it could exchange
21 traffic with BellSouth.

1 **Q. IS MS. COX’S POSITION ON LOCAL NETWORKS CONSISTENT**
2 **WITH OTHER STATEMENTS BY BELLSOUTH?**

3 A. No. Mr. Sachetti cites several statements by BellSouth that indicate
4 that Ms. Cox’s representation is incorrect. I would like to add a few
5 more examples to reinforce this point.

6 At a recent speaking engagement, BellSouth Chairman and
7 CEO, Mr. Duane Ackerman boasted about the integrated nature of
8 BellSouth’s wireline network, especially as it relates to data, saying
9 that BellSouth’s network is “the most robust local network in the U. S.,
10 if not the world”, and that the network is “not about a series of stand-
11 alone internet data centers”, but “about an integrated e>business
12 network platform, available to all of our customers wherever they are.”
13 Mr. Ackerman attributes BellSouth’s ability to provide advanced
14 services to its customers to the integration of its existing network
15 facilities consisting of “Internet points-of-presence, central offices,
16 SONET rings and Fast Packet switches”.³

17 Clearly, Mr. Ackerman’s references to “the most robust local
18 network in the US, if not the world” was not a reference to one of the
19 many “local networks” that may be found in a LATA as suggested by

³ Remarks of Duane Ackerman at the Goldman Sachs 2000 Communicopia IX Conference, October 4, 2000.

1 Ms. Cox. Instead, the industry readily recognizes his comments to
2 refer to the entirety of the integrated BellSouth network.

3 **Q. MS. COX CLAIMS THAT “LEVEL 3 IS INAPPROPRIATELY**
4 **ATTEMPTING TO SHIFT COSTS TO BELLSOUTH.” (TESTIMONY**
5 **OF COX AT 8) PLEASE RESPOND.**

6 A. This is not true. Level 3 is deploying its network consistent with
7 efficient engineering principles. Ms. Cox’s arguments regarding the
8 number of POIs is an attempt by BellSouth to raise Level 3’s costs to
9 enter BellSouth’s heretofore monopoly market. In doing so, Ms. Cox
10 is attempting to relitigate points which Congress and the FCC have
11 already decided. Delivering traffic originated by BellSouth customers
12 to the POI is BellSouth’s responsibility – financially and operationally.
13 Mr. Rogers addresses this extensively in his rebuttal testimony.

14 **Q. PLEASE RESPOND TO MS. COX’S EXAMPLE OF A CALL**
15 **BETWEEN TWO NEIGHBORS IN LAKE CITY – ONE WHO IS A**
16 **CUSTOMER OF BELLSOUTH AND ONE WHO IS A CUSTOMER**
17 **OF LEVEL 3. (TESTIMONY OF COX AT 8-10)**

18 A. First of all, many neighbors have different telecommunications
19 providers. In the long-distance market, for instance, it would be
20 highly unusual for all neighbors in a cul-de-sac to have the same
21 provider. This is one of the key benefits of competition – choice of
22 providers and services.

1 The fact that a BellSouth customer in Lake City calls a Level
2 3 customer in Lake City does not change the responsibilities of the
3 carriers. BellSouth delivers the call from Lake City to Jacksonville and
4 Level 3 then terminates the call from Jacksonville to Lake City. There
5 is nothing one-sided about this arrangement. As noted in my Direct
6 Testimony, it is inappropriate to impose any charges for local
7 interconnection trunks (and the facilities upon which those trunks
8 ride), as these are co-carrier facilities and trunks provided for the
9 mutual benefit of the parties in exchanging customer traffic, and both
10 parties must deploy matching capacity on their side of the POI.
11 Further, as both parties have already agreed in Section 1.1.1 of
12 Attachment 3, it is each carrier's financial and operational
13 responsibility to supply and maintain the network on its side of the
14 POI to deliver traffic to the terminating carrier, so a requirement that
15 each party then pay the other for trunks and facilities on the other's
16 network is inconsistent with other resolved sections of the contract.

17 **Q. MS. COX STATES THAT "TO MAKE THE POINT MORE SIMPLY,**
18 **LEVEL 3 WANTS BELLSOUTH TO BEAR THE COST OF THE**
19 **FACILITIES USED TO HAUL THE CALL, DESCRIBED ABOVE,**
20 **FROM LAKE CITY TO JACKSONVILLE. THERE IS NOTHING**
21 **FAIR, EQUITABLE OR REASONABLE ABOUT LEVEL 3'S**
22 **REQUEST." PLEASE RESPOND.**

1 A. First, as noted above, the FCC's "rules of the road" validate Level 3's
2 approach and this Commission has found – in the Sprint decision –
3 that it is technically feasible to require a single POI within a LATA.
4 Despite BellSouth's protestations to the contrary, these decisions
5 have already been made. Further, as noted above, given the
6 reciprocal responsibilities on each side of the POI, the handling of
7 traffic as required by the FCC and proposed by Level 3 is certainly
8 fair, equitable and reasonable. Requiring an ALEC to pay for the
9 trunks and facilities on the BellSouth side of the POI – on the
10 BellSouth network – renders the establishment of a single POI
11 meaningless. Under BellSouth's theory, an ALEC is responsible to
12 pick up traffic wherever BellSouth demands, thereby making the POI
13 a useless concept.

14 **Q. IF THE COMMISSION ACCEPTED BELLSOUTH'S PROPOSAL**
15 **WHAT WOULD BE THE RESULT?**

16 A. The result would be one of two scenarios – uneconomic duplication
17 of BellSouth's network, and/or, elimination of competition. The
18 Commission should reject BellSouth's fiction of independent, stand-
19 alone local networks for purposes of interconnection.

20 **Q. MS. COX STATES THAT BELLSOUTH DOES NOT RECOVER THE**
21 **COSTS FOR CARRYING TRAFFIC TO THE POI THROUGH**

1 **RECIPROCAL COMPENSATION. (TESTIMONY OF COX AT 11)**
2 **PLEASE COMMENT.**

3 A. She is correct. Reciprocal compensation is for the termination of
4 traffic originated by another provider. As such, BellSouth is
5 compensated for calls originated by Level 3 customers and Level 3 is
6 compensated for calls originated by BellSouth customers.

7 **Q. DOES THAT MEAN THAT BELLSOUTH MAY CHARGE FOR THE**
8 **FACILITIES USED TO DELIVER TRAFFIC TO THE POI?**

9 A. Absolutely not. As noted by the FCC, "A LEC may not assess
10 charges on any other telecommunications carrier for local
11 telecommunications traffic that originates on the LEC's network."
12 (FCC Rule 51.703(b)) In a recent Order, the FCC again reiterated its
13 position that a LEC may not charge for facilities or traffic on its side of
14 the POI. The FCC stated the following:

15 Defendants argue that section 51.703(b) governs only
16 the charges for "traffic" between carriers and does not
17 prevent LECs from charging for the "facilities" used to
18 transport that traffic. We find that argument
19 unpersuasive given the clear mandate of the *Local*
20 *Competition Order*. The Metzger Letter correctly stated
21 that the Commission's rules prohibit LECs from
22 charging for facilities used to deliver LEC-originated
23 traffic, in addition to prohibiting charges for the traffic
24 itself. Since the traffic must be delivered over facilities,
25 charging carriers for facilities used to deliver traffic
26 results in those carriers paying for LEC-originated traffic
27 and would be inconsistent with the rules. Moreover, the
28 Order requires a carrier to pay for dedicated facilities
29 only to the extent it uses those facilities to deliver traffic

1 that it originates. Indeed, the distinction urged by
2 Defendants is nonsensical, because LECs could
3 continue to charge carriers for the delivery of originating
4 traffic by merely re-designating the “traffic” charges as
5 “facilities” charges. Such a result would be inconsistent
6 with the language and intent of the Order and the
7 Commission’s rules.⁴ (footnotes omitted; emphasis in
8 original)

9 It is clear that each LEC bears the responsibility of operating and
10 maintaining the facilities used to transport and deliver traffic on its
11 side of the POI. This responsibility extends to both the trunks and
12 facilities as well as the traffic that transits those trunks and facilities.
13 Likewise, an interconnecting terminating LEC will bear
14 responsibility for the facilities on its side of the POI, but then
15 recover the costs of transporting and terminating traffic over those
16 facilities from the originating LEC, in the form of reciprocal
17 compensation.

18 **Q. DID THE FCC FURTHER EXPLAIN ITS LOGIC FOR REQUIRING**
19 **THE ORIGINATING CARRIER TO BEAR THE COSTS OF**
20 **DELIVERING ORIGINATING TRAFFIC TO THE TERMINATING**
21 **CARRIER?**

22 A. Yes. In the *TSR Order* the FCC further clarified its logic as follows:

⁴ *In the Matters of TSR WIRELESS, LLC, et al., Complainants, v. US WEST COMMUNICATIONS, INC. et al., Defendants*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, File Nos. E-98-13, E-98-15, E-98-16, E-98-17, E-98-18, ¶25 (rel. June 21, 2000) (*TSR Order*).

1 According to Defendants, the *Local Competition Order's*
 2 regulatory regime, which requires carriers to pay for
 3 facilities used to deliver their originating traffic to their
 4 co-carriers, represents a physical occupation of
 5 Defendants property without just compensation, in
 6 violation of the Takings Clause of the Constitution. We
 7 disagree. The *Local Competition Order* requires a
 8 carrier to pay the cost of facilities used to deliver traffic
 9 originated by that carrier to the network of its co-carrier,
 10 who then terminates that traffic and bills the originating
 11 carrier for termination compensation. In essence, the
 12 originating carrier holds itself out as being capable of
 13 transmitting a telephone call to any end user, and is
 14 responsible for paying the cost of delivering the call to
 15 the network of the co-carrier who will then terminate the
 16 call. Under the Commission's regulations, the cost of
 17 the facilities used to deliver this traffic is the originating
 18 carrier's responsibility, because these facilities are part
 19 of the originating carrier's network. The originating
 20 carrier recovers the costs of these facilities through the
 21 rates it charges its own customers for making calls. This
 22 regime represents "rules of the road" under which all
 23 carriers operate, and which make it possible for one
 24 company's customer to call any other customer even if
 25 that customer is served by another telephone
 26 company.⁵ (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)

27
 28 By this reasoning, Level 3 should not have to pay BellSouth for the
 29 interconnection trunks and facilities that transport BellSouth-
 30 originated traffic to Level 3 for termination.

31
 32 **ISSUE 6 – Should the parties be required to pay reciprocal**
 33 **compensation on traffic originating from or terminating to an**

⁵ *Id.* at ¶34.

1 enhanced service provider, including an internet service
2 provider (“ISP”)?

3 **Q. AT PAGE 18 OF HER TESTIMONY, MS. COX STATES THAT**
4 **LEVEL 3 HAS NOT PROVIDED ANY EVIDENCE TO SHOW**
5 **THAT ISP-BOUND TRAFFIC IS LOCAL. DO YOU AGREE?**

6 **A.** No. BellSouth has evidently decided not to respond to Level 3’s
7 evidence, which is substantial. The fact that calls to an ISP travel
8 the same path and use the same facilities as any other local call, is
9 not rebutted by BellSouth. It would be completely inconsistent for
10 BellSouth to pay reciprocal compensation for some local calls but
11 not for others.

12 **Q: HAS THIS DISPUTE ESSENTIALLY BEEN RESOLVED BY MS.**
13 **COX’S CONCILIATORY OFFER TO ABIDE BY THE**
14 **COMMISSION’S PREVIOUS DECISIONS AND TRACK AND**
15 **TRUE-UP PAYMENTS ONCE AN INTERCARRIER**
16 **COMPENSATION MECHANISM IS ESTABLISHED? (COX AT 21)**

17 **A:** No. Ms. Cox’s position that BellSouth agrees to apply the
18 Commission’s Orders in the ITC^DeltaCom, Intermedia and ICG
19 cases, as a “conciliatory offer” that avoids requiring the
20 Commission to rehear this issue is a red herring. Although Ms. Cox
21 does not state BellSouth’s interpretation of the Commission’s
22 “status quo” rulings, BellSouth has made clear in its response

1 (paragraphs 26 and 27) to Level 3's Petition for Arbitration that it
2 believes the status quo is that BellSouth will not pay Level 3
3 reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound traffic. Accordingly, Level 3
4 asks that the Commission affirmatively address BellSouth's
5 obligation to pay reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound traffic.
6 The Commission should rule, once again, that reciprocal
7 compensation is owed for traffic to Internet Service Providers.

8 Furthermore, Level 3 does not agree that a "track and true
9 up" arrangement is appropriate. The retrospective effect of a final
10 resolution of this issue on a national level is not an issue in this
11 arbitration. If there is to be any retrospective adjustment for Level
12 3, to avoid a discriminatory impact on Level 3, it should not be
13 determined until a final resolution of this issue has been rendered.

14 **ISSUE 7 – Should BellSouth be permitted to define its**
15 **obligation to pay reciprocal compensation to Level 3 based**
16 **upon the physical location of Level 3's customers? Should**
17 **BellSouth be able to charge originating access to Level 3 on**
18 **all calls going to a particular NXX code based upon the**
19 **location of any one customer?**

20 **Q. MS. COX REFERENCES THE MAINE COMMISSION ORDER AS**
21 **SUPPORT FOR ITS POSITION ON THIS ISSUE. (TESTIMONY**
22 **OF COX AT 28-30) PLEASE COMMENT.**

1 A. The ILECs frequently cite this order as support for their positions.
2
3 Many commissions, however, have not agreed with the ILECs on
4 this issue. For instance, in a recent decision on this dispute, the
5 Michigan Commission stated:

6 Commission precedent on the issue of the
7 appropriate rating of a call to a customer
8 located outside the geographic area
9 associated with the NXX assigned to that
10 customer has consistently found that intra NXX
11 calls are to be considered local for rating
12 purposes, despite their actual routing. ...

13 The arbitration panel adopted the reasoning of
14 the ICC in its May 8, 2000 decision involving
15 an arbitration agreement between Focal and
16 Ameritech Illinois. In that case, Ameritech
17 Illinois requested language that would have
18 required Focal to establish a point of
19 interconnection within 15 miles of the rate
20 center for any NXX code that Focal used to
21 provide FX service. The ICC determined that
22 nothing in state or federal law required
23 adoption of the proposal and it rejected
24 Ameritech Illinois' arguments concerning the
25 alleged "free ride" that Focal would obtain
26 without the requirement. That free ride
27 argument appears to be the same as one of
28 the arguments that Ameritech Michigan poses
29 in this case. In the ICC's view, the manner in
30 which the parties currently handle traffic belied
31 Ameritech Illinois' argument, because
32 Ameritech Illinois would not be required to
33 carry traffic any further or incur any extra
34 expense based on the nature of the call being
35 FX service. Rather, Ameritech Illinois delivers
36 the call to the point of interconnection
37 associated with the NXX, after which, Focal

1 delivers the call to the FX customer, wherever
2 that customer might be located.⁶

3
4 Level 3 urges this Commission to consider, as Michigan did, how
5 the industry traditionally rated calls, and the actual functions
6 involved in exchanging this traffic.

7 **Q. MS. COX STATES THAT “THE FCC HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT**
8 **TRAFFIC JURISDICTION IS DETERMINED BASED UPON THE**
9 **ORIGINATING AND TERMINATING END POINTS OF A CALL,**
10 **NOT THE NPA/NXX OF THE CALLING OR CALLED NUMBER.”**
11 **(TESTIMONY OF COX AT 25) PLEASE COMMENT.**

12 A. Recent rulings specifically rebut Ms. Cox’s suggestion. For
13 instance, The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
14 Columbia Circuit’s decision⁷ requires the Commission to find that
15 ISP-bound calls are subject to reciprocal compensation. In *Bell*
16 *Atlantic*, the D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded the FCC
17 *Declaratory Ruling*⁸ which had held that ISP-bound traffic is

⁶ *Petition of Coast to Coast Telecommunications, Inc., for arbitration of interconnection rates, terms, conditions, and related arrangements with Michigan Bell Telephone Company, d/b/a Ameritech Michigan*, Case No. U-12382, Order Adopting Arbitrated Agreement, 9 (Mich. P.S.C. Aug. 17, 2000).

⁷ *Bell Atlantic Telephone Companies v. FCC*, 206 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“*Bell Atlantic*”).

⁸ *Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Declaratory Ruling in CC Docket No. 96-98 and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 99-68*, 14 FCC Rcd 3689 (1999). This order is frequently referred to as the FCC *ISP Order*.

1 jurisdictionally mixed but largely interstate traffic and not subject to
2 Section 251(b)(5)'s reciprocal compensation obligation.

3 The D.C. Circuit held that the FCC applied the wrong
4 analysis in the *ISP Order*. In determining that ISP-bound traffic
5 was not subject to reciprocal compensation under Section
6 251(b)(5), the FCC engaged in the end-to-end analysis that it has
7 traditionally used to determine the jurisdictional nature of traffic.
8 The court rejected this approach, saying that “[h]owever sound the
9 end-to-end analysis may be for jurisdictional purposes, the
10 Commission has not explained why viewing [ISP-bound calls] as
11 continuous works for purposes of reciprocal compensation.” *Id.* at
12 7. In other words, the fact that a call to an ISP may be
13 jurisdictionally interstate under an “end-to-end” analysis does mean
14 that reciprocal compensation is not paid on the call.

15 **Q: MS. COX STATES IN HER TESTIMONY THAT “TRAFFIC**
16 **JURISDICTION BASED ON RATE CENTER ASSIGNMENT IS**
17 **USED FOR RETAIL END USER BILLING, BUT NOT FOR**
18 **INTER-COMPANY COMPENSATION PURPOSES.” (COX AT**
19 **25). DO YOU AGREE WITH HER?**

20 A. No. The regulatory treatment of a particular call should be the
21 same for retail end user billing and for intercarrier compensation. A
22 call that is rated as local for retail purposes by comparing the NXX

1 codes of the calling party and the called party should also be a
2 local call for compensation purposes.

3 **Q: WHY SHOULD A CALL RATED AS LOCAL FOR RETAIL**
4 **PURPOSES BE TREATED AS LOCAL FOR COMPENSATION**
5 **PURPOSES?**

6 A: The calls should be treated the same because in a competitive
7 environment, the costs are the same to the originating carrier.
8 Also, they should be treated the same because adopting
9 BellSouth's position would require both parties to establish
10 elaborate billing mechanisms to distinguish calls to customers with
11 virtual presences from calls to customers with physical presences
12 that share the same NXX code.

13 **Q: DOES THE EXCHANGE OF TRAFFIC IN A COMPETITIVE**
14 **ENVIRONMENT MAKE A DIFFERENCE?**

15 A: Yes. In a competitive environment, the ILEC already incurs costs
16 in addition to those it would typically incur in a monopoly
17 environment. These additional costs are the costs of transporting
18 all traffic bound to a Level 3 customer to the Level 3 POI. In a
19 monopoly environment, BellSouth probably would not route all
20 traffic through a single hub. In a competitive environment,
21 however, the minor inefficiencies related to routing to a central
22 exchange point are offset by increased benefits related to improved

1 service quality, lower prices, and additional service options
2 provided by competitors.

3 With this distinction in mind, I believe two additional
4 diagrams demonstrating interconnection would be helpful. The first
5 diagram, which should go before Diagram 6, illustrates the path of
6 a call when Level 3 expands its service offerings to provide local
7 service to a second local calling area. In this scenario, Level 3's
8 switch and POI are still in the first local calling area (as illustrated in
9 Diagram 5). This diagram is labeled Diagram 5.1 and is attached
10 as Exhibit __ (TJG-8). The BellSouth customer and the Level 3
11 customers in local calling area 2 may place local calls to each
12 other, but the traffic is routed out of local calling area 2 to the POI
13 in local calling area 1, before it is routed back to be terminated in
14 local calling area 2. If BellSouth were serving both customers, the
15 call probably would not be routed out of local calling area 2. In a
16 competitive environment, however, BellSouth must route the call to
17 the POI with Level 3 in local calling area 1, and then Level 3 bears
18 the obligation of transporting the call back to its customer in local
19 calling area 2.

20 The virtual NXX arrangements at issue in this case are a
21 variation on the scenario illustrated in Diagram 5.1. A virtual NXX
22 arrangement is illustrated in Diagram 5.2 which is attached as

1 Exhibit __ TJJ-9). The transport provided by Level 3 back to local
2 calling area 2 is indicated by a dotted line because it is not
3 necessary for it to be provided. Level 3's customer has a virtual
4 presence in local calling area 2 rather than a physical presence. In
5 other words, to the BellSouth customer in local calling area two, it
6 appears that the Level 3 customer is physically located in local
7 calling area 2. It would be physically possible to establish such a
8 presence in each local calling area, but as I've stated before, that
9 would unnecessarily increase the cost of Internet access for
10 consumers and ISPs alike. If the ISP or Level 3 did establish a
11 local presence, the diagram would be the same as in Diagram 5.1.
12 Level 3 could provide the transport back to local calling area 2, and
13 its customer could establish a physical presence there, in which
14 case the scenario would be the same as in Diagram 5.1, and the
15 call would be unmistakably local. In both scenarios, Diagram 5.1
16 and Diagram 5.2, the transport obligations of BellSouth, and the
17 accompanying costs, are identical. The physical location of the
18 customer makes no difference in terms of BellSouth's network
19 costs in the scenarios illustrated by Diagram 5.1 and Diagram 5.2.
20 When I say that the physical location of the called party should not
21 matter for purposes of reciprocal compensation, I am referring to
22 the arrangement illustrated in Diagrams 5.1 and 5.2. These

1 diagrams show, contrary to Ms. Cox's contentions, that there is
2 good reason from a network cost and operational perspective to
3 treat calls rated as local for retail purposes as local for intercarrier
4 compensation purposes as well.

5 **Q: HAS ANY STATE COMMISSION ADOPTED THIS APPROACH?**

6 A: Yes. The Michigan and California Commissions have ruled that the
7 rating of a call based upon a comparison of the NXX codes of the
8 calling and the called parties determines the intercarrier
9 compensation for the call.⁹

10 **Q: IS THERE A SECOND REASON FOR A CALL THAT IS RATED**
11 **AS LOCAL TO BE TREATED AS A LOCAL CALL FOR**
12 **COMPENSATION PURPOSES?**

13 A: Yes. BellSouth has not explained how the parties could possibly
14 comply with a ruling that denies reciprocal compensation based on
15 the physical location of the called party when the called party has a
16 telephone number associated with a rate center where a call to it
17 would otherwise be rated as a local call. If the BellSouth position
18 were adopted, reciprocal compensation would be owed for a call to

⁹ See *In re Petition of Level 3 Communications, LLC for Arbitration Pursuant to Section 252(b) of the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 to Establish an Interconnection Agreement with Ameritech Michigan*, Case No. U-12460, Opinion and Order (Mich. P.S.C. Oct. 24, 2000); *In re Petition of Pacific Bell for Arbitration of an Interconnection Agreement with MFS/WorldCom Pursuant to Section 252(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996*, D. 99-09-969 (Ca. P.U.C. Sep. 17, 1999).

1 a customer with a physical presence in a local calling area
2 associated with a particular NXX code, but reciprocal
3 compensation would not be owed to a customer without such a
4 physical presence. Again, this goes back to how the industry has
5 always rated telephone calls. To the switches and billing systems
6 used by BellSouth and Level 3, those two calls are identical for
7 billing purposes because the switches and billing systems compare
8 NXX codes, and make no reference to the physical location of the
9 called party. Adopting BellSouth's position on this issue could likely
10 require Level 3 and BellSouth to compile billing records by hand
11 and screen out calls to numbers for customers with only virtual
12 presences in local calling areas. Such a process creates a
13 disincentive for Level 3 to expand its subscriber base: the larger
14 the subscriber base, the more onerous the screening function, the
15 longer the delay in submitting bills to BellSouth, which would add
16 further delay in receiving compensation for services rendered to
17 BellSouth.

18 Simply denying reciprocal compensation for all traffic to an
19 NXX code used to provide customers with a virtual presence is
20 unsupportable because nothing prevents Level 3 from using a
21 single NXX code for all of its customers in a local calling area,
22 whether their presence is physical or virtual. The alternative –

1 requiring Level 3 to use unique NXX codes for customers with
2 physical presences and customers with virtual presences – is also
3 contrary to sound public policy because it will contribute to
4 numbering resource exhaust.

5 Further, adopting BellSouth's resolution of this issue may
6 lead to unusual and confusing results. Assume, for example, that
7 the facilities of a customer using Level 3's virtual NXX product are
8 located in downtown Jacksonville. Under BellSouth's position, a
9 call from a BellSouth subscriber in Jacksonville to the Jacksonville
10 NXX of the customer served by Level 3 would be rated as local and
11 reciprocal compensation would be owed. Furthermore, under
12 BellSouth's position, a call from a BellSouth subscriber in Lake City
13 to the same Level 3 customer's Lake City NXX code would not be
14 rated as local and reciprocal compensation would not be owed
15 because the Level 3 customer has no presence in Lake City.
16 However, under BellSouth's reasoning, a call from the same
17 Jacksonville BellSouth subscriber to the Lake City NXX code of the
18 Level 3 customer should be considered local because the call
19 originates and physically terminates in Jacksonville, even though
20 the number dialed is associated with Lake City and the switches
21 processing the call would recognize the call as a toll call. In that

1 case, reciprocal compensation would be owed for a call that has
2 the appearances of a toll call to the switches connecting the call.

3 These practical considerations, as well as an understanding
4 that BellSouth's costs of handing traffic off to Level 3 are not
5 increased by the use of a virtual NXX to serve customers, should
6 provide the Commission with good cause to reject BellSouth's
7 proposal to treat locally-dialed calls differently from one another for
8 intercarrier compensation purposes.

9 **Q: UNDER BELLSOUTH'S PROPOSAL, HOW WOULD ALECS BE**
10 **COMPENSATED FOR HANDLING TRAFFIC ORIGINATED BY**
11 **BELLSOUTH CUSTOMERS?**

12 A. ALECs would receive no compensation for terminating calls
13 originated by BellSouth's customers and would instead pay
14 BellSouth for originating such calls even though BellSouth incurs
15 no more cost in doing so than for any other locally-dialed call.
16 Such a result is anticompetitive as it would increase the cost of
17 new entrants and at the same time result in a "free ride" for
18 BellSouth. The Commission should reject BellSouth's proposal.

19 **Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?**

20 A. Yes, it does.

1 COMMISSIONER JABER: Your witness has agreed to
2 summary?

3 MR. ROMANO: Yes.

4 BY MR. ROMANO:

5 Q Mr. Gates, would you please provide your summary
6 at this time?

7 A Yes. Madam Chair, Commissioner Baez, good
8 morning. I do have a brief summary of my testimonies. I
9 address four issues.

10 The question in Issue 2 is should Level 3
11 receive symmetrical compensation from BellSouth for leased
12 facility interconnection? The answer to that question is
13 yes, absolutely. The dispute over the serving wire center
14 definition is caused, in significant part, because of the
15 differences between the two networks. The BellSouth
16 network has been developed over the last hundred years
17 with monopoly rents. Because of that and changes in
18 technology, it's not necessarily the most efficient
19 network out there today.

20 The Level 3 network is a brand new network
21 utilizing the latest technologies, and it's being expanded
22 over time as the profits allow. Obviously, the Level 3
23 network is not as extensive, certainly not ubiquitous like
24 the BellSouth network.

25 Recognizing this disparity between the two

1 networks, BellSouth has structured its rates in such a way
2 that BellSouth can charge more for the very same
3 transport, the same transport facility, based only upon
4 its location in a multiswitch network.

5 Based on the language proposed by BellSouth,
6 when BellSouth originates traffic, it pays no dedicated
7 interoffice transport. But when Level 3 originates
8 traffic, it must pay for the dedicated interoffice
9 transport, and that's patently unfair.

10 New entrants, like Level 3, should not be
11 disadvantaged by their choice of technology or by their
12 network design. Level 3 should be allowed to charge
13 BellSouth whatever it is that BellSouth charges Level 3 in
14 order to have symmetrical rates. In other words, 10 miles
15 of transport purchased by Level 3 should cost the same as
16 10 miles of transport purchased by BellSouth.

17 Issue Number 3. The question is should each
18 carrier be required to pay for the use of interconnection
19 trunks on the other carrier's network? The answer to that
20 question is no. Any charges for interconnection trunks
21 are inappropriate, because these are co-carrier trunks.

22 You heard Mr. Romano talk about co-carrier
23 trunks earlier today. These trunks are in place for the
24 mutual benefit of both carriers. Both carriers, both
25 parties, must deploy matching capacity on their side of

1 the point of interface or the interconnection point.

2 For instance, BellSouth could not have 300
3 circuits coming into the interconnection point and Level 3
4 only have 30 coming out. They do have to match. Indeed,
5 and this is curious in this proceeding, Section 1.1.1 of
6 the interconnection agreement, which is not being disputed
7 by either BellSouth or Level 3 says, and I'm quoting,
8 "Each party is financially and operationally responsible
9 for providing the network on its side of the IP," closed
10 quote.

11 Given that agreement, BellSouth's attempt to
12 charge Level 3 for the facilities on its side of the IP
13 should be rejected; otherwise, the provision for a single
14 IP has no meaning whatsoever. As BellSouth would make new
15 entrants, like Level 3, pay for the cost of reaching out
16 beyond the interconnection point further into the
17 BellSouth network.

18 Issue Number 6. That question asks should the
19 parties be required to pay reciprocal compensation on
20 traffic originating from or terminating to an enhanced
21 service provider, including an ISP or Internet Service
22 Provider? Yes, they should.

23 BellSouth incorrectly argues that traffic to an
24 ISP is not a local call and as such is not eligible for
25 reciprocal compensation. I think, you'll find during our

1 presentations today that their actions belie the
2 statement. BellSouth handles calls to ISPs in exactly the
3 same manner as it handles all other local calls.

4 It is not technically feasible or in the public
5 interest to break out these ISP-bound calls from other
6 local calls; one, because they are handled and processed
7 in the same manner; two, because there are no good ways to
8 do so. Separately identifying these calls and charging a
9 different rate for the ISP-bound calls results in
10 discrimination, because there is no difference in the
11 function of delivering ISP-bound calls from other local
12 calls.

13 If BellSouth's proposal to treat these calls as
14 nonlocal is accepted, new entrants like Level 3 will be
15 forced to terminate traffic which has been originated by
16 BellSouth customers with no compensation whatsoever.

17 Issue Number 7. Should BellSouth be permitted
18 to define its obligation to pay reciprocal compensation to
19 Level 3 based upon the physical location of Level 3's
20 customers? The answer to that question is no. BellSouth,
21 again, is attempting to avoid paying reciprocal
22 compensation by limiting that compensation to calls
23 between customers physically located in the same local
24 calling area.

25 BellSouth fails to show any policy, cost, or

1 other justification for eliminating this traffic from its
2 reciprocal compensation obligation or for imposing
3 switched access charges on this traffic. In fact, what
4 BellSouth proposes is troubling twice over. Not only
5 would the new entrant, like Level 3, pay switched access
6 charges on every minute of a call that's originated by
7 BellSouth, but would also receive absolutely nothing in
8 return for helping BellSouth to terminate that call.

9 The jurisdiction of calls has traditionally been
10 determined by comparing NXX codes. And I've been
11 reviewing the discovery and other documents, and I'm
12 finding that, indeed, BellSouth determines the
13 jurisdictionality of a call based on NXX codes.

14 What BellSouth is proposing, however, is
15 inconsistent with that historical approach, and they've
16 developed this new and self-serving method that would
17 eliminate these calls from its reciprocal compensation
18 obligation. The fact is these calls do not change the
19 costs incurred by BellSouth, and they're handled like all
20 other local calls.

21 BellSouth's proposal should be rejected, and it
22 should be required to treat these calls as local for
23 intercarrier compensation purposes. The Commission should
24 also reject BellSouth's proposal to impose access charges
25 on this traffic. The Commission has already found that

1 the application of access charges is inappropriate in
2 significant part because of the FCC's enhanced service
3 provider exemption.

4 Moreover, since BellSouth has admitted that its
5 costs of originating these calls don't differ from the
6 cost of originating any local calls allowing BellSouth to
7 impose switched access charges on these calls introduces
8 an unjustifiable noncost-based inefficiency at a time when
9 regulators in the industry are trying to move rates closer
10 to cost.

11 Thank you.

12 Q Mr. Gates, does that conclude your summary?

13 A Yes, it does.

14 MR. ROMANO: Madam Chair, Mr. Gates is available
15 for cross examination.

16 COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Lackey?

17 MR. LACKEY: Thank you, ma'am.

18 CROSS EXAMINATION

19 BY MR. LACKEY:

20 Q Mr. Gates, my name is Doug Lackey. I'm an
21 attorney for BellSouth.

22 A Good morning, Mr. Lackey.

23 Q Good morning. Did the previous witness leave
24 Exhibits 5 and 6 there on the table for you?

25 A No, he did not.

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1 Q Let me have some brought down to you.

2 A Thank you.

3 Q Do you have them, sir?

4 A I do have them in front of me.

5 Q Okay. I have a question that I want to ask you
6 that's based on Exhibit 6, first. In Exhibit 6, do you
7 see the BST end user that is represented by the triangle
8 with the line on top of it that's located in Local Calling
9 Area Number 1?

10 A Yes, I do.

11 Q Do you see the Level 3 end user that is
12 represented by the same symbol that is located in what's
13 marked Local Calling Area 2?

14 A Yes, I do.

15 Q Okay. Now, if the BellSouth end user in Local
16 Calling Area 1 places a call to the Level 3 end user in
17 Local Calling Area 2, is it Level 3's position that Level
18 3 is entitled to reciprocal compensation to be paid by
19 BellSouth to Level 3 for that call?

20 A Well, it's not Level 3's position. I've heard
21 that comment today a few times. It's the opinion of
22 Congress, and it's the opinion of the FCC implementing the
23 Act of 1996. Level 3 is just exercising its rights for
24 interconnection in receiving the terminating reciprocal
25 compensation for that call.

1 Q So, the answer to my question was yes?

2 A Level 3 would expect to receive termination
3 costs for terminating that call for BellSouth so, yes, it
4 would receive reciprocal compensation.

5 Q Now, you will agree with me, won't you, that we
6 only owe reciprocal compensation for calls that originate
7 and terminate in the same local calling area, won't you?

8 A No, of course, not.

9 Q You will not?

10 A No.

11 Q Are you familiar with the Code of Federal
12 Regulations, particularly Section 51 as it relates to
13 reciprocal compensation?

14 A Well, I don't have it memorized, but I'm aware
15 of it.

16 Q All right. Let me see if I can find you a copy
17 of that that we used earlier today, too.

18 A I have that in front of me.

19 Q All right. I have the whole thing, if you think
20 I've left something out.

21 A No, I trust you.

22 Q I wouldn't do that, if I were you.

23 A You've crossed me before, Mr. Lackey. I've
24 learned my lesson.

25 Q Have I?

1 A Yes, you have.

2 MR. LACKEY: You know, getting old is terrible,
3 Commissioners, I can't remember.

4 BY MR. LACKEY:

5 Q Look at Section 51.701. This is the section
6 that Mr. Turner read to, I think, Mr. Rogers earlier
7 today, 51.701(a), right?

8 A Right.

9 Q And it says that "The provisions of this subpart
10 apply to reciprocal compensation for transport and
11 termination of local telecommunications traffic between
12 LECs and other telecommunications carriers," right?

13 A Yes, sir, that's what it says.

14 Q And you will agree with me that a call that goes
15 from a BellSouth customer to a Level 3 customer is a call
16 between wire line customers and not a call between a wire
17 line customer and a CMRS customer, won't you?

18 A For purposes of your example, I would.

19 Q All right. If we look at 51.701(b)(1) -- well,
20 let's start with (b). (b) defines local
21 telecommunications traffic, doesn't it?

22 A Well, (b) is kind of the label for the
23 definition of local telecommunications traffic.

24 Q Okay. (b) says, local telecommunications
25 traffic -- for purposes of this subpart, local

1 telecommunications traffic means... and then there are
2 followed two subparts, right?

3 A Yes.

4 Q And subpart one, if I read it correctly, says,
5 "Telecommunications traffic between a LEC and a
6 telecommunications carrier, other than a CMRS provider,
7 that originates and terminates within a local service area
8 established by the state commission," I read that
9 correctly, didn't I?

10 A I think, you did.

11 Q Now, in Florida, as in most other states, the
12 incumbent local exchange carriers, generally with the
13 assistance and always with the approval of the state
14 Public Service Commission, establish local calling areas,
15 correct?

16 A Yes, they do.

17 Q And in our Exhibit 6, I had already -- or
18 actually, Mr. Turner had already indicated that this
19 represented two different local calling areas, correct?

20 A That's correct. But, of course, there are
21 situations when calls between local calling areas are,
22 indeed, local. EAS, Extended Area Service, is one,
23 optional local calling plans is another example.

24 Q Excuse me, Mr. Gates. Wasn't Mr. Turner very
25 careful to always say that he was talking about a customer

1 that had plain-vanilla local service?

2 A Well, yes. But honestly, Mr. Lackey, I don't
3 know what that means, plain-vanilla local service. I'm
4 not familiar with that phrase. It's probably not in the
5 tariff.

6 Q Well, --

7 A But I would point out one thing that's very
8 obvious to me with this discussion and that's that despite
9 this definition, both the FCC and this Commission have
10 decided to treat these calls as local calls.

11 Q Well, I'm not ready to go there just yet.

12 A Okay.

13 Q I want to make sure we've got the facts
14 straight. We had established in this Exhibit Number 6
15 that there were two -- and if it wasn't clear before --
16 separate local calling areas. That's what's represented
17 on the diagram, isn't it?

18 A Yes, I see that.

19 Q And the call I gave you a moment ago that
20 originated with a BellSouth local user in Local Calling
21 Area 1, that call originated in Local Calling Area Number
22 1 and, under my example, it terminated in Local Calling
23 Area Number 2, didn't it?

24 A Yes, it did.

25 Q And if local telecommunications traffic is

1 defined as traffic that originates and terminates within a
2 local calling -- a local service area established by the
3 state commission, you will agree with me that in this case
4 that call did not originate and terminate in the same
5 local calling area, won't you?

6 A It originates in one and terminates in another.
7 And if we're assuming basic service with no EAS or no
8 virtual NXX service -- I'll let you ask the question,
9 Mr. Lackey. What's your point on this?

10 Q I don't make points. I just ask questions.

11 My question to you is, and I may be confused
12 now, but I want to know whether Level 3 wants this
13 Commission to order BellSouth to pay Level 3 reciprocal
14 compensation that is due for terminating a local call for
15 the call that begins in Local Calling Area 1, BellSouth's
16 end user, and terminates in Local Calling Area 2 with the
17 Level 3 end user?

18 A Yes. Level 3 is asking this Commission to
19 provide reciprocal compensation in that situation. And I
20 would also note that that request has been supported by
21 decisions in amicus briefs and orders of the FCC.

22 The alternative, and that is, to build
23 facilities to each local calling area within the state to
24 each of BellSouth's local calling areas, has been found by
25 the FCC to be an enormous cost that would thwart the

1 fundamental goal of the Telecom Act, which is to allow for
2 local competition.

3 Q Well, let's just assume, for the moment, that
4 instead of Level 3 end user up in Local Calling Area 2,
5 that that was a BellSouth end user in Local Calling Area
6 2. Will you assume that with me just for a moment?

7 A Yes.

8 Q Now, if the BellSouth end user in Local Calling
9 Area 1 had just had plain basic telephone service, no
10 extended area service, nothing else, no bells or whistles,
11 called the BellSouth's subscriber in Local Calling Area 2,
12 the BellSouth end user would be charged a toll call,
13 correct?

14 A Well, I don't know that, Mr. Lackey. I don't
15 know what BellSouth's local service says. I don't know
16 what the toll offering is. In a general sense, I can
17 agree, but not specifically.

18 Q All right. If we assume, for the purpose of
19 this question, that calls within a local calling area are
20 paid for by a local calling rate and that calls between
21 local calling areas where there's no EAS are treated as
22 toll calls, that in that scenario that would be a toll
23 call, correct?

24 A Based on your representations, that would be a
25 toll call for BellSouth.

1 Q Well, for instance, can a customer in Jupiter,
2 Florida call a customer in Miami without paying a toll
3 call, if you know?

4 A I've heard you refer to Jupiter. I assume, it's
5 a long, long ways away from Miami, but I don't know that
6 location.

7 Q Okay. Now, let's change the Level 3 end user in
8 Exhibit 6. And instead of -- it's still a Level 3 end
9 user, but let's say it's an ISP, an Internet Service
10 Provider, okay?

11 A Okay.

12 Q And I suppose your answer would still be the
13 same; and that is, when the BellSouth end user in Local
14 Calling Area 1 places a call to the ISP located in a
15 different local calling area, that reciprocal comp should
16 be paid for that call as well, correct?

17 A Yes. And again, it's not just the Level 3
18 position. That's the way reciprocal compensation works.
19 The BellSouth customer originates the call, BellSouth
20 carries it to the interconnection point and, then, it's
21 Level 3's responsibility to terminate the call.

22 And we could come up with scenarios that would
23 look just as dire as the ones that you've suggested,
24 perhaps, between Jupiter and Miami, but the point is the
25 financial and operational responsibilities change at the

1 interconnection point.

2 Q Do you see the Level 3 end user located in Local
3 Calling Area 1 at the bottom oval?

4 A Yes.

5 Q Now, if the BellSouth end user -- let's just
6 assume that the BellSouth end user and the Level 3 end
7 user in that Local Calling Area 1 happened to be next-door
8 neighbors. Now, in that scenario where the BST end user
9 calls the Level 3 end user, you want BellSouth to pay
10 reciprocal comp to Level 3 for that call as well, correct?

11 A Yes, and let me explain why. That call is
12 delivered to the interconnection point in Local Calling
13 Area 2, and then it becomes Level 3's responsibility to
14 terminate that call based on the calling numbers supplied
15 by the BellSouth customer. So, then, Level 3 would
16 terminate that call from Local Calling Area 2 down to
17 Local Calling Area 1.

18 Q Would it be a fair statement --

19 COMMISSIONER JABER: Excuse me.

20 MR. LACKEY: Yes, ma'am.

21 COMMISSIONER JABER: How is that different,
22 Mr. Gates, from BellSouth having to transport the call to
23 Local Area 2 to get to your IP?

24 THE WITNESS: Well, really, my point is that
25 it's really the same. It's somewhat symmetrical.

1 BellSouth transports it up to the Level 3 switch; do you
2 see it there? And then, Level 3 brings it back down on
3 the right-hand side down to Local Calling Area 2. It's a
4 shared responsibility in provisioning of the call.

5 COMMISSIONER JABER: Okay. And in provisioning
6 that call, explain to me the compensation that you expect.
7 How is BellSouth compensated for the routing of the call
8 to the switch or to the IP? And how is it you expect
9 Level 3 to be compensated for the routing from your switch
10 back to the Level 3 customer?

11 THE WITNESS: Okay. Under the terms of
12 reciprocal compensation, which have been laid out, it's
13 the originating carrier's responsibility, BellSouth's
14 responsibility, to get that call from the person, the
15 BellSouth end user there, up to the interconnection point.
16 The TSR order and other FCC orders have said that --

17 COMMISSIONER JABER: Okay, that's the
18 responsibility to deliver the call.

19 THE WITNESS: Yes.

20 COMMISSIONER JABER: I'm talking about charges.

21 THE WITNESS: Yes, I was going to get to that.

22 Let me get to it right now. The orders also refer to
23 this, because this complaint has been made, obviously,
24 before the FCC and the courts.

25 The compensation for BellSouth is the local

1 rates. We've heard Mr. Lackey and others talk about a \$10
2 rate. I don't know what those rates are, and I don't know
3 what the costs are providing service. But clearly, the
4 local -- basic local rate, subscriber line charges,
5 revenues from vertical services, any universal service
6 surcharges that might apply, and other subsidies, such as
7 from access charges, also compensate BellSouth. It's not
8 just the \$10 rate that BellSouth has suggested that
9 provides compensation.

10 So, those are the responsibilities of the
11 originating carrier to get it up there, how is it
12 compensated through those local rates and other subsidies
13 that it receives? Once it gets to the IP, then, it
14 becomes Level 3's responsibility to terminate that call.
15 So, Level 3, either through its own network or through the
16 lease of BellSouth's network, will terminate that call
17 back down to Local Calling Area 1.

18 Now, pursuant to the reciprocal compensation
19 guidelines, the terminating carrier is allowed to receive
20 terminating charges for the switching, local switching,
21 tandem switching, and the transport for terminating that
22 call.

23 Now, we might want to argue about what costs
24 we're talking about here and what rates, but it's
25 important to note that those rates are based on

1 BellSouth's costs. And this Commission, of course, has
2 dealt with that extensively, so I know you're aware of
3 that. So, Level 3 would receive terminating rates for
4 terminating that call back down to Local Calling Area 1.

5 COMMISSIONER JABER: Okay. So, now as to the
6 question, the fact that BellSouth delivering that call to
7 Level 3 switch or the IP is outside the local calling
8 area; therefore, under the daily scheme that BellSouth has
9 set up for its networks, that would be a toll call.

10 THE WITNESS: Only in the way they're kind of
11 framing this discussion. We're talking about
12 interconnection. And the FCC has said that new entrants
13 only need one interconnection point per LATA, okay? And
14 they've said that very specifically in the Texas 271
15 order, paragraph 78, one interconnection point per LATA,
16 okay? That means the ILEC or BellSouth is responsible to
17 get all of the originating traffic from its customers to
18 the interconnection point conversely or symmetrically and
19 the other side of that Level 3, then, terminates all that
20 traffic.

21 COMMISSIONER JABER: All right. That's the
22 responsibility to deliver the traffic. What does the FCC
23 say about charging for the toll call or compensating for
24 the fact that it's outside the local calling area?

25 THE WITNESS: There is no distinction in the FCC

1 orders between local and toll with respect to
2 interconnection and pricing, okay? It doesn't matter in
3 the FCC's orders whether it's a 50-foot call or a 6-inch
4 call or a 300-mile call. If the originating call -- I
5 mean, the originating call has to be delivered to the
6 interconnection point. And on the other side of that, it
7 doesn't matter if that call is a 300-mile distance. Level
8 3 still has to terminate that call 300 miles.

9 What we've seen today is some kind of extreme
10 examples which may, in fact, occur. Now, my guess is that
11 the amount of that traffic in those extreme examples would
12 be very small, I don't know.

13 COMMISSIONER JABER: Do you think reciprocal
14 compensation is a cost recovery mechanism?

15 THE WITNESS: It is a cost recovery mechanism.
16 And, in fact -- yeah, it definitely is. And could I
17 expand on that just briefly? If Level 3 were not in the
18 state, okay, and this call had to be handled entirely by
19 BellSouth, that customer would -- well, that's a bad
20 example.

21 The point is that Level 3 is performing a
22 function for BellSouth. And if Level 3 hadn't terminated
23 that call, BellSouth would have to terminate that call.
24 So, Level 3 and BellSouth, particularly, should be
25 indifferent as to whether they terminate the call or

1 whether they pay Level 3 or some other new entrant to
2 terminate the call, because we're using BellSouth's costs.
3 So, they should be fully compensated for that termination.

4 COMMISSIONER JABER: Okay.

5 BY MR. LACKEY:

6 Q Let me just explore this for a moment more, and
7 then I'll move on to something else.

8 The logical extension of the discussion you just
9 had, and the one you had with me, seems pretty clear, but
10 I want to examine it.

11 You do agree, don't you, that with my statement,
12 and I made it as a statement and I should have asked you
13 the question, that BellSouth and this Commission do
14 establish local calling areas for BellSouth and the state
15 of Florida, correct?

16 A Certainly.

17 Q And I suppose Level 3, for its customers, can
18 define any local calling area in the state of Florida that
19 it chooses, correct?

20 A I don't know the requirements for new entrants
21 in Florida.

22 Q Okay.

23 A I just don't know.

24 Q All right. But under your interpretation of
25 BellSouth's obligations, BellSouth would owe Level 3

1 reciprocal compensation for any call that its customer
2 originated that Level 3 terminated anywhere in the LATA
3 that the call originated in, correct?

4 And what I mean is I was just using two calling
5 areas here, but if there were 30 calling areas, the same
6 logic would apply, correct?

7 A Well, generally, I would agree with your
8 statement. We may differ on the specifics and how that's
9 implemented.

10 Q Okay. Now, I tried to write it down. I think,
11 I've got it. You said something about using an extreme
12 example, which I've been known to do, but I want to show
13 you something else.

14 MR. LACKEY: I'd like to have this marked as
15 Exhibit -- I think, we're up to 8.

16 COMMISSIONER JABER: 8. Exhibit 8 is a diagram
17 indicating Local Call within the Same Local Calling Area.

18 (Exhibit 8 marked for identification.)

19 MR. LACKEY: If you need a short title -- you're
20 okay? All right.

21 BY MR. LACKEY:

22 Q Now, somebody, in their exuberance in the
23 diagram to the upper right put Level E instead of Level 3,
24 so would you correct that for me, Mr. Gates?

25 A Yes.

1 Q Now, what this Chart 8 lays out is on the left
2 side it's simply a replication, if we've done it
3 correctly, of Exhibit 5. Do you see that?

4 A Appears to be similar.

5 Q Okay. If we did it right, it's the same, but as
6 long as we can agree it's similar, that's fine. Again,
7 the big box represents a local calling area, and then the
8 -- a BellSouth local calling area, and then the things
9 that are within the box are the same as they were
10 represented to be on Exhibit 5.

11 And what I've done on this Chart 8 is I've put a
12 heavy black-dotted line that I've labeled several state
13 lines, and then I've got another box that's got a
14 telephone subscriber in it, shows that it's in Louisville,
15 Kentucky, and it's labeled a Level 3 end user. Do you see
16 that?

17 A Yes, I do.

18 Q Okay. Now, here's my question. I see what's
19 missing on this. In the original Exhibit 5, if you'll
20 look at the BellSouth customer on the lower left-hand
21 corner, we call that BellSouth end user number one and the
22 BellSouth end user in the middle was BellSouth end user
23 number two. Would you add those to the chart as well, so
24 you know what I'm talking about?

25 A Yeah. So, the one on the left is number one and

1 the one further right is number two?

2 Q The one on the left is number one, the one in
3 the middle is number two.

4 A Yes.

5 Q That should be the only two BellSouth end users
6 on the chart.

7 Now, if BellSouth end user number one dials a
8 number that Level 3 has assigned to its end user in
9 Louisville, Kentucky, Level 3 will complete that call to
10 its end user, won't it?

11 A If a BellSouth customer dials a Louisville,
12 Kentucky customer, yes, Level 3 would complete that call.

13 Q Okay. Now, would Level 3 expect BellSouth to
14 pay Level 3 local reciprocal compensation for that call?

15 A No, sir, that's not a local call.

16 Q Okay. What would Level 3 ask BellSouth to
17 compensate Level 3, at what level, do you know?

18 A Well, it's not a local call. Reciprocal
19 compensation issues wouldn't apply to this. It would be a
20 toll call, per se, so if anything applied, it would be
21 access charges.

22 Q Okay. So, if the BellSouth end user dialed the
23 number in Louisville, Kentucky of the Level 3 end user, it
24 would -- a call would go to the Level 3 switch and Level 3
25 would then transmit the call to Louisville, Kentucky and

1 would, presumably, charge BellSouth some form of access
2 for that long-distance call; is that correct?

3 A You know, it's really not clear to me. I don't
4 know how Level 3's interstate network works. There would
5 be some charges, obviously, in Louisville to terminate the
6 call with the local phone company. I really don't know,
7 without looking more specifically at how it's actually
8 handled, what charges would apply, but clearly not
9 reciprocal compensation.

10 Q Now, in fact, if Level 3 were acting as an
11 interexchange carrier in this scenario, Level 3 would pay
12 BellSouth access charges for delivering the originating
13 call to Level 3, wouldn't it?

14 A Well, it's a BellSouth customer --

15 Q Yes.

16 A -- making the call.

17 Q That's correct.

18 A In order for Level 3 to pay originating access
19 charges, Level 3 would have to be the toll provider for
20 the BellSouth end user.

21 Q Exactly.

22 A We haven't established that fact. Is that what
23 you're suggesting?

24 Q Well, why don't we assume that. Why don't we
25 assume that Level 3 is acting as the interexchange carrier

1 here and that BellSouth end user number one, because
2 BellSouth cannot carry traffic interstate, has selected
3 Level 3 to haul its long-distance traffic.

4 A Okay. So, Level 3 is the pick, the primary
5 interexchange carrier. That customer would go off hook,
6 and BellSouth would deliver it to Level 3. Level 3 would
7 pay originating access charges, and there would be some
8 terminating access charges for the call, although it's not
9 clear exactly, based on this, how they would apply.

10 Q Yeah. Well, let's not worry about the
11 terminating end, unless you think it's really relevant,
12 because we don't know who is in Kentucky or anything else.

13 A Yeah, it's really not relevant, because just as
14 with local calls, your responsibility ends at the
15 interconnection point. So, the costs are no different for
16 BellSouth for this, you know, 500-mile toll call versus a
17 2-mile local call.

18 Q All right. Now, I don't mean to repeat myself,
19 and I'm sorry if I am, but I just want to make sure we're
20 clear. The BellSouth customer has picked the Level 3,
21 Level 3 is there their interexchange carrier. They dial a
22 number in Louisville, Kentucky which, I guess, is 11
23 digits. BellSouth hands the call off to Level 3, Level 3
24 sends the call off to Kentucky. Level 3 pays BellSouth
25 originating access for that call and then, presumably,

1 charges the end user for a toll call, correct?

2 A Yes, that's correct. And the distinction is
3 that as compared to local with the toll call, Level 3 is
4 billing the end user. In a local call, BellSouth would be
5 billing the end user.

6 Q Okay.

7 A So, Level 3 is getting the revenues from the
8 call and is paying BellSouth originating access for
9 performing that function that it could not perform, just
10 like with reciprocal compensation, terminating reciprocal
11 compensation is paid to Level 3 for terminating the call
12 for BellSouth. So, I think, there are some analogies
13 here.

14 Q Okay. Now, you've been in the business long
15 enough and were with MCI long enough to know what Feature
16 Group A is, correct?

17 A I vaguely remember. It's something that rarely,
18 if ever, gets used anymore because it's so archaic, and
19 there are no transmission parameters. It's pretty risky
20 to use and pretty difficult to use.

21 Q But when long-distance competition first
22 started, there was no equal access and as a result,
23 long-distance carriers used Feature Group A to have their
24 customers access their facilities, right?

25 A Feature Group A was used, even though there was

1 no answer supervision. You may remember this years ago.
2 People got billed for one and two-minute calls when, in
3 fact, the called party never answered, but there was no
4 answer supervision like you find on Feature Group D or
5 even Feature Group B, so it was very problematic.

6 Q And the way Feature Group A would have worked in
7 this scenario, if that was what was used, is the BellSouth
8 end user number one would have dialed a 7-digit local
9 number, would have gotten to the IXE switch here at Level
10 3, would have gotten a second dial tone, and would have
11 dialed the 11 digits necessary to get to Louisville,
12 Kentucky, right?

13 A No. You left out probably a 14-digit pin that
14 would also have to be entered, because there is no --

15 Q Good point.

16 A -- ANI, Automatic Number Identification. So,
17 there'd be about 32 digits that would have to be entered.

18 Q Good point. The BellSouth customer would dial a
19 7-digit number. That would carry the call to the Level 3
20 switch for where a second dial tone would be obtained.
21 The customer would dial some kind of a pin that would tell
22 the IXE who it was, and then they would dial the
23 long-distance call, right?

24 A Yes, that's correct.

25 Q And for that BellSouth would receive originating

1 terminating -- I'm sorry, originating Feature Group A and,
2 presumably, Level 3 would bill the end user, correct?

3 A Right. And there were all sorts of premium
4 switched access differentials and pricing issues
5 associated with that quality of that call, but essentially
6 people would pay it.

7 Q Now, do you happen to note whether Level 3
8 either owns or owns an interest in any ISPs?

9 MR. ROMANO: Objection, Your Honor. I don't
10 quite now what the relevance is of that and also,
11 Mr. Gates is not a company employee.

12 COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Lackey, the objection
13 is relevance.

14 MR. LACKEY: Well, I think, I'm going to show
15 why, in just a moment, but the point of the matter is that
16 in his testimony he makes continual references about the
17 benefits that this arrangement brings in terms of bringing
18 ISPs to the state and the services that are provided to
19 end users.

20 What I'm curious about is whether Level 3 owns
21 an ISP and whether there is some arrangement between that
22 ISP and Level 3 that is predicated upon the payment of
23 reciprocal comp for calls to ISPs. That's where I'm
24 trying to go with that.

25 COMMISSIONER JABER: I'm going to allow the

1 question, Mr. Romano, but to the degree he doesn't know
2 the answer, he doesn't know.

3 MR. ROMANO: Yeah, actually, I'll withdraw the
4 objection based on that explanation.

5 A Yeah, I do not know, Mr. Lackey.

6 BY MR. LACKEY:

7 Q Okay. Will you accept that it's possible that
8 Level 3 is routing calls, ISP-bound calls, to ISPs that
9 are located in a state completely different than Florida,
10 maybe even Kentucky?

11 A I don't know.

12 Q Well, I understand you don't know, but I mean, I
13 think, you say in your testimony that not every ISP has a
14 local location in every local calling area and that that's
15 part of the reason why the virtual NXX is important, don't
16 you?

17 A Well, the virtual NXX issue is still a local
18 calling issue. And, I think, you're asking me about
19 interstate calls. I guess, it's conceivable that Level 3,
20 as an interexchange carrier, could deliver a call out of
21 state, if that's what you're asking me.

22 Q Well, let me ask you the question a little bit
23 differently, then, because I didn't realize it was going
24 to be confusing.

25 The virtual NXX issue, Issue 7, that this

1 Commission is addressing, involves the question of
2 assigning NXXs, numbers out of an NXX, to customers who
3 are not physically located in the local calling area where
4 the NXX is resident, correct?

5 A Yes, sir, that's correct, but it's not simply an
6 ISP issue. I mean, many customers use a virtual NXX to
7 provide a presence in another exchange. Companies who --
8 heaven forbid, it could be a law firm who wants a presence
9 in another exchange until they have enough business to
10 justify renting office space or it could be a car
11 dealership or a chiropractor or anybody who would want a
12 virtual presence there. It's not just ISPs.

13 Q And the physical location of the customer,
14 whoever it happens to be, doesn't have to be, for
15 instance, in the state of Florida. The number could be
16 assigned to customers located in Kentucky, correct?

17 A Well, that's certainly not any of the examples
18 that we've used in my testimony. We've talked about a
19 virtual NXX, and we're talking about intra-NXX calls so
20 that the NXX in the virtual exchange is associated with
21 the NXX so that it is truly a local call, what we call
22 intra-NXX calls.

23 I think, what you're suggesting, Mr. Lackey, is
24 not really an intra-NXX call but something like a toll
25 call which, as we discussed earlier, really has nothing to

1 do with reciprocal compensation.

2 Q My question to you is -- let me break it down
3 into pieces. Maybe I'm not being clear.

4 Let's assume that Level 3 has an NXX that's 551,
5 551-XXXX. That's a 10,000 number block that starts with
6 555-0000 and goes up to whatever it is, 551-9999, right?

7 A Yes, sir.

8 Q And if that NXX is assigned to Level 3 in this
9 diagram on page 8 -- I'm sorry, Exhibit 8, that NXX would
10 be resident in the Level 3 switch, correct?

11 A Yes, it would.

12 Q And so, everybody in the country using the LERG
13 -- what is that, the Local Exchange User's Guide?

14 A Local Exchange Routing Guide.

15 Q Routing Guide -- would know that exchange 551,
16 with the proper area code, I guess, is located in that
17 Level 3 switch that we've designated here, correct?

18 A Well, not really, and here's the flaw in your
19 argument. You can't use 551 everywhere; or you can, if
20 you include the NPA, and that's the flaw in this example.
21 The NPA would be different in Louisville than it is in
22 Florida.

23 Q Okay.

24 COMMISSIONER JABER: NPA, meaning the area code?

25 THE WITNESS: Yes, like 850.

1 COMMISSIONER JABER: Well, I understood his
2 question to be that assume it's the same area code.

3 MR. LACKEY: I'll put that in. It was there.
4 Why don't I rephrase the question and see if I can get
5 that in, Madam Chairman.

6 BY MR. LACKEY:

7 Q Let's assume that the NXX code that has been
8 assigned to that level switch is 850-551-XXXX, okay?

9 A Okay.

10 Q Then, a call from anywhere in the country to
11 850-551-whatever it happens to be, would be routed to that
12 Level 3 switch that's in our little local calling area
13 here on Exhibit 8, correct?

14 A It would be routed to which local calling area?

15 Q It would be routed to the box labeled Level 3
16 switch on Exhibit 8.

17 A Yes.

18 Q Okay. Now, under Level 3's approach to Issue 7,
19 could Level 3 assign to the Level 3 end user in
20 Louisville, Kentucky the number 850-551-1234?

21 A I don't believe so. And, I think, that would
22 violate the Local Exchange Routing Guide, but I will
23 freely admit that I'm not an engineer, so I would defer to
24 Mr. Sachetti on that particular issue. But it makes no
25 sense to me that that would work. I mean, that would

1 completely mess up the routing tables which are taken care
2 of with the LERG.

3 Q Well, maybe we need to discuss what happens when
4 you have a virtual NXX. When you have a virtual NXX and
5 one of the numbers that's included and that's dialed, does
6 the Level 3 switch do a translation and convert that
7 number into a different number?

8 A The way it works is that the NXX and the 7-digit
9 number is assigned to that particular customer in the
10 originating exchange, okay? And that's not normally done
11 with an NPA. It's done with an NXX. And, historically
12 and traditionally and operationally, that's the way we
13 determine local calls. If the NXXs are in the same
14 routing table, it is a local call.

15 And that's the way, for instance, BellSouth
16 bills for its foreign exchange service based on the NXX of
17 the numbers, not based on the actual location of the
18 originating caller versus the terminating or caller
19 number. That's the way BellSouth books its revenues and
20 its expenses based on the NXXs, not based on the physical
21 location of the call-in and calling parties.

22 Q Well, thank you for that, but what I asked you
23 was does the switch translate the number into something
24 else?

25 A Well, I'm not a switch translation expert, but,

1 I think, what it does is associates that number with that
2 other exchange, and that would be done -- I don't know if
3 it's in the translation table, Mr. Lackey, or in routing
4 tables or in some other part of the switch. I'm not a
5 soft switch expert. I'm more familiar with the circuit
6 switches that BellSouth would use. And soft switches, as
7 you know, using Internet protocol, are a different animal,
8 and I'm not an expert on those.

9 Q All right. So, let's see if I picked up a piece
10 of what you said there. The Level 3 switch associates the
11 number that was dialed with a number in another exchange;
12 is that what you said?

13 A Yeah. They assign a number. That customer is
14 assigned a number in the, say, Local Calling Area 2 that
15 is the same NXX as in Local Calling Area 1 that provides
16 the local presence for the customer in that foreign
17 exchange or in that exchange other than the exchange where
18 the call was originated.

19 Q Well, let's see if I understand that. And I'm
20 going to use a Florida-to-Florida example here, because I
21 know the area codes here.

22 Let's assume that there is a customer of Level
23 3's who is located in Tampa, Florida and that's area code
24 727, but he wants a number that's associated with the
25 Level 3 switch on Exhibit 8, which is in the 850 area

1 code.

2 Now, is the way this works, to your
3 understanding, that if Level 3 is assigned 850-551-1234 to
4 that customer, that when a call came into the Level 3
5 switch that was dialed 850-551-1234, that that switch
6 would then associate that call with a second number? And
7 let's just assume it's 727-441-1234. Is that what
8 happens?

9 A I don't know. I would be guessing to speculate
10 on that, Mr. Lackey, but, I think, including the NPA has
11 -- introduces another parameter that I, personally,
12 haven't thought about. When I think of virtual NXX I
13 think of intra-NXX calls within the NPA, not calls, you
14 know, between NPAs.

15 Q Okay.

16 COMMISSIONER JABER: But why would you ask for
17 assignability within the NPA? Help me understand that.

18 THE WITNESS: Well, within the NPA?

19 COMMISSIONER JABER: Because you said that's
20 what you think of when you talk about assignability.

21 THE WITNESS: Right. Well, those, of course,
22 are large areas, quite large areas, depending on how many
23 NPAs we have in the state. So, when I say within the NPA,
24 I'm referring to the NXX code. I'm assuming people are
25 dialing local calls, and that's what has confused me about

1 this line of cross is that we're referring now to NPAs and
2 NXXs and, to me, that's a toll call.

3 And that's the confusion, that we've never
4 really discussed this. I haven't discussed it with Level
5 3, and I don't know how soft switch would manage those
6 numbers, given that type of an assignment. But the
7 assignments that I'm talking about in my testimony, in my
8 direct and rebuttal, deal with intra-NXX calls within an
9 NPA.

10 So, the NPA is not an issue. And that is a, by
11 definition, a local call. And this whole NPA issue is an
12 interesting intellectual discussion, and I know we will
13 figure this out, I just don't know if I'm the right person
14 to do that at this point.

15 COMMISSIONER JABER: I thought he added the NPA
16 to his example because you didn't think you could answer
17 the question without knowing what the NPA was.

18 THE WITNESS: Well, as I said before, I think,
19 if you have different NPAs, that's not a local call,
20 that's a toll call. And that's why I asked him to tell me
21 what NPAs were involved, because if we're talking about
22 different NPAs, we're not talking about local.

23 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: See, I understood the
24 question to be what's behind that local call. If you're
25 just going to assume, for the moment, that is a local

1 call, it's intra NXX, what happens behind that?

2 THE WITNESS: Behind it? What happens behind
3 it? And that's a very good question, and I can see where
4 that confusion would come from.

5 What happens behind the call is based on the
6 numbers that were dialed, okay? If someone dials
7 551-XXXX, it's going to be routed based on that number.
8 That's the calling number. It will go to the switch,
9 it'll terminate to that number, okay?

10 If someone dials whatever the Louisville,
11 Kentucky NPA is and then 551-XXXX, then it's going to be
12 routed out of state. That is not a local call.

13 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And I'm not sure that's what
14 we're talking about. If you're talking about a virtual
15 NXX, you're suggesting a situation where, if I wanted --
16 as you described, if I wanted a presence within a certain
17 NXX --

18 THE WITNESS: Yes.

19 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: -- and by default and by
20 definition within a certain NPA, and I happen to be either
21 outside of one or outside of both, behind that local call
22 there's a -- you know, there's a -- I guess, I would
23 assume a toll component or some additional routing that
24 gets it to where I am. I'm not in the NXX that I have a
25 presence in.

1 THE WITNESS: Right.

2 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: So, something has to happen
3 after that local number is called to get to -- you know,
4 to get to me. And I'm just interested in knowing what
5 that is. And I'm not sure that I'm in line with what
6 Mr. Lackey is trying to develop, but I'm curious to know
7 what happens after that local call.

8 THE WITNESS: Well, that number, that local
9 number, is associated with a Level 3 customer. So, when
10 that number is dialed, it is -- BellSouth routes it to the
11 interconnection point, and the call is then given to Level
12 3, and then Level 3 terminates it to that number, okay?

13 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: As a regular call.

14 THE WITNESS: Yes.

15 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: No matter where it's
16 located --

17 THE WITNESS: Right, because it's --

18 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: -- in relation to you.

19 THE WITNESS: Right, because it's a 7-digit
20 call, right, local call.

21 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I guess, I'm not sure we're
22 crossing that -- after you receive it as a local call and
23 you have to route it to where the true physical presence
24 is --

25 THE WITNESS: Right.

1 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: -- that is still a local
2 call for you?

3 THE WITNESS: Yes.

4 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Or in relation to the
5 customer, I guess.

6 THE WITNESS: Yes. And it's also -- that's the
7 way BellSouth does NXX service. Because the NXXs are
8 within the same routing cable, per se. Like a call from
9 one NXX to this NXX is known be a local call, okay?
10 That's what the routing cables tell you. If it's a
11 different NXX, then, it must be, you know, a toll call, so
12 yes.

13 BY MR. LACKEY:

14 Q I'm sorry, if I've confused things, but let me
15 ask you this, Mr. Gates. How does this work in Miami
16 where there's an NPA overlay?

17 A I don't think on overlay or even an NPA split
18 would make a difference, because those overlays and splits
19 are all accounted for in the LERG, the Local Exchange
20 Routing Guide.

21 Q Well, I'm afraid I've managed to obfuscate the
22 point here, so let me ask a different question, and I
23 apologize for doing that.

24 COMMISSIONER JABER: Actually, how much further
25 do you have to go? How much more time do you need with

1 this witness?

2 MR. LACKEY: It's going to take a little while.

3 COMMISSIONER JABER: I think, we're going to go
4 until 12:45, and then take a short break for lunch.

5 BY MR. LACKEY:

6 Q Just so we're clear on what the issue is here,
7 we've got a switch in Miami, right? You have a switch in
8 Miami, right?

9 A Level 3 does, yes.

10 Q Level 3 does. And you have an NXX, probably
11 more than one, that's honed in that office in Miami,
12 correct?

13 A Yes.

14 Q And someone who is in Jupiter, which I will
15 represent to you is in a different NPA than Miami, could
16 buy one of the local numbers out of your Miami switch,
17 right?

18 A That I don't know. I don't know the NPA
19 impacts.

20 Q Okay.

21 A Now, if you'd like, if you want to take a break,
22 we could discuss that internally and get you an
23 affirmative answer, but the NPA issue is something that I
24 would be guessing on.

25 Q Okay. Why don't I move to another line of

1 questioning for the next 15 minutes and see what I can
2 wrap up and then I'll pick this up after the lunch break,
3 because it may be more fruitful. We might actually get
4 where I need to be, if we do that.

5 Let's move to Issue 2, which deals with
6 symmetrical reciprocal compensation, if I understand; is
7 that correct?

8 A Yes.

9 Q All right. Do you have Exhibit 5 there in front
10 of you?

11 A Yes, I do.

12 Q Okay. And when Mr. Turner went through this
13 with the earlier witnesses, I think, we identified what
14 all the component parts were; a single local calling area,
15 an agreed upon IP, a Level 3 switch to BellSouth end
16 office switches; do you see all that?

17 A Yes, I do.

18 Q Okay. Now, if I understand what the issue is
19 here is when the Level 3 end user calls the BellSouth end
20 user one, the call travels from the Level 3 end user to
21 the Level 3 switch, right?

22 A Yes.

23 Q From the Level 3 switch to the IP, right?

24 A Yes.

25 Q The call is then handed off to BellSouth where

1 it is transported to the end office with the Xs in it,
2 right?

3 A Yes.

4 Q And the call is then transported to the end
5 office serving the called party, correct?

6 A Yes.

7 Q And what we've described on this Exhibit 5 are
8 two alternative ways of getting from that end office with
9 the Xs in it to the BellSouth end office switch, either
10 using dedicated interoffice transport or, in an
11 appropriate case, using tandem switching and common
12 transport; is that correct?

13 A I see that there, yes.

14 Q Well, that is two ways that the call could get
15 to that end office, correct?

16 A Yeah, you could use dedicated transport or
17 through the tandem, yes.

18 Q Okay. Now -- and I may be confused about this,
19 so, if I'm wrong, help me.

20 What I understand the issue here to be is that
21 when the call goes from the Level 3 end user to the
22 BellSouth end user, Level 3 has to pay call transport for
23 the red line that's marked local channel and then has to,
24 assuming it's dedicated transport, has to pay call
25 transport for the red line marked DIT.

1 But when the call goes from the BellSouth end
2 user number one to the Level 3 end user, BellSouth only
3 pays Level 3 an amount equal to the red line between the
4 IP and Level 3 switch marked LC. And Level 3 says those
5 two amounts are different, and that's unfair. Is that
6 your position?

7 A Well, generally, I would agree with your
8 characterization. I think, the important point here is
9 that this is a fixed scenario, this transport. And if the
10 traffic originates from BellSouth or if it originates from
11 Level 3, these trunks don't change, the costs should be
12 the same.

13 And the problem is by virtue of the way
14 BellSouth has designed serving wire center, Level 3 when
15 it originates a call, will have to pay dedicated
16 interoffice transport, whereas BellSouth would not.

17 MR. LACKEY: I want to hand out another chart,
18 which I'd like to have labeled Exhibit 9, Madam Chairman.

19 COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Lackey, can you give me
20 a short title for Exhibit 9, please?

21 MR. LACKEY: Yes. This is Cost of Exchanging
22 Local Calls.

23 COMMISSIONER JABER: Thank you.

24 (Exhibit 9 marked for identification.)

25 BY MR. LACKEY:

1 Q Mr. Gates, do you see that this chart looks
2 somewhat like Exhibit 5, except I've added a line along
3 the bottom and I have partitioned the call into three
4 segments, the segment between the Level 3 switch and the
5 IP, between the IP and the BellSouth end office, and
6 between the BellSouth end office and the BellSouth end
7 office serving the called party. Do you see that?

8 A I do see that. Can you tell me -- to help me
9 with this example, where is the BellSouth serving wire
10 center? When BellSouth originates a call, where is the
11 serving wire center?

12 Q I would believe that the serving wire center, in
13 the context of this case and in the context of the
14 testimony that's being given, is in the box labeled BST
15 wire center.

16 A Labeled -- excuse me?

17 Q You see the box labeled BST wire center? It's
18 right in the middle of the page?

19 A Oh, BST wire center.

20 Q It's got the end office switch in it. It's got
21 a tandem switch in the --

22 A Well, that would not be the serving wire center
23 for BellSouth originating traffic, and that's my
24 confusion.

25 Q I'm sorry.

1 A The serving wire center has to be on the Level 3
2 network.

3 Q I don't believe that I mentioned BellSouth
4 originating traffic yet.

5 A Oh, well, I thought we were going both ways.

6 Q Not yet.

7 A Okay. Would you tell me, then, where the Level
8 3 serving wire center is?

9 Q I believe, as you point out in your testimony,
10 using the confusing language of the interconnection
11 agreement, that the serving wire center you just mentioned
12 is the one labeled BST wire center.

13 A Okay, so that's the Level 3 serving wire center?

14 Q Yeah. And just to put a fork in it, if the call
15 were going the other way, the BellSouth serving wire
16 center would be the box marked Level 3 switch, right?

17 A Yes.

18 Q That's the confusing language that you point out
19 in your testimony.

20 A Yes. And we had to add that here to make this
21 clear, just kind of ironic.

22 Q Well, I'm sure everybody appreciates that
23 clarity.

24 I have put along the bottom the three segments
25 of the call, and I have assigned, quite arbitrarily,

1 figures to that; do you see that, 10 cents, one cent, one
2 cent?

3 A Yes.

4 Q Now, I have another chart, killed another tree,
5 that's got the actual figures on it about what that would
6 cost, but I thought I'd use this for simplicity if you
7 could agree with me, just for illustrative purposes, to
8 use those costs that I've put on Exhibit 9, okay?

9 A Yes.

10 Q And what I've posited here is that the local
11 channel between the box marked Level 3 switch and the IP
12 is one penny. And I posited that the cost of the facility
13 between the IP and the BellSouth end office with the Xs is
14 also one cent, okay?

15 A Yes.

16 Q And I've assumed that, because they're both
17 local channels, which are flat-rated facilities, correct?

18 A Yeah. In actuality, it's probably just one
19 channel going from the Level 3 switch through the IP to
20 the end office. They're probably not two separate pieces,
21 but you can illustrate it that way, if you'd like.

22 Q Okay. And you don't have any objection with me
23 assigning an identical cost to those two pieces, correct?

24 A Well, I'm not expressing any opinions on the
25 cost of this.

1 Q Okay. And then, I have on the piece that's
2 represented by the dedicated interoffice transport, I've
3 assigned a cost of 10 cents to it, okay?

4 A Yes, I see that.

5 Q Now, if I understand correctly, the way this
6 would work is when a Level 3 caller -- and again, I'm not
7 asking you to accept that my costing is right, I'm just
8 trying to illustrate a point -- that when a Level 3 caller
9 calls the BellSouth end user number one that we've been
10 talking about, that the call goes to the Level 3 switch,
11 goes to the IP, goes to the end office marked with the Xs,
12 goes over the DIT to the BellSouth end office switch, and
13 then and in that call, Level 3 would have to pay, using my
14 cost figures, BellSouth 11 cents; is that correct?

15 A 11 cents or 12 cents.

16 Q Well, I don't believe that you would pay us for
17 your facility between the Level 3 switch and the IP.

18 A Oh, I see. So, these are costs and not rates,
19 per se.

20 Q In this case, since rates equal cost, we can
21 call them either one. But the point is for call transport
22 you'd have to pay us 11 cents under this very simplistic
23 example, correct?

24 A Okay.

25 Q Is that right?

1 A Yes.

2 Q Okay. And if the call went from the BellSouth
3 end user to the Level 3 end user; that is, it went from
4 end user one to the BellSouth end office switch to the BST
5 wire center to the IP, and we then handed it off to you
6 there at the IP, you carried it to your switch, we would
7 only pay you one cent, correct?

8 A Yeah, BellSouth originated call, the DIT would
9 go from the BellSouth serving wire center, which is the
10 Level 3 switch, to the first point of switching, which is
11 the same Level 3 switch, so there would be, yes, one cent.

12 Q Okay. But I want to make sure I've captured
13 your point exactly and; that is, when a call goes from a
14 Level 3 end user to the BellSouth end user, you have to
15 pay us 11 cents, but when the call goes from the BellSouth
16 end user to the Level 3 end user, we only have to pay you
17 a penny.

18 A In essence, that might be the complaint, per se,
19 but the point is that they should be equivalent.

20 Q Okay.

21 A They shouldn't differ based on definitions.

22 Q All right. And Level 3 --

23 COMMISSIONER JABER: Wait, that what should be
24 equivalent?

25 THE WITNESS: The charges for using these

1 facilities. If Level 3 purchased 10 miles of local
2 transport from BellSouth, that price should be the same as
3 if BellSouth purchased 10 miles of transport from Level 3,
4 they should be symmetrical.

5 COMMISSIONER JABER: So, if BellSouth pays you
6 one cent for purposes of this example, are you saying that
7 Level 3 should pay BellSouth one cent?

8 THE WITNESS: Well, yes, in a way. I wouldn't
9 have stated it quite that way, but the point is if you
10 look at this diagram, the transport is there. The only
11 reason BellSouth is paying one cent instead of 11 is
12 because of the definition. The Level 3 switch is both the
13 BellSouth serving wire center and the first point of
14 switching. And per their contract language, that's where
15 the DIT goes between. And if it's the same switch, there
16 is no DIT, so because of that, the prices are different.

17 And yes, we're saying that they should be the
18 same, whether it's one cent or 10 cents or \$10,000, we're
19 saying the rates should be the same. The physical
20 facilities don't change. They should be symmetrical.

21 COMMISSIONER JABER: Okay. And that's how you
22 define symmetrical reciprocal compensation?

23 THE WITNESS: Well, symmetrical, not reciprocal.

24 COMMISSIONER JABER: Okay. And that definition,
25 according to your position, doesn't take into account how

1 many steps or how many functions or how many services
2 BellSouth has to go through to deliver the call.

3 THE WITNESS: That's correct, because they're
4 the same on both sides. If Level 3 is provisioning the
5 transport or if BellSouth is provisioning the transport,
6 both companies do the same functions, you know, tack up
7 the same facilities, so there is no discrepancy there, but
8 there is a huge discrepancy in what the carriers are paid
9 just based on the definitions and the language. So, we
10 just want to make sure that the language alone doesn't
11 force this huge discrepancy in what we pay and what we
12 receive.

13 BY MR. LACKEY:

14 Q Let me follow-up on that question. You were
15 asked whether Level 3 wanted to pay a penny for the call
16 that goes from Level 3 end user to BellSouth end user. In
17 actuality what you've asked the Commission to do in your
18 testimony is to allow Level 3 to charge BellSouth 11
19 cents, using my example, for the call that goes from the
20 BellSouth end user to the Level 3 end user, haven't you?

21 A That's correct, Mr. Lackey. What we're saying
22 is that if you're going to charge Level 3 11 cents based
23 on these definitions in your language, then Level 3 should
24 be able to charge BellSouth 11 cents because, as you can
25 see, the trunks aren't changing. The facilities are the

1 same. The rates and the costs should be the same as well.

2 Q Well, that's what I want to talk about. Now, we
3 had this conversation about rates and costs, and I told
4 you that they were the same in this case, that the cost of
5 the local channel was a penny and that the cost of the DIT
6 was 10 cents; do you recall that?

7 A Yeah, just for a hypothetical, correct?

8 Q Yeah, that's all.

9 A Sure.

10 Q I'm just trying to get the principle.

11 A Mm-hmm.

12 Q So, if BellSouth's end user originates a call to
13 a Level 3 end user, BellSouth is going to incur the cost
14 of local switching at its switch right above that end user
15 one, right?

16 A Well, that's its own internal cost, yes.

17 Q Sure. And it's going to incur the cost of
18 carrying the call from that end office to the end office
19 in that wire center of 10 cents, right? I'm sure you're
20 going to say its internal cost, but it's going to incur
21 that 10-cent cost, right?

22 A Well, here's the problem.

23 Q Can I have a yes or no before I get the problem?

24 A That's what we're asking. The problem is based
25 on the definition. BellSouth wouldn't pay a dime for

1 that. There would be no dedicated interoffice transport.

2 Q Excuse me. Is it your position or Level 3's
3 position that it costs BellSouth absolutely nothing to
4 haul a call between the BST end office switch on the left
5 side of this diagram and the BST serving or the BST wire
6 center that's in the middle of this diagram?

7 A Well, let's be sure we understand your example.
8 We're talking about a call that BellSouth is originating
9 and BellSouth is purchasing from Level 3 dedicated
10 interoffice transport and local channel facilities.
11 That's the scenario, okay?

12 In this scenario, when that call gets to the
13 switch and then it's transferred over to the IP, BellSouth
14 pays Level 3 nothing. They get no dedicated interoffice
15 transport for that. They do get the local channel
16 facility, which is the one cent.

17 Q All right, Mr. Gates, that wasn't the question.
18 Let me try it a different way.

19 We've agreed already, haven't we, under my
20 example, my hypothetical, that going from the right to the
21 left, that from the IP to the BellSouth end office switch
22 costs 11 cents. We've already discussed that, right?

23 A Well, yeah. It doesn't matter really what
24 anything costs. Our dispute here is over who's paying
25 what.

1 Q I understand that, but we've agreed that it
2 costs 11 cents, correct?

3 A That's fine.

4 Q Now, if it costs 11 cents to move the call from
5 the IP to the BST end office switch, then doesn't simple
6 logic tell you that it would cost 11 cents to move it from
7 BellSouth's end office switch to the IP over BellSouth's
8 own facilities? Cost is cost, isn't it?

9 A That's right. And if you're going to impose
10 those costs on a competitor, then the competitor should
11 also be able to impose those costs on BellSouth; hence,
12 our request for symmetrical rates.

13 Q Well, excuse me, Mr. Gates. When BellSouth's
14 end user calls the Level 3 end user and BellSouth has to
15 deliver that call to that IP, it has already incurred 11
16 cents worth of cost to deliver that call to that IP; then,
17 it hands it off to you and you charge me one cent for
18 delivering it to your central office, and I've incurred a
19 total cost of 12 cents, haven't I?

20 A No. This example is just completely confused by
21 the fact that you're linking in kind of reciprocal
22 compensation issues and the symmetrical compensation
23 issues associated with this leased transport.

24 This is not a reciprocal compensation issue
25 whatsoever, okay? We're talking about leasing transport

1 facilities from each other to, in fact, interconnection.

2 Q Mr. Gates, I didn't say a word about leasing any
3 facilities.

4 COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Lackey --

5 MR. LACKEY: Yes, ma'am.

6 COMMISSIONER JABER: Let me try to understand
7 what you're saying. You acknowledged, at least it was
8 your testimony in response to my question that reciprocal
9 compensation was a cost recovery mechanism.

10 THE WITNESS: It is.

11 COMMISSIONER JABER: All right. So, for
12 purposes of understanding what reciprocal compensation
13 should mean, in the case of Level 3 and BellSouth, we have
14 to look at cost; is that correct?

15 THE WITNESS: That's correct.

16 COMMISSIONER JABER: All right. You acknowledge
17 that it costs BellSouth something to deliver a call to a
18 Level 3 end user?

19 THE WITNESS: Yes.

20 COMMISSIONER JABER: Is it your testimony that
21 BellSouth should recover that cost?

22 THE WITNESS: See, and this is the confusion,
23 your last question about delivering to an end user.
24 That's not what we're talking about in this scenario.
25 We're just talking about trunks between facilities, okay?

1 Reciprocal compensation does deal with terminating the
2 call to an end user. That's not what this particular
3 issue is. We're talking about trunks that meet at the IP
4 or the interconnection point.

5 COMMISSIONER JABER: So, in this example, it
6 would be the trunk that's indicated in the red line
7 between the X and the IP?

8 THE WITNESS: Yes, that's a local channel
9 facility. And then the DIT, which is to the left, the
10 red, okay, and the point is, very simply, if Level 3
11 originates a call, okay, and uses those facilities of
12 BellSouth, it gets charged for the DIT, okay, because the
13 BellSouth serving wire center or -- excuse me, the Level 3
14 serving wire center, which is the BST wire center there,
15 okay, the DIT goes between there and the first point of
16 switching, the first point of switching is the box to the
17 left, the BST end office switch. That's the definition
18 for DIT, it goes from the Level 3 serving wire center to
19 that first point of switching, okay?

20 Now, so Level 3 would pay that for those trunks.
21 The problem is conversing on the other side, if BellSouth
22 were to have trunks from Level 3, because of the
23 definition the BellSouth serving wire center -- okay, I'm
24 sorry, let me be very specific.

25 COMMISSIONER JABER: Let's take it one step at a

1 time, so I don't get confused.

2 THE WITNESS: Okay.

3 COMMISSIONER JABER: The red line marked DIT --

4 THE WITNESS: Yes.

5 COMMISSIONER JABER: -- the line from Level 3
6 wire center to that X, you're saying that does not equate,
7 for purposes of this example to the 10 cents, because
8 we're talking about the cost of the trunk and not the cost
9 of delivering the call.

10 THE WITNESS: Well, what I'm saying is -- that's
11 not exactly what I'm saying, excuse me.

12 COMMISSIONER JABER: Well, that's the confusion.

13 THE WITNESS: And I apologize, yeah.

14 COMMISSIONER JABER: That's the confusion.

15 THE WITNESS: Yes. What I'm saying is, based on
16 the tariff language or the contract language that they're
17 proposing, BellSouth would be compensated for DIT if Level
18 3 were to lease DIT for calls, okay?

19 On the other side of that, if Level 3 were to
20 lease facilities to BellSouth, Level 3 would not receive
21 any DIT because of the definitions. And the point is the
22 facilities are the same. Whether Level 3 provided those
23 or whether BellSouth provided those facilities they would
24 look just like this, they wouldn't change. The only
25 difference would be in how much compensation you would

1 receive.

2 BellSouth would receive 11 cents, and Level 3
3 would receive a penny, but they're providing the same
4 physical facilities. And the only reason that occurs,
5 that anomaly, is because of the definitions.

6 And we're saying one way to fix that is to make
7 sure that whatever it is that BellSouth charges allow
8 Level 3 to charge the same so that it is symmetrical.

9 COMMISSIONER JABER: Who established those
10 definitions?

11 THE WITNESS: BellSouth did.

12 COMMISSIONER JABER: In accordance with the FCC?

13 THE WITNESS: Well, these definitions are in the
14 contract.

15 COMMISSIONER JABER: Okay.

16 THE WITNESS: I don't think the FCC guidelines
17 provided any guidance for these issues.

18 COMMISSIONER JABER: Okay. Mr. Lackey.

19 THE WITNESS: One final point, if I may. It's
20 not that Level 3 is opposing paying for these trunks.
21 Level 3 is willing to pay, but it just requests that its
22 costs be recovered, too, through a symmetrical rate design
23 so that they can recover their costs as well.

24 BY MR. LACKEY:

25 Q Mr. Gates, do you know whether the definitions

1 that you've just been talking about are in dispute or not
2 in this proceeding?

3 A The definitions themselves?

4 Q The definitions themselves, are they in dispute?

5 A Well, I think, Ms. Cox and I had a somewhat
6 difference of opinion on how we define serving wire
7 center. If you're asking me whether the company has
8 negotiated the language in the contract, I don't know.
9 I'd defer to Mr. Romano, who did most of those
10 negotiations.

11 Q Mr. Who?

12 A Mr. Romano.

13 Q Okay. So you don't know, in response to an
14 earlier question, whether BellSouth proposed those
15 definitions or whether they were mutually agreed upon
16 between BellSouth and Level 3?

17 A I don't know. I would note, though, Mr. Lackey,
18 that we're trying to change them. So, I sincerely doubt
19 Level 3 would agree to something that we're now trying to
20 change.

21 Q Let's approach this a little differently. Are
22 you saying now that beginning at the IP and moving to the
23 left that -- I'm sorry, there's two ways to do this, isn't
24 there? First of all, Level 3 can interconnect with our
25 network at the IP and then pay us call termination -- call

1 transport and termination reciprocal comp for completing
2 that call to our end user, correct?

3 A Yes, for reciprocal compensation, that's
4 correct.

5 Q Okay.

6 A We would hand the call off at the IP and
7 BellSouth would terminate it.

8 Q Alternatively, even though we're interconnecting
9 our networks at the IP, you could lease facilities from
10 BellSouth; say, a facility that's marked LC there and the
11 facility labeled DIT, you could lease those from us and
12 then avoid paying call transport as reciprocal comp for a
13 call, correct?

14 A Yes. That's an agreement the companies reached.
15 And, of course, it goes both ways for Level 3 and for
16 BellSouth.

17 Q Okay. And so, there's two ways to look at this
18 problem. If you don't buy the -- lease the facilities
19 from us, then it's reciprocal comp from the IP to the
20 BellSouth end office switch on the left where you'd have
21 to pay end office switching or you could lease LC, the
22 line labeled LC and the line labeled DIT, and all you
23 would owe us for reciprocal comp is end office switching,
24 correct?

25 A I think, that's one way that we would do that.

1 That doesn't solve the problem with this scenario, but it
2 could be done that way, yes.

3 Q All right. I'm just trying to get the
4 definitions. I'm trying to figure out what we're talking
5 about, because you were talking about having leased the
6 facilities between the IP and the BellSouth's end office
7 switch, I thought. You did say that, didn't you?

8 A No. Well, yeah, that's the purpose of this
9 leased facility arrangement --

10 Q Okay.

11 A -- is that we lease the trunks from BellSouth to
12 accomplish this.

13 Q Okay. Let me ask you to assume one thing, and
14 I'll finish on this line. Let me just ask you to assume
15 as an absolute indisputable, undeniable, can't-contest-it
16 fact that the cost of moving a call, whether it's going
17 from Level 3 to BellSouth or BellSouth to Level 3 is 12
18 cents. It's marked on the bottom line here, okay?

19 A That's your assumption.

20 Q Well, I mean, there's no reason why the cost
21 would be any different in a scenario from a call moving in
22 one direction versus another direction. The cost is the
23 cost is the cost, right?

24 A True, because we're talking about dedicated
25 facilities. That's probably even more true. The costs

1 should be the same going either way.

2 Q Okay. And part of Level 3's position in this
3 litigation is that BellSouth has an absolute obligation to
4 deliver BellSouth's originating calls to that IP, correct?

5 A Yes.

6 Q Okay. And if a cost is a cost is a cost, then
7 when BellSouth's end user calls the Level 3 end user,
8 BellSouth itself internally incurs 11 cents worth of
9 costs, using this example, in getting the call to its IP,
10 however it gets it there, right?

11 A Well, based on your assumption, that's correct.

12 Q Okay.

13 A And if we're doing reciprocal compensation and
14 we're not using these leased facility interconnections,
15 then we're talking about your obligation to deliver that
16 service to the IP.

17 Q All right. And so, BellSouth incurs 11 cents to
18 deliver to the IP, and then under this example we pay you
19 the penny for the line class code -- I'm sorry, for the
20 line class code, I'm tired.

21 A Local channel facility?

22 Q Local channel facility. And so, BellSouth has
23 incurred a cost of 11 cents, paid you a penny, so
24 BellSouth has a total cost of 12 cents that it has
25 incurred hauling that call or transmitting that call or

1 carrying that call from its end office to the Level 3 end
2 office, right?

3 A That's what your diagram shows.

4 Q And if a call goes in the other direction, Level
5 3, presumably, incurs a penny from its local channel, and
6 then it pays BellSouth, because it's leased the
7 facilities, a penny for the next local channel and 10
8 cents for the DIT, so it's incurred a cost of 12 cents for
9 that call, correct?

10 A That's correct. The problem lies in that both
11 carriers are incurring the same cost. The problem is
12 BellSouth is allowed to recover those costs through rates;
13 Level 3, by virtue of these definitions, is not.

14 Q So, what you want, your solution is even though
15 BellSouth has already incurred 12 cents worth of costs,
16 you want BellSouth to pay an additional 10 cents for that
17 call for that little facility marked LC between the IP and
18 the Level 3 switch in order to be safe, right?

19 A No. We expect BellSouth to pay for dedicated
20 interoffice transport in the same manner that Level 3
21 would pay for dedicated interoffice transport.

22 Q In this example, you want us to write you a
23 check, an 11-cent check, for our use of that little
24 facility between the IP and the Level 3 switch for every
25 call we send to you in this scenario, correct?

1 A Well, I wouldn't agree with that
2 characterization. What we are asking for is that the
3 rates be the same, that Level 3 not be discriminated
4 against or denied compensation simply because of
5 definitions in the wording of the tariff.

6 And we're willing to sit down and discuss that
7 wording, change the wording, or if BellSouth isn't willing
8 to change it so that it's acceptable so that it's not
9 discriminatory based on network design, then, the only way
10 to fix that is to order that Level 3 be allowed to charge
11 the same rates that BellSouth is allowed to charge.

12 Q If you pay us 11 cents for hauling this call,
13 you want us to pay you 11 cents, even though we've already
14 incurred an 11-cent cost to get it to the IP, right?

15 A Asked and answered. I'm sorry --

16 Q Can I have a yes?

17 A I can't -- I think, I've answered it as many
18 ways as I can.

19 Q How about with a yes.

20 A Would you like to ask the question again?

21 Q Sure, if you don't object to it as asked and
22 answered.

23 A I'm sorry.

24 Q If BellSouth charges, in this scenario, 11 cents
25 to Level 3 for these facilities for the call going from

1 Level 3 to BellSouth, you want BellSouth to pay you 11
2 cents for the use of the facility between the IP and the
3 Level 3 switch, even though BellSouth has already incurred
4 an 11-cent cost to get the call to the IP in the first
5 instance? Yes or no, please.

6 MR. ROMANO: Actually, I'm going to object, not
7 on asked and answered grounds, but for the fact that this
8 hypothetical has gone on for a while without touching on
9 reality. I'm not sure where the one-cent basis comes from
10 for the local facility channel cost for Level 3. I think,
11 that is probably the strongest objection. There's no
12 basis for the hypothetical to show the one-cent cost for
13 the local channel is, in fact, a cost being incurred by
14 Level 3, in this instance.

15 COMMISSIONER JABER: Okay. So, your objection
16 is foundation hasn't been laid for the question?

17 MR. ROMANO: Precisely.

18 MR. LACKEY: My response is it's a little late.
19 We've been talking about this for a half an hour. And I
20 indicated that it was for illustrative purposes so that we
21 could simply see what they were really asking for here.

22 COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Romano, we're going to
23 do this. The questions have been allowed. He was about
24 to answer the question. You may redirect him. I think,
25 it has been clear that this is a hypothetical, and he was

1 asked to accept some assumptions.

2 MR. ROMANO: I understand.

3 COMMISSIONER JABER: So, I'll allow this
4 question.

5 And Mr. Gates, it goes a lot better if you start
6 with a yes or no, and then you're allowed to elaborate,
7 but answer the question. Re-ask it.

8 MR. LACKEY: Yes, ma'am.

9 BY MR. LACKEY:

10 Q If BellSouth charges Level 3 11 cents for a call
11 in this Exhibit 9 that moves from the Level 3 end user to
12 the BellSouth end user number one, then what Level 3 is
13 asking the Commission to do is to allow Level 3 to charge
14 BellSouth 11 cents for a call that goes the other way from
15 the BellSouth end user number one to the Level 3 end user,
16 even though BellSouth, using this diagram and the
17 assumptions we've been talking about, has already incurred
18 11 cents worth of costs to get the call to the IP?

19 A The answer, first of all, is no. That's the
20 only way I can answer that question. It's a compound
21 question. Several assumptions I disagree with.

22 We're not talking about a call, which Mr. Lackey
23 keeps referring to. We're talking about a fixed facility,
24 a trunk group. Maybe it's a DS-3, 672 waste-grade
25 circuits. We're not talking about a call. We're talking

1 about a fixed facility that's made available on a
2 dedicated basis for a particular charge, okay?

3 COMMISSIONER JABER: To deliver a call?

4 THE WITNESS: Well, you can use it for
5 delivering calls, yes.

6 COMMISSIONER JABER: All right. Let me ask it,
7 because I really am very interested in your answer, in
8 this regard.

9 If BellSouth has to use all of these trunks and
10 facilities and loops and all of the other acronyms that
11 are in this diagram or any other diagram they show and
12 they incur a charge, and that happens to be 12 cents --

13 THE WITNESS: Mm-hmm.

14 COMMISSIONER JABER: -- is it your position that
15 there should be an additional charge paid to you for the
16 delivery of the call using -- not using, in this case,
17 trunks or facilities or loops from the IP to the Level 3
18 switch?

19 See, the question is are you asking them to pay
20 you an additional cost for the trunk between the IP and
21 the Level 3 switch?

22 THE WITNESS: We're not asking for any
23 additional fees or rates for that; no, not at all. What
24 we're trying to point out is that Level 3 should receive
25 compensation for DIT, just like BellSouth receives

1 compensation for DIT.

2 COMMISSIONER JABER: Even if Level 3 isn't using
3 a DIT?

4 THE WITNESS: Well, the only reason we're not
5 using DIT is by virtue of this definition and the fact
6 that we have one switch, okay, and they've picked this --
7 if you look at this example, this BellSouth end office
8 switch over here, okay, that's the first point of
9 switching, okay?

10 By calling it the first point of switching, I
11 mean, they could have defined the Level 3 serving wire
12 center as the point at which the DIT runs between here,
13 and they didn't. They picked a different switch other
14 than this switch, okay? Knowing that Level 3 only has one
15 switch, those definitions don't help Level 3 in terms of
16 cost recovery. So, even though this trunk group is nailed
17 up, you know, physically there, there would be different
18 compensation for those trunk groups based on those
19 definitions.

20 And the point about equivalent compensation for
21 what appears to be different facilities, the key there is
22 that we need to fix these definitions to make it fair for
23 new entrants. You can't discriminate against a company
24 simply because they don't go out and buy those old
25 classified switches and stick them in every, you know,

1 small calling area, okay?

2 This is a new technology company with soft
3 switches that can serve an entire LATA or more with a soft
4 switch. And we're merely asking to change these
5 definitions to make it more fair, make it equitable in
6 terms of cost recovery, that they not be able to impose
7 costs that Level 3 is not able to also impose on them.

8 COMMISSIONER JABER: Okay. We're going to take
9 a lunch break. We're going to come back at 1:45.

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(Transcript continues in Volume 3.)

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STATE OF FLORIDA

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

COUNTY OF LEON)

I, KORETTA E. STANFORD, RPR, Official Commission Reporter, do hereby certify that the Hearing in Docket No. 000907-TP was heard by the Staff of the Florida Public Service Commission at the time and place herein stated.

It is further certified that I stenographically reported the said proceedings; that the same has been transcribed under my direct supervision; and that this transcript, consisting of 177 pages, Volume 2 constitutes a true transcription of my notes of said proceedings and the insertion of the prescribed prefiled testimony of the witnesses.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor am I a relative or employee of any of the parties' attorneys or counsel connected with the action, nor am I financially interested in the action.

DATED THIS 13TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2000.

Koretta E. Stanford
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FPSC Official Commissioner Reporter
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