1		BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.
2		REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF CYNTHIA K. COX
3		BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
4		DOCKET NO. 000121-TP
5		MARCH 21, 2001
6		
7	Q.	PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, YOUR POSITION WITH BELLSOUTH
8		TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. ("BELLSOUTH") AND YOUR
9		BUSINESS ADDRESS.
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l 1	A.	My name is Cynthia K. Cox. I am employed by BellSouth as Senior Director for
12		State Regulatory for the nine-state BellSouth region. My business address is
13		675 West Peachtree Street, Atlanta, Georgia 30375.
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15	Q.	HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY FILED TESTIMONY IN THIS PROCEEDING?
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17	A.	Yes. I filed direct testimony in this proceeding on March 1, 2001.
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19	Q.	WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?
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21	A.	The purpose of my rebuttal testimony is to respond to the direct testimony filed
22		by several witnesses in this proceeding on March 1, 2001. Specifically, I will
23		address portions of the testimony of Mr. John J. Rubino and Dr. George S. Ford
24		filed on behalf of Z-Tel Communications, Inc. ("Z-Tel"); Ms. Cheryl Bursh and
25		Ms. Karen Kinard filed on behalf of AT&T Communications of the Southern

1		States, Inc., worldCom, Inc., Dieca Communications Company D/B/A Covad
2		Communications Company, New South Communications Corp., Mpower
3		Communications Corp., e.spire Communications, Inc., ITC^DeltaCom
4		Communications, Inc., Rhythms Links Inc., and Z-Tel, (collectively referred to
5		as "ALEC Coalition"); Mr. Thomas Allen, filed on behalf of Covad
6		Communications Company ("Covad"); Mr. James Falvey, filed on behalf of
7		e.spire Communications, Inc. ("e.spire"); Mr. Michael Iacino, filed on behalf of
8		Mpower Communications Corp. ("Mpower"); and, Mr. William Gulas and Mr.
9		Keith Kramer, filed on behalf of IDS Telcom, LCC ("IDS").
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11	Q.	DO YOU HAVE ANY GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE ALECS' DIRECT
12		TESTIMONY, FILED ON MARCH 1, 2001?
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14	A.	Yes. BellSouth has spent an enormous amount of time and money over the past
15		several years developing a performance measurement plan that will more than
16		adequately measure the service that BellSouth provides to the alternative local
17		exchange company ("ALEC") community. The plan will allow both this
18		Commission and the FCC to determine whether BellSouth is providing service
19		to ALECs in "substantially the same time and manner" that it provides to itself,
20		or that it allows the ALECs a "meaningful opportunity to compete", as required
21		by the FCC.
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23		I would also like to briefly respond to the implications by Ms. Bursh (pages 4-5)
24		that local competition will not be realized absent a performance measurement
25		and enforcement plan. Local competition is here. According to a recent FCC

	report, Florida is among the top four states in the nation in terms of end-user
	lines served by ALECs. The FCC's analysis reveals that, as of June 30, 2000,
	16 large ALECs alone served 983,047 access lines in Florida and that 8.1% of
	total Florida access lines had been won by ALECs. In December 2000, this
	Commission's Division of Competitive Services released a similar report that
	also found substantial competition in Florida. Specifically, the FPSC's
	"Competition in Telecommunications Markets in Florida" report states,
	ALECs responding to this year's data request report serving 710,617
	access lines, more than 6 percent of the state's total and more than the
	nationwide average of 4 percent. In addition to those companies
	actively serving telephone customers in Florida, another 100 indicated
	they are poised to enter the state's markets either through resale, UNEs,
	facilities-based or a combination of these business strategies. Business
	customers can obtain services in nearly 70 percent of the state's
	exchanges at rates, terms, and conditions presumably comparable to
	those offered by incumbent LECs. (Competition Report at page 55)
	It is obvious that local competition in Florida is not being deterred by the
	absence to date of a Commission-approved performance measurement and
	enforcement plan.
Q.	PLEASE RESPOND TO DR. FORD'S CONTENTION (PAGE 6, LINES 20-
	21) THAT "THE FCC'S STANDARDS FOR A PERFORMANCE PLAN ARE

VERY LOW."

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A. 1 Dr. Ford seems to suggest that the FCC has set the standard for a performance 2 plan too low when it approved Southwestern Bell's 271 applications for Texas, 3 Oklahoma and Kansas. He also suggests that this Commission should require a more stringent performance plan than the FCC has determined is needed. It is 4 not surprising that Dr. Ford takes issue with the FCC's 271 decisions since the 5 FCC has expressly disagreed with basic assumptions contained in Dr. Ford's 6 testimony in those cases. (See Memorandum Opinion and Order in CC Docket 7 No. 99-295, released December 22, 1999, ¶ 435, fn 1330) However, to the 8 extent Dr. Ford is arguing that the FCC's analysis for establishing its 9 performance plan standards is flawed, he is simply wrong. Further, even if 10 there were some basis for this Commission to conclude that the FCC has set the 11 bar too low (and there is none), it would still not be appropriate to simply ignore 12 the conclusions of the FCC and set different, higher standards. 13

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Q. PLEASE RESPOND TO MS. BURSH'S COMMENTS ON PAGE 5 THAT
BELLSOUTH HAS NO INCENTIVE TO COMPLY WITH PERFORMANCE
STANDARDS WITHOUT A PENATLY PLAN.

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BellSouth has a multitude of incentives to comply with the Act absent a penalty plan. First, BellSouth's compliance is not contingent upon enforcement mechanisms but is required by law. Second, ALECs have many options to pursue should they believe BellSouth is not in compliance with its obligations (i.e. FCC complaint process, Commission complaint process, or other legal action). Finally, BellSouth cannot gain the authority to provide long distance service in Florida unless it is determined by the FCC – with input from this

1		Commission - that BellSouth is providing nondiscriminatory access to all
2		ALECs in Florida. These are powerful incentives for BellSouth to comply with
3		its obligations under the Act, and these incentives have not been diminished by
4		the lack (to date) of enforcement mechanisms.
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6	Q.	ON PAGE 37, MS. BURSH CONTENDS THAT THE PENALTY PLAN
7		SHOULD GO INTO EFFECT IMMEDIATELY. DO YOU AGREE?
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9	A.	Absolutely not. As I stated in my direct testimony, it is not appropriate for
10		BellSouth's penalty plan to take effect until it is necessary to serve its purpose -
11		i.e., until after BellSouth receives interLATA authority. Ms. Bursh's contention
12		(page 37, line 21) that penalties must be paid immediately "so that the benefits
13		of its effect on the marketplace can be realized" is misplaced. As demonstrated
14		by the FCC and Florida PSC reports cited above, the marketplace is developing
15		quite well without the payment of penalties. Further, it is the performance
16		measurements that are designed to demonstrate compliance, not the penalty
17		plan. The penalty plan is designed to prevent backsliding after interLATA
18		relief.
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20		The FCC's public interest analysis in the Bell Atlantic New York Order
21		supports this conclusion by stating:
22		[o]ur examination of the New York monitoring and enforcement
23		mechanisms is solely for the purpose of determining whether the risk of
24		post-approval [271] (emphasis added) non-compliance is sufficiently
25		great that approval of its section 271 application would not be in the

1	public interest. Our analysis has no bearing on the separate question of
2	how the Commission would view and respond to any particular conduct
3	by Bell Atlantic in the federal enforcement context. Id. fn. 1326.
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5	The FCC also says, in footnote 1323 of the same Order, (referring to Bell
6	Atlantic's proposed performance plan),
7	[b]ecause this aspect of our <u>public interest inquiry</u> necessarily is
8	forward-looking and requires a predictive judgment, this is a situation
9	where it is appropriate to consider commitments made by the applicant
10	to be subject to a framework in the future. (Emphasis added.)
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12	The FCC reached similar conclusion in its orders approving Southwestern
13	Bell's 271 applications in Texas, Kansas and Oklahoma. (See Southwestern
14	Bell Texas Order, ¶ 423-424; Southwestern Bell Kansas/Oklahoma Order, ¶
15	273)
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17	Performance remedies are not a requirement of Section 251 of the Act, nor are
18	they necessary to ensure that BellSouth fulfills its responsibilities under this
19	Section. The FCC, although strongly encouraging "state performance
20	monitoring and post-entry level enforcement," has "never required BOC
21	applicants to demonstrate that they are subject to such mechanisms as a
22	condition of section 271 approval." (Bell Atlantic New York Order, ¶ 429)
23	(emphasis added) Therefore, performance monitoring and remedies are not
24	required by the Act, and are not necessary to enforce the Section 251 market
25	opening provisions of the Act.

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2	Q.	IN THE TWO QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON PAGES 8-9 OF HIS
3		TESTIMONY, Z-TEL'S WITNESS MR. JOHN RUBINO RECOMMENDS
4		THAT THE COMMISSION "EXAMINE THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOME
5		TYPE OF PERFORMANCE ASSURANCE PLAN AS EARLY AS
6		POSSIBLE IN THE EVOLUTION OF THEIR LOCAL SERVICE MARKET"
7		(PAGE 8 LINES 17-19), AND "OBSERVE THE ACTUAL MARKET IN
8		ACTION TO ENSURE THAT THE PERFORMANCE METRICS CAPTURE
9		AND REPORT RESULTS ACCURATELY." (PAGE 9, LINES 3-4) PLEASE
10		COMMENT.
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12	A.	BellSouth agrees with Mr. Rubino's suggestions. However, I find them odd
13		since he apparently doesn't acknowledge that BellSouth, the FPSC, the FCC
14		and the ALECs have been working together very closely to ensure just what Mr
15		Rubino suggests.
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17		BellSouth's performance measurement and enforcement plan take into
8		consideration all of the points that Mr. Rubino has made. In addition, BellSouth
19		has submitted to an independent, extensive third-party testing process,
20		conducted by KPMG, to determine, among other things, if BellSouth's reported
21		measurements are accurate. It is the actual BellSouth systems and processes
22		that have been tested. Yet, Mr. Rubino suggests that in addition to the testing,
23		additional observations of the actual market in action should be made.
24		BellSouth has had commercial use of its network and systems in Florida since

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1996. This use has grown significantly since that time and the information that

BellSouth submits to the ALECs and to the Commission on a periodic basis is 1 2 reflecting actual commercial usage. 3 Q. MS. KINARD SUGGESTS ON PAGE 40 THAT BELLSOUTH SHOULD BE 4 REQUIRED TO REPORT AFFILIATE PERFORMANCE INFORMATION 5 "SEPARATELY BY EACH AFFILIATE (DATA, WIRELESS, FUTURE 6 7 LONG DISTANCE, OR OTHER) WITH ACTIVITY IN THE METRIC 8 CATEGORY." (LINES 23-24) DO YOU AGREE? 9 10 A. Yes and no. It appears we are in agreement with Ms. Kinard that a BellSouth affiliate that does not purchase wholesale services from BellSouth should not be 11 12 subject to a reporting requirement. However, we disagree with Ms. Kinard 13 since she appears to believe that data should be reported for any BellSouth 14 affiliate that purchases wholesale services, even if that affiliate is not providing 15 local services. In the context of performance measurements and enforcement 16 mechanisms, the only current BellSouth affiliate that could potentially be 17 relevant to the discussion is BellSouth's ALEC, which is the only affiliate that could provide local exchange services. 18 19 20 Even if the Commission determines that affiliate reporting is appropriate, it 21 makes no sense to attempt to use the provision of wholesale service to a 22 BellSouth affiliate as a surrogate for a retail analog unless the affiliate buys the

same wholesale services that ALECs buy to provide local services. Obviously,

the services that a wireless BellSouth affiliate purchases or that a long distance

affiliate purchases to provide their services are different than the services that

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ALECs purchase from BellSouth to provide local service. For this reason, the
wholesale services these non-local affiliates would purchase really cannot be
used as an analog to make parity judgments. Given this, there is simply no
reason to require that this information about fundamentally different types of
transactions be reported.

7 Q. THE TESTIMONY OF MESSRS. JAMES FALVEY (E.SPIRE), THOMAS
8 ALLEN (COVAD), AND MICHAEL IACINO (MPOWER) RAISES
9 SEVERAL ISSUES AND AREAS WHERE THEY BELIEVE THIS
10 COMMISSION SHOULD ESTABLISH PERFORMANCE
11 MEASUREMENTS. PLEASE COMMENT.

A.

The testimony of these witnesses addresses several issues, most of an operational nature. In order to introduce or discuss gratuitous complaints, Mr. Falvey, Mr. Iacino and Mr. Allen loosely tie operational issues to the subject of performance measurements. This docket is not a complaint proceeding; its purpose is to determine the appropriateness of BellSouth's performance measurement and enforcement plan. These anecdotal complaints do not provide any meaningful input for the Commission in its deliberation on appropriate performance measurements and enforcement mechanisms. Beyond the irrelevance of these claims to this proceeding, it is also inappropriate to introduce these anecdotal complaints in this docket. The Commission does not have sufficient information, or time, to review data that would be necessary to make a judgment as to the validity of these ALEC's allegations. If any of these ALECs actually have legitimate complaints, they would be best handled

1		through the filing of a complaint under the well-established Commission
2		procedure, not in a generic performance measurements docket. Having said
3		this, BellSouth denies that it has intentionally done any of the things that these
4		witnesses claim.
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6		It should be noted that even if e.spire, Covad, or Mpower had raised problems
7		with enough specificity for them to be addressed, it has not been the intention of
8		the FCC, nor should it be of this Commission, to craft a performance
9		measurement for every single item or service that BellSouth provides to the
10		ALEC community. The FCC, in ¶440 of its Bell Atlantic New York Order,
11		noted,
12		[c]ommenters have set forth a long list of specific criticisms, arguing
13		that the Plan: unduly forgives discriminatory conduct; fails to deter
14		targeted discrimination directed against individual competing carriers;
15		excessively aggregates performance data and combines metrics, thereby
16		masking unsatisfactory results; and does not include penalties that
17		escalate with the severity of the performance shortfall. These criticisms,
18		however, do not undermine our overall confidence that the Plan will
19		detect and sanction poor performance when it occurs.
20		BellSouth's plan will "detect and sanction poor performance when it occurs."
21		
22	Q.	DO YOU HAVE ANY GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE TESTIMONY OF
23		MESSRS. WILLIAM GULAS OR KEITH KRAMER (IDS)?

A. Yes. The testimony of these two witnesses is very much like the testimony

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offered by e.spire, Covad, and Mpower. Generally, all of these companies are attempting to use this docket as an opportunity to improperly put complaints about BellSouth's alleged performance in front of the Commission, albeit in an improper forum and in a cursory fashion that does not allow these complaints to be investigated to determine if they are valid. However, the brevity of Mr. Gulas' and Mr. Kramer's testimony, along with the fact that they both filed exactly the same testimony, supports the conclusion that these claims are spurious. The Commission should ignore such unsupported assertions in this case.

## 11 Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?

13 A. Yes.

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