


DOCKET NO. 010006-WS - Water and wastewater industry annual reestablishment of authorized range of return on common equity of water and wastewater utilities pursuant to Section 367.081(4)(f), F.S.

WITNESS: Direct Testimony of Pete Lester
Appearing on Behalf of Staff

DATE FILED: September 28, 2001



DIRECT TESTIMONY OF PETE LESTER

1
2 Q. Please state your name and business address.

3 A. My name is Pete Lester and my business address is 2540 Shumard Oak
4 Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850.

5 Q. By whom are you employed and in what capacity?

6 A. I am employed by the Florida Public Service Commission (FPSC or
7 Commission) as an Economic Analyst in the Finance and Tax Section of the
8 Division of Economic Regulation.

9 Q. Will you briefly summarize your educational background and experience?

10 A. I received a Bachelor of Science degree in Finance from Florida State
11 University in March 1978. In June 1980, I received a Masters of Business
12 Administration degree also from Florida State University. In August 1980, I
13 began work as a material price analyst for Avco Aerostructures, a major
14 aerospace subcontractor located in Nashville, Tennessee. My responsibilities
15 included preparing bids for subcontracts, analyzing price variances among
16 vendors, pricing plan changes, and helping customer and government auditors.

17 In September 1981, I joined the Staff of the Commission as a staff
18 analyst in the Division of Water and Wastewater. As an analyst, I was
19 responsible for rate structure issues on file and suspend rate cases and for
20 all finance, accounting, and rate structure issues for staff-assisted rate
21 cases, overearnings investigations, and certificate cases. In addition, I was
22 responsible for case coordination and scheduling, presenting staff positions
23 to customers at customer meetings, responding to customer complaints, and
24 conducting research projects.

25 In August 1990, I was promoted to an Economic Analyst position in the

1 Finance Section in the Division of Auditing and Financial Analysis. I now
2 work in the Division of Economic Regulation. My responsibilities include
3 advising the Commission on the appropriate cost of equity, capital structure,
4 and overall cost of capital for utility companies in rate cases and other
5 proceedings.

6 Q. Are you a member of any professional associations?

7 A. Yes. I am a member of the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial
8 Analysts (SURFA). I have been awarded the professional designation Certified
9 Rate of Return Analyst (CRRRA) by SURFA. This designation is awarded based
10 upon education, experience, and the successful completion of a written
11 examination.

12 In addition, I have been awarded the professional designation Chartered
13 Financial Analyst (CFA) by the Association for Investment Management and
14 Research (AIMR), of which I am a member. A CFA is awarded based on the
15 candidate having qualifying work experience, meeting AIMR's standards, and
16 passing three exams.

17 Q. Have you previously testified before the Commission?

18 A. Yes. I testified on behalf of staff in Docket No. 920733-WS, Docket No.
19 940620-GU and Docket No. 940276-GU regarding General Development Utilities,
20 Florida Public Utilities, and City Gas Company of Florida, respectively. The
21 subject of my testimony was cost of equity and capital structure. In
22 addition, as a Commission staff member, I have participated in many rate and
23 regulatory proceedings.

24 Q. What is the purpose of your testimony?

25 A. The purpose of my testimony is to recommend a leverage formula that

1 reflects the appropriate range of returns on common equity for an average
2 water and wastewater utility pursuant to Section 367.081(4)(f), Florida
3 Statutes. I am recommending a specific leverage formula methodology based on
4 cost of equity models.

5 Q. Do you have exhibits that accompany your testimony?

6 A. Yes. Attached to my testimony are Exhibits PL-1 through PL-22. Exhibit
7 PL-1 is an index of the exhibits.

8 Q. Please define some of the technical terms you use in your testimony.

9 A. The cost of common equity is the minimum rate of return necessary to
10 attract capital to a common equity investment. It is the minimum rate of
11 return that a stockholder considers acceptable, both considering the riskiness
12 of the investment and returns available on other investments. This is also
13 known as the investors' required return on common equity.

14 The leverage formula is an equation that calculates the return on equity
15 (ROE) for a water and wastewater utility as a general debt cost rate plus an
16 equity risk premium. The only variable is the water and wastewater utility's
17 equity ratio. I have presented the general form of the equation, and defined
18 the equity ratio, on Exhibit PL-2.

19 Business risk for a firm is the uncertainty inherent in projections of
20 future returns on assets and depends on many factors such as demand
21 variability, sales price variability, the ability to adjust output prices for
22 changes in input prices, and the extent to which costs are fixed.

23 Financial risk is the additional risk, above business risk, faced by
24 stockholders due to the firm's use of financial leverage:

25 An investment grade bond is a bond with a rating of BBB or better.

1 Using Standard & Poor's (S & P's) system as an example, bonds in the top four
2 ratings categories, AAA, AA, A, and BBB, are considered investment grade and
3 are eligible for bank investment under the regulations of the Controller of
4 the Currency. In addition, laws of various states restrict investments by
5 banks, insurance companies, pension funds and fiduciaries generally to
6 investment grade bonds.

7 Q. What principles provide the legal framework for your determination of
8 the cost of equity as calculated by the leverage formula?

9 A. I believe my analysis follows the principles established by the United
10 States Supreme Court in Bluefield Waterworks and Improvement Company v. Public
11 Service Commission of West Virginia, 262 U.S. 679 (1923) and Federal Power
12 Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Company, 320 U.S. 591 (1944). In my opinion,
13 the Supreme Court held in both the Hope and Bluefield decisions that the
14 return to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments
15 in other enterprises having corresponding risks. Also, the return should be
16 sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise
17 so that it can maintain credit and attract capital.

18 In addition, Section 367.081(4)(f), Florida Statutes, and Rule 25-
19 30.415, Florida Administrative Code, state the legal framework for the
20 leverage formula.

21 Q. Does your leverage formula recommendation take into consideration that
22 the return on equity should be commensurate with returns on other investments
23 of corresponding risks, and that the return should be sufficient to assure
24 confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise?

25 A. Yes. My recommendation of the appropriate leverage formula is based

1 upon my analysis of required returns for common equity investments with
2 comparable risk as determined through the direct application of capital market
3 valuation models to current financial data. I believe an analysis based upon
4 current stock prices, interest rates, and investor expectations satisfies the
5 comparable returns, capital attraction, and financial integrity guidelines
6 established in the Hope and Bluefield decisions for determining a fair and
7 reasonable rate of return on common equity. In addition, I have adjusted the
8 leverage formula calculation to compensate for risk not captured by the
9 models.

10 Q. What do you recommend as the appropriate leverage formula?

11 A. Based upon the results of my analysis, I recommend a leverage formula
12 that indicates a range of 9.69% to 10.80% as reasonable returns on common
13 equity for an average water and wastewater utility under the Commission's
14 jurisdiction. I have presented the calculation of my recommended leverage
15 formula on Exhibit PL-3.

16 Q. Does your recommended leverage formula represent a change in the current
17 Commission leverage formula methodology?

18 A. Yes. I am recommending changes to the status quo methodology. As
19 background, the Commission authorized the current leverage formula by Order
20 No. PSC-00-1162-PAA-WS, effective on July 18, 2000 in Docket No. 000006-WS.
21 In Docket No. 010006-WS, the Commission proposed a leverage formula by Order
22 No. PSC-01-1226-PAA-WS, issued on June 1, 2001, which proposed a range of
23 9.14% to 10.24% as reasonable returns on common equity. The Florida
24 Waterworks Association protested this Proposed Agency Action (PAA) order. In
25 my testimony, I refer to the leverage formula methodology in the protested PAA

1 | order as the status quo methodology as it is the same methodology behind the
2 | current leverage formula with two minor modifications to the capital asset
3 | pricing model (CAPM).

4 | Q. Why did you investigate changing the status quo methodology?

5 | A. As shown on Exhibit PL-4, I compared the range of returns on common
6 | equity from the current leverage formula and past leverage formulas to returns
7 | authorized for water utilities in other states. Since 1997, the Commission's
8 | leverage formula has produced returns on common equity generally below the
9 | authorized returns on equity for water utilities in other states. In
10 | addition, in late 2000 and early 2001, the Commission processed gas rate cases
11 | for City Gas Company, Chesapeake Utilities Corporation, and St. Joe Natural
12 | Gas. In each of these cases, the Commission authorized an ROE of 11.5%.

13 | I do not believe that ROEs authorized for water utilities in other
14 | states are necessarily a guide as to how the Commission should set ROEs for
15 | water and wastewater utilities under its jurisdiction. Also, I do not believe
16 | ROEs set for utilities in one industry should determine the Commission's ROE
17 | decisions in another industry. Still, the higher ROEs for water utilities in
18 | other states and for other regulated industries in Florida suggest that review
19 | of the leverage formula methodology, and possible change to that methodology,
20 | is appropriate.

21 | Q. What are the assumptions behind the leverage formula?

22 | A. A key assumption is that a water and wastewater utility's cost of
23 | capital remains constant over a range of different equity ratios. As a
24 | utility increases its use of debt, its cost of equity rises due to increased
25 | financial risk. The increased cost of equity is offset by a larger proportion

1 | of lower cost debt in the capital structure. The result is that the overall
2 | cost of capital remains constant.

3 | A second assumption is that all water and wastewater utilities have
4 | similar business risk profiles. I consider this assumption to agree with the
5 | statutory notion of an average water and wastewater utility. Also, business
6 | risk is assumed to be reduced in a regulatory environment. Further, total
7 | risk for the utility is business risk plus financial risk. Financial
8 | leverage, as measured by the equity ratio, is the appropriate benchmark for
9 | financial risk.

10 | Q. Would you describe the general approach you used to determine the
11 | appropriate leverage formula?

12 | A. I analyzed current economic conditions and trends, and national and
13 | state industry factors. I believe economic conditions and national industry
14 | factors affect the capital markets. I then applied two generally accepted
15 | market-based rate of return models to an index of water utilities and an index
16 | of natural gas distribution utilities. I used the results of these models,
17 | along with specific risk adjustments, to determine the appropriate leverage
18 | formula.

19 | Q. What is your analysis of the current economic environment?

20 | A. After approximately 10 years of economic expansion, the economy
21 | experienced a downturn during the second quarter of 2001. Growth in real
22 | gross domestic product (real GDP), the inflation-adjusted total amount of
23 | goods and services produced in the United States, and the unemployment rate
24 | are indicators of current economic activity. Real GDP grew at an annual rate
25 | of 0.2% in the second quarter of 2001, the slowest pace in over 8 years. This

1 | is down from the 1.3% rate in the first quarter of 2001 and the 1.9% rate in
2 | the last quarter of 2000. The civilian unemployment rate stood at 4.5% in the
3 | second quarter of 2001, up from the 4.2% rate in the first quarter of 2001 and
4 | the 4.0% rate for the last 3 quarters of 2000. The annual inflation rate, as
5 | measured by the change in the Consumer Price Index, was 3.0% in the second
6 | quarter of 2001, down from the 4.2% rate in the first quarter.

7 | The Blue Chip Economic Indicators and the Blue Chip Financial Forecasts
8 | provide consensus estimates of economic and financial activity. The September
9 | 10, 2001 issue of the Blue Chip Economic Indicators estimates real GDP growth
10 | will increase to a range of 3.1% to 3.5% for 2002. The annual unemployment
11 | rate is estimated to increase to a range of 4.8% to 4.9% for 2002. The annual
12 | inflation rate is estimated to decrease to a range of 2.5% to 2.6% for 2002.

13 | The economic downturn had prompted the Federal Reserve to cut short-term
14 | interest rates by reducing the federal-funds target rate. The federal-funds
15 | rate is the interest rate charged on overnight loans between banks. The
16 | Federal Reserve has cut its federal-funds target 8 times in 2001, from 6.5%
17 | to 3.0%. The most recent cut by .50% to 3.0% on September 17, 2001 is the
18 | lowest level since 1994. This cut was in response to the financial
19 | disruptions caused by the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the
20 | Pentagon.

21 | Q. What is your analysis of conditions in the national water industry?

22 | A. Investor-owned water utilities are natural monopolies. Water has no
23 | substitute and water utilities do not face competition. Unlike electric
24 | utilities, water utilities do not face the issue of restructuring.

25 | Water utilities face federal and state regulation regarding water

1 | quality. Under the 1996 amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA or
2 | the Act), the maximum allowable contaminant level is based on cost/benefit and
3 | relative risk analyses in contrast to the earlier standards, which were based
4 | on available technology. With the amendments, states have the flexibility to
5 | adjust testing and monitoring requirements based on local conditions. The
6 | SDWA amendments have reduced the level of capital spending necessary for
7 | compliance with the Act. However, regulations under the SDWA are evolving and
8 | new standards and new contaminants can arise.

9 | Infrastructure replacement has become an issue for investor-owned water
10 | utilities. Some utilities' transmission mains and distribution lines are
11 | approaching the end of useful life. The size of the issue varies from system
12 | to system. Some treatment plants are more than 50 years old and need to be
13 | replaced due to age and to meet SDWA regulations. The need for infrastructure
14 | replacement could cause financial stress for some utilities, particularly
15 | smaller ones.

16 | Consolidation through mergers and acquisitions has become a feature of
17 | the industry. In 2000, United Water Resources was acquired by Suez Lyonnais
18 | des Eaux S.A., a French firm that manages water systems by contract. Also in
19 | 2000, E'town Corporation was acquired by Thames Water, and Consumers Water was
20 | acquired by Philadelphia Suburban. Since small systems have difficulty
21 | obtaining funding for SDWA compliance and infrastructure replacement, they
22 | become candidates for acquisition by larger systems.

23 | Q. What is your analysis of conditions in the Florida water and wastewater
24 | utility industry?

25 | A. The Commission has jurisdiction over investor-owned water and wastewater

1 utilities in 36 of Florida's 67 counties. To get a sense of the size and
2 performance of these utilities, I gathered information from the Commission's
3 annual reports for 2000. The Commission mailed 208 annual reports for 2000.
4 I used 182 of these reports. I could not use 26 reports because some utilities
5 have yet to file their annual reports or are new companies with no revenue.
6 Also, some utilities became non-jurisdictional during 2000.

7 Some utilities are water and wastewater and some are water-only or
8 wastewater-only. In my analysis, I separated water and wastewater operations
9 since the Commission sets water and wastewater rates separately and measures
10 earnings separately. In my testimony, when I refer to a water system, I mean
11 all the water operations owned by a utility. By wastewater system, I mean all
12 the wastewater operations owned by a utility.

13 Exhibit PL-5 shows the breakdown of systems by revenue. The majority of
14 the utilities report less than \$200,000 in revenue. Most of the 148 water
15 systems and 118 wastewater systems are small.

16 Exhibits PL-6 and PL-7 show revenue and earnings for Florida's five
17 investor-owned electric utilities and eight investor-owned gas utilities,
18 respectively. Exhibit PL-8 compares average and median 2000 revenue for
19 Florida's investor-owned gas utilities to the average and median revenue for
20 water and wastewater systems. As demonstrated by these exhibits (PL-6 through
21 PL-8), the water and wastewater systems are dramatically smaller by revenue
22 than the electric utilities. The water and wastewater systems are much smaller
23 than Florida gas utilities.

24 Exhibits PL-9 and PL-10 show the distribution by revenue of the nine
25 water and wastewater systems with revenue over \$1 million. Excepting outliers

1 | like Florida Water Services Corporation and United Water - Florida, Inc., the
2 | largest water and wastewater systems have less than \$4 million in revenue.

3 | Q. What is the earnings performance of the Florida water and wastewater
4 | utilities?

5 | A. Exhibits PL-11 and PL-12 show the achieved ROEs of the water and
6 | wastewater systems. Since the range of achieved ROEs is wide, I believe the
7 | median is a better statistic for comparison purposes. The largest water and
8 | wastewater systems, which have revenue greater than \$1 million, perform better
9 | than Florida gas utilities but not as well as Florida electric utilities (See
10 | Exhibits PL-6 and PL-7). The smaller water systems, those with less than \$1
11 | million in revenue, are less profitable than both the gas utilities and the
12 | larger water systems.

13 | Just looking at the median achieved ROE, one might conclude that
14 | wastewater systems with revenue less than \$1 million but greater than \$200
15 | thousand have similar profitability to gas utilities. However, nearly half
16 | these wastewater systems report losses. Of the eight gas utilities, two report
17 | losses for 2000 and both these utilities have less than \$1 million in revenue.

18 | Q. What conclusions do you reach based on your analysis of the size and
19 | performance of Florida water and wastewater utilities?

20 | A. By revenue, Florida water and wastewater utilities are much smaller than
21 | the state's other regulated utilities. The largest water and wastewater
22 | utilities are profitable and perform comparably well but they are only a small
23 | percentage of the total number of utilities. Most of the water and wastewater
24 | utilities have less than \$1 million in revenue. In the \$200 thousand to \$1
25 | million revenue category, approximately half the water and wastewater utilities

1 report losses. The smaller systems are less profitable than the larger
2 systems, with systems in the less than \$200 thousand in revenue category being
3 the least profitable and showing the most losses.

4 Economies of scale matter for utilities and this is particularly true
5 with water and wastewater utilities. Water and wastewater systems are capital
6 intensive and have high fixed costs. Larger systems have more volume over
7 which to spread these costs. Therefore, it is not surprising that the largest
8 systems perform better than the smaller ones.

9 Based on the annual reports for 2000, I believe an average Florida water
10 and wastewater utility is small, with less than \$1 million in revenue. Since
11 the leverage formula is intended for an average water and wastewater utility,
12 I believe it is appropriate to emphasize the systems with less than \$1 million
13 in revenue and not focus on the extremes, such as the largest systems or the
14 very small systems.

15 Q. Are there positive factors for Florida water and wastewater utilities?

16 A. Yes. Florida Statutes and Commission Rules allow water and wastewater
17 utilities to pass through in rates the increased costs for purchased water,
18 purchased wastewater treatment, property taxes, purchased power, and required
19 testing for environmental compliance. Also, water and wastewater utilities may
20 adjust their rates to keep up with general inflation. These adjustment
21 procedures allow water and wastewater utilities to keep whole with respect to
22 many cost increases.

23 Other positive factors involve customer growth and revenue mix. Florida
24 utilities overall experience favorable customer growth and I believe this is
25 a positive effect for most water and wastewater utilities. The water and

1 | wastewater utilities primarily serve residential customers. Residential
2 | revenue can be less variable than revenue from industrial customers. Regarding
3 | water quality, the Drinking Water State Revolving Fund, managed by the Florida
4 | Department of Environmental Protection, may provide loans to qualifying
5 | investor-owned water systems with less than 1500 connections for SDWA
6 | compliance projects.

7 | Q. How would you assess the regulatory risk facing Florida water and
8 | wastewater utilities?

9 | A. In assessing regulatory risk, bond rating agencies look at various issues
10 | such as whether the regulatory commission is elected or appointed and whether
11 | the regulator allows projected test years and adjustment clauses. Standard &
12 | Poor's generally views regulation as practiced by the FPSC as supportive.
13 | However, for water and wastewater utilities, FPSC regulation is by county
14 | option. I believe this causes uncertainty regarding regulation for water and
15 | wastewater utilities. For example, four counties have taken back regulation
16 | from the Commission since 1996. Therefore, I believe Florida water and
17 | wastewater utilities face somewhat higher regulatory risk compared with Florida
18 | electric and gas utilities.

19 | Q. Can the cost of equity be estimated precisely?

20 | A. No. Estimating the cost of equity is a subjective procedure. The cost
21 | of equity depends on investor expectations, which cannot be known entirely and
22 | which change frequently. Therefore, the cost of equity cannot be measured
23 | precisely and it is generally estimated within a range. When analyzing cost
24 | of equity estimates, it is important to understand the rationale underlying the
25 | subjective inputs and how well the models relied upon reflect reality.

1 Q. What methods did you use to determine the cost of equity inputs for the
2 leverage formula?

3 A. To determine the cost of equity inputs for the leverage formula, I used
4 a two-stage annually compounded discounted cash flow (DCF) model and a capital
5 asset pricing model (CAPM). I applied these models to an index of water
6 utilities and to an index of natural gas distribution utilities. I developed
7 both indexes from utilities followed by the Value Line Investment Survey.

8 Relying on an index of comparable companies, instead of a single company,
9 helps reduce forecasting errors and should provide more reliable information
10 for use in measuring the cost of equity. Use of an index of companies avoids
11 abnormal conditions that might be associated with one company.

12 Q. Please describe your index of water utilities.

13 A. My water index consists of the four water utilities followed by Value
14 Line. These are large, publicly-traded water utilities that have operations
15 concentrated in the Northeast and in California. Exhibit PL-13 lists the
16 utilities and their investment characteristics.

17 Q. Why have you chosen to include an index of natural gas distribution
18 utilities in calculating the leverage formula?

19 A. As recently as the first quarter of 2000, Value Line reported on six
20 water companies. Due to mergers and to acquisitions by foreign companies, the
21 number has shrunk to four. I believe this is a small number of utilities upon
22 which to base an ROE determination.

23 Value Line reports on 19 natural gas distribution utilities. I have
24 selected an index of 11 companies from this group. These gas utilities are
25 monopolies regulated by state regulatory commissions. As such, I believe this

1 | index, along with the water index, form reasonable proxy groups for determining
2 | the general cost of equity for water and wastewater utilities. I believe
3 | adjustments to the general cost of equity are necessary for determining the
4 | appropriate cost of equity for an average Florida water and wastewater utility.

5 | Q. Are you assuming that an index of water utilities and an index of gas
6 | utilities are appropriate proxy groups for wastewater utilities?

7 | A. Yes. This is an assumption behind the leverage formula. No publicly
8 | traded companies depend significantly on wastewater revenues. To determine the
9 | cost of equity for wastewater utilities, one must use a group of companies with
10 | comparable characteristics. I believe that an index of water utilities and an
11 | index of gas utilities are an appropriate proxy for determining the appropriate
12 | cost of equity for wastewater utilities. Each index represents capital
13 | intensive natural monopolies regulated by state commissions.

14 | Q. Please describe your index of gas utilities.

15 | A. My gas index consists of 11 gas utilities. I derived this group from the
16 | 20 gas utilities followed by Value Line. I eliminated companies that had
17 | substantial non-regulated revenue, i.e., above 22% of total revenue. The 11
18 | gas utilities in my index have sales-to-net-plant ratios less than 1.0. This
19 | indicates these utilities are capital intensive. Exhibit PL-14 lists the
20 | utilities and their investment characteristics.

21 | Q. What is the theory behind the DCF model?

22 | A. The DCF model is based on two principles. First, investors value an
23 | asset based on the future cash flows they expect to receive. Second, investors
24 | value a dollar today more than a dollar received in the future, meaning that
25 | the time value of money is assumed. Therefore, in a DCF analysis, the cost of

1 equity is the discount rate that equates the present value of expected cash
2 flows associated with a share of stock to the present market price of the
3 stock.

4 On Exhibit PL-15, I have provided the basic DCF equation and defined the
5 terms in the equation. The basic model has three simplifying assumptions: 1)
6 dividends are paid annually and grow at a constant rate; 2) the price of the
7 stock is determined on the dividend payment date; and 3) dividends increase
8 once a year starting one year from the dividend payment date.

9 Q. What DCF model have you used in your analysis?

10 A. I have used a two-stage annually compounded DCF model. An assumption
11 behind the basic DCF model is that dividends grow at a constant rate. A two-
12 stage DCF model allows for two periods of dividend growth: a near term period
13 during which dividends are specifically forecasted and a subsequent period of
14 sustainable growth. On Exhibit PL-16, I have presented the equation for my
15 two-stage annually compounded DCF model and defined the terms.

16 Q. What are the inputs for your DCF model?

17 A. I used current stock prices for the utilities in my indexes, specific
18 dividend forecasts for the initial growth period, and a sustainable or long-
19 term growth rate. For current stock prices, I first calculated the average of
20 the high and low stock prices for August 2001 for each utility in the index.
21 I then calculated an average stock price for the index, which is the input to
22 my model. I used Value Line's forecast of dividends for 2001, 2002 and 2005
23 and assumed a constant growth rate between these years to estimate dividends
24 for the initial growth period. I calculated the long-term growth rate using
25 the earnings retention method, also know as the "b x r approach." The inputs

1 | for my earnings retention method are Value Line's expected earned return on
2 | equity (r) and the expected retention rate (b) for 2005.

3 | Q. What are the results of your DCF analysis?

4 | A. The results of my DCF analysis show that the cost of equity is 9.01% for
5 | the water index and 10.71% for the gas index. Exhibit PL-17 shows the inputs
6 | and results for my DCF analysis.

7 | Q. What is the theory behind the CAPM model?

8 | A. The CAPM model is based on two general assumptions. First, investors are
9 | assumed to be risk averse. They require a higher return for riskier
10 | investments. Essentially, there is a risk/return tradeoff. Second,
11 | diversification reduces risk. Investors can eliminate unsystematic risk, also
12 | known as company specific risk, by holding diversified portfolios. The returns
13 | to such a portfolio compensate investors only for systematic risk, that is,
14 | general market risk that cannot be diversified away.

15 | A risk statistic, beta, is used to measure systematic risk. A particular
16 | stock's beta is a measure of the volatility of that stock's return compared to
17 | the return on a broad market index. By definition, the beta of the market
18 | index is 1.0. Lower risk stocks, like utilities, generally have betas
19 | significantly below 1.0.

20 | The CAPM model is a risk premium model. It defines the cost of equity
21 | as a risk-free rate plus a premium. The premium for a specific company is
22 | developed as follows: The return on a broad stock market index is calculated
23 | and the risk-free rate is subtracted from this. This result is multiplied by
24 | the company's beta and added to the risk-free rate. The result is an estimate
25 | of the cost of equity for a specific company. I presented the equation for the

1 | CAPM model on Exhibit PL-18.

2 | Q. What are the inputs for your CAPM model?

3 | A. For the risk free rate, I have used the forecasted 30-year Treasury bond
4 | yields from the August 1, 2001 Blue Chip Financial Forecast. I used a rate of
5 | 5.74%, which is an average of the forecasted Treasury bond yields from the 4th
6 | quarter of 2001 to the 4th quarter of 2002. As shown on Exhibits PL-13 and PL-
7 | 14, the average beta for both the water and gas indexes is .61.

8 | I estimated the market return by applying a simple DCF equation to 652
9 | stocks from Value Line. The stock prices are for July 2001. I eliminated
10 | stocks that did not pay dividends and stocks that had earnings or dividend
11 | growth rates above 20%. Growth rates above 20% are not sustainable in the long
12 | run. I believe this is a large group of stocks that is an appropriate proxy
13 | for determining the market return. For the growth rate, I used the average of
14 | projected earnings per share growth and projected dividend growth. The
15 | resulting market return is 10.79%.

16 | As explained on Exhibit PL-18, I added 10 basis points to the calculated
17 | market return to approximate quarterly compounding of dividends. While I
18 | believe the annual DCF model is appropriate for utilities, the companies I used
19 | to estimate the market return are in competitive industries and do not
20 | necessarily receive regular monthly revenue like utilities. Therefore, a
21 | quarterly compounding adjustment is appropriate. With this adjustment, the
22 | market return is 10.89%.

23 | Q. What are the results of your CAPM analysis?

24 | A. The results of my CAPM analysis show that the cost of equity is 8.98% for
25 | both the water and gas indexes. Exhibit PL-18 shows the inputs and results for

1 | my CAPM analysis.

2 | Q. Did you include an allowance for issuance costs in your DCF and CAPM
3 | analysis?

4 | A. Yes. The DCF model includes an allowance for issuance costs, calculated
5 | as 3% of the stock price. An allowance for issuance costs, also known as
6 | flotation costs, enables the utility to recover the costs incurred when issuing
7 | common stock. Issuance costs includes registration fees, legal fees,
8 | underwriter fees, printing and mailing. Investors could not earn the required
9 | return on their investment without an issuance cost adjustment because the
10 | sales price of the stock will exceed the net proceeds to the company because
11 | the company incurs issuance costs. A company can incur these costs whether the
12 | stock is publicly traded or privately held. Historically, utility underwriting
13 | expenses associated with issuing common stock have averaged 3 to 4 percent of
14 | gross proceeds.

15 | As shown on Exhibit PL-18, I added 10 basis points to the CAPM results
16 | as a flotation cost allowance. This is essentially the effect of allowing
17 | flotation costs for the DCF model and results.

18 | Q. Are the four results indicated by your two models and two indexes
19 | appropriate for an average Florida water and wastewater utility?

20 | A. No. While the range of ROEs I calculated for the index is an appropriate
21 | starting place, an average Florida water and wastewater utility is riskier than
22 | the utilities in my water index and gas index.

23 | Q. Why is an average Florida water and wastewater utility riskier than the
24 | utilities in the indexes?

25 | A. A comparison of revenues from Exhibits PL-13 and PL-14 with revenues from

1 Exhibit PL-8 demonstrates that an average Florida water and wastewater utility
2 is considerably smaller than the utilities in the indexes. The smallest
3 utility in my water and gas indexes is American States Water, with
4 approximately \$184 million in revenue for 2000. The entire FPSC-regulated
5 water and wastewater industry had approximately \$152 million in revenue for
6 2000. The two largest Florida water and wastewater utilities account for
7 approximately half the industry revenue.

8 A comparison of Exhibits PL-11 and PL-12 with Exhibits PL-13 and PL-14
9 shows the utilities in the indexes have significantly higher achieved ROEs
10 compared with the achieved ROEs of Florida water and wastewater utilities.
11 None of the index utilities report losses for 2000. In contrast, a significant
12 number of Florida water and wastewater utilities report losses for 2000.

13 According to the S & P Report "New Ripples in U.S. Water Industry,"
14 September 8, 2000, by Dimitri Nikas, regarding small water systems, an
15 Environmental Protection Agency report to Congress in 1995 stated the
16 following:

17 Small systems are, on average, not financially healthy, lack
18 economies of scale, and have higher costs per unit of water than
19 do large or mid-size water purveyors.

20 Noting this, Standard & Poor's made the following statement:

21 *On the other hand, large water utilities have superior*
22 *technological resources and adequate access to capital. (See S &*
23 *P Report "U.S. Water Utility Industry Still Fragmented,*
24 *Opportunities Abound," June 11, 2001, Dimitri Nikas.)*

25 Value Line states the following regarding small water utilities:

1 *The costs of meeting safe drinking water guidelines are especially*
2 *burdensome for smaller utilities because they generally lack the*
3 *funds needed for long-term structural improvements. (See The Value*
4 *Line Investment Survey, Ed. 9, August 3, 2001, p. 1419.)*

5 I believe the concern that small utilities lack funds for water quality
6 and structural improvements, such as infrastructure replacement, is valid.

7 Q. What risk adjustment do you recommend for the leverage formula?

8 A. I recommend three adjustments. First, the Commission should adjust the
9 results of the models for the yield difference between the bond rating for the
10 utilities in the indexes and a Baa rated bond. Second, the Commission should
11 adjust the results of the models to reflect a private placement premium. These
12 two adjustments are consistent with the status quo methodology. Third, the
13 Commission should adjust the results of the models to allow a small-utility
14 risk premium. I do not believe that status quo methodology adequately reflects
15 the risk faced by an average water and wastewater utility in Florida.

16 These adjustments are based on the assumption that the difference between
17 debt costs for utilities in the indexes and for an average water and wastewater
18 utility is the appropriate risk adjustment to the ROE results of the models.
19 Differences in the cost of debt are a proxy for differences in the cost of
20 equity.

21 Q. Please describe the adjustment for the bond yield differential.

22 A. This adjustment, part of the status quo methodology, is made to the
23 results of the models to compensate for the fact that Florida water and
24 wastewater utilities are smaller than the companies in the indexes. The
25 adjustment is based on the historical difference between the yields on bonds

1 | that could be issued by the companies in the indexes, according to bond rating,
2 | and the yield on BBB rated bonds, the lowest investment grade. The assumption
3 | is that a small utility, given efficient management and a sound regulatory
4 | environment, should be considered at least in the lowest investment grade
5 | category. As I explain later, I believe this assumption should be relaxed.

6 | According to Exhibits PL-13 and PL-14, the median S & P bond rating
7 | for the water index is A+ and it is A- for the gas index. I have treated S &
8 | P bond ratings and Moody's bond ratings as equivalents; for example, a BBB
9 | rating by S & P is the same as a Baa rating by Moody's. The water index has
10 | a median bond rating of A1 and the gas index has a median bond rating of A3.
11 | For the water index, I used the historical spread between the yields on A1 and
12 | Baa2 public utility bonds as calculated over the past 120 months. For the gas
13 | index, I used the historical spread between yields on A3 and Baa2 public
14 | utility bonds. The average of these two spreads is .25% or 25 basis points.
15 | Exhibit PL-19 presents the bond yield differentials.

16 | By adding 25 basis points to the results of the models, the resulting
17 | returns on equity are appropriate for water utilities that can issue BBB rated
18 | bonds. However, an average Florida water and wastewater utility is too small
19 | to issue publicly traded bonds. This is the basis for the private placement
20 | adjustment.

21 | Q. Please describe the private placement premium adjustment.

22 | A. The private placement premium recognizes that investors require a
23 | liquidity premium for holding privately placed bonds. These bonds do not have
24 | a public market, meaning that investors must hold them to maturity. All other
25 | things being equal, privately placed bonds require a higher return than

1 | publicly traded bonds.

2 | The Commission included this adjustment in the leverage formula
3 | methodology in 1995, with the original premium being 25 basis points. The
4 | Commission increased the premium to 50 basis points in 1999. I believe this
5 | adjustment of 50 basis points for the private placement premium is appropriate
6 | because investors require a liquidity premium for holding privately placed
7 | bonds.

8 | Q. Please describe the small-utility risk premium.

9 | A. In the status quo methodology, the bond yield differential is assumed
10 | to compensate appropriately for the small size of water and wastewater
11 | utilities. I believe this adjustment, by itself, is too conservative. It
12 | basically adjusts the cost of equity to the level of a company that can issue
13 | BBB rated bonds. Yet an average Florida water and wastewater utility is not
14 | in a position to issue rated bonds or even privately placed bonds. Bond expert
15 | and finance scholar Frank Fabozzi, in his book Bond Markets, Analysis and
16 | Strategies, 3rd edition, 1996, states the following:

17 | *Borrowers in the publicly issued bond market are typically large*
18 | *corporations. Issuers of privately placed bonds tend to be medium*
19 | *-sized corporations. Those corporations that borrow from banks*
20 | *tend to be small corporations. (See page 149.)*

21 | For rated bonds, S & P's Bond Guide reports new bond issues. For May
22 | 2001, the size of bond issues ranged from \$90 million to over \$4 billion.
23 | Ratings ranged from a very speculative B rating to an investment grade AA
24 | rating. The size of these issues is in stark contrast to the size of Florida
25 | water and wastewater utilities, most of which have revenue less than \$1

1 million.

2 Water and wastewater utilities are public utilities that have an
3 obligation to serve. This, along with water quality and infrastructure
4 replacement issues, means these utilities have to raise capital at various
5 times, even times of adverse financial conditions. In addition, many Florida
6 water and wastewater utilities have relied on contributions-in-aid-of-
7 construction (CIAC) to finance a portion of the original cost of the plant and
8 lines. CIAC reduces rate base, which can make raising capital more expensive.
9 I believe that a small- utility risk premium should be added to the return on
10 equity to recognize the financial stress, and hence risk, that small water and
11 wastewater systems can experience.

12 I have chosen 50 basis points as the appropriate small-utility risk
13 premium. Exhibit PL-20 shows the difference between yields on BBB rated and
14 BB+ rated industrial bonds over the 5-year period beginning in 1996 and ending
15 in 2000. The yield difference has ranged from 55 basis points to 135 basis
16 points, with an average of 83 basis points. Bonds rated BB+ are below
17 investment grade and may face uncertainties during adverse economic conditions.
18 Bonds in this category are somewhat speculative and are known as high-yield or
19 junk bonds. While the issuers of these bonds are still very large compared
20 with Florida water and wastewater utilities, the additional yield is an
21 indicator of the additional risk beyond the BBB rating. Since the spread
22 between BBB yields and BB+ yields can widen considerably during times of a
23 credit crunch, I believe using the actual BB+ yield is inappropriate.
24 Therefore I chose 50 basis points as a risk allowance that is beyond what BBB
25 bonds yield yet allows recognition that well managed water and wastewater

1 | utilities with supportive regulation should not be considered speculative
2 | investments.

3 | Q. How have you implemented these risk adjustments?

4 | A. I have included a bond yield differential, a private placement premium,
5 | and a small-utility risk premium in the calculation of my recommended leverage
6 | formula, which is presented on Exhibits PL-3 and PL-21.

7 | Q. Why have you chosen a 40% limit on the equity ratio input to the leverage
8 | formula?

9 | A. The 40% limit is part of the status quo methodology. The intent of this
10 | limit is to discourage imprudent capital structures for water and wastewater
11 | utilities. I note that my water and gas indexes have average equity ratios
12 | close to 40%. Therefore, I believe 40% is the appropriate standard.

13 | Q. Please summarize your testimony.

14 | A. I recommend that the leverage formula methodology include an index of gas
15 | utilities and include a small-utility risk premium of 50 basis points. With
16 | this methodology, the leverage formula produces a range of 9.69% to 10.80% for
17 | ROEs for water and wastewater utilities. My recommended leverage formula is
18 | presented on Exhibit PL-3. I also presented the leverage formula using the
19 | status quo methodology on Exhibit PL-22.

20 | Q. Does this conclude your testimony?

21 | A. Yes. It does.

22 |

23 |

24 |

25 |

Index of Exhibits

PL-1	Index of Exhibits
PL-2	Leverage Formula Equation
PL-3	Calculation of Recommended Leverage Formula
PL-4	Comparison of Authorized ROEs
PL-5	Breakdown of Systems by Revenue
PL-6	Electric Utilities Revenue & Earnings
PL-7	Gas Utilities Revenue & Earnings
PL-8	Water & Wastewater Systems Revenue
PL-9	Distribution of Water Systems
PL-10	Distribution of Wastewater Systems
PL-11	Achieved ROEs for Water Systems
PL-12	Achieved ROEs for Wastewater Systems
PL-13	Index of Water Utilities
PL-14	Index of Gas Utilities
PL-15	Basic DCF Equation
PL-16	Two Stage DCF Equation
PL-17	DCF Analysis
PL-18	CAPM Analysis
PL-19	Bond Yield Differentials
PL-20	Spread Between BBB and BB+ Bond Yields
PL-21	Leverage Formula Calculation and Comparison
PL-22	Status Quo Leverage Formula

Water and Wastewater Leverage Formula

$$\text{ROE} = \text{Bond Yield} + \frac{\text{Equity Risk Premium}}{\text{Equity Ratio}}$$

where:

ROE is return on common equity.

Bond Yield is a constant term and is the recent average monthly yield on BBB rated public utility bonds plus adjustments.

Equity Risk Premium is a constant term for the amount the cost of equity exceeds the cost of debt and is derived from cost of equity models plus adjustments.

$$\text{Equity Ratio} = \frac{\text{Common Equity}}{\text{Common Equity} + \text{Preferred Equity} + \text{Long Term Debt} + \text{Short Term Debt}}$$

RECOMMENDED
Marginal Cost of Investor Capital
Average Water and Wastewater Utility

Recommended: 8.95 + 0.738/ER

Range: 9.69% to 10.80%

<u>Capital Component</u>	<u>Ratio</u>	<u>Marginal Cost Rate</u>	<u>Weighted Marginal Cost Rate</u>
Common Equity	42.94% *	10.67%	4.58%
Total Debt	57.06%	8.95% **	5.11%
	100.0%		9.69%

A 40% equity ratio is the floor for calculating the required return on common equity. The return on equity at a 40% equity ratio is $8.95\% + .738/.40 = 10.80\%$.

Marginal Cost of Investor Capital
Average Water & Wastewater Utility at 40% Equity Ratio

<u>Capital Component</u>	<u>Ratio</u>	<u>Marginal Cost Rate</u>	<u>Weighted Marginal Cost Rate</u>
Common Equity	40.00%	10.79%	4.32%
Total Debt	60.00%	8.95% **	5.37%
	100.0%		9.69%

Where: ER = Equity Ratio = Common Equity / (Common Equity + Preferred Equity + Long-Term Debt + Short-Term Debt)

* Average of average gas index equity ratios and average water index equity ratios.

** Baa rate for August 2001 plus a 50 basis point private placement premium plus 50 basis point small-utility risk premium.

Source: Moody's Credit Perspectives, PL-21

COMPARISON OF ALLOWED ROEs

	Allowed ROE *	Order Date
American States Water Co.	10.00%	4Q99
American Water Works	11.02%	--
Artesian Resources Corp.	10.44%	04/00
California Water Service Group	10.48%	--
Connecticut Water Service, Inc.	12.70%	03/91
Middlesex Water Company	10.25%	--
Pennichuck Corporation	10.45%	--
Philadelphia Suburban Corp.	10.65%	--
SJW Corporation	10.20%	07/96
Southwest Water Company	10.00%	01/98
York Water Company	10.30%	10/99

FPSC Leverage Formula Range

2000	9.37% to 9.94%
1999	8.93% to 10.12%
1998	8.57% to 9.85%
1997	9.21% to 10.46%
1996	10.18% to 11.88%
1995	10.18% to 11.88%

* ROEs for companies operating in multiple jurisdictions are averages.

Source: C.A. Turner Utility Reports, Sept. 2001 & PSC Leverage Formula Orders

BREAKDOWN OF WATER AND WASTEWATER SYSTEMS BY REVENUE

As of December 31, 2000

	Number of Systems
Water Systems With Less that \$200K Revenue	97
Water Systems With \$200K to \$1,000,000 in Revenue	42
Water Systems With \$1,000,000 or More in Revenue	9
TOTAL	148
Wastewater Systems With Less that \$200K Revenue	73
Wastewater Systems \$200K to \$1,000,000 in Revenue	36
Wastewater Systems With \$1,000,000 or More in Revenue	9
TOTAL	118

SOURCE: PSC Annual Reports for 2000

Florida Electric Utilities Revenue & Earnings for 2000

<u>Company</u>	<u>Achieved ROE</u>	<u>Revenue excluding clause revenue</u>
Florida Power & Light Co.	12.21%	\$3,447,550,859
Florida Power Corp.	12.74%	1,330,303,532
FPUC- Fernandina Beach	12.62%	6,793,712
FPUC-Mariana	11.75%	6,232,216
Gulf Power Co.	12.76%	355,468,247
Tampa Electric Co.	12.31%	784,476,945

Number of Utilities

6

	<u>Achieved ROE</u>	<u>Revenue excluding clause revenue</u>
Average	12.40%	\$988,470,919
Median	12.47%	\$569,972,596
Range	11.75% to 12.76%	\$6,232,216 to \$3,447,550,859

Number Above Authorized ROE Range 3

Number Reporting a Loss 0

Source: FPSC Surveillance Reports for December 2000

FPSC Regulated Gas Companies

<u>Company</u>	<u>Achieved ROE</u>	<u>Net Revenue</u>
Chesapeake Utilities	4.65%	\$9,560,464
City Gas	3.39%	32,840,339
FPUC	11.82%	17,106,592
Indiantown Gas	-6.92%	556,181
Peoples Gas System	10.90%	145,147,000
Sebring Gas System	-31.90%	259,935
South Florida Natural Gas	1.44%	1,577,833
St. Joe Natural Gas	0.08%	1,148,670
Number of Systems	8	
	<u>Achieved ROE</u>	<u>Net Revenue</u>
Average	-0.82%	\$26,024,627
Median	2.42%	\$5,569,149
Range	-31.90% to 11.82%	\$259,935 to \$145,147,000
Number Above 12% ROE	0	
Number Reporting a Loss	2	


Source: December 2000 Surveillance Reports


Comparison of 2000 Revenue for Gas Companies and WAW Systems

<u>Gas Systems</u>		<u>Water Systems & Revenue</u>		
	Florida Gas Utilities (1)	Over \$1 Million	\$200 K to \$1 Million	Less Than \$200K
Number of Systems	8	9	42	97
<u>Revenue</u>				
Average	\$26,024,627	\$5,785,778	\$412,511	\$67,644
Median	5,569,149	2,316,526	325,606	54,052
Range	259,935 to 145,147,000	1,089,043 to 26,199,153	202,277 to 913,740	2,005 to 188,806
<u>Gas Systems</u>		<u>Wastewater Systems & Revenue</u>		
	Florida Gas Utilities (1)	Over \$1 Million	\$200 K to \$1 Million	Less Than \$200K
Number of Systems	8	9	36	73
<u>Revenue</u>				
Average	\$26,024,627	\$6,057,937	\$458,717	\$71,541
Median	5,569,149	2,949,128	417,356	53,981
Range	259,935 to 145,147,000	1,027,439 to 20,531,114	213,864 to 907,909	4,274 to 199,073

(1) Net Revenue

Source: PSC Annual Reports for 2000 & Dec. 2000 Surveillance Reports





Comparison of 2000 Profitability for Water SystemsWater Systems by Revenue Class

	Over \$1 Million	\$200 K to \$1 Million	Under \$200 K	\$200 K to \$1 Million	Under \$200 K
	<u>With Common Equity</u>			<u>Without Common Equity</u>	
Number of Systems	9	28	56	14	41
	<u>Achieved ROE</u>			<u>Achieved ROR</u>	
Average	18.14%	-106.07%	-15.44%	-0.83%	-27.64%
Median	12.04%	0.50%	-2.30%	8.06%	-10.20%
Range	7.37% to 59.92%	-3076.74% to 359.54%	-392.84% to 486.96%	-81.81% to 18.52%	-460.74% to 225.92%
Number Above 12% ROE	5	5	12	--	--
Number Reporting Losses	0	14	32	4	28
Number Above 10% ROR				1	5

ROR - rate of return

Source: PSC Annual Reports for 2000

Comparison of 2000 Profitability for Wastewater Systems**Wastewater Systems by Revenue Class**

	Over \$1 Million	\$200 K to \$1 Million	Under \$200 K	Over \$1 Million	\$200 K to \$1 Million	Under \$200 K
	<u>With Common Equity</u>			<u>Without Common Equity</u>		
# of Systems	6	28	43	3	8	30
	<u>Achieved ROE</u>			<u>Achieved ROR</u>		
Average	5.67%	-6.45%	-34.59%	7.53%	4.68%	-12.81%
Median	8.30%	2.77%	-5.25%	7.13%	5.62%	-3.87%
Range	-32.52% to 35.56%	-234.46% to 96.64%	-360.57% to 28.44%	5.85% to 9.61%	-3.73% to 9.82%	-148.99% to 55.53%
# Above 12% ROE	2	4	2	--	--	--
# Reporting Losses	1	12	33	0	1	19
# Above 10% ROR				0	0	5

ROR - rate of return

Source: PSC Annual Reports for 2000

WATER INDEX STATISTICS

Company Name	Percent Non-utility Revenue (1)	Sales to Net Plant Ratio (2)	Beta (3)	S & P Bond Rating (4)	Annual Revenue (5) Millions \$	Equity Ratio (6)	Achieved ROE for 2000(7)
American States Water	10%	0.36	0.65	A+	\$183.9	45.15%	9.30%
American Water Works	3%	0.26	0.55	A	1,350.6	36.46%	9.40%
California Water Service	2%	0.42	0.65	AA-	244.8	47.98%	10.10%
Philadelphia Suburban	3%	0.22	0.60	A+	275.5	42.76%	11.70%
AVERAGE	5%	0.32	0.61	--	513.7	43.09%	10.13%
MEDIAN	3%	0.31	0.63	A+	260.15	43.96%	9.75%

(1) From 1st Quarter 2001 10-Q's & 10-K's for 2000

(2) From ValueScreen July 2001 Disk

(3) From ValueScreen July 2001 Disk

(4) From Standard & Poor's Ratings Direct Website

(5) From ValueScreen July 2001 Disk

(6) From 1st Quarter 2001 10-Q's

(7) Value Line Investment Survey, Ed. 9, August 3, 2001

GAS INDEX STATISTICS

Company Name	Percent Non-utility Revenue (1)	Sales to Net Plant Ratio (2)	Beta (3)	S & P Bond Rating (4)	Annual Revenue (5) Millions \$	Equity Ratio (6)	Achieved ROE for 2000(7)
AGL Resources	1%	0.37	0.60	A-	\$607.40	33.60%	11.50%
Atmos Energy	4%	0.87	0.55	A-	850.15	58.06%	8.20%
Cascade Natural Gas	0%	0.85	0.55	BBB+	241.94	44.76%	12.90%
Energen Corp.	19%	0.61	0.75	A-	555.60	43.88%	13.80%
Laclede Gas	11%	0.98	0.50	AA-	566.13	44.32%	9.10%
Northwest Nat. Gas	1%	0.57	0.60	A	532.11	49.45%	10.00%
Peoples Energy	16%	0.86	0.70	A+	1,417.53	40.85%	12.40%
Piedmont Natural Gas	0%	0.77	0.60	A	830.38	53.83%	12.10%
SEMCO Energy	16%	0.83	0.65	BBB	422.59	20.35%	12.30%
Southwest Gas	5%	0.61	0.65	BBB-	1,034.09	33.39%	7.20%
WGL Holdings Inc.	22%	0.71	0.60	AA-	1,031.10	48.15%	11.70%
AVERAGE	9%	0.73	0.61	--	735.37	42.79%	11.02%
MEDIAN	5%	0.77	0.60	A-	607.40	44.32%	11.70%

(1) From 1st Quarter 2001 10-Q's

(2) From ValueScreen July 2001 Disk

(3) From ValueScreen July 2001 Disk

(4) From Standard & Poor's Ratings Direct Website

(5) From ValueScreen July 2001 Disk

(6) From 1st Quarter 2001 10-Q's

(7) Value Line Investment Survey, Ed. 3, June 22, 2001

BASIC DCF EQUATION

$$P_0 = \frac{D_1}{(1+K)} + \frac{D_2}{(1+K)^2} + \frac{D_3}{(1+K)^3} + \dots + \frac{D_\infty}{(1+K)^\infty}$$

where: D_t = Dividends paid at the end of period t

K = Investors' required rate of return.

P_0 = The current price of the stock this can also be written as

$$P_0 = \sum_{t=1}^n \frac{D_t}{(1+K)^t}, \text{ as } n \text{ approaches } \infty$$

Assuming constant growth in dividends and $g < K$, these equations reduce to

$$K = \frac{D_1}{P_0} + g$$

where g is the constant growth rate in dividends.

TWO-STAGE ANNUALLY COMPOUNDED DCF MODEL

$$P_0(1-FC) = \frac{D_1}{(1+K)} + \frac{D_2}{(1+K)^2} + \dots + \frac{D_n}{(1+K)^n} + \frac{D_n(1+g)}{K-g} \frac{1}{(1+K)^n}$$

Where

P_0 = The current stock price

D_1, D_2, \dots, D_n = Expected dividends each year

FC = Flotation costs

K = Investors required rate of return

g = The constant growth rate after year n

INDEX OF WATER UTILITIES

COST OF EQUITY

COMPANIES						Value Line Issue: Ed. 9 - 8/03/01			AUG. 2001	
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	EPS4	ROE4	GR1-4	GR4+	AVER-PR
AMERICAN STATES WATER	1.30	1.32	1.35	1.39	1.42	2.60	10.50	1.0246	1.0477	36.600
AMERICAN WATER WORKS	0.94	0.98	1.02	1.06	1.11	2.65	13.50	1.0424	1.0785	33.370
CALIFORNIA WATER SVC.	1.12	1.14	1.16	1.18	1.20	2.00	13.00	1.0172	1.0520	25.080
PHILADELPHIA SUBURBAN	0.62	0.64	0.67	0.69	0.72	1.35	12.50	1.0400	1.0583	27.300
AVERAGE	0.9950	1.0200	1.0498	1.0807	1.1125	2.15	12.3750	1.0311	1.0591	30.588
					1.1783					

S&P STOCK GUIDE: SEPT. 2001 with August Stock Prices

Annual 9.01% COST OF EQUITY

Average Price Less Flotation
\$29.67

Cash Flows

0.9261108	0.8729520	0.8242517	0.7783468	0.747526	25.520691
29.66988					

Sources: Stock Prices/S&P Stock Guides; Dividends, EPS, ROE/Value Line, Ed. 9

COST OF EQUITY

INDEX OF GAS UTILITIES

VALUE LINE ISSUE: Ed. 3, 6/22/01

COMPANIES	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	EPS4	ROE4	GR1-4	GR4+	AVER-PR
AGL RESOURCES	1.08	1.08	1.10	1.13	1.15	1.85	12.00	1.0212	1.0454	22.800
ATMOS ENERGY	1.16	1.20	1.25	1.30	1.35	2.60	17.50	1.0400	1.0841	21.345
CASCADE NATURAL GAS	0.96	0.96	0.97	0.99	1.00	1.90	14.50	1.0137	1.0687	20.675
ENERGEN CORP.	0.69	0.71	0.74	0.77	0.80	4.10	23.00	1.0406	1.1851	25.950
LACLEDE GAS	1.35	1.36	1.39	1.42	1.45	2.15	11.50	1.0216	1.0374	23.650
NORTHWEST NAT. GAS	1.25	1.26	1.27	1.29	1.30	2.45	11.00	1.0105	1.0516	24.655
PEOPLES ENERGY	2.04	2.08	2.11	2.13	2.16	4.05	12.00	1.0127	1.0560	38.235
PIEDMONT NATURAL GAS	1.52	1.60	1.67	1.74	1.82	3.00	13.00	1.0439	1.0511	33.020
SEMCO ENERGY	0.84	0.88	0.92	0.96	1.00	1.70	3.50	1.0435	1.0144	14.925
SOUTHWEST GAS	0.82	0.84	0.88	0.92	0.96	1.75	8.00	1.0455	1.0361	23.460
WGL HOLDINGS	1.26	1.28	1.30	1.33	1.35	2.60	12.50	1.0179	1.0601	27.350
AVERAGE	1.1791	1.2045	1.2365	1.2695	1.3036	2.56	12.5909	1.0283	1.0627	25.097
					1.3854					

S&P STOCK GUIDE: SEPT. 2001 with August Stock Prices

Annual 10.71% COST OF EQUITY

Average Price less Flotation
\$24.34

Cash Flows

1.0876188 1.006462 0.933303 0.865613 0.8194280 19.631487

5

24.34391

Sources: Stock Prices/S&P Stock Guides; Dividends, EPS, ROE/Value Line, Ed. 3

Capital Asset Pricing Model Cost of Equity for
an Average Water or Wastewater Utility

CAPM Analysis Formula

$$K = RF + \text{Beta}(\text{MR} - \text{RF})$$

$$K = \text{Investor's required rate of return}$$

$$\text{RF} = \text{Risk-free rate (Blue Chip forecast for 30-year Treasury bond)}$$

Beta = Measure of systematic risk (Average for water utilities followed by Value Line and average for the gas index)

$$\text{MR} = \text{Market return}$$

$$\text{GAS } \underline{8.98\%} = 5.74\% + .61(10.89\% - 5.74\%) + .10\%$$

$$\text{WATER } \underline{8.98\%} = 5.74\% + .61(10.89\% - 5.74\%) + .10\%$$

Note: I estimated the market return using an annual DCF model for a large number of dividend paying stocks followed by Value Line. For July 2001 stock prices, the result was 10.79%. I added 10 basis points to allow for the quarterly compounding of dividends. The resulting market return is 10.89%. I also added 10 basis points to the CAPM result to allow for flotation costs.

Source: Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, August 1, 2001 Value Screen CD 2.0, August 2001

Bond Yield Differentials Public Utility Long Term Bond Yield Averages		
	August 2001 Yields	120 Month Average Spread in Basis Points
Calculated A1 Yield	7.52%	
		4.54
August 2001 Reported A2 Yield	7.59%	
		9.2
Calculated A3 Yield	7.71%	
		9.2
Calculated Baa1 Yield	7.83%	
		9.2
August 2001 Reported Baa2 Yield	7.95%	
		9.2
Calculated Baa3 Yield	8.07%	
Source: Moody's Credit Perspectives		

Historical Yield Spread Between BBB and BB+ Bonds

		<u>BBB</u>	<u>BB+</u>	<u>DIFFERENCE</u>
2000	High	9.46%	10.81%	1.35%
	Low	8.40%	9.41%	1.01%
1999	High	8.79%	9.91%	1.12%
	Low	7.28%	8.09%	0.81%
1998	High	7.49%	8.57%	1.08%
	Low	6.66%	7.28%	0.62%
1997	High	8.04%	8.61%	0.57%
	Low	7.12%	7.72%	0.60%
1996	High	8.29%	8.84%	0.55%
	Low	6.62%	7.22%	0.60%
			Average	0.83%
			Range	0.55% to 1.35%

Source: S & P Bond Guide, July 2001 & January 1999

Calculation of Recommended and Status Quo Leverage Formulae

	<u>Recommended</u> <u>2001</u>	<u>Status Quo</u> <u>2001</u>
(A) DCF ROE for Water Index	9.01%	9.01%
(B) DCF ROE for Gas Index	10.71%	
(C) CAPM for Water Index	8.98%	<u>8.98%</u>
(D) CAPM for Gas Index	<u>8.98%</u>	
AVERAGE	9.42%	9.00%
Bond Yield Differential	.25%	.41%
Small-Utility Risk Premium	.50%	
Private Placement Premium	.50%	.50%
Adjustment to Reflect Required Equity		
Return at a 40% Equity Ratio	<u>.13%</u>	<u>.11%</u>
Cost of Equity for Average Florida WAW		
Utility at a 40% Equity Ratio	<u>10.80%</u>	<u>10.01%</u>
<u>2000 Leverage Formula</u> (Currently in Effect)		
Return on Common Equity	= 8.99% + .376/ER	
Range of Returns on Equity	= 9.37% - 9.94%	
<u>2001 Leverage Formula</u> (Recommended)		
Return on Common Equity	= 8.95% + .738/ER	
Range of Returns on Equity	= 9.69% - 10.80%	
<u>2001 Leverage Formula</u> (Status Quo)		
Return on Common Equity	= 8.54% + .588/ER	
Range of Returns on Equity	= 9.13% - 10.01%	

STATUS QUO

Marginal Cost of Investor Capital
Average Water and Wastewater Utility

Status Quo: 8.54% + 0.588/ER

Range: 9.13% to 10.01%

Calculated as follows:

<u>Capital Component</u>	<u>Ratio</u>	<u>Marginal Cost Rate</u>	<u>Weighted Marginal Cost Rate</u>
Common Equity	43.09%	9.91%	4.27%
Total Debt	<u>56.91%</u>	8.54% *	<u>4.86%</u>
	100.00%		9.13%

A 40% equity ratio is the floor for calculating the required return on common equity. The return on equity at a 40% equity ratio is:

$$8.54\% + 0.588/.40 = 10.01\%$$

Marginal Cost of Investor Capital
Average Water & Wastewater Utility at 40% Equity Ratio

<u>Capital Component</u>	<u>Ratio</u>	<u>Marginal Cost Rate</u>	<u>Weighted Marginal Cost Rate</u>
Common Equity	40.00%	10.01%	4.00%
Total Debt	<u>60.00%</u>	8.54% *	<u>5.12%</u>
	100.00%		9.13%

Where: ER = Equity Ratio = Common Equity / (Common Equity + Preferred Equity + Long-Term Debt + Short-Term Debt)

* Assumed Baa3 rate for August 2001 plus a 50 basis point private placement premium.

Source: Moody's Credit Perspectives, PL-21

BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In re: Water and wastewater
industry annual reestablishment
of authorized range of return on
common equity of water and
wastewater utilities pursuant to
Section 367.081(4)(f), F.S.


DOCKET NO. 010006-WS
FILED: SEPTEMBER 28, 2001

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the **DIRECT TESTIMONY OF PETE LESTER**, on behalf of the Staff of the Florida Public Service Commission, has been furnished by U.S. Mail, this 28th day of September, 2001, to the following:

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