

**BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION**

In re: Investigation into Pricing of            )  
Unbundled Network Elements                )   Docket No. 990649B-TP  
  )

**SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF**

**DAVID G. TUCEK**

**ON BEHALF OF**

**VERIZON FLORIDA INC.**

**SUBJECT: LONG RUN INCREMENTAL COSTS**

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- 1 (1) Surrebuttal Exhibit DGT-1, "Comparison of ICM-FL Modeled  
2 Investment with Reproduction Cost ";
- 3 (2) Surrebuttal Exhibit DGT-2, "Impact of Market Segmentation on  
4 DS-1 Requirements";
- 5 (3) Surrebuttal Exhibit DGT-3, "Difference Between a 4:1 and a 6:1  
6 Concentration Ratio";
- 7 (4) Surrebuttal Exhibit DGT-4, "Impact of High Target Fill Factors";
- 8 (5) Surrebuttal Exhibit DGT-5, "Comparison of Modeled Investment  
9 per Line"; and,
- 10 (6) Surrebuttal Exhibit DGT-6, "Impact of C. A. Turner and Calibration  
11 on Fixed Allocator".

12  
13 Note that Surrebuttal Exhibit DGT-5 is confidential.

14  
15 **Q. HOW IS THE REMAINDER OF YOUR SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY**  
16 **ORGANIZED?**

17 A. The remainder of my surrebuttal testimony is organized into five sections.  
18 First, I address the fundamental flaw underlying many of Dr. Ankum's  
19 recommendations relating to Verizon's cost study. Second, I point out  
20 several inconsistencies, unsupported statements and misstatements of  
21 fact contained in Dr. Ankum's rebuttal testimony. Third, I address Dr.  
22 Ankum's specific allegations and recommendations concerning Verizon's  
23 cost study. Fourth, I explain why the Commission should disregard Mr.  
24 Fischer's recommendations concerning ICM-FL's use of the C. A. Turner  
25 index and ICM-FL's calibration adjustment, as well as his comparison of

1 Verizon's fixed allocator with that of BellSouth. Finally, I present a  
2 summary of my surrebuttal testimony and highlight the reasons why the  
3 Commission should disregard Dr. Ankum's and Mr. Fischer's  
4 recommendations.

5

6

**DR. ANKUM'S REBUTTAL TESTIMONY SUFFERS**

7

**FROM A FUNDAMENTAL FLAW**

8

9 **Q. WHAT FUNDAMENTAL FLAW UNDERLIES DR. ANKUM'S**  
10 **REBUTTAL TESTIMONY?**

11 **A.** Dr. Ankum argues that TELRIC estimates must be based on a totally  
12 hypothetical network. For example, Dr. Ankum makes the following  
13 assertions and recommendations in his rebuttal testimony:

14

15 (1) Remote terminals (RTs) should be placed as close to the customer  
16 as possible (Ankum Rebuttal, p.6);

17

18 (2) The use of copper should be decreased and the use of fiber  
19 should be increased (Ankum Rebuttal, p 7);

20

21 (3) The GTD-5 switch should be eliminated from Verizon Florida's  
22 modeled network (Ankum Rebuttal, p. 9);

23

24 (4) Verizon's NRC study should presume that the former GTE service  
25 ordering centers are consolidated with Verizon's, whether they

1                   actually are or not (Ankum Rebuttal, p. 15);

2

3           (5)    TELRIC-based switching rates should be based only on cutover  
4           switch prices, and should not reflect the pricing for additions to  
5           existing switches (Ankum Rebuttal, pp. 83-84).

6

7           While each of the above recommendations is flawed in its own right,  
8           taken together, they make clear that Dr. Ankum advocates basing  
9           TELRIC estimates and UNE rates on a network that is disconnected from  
10          the real world, and that is completely unlike the network from which the  
11          UNEs will be provisioned. Dr. Ankum's disregard for the characteristics of  
12          the real network indicates that he is unconcerned with the costs that  
13          Verizon will incur in provisioning UNEs.

14

15   **Q.    ARE THERE OTHER PORTIONS OF DR. ANKUM'S REBUTTAL**  
16   **TESTIMONY THAT INDICATE HE IS NOT CONCERNED WITH THE**  
17   **CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REAL NETWORK, OR WITH THE**  
18   **COSTS VERIZON WILL INCUR IN PROVISIONING UNES?**

19   A.    Yes. Dr. Ankum makes several recommendations concerning fill factors  
20          for various components of the network. These recommendations share  
21          two characteristics. First, they are unsupported by any reference to  
22          Verizon's Florida network. Second, with the exception of Dr. Ankum's  
23          completely unsupported recommendation for conduit, the recommended  
24          values are all in excess of 75 percent. In making these fill factor  
25          recommendations, Dr. Ankum is advocating a network operating nearly at

1 capacity and ignores, as I explain below, the impact of discrete facility  
2 sizes on fill factors.

3

4 Additionally, at page 82 of his rebuttal testimony, Dr. Ankum relies on a  
5 partial excerpt of Paragraph 685 from the FCC's Local Competition Order  
6 to support his position that the switch prices underlying Verizon's TELRIC  
7 estimates should reflect the assumption that Verizon is completely  
8 rebuilding its switch network. In presenting only an excerpt as if it were  
9 the entire paragraph, Dr. Ankum has misdirected the Commission's  
10 attention away from the FCC's stated intent for the TELRIC standard.  
11 This is easily seen by reading the entire paragraph:

12

13 Under the third approach, prices for interconnection and  
14 access to unbundled elements would be developed from a  
15 forward-looking economic cost methodology based on the  
16 most efficient technology deployed in the incumbent LEC's  
17 current wire center locations. This approach mitigates  
18 incumbent LECs' concerns that a forward-looking pricing  
19 methodology ignores existing network design, while basing  
20 prices on efficient, new technology that is compatible with  
21 the existing infrastructure. *This benchmark of forward-*  
22 *looking cost and existing network design most closely*  
23 *represents the incremental costs that incumbents actually*  
24 *expect to incur in making network elements available to*  
25 *new entrants.* Moreover, this approach encourages

1 facilities-based competition to the extent that new entrants,  
2 by designing more efficient network configurations, are able  
3 to provide the service at a lower cost than the incumbent  
4 LEC. We, therefore, conclude that the forward-looking  
5 pricing methodology for interconnection and unbundled  
6 network elements should be based on costs that assume  
7 that wire centers will be placed at the incumbent LEC's  
8 current wire center locations, but that the reconstructed  
9 local network will employ the most efficient technology for  
10 reasonably foreseeable capacity requirements.  
11 (Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the  
12 Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and Order,  
13 11 FCC Rcd. 15499 (1996) ("First Report and Order")  
14 [*emphasis added*]).

15  
16 It is clear from reading the entire paragraph that the FCC intended  
17 TELRIC to estimate the costs ILECs expect to incur in providing UNEs  
18 out of their own networks, not out of some fantasy or hypothetical  
19 network. To argue that the inputs for switch prices -- or any other input --  
20 must be developed as if the network is built all at once just because the  
21 FCC only specified that wire center locations must be fixed, is both self-  
22 serving and plainly contrary to the FCC's intent. This is true even if the  
23 model employed designs the network all at once -- to be useful, costs  
24 must be grounded in reality and model inputs must reflect actual  
25 experience.



1 **Q. HAS THE COMMISSION DETERMINED THAT COSTS AND MODEL**  
2 **INPUTS MUST BE GROUNDED IN REALITY?**

3 A. Yes. In Docket Number 980696-TP, AT&T argued that the modeled  
4 sharing percentage for buried plant should exceed actual experience  
5 because sharing opportunities will be greater in a UNE environment, and  
6 because opportunities exist for sharing with other industries in a scorched  
7 node environment. The Commission disagreed:

8  
9 While this proceeding is to determine the cost of a forward-  
10 looking scorched node network, there needs to remain a  
11 basis in reality if the costs developed for the network are to  
12 have any relevance to the cost of basic local telephone  
13 service. We believe that assuming sharing percentages  
14 which require, for example, power and cable TV companies  
15 to rebuild their networks so that more of the cost of a  
16 telephone network can be shifted to other industries, means  
17 a network severed from reality.

18 (Order, Docket No. 980696-TP (January 7, 1999), p. 129).

19

20 **Q. DOES ICM-FL MODEL VERIZON'S EXISTING FLORIDA NETWORK?**

21 A. No, but it comes closer to this than any other model of Verizon's Florida  
22 network that has been provided to this Commission. As I explained in my  
23 direct testimony (pp. 3-4), unlike earlier versions of ICM, ICM-FL does not  
24 model digital loop carrier (DLC) locations by imposing a copper-loop  
25 length restriction, and the end-office assignments in ICM-FL's modeled

1 SONET rings do not assume every hub office is an access tandem.  
2 These changes cause the network modeled by ICM-FL to more closely  
3 resemble the network from which Verizon provisions UNEs in Florida.  
4

5 **Q. DOES ICM-FL PRODUCE UNREASONABLY HIGH UNE COSTS AND**  
6 **RATES AS DR. ANKUM CONTENDS AT PAGES 5-6 OF HIS**  
7 **REBUTTAL TESTIMONY?**

8 A. No. Dr. Ankum bases this contention, in part, on his claim that there are  
9 unspecified errors in ICM-FL, and on his comparison of Verizon's  
10 proposed UNE rates with those in other jurisdictions. This latter argument  
11 improperly ignores the differences among states and mistakenly assumes  
12 that UNE costs must be based on a hypothetical network that will never  
13 exist anywhere. Rather than look to the costs in other states, it is more  
14 useful to compare ICM-FL's modeled network and costs to Verizon's  
15 existing Florida network. For example, a comparison of modeled and  
16 actual sheath feet, in thousands, shows:

	<b>Modeled</b>	<b>Actual</b>	<b>Variance</b>
<b>Fiber</b>	13,552	22,247	-39.1%
<b>Copper</b>	<u>132,507</u>	<u>164,160</u>	-19.3%
<b>Total</b>	146,059	186,407	-21.6%

21  
22 In terms of the physical amount of sheath feet, ICM-FL models a much  
23 smaller, and therefore less costly, outside plant (OSP) network. Likewise,  
24 as shown in Surrebuttal Exhibit DGT-1, the level of investment modeled  
25 by ICM-FL compares favorably with the reproduction cost of the modeled

1 network. It is clear that ICM-FL does not model unreasonably high costs  
2 when compared to Verizon's existing Florida network.

3

4 **Q. WHY IS THE REPRODUCTION COST OF THE EXISTING NETWORK A**  
5 **USEFUL BENCHMARK AGAINST WHICH TO GAUGE ICM-FL'S**  
6 **RESULTS?**

7 A. The key issue in this proceeding is cost -- particularly the cost of the  
8 network as whole. While Dr. Ankum has criticized ICM-FL based on  
9 certain specific characteristics, the first question that must be addressed  
10 is how the cost of the modeled network compares to the existing network  
11 overall. The only comprehensive way to answer this question is to  
12 measure the network in terms of dollars. However, because the relative  
13 prices of telephone plant change over time, book investment is not suited  
14 for this purpose. The C. A. Turner indices measure this change in relative  
15 prices by account and vintage year, and develop a dollar measure of the  
16 reproduction cost of the existing network. If modeled investment is  
17 substantially above the reproduction cost without some valid reason, then  
18 the efficacy of the modeling process is called into question. As shown in  
19 Surrebuttal Exhibit DGT-1, modeled investment is *below* the reproduction  
20 cost. Accordingly, Dr. Ankum's broad charge that ICM-FL produces  
21 unreasonably high rates and costs is demonstrably false.

22

23 **Q. WHY ARE ICM-FL'S MODELED INVESTMENT AND SHEATH FEET**  
24 **LESS THAN THE EXISTING NETWORK'S REPRODUCTION COST**  
25 **AND SHEATH FEET?**

1 A. The main reason is that the modeled network assumes a level of  
2 optimization that will never be achieved in the real world. For example,  
3 when ICM-FL models the fiber routes connecting DLCs to the central  
4 office, it assumes that all fibers -- including those used for interoffice fiber  
5 routes -- share the same sheath to the fullest extent possible. Likewise,  
6 when DLCs are sized, ICM-FL places the smallest DLC capable of  
7 serving the required number of lines. In the real world, the network grows  
8 incrementally, so that multiple fiber sheaths may be placed along the  
9 same route, or more than one DLC may be placed to serve a group of  
10 customers even though only one is required given current demand.

11

12 These outcomes result from the assumption that the network is built all at  
13 once, thereby causing the modeled placement and material costs to be  
14 understated. Cost models making this assumption, including ICM-FL,  
15 also assume economies of scope and scale that will never be realized.  
16 Consequently, the resulting cost estimates must be viewed as a lower  
17 bound on the forward-looking incremental costs of provisioning UNEs to  
18 new entrants. (See Tucek Direct, pp. 20-22). This basic model  
19 characteristic must be kept in mind when considering arguments that  
20 decrease estimated costs in the name of achieving greater efficiency or a  
21 more optimal design.

22

23

24

25

1                   **DR. ANKUM'S REBUTTAL TESTIMONY IS INTERNALLY**  
2                   **INCONSISTENT, MISSTATES FACTS, AND CONTAINS UNSUPPORTED**  
3                   **STATEMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

4  
5   **Q.    WHAT DOES THIS PORTION OF YOUR SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY**  
6           **ADDRESS?**

7    A.    This portion of my surrebuttal testimony addresses inconsistencies  
8           among the recommendations and positions advocated by Dr. Ankum. I  
9           also point out certain unsupported statements and recommendations, as  
10          well as misstatements of fact, made by Dr. Ankum. My intent here is to  
11          ensure the Commission's record is as clear and accurate as possible. I  
12          do not speculate on the reasons why Dr. Ankum's rebuttal testimony  
13          contains these misstatements.

14  
15   **Q.    HOW IS DR. ANKUM'S REBUTTAL TESTIMONY INCONSISTENT?**

16    A.    There are five major inconsistencies in Dr. Ankum's recommendations.  
17          The first inconsistency has to do with his recommended 6:1 concentration  
18          ratio for DLCs, and his contention that these remote terminals should be  
19          pushed further into the network so that they are closer to the end-users.  
20          (Ankum Rebuttal, pp. 8 and 6). If this were done, either in the real  
21          network or in the modeled network, the average DLC size would  
22          necessarily decrease. As I explain below, the use of a 6:1 concentration  
23          ratio has no effect on the number of DS-1s required to serve small DLCs.  
24          Consequently, pushing DLCs further into the network decreases the  
25          average realized concentration ratio, and is contrary to Dr. Ankum's

1 proposal to use 6:1 concentration everywhere.

2

3 The second inconsistency in Dr. Ankum's rebuttal testimony relates to his  
4 recommendation that remote terminals be pushed further in the network,  
5 and to his criticism of Verizon's unbundled DS-1 study. (Ankum Rebuttal,  
6 pp. 59 and 62). Dr. Ankum's main complaint concerning Verizon's  
7 unbundled DS-1 study is that the fill factor used to develop the cost for  
8 the 28 DS-1 fiber system is too low. However, as I explain below, this fill  
9 factor is based on Verizon's actual experience in placing these systems  
10 close to end-user locations. Dr. Ankum is trying to have it both ways: he  
11 levies an unsupported criticism against the DLC placement underlying the  
12 unbundled loop costs, and then complains about the fill factors that result  
13 when remote terminals are pushed further into the network.

14

15 The third inconsistency concerns Dr. Ankum's position that integrated  
16 digital loop carriers (IDLCs) should be used when modeling an unbundled  
17 loop. (Ankum Rebuttal, p. 51). As I explain below, all of the hypothetically  
18 viable IDLC unbundling solutions require that the traffic be delivered at a  
19 DS-1 level. This means that in order to provision completely utilized DS-  
20 1s to an ALEC, the number of unbundled loops that an ALEC orders out  
21 of a given DLC must be a multiple of 24. This is an outcome whose  
22 likelihood decreases with the size of the DLC and with increases in the  
23 number of ALECs. Consequently, Dr. Ankum's proposal to model IDLCs  
24 would increase the number of DS-1s required for each IDLC. This in turn  
25 decreases the realized concentration ratio and is again contrary to his

1 proposal that a 6:1 concentration ratio be used everywhere.

2

3 The fourth inconsistency exists between his recommendations that the  
4 Commission adopt the FCC's depreciation lives, and that the modeled  
5 network assume complete replacement of existing switches with the most  
6 current technology. (Ankum Rebuttal, pp. 107 and 84) If it were true that  
7 an efficient and rational carrier would replace all of its existing switches  
8 with the most current technology, then the required depreciation life for  
9 digital switches would be much shorter than the 12 to 18 years prescribed  
10 by the FCC and advocated by Dr. Ankum. Indeed, the depreciation life  
11 would have to be shorter than the 10 years sponsored by Mr. Sovereign  
12 in his direct testimony.

13

14 The fifth inconsistency exists between Dr. Ankum's recommendation that  
15 all of Verizon's GTD-5 switches be replaced and his recommendation that  
16 only cutover prices for initial switch placements be used to model switch  
17 costs. (Ankum Rebuttal, pp. 75-78). On the surface, it seems to make  
18 sense that, if the GTD-5 switches were replaced, then Dr. Ankum's  
19 claimed cutover prices would be appropriate. This hasty conclusion,  
20 however, fails to consider the ability of Verizon's other switch vendors to  
21 build, deliver and install the required replacement switches within a short  
22 timeframe. For Verizon, this would involve replacing the switches in 72  
23 out of 90 wire centers in Florida. The problem is further complicated by  
24 the need to replace exiting host/remote complexes simultaneously,  
25 without any service disruptions. Presumably, if the wholesale

1 replacement of the GTD-5 switches is the correct course of action for  
2 Verizon in Florida, then it is the correct action for the entire former GTE  
3 footprint. In my opinion, the demands put on the other switch vendors  
4 and on Verizon make it unlikely that existing switch prices could be  
5 obtained under Dr. Ankum's view of what constitutes a proper TELRIC  
6 study. Dr. Ankum's insistence on cutover prices is in direct conflict with  
7 his insistence that Verizon's costs be modeled as if all GTD-5 switches  
8 were replaced.

9  
10 **Q. WHAT UNSUPPORTED STATEMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**  
11 **HAS DR. ANKUM MADE IN HIS REBUTTAL TESTIMONY?**

12 A. Dr. Ankum's Exhibit No. AHA-6 presents his recommendations for the fill  
13 factors for several components of the local network. While he has offered  
14 arguments (albeit unconvincing ones) for some of these fills, the  
15 recommendation for conduit simply appears in this schedule with no  
16 supporting discussion whatsoever in his rebuttal testimony. Dr. Ankum's  
17 recommendation for drop lengths is, likewise, just a summary conclusion  
18 that the lengths he recommends are appropriate. (Ankum Rebuttal,  
19 p.57).

20  
21 Dr. Ankum claims, incorrectly, that the drop is a very expensive portion of  
22 the loop in ICM-FL. (Ankum Rebuttal, p. 39). He does not support this  
23 statement in any way whatsoever, although ICM-FL offers him an easy  
24 avenue to do so. It is possible to set ICM-FL's minimum and maximum  
25 average drop length to one via the run time options screen, effectively



1 setting the length of all drop wires and entrance facilities to one foot.  
2 When this is done, the TELRIC for the 2-wire loop decreases from \$22.94  
3 to \$22.00 -- a decrease of less than one dollar. While this is not an  
4 insignificant amount, it hardly supports Dr. Ankum's claim that the "drop is  
5 a very expensive portion of the loop in ICM" or that ICM-FL assumes  
6 excessively long drops.

7

8 Finally, Dr. Ankum contends, without support, that the objective fill for  
9 feeder is 90 percent. (Ankum Rebuttal, p. 40). It is not clear what this  
10 means, since Dr. Ankum apparently defines "objective fill" differently than  
11 do other industry participants, including AT&T witnesses. The response  
12 to Verizon Interrogatory Number 9 gave the following definition of  
13 "objective fill":

14

15 The fill that can be sustained on a facility permanently,  
16 accounting for maintenance, and administration, but not  
17 future growth in customers for ultimate demand.

18

19 In the past, AT&T witnesses have given a very different definition of  
20 "objective fill." In response to US West Data Request Number 6, in a  
21 Washington UNE proceeding (Docket Nos. WUTC-960369, -370, -371),  
22 AT&T witness John Klick defined objective fill as follows:

23

24 Objective fill is the approximate utilization level at which an  
25 engineer begins looking at reinforcing the network to account

1 for growth in demand. This fill includes the spare capacity  
2 needed for breakage, testing and administrative, and limited  
3 growth. AT&T used the objective fill factor suggested by the  
4 Commission in this proceeding.

5  
6 In the same proceeding, AT&T witness Dean Fassett equated objective  
7 fill with "fill at relief" and defined this as "the fill factor or percent utilization  
8 which will trigger the engineer to study whether relief is necessary."  
9 (Direct Testimony of Dean Fassett, p. 15). Thus, not only is Dr. Ankum's  
10 statement that the objective fill for feeder is 90 percent unsupported, but  
11 his definition of "objective fill" is unsupported as well.

12

13 **Q. WHAT MISSTATEMENTS OF FACT HAS DR. ANKUM MADE IN HIS**  
14 **REBUTTAL TESTIMONY?**

15 A. I found eight worth mentioning here. First Dr. Ankum erroneously states  
16 that "use of a secondary SAI (serving area interface) increases the use of  
17 copper facilities." (Ankum Rebuttal, p. 7). If Dr. Ankum understood the  
18 purpose of an SAI, he would know that this cannot be the case. For  
19 example, suppose that there are three 50-pair copper cables, each  
20 serving 26 customers and that each of these cables meets at an SAI as  
21 we trace their route from the end-users to the wire center. The SAI, also  
22 called a cross-connect box, allows the three 50-pair cables to be  
23 terminated, with their working loops being served by one or more larger  
24 cables. In this example, beyond the SAI, the 78 working lines would be  
25 served by a single 100-pair cable, instead of the three 50-pair cables.

1           Thus, it is clear that SAIs reduce the amount of copper cable needed in  
2           the network.

3

4           Second, Dr. Ankum asserts that Verizon's model assumes that customers  
5           are equally distributed throughout a fixed arbitrary grid and that the model  
6           builds plant to locations where no customers exist. (Ankum Rebuttal, pp.  
7           8 and 58). This is not true. ICM-FL models the amount of copper  
8           distribution and feeder plant based on the amount of road feet in a given  
9           wire center, where the road feet measure includes only those types of  
10          roads along which one would expect end users to be located. Moreover,  
11          as I just noted, the total modeled sheath feet is more than 20 percent less  
12          than the sheath feet in the existing network. This is hardly the result one  
13          would expect if ICM-FL built plant to locations where no customers exist.

14

15          Third, Dr. Ankum states that Verizon's common cost study is conducted  
16          externally to ICM-FL. (Ankum Rebuttal, p. 36). This is not accurate,  
17          since the identification of Verizon's common costs goes hand in hand with  
18          the development ICM-FL's modeled expenses. Even though Dr. Ankum  
19          does not address common costs in his rebuttal testimony, this point is  
20          worth noting to highlight the linkage between ICM-FL and the common  
21          cost allocator sponsored by Verizon witness Dennis Trimble. Many of Dr.  
22          Ankum's recommendations, if implemented, would decrease the direct  
23          costs modeled by ICM-FL. Such changes would require a recalculation of  
24          the common cost allocator to account for the decrease in the denominator  
25          of the common-to-direct cost ratio.

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Fourth, Dr. Ankum states that ICM-FL places DLCs beyond a pre-determined fiber-copper crossover point, and that in many instances the DLC equipment only serves a few customers. (Ankum Rebuttal, p. 27). Again, this is not true. As I explained above, and in my direct testimony, ICM-FL does not use a copper loop-length restriction to determine the number or locations of DLCs. (Tucek Direct, p. 3). Moreover, except for the smallest DLC size (24 lines), the DLCs modeled by ICM-FL have an average fill in excess of 70 percent -- overall the DLC fill equals 95 percent. Finally, ICM-FL only models eight 24-line DLCs in Verizon's entire Florida network. Setting the material and placement costs associated with these DLCs to zero decreases the statewide average 2-wire loop TELRIC by less than a penny.

Fifth, Dr. Ankum states that ICM-FL places three drops to every residential unit. (Ankum Rebuttal, p. 38). In response to Verizon Interrogatory 8 asking for support of this statement, the ALEC Coalition pointed to pages 13-15 of Book II of ICM-FL's Model Methodology. However, the cited documentation makes it clear that ICM-FL places only one drop to each residential location:

If the number of residential units in a demand unit is less than 500, then single family dwellings with drop wires are assumed. User input determines the size of the drop wire (3 or 5 pair). The 500-line threshold is also a user input. The

1                   number of drop wires is equal to the number of residential  
2                   units. (ICM Model Methodology, Release ICM-FL, Loop  
3                   Module, Book II of VII, p. 13.)

4  
5                   Clearly, Dr. Ankum has confused a 3-pair drop with three individual drops.  
6                   Since the “number of drop wires is equal to the number of residential  
7                   units,” it is impossible for ICM-FL to model three drops for each  
8                   residential unit as Dr. Ankum claims.

9  
10                  Sixth, Dr. Ankum presents a fabricated example in which he portrays the  
11                  total cost of a DLC to remain unchanged, even though the number of  
12                  lines served increases. (Ankum Rebuttal, p. 52). This is not an accurate  
13                  representation of DLC costs. As the number of lines served by a DLC is  
14                  increased, the total cost will increase because, among other things,  
15                  additional line cards will be needed, the required cabinet size increases,  
16                  and the site preparation costs may change.

17  
18                  Seventh, Dr. Ankum incorrectly states that the GTD-5 is “produced” by  
19                  GTE. (Ankum Rebuttal, p. 74). This is not true. The GTD-5 is  
20                  manufactured by AGCS, Inc., which is a subsidiary of Lucent. This is  
21                  easily verified by visiting AGCS’s web site at “<http://www.agcs.com/>”.

22  
23                  Finally, Dr. Ankum claims that “Verizon has based its switching studies on  
24                  the discounts that it will receive for growth lines. ....As such, Verizon  
25                  appears to ignore large numbers of facilities that would receive the large

1 discounts if and when switches are newly installed.” (Ankum Rebuttal, p.  
2 77). In support of this position, he cites my direct testimony at page 6,  
3 lines 8-11. However, that portion of my testimony states:

4  
5 In particular, the switching costs produced by ICM-FL are  
6 based on the host/remote relationships and technology mix  
7 found in Verizon’s network, and on the switch prices that  
8 Verizon is able to obtain today and for the foreseeable  
9 future.

10  
11 Moreover, at page 17, lines 8-13, of my direct testimony, I state:

12  
13 The Switch Module calculates the investment needed to  
14 provide the circuit connections for completing telephone  
15 calls. The switch module designs a network based on  
16 Verizon’s existing wire center locations, host/remote  
17 relationships, and the digital switch types that Verizon  
18 deploys in its network. *Costs are based on the current*  
19 *prices Verizon pays for initial switch placements and*  
20 *expansions. (Emphasis added.)*

21  
22 I cannot speculate on the reasons why Dr. Ankum’s rebuttal testimony  
23 contains these misstatements, but it is important that the Commission has  
24 an accurate understanding of the facts so that its evidentiary record is  
25 reliable.

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**DR. ANKUM'S SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS AND  
RECOMMENDATIONS ARE FLAWED**

**Q. WHAT PORTIONS OF DR. ANKUM'S REBUTTAL TESTIMONY DOES THIS SECTION OF YOUR SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY ADDRESS?**

A. This portion of my surrebuttal testimony addresses the specific allegations and recommendations Dr. Ankum makes with respect to Verizon's recurring cost study. In particular, I address the following issues:

- (1) Dr. Ankum's claim that Verizon's cost studies should reflect the post-merger environment;
- (2) Dr. Ankum's charge that ICM-FL is not open and auditable;
- (3) Dr. Ankum's recommendations concerning fill factors and growth capacity;
- (4) Dr. Ankum's claims concerning the use of IDLCs and the GR 303 interface to unbundle loops;
- (5) Dr. Ankum's recommendation that a 6:1 concentration ratio be assumed for ICM-FL's modeled DLCs;
- (6) Dr. Ankum's allegation that ICM-FL's modeled drop lengths are too long;
- (7) Dr. Ankum's criticisms of ICM-FL's modeling of customer locations;
- (8) Dr. Ankum's claim that ICM-FL does not take advantage of the efficiencies of fiber facilities;

- 1 (9) Dr. Ankum's allegations concerning DLC placement costs;
- 2 (10) Dr. Ankum's allegations concerning Verizon's cost study for
- 3 unbundled DS-1 loops;
- 4 (11) Dr. Ankum's claim that Verizon should file a cost study for EELs;
- 5 (12) Dr. Ankum's claim that the GTD-5 is not a forward-looking switch;
- 6 (13) Dr. Ankum's recommendations concerning the switch pricing used
- 7 to model switch costs; and,
- 8 (14) Dr. Ankum's claim that feature costs are not usage-sensitive and
- 9 should be recovered on a flat-rate basis.

10

11 With respect to issue (1), I also respond to Mr. Fischer's claim that the

12 common cost factor used by Verizon in this proceeding should reflect the

13 savings anticipated from the merger between Bell Atlantic and GTE.

14

15 Finally, in discussing many of these issues below, I report the cost

16 estimates produced by ICM-FL if the modifications consistent with Dr.

17 Ankum's recommendations are made. I report these results only to

18 quantify the relative importance of Dr. Ankum's recommendations for the

19 Commission. The fact that the results are presented in my surrebuttal

20 testimony does not imply that I or Verizon endorse any of Dr. Ankum's

21 recommendations.

22

23

### **Merger-Related Savings**

24

25 **Q. PLEASE COMMENT ON DR. ANKUM'S CLAIM THAT VERIZON'S**



1           **COST STUDY SHOULD REFLECT THE POST-MERGER**  
2           **ENVIRONMENT.**

3       A.     Dr. Ankum makes this claim at several places in his rebuttal testimony.  
4           At page 6, he claims that Verizon Florida should be able to capitalize on  
5           the efficiencies of scale and scope afforded by the size of the largest  
6           ILEC in the country. At page 12, he enjoins the Commission to evaluate  
7           Verizon's cost studies against the "standards that applys [sic] *to Verizon*  
8           *as the nations' [sic] largest ILEC.*" At page 16 of his rebuttal testimony,  
9           Dr. Ankum states that "the old practice of protecting GTE as a smaller  
10          and more rural company is no longer appropriate."

11

12          I am not aware of any instance in which this Commission has protected  
13          GTE as "a smaller and more rural company." Additionally, the number of  
14          wire centers and lines served by Verizon in Florida has not changed as a  
15          result of the merger, nor have the local markets in which Verizon  
16          purchases labor. At least with respect to local operations, there have  
17          been no increased economies of scope and scale.

18

19       **Q.     IS IT REASONABLE TO EXPECT THAT THE SAVINGS FROM THE**  
20       **MERGER COULD BE IMMEDIATELY REALIZED UPON THE**  
21       **MERGER'S COMPLETION?**

22       A.     No. The savings resulting from the merger were not expected to be  
23           achieved immediately. Page 3 of Mr. Fischer's exhibit WRF-6 makes it  
24           clear that the merger savings were not expected to be realized until three  
25           years after the merger's completion. The merger transaction was not

1 closed until July, 2000.

2

3 **Q. DOES VERIZON'S COST STUDY REFLECT AN ADJUSTMENT FOR**  
4 **THE SAVINGS RESULTING FROM THE MERGER BETWEEN GTE**  
5 **AND BELL ATLANTIC?**

6 A. Yes. The expense inputs for ICM-FL reflect a downward adjustment of  
7 \$36.4 million in merger-related expense savings. This adjustment is  
8 shown in the schedule labeled Attachment I.a.5 in the "Section 5.pdf" file  
9 contained in Verizon's cost study filing. More than half of this amount is  
10 a reduction in the common costs modeled by ICM-FL -- without the  
11 adjustment for the merger savings, the fixed allocator would be almost  
12 150 basis points higher. Consequently, Mr. Fischer's claim that Verizon's  
13 common costs should be adjusted to reflect the benefits of the Bell  
14 Atlantic / GTE merger are unfounded. (Fischer Rebuttal, pp. 23-24).

15

16 **ICM-FL Is Open and Auditable**

17

18 **Q. IS DR. ANKUM CORRECT WHEN HE CLAIMS THAT ICM-FL IS NOT**  
19 **OPEN AND AUDITABLE?**

20 A. No. Dr. Ankum acknowledges that he has access to ICM-FL's code, but  
21 claims that the model is not sufficiently flexible to allow model auditing  
22 and inputting of different assumptions. (Ankum Rebuttal, p. 26) Nothing  
23 could be further from the truth. Nearly all of ICM-FL's inputs are user-  
24 adjustable, including material and placement costs, cable and DLC sizes,  
25 the ratio of installed-to-working lines, the amount of administrative fill,

1 depreciation lives, the cost of money, and the minimum and maximum  
2 average drop lengths. As I explain below, ICM-FL is sufficiently flexible to  
3 see the impact of Mr. Fischer's recommendations concerning the C. A.  
4 Turner indices. Even the size of the drop can be changed to 2 pairs as  
5 Dr. Ankum recommends in his rebuttal testimony: one need only  
6 populate the input for the cost of a 5-pair drop with the corresponding 2-  
7 pair drop cost and run the model with the 5-pair option selected. (I report  
8 the results of this exercise below, in my discussion of Dr. Ankum's  
9 recommendations for drop costs.) In short, Dr. Ankum's claim that it is  
10 not possible to vary the inputs and compare the outcomes of various  
11 scenarios is simply not true.

12

13 **Q. SHORT OF MODIFYING THE CODE, IS IT POSSIBLE TO VARY**  
14 **EVERY INPUT AND ASSUMPTION CONTAINED WITHIN ICM-FL?**

15 A. No. But such a standard of flexibility is substantially more stringent than  
16 AT&T and MCI have advocated in the past. For example, in a previous  
17 UNE proceeding in Washington, AT&T/MCI witness Mercer implied that  
18 AT&T's Hatfield Model was superior because it had "many tens of  
19 thousands of inputs" even though there were only around 660 inputs  
20 "specifically present[ed] for users to vary". (Docket Nos. WUTC-960369, -  
21 370, -371, *Hearing Transcripts* (July, 1997) at p. 371). Contrary to Dr.  
22 Ankum's apparent view, not every underlying input or assumption in a  
23 model needs to be user-adjustable in order for AT&T and MCI to support  
24 its use.

25

1 **Q. IS DR. ANKUM'S COMPLAINT THAT ICM-FL IS NOT SPREADSHEET**  
2 **BASED LEGITIMATE?**

3 A. No. ICM-FL is a code-based model written in Delphi Pascal, which is a  
4 commercially available development environment for Windows-based  
5 Pascal applications. It may be true that Dr. Ankum does not have the  
6 ability or expertise to modify ICM-FL's code, but this does not mean that  
7 none of the employees or consultants of AT&T, MCI or other members of  
8 the ALEC Coalition do not. The code has been made available in both  
9 PDF and text file form, and the skills and other resources needed to  
10 modify it are easily obtained on the open market.

11

12 More to the point, Dr. Ankum's complaint about ICM-FL's code-based  
13 platform is belied by AT&T's own actions. The model sponsored by  
14 BellSouth in this proceeding has a mixed code- and spreadsheet-based  
15 platform, utilizing C++, Visual Basic, and Excel. While AT&T has voiced  
16 some concerns about BellSouth's model, it is my understanding that they  
17 have not complained about the code-based portions of the model  
18 specifically on the grounds that they are code-based. Similarly, AT&T  
19 and MCI WorldCom have sponsored a modified version of the FCC's  
20 federal universal service cost model (HCPM or Synthesis Model) in UNE  
21 proceedings in Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania. This is significant  
22 because AT&T has modified the coding in the loop portion of the model --  
23 a portion that has a code-based platform utilizing Turbo Pascal --  
24 allegedly to make the model UNE compliant. (Turbo Pascal is an  
25 outdated Pascal development environment that is no longer commercially

1 available in the United States. The manufacturer, Borland, recommends  
2 Delphi Pascal for Windows applications.) The fact that a model's platform  
3 is code-based certainly has not prevented some members of the ALEC  
4 Coalition from advocating its use when it suited their purposes.

5

6 **Q. ARE THERE CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS EMBEDDED IN ICM-FL'S**  
7 **CODE THAT DEAL WITH CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES AS DR. ANKUM**  
8 **CLAIMS?**

9 A. No. I have participated in TELRIC proceedings since the fall of 1996. In  
10 my opinion, the controversial issues have been limited largely to the  
11 following topics:

- 12 (1) modeling of customer locations;  
13 (2) assumptions regarding fill factors;  
14 (3) inputs dealing with depreciation and the cost of money;  
15 (4) inputs dealing with placement and material costs; and  
16 (5) network design assumptions.

17

18 I discuss issues (1) and (2) below and show that, with one exception, the  
19 assumptions are not embedded in ICM-FL's code. The inputs at issue in  
20 items (3) and (4) are easily adjustable in ICM-FL. With respect to item  
21 (5), the disagreement generally focuses on the assumed level of structure  
22 sharing, the DLC configuration modeled in a UNE environment, and on  
23 the switching technology used. The level of structure sharing in ICM-FL  
24 is determined by user inputs changed via the run time options screen,  
25 and is not embedded in ICM-FL's code. Similarly, the DLC and switching

1 technology inputs are not embedded in ICM-FL's code. Dr. Ankum will no  
2 doubt disagree with me on what a list of controversial issues should  
3 include. I note, however, that in response to Verizon's interrogatories, the  
4 ALEC Coalition declined to identify any issues beyond those mentioned in  
5 Dr. Ankum's testimony and did not characterize any as "controversial."

6  
7 **Dr. Ankum's Fill Factor Recommendations**  
8 **Should Not Be Adopted**

9  
10 **Q. SHOULD THE COMMISSION ACCEPT DR. ANKUM'S**  
11 **RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING FILL FACTORS?**

12 **A.** No. As I noted earlier, Dr. Ankum's recommended fills are very high -- he  
13 would have this Commission base costs on a network operating close to  
14 capacity. More important, Dr. Ankum seems to labor under the incorrect  
15 assumption that ICM-FL contains hidden calculations that rely on the fills  
16 for distribution, feeder, drops, COTs, RTs, channel units and conduit to  
17 size telecommunications plant and calculate costs. He seems to not  
18 understand that, for example, the distribution fills reported by ICM are  
19 results and not inputs. (The distribution and feeder fills reported by ICM-  
20 FL are calculated as described in Verizon's response to Staff Data  
21 Request 75; this response was provided at the time Verizon's cost study  
22 was filed.) The only fill factor input that ICM-FL's loop module relies upon  
23 is an administrative fill input of 0.98, which allows 2 percent fill for  
24 administrative spare. Additionally, the development of the DLC material  
25 inputs for line cards is based on provision for 4.76 percent administrative

1 spare. Both of these fill factors can be changed, either directly via the run  
2 time options screen or by modifying the per-line inputs for DLCs in ICM-  
3 FL's material inputs table. Finally, entrance cables are sized based on an  
4 assumed fill of 50 percent. While this assumption is embedded in ICM-  
5 FL's code, it is possible to change it by modifying the material inputs  
6 table.

7

8 **Q. HAVE AT&T AND MCI SPONSORED A MODEL THAT PRODUCES**  
9 **FILL FACTORS THAT ARE MUCH DIFFERENT THAN THOSE**  
10 **RECOMMENDED BY DR. ANKUM?**

11 A. Yes, but not in this proceeding. In other states, and in Florida Docket  
12 Number 980696-TP, AT&T and MCI have sponsored the HAI Model (also  
13 known as the Hatfield Model). The HAI Model sizes cable based on  
14 cable-sizing inputs that range from a low of 50 percent to a high of 75  
15 percent for distribution cable, and from 65 to 80 percent for copper feeder  
16 cable. The model sizes cable by dividing the required demand by the  
17 sizing input, and then modeling the cost of the next largest cable size.  
18 The resulting effective fill factors are about two-thirds of the cable sizing  
19 input. For example, if the sizing input were 75 percent, and a cable to  
20 serve 39 customers were needed, a 100-pair cable would be chosen and  
21 the resulting fill would be 39 percent. Since the maximum cable sizing  
22 factor used in the HAI Model is 80 percent, it is clear that Dr. Ankum's  
23 recommended fill factors -- at least for distribution and copper feeder  
24 cables -- are substantially higher than those espoused by AT&T and MCI  
25 in other proceedings. Indeed, in Verizon's Massachusetts UNE

1 proceeding (Case Number DTE 01-20 (Part A)), AT&T witness John  
2 Donovan testified that the HAI Model produced an average effective of fill  
3 of 48.3 percent for Verizon's Massachusetts network. (Direct Testimony  
4 of John C. Donovan, May 1, 2001, p. 20.)  
5

6 **Q. HOW DOES ICM-FL SIZE THE LOCAL OSP NETWORK?**

7 A. Besides the administrative fill input I just mentioned, ICM relies on two  
8 inputs that can be changed via the run time options screen. These inputs  
9 are called the engineering factors for distribution and feeder, and can be  
10 thought of as the ratio of installed to working lines. In Verizon's filing,  
11 they take the values of 2.16 and 1.011, respectively. (The derivation of  
12 these factors can be found in the files "DISTFACT.xls" and "ENGFEEDER  
13 FACTOR.xls" on the CD-ROM containing Verizon's cost study.)  
14 Suppose, for example, that 40 working lines are needed for a given  
15 distribution cable. ICM-FL will determine that 86.4 ( $40 \times 2.16$ ) pairs are  
16 needed, and install the next largest size cable, a 100-pair cable. Since  
17  $86.4/100$  is less than the administrative fill input of 0.98, no cable-size  
18 adjustment for administrative spare is needed. (If 98, 99, or 100 pairs  
19 were needed, the next largest size cable would be used.) Copper feeder  
20 cables are sized in the same way, with the feeder engineering factor  
21 being used instead. The feeder engineering factor is also used to  
22 determine the size of the DLC modeled by ICM-FL. For example, if a  
23 given DLC serves 80 working lines, ICM-FL determines that the DLC  
24 must be big enough to accommodate 80.88 lines and installs the next  
25 largest size -- in this case, a 96-line DLC. The administrative fill input of



1 0.98 is not used in sizing the DLCs.

2

3 **Q. DO THE ENGINEERING FACTORS FOR DISTRIBUTION AND FEEDER**  
4 **PLANT REFLECT THE NEED TO ACCOMMODATE FUTURE**  
5 **DEMAND?**

6 A. Yes. ICM-FL's distribution engineering factor is based on an assumption  
7 of placing 2.36 pairs per lot, which is consistent with Verizon's guideline  
8 of 2.0 to 2.5 pairs per lot. The feeder engineering factor is based on the  
9 forecasted growth in access lines over a 4-year period -- the factor  
10 reflects one-half of this growth to correspond to the midpoint of this  
11 period.

12

13 **Q. IS DR. ANKUM CORRECT WHEN HE SAYS, AT PAGE 36 OF HIS**  
14 **REBUTTAL TESTIMONY, THAT CURRENT USERS SHOULD NOT**  
15 **PAY FOR CAPACITY INSTALLED TO SERVE FUTURE DEMAND?**

16 A. No. Dr. Ankum's argument suffers from a major fallacy -- it overlooks the  
17 fact that growth in customer demand is an ongoing process. Existing  
18 customers benefit from the prior provision of spare capacity since it  
19 enables Verizon to meet demand as it occurs in a cost-effective manner.  
20 Consider the consequences of excluding the cost of spare capacity from  
21 the rates charged current customers, whether they are ALECs or end-  
22 users. For simplicity, assume that there were no other costs to be  
23 recovered other than the TELRIC (or the TSLRIC in the case of end-  
24 users) so that setting rates equal to direct cost ensures that the total cost  
25 of the network is recovered. If the rates charged today's customers do

1 not reflect the costs of today's spare capacity, then these costs either will  
2 not be recovered or will be recovered by future customers. However, the  
3 latter outcome would only be possible if the rates charged to a customer  
4 were based on the date the customer subscribed to the network -- in  
5 other words, if temporal deaveraging was used to set rates. Such a  
6 pricing scheme is obviously infeasible and must be rejected.

7

8 **Q. HAVE OTHER AT&T WITNESSES TESTIFIED ON PROVIDING**  
9 **CAPACITY FOR FUTURE DEMAND?**

10 A. Yes. In Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy  
11 Case Number DTE 01-20 (Part A), Dr. Robert A. Mercer testified on  
12 behalf of AT&T. On cross examination, Dr. Mercer was asked if the  
13 Department should consider the cost of serving tomorrow's demand and  
14 answered as follows:

15 Any answer that I give -- and I will give -- I'll predicate with the  
16 fact that this has been an intense argument among  
17 economists on both sides of this issue. You know, the  
18 extreme in one direction says any growth that you build into  
19 the model essentially leads to what -- you're more an  
20 economist than I am -- an intergenerational transfer, in the  
21 sense that if you size the network to have any excess growth,  
22 you're essentially saying today's ratepayers, in the way these  
23 UNE rates are set -- today's ratepayers are going to be paying  
24 for customers that are going to be served tomorrow by that  
25 excess capacity.

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The other extreme says, but from an engineering point of view I also understand that I can't go out and rebuild -- you know, I can't string two pairs on the poles every time I want to serve, you know, another two lines.

If you now look -- to go back to something Mr. Donovan was saying about riser cable. If you look at any reasonable percentage of, say, literally broken pairs, it's typically very small. Churn is typically a few percent. So when we're achieving a 48.4 percent fill, most of that, you're saying -- Let me not use that number, because that happens because of modularity. If I start even at 75 percent, I only needed a few percent to account for churn and for literally broken pairs. What's the rest of it? The rest is that the compromised position that we finally arrived at in the model was there had to be some amount provided for growth, because it was hard to explain why an engineer would go out and put in a bigger-than-necessary cable but a cost model should not.

*So the model, even at the 75 percent sizing factor, the model has in it in fact a fair amount of capacity for growth, because otherwise you would be at more like what you asked a moment ago about objective fill, you would be at a level more like 85 or 90 percent, in order to ensure that the rates right*

1                    *now were only paying for the demand that was serving the*  
2                    *loops that are out there today.*  
3                    (Case No. DTE 01-20 (Part A), *Hearing Transcripts* (February  
4                    5, 2002) at pp. 3045-3047; [*emphasis added*])  
5

6                    Even though Verizon and AT&T disagreed on the appropriate level of  
7                    spare capacity in Massachusetts, AT&T's witnesses acknowledge that it  
8                    is appropriate for a cost model to reflect the need to build capacity today  
9                    to serve tomorrow's demand. It is unclear to me how this position is  
10                    invalidated simply because the ALEC Coalition did not sponsor a model in  
11                    the current proceeding.  
12

13                    **Q.    IS IT POSSIBLE TO ESTIMATE HOW MUCH OF THE 2-WIRE LOOP**  
14                    **TELRIC IS DUE TO ICM-FL'S PROVISION FOR FUTURE DEMAND?**

15                    A.    Yes. All one has to do is set the two engineering inputs I described  
16                    above equal to one. Doing so produces the following results for the 2-  
17                    wire loop TELRIC and the modeled fills for distribution and feeder plant:  
18

	<b>2-Wire Loop</b>	<b>Dist Fill</b>	<b>Feeder Fill</b>	
19				
20	<b>Factors=1:</b>	\$21.33	73.54%	94.55%
21				
22	<b>Filed:</b>	\$22.94	38.28%	93.59%
23				
24	<b>Change:</b>	(\$ 1.61)	35.26%	0.96%
25				

1 Note that even though the distribution fill nearly doubles, the cost per  
2 loop decreases by only 7 percent. The reason for this is that the  
3 accommodation for growth comes mainly through selection of larger  
4 copper cables -- the placement costs remain virtually unchanged  
5 between the two runs. Note also that setting these two inputs to one  
6 means distribution plant will be designed to accommodate only the  
7 existing number of working lines and that no provision for growth in  
8 the feeder network is provided for -- something no network engineer  
9 would ever do. Even if the filed inputs were deemed to be too high,  
10 any reasonable alternatives would still need to be greater than one,  
11 so that the changes shown above would necessarily be smaller.  
12 Indeed, on cross examination in the same Massachusetts UNE  
13 proceeding cited above, AT&T witness John C. Donovan testified that  
14 1.6 to 2.0 pairs per living unit is the minimum design standard.  
15 (Case No. DTE (Part A), *Hearing Transcripts* (February 5, 2002) at p.  
16 2868).

17

18 **Q. DOES DR. ANKUM'S RECOMMENDATION THAT THE COST OF**  
19 **COPPER FEEDER CABLES BE BASED ON A 90 PERCENT FILL**  
20 **MAKE SENSE?**

21 **A.** No. Dr. Ankum's recommendation is based on his unsupported assertion  
22 that copper feeder will not be reinforced, and that fiber facilities will be  
23 used instead. While it is true that a combination of fiber plus DLCs will  
24 replace copper feeder cables in some instances, it is too broad an  
25 assertion to say that it will happen everywhere in all cases. In any event,

1 copper feeder facilities will still be needed to connect customers to the  
2 DLCs -- it is only the feeder routes between the DLCs and central office  
3 that are replaced with fiber, not *every* copper feeder facility. This is an  
4 important distinction because this is the network modeled by ICM-FL.  
5 The routes from the DLCs to the central office are assumed to be all fiber,  
6 and only the copper subfeeder needed to connect the distribution plant to  
7 the DLCs, or customers not served by DLCs to the central office, is  
8 modeled.

9

10 **Q. SHOULD THE COMMISSION ADOPT DR. ANKUM'S**  
11 **RECOMMENDATION THAT ONLY 2-PAIR DROPS BE MODELED FOR**  
12 **INDIVIDUAL RESIDENCE AND BUSINESS UNITS?**

13 A. No. Dr. Ankum offers no support for this recommendation other than his  
14 incorrect claim that the drop is a very expensive portion of the loop in  
15 ICM-FL. Verizon destandardized 2-pair drops in 1997 -- see the file  
16 "3wr\_drp3.PDF" on the ICM-FL CD. ICM-FL's use of a 3-pair drop  
17 instead of a 2-pair drop reflects Verizon's actual operating practice and  
18 recognizes that many customers have more than one line. Once a  
19 subscriber orders a second line, use of a 2-pair drop means that a second  
20 drop must be placed if one of the pairs fails, or if a third line is ordered.  
21 Moreover, based on the cost differential between a 2-pair and 3-pair drop  
22 that existed in 1997, use of a 2-pair drop decreases the 2-wire loop  
23 TELRIC by only 4 cents. This minimal change reflects the fact that the  
24 drop placement costs do not change if a 2-pair drop is used. The small  
25 change also supports the use of a 3-pair drop since doing so reduces the

1 likelihood of incurring the additional placement cost of installing a second  
2 drop at a customer's premises.

3

4 **Q. DOES DR. ANKUM'S RECOMMENDATION THAT THE FILL FACTOR**  
5 **FOR THE 2-PAIR (OR 3-PAIR) DROPS BE SET NO LOWER THAN**  
6 **THE FILLS APPROVED FOR COPPER DISTRIBUTION MAKE SENSE?**

7 A. No. Consider a 50-pair distribution cable that is serving 30 residential  
8 customers who have ordered only one line each. The fill on the  
9 distribution cable is obviously 60 percent (30/50), and the fill on each 2-  
10 pair drop can only be 50 percent. Suppose further that half of the 30  
11 customers order a second line. The fill on the distribution cable increases  
12 to 90 percent (45/50), while the average fill on the drops is only 75  
13 percent (45/(2x30)). This example illustrates a basic confusion underlying  
14 Dr. Ankum's fill factor recommendations. ICM-FL does not use fill-factor  
15 assumptions for individual components of the network to develop their  
16 costs so that they can be summed to develop the cost of the loop.  
17 Instead, ICM-FL sizes cables as I described earlier and chooses the  
18 required network components based on the discrete sizes available. This  
19 is the same approach followed by the HAI Model, by BCPM and by  
20 Sprint's and BellSouth's current models. This approach to modeling the  
21 network ensures that the individual network components "fit together" and  
22 generates the fill factors underlying the network, whether they are  
23 reported or not, in a consistent fashion.

24

25

1 Use of IDLCs In ICM-FL

2

3 Q. IS IT POSSIBLE TO UNBUNDLE LOOPS USING INTEGRATED DLCS  
4 WITHOUT CONVERTING FROM DIGITAL TO ANALOG AND  
5 TERMINATING THE UNBUNDLED LOOP AT THE MAIN  
6 DISTRIBUTION FRAME?

7 A. It is only possible in a hypothetical sense. Telcordia's *Notes on the*  
8 *Network* (October, 2000) describes four general approaches. In the first  
9 approach, a separate GR-303 Interface Group is used for each ALEC  
10 customer. This arrangement requires the unbundled loops to be handed  
11 off to the ALEC at a DS-1 level of service. In discussing this approach,  
12 Telcordia notes:

13

14 This arrangement may be cost effective for those CLECs  
15 having a "critical mass" of subscribers served by the RDT or  
16 group of RDTs in a CEV. Since the GR-303 Interface Group  
17 supports operations functionality, there are a variety of  
18 issues (provisioning, alarm reporting, sharing of test  
19 resources, etc.) that are currently being addressed by the  
20 industry.

21 (*Notes on the Network*, p. 12-55)

22

23 The issues inherent with multi-carrier operation noted by Telcordia are not  
24 trivial. They cannot be solved with only Operating Support System (OSS)  
25 or process changes. New and as yet undefined functional capabilities



1 must be developed by both switch and DLC suppliers. Even if the ALEC  
2 is willing to allow Verizon to administer the RT, Verizon would have to  
3 connect its OSS to the ALEC switch, and maintain the ALEC circuit  
4 assignment data, in order to control the assignment of circuits in and  
5 through the ALEC switch. The ALEC would still need to control its switch,  
6 which means that a single switch would be driven by two separate and  
7 different OSS infrastructures. Moreover, the multi-carrier operation  
8 envisioned by this approach presents a set of security problems that  
9 would not otherwise exist, since the assignment and control information  
10 for the RT would flow through each connected switch. No switch or RT  
11 functionality currently exists to prevent one switch operator from  
12 interacting with other Verizon and ALEC loops provisioned in the same  
13 RT, whether this interaction is accidental or deliberate.

14  
15 The second approach is a variation of the first, and involves using a TR-  
16 08 Interface Group for the ALEC traffic and a GR-303 interface for the  
17 ILEC traffic. However, the TR-08 interface only allows concentration in  
18 Mode II, in which 48 channels per DS-1 are provisioned. (*Notes on the*  
19 *Network*, p. 12-28). This produces a 2:1 concentration ratio, far less than  
20 Dr. Ankum's 6:1 recommended benchmark. Additionally, this  
21 arrangement requires that a group of 96 RT channels (or multiples of 96  
22 channels) be dedicated to the ALEC, no matter how many loops are  
23 unbundled from a single RT. This is a different service than an  
24 unbundled loop, which is "a transmission facility between a distribution  
25 frame, or its equivalent, in an incumbent LEC central office, and the

1 network interface device at the customer premises.” (First Report and  
2 Order, ¶ 380). Finally, because this arrangement still involves delivering  
3 traffic to the ALEC at the DS-1 level, the “critical mass” issue noted above  
4 still applies and must be resolved at each RT site, not at a wire center  
5 level.

6  
7 The third method described by Telcordia contemplates an entire RT being  
8 leased by the ALEC. (*Notes on the Network*, p. 12-57). Because ICM-FL  
9 sizes DLCs based on the entire demand at each DLC location, this option  
10 would necessarily increase the number of modeled DLCs and the  
11 reported costs, even if IDLCs were assumed. In addition, the modeled fill  
12 on the DLCs would decrease. Finally, the leasing of an entire RT is again  
13 a different service than provisioning an unbundled loop.

14  
15 Lastly, Telcordia suggests that it is hypothetically feasible to share a GR-  
16 303 Interface Group and use the sidedoor port of the switch to transport  
17 ALEC traffic out of the ILEC switch. Under this arrangement, the ALEC  
18 circuits are provisioned as non-switched / non-locally switched circuits  
19 within the IDLC. Unless the ALEC is fully utilizing the DS-1 leaving the  
20 sidedoor port, a digital cross-connect will be needed to hand off the  
21 unbundled loops at a voice grade level. In discussing this option,  
22 Telcordia observed the following:

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24 The ILEC must address the following issues associated with  
25 the sidedoor port arrangement:

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- A. The cost of a DS1 switch termination for a sidedoor port is about ten times the cost for a DS1 line card on a RDT.
  - B. Since each CLEC circuit requires a nailed up DS0, the ILEC may encounter blocking over the IDLC system as other circuits compete for DS0 channels.
  - C. The number of sidedoor ports that can be engineered varies depending on the LDS supplier.
  - D. There is limited support in existing special services design systems and databases to support sidedoor port circuits.
  - E. The ILEC may need field visits to install special service D4 channel units at the RDT.
- (Notes on the Network, p. 12-56. Note that "LDS" stands for the Local Digital Switching system.)

**Q. FOR THE PURPOSE OF MODELING THE TELRIC OF AN UNBUNDLED LOOP SERVED BY A DLC, SHOULD AN INTEGRATED OR UNIVERSAL CONFIGURATION BE ASSUMED?**

A. This question must really be answered in the context of what technology is commercially available today. As noted above, there are numerous issues to be resolved before such an integrated capability can be realized, including issues dealing with the desired configuration, software requirements, central office and RT surveillance and security capabilities, traffic engineering, and trouble/fault identification. Regardless of what is

1 hypothetically feasible, the question of what DLC architecture a cost  
2 model should assume is dominated by the fact that no switch or NGDLC  
3 vendors have commercially offered products with the functionality  
4 required to support a multi-carrier operation of a GR-303 interface.  
5 Because TELRIC must be based on equipment and technology that is  
6 commercially available today, a universal DLC configuration is the correct  
7 assumption to make when modeling the TELRIC of an unbundled loop.

8  
9 **Q. IS IT POSSIBLE TO MODIFY ICM-FL TO UTILIZE INTEGRATED DLCS**  
10 **IN ESTIMATING COSTS?**

11 A. Yes. If the "Retail" option is selected in the run time options screen, ICM-  
12 FL will model a network configured with IDLCs. The only thing else that  
13 needs to be done is to develop expense inputs that are consistent with  
14 this network configuration and that exclude the avoided retail costs. If this  
15 is done, the TELRIC for the 2-wire loop falls by \$1.39 to \$21.55 per  
16 month. All of the hypothetical solutions described above and three of the  
17 four solutions discussed in the MCI WorldCom paper (Ankum Exhibit  
18 AHA-8) require that at least an entire DS-1 be delivered to the ALEC.  
19 Again, this is a different service than an unbundled loop. (The fourth  
20 solution in the MCI WorldCom paper involves "hairpinning" the circuit  
21 through the sidedoor port as described earlier. The paper readily  
22 acknowledges that this is not an efficient arrangement since it  
23 unnecessarily and quickly consumes switch resources). This requires an  
24 increase in the number of DS-1s for each DLC, unless the ALEC  
25 unbundles customers in groups of 24 from *each* of the relevant DLCs. As

1 I noted earlier, this is an outcome whose likelihood decreases with the  
2 size of the DLC and with increases in the number of ALECs. Surrebuttal  
3 Exhibit DGT-2 provides an example of the phenomenon.

4  
5 In this exhibit, I have assumed that three carriers are competing for  
6 customers in Verizon's network, under two market share scenarios. One  
7 of the carriers is Verizon, although it doesn't matter which of the three it  
8 is. For purposes of this example, requirements for channels needed for  
9 maintenance, alarms, etc., are ignored, and it is assumed that each DLC  
10 is 100 percent utilized. Scenario 1 assumes that the three carriers all  
11 have an equal chance of providing service to a given end-user. Scenario  
12 2 assumes a more lop-sided distribution. The section at the bottom of  
13 page one of the exhibit shows the number of DS-1 circuits that would be  
14 required under two concentration ratios, based on the number of DLCs  
15 modeled by ICM-FL. Under both concentration ratios, the number of DS-  
16 1s increases -- with more competing carriers the increase would of course  
17 be greater. Consequently, even if loops could be unbundled from an  
18 IDLC, the resulting decrease in the 2-wire TELRIC would be less than the  
19 \$1.39 discussed above.

20

21 **Dr. Ankum's Recommended 6:1 Concentration Ratio**

22 **Should Not Be Adopted**

23

24 **Q. WHAT CONCENTRATION RATIO IS ASSUMED IN ICM-FL?**

25 **A. The DLC inputs used by ICM-FL are a based on a 4:1 concentration ratio.**

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**Q. SHOULD THE COMMISSION ADOPT DR. ANKUM'S RECOMMENDATION FOR A 6:1 CONCENTRATION RATIO?**

A. No. As discussed above, Dr. Ankum's fabricated example at page 52 of his rebuttal testimony is based on the incorrect assumption that the cost of the DLC remains the same even though the number of end-users served increases. Consequently, the decreases in the cost per voice grade channel (or DS-0) shown in Dr. Ankum's table are misleading. Moreover, moving from a 4:1 to a 6:1 concentration ratio has no impact on the number of DS-1 links required for 192-line DLCs and smaller. (See Surrebuttal Exhibit DGT-3.) Finally, in recommending a 6:1 concentration ratio, Dr. Ankum has given no consideration to the resulting increase in the blocking probability.

**Q. IS IT POSSIBLE TO MODIFY ICM-FL'S DLC INPUTS TO REFLECT A 6:1 CONCENTRATION RATIO?**

A. Yes. The only investment that is affected is in the DSX-1 panel and the associated cards. In the universal configuration underlying Verizon's filed costs, there is no change in the investment or in the resulting 2-wire loop TELRIC. If a 6:1 concentration ratio is used with the inputs for the integrated arrangement in the run I just described, the resulting 2-wire loop TELRIC is \$21.54, a decrease of only one cent. Thus, the difference between the 4:1 and 6:1 concentration ratio is substantially smaller than Dr. Ankum would have this Commission believe.

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**ICM-FL's Drop Lengths**

**Q. SHOULD THE COMMISSION ACCEPT DR. ANKUM'S RECOMMENDATION FOR MODELED DROP LENGTHS?**

A. No. Dr. Ankum's recommended drop lengths are unsupported by his testimony, or by any other portion of the record in this proceeding. Moreover, his recommendation to specify a drop length for each deaveraged zone does not make sense. In order to determine the composition of the zones, one must know the loop costs for each wire center. This cannot be done without first determining the modeled drop length. As I explain below, ICM-FL determines the average drop length based on the characteristics of the individual demand point, or grid. This means that grids which have similar density characteristics will have similar average drop lengths, regardless of the zone their particular wire center is ultimately assigned to.

**Q. HOW DOES ICM-FL MODEL THE DROP LENGTH FOR A GIVEN DEMAND POINT OR GRID?**

A. The average drop length is determined by the number of business and residential units in each grid and by an assumed grid area of 2.7 million square feet. (As noted in the response to Staff Interrogatory 141, Set Six, this assumed grid area is less than the average grid area in ICM-FL, so that using the assumed area results in shorter drop lengths.) The number of business and residential units is determined by dividing the business

1 and residence lines by the number of lines per unit. The number of lines  
2 per unit for businesses and residences are user-adjustable inputs that are  
3 specified via ICM-FL's run time options screen. Dividing the grid area by  
4 the total number of units produces the average size lot for the grid,  
5 including streets, sidewalks, shoulders, and right-of-way areas. ICM-FL  
6 assumes that the lot is square and calculates the average drop length for  
7 the grid as the distance from the center to the corner. This approach  
8 recognizes both front and back placement of drops and accounts for the  
9 fact that many drops must cross the street to reach the distribution cable.  
10 Because the calculations just described can result in unusually long or  
11 short drop lengths in sparsely or densely populated grids, ICM-FL allows  
12 the user to specify maximum and minimum values for the modeled  
13 average drop length.

14  
15 **Q. DOES ICM-FL REPORT THE AVERAGE MODELED DROP LENGTH?**

16 A. No, but it is possible to extract the records corresponding to the populated  
17 demand points or grids to an Excel file and calculate the average drop  
18 length modeled by ICM-FL. Based on the inputs filed in Verizon's cost  
19 study, the average modeled drop length is 102.7 feet. Because one drop  
20 can serve more than one line, the average is only 73.3 feet per line.

21  
22 **Q. HOW DO THE MODELED DROP LENGTHS COMPARE TO DR.  
23 ANKUM'S RECOMMENDED LENGTHS FOR EACH ZONE?**

24 A. ICM-FL models drops that are longer than Dr. Ankum's unsupported  
25 recommendation, as shown in the table below:



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	<u>Zone 1</u>	<u>Zone 2</u>	<u>Zone 3</u>	<u>Overall</u>
<b>Filed:</b>	81.8	129.0	259.0	102.7
<b>Dr. Ankum:</b>	75.0	100.0	150.0	85.5

**Q. IS IT POSSIBLE TO FORCE THE AVERAGE DROP LENGTHS IN EACH ZONE TO EQUAL THE VALUES RECOMMENDED BY DR. ANKUM?**

A. No. However, one can lower the values for minimum and maximum average drop length and decrease the average length of the modeled drop in each zone. The average modeled drop length is not particularly sensitive to reductions in the minimum average drop length -- setting it to 10 only reduces the average Zone 1 drop length to 81.2 feet, and does not change the average for the other two zones. If the input for the maximum average drop length is decreased to 165, the following average drop lengths are obtained:

	<u>Zone 1</u>	<u>Zone 2</u>	<u>Zone 3</u>	<u>Overall</u>
	79.2	109.6	149.5	91.5

As is shown above, setting the maximum average drop length to 165, forces the average drop lengths for each zone close to Dr. Ankum's unsupported recommendations. Overall, the average modeled drop length decreases by 11 percent.

1 Q. WHAT IMPACT DOES THIS INPUT CHANGE HAVE ON THE  
2 AVERAGE TELRIC FOR THE 2-WIRE LOOP?

3 A. The results by zone and overall are shown in the table below:

4

	<u>Zone 1</u>	<u>Zone 2</u>	<u>Zone 3</u>	<u>Overall</u>
5 <b>Filed:</b>	\$18.94	\$27.68	\$74.16	\$22.94
6 <b>Max=165:</b>	\$18.92	\$27.47	\$72.86	\$22.84
7 <b>Decrease:</b>	(\$ 0.01)	(\$ 0.20)	(\$ 1.31)	(\$ 0.10)

8

9  
10 Thus, moving ICM-FL's average modeled drop lengths substantially  
11 towards Dr. Ankum's recommendation has very little impact on the  
12 resulting cost estimates. As I explained earlier, drop costs are not a very  
13 expensive part of the loop in ICM-FL -- an 11 percent decrease in length  
14 results in a less than one-half of one percent decrease in the 2-wire loop  
15 TELRIC.

16

#### 17 ICM-FL's Modeling of Customer Locations

18

19 Q. HOW DOES ICM-FL MODEL CUSTOMER LOCATIONS?

20 A. As I explained at page 22 of my direct testimony, ICM-FL utilizes a very  
21 small grid area, called a demand point, along with information on road  
22 feet, and estimates of access lines by census blocks obtained from PNR  
23 Associates. The line count estimates for each census block are assigned  
24 to each demand point based on its share of the road feet in the census  
25 block. The road feet measure corresponds to the types of roads along

1 which residential or business development would normally occur, and  
2 from which customers would have access to their premises. The  
3 measure excludes interstate highways, limited access roads, bridges,  
4 tunnels, access ramps, and motorcycle trails because these are not roads  
5 along which customers typically are located. Alleys and driveways are  
6 also excluded because including them would overstate the amount of  
7 road feet along which telephone plant is placed. The demand units are  
8 assigned to each wire center based on Verizon's tariffed exchange  
9 boundaries. The resulting totals for each wire center are trued up to  
10 Verizon's actual line counts by wire center so that the sums of the  
11 residential and business line counts for the demand units in a wire center  
12 equal the actual totals for that wire center.

13

14 **Q. DOES ICM-FL ASSUME THAT CUSTOMERS ARE EQUALLY**  
15 **DISTRIBUTED THROUGHOUT EACH GRID AS DR. ANKUM CLAIMS?**

16 A. No. ICM-FL uses the lines and road feet for each grid to model the cost  
17 of the copper distribution plant needed to serve the customers based on  
18 the user inputs in the FLtempl.db table. The total amount of copper and  
19 fiber feeder in a wire center is constrained by the amount of road feet in  
20 the wire center. Again, the road feet measure only includes those roads  
21 along which residential or business development would normally occur.

22

23 **Q. IS GEOCODING OF CUSTOMER LOCATIONS THE PANACEA THAT**  
24 **DR. ANKUM SUGGESTS IT IS?**

25 A. No. One of the major problems with geocoding is that it is a very

1 expensive undertaking, so much so that the geocoded locations  
2 underlying Dr. Ankum's HAI benchmark have not been updated even  
3 though they are based on a 1997 address list from Metromail.  
4 Additionally, the success rate associated with geocoding is substantially  
5 less than 100 percent. For Florida, the HAI Model's success rate ranges  
6 from 34 to 85 percent depending on the density zone. For the two most  
7 dense zones, the success rate is 50 percent or less. For the state overall,  
8 the average success rate is only 70 percent. This average reflects a low  
9 of 55 percent for BellSouth, and a high of 79 percent for Verizon.

10

11 **Q. WHY IS THE GEOCODING SUCCESS RATE A SOURCE OF**  
12 **CONCERN?**

13 A. A geocoding success rate of less than 100 percent forces the model  
14 developers to manufacture surrogate geocoded locations for the  
15 residential and business customers who were not successfully geocoded.  
16 The HAI Model developers have used two methods to manufacture these  
17 surrogate locations. At one time, they assumed that the surrogate  
18 locations would be uniformly distributed along census block boundaries.  
19 They now assume that the surrogate locations will be uniformly  
20 distributed along the roads within a census block.

21

22 Both of these solutions present their own problems. By distributing the  
23 manufactured locations along census block boundaries, the model  
24 developers are placing customers where roads may or may not exist  
25 since such census blocks are often bordered by political boundaries,

1 rivers or railroad tracks. The more recent device of placing the surrogate  
2 locations uniformly along the road network will result in customers being  
3 “located” between existing houses and business locations. Also, one  
4 source of geocoding failure is the inability to assign latitudes and  
5 longitudes to addresses consisting of a post office box or a rural route --  
6 the surrogate locations for these subscribers will line up with the actual  
7 locations only by chance. Consequently, it is almost a certainty that Dr.  
8 Ankum’s HAI standard is building plant to locations where no customers  
9 exist, the very charge he has leveled against ICM-FL. Clearly, failure to  
10 geocode customer locations with sufficient accuracy can lead to suspect  
11 and inferior results.

12

13 **Q. IS THERE ANY OTHER REASON WHY USE OF GEOCODED DATA**  
14 **MIGHT PRODUCE INFERIOR RESULTS?**

15 A. Yes. Use of geocoded data -- even with a 100 percent success rate --  
16 adds little to a model if the detail is thrown away before the modeled  
17 network is built. This is what Dr. Ankum’s HAI benchmark does. The  
18 basic unit of analysis in the HAI Model is the “cluster” which is a  
19 rectangular area in which the customer locations are effectively assumed  
20 to be evenly distributed. The cluster is the most granular level of location  
21 information for which the HAI Model designs outside plant. In  
22 Massachusetts, the HAI Model utilized less than 4,700 clusters to design  
23 a network supporting nearly 4.5 million lines. In Florida, the HAI Model  
24 uses less than 2,100 clusters to model Verizon’s network. By  
25 comparison, ICM-FL utilizes more than 23,000 of the demand points I

1 described above to design a network supporting almost 2.5 million lines.

2

3 **Q. IS IT POSSIBLE TO USE GEOCODED DATA IN ICM-FL?**

4 A. Yes. Assuming that one had a database containing the geocoded  
5 location for each of Verizon's Florida customers, it would be possible to  
6 map those locations to the 1/200<sup>th</sup> by 1/200<sup>th</sup> of a degree grid structure  
7 used by ICM-FL. While this is not an easy task, it is clear the ICM-FL's  
8 customer location assumptions are not embedded in the model's code.

9

10 **Q. HAS BELLSOUTH PROVIDED A MODEL OF THEIR NETWORK THAT**  
11 **RELIES ON GEOCODED INFORMATION?**

12 A. Yes, they have. With respect to the granularity issue, BellSouth's model  
13 is superior to the HAI Model, since it does not condense the geocoded  
14 locations into clusters before modeling the network. However, this  
15 feature comes at a cost since it takes more than 10 hours to do a  
16 complete run of the BellSouth model. By comparison, ICM-FL will finish a  
17 complete run in about 11 minutes on my desktop. Additionally, like all  
18 models based on geocoded data, I am sure that BellSouth's success rate  
19 is not 100 percent, so that some device to create surrogate locations  
20 must be employed.

21

22 **The Efficiencies of Fiber Facilities**

23

24 **Q. DOES ICM-FL FAIL TO REFLECT THE EFFICIENCIES OF FIBER**  
25 **FACILITIES AS DR. ANKUM CLAIMS AT PAGE 59?**

1 A. No. Dr. Ankum bases his erroneous claim on the argument that (1)  
2 remote terminals (i.e., DLCs) should be placed closer to the customer; (2)  
3 ICM-FL's use of secondary SAIs increases the amount of copper used;  
4 and (3) that ICM-FL always assumes that some portion of the feeder is  
5 copper even if the DLC is fiber-based. As I explained earlier, Dr. Ankum's  
6 position that DLCs should be forced further into the network is at odds  
7 with his complaint that ICM-FL models DLCs that are too small and  
8 underutilized, and with his criticism of Verizon's unbundled DS-1 study.  
9 Likewise, I have already explained that ICM-FL's use of secondary SAIs  
10 *decreases* the use of copper.

11  
12 It is true that ICM-FL assumes the use of copper feeder, even though all  
13 of the modeled DLCs are fiber based. The copper feeder routes modeled  
14 by ICM-FL are the facilities between the distribution plant and the DLCs,  
15 or between customers not served by DLCs and the central office. All of  
16 the feeder connecting the DLCs to the wire center is fiber. Dr. Ankum's  
17 position on this issue implies that the Commission should base rates on  
18 the costs associated with a fantasy network: in order to overcome Dr.  
19 Ankum's objection, ICM-FL would have to place a DLC at the first SAI  
20 that is modeled as one moves from the end user towards the central  
21 office. This is the only way that the copper subfeeder could be  
22 eliminated. Such a network would bear no resemblance to the network  
23 from which Verizon provisions UNEs in Florida.

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**DLC Placement Costs**

**Q. HAS DR. ANKUM CORRECTLY CHARACTERIZED VERIZON'S TESTIMONY IN MASSACHUSETTS CONCERNING THE COST OF DLC PLACEMENT WITHIN BUILDINGS?**

A. No. While he has correctly copied the quote from the Massachusetts proceeding at page 60 of his rebuttal testimony, he has not provided the Commission with a complete picture of the discussion in which the statement was made. The Verizon testimony he cites was rebutting Dr. Ankum's claim that the Massachusetts study made a different assumption than Verizon's New York study, and had therefore *erred* by placing DLCs within a building:

Third, Dr. Ankum states "In New York, VZ did not advocate this design. In fact, in New York there were many instances where the RT for large buildings was placed outside of the building."

The statement is erroneous. Dedicated RTs is the design employed in NY for large buildings. This fact is clearly documented in the record of the recent New York UNE proceeding. In light of the clear record in the New York proceeding, Verizon MA does not understand the basis for Dr. Ankum's assertion that "there were many instances where RT's for large buildings were placed outside of the



1 building.” Perhaps he has confused the use of CEVs or  
2 similar underground enclosures to house RT’s in some  
3 metropolitan installations with the situation of serving a large  
4 building. Such underground structures are used in  
5 metropolitan areas as substitutes for the common above  
6 ground cabinets typically used in suburban areas. In either  
7 case, the RT is serving an extended distribution area not a  
8 single building. An RT outside in a CEV to serve a large  
9 building would only be employed in the very rare  
10 circumstance that the building owner would not supply space  
11 within the building. The reason is simple economics. An  
12 underground structure in a metropolitan environment could  
13 cost \$100K or more. Space within buildings is usually less  
14 expensive.

15  
16 Fourth, Dr. Ankum alleges: “It is wasteful to incur the  
17 expense of an RT with ample spare to serve other  
18 customers, but to limit the use of this RT artificially to just  
19 one set of customers.”

20  
21 Dr. Ankum offers no support for this assertion. The RTs  
22 placed in a building are efficiently designed and sized to the  
23 application, not with ample spare. Efficient engineering  
24 decisions should be based on the relative economics of the  
25 available alternatives. The use of a dedicated RT to serve a

1 large building is more economic generally than the practical  
2 alternatives which are typically either copper cable or copper  
3 extension from a remote RT. The economics of fiber versus  
4 copper always favor extending the RT as close to the  
5 customer as possible as long as two conditions can be met:  
6 that a site for the RT can be obtained at reasonable cost and  
7 that the fill of the system exceeds a threshold level. Both  
8 conditions are met in the large building situation. Locating  
9 RT's within a building involves minimum site cost and the line  
10 size threshold used in the study insures that reasonable fill is  
11 achieved.

12 (Case Number D.T.E. 01-20, *Surrebuttal Testimony of*  
13 *Verizon-MA Panel* at pp 56-57.)  
14

15 It is clear from the above that the comparison being made is between  
16 locating a DLC in a building and locating it in an underground, controlled  
17 environment vault (CEV). As I explain below, ICM-FL assumes that its  
18 DLCs are either pole-mounted or are placed on concrete pads. There is  
19 no evidence to suggest that placing a DLC in a building is cheaper than  
20 either of these options.

21

22 **Q. DOES ICM-FL MODEL DLC PLACEMENT COSTS AS IF THEY WERE**  
23 **LOCATED IN BUILDING?**

24 A. No. ICM-FL has no mechanism for deciding if a given DLC is located in a  
25 building. However, in lodging this complaint against ICM-FL, Dr. Ankum

1 proposes a standard that no model that I am aware of in Florida has ever  
2 met. This includes BCPM, BellSouth's and Sprint's current models, as  
3 well as the HAI Model. Moreover, Dr. Ankum's complaint is one-sided at  
4 best. None of these models, including ICM-FL, models the cost of placing  
5 DLCs underground in a CEV. Use of CEVs occurs in the real network  
6 because of congestion or because of local zoning ordinances. The  
7 placement costs associated with CEVs exceed the DLC placement costs  
8 modeled by ICM-FL. Thus, Dr. Ankum would have the Commission  
9 reduce the costs modeled by ICM-FL to reflect the allegedly lower costs  
10 of placing DLCs in a building, but is content to ignore the higher costs of  
11 CEV placement.

12

13 **Q. HOW DOES ICM-FL MODEL THE PLACEMENT COSTS OF DLCS?**

14 A. For DLCs that are 448 lines and smaller, ICM-FL assumes that the DLC  
15 is pole mounted. For larger DLCs, ICM-FL assumes the DLCs are placed  
16 outside on a concrete pad -- this is the same assumption that the HAI  
17 Model makes for all of its modeled DLCs. If the DLC is placed in a  
18 building, not all of the placement costs will be eliminated, since installing  
19 the DLC in a building will require the assembly of individual racks and  
20 shelves. If the modeled placement costs for the large DLCs are reduced  
21 by eliminating the portion associated with securing an easement, and by  
22 reducing the site preparation costs by 50 percent, the TELRIC for the 2-  
23 wire loop decreases by 9 cents to \$22.85 per month. So, even if Dr.  
24 Ankum's claimed cost savings do exist, the overall impact on the TELRIC  
25 is very small.

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**Verizon's Costs for Unbundled DS-1 Loops**

**Q. HOW WERE THE TELRICS FOR UNBUNDLED DS-1 LOOPS DEVELOPED?**

A. Verizon's unbundled DS-1 TELRICS are based on the weighted average of provisioning such circuits over metallic and fiber facilities. The costs of provisioning DS-1s via metallic facilities are based on the 4-wire loop costs modeled by ICM-FL for each wire center, plus the cost of the circuit equipment needed to create the DS-1 circuit. The costs of provisioning DS-1s via a fiber facility are based on the cost of three fiber systems: (1) an OC3 system equipped for 28 DS-1s, (2) an OC3 system equipped for 84 DS-1s, and (3) an OC12 system equipped for 336 DS-1s. The costs of the fiber facilities for the fiber systems are based on the average loop length modeled by ICM-FL for business loops in each Florida wire center.

Referring to Dr. Ankum's exhibit AHA-10 -- which only portrays results for a single wire center -- the fill factors used for each of the four provisioning methods are shown in Column C. The fiber system and facility costs in Column A are divided by the corresponding number of DS-1s to obtain a capacity cost per DS-1 assuming 100 percent utilization. These costs are divided by the fill factor in Column C to obtain a cost per provisioned DS-1. The costs per provisioned DS-1 are averaged based on the weightings in Column E to arrive at an average cost per provisioned DS-1 for each wire center. The statewide average cost across all wire centers is

1           \$210.83 per DS-1 per month.

2

3   **Q.   HOW ARE THE FILL FACTORS AND WEIGHTING DISCUSSED**  
4   **ABOVE DEVELOPED?**

5   A.   The 100 percent fill factor for the metallic facility is used to account for the  
6       fact that the costs already reflect ICM-FL's modeled utilization, and the  
7       33.3 percent fill factors for the fiber facilities reflect the use of 4 fibers out  
8       of a 12-fiber sheath. The fills for the three fiber systems are based on the  
9       actual number of provisioned circuits divided by the system capacity on a  
10      statewide basis. The weightings shown in Column E are based on the  
11      actual number of circuits provisioned in the state for each facility type.  
12      The weightings represent the likelihood that a given unbundled DS-1 will  
13      be provisioned via one of the four methods described above. Note that  
14      only the metallic facility and the 28 DS-1 OC3 system have a significant  
15      effect on the costs: if the other two fiber systems are eliminated, the  
16      monthly cost in Dr. Ankum's exhibit decreases by only one-tenth of one  
17      percent.

18

19   **Q.   WHERE ARE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THESE COSTS FOUND IN**  
20   **VERIZON'S COST STUDY FILING?**

21   A.   They are found in the "FLHICapWtg.xls" and "FL Fiber Loops.xls"  
22       spreadsheets on the CD-ROM that contained Verizon's cost study filing.  
23       The latter file is used to model the fiber terminal and facility costs shown  
24       in Column A of Dr. Ankum's exhibit. The facility costs vary by wire center  
25       and are based on the average modeled loop length for business lines as

1 explained above. The spreadsheet must be “run” for each wire center by  
2 entering the wire center number in cell K3 in the tab labeled INVRPTS.  
3 (The wire center number is simply the sequence number for each CLLI  
4 found in Column A of the tab labeled FL Nodes. It is nothing more than  
5 an integer ranging from 1 to 90.) The resulting facility cost is found in cell  
6 O47 in the MRCRPTS tab. This value is copied and pasted into the  
7 “FLHICapWtg.xls” spreadsheet in column E of the tab labeled WC DATA.  
8 Column F of this tab contains the DS-1 metallic costs extracted from  
9 ICM-FL. This spreadsheet is also “run” for each wire center by entering  
10 its sequence number in cell S6 of the REPORTS tab. The resulting cost  
11 is found in cell P47 of the same tab and is copied and pasted to column G  
12 of the WC DATA tab. The statewide average is found in cell G97 of the  
13 same tab

14

15 **Q. ARE THE FILLS USED IN THE STUDY FOR THE THREE FIBER-**  
16 **BASED SYSTEMS REASONABLE?**

17 A. Yes. What Dr. Ankum fails to realize is that the fills are based on  
18 provisioning DS-1’s to specific locations in Verizon’s actual network. In  
19 order to achieve the 90 percent fill recommended by Dr. Ankum for the  
20 smallest of the three fiber systems, the average number of DS-1s  
21 provided at each location would have to be 25.2 (28 x 0.9) -- on a voice  
22 grade basis, this is more than 600 circuits. Such an assumption is simply  
23 not representative of the average demand characteristics that Verizon  
24 has experienced in provisioning DS-1s.

25

1 Q. SHOULD THE COMMISSION ACCEPT DR. ANKUM'S  
2 RECOMMENDATION TO BASE THE COSTS OF UNBUNDLED DS-1s  
3 ON A 90 PERCENT FILL FOR THE THREE FIBER SYSTEMS?

4 A. No. Once again, Dr. Ankum would have the Commission base UNE  
5 costs on a network operating nearly at capacity. As I explained above,  
6 the fills used in the study represent the utilization that Verizon has  
7 actually realized in its existing network. There is no reason to expect the  
8 level of utilization to miraculously increase to 90 percent.

9

10 Q. WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF BASING COSTS, AND ULTIMATELY  
11 RATES, ON TARGET FILLS THAT EXCEED THE ACTUAL AVERAGE  
12 FILL?

13 A. In terms of Dr. Ankum's specific recommendation, the unbundled DS-1  
14 TELRIC falls from \$210.82 to \$106.48 per month. Conceptually, basing  
15 costs and rates on a fill greater than the average fill means that total costs  
16 will not be recovered. This is illustrated by the example shown in  
17 Surrebuttal Exhibit DGT-4.

18

19 This example assumes a company that owns only three feeder routes  
20 from which it unbundles pairs. For purposes of this example, I have set  
21 aside the question of common costs so that we can assume that the rate  
22 per pair is set equal to the TELRIC. Section 1 of the exhibit sets out the  
23 assumptions concerning the number of installed and working pairs for  
24 each route, as well as the total cost per route and for the company as a  
25 whole. Section 2 illustrates the impact of setting the company-wide per-

1 unit cost (and rate) based on a target fill of 85 percent, greater than the  
2 averaged realized fill of 68.4 percent. Section 3 shows the same  
3 calculations based on the averaged realized fill.

4  
5 If the target fill is used to develop the per-unit cost and rate, the company  
6 will not recover its total costs. This is true for any target fill that it is  
7 greater than the average. It is clear from this example that costs must be  
8 based on an average fill level, not on an unrealistically high and  
9 unsupported level such as Dr. Ankum recommends.

10

11

#### **Cost Studies for EELS**

12

13 **Q. IS DR. ANKUM CORRECT WHEN HE CLAIMS THAT PROVISIONING**  
14 **AN EEL IS DIFFERENT THAN PROVISIONING AN UNBUNDLED**  
15 **LOOP, MULTIPLEXING AND INTEROFFICE TRANSPORT?**

16 **A.** No. As a threshold matter, I note that his example at page 69 of his  
17 rebuttal testimony does not apply to the 41 percent of loops that ICM-FL  
18 models as being directly served by the main distribution frame. To the  
19 extent that his position has any merit whatsoever, it would only apply to  
20 those loops served by a DLC. Thus, Dr. Ankum's position on EELs is the  
21 same as his position on IDLCs -- it is premised on his incorrect claim that  
22 it is possible to unbundle a loop from an IDLC using the GR 303 interface.  
23 As explained above, no commercially viable means of accomplishing this  
24 task exists.

25



1 The transport facility between the two offices in Dr. Ankum's example is a  
2 path dedicated to the voice-grade circuit corresponding to the end-user  
3 involved. If the DS-1 from the DLC serving the end-user is integrated into  
4 the trunk side of the switch, the only way to dedicated this path is to  
5 "hairpin" or "nail up" the circuit through the sidedoor port of the switch.  
6 This arrangement wastes switch resources as Telcordia and MCI  
7 WorldCom have acknowledged. If an entire DS-1 is used to establish this  
8 path, then the "loop portion" of the EEL is not an unbundled loop -- it is an  
9 entirely different service. Moreover, such arrangements will result in  
10 underutilization of DS-1s, particularly as the number of ALECs increases.

11

12 **The GTD-5 Is a Forward-Looking Technology**

13

14 **Q. IS THE GTD-5 A FORWARD-LOOKING TECHNOLOGY?**

15 A. Yes. AGCS continues to market and support the GTD-5, and Verizon  
16 continues to buy line additions and remotes. In April, 1997, BC TEL  
17 signed a \$60 million volume purchase agreement with AGCS to purchase  
18 GTD-5 Class 5 digital switching equipment and IN products. Contrary to  
19 the findings of the Texas Public Utility Commission relied upon by Dr.  
20 Ankum, ISDN is supported by the GTD-5. Finally, in May, 2000, both the  
21 Michigan Public Service Commission and the Michigan staff concluded  
22 that the GTD-5 is a forward-looking switch and should be used to  
23 estimate Verizon's switching costs. (Case No. U-11832, *Order* (May,  
24 2000) at pp. 24 and 27). Verizon has no plans to replace the GTD-5 and  
25 will provision UNEs out of a network in Florida that contains GTD-5s in 72

1 out of 90 wire centers.

2

3

### Switch Pricing

4

5 **Q. IS DR. ANKUM CORRECT THAT VERIZON HAS PROPOSED**  
6 **SWITCHING COSTS THAT ARE ONLY BASED ON THE COST OF**  
7 **ADDING TO EXISTING SWITCHES?**

8 A. No. As I explained above and in my direct testimony, the switching costs  
9 modeled by ICM-FL are based on the prices Verizon pays for initial switch  
10 placements and expansions. (Tucek Direct, p. 17). This is accomplished  
11 through use of a discount factor in the SCIS and CostMod runs that  
12 reflects the initial switch pricing, and through use of an investment  
13 adjustment factor (IAF) that reflects the pricing of additions. The files  
14 supporting the development of the discount factors were provided with  
15 Verizon's cost study, and the calculation was explained further in  
16 response to the ALEC Coalition's Interrogatory Number 23, Set 1.

17

18 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE HOW THE DISCOUNTS USED AS INPUTS TO**  
19 **SCIS AND COSTMOD WERE DEVELOPED.**

20 A. First, SCIS and CostMod were run with no discount for a set of eight  
21 model office clusters for the 5ESS, GTD-5 and DMS-100 switching  
22 technologies as shown in the table below:

23

24

25

1	Cluster	Base			
2	Size	Unit	Remote 1	Remote 2	Remote 3
3	700	700	----	----	----
4	1,700	1,700	----	----	----
5	3,400	3,400	----	----	----
6	6,300	5,000	1,300	----	----
7	10,900	8,300	2,600	----	----
8	18,500	13,300	2,600	2,600	----
9	36,200	29,200	2,333	2,333	2,333
10	90,000	60,000	3,750	<== 8 of these remotes	

11

12 For the DMS-10, SCIS was run with no discount for the first five model  
13 office clusters shown above. The usage inputs for each of these SCIS  
14 and CostMod runs were based on system-wide averages for comparably  
15 sized switches. Next, discounts were computed for each of the above  
16 configurations based on the total modeled switch costs and on the switch  
17 costs resulting from the vendor quotes and the Nortel contract for initial  
18 switch purchases. Finally, weighted averages of these discounts across  
19 the cluster sizes were calculated. These weighted averages are the  
20 discount inputs used in the subsequent SCIS and CostMod runs for each  
21 Verizon Florida wire center.

22

23 **Q. HOW WAS THE IAF INPUT CALCULATED?**

24 A. ICM-FL's IAF input is calculated for each of the base unit line sizes shown  
25 above. Line and trunk growth for each base unit is calculated over a six-

1 year timeframe, using Florida-specific growth rates, and are priced as  
2 additions to existing switches. The IAF input for each base-unit and line-  
3 size combination is calculated as the present value of the purchase cost  
4 of the initial switch plus the additions, divided by the initial switch cost.  
5 Algebraically, the factor's calculation can be expressed as:

6

$$\frac{\text{Initial Switch Cost} + \text{PV}(\text{Cost of Line Additions})}{\text{Initial Switch Cost}}$$

7  
8  
9

10  
11 The outputs of SCIS and CostMod, which only reflect the initial switch  
12 pricing, are multiplied by this factor to produce a blended switch cost that  
13 reflects the pricing for both initial switch purchases and for line additions.  
14 The numerator represents ICM-FL's view of the total material cost of the  
15 switch using the initial switch pricing and the cost of additions.

16  
17 **Q. HOW DOES THE CALCULATION OF THE IAF INPUT COMPARE TO**  
18 **THE CALCULATION PROPOSED BY DR. ANKUM?**

19 A. ICM-FL's IAF input is very similar to Dr. Ankum's proposal. At page 87 of  
20 his rebuttal testimony, Dr. Ankum proposes the following formula:

21

$$\frac{\text{PV}(\text{cutover price} \times \# \text{ of cutover lines}) + \text{PV}(\text{growth price} \times \# \text{ growth lines})}{\text{Sum of Cutover and Growth Lines}}$$

22  
23  
24  
25

1 The formula offered by Dr. Ankum produces a cost per line that, if  
2 multiplied by the sum of the cutover and growth lines, produces Dr.  
3 Ankum's view of total switch costs. In other words, the numerator of his  
4 formula represents the total material cost of the switch using cutover and  
5 growth pricing. Because Dr. Ankum's "cutover price" and "growth price"  
6 are just different terms for "initial switch pricing" and the "cost of  
7 additions", the numerators of both formulas are conceptually equivalent:  
8 they represent ICM-FL's and Dr. Ankum's view of what a switch costs  
9 based on a mix of cutover and growth pricing. As explained below, ICM-  
10 FL's IAF input produces a lower estimate of switching costs than does Dr.  
11 Ankum's formula.

12

13 **Q. WHY DOES ICM-FL'S IAF INPUT PRODUCE A LOWER RESULT**  
14 **THAN DR. ANKUM'S FORMULA?**

15 A. There are two reasons. First, it is clear that the first term of each  
16 numerator is identical -- the present value of "the cutover price x the  
17 number of cutover lines" is nothing more than the initial switch price. The  
18 expressions differ in the second term, since Dr. Ankum proposes  
19 calculating the present value of the additions over the entire life of the  
20 switch. As explained above, the IAF input only reflects additions over a  
21 six-year timeframe. If the analysis were extended over the entire life of  
22 the switch (18 years in Dr. Ankum's view, but only 10 years according to  
23 Verizon witness Allen Sovereign), the factor would necessarily be higher  
24 as would the switching costs modeled by ICM-FL.

25

1 Second, the cost of the additions used in the development of the IAF  
2 input does not include *all* of the additional vendor equipment that would  
3 be needed over the life of the switch. The development of the IAF input  
4 excludes such items as additional host/remote links, software and  
5 processor upgrades, or additional network paths. Including these items  
6 over the life of the switch would again result in a higher IAF input and  
7 higher modeled switching costs.

8

9 **Q. ON A PER-LINE BASIS, DOES ICM-FL MODEL HIGHER SWITCH**  
10 **COSTS FOR THE GTD-5 THAN IT DOES FOR THE 5ESS AND**  
11 **NORTEL SWITCHES?**

12 A. The answer to this question is confidential, and is contained in  
13 confidential Surrebuttal Exhibit DGT-5.

14

15

#### **Feature Costs**

16

17 **Q. IS DR. ANKUM CORRECT THAT MOST OF THE COSTS OF**  
18 **FEATURES ARE NON-TRAFFIC SENSITIVE?**

19 A. No. Feature costs arise from three sources: (1) the right-to-use fees for  
20 specific feature packages; (2) special hardware, such as conference  
21 circuits, that some features require; and (3) the processor time utilized by  
22 feature activation. Additionally, it is physically impossible for every port to  
23 have access to every switch feature. For example, only a port that  
24 corresponds to a Centrex customer can access Centrex features, and  
25 only ISDN lines can access ISDN features. Consequently, Verizon's

1 feature costs will depend both on the number and types of features that  
2 end-users subscribe to. If access to all features is sold to ALECs on a  
3 flat-rate basis, then from their perspective the features have been priced  
4 at zero on the margin. It is reasonable to assume that ALECs purchasing  
5 such ports will offer the features at low or zero cost to end users in order  
6 to differentiate their services. The success of the ALECs' marketing  
7 efforts will consequently determine the actual demand on the switch  
8 processor resulting from feature usage -- if it increases enough, it may  
9 well be that a larger processor must be installed or that multiple switches  
10 will have to be placed. To claim that feature costs are mostly non-traffic  
11 sensitive ignores the costs arising from specialized hardware and from  
12 processor usage, as well as the impact of ALEC pricing to their own end  
13 users, on the demand placed on Verizon's switch resources.

14

15 **Q. DO THE PORT AND MOU COSTS ESTIMATED BY ICM-FL INCLUDE**  
16 **THE COSTS OF FEATURES?**

17 **A.** No. If the Commission orders that these costs be recovered in the port or  
18 per-MOU rates, or in some combination of the two, it will be necessary to  
19 modify the inputs to ICM-FL to include these costs in the port and MOU  
20 TELRICs.

21

22 **MR. FISCHER'S REBUTTAL TESTIMONY**

23

24 **Q. WHAT PORTIONS OF MR. FISCHER'S REBUTTAL TESTIMONY**  
25 **DOES YOUR SURREBUTTAL ADDRESS?**

1 A. This portion of my surrebuttal addresses Mr. Fischer's recommendations  
2 concerning ICM-FL's modeling of operating expenses, including his  
3 concerns with Verizon's use of the C. A. Turner indices and with ICM-FL's  
4 calibration option. I also respond to his assertion that Verizon's common  
5 cost allocator should be within a few percentage points of BellSouth's  
6 allocator.

7

8 **Q. IS MR. FISCHER CORRECT THAT THE OPERATING EXPENSES IN**  
9 **THE NUMERATOR OF ICM-FL'S EXPENSE-TO-INVESTMENT RATIOS**  
10 **ARE NOT FORWARD LOOKING?**

11 A. No. The expenses have been made forward-looking through the  
12 adjustments that Mr. Fischer listed in his rebuttal testimony: the  
13 normalization entries for certain non-recurring items, removal of expenses  
14 related to non-forward-looking technology, removal of avoided retail costs  
15 and removal of costs that are identified and modeled through other cost  
16 studies. (Fischer Rebuttal, p. 18). Additionally, as I discussed above, the  
17 modeled expenses have been made forward-looking through a downward  
18 adjustment to reflect yet-to-be-realized merger savings. Finally, as I  
19 explain below, the numerators of the expense-to-investment ratios have  
20 also been made forward-looking through the use of the C. A. Turner  
21 indices to express the cost of the general support assets (the 21xx plant  
22 accounts) on a reproduction cost basis.

23

24 Mr. Fischer's allegation that ICM-FL does not model forward-looking  
25 operating expenses centers on his disagreement with Verizon's use of the



1 C. A. Turner indices, and on his claim that operating expenses should be  
2 determined through a bottoms-up determination of operating expenses.  
3 With respect to the latter claim, Mr. Fischer is espousing a standard that  
4 AT&T and MCI WorldCom have failed to embrace in Florida and  
5 elsewhere. Both of these companies have sponsored the HAI Model in  
6 numerous proceedings. This model, though flawed in many respects,  
7 adopted a similar "tops-down" approach to modeling operating expenses.  
8 Indeed, every model that I am aware of, including those filed before this  
9 Commission, has employed a similar approach.

10

11 **Q. IS VERIZON'S USE OF 2000 ARMIS DATA AS THE STARTING POINT**  
12 **FOR MODELING OPERATING EXPENSES APPROPRIATE?**

13 A. Yes. As I explained above in my discussion of Dr. Ankum's rebuttal  
14 testimony, if the objective is to estimate the forward-looking costs that  
15 Verizon will incur in unbundling its network, then the modeled network  
16 must have some basis in reality. The same is true for operating  
17 expenses. The 2000 ARMIS data used as a starting point were  
18 generated by the activities and resources needed to operate and maintain  
19 the network from which Verizon's UNEs are provisioned. There is no  
20 better starting point from which to model Verizon's operating expenses.

21

22 **Q. WHY DOES VERIZON BASE THE CARRYING COSTS OF THE**  
23 **GENERAL SUPPORT ASSETS (THE 21XX ACCOUNTS) ON THE**  
24 **REPRODUCTION COST OF THESE ASSETS?**

25 A. Unlike the number of poles or the amount of cable in the network, there is

1 no direct way to model the quantity of these assets needed to support the  
2 network. It would be inappropriate to model the level of assets required  
3 on the basis of their historical cost. For example, account 2124 (General  
4 Purpose Computers) has a historical cost of \$91.3 million. The  
5 reproduction cost of these assets, based on application of the C. A.  
6 Turner indices by vintage year, is \$52.7 million. Likewise, account 2121  
7 (Buildings) has a historical cost of \$229.0 million and a reproduction cost  
8 of \$397.3 million. Clearly, the reproduction cost is closer to the forward-  
9 looking cost of completely new assets than is the historical cost. Given  
10 that it is not possible to model the required physical quantity of such  
11 assets in the same way that one models the number of poles, etc., use of  
12 the reproduction cost is the best possible approach to modeling the costs  
13 associated with these assets.

14

15 **Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF ICM-FL'S "CALIBRATION" OPTION?**

16 A. When the user selects the calibration option, ICM-FL adjusts the  
17 denominators of the expense-to-investment ratios so that they match the  
18 modeled investment for three broad categories of plant: switching, circuit  
19 equipment, and outside plant. The calibration option ensures that the  
20 investments in the expense-to-investment ratios are consistent with the  
21 modeled investments to which they will be applied. Even with this  
22 adjustment, the total amount of expenses modeled by ICM-FL falls short  
23 of the sum of the expenses in the ratios' numerators by \$11.8 million. If  
24 the option is not used, then the shortfall increases to \$79.1 million.

25

1 Q. IS IT POSSIBLE TO “TURN OFF” THE C. A. TURNER AND  
2 CALIBRATION ADJUSTMENTS IN ICM-FL AS MR. FISCHER  
3 RECOMMENDS AT PAGES 20 AND 22 OF HIS REBUTTAL  
4 TESTIMONY?

5 A. Yes. The option to select or not select the calibration adjustment is made  
6 via ICM-FL’s run-time options screen for expenses. The C. A. Turner  
7 adjustment can easily be “turned off” by modifying the inputs found in the  
8 FLGTEEXP.db table. Specifically, the “Adjust 1” value needs to be set  
9 equal to one for each of the 2xxx accounts.

10

11 Q. WHAT IS THE RESULT OF THESE CHANGES?

12 A. The TELRIC for the two-wire loop decreases by 71 cents to \$22.23 per  
13 month. Additionally, the total direct costs modeled by ICM-FL decrease  
14 by \$18.2 million, total common costs decrease by \$2.5 million, and the  
15 shortfall between modeled expenses and the sum of the numerators in  
16 the expense-to-investment ratios equals \$59.9 million. Recognizing these  
17 changes, including an adjustment for the \$59.9 million shortfall, results in  
18 an increase in the fixed allocator from 14.09 to 19.89 percent. Surrebuttal  
19 Exhibit DGT-6 summarizes the calculation of the shortfall in modeled  
20 expenses, the change in direct and common costs, and the impact on the  
21 fixed allocator. The net impact on the average 2-wire loop UNE rate is an  
22 increase of 48 cents, to \$26.65 per month.

23

24 Q. IS MR. FISCHER’S ASSERTION THAT THE COMMON COST  
25 ALLOCATORS FOR VERIZON AND BELLSOUTH BE WITHIN A FEW

1           **PERCENTAGE POINTS OF EACH OTHER WARRANTED?**

2    A.    No. Mr. Fischer makes this assertion at page 25 of his rebuttal testimony  
3           and supports it only with an appeal to “any measure of reasonableness.”  
4           Mr. Fischer’s assertion rests on the incorrect assumption that Verizon and  
5           BellSouth have modeled expenses and common costs in the same way.  
6           A review of BellSouth’s testimony and cost study shows that the two  
7           companies have not adopted the same approach. For example, costs  
8           that BellSouth identifies as shared are modeled with specific “shared cost  
9           factors” -- ICM-FL has no separate set of factors for shared costs, but  
10          relies instead on the assignment of costs to cost pools based on  
11          accounting detail at the work center and six-digit account level. More  
12          important, large categories of costs that are identified as common by  
13          Verizon are treated differently by BellSouth. For example, more than 35  
14          percent of the carrying costs of the general support assets are treated as  
15          common by Verizon -- these costs make up nearly 30 percent of  
16          Verizon’s total common costs. BellSouth does not assign any of these  
17          costs to the common category. Presumably, they are either directly  
18          assigned to the UNEs or attributed via BellSouth’s shared cost factors.  
19          The different treatment of these costs by the two studies serves to  
20          increase Verizon’s fixed allocator in two ways. First, the treatment of  
21          these costs increases the allocator by making the numerator larger in the  
22          ratio of common to direct costs. Second, the allocator is increased  
23          because these costs are excluded from the ratio’s denominator.

24  
25

1 Q. DO THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO COMPANIES' COST  
2 STUDIES MEAN THAT ONE IS SUPERIOR TO THE OTHER?

3 A. No. What it does mean is that Mr. Fischer's casual assertion that  
4 Verizon's and BellSouth's common cost allocators should be within a few  
5 percentage points of each other is unwarranted and should be  
6 disregarded by the Commission. Because the two companies adopted  
7 different methodologies with respect to identifying common costs, it is  
8 clear that nothing can be learned from comparing the resulting common  
9 cost allocators.

10

11

#### SUMMARY

12

13 Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR SURREBUTAL TESTIMONY AS IT  
14 RELATES TO DR. ANKUM'S TESTIMONY OVERALL.

15 A. Dr. Ankum's testimony and recommendations start from the false premise  
16 that TELRIC estimates must be based on a hypothetical fantasy network.  
17 In adopting this view, Dr. Ankum shows that he is not concerned with the  
18 characteristics of the real network or with the costs that Verizon will incur  
19 in provisioning UNEs. This is contrary to the Commission's view (in  
20 980696-TP) that "there needs to remain a basis in reality if the costs  
21 developed for the network are to have any relevance to the cost of basic  
22 local telephone service." Contrary to Dr. Ankum's testimony, ICM-FL  
23 does not produce unreasonably high UNE rates. In fact, modeled sheath  
24 feet and investment are substantially below the actual sheath feet and the  
25 reproduction cost of Verizon's existing Florida network. As I explained

1 above and in my direct testimony, ICM-FL assumes economies of scope  
2 and scale that will never be realized and consequently produces cost  
3 estimates that must be viewed as a lower bound on the forward-looking  
4 incremental costs of provisioning UNEs to new entrants.

5  
6 Dr. Ankum's rebuttal testimony also contains several unsupported  
7 statements and inconsistencies. For example, Dr. Ankum's  
8 recommendation for conduit fill simply appears in his exhibit AHA-6, and  
9 he makes the unsupported claim that the drop is a very expensive portion  
10 of the loop in ICM-FL. Additionally, Dr. Ankum recommends a 6:1  
11 concentration ratio and also complains about the fiber-system fill factors  
12 underlying Verizon's unbundled DS-1 study. At the same time, he  
13 advocates the position that remote terminals should be pushed further  
14 into the network -- something that will lower both the average  
15 concentration ratio and the realized fills on fiber systems. Likewise, Dr.  
16 Ankum recommends that switch costs be modeled as if Verizon replaced  
17 the GTD-5 in 72 out of 90 wire centers in Florida. At the same time, he  
18 insists that switch costs be heavily weighted towards initial switch prices,  
19 and that the FCC's longer depreciation lives be used for digital switches.  
20 These positions are inconsistent since, if all of the GTD-5 switches were  
21 replaced, it is likely that the modeled prices for initial switches could not  
22 be obtained from Verizon's other switch vendors. Moreover, even if an  
23 efficient and rational carrier would replace all of its existing switches with  
24 the most current technology, the required depreciation life for digital  
25 switches would be much shorter than the 10 years sponsored by Mr.

1 Sovereign in his direct testimony.

2

3 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR SURREBUTAL TESTIMONY AS IT**  
4 **RELATES TO DR. ANKUM'S SPECIFIC CLAIMS AND**  
5 **RECOMMENDATIONS.**

6 A. Dr. Ankum's claim that Verizon's cost study should reflect the post-  
7 merger environment is deficient in several respects. First, Dr. Ankum fails  
8 to realize that all of the anticipated merger savings were not realized on  
9 day one of the merger, and were not expected to be fully realized until  
10 three years after the close of the merger transaction. Second, he fails to  
11 recognize that the number of customers and wire centers served by  
12 Verizon in Florida have not changed as a result of the merger. Likewise,  
13 there has been no change in the local markets in which Verizon Florida  
14 purchases labor. In short, there have been no increased economies of  
15 scope and scale with respect to these aspects of Verizon's Florida  
16 network. Finally, Dr. Ankum completely overlooks the fact that Verizon's  
17 cost study contains a downward adjustment in operating expenses to  
18 reflect the anticipated merger savings. Because of these deficiencies in  
19 Dr. Ankum's testimony, the Commission should ignore his  
20 recommendations on this topic.

21

22 Dr. Ankum also wrongly claims that ICM-FL is not open and auditable.  
23 He acknowledges that he has access to the model's code, but claims that  
24 the model is not sufficiently flexible to allow model auditing and inputting  
25 of different assumptions. This is simply not true -- nearly every input to

1 ICM-FL, including the DLC locations, is user-adjustable. Additionally, Dr.  
2 Ankum's complaint that ICM-FL is not spreadsheet-based is belied by  
3 AT&T's and MCI's own actions. Not only have they not levied this  
4 complaint against BellSouth's model in this proceeding, they have relied  
5 on the FCC's Synthesis Model to advocate their positions in other states.  
6 Specifically, AT&T and MCI are currently sponsoring a modified version of  
7 the Synthesis Model in UNE proceedings in Virginia, Maryland, and  
8 Pennsylvania. In doing so, they have modified the loop portion of the  
9 Synthesis Model, which has a code-based platform utilizing Turbo Pascal.  
10 Clearly, even though Dr. Ankum may not have the expertise or ability to  
11 modify ICM-FL's code, other employees and consultants employed by  
12 AT&T and MCI can.

13

14 Dr. Ankum has made numerous recommendations concerning fill factors  
15 and has claimed that TELRIC estimates should not reflect the cost of  
16 capacity needed to serve future demand. In making his fill factor  
17 recommendations, Dr. Ankum would have the Commission set rates  
18 based on the cost of a network that is severed from reality and operating  
19 at near capacity. Additionally, his recommended fill for distribution plant  
20 is higher than the fill produced by the HAI Model that has been sponsored  
21 by AT&T and MCI in many states, including Florida. Moreover, Dr.  
22 Ankum's position concerning the cost of capacity for future growth is at  
23 odds with the position of AT&T witnesses in Massachusetts, and ignores  
24 the fact that today's customers benefit from the provision of spare  
25 capacity. More to the point, it begs the question of how these costs



1 should be recovered if they are excluded from the rates established in this  
2 proceeding. The answer is that they will not be recovered unless rates  
3 are based on the point in time that a subscriber or an ALEC connects to  
4 the network. Dr. Ankum's fill factor recommendations and his testimony  
5 concerning capacity for future demand should be disregarded by the  
6 Commission.

7  
8 Dr. Ankum has claimed that the costs of an unbundled loop should be  
9 based on an IDLC using the GR 303 interface instead of the UDLC  
10 configuration assumed by ICM-FL. In making this claim, he has ignored  
11 the fact that no switch or NGDLC vendors have commercially offered  
12 products with the functionality required to support a multi-carrier operation  
13 of a GR-303 interface. Except for the so-called "hairpinning" solution, all  
14 of the hypothetical means of unbundling a loop from an IDLC require that  
15 one or more DS-1s be dedicated to each ALEC from each DLC from  
16 which they unbundle loops. Not only does this increase the number of  
17 DS-1 links required, such an arrangement constitutes a different service  
18 than an unbundled loop. Both Telcordia and MCI WorldCom have  
19 acknowledged that "hairpinning" is wasteful of the ILEC switching  
20 resources. The TELRIC of unbundled loops should be based on the  
21 UDLC configuration assumed in Verizon's cost study filing.

22  
23 The Commission should disregard Dr. Ankum's recommendation that a  
24 6:1 concentration ratio be assumed when developing DLC costs. For one  
25 thing, the fabricated example underlying Dr. Ankum's argument wrongly

1 assumes that total DLC costs will remain constant even though the  
2 number of lines served increases. Moreover, increasing the  
3 concentration ratio to 6:1 only impacts the costs of the DSX-1 panel and  
4 associated cards in ICM-FL's IDLC inputs. Compared to the 4:1  
5 concentration ratio assumed by ICM-FL, the 2-wire loop TELRIC  
6 decreases by only one cent, assuming that IDLCs are used.

7

8 Dr. Ankum's drop length recommendations are supported only by the  
9 statement that his recommended lengths "reflect that drops tend to be  
10 shorter in densely populated urban areas, where one might find more  
11 apartment complexes and town houses, than in suburban and rural  
12 areas." This statement, while true, says nothing about the specific  
13 lengths Dr. Ankum proposes the Commission adopt. Moreover, reducing  
14 ICM-FL's input for the maximum average drop length to 165 feet  
15 produces average drop lengths close to Dr. Ankum's proposal and only  
16 reduces the average 2-wire TELRIC by a dime. The Commission should  
17 ignore Dr. Ankum's drop-length recommendation because it is  
18 unsupported and because the impact on the estimated costs is not  
19 significant.

20

21 Dr. Ankum's criticism of ICM-FL's modeling of customer locations is  
22 based on his incorrect assertion that ICM-FL assumes that "customers  
23 are equally distributed throughout a fixed arbitrary grid," and that this  
24 "results in excessive amounts of plant being modeled and plant being  
25 placed to locations where no customers exist." As I explained above, this

1 is simply not true. Further, the HAI benchmark that Dr. Ankum points to  
2 in support of geocoding is itself seriously flawed. In addition to being  
3 expensive to implement, geocoding is not the panacea Dr. Ankum  
4 purports it to be because failure to locate 100 percent of the customers  
5 inevitably requires the use of surrogate locations. Finally, unless the  
6 geocoded information is discarded before the modeled network is  
7 designed, geocoding will substantially increase the time associated with a  
8 model run. ICM-FL models customer locations correctly and Dr. Ankum's  
9 testimony to the contrary should be disregarded by the Commission.

10

11 Dr. Ankum's claim that ICM-FL does not take advantage of the  
12 efficiencies of fiber facilities should be disregarded by the Commission  
13 because it is not true. ICM-FL assumes that all DLCs are connected to  
14 the central office via fiber feeder routes. The only copper feeder modeled  
15 by ICM-FL is the subfeeder needed to connect distribution plant to the  
16 DLCs or, in the case of customers not served by DLCs, to the switch.  
17 Further, ICM-FL efficiently uses fiber because all of the modeled fiber  
18 routes -- including the interoffice fiber routes -- share the same sheath to  
19 the fullest extent possible. Finally, Dr. Ankum's complaint should be  
20 ignored because his objection could only be overcome by placing a DLC  
21 at the first SAI modeled as one moves from the end user towards the  
22 office. While this would eliminate all copper feeder in ICM-FL, the  
23 resulting network would bear no resemblance to the network from which  
24 Verizon provisions UNEs.

25

1 Dr. Ankum's complaint that ICM-FL does not model the placing of DLCs  
2 within buildings should be ignored because it is based on a  
3 mischaracterization of Verizon's Massachusetts testimony, and because it  
4 fails to consider that the higher cost of CEV placements is not modeled,  
5 even though CEVs occur in the real network. Further, Dr. Ankum is  
6 espousing a standard not met by any model that has been filed in Florida,  
7 including models sponsored by AT&T.

8  
9 Dr. Ankum's criticism of Verizon's unbundled DS-1 study centers on his  
10 disagreement with the fill factors used in developing the costs of the fiber-  
11 based systems. His recommendation that a 90 percent fill implies that the  
12 average site served by the smallest modeled fiber system would require  
13 more than 25 DS-1 circuits, or 600 voice-grade equivalents. Basing  
14 costs, and rates, on a fill that exceeds the actual realized fills upon which  
15 Verizon's cost study is based means that total costs will not be recovered.  
16 Accordingly, Dr. Ankum's unsupported recommendation should be  
17 rejected.

18  
19 Dr. Ankum's position on EELs has no merit whatsoever with respect to  
20 the 41 percent of loops that ICM-FL models as being directly served by  
21 the main distribution frame. With respect to the remaining loops, his  
22 argument relies on the ability to unbundle loops from an IDLC, and should  
23 therefore be rejected for that reason alone. Moreover, all of the  
24 hypothetical arrangements for delivering loops to ALECs from an IDLC  
25 either waste Verizon's switching resources or result in underutilization of

1 DS-1 circuits.

2

3 Contrary to Dr. Ankum's claim, the GTD-5 is a forward-looking switch and  
4 is marketed and supported by its manufacturer, AGCS, Inc. Even if it was  
5 appropriate to model switching costs as if all of the GTD-5s were replaced  
6 -- something that Verizon has no intention of doing -- the switch prices  
7 and other costs used by ICM-FL to estimate switching costs could not be  
8 attained. Dr. Ankum's recommendation to replace the GTD-5 has no  
9 basis in reality and should be rejected.

10

11 Dr. Ankum is simply wrong when he claims that Verizon bases its  
12 switching costs solely on the pricing for switch additions. To the contrary,  
13 ICM-FL's development of switch costs is consistent with Dr. Ankum's own  
14 proposed method and results in a lower level of modeled switch costs.  
15 Accordingly, Dr. Ankum's testimony on this issue should be ignored.

16

17 Finally, Dr. Ankum is wrong to suggest that feature costs are mostly non-  
18 traffic sensitive. Feature costs arise out of right-to-use fees, specialized  
19 hardware, and processor usage, and will in part be determined by the  
20 ALECs' marketing of features to end users. If feature costs are to be  
21 recovered either through the port or MOU rates, then ICM-FL will have to  
22 be modified to include the feature costs in the corresponding TELRICs.

23

24 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY AS IT**  
25 **RELATES TO MR. FISCHER'S REBUTTAL TESTIMONY.**

1 A. Mr. Fischer is incorrect when he claims that ICM-FL's expenses are not  
2 forward-looking. ICM-FL's expenses have been made forward-looking  
3 through the normalization entries for certain non-recurring items; the  
4 removal of expenses related to non-forward-looking technology; the  
5 removal of avoided retail costs; the removal of costs which are identified  
6 and modeled through other cost studies; and through a downward  
7 adjustment to reflect yet-to-be-realized merger savings. The modeled  
8 expenses have also been made forward-looking by basing the carrying  
9 cost of the general support assets on their reproduction cost through use  
10 of the C. A. Turner indices.

11  
12 Mr. Fischer's objection to ICM-FL's "calibration" adjustment is unfounded.  
13 The calibration adjustment is used to ensure that the investments in the  
14 expense-to-investment ratios are consistent with the modeled  
15 investments to which they will be applied.

16  
17 Mr. Fischer's recommendations concerning the C. A. Turner indices and  
18 the calibration adjustment should be rejected by the Commission.  
19 However, if they are accepted, the common cost allocator will need to be  
20 recalculated to reflect the change in common and direct costs, and to  
21 correct for the \$59.9 million calibration shortfall. As a result, the allocator  
22 will increase from 14.09 to 19.89 percent.

23  
24 Finally, the Commission should disregard Mr. Fischer's assertion that  
25 Verizon's and BellSouth's common cost allocator should be within a few

1 percentage points of each other. Because of differences in the underlying  
2 identification of common costs, nothing can be learned by comparing the  
3 resulting allocators for the two companies.

4

5 **Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY?**

6 **A. Yes.**

7

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Comparison of ICM-FL Modeled Investment with Reproduction Cost

Acct No.	Account	Composite C. A. Turner Index*	***** All Accounts *****			***** Network Accts *****	
			2000 ARMIS Amount (13-month Average)	2000 Reproduction Cost	ICM Modeled Investment**	2000 Reproduction Cost	ICM Modeled Investment**
211100	Land***	1.0000000	19,679,476	19,679,476	19,679,476		
211200	Motor Vehicles	1.1151000	25,431,019	28,358,129	28,358,129		
211500	Garage Work Equipment	1.1341000	1,198,047	1,358,705	1,358,705		
211600	Other Work Equipment	1.1341000	29,577,948	33,544,351	33,544,351		
212100	Buildings	1.7387000	229,016,159	398,190,396	398,190,396		
212200	Furniture	1.1062000	6,190,428	6,847,851	6,847,851		
212300	Office Equipment	1.0152062	70,101,686	71,167,666	71,167,666		
212400	General Purpose Computers	0.5772000	91,278,237	52,685,798	52,685,798		
221200	Digital Electronic Switching	0.7506000	993,018,000	745,359,311	432,871,846	745,359,311	432,871,846
223100	Radio Systems	1.0319000	1,838,000	1,896,632	0	1,896,632	0
223200	Circuit Equipment	0.9647000	880,659,000	849,571,737	496,618,041	849,571,737	496,618,041
241100	Poles	2.1156000	29,177,755	61,728,458	22,695,697	61,728,458	22,695,697
242110	Metallic Aerial Cable	1.4214000	220,780,478	313,817,371	216,821,324	313,817,371	216,821,324
242120	Nonmetallic Aerial Cable	1.0245000	1,052,707	1,078,498	1,982,472	1,078,498	1,982,472
242210	Underground Cable - Metallic Cable	1.4625000	349,586,655	511,270,483	312,102,793	511,270,483	312,102,793
242220	Underground Cable- Nonmetallic Cable	1.0587000	100,203,115	106,085,038	10,750,259	106,085,038	10,750,259
242310	Buried Cable - Metallic	1.2945000	1,351,609,461	1,749,658,447	981,811,200	1,749,658,447	981,811,200
242320	Buried Cable - Nonmetallic	1.0157000	9,999,634	10,156,628	33,801,722	10,156,628	33,801,722
242410	Submarine Cable - Metallic	2.0746000	1,731,402	3,591,967	0	3,591,967	0
242420	Submarine Cable - Nonmetallic	1.1769000	1,012,906	1,192,089		1,192,089	
242610	Intra-building Network Cable - Metallic	1.5998000	1,894,273	3,030,458	0	3,030,458	0
243100	Aerial Wire	1.0628000	1,277,751	1,357,994	0	1,357,994	0
244100	Conduit Systems	1.8036000	301,191,862	543,229,642	476,435,131	543,229,642	476,435,131
269030	Intangibles - NW Software -Appl. & Oprtng****	1.0000000	40,212,501	70,490,076	70,490,076	70,490,076	70,490,076
			4,757,718,500	5,585,347,203	3,668,212,934	4,973,514,831	3,056,380,561
Variance as a Percent of Reproduction Cost:				-34.3%		-38.5%	

Notes:

\* From Attachment J.1, Section 7.PDF .

\*\* From the Calibration Report from the ICM-FL Reports menu. Amounts for Non-network accounts equal the reproduction costs.

\*\*\*Reproduction amount set equal to book value for Land.

\*\*\*\*Reproduction amounts set equal to ICM-FL modeled investment to reflect consistent treatment across all wire centers.



Impact of Market Segmentation on DS-1 Requirements

DLC Size	Number of Modeled DLCs	UDLC Configuration		IDLC Configuration Required DS-1 Links For Each DLC			
		6:1 DS-1 Links	4:1 DS-1 Links	Market Share *** Scenario 1 ***		Market Share *** Scenario 2 ***	
		6:1	4:1	6:1	4:1	6:1	4:1
24	8	1	1	3	3	3	3
48	9	1	1	3	3	3	3
96	17	1	1	3	3	3	3
192	39	2	2	3	3	3	4
224	12	2	3	3	3	3	4
448	110	4	5	6	6	4	6
672	55	5	7	6	9	6	9
896	61	7	10	9	12	7	11
1120	53	8	12	9	12	9	12
1344	51	10	14	12	15	11	16
1568	38	11	17	12	18	12	18
2016	596	14	21	15	21	16	23

	UDLC		*** Scenario 1 ***		*** Scenario 2 ***	
	6:1	4:1	6:1	4:1	6:1	4:1
Total Modeled DS-1s:	10,974	16,205	12,279	16,743	12,482	17,976
Percent Change:			11.9%	3.3%	13.7%	10.9%

Impact of Market Segmentation on DS-1 Requirements

IDLC Configuration  
 Market Share  
 Scenario 1

\*\*\*\*\*

DLC Size	Carrier Number 1			Carrier Number 2			Carrier Number 3		
	Share 33.33% Customers	6:1 DS-1 Links	4:1 DS-1 Links	Share 33.33% Customers	6:1 DS-1 Links	4:1 DS-1 Links	Share 33.33% Customers	6:1 DS-1 Links	4:1 DS-1 Links
24	8	1	1	8	1	1	8	1	1
48	16	1	1	16	1	1	16	1	1
96	32	1	1	32	1	1	32	1	1
192	64	1	1	64	1	1	64	1	1
224	75	1	1	75	1	1	74	1	1
448	149	2	2	149	2	2	150	2	2
672	224	2	3	224	2	3	224	2	3
896	299	3	4	299	3	4	298	3	4
1120	373	3	4	373	3	4	374	3	4
1344	448	4	5	448	4	5	448	4	5
1568	523	4	6	523	4	6	522	4	6
2016	672	5	7	672	5	7	672	5	7

\*\*\*\*\*

Impact of Market Segmentation on DS-1 Requirements


IDLC Configuration  
 Market Share  
 Scenario 2

*****				*****			*****		
Carrier Number 1				Carrier Number 2			Carrier Number 3		
DLC Size	Share	6:1	4:1	Customers	6:1	4:1	Customers	6:1	4:1
	60.00%	DS-1 Links	DS-1 Links		25.00%	DS-1 Links		DS-1 Links	15.00%
24	14	1	1	6	1	1	4	1	1
48	29	1	1	12	1	1	7	1	1
96	58	1	1	24	1	1	14	1	1
192	115	1	2	48	1	1	29	1	1
224	134	1	2	56	1	1	34	1	1
448	269	2	3	112	1	2	67	1	1
672	403	3	5	168	2	2	101	1	2
896	538	4	6	224	2	3	134	1	2
1120	672	5	7	280	2	3	168	2	2
1344	806	6	9	336	3	4	202	2	3
1568	941	7	10	392	3	5	235	2	3
2016	1210	9	13	504	4	6	302	3	4

**Difference Between a 4:1 and a 6:1 Concentration Ratio**

DLC Size	Size / 24	Concentration Ratio			4 : 1 Minus 6 : 1
		1 : 1 DS-1 Links	4 : 1 DS-1 Links	6 : 1 DS-1 Links	
24	1.0000	1	1	1	0
48	2.0000	2	1	1	0
96	4.0000	4	1	1	0
192	8.0000	8	2	2	0
224	9.3333	10	3	2	1
448	18.6667	19	5	4	1
672	28.0000	28	7	5	2
896	37.3333	38	10	7	3
1120	46.6667	47	12	8	4
1344	56.0000	56	14	10	4
1568	65.3333	66	17	11	6
2016	84.0000	84	21	14	7

Formula for Size = 896



**Impact of High Target Fill Factors**

**Hypothetical Example of Company with Three Feeder Routes**

	Assumed Target Fill:			85.0%
<b>Section 1</b>	<b>Route 1</b>	<b>Route 2</b>	<b>Route 3</b>	<b>Total Company</b>
Number of Installed Loops	500	700	1,000	2,200
Number of Active Loops	255	400	850	1,505
Actual Fill	51.0%	57.1%	85.0%	68.4%
TELRIC per Route	\$7,500	\$10,500	\$15,000	\$33,000

**Calculation of TELRIC on a per Loop Basis**  
 (Sum of TELRIC per Route) / (Sum of Installed x Fill Factor)

<b>Section 2</b>				
<b>Using Target Fill</b>				
TELRIC per Loop	\$17.65	\$17.65	\$17.65	\$17.65
times Number of Active Loops	255	400	850	1,505
Implied TELRIC per Route ==>	\$4,500	\$7,059	\$15,000	\$26,559
Shortfall	(\$3,000)	(\$3,441)	\$0	(\$6,441)

<b>Section 3</b>				
<b>Using Actual Fill</b>				
TELRIC per Loop	\$21.93	\$21.93	\$21.93	\$21.93
times Number of Active Loops	255	400	850	1,505
Implied TELRIC per Route ==>	\$5,591	\$8,771	\$18,638	\$33,000
Shortfall	(\$1,909)	(\$1,729)	\$3,638	\$0

**Comparison of Modeled Investment per Line**

**Q. ON A PER-LINE BASIS, DOES ICM-FL MODEL HIGHER SWITCH COSTS FOR THE GTD-5 THAN IT DOES FOR THE 5ESS AND NORTEL SWITCHES?**

A. XXX This is shown in the table below. Whether the modeled switch costs include or exclude power, test equipment, and the EF&I and IAF adjustments, the modeled switch investment per line for the XXXXXXXXXXXX is less than the modeled investment for the XXXXX and the XXXXXX.

Note that both the modeled investments shown below and the relative ordering of the three vendors are company and vendor confidential.

	<b>Without Power, Test, EF&amp;I and IAF Adjustments</b>	<b>With Power, Test, EF&amp;I and IAF Adjustments</b>
XXXXXXXX	\$XXXXXX	\$XXXXXX
XXXXXXXX	\$XXXXXX	\$XXXXXX
XXXXXXXX	\$XXXXXX	\$XXXXXX
XXXXXXXX	\$XXXXXX	\$XXXXXX
XXXXXXXX	\$XXXXXX	\$XXXXXX

**Impact of C. A. Turner and Calibration on Fixed Allocator**

**FILED FIXED ALLOCATOR CALCULATION**

(Attachment DBT-1, Trimble Direct)

$$\text{Fixed Allocator} = \frac{\text{Common Costs}}{\text{Direct Costs}} = \frac{\$169,821,794}{\$1,205,040,469} = 14.09\%$$

**FIXED ALLOCATOR WITH ADJUSTMENT FOR**

**CALIBRATION SHORTFALL OF (\$11,752,844)**

(Based on Filed Costs – See Page 2)

$$\frac{\text{Adjusted Common Costs}}{\text{Adjusted Direct Costs}} = \frac{\$181,574,638}{\$1,193,287,625} = 15.22\%$$

**FIXED ALLOCATOR WITH ADJUSTMENT FOR**

**CALIBRATION SHORTFALL OF (\$79,108,406)**

(With No Calibration – See Page 2)

$$\frac{\text{Adjusted Common Costs}}{\text{Adjusted Direct Costs}} = \frac{\$248,930,200}{\$1,125,932,062} = 22.11\%$$

**FIXED ALLOCATOR WITH ADJUSTMENT FOR**

**CALIBRATION SHORTFALL OF (\$59,940,281)**

**CHANGE IN DIRECT COSTS OF (\$18,164,124)**

**CHANGE IN COMMON COSTS OF (\$2,465,947)**

(With No Calibration and No C. A. Turner  
 Adjustment– See Page 2)

$$\frac{\$227,296,128}{\$1,142,634,241} = 19.89\%$$

**Note:** The calibration shortfall increases the numerator and decreases the denominator of the allocator.

The change in direct costs decreases the denominator of the allocator.

The change in common costs decreases the numerator of the allocator.

Impact of C. A. Turner and Calibration on Fixed Allocator

Calculation of Calibration Shortfall and Change in Direct and Common Costs

Account	Cost Pool	Modeled Investment	Filed			With No Calibration			With No Calibration and No C. A. Turner Adjustment		
			Numerator (Expenses)	Denominator (Investment)	E / I Ratio	Numerator (Expenses)	Denominator (Investment)	E / I Ratio	Numerator (Expenses)	Denominator (Investment)	E / I Ratio
242120	Aerial Non-Metallic	1,982,472	12,950	671,084	0.019297	12,950	1,078,498	0.012007	12,869	1,052,707	0.012225
242110	Aerial Metallic	216,821,324	13,158,664	197,155,077	0.066743	13,158,664	316,847,831	0.041530	13,076,129	222,674,752	0.058723
242320	Buried Non-Metallic	33,801,722	221,221	7,061,615	0.031327	221,221	11,348,718	0.019493	219,834	11,012,540	0.019962
242310	Buried Metallic	981,811,200	57,327,496	1,090,940,784	0.052549	57,327,496	1,753,250,413	0.032698	56,967,919	1,353,340,863	0.042094
242220	Underground Non-Metallic	10,750,259	460,934	66,010,248	0.006983	460,934	106,085,038	0.004345	458,043	100,203,115	0.004571
242210	Underground Metallic	312,102,793	2,295,337	318,132,434	0.007215	2,295,337	511,270,483	0.004489	2,280,940	349,586,655	0.006525
241100	Poles	22,695,697	18,997,772	38,409,854	0.494607	18,997,772	61,728,458	0.307764	19,493,745	29,177,755	0.668103
244100	Conduit	476,435,131	269,448	338,018,669	0.000797	269,448	543,229,642	0.000496	277,677	301,191,862	0.000922
223200	Transmission	496,618,041	26,922,294	498,514,265	0.054005	26,922,294	846,771,815	0.031794	20,421,714	882,497,000	0.023141
221200 & 269030	Switch	503,361,922	71,515,355	503,362,208	0.142075	71,515,355	785,571,812	0.091036	59,808,480	1,033,230,501	0.057885
		3,056,380,561	191,181,472	3,058,276,238		191,181,472	4,937,182,708		173,017,348	4,283,967,750	
Sum of Modeled Investment x E / I Ratio			179,428,628			112,073,065			113,077,067		
Calibration Shortfall			(11,752,844)	[1]		(79,108,406)	[2]		(59,940,281)	[2]	
Change in Direct Costs			0			0			(18,164,124)		
Common Costs			169,821,793			169,821,793			167,355,846		
Change in Common Costs			0			0			(2,465,947)		

[1] "Calibration Shortfall" is inherent in the methodology.  
 [2] "Calibration Shortfall" arises from failure to select calibration option.