BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

IN RE: DOCKET NO. 020262-EI - Petition to determine

need for an electrical power plant in Martin County by Florida Power & Light Company.

DOCKET NO. 020263-EI - Petition to determine need for an electrical power plant in Manatee

County by Florida Power & Light Company.

BEFORE: CHAIRMAN LILA A. JABER

COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON COMMISSIONER BRAULIO L. BAEZ COMMISSIONER MICHAEL A. PALECKI COMMISSIONER RUDOLPH BRADLEY

PROCEEDINGS: AGENDA CONFERENCE

ITEM NUMBER: 7

DATE: Tuesday, November 19, 2002

PLACE: 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 148

Tallahassee, Florida

REPORTED BY: MARY ALLEN NEEL

Registered Professional Reporter

ÁCCURATE STENOTYPE REPORTERS 100 SALEM COURT TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301 (850)878-2221

11-25-02

PARTICIPANTS:

MARTHA BROWN, TIM DEVLIN, MIKE HAFF, LARRY HARRIS, CHRISTINE KENNY and PETE LESTER, Florida Public Service Commission.

STAFF RECOMMENDATION

ISSUE 1: Does Florida Power & Light Company have a need for Martin Unit 8, taking into account the need for electric system reliability and integrity?

RECOMMENDATION: In order to precisely meet a planning reserve margin criterion of 20.0%, FPL needs only 15 MW of capacity with the addition of Manatee Unit 3 in summer 2005. Therefore, FPL does not have a pressing reliability need for the entire 789 MW of capacity from Martin Unit 8 until summer 2006. However, as discussed in Issue 14, it is more cost-effective for FPL to place Martin Unit 8 into commercial service in 2005 rather than 2006. Placing Martin Unit 8 into service in 2005 will enhance FPL's electric system reliability and integrity.

ISSUE 2: Does Florida Power & Light Company have a need Manatee Unit 3, taking into account the need for electric service reliability and integrity?

RECOMMENDATION: Yes. FP&L has an estimated need for 1,122 MW of capacity for summer 2005. The 1,107 MW of summer capacity from Manatee Unit 3 is needed by FPL to ensure electric system reliability and integrity. With the addition of Manatee Unit 3 in summer 2005, FPL's projected reserve margin for summer 2005 is 19.92%.

ISSUE 3: Does Florida Power & Light have a need for Martin Unit 8, taking into account the need for adequate electricity at a reasonable cost?

RECOMMENDATION: Yes. FPL has chosen a proven technology and has experience with the construction and operation of combined cycle units. The estimated costs for Martin Unit 8 appear to be reasonable.

ISSUE 4: Does Florida Power & Light Company have a need for Manatee Unit 3, taking into account the need for adequate electricity at a reasonable cost? RECOMMENDATION: Yes. FPL has chosen a proven technology and has experience with the construction and operation of combined cycle units. The estimated costs for Manatee Unit 3 appear to be reasonable.

<u>ISSUE 5</u>: Are there any conservation measures taken by or reasonably available to Florida Power & Light Company that might mitigate the need for Martin Unit 8?

<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>: No. FPL appears to have implemented all available cost-effective conservation and demand-side management measures.

<u>ISSUE 6</u>: Are there any conservation measures taken by or reasonably available to Florida Power & Light Company that might mitigate the need For Manatee Unit 3?

<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>: No. FPL appears to have implemented all available cost-effective conservation and demand-side management measures.

ISSUE 7: Has Florida Power & Light Company adequately ensured the availability of fuel commodity and transportation to serve Martin Unit 8?

RECOMMENDATION: Yes. While FPL has yet to sign a contract to supply natural gas to the proposed unit, FPL will provide the Commission with a copy of the signed contract for commodity and transportation to serve Martin Unit 8 once signed.

ISSUE 8: Has Florida Power & Light Company adequately ensured the availability of fuel commodity and transportation to serve Manatee Unit 3?

RECOMMENDATION: Yes. While FPL has yet to sign a contract to supply natural gas to the proposed unit, FPL will provide the Commission with a copy of the signed contract for commodity and transportation to serve Manatee Unit 3 once signed.

ISSUE 9: Did Florida Power & Light Company's Supplemental Request for Proposals issued April 26, 2002, satisfy the requirements of Rule 25-22.082, Florida Administrative Code?

RECOMMENDATION: Yes. FPL properly issued and evaluated the supplemental RFP in accordance with Rule 25-22.082, Florida Administrative Code, and has therefore satisfied the requirements of the rule.

ISSUE 10: Was the process used by Florida Power & Light Company 'to evaluate Martin Unit 8, Manatee Unit 3, and projects submitted in response to its Supplemental Request for Proposals issued April 26, 2002, fair, reasonable, and appropriate?

RECOMMENDATION: Yes. FPL's analysis of its self-build options, individual responses to the

supplemental RFP, and grouping of proposals for purposes of the economic evaluation was appropriate. FPL's evaluation process reasonably resulted in the choice of the most cost-effective alternative required by statute.

ISSUE 11: In its evaluation of Martin 8, Manatee 3, and projects filed in response to its Supplemental Request for Proposals issued on April 26, 2002, did Florida Power & Light employ fair and reasonable assumptions and methodologies?

RECOMMENDATION: Yes. Given the variation in the proposals with regard to term and megawatts proposed, the methodologies employed to evaluate supply-side options were fair and reasonable. As discussed in staff's recommendation for Issues 11(a) through 11(g), FPL used fair and reasonable assumptions in evaluating all supply-side options.

<u>ISSUE 11(a)</u>: Were the assumptions regarding parameters that FPL assigned to its own proposed units reasonable and appropriate?

<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>: Yes. FPL's heat rate and availability assumptions for Martin Unit 8 and Manatee Unit 3 are reasonable and appropriate.

ISSUE 11(b): Did FPL appropriately model variable 0&M costs in its analysis?

RECOMMENDATION: Yes. FP&L used the variable 0&M costs contained in its supplemental RFP for the self-build projects. FPL modeled variable 0&M costs for the bidders as they were bid.

ISSUE 11(c): When modeling and quantifying the costs of all options, did FP&L fairly and appropriately compare the costs of projects having different durations?

RECOMMENDATION: Yes. FPL's use of greenfield filler units in its expansion plan studies was appropriate.

ISSUE 11(d): When modeling and quantifying the costs of all options, did FPL employ assumptions regarding the gas transportation costs applicable to filler units that were fair, reasonable, and appropriate?

RECOMMENDATION: Yes. FPL used identical gas transportation cost assumptions for filler units for generation expansion plans containing both FPL's self-build units and the RFP projects.

ITEM 11(e): When modeling and quantifying the costs of all options, including its own, did FP&L appropriately and adequately take cycling and start-up costs into account?

RECOMMENDATION: Yes. Further, FPL modeled cycling and start-up costs identically for its self-build units and the RFP projects.

<u>ISSUE 11(f)</u>: When modeling and quantifying the costs of all options, did FPL appropriately and adequately take into account the impact of seasonal variations on heat rate and unit output?

RECOMMENDATION: Yes. Using greater precision to model seasonal variations on heat rate and unit output was unnecessary and would have affected both the FP&L self-build units and the RFP projects virtually the same.

<u>ISSUE 11(g)</u>: Did FP&L act in a fair, reasonable, and appropriate manner in not considering for the short list portfolios that included TECO and other bidders, in part, because TECO's reserve margin requirement might be impaired?

<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>: Yes. FPL considered, but appropriately did not include, TECO on its short list.

ISSUE 12: Was Florida Power & Light Company's decision to apply an equity penalty cost to projects filed in response to its Supplemental Request for Proposals appropriate? If so, was the amount properly calculated?

RECOMMENDATION: No. The application of the equity penalty in FPL's evaluation of outside supply options is not appropriate in this case. The Commission should determine the appropriateness of an equity penalty on a case-by-case basis. Even without the implementation of the equity penalty, FPL's self-build option still appears to be the most cost-effective method of adding capacity.

ISSUE 13: In its evaluation of Martin Unit 8, Manatee Unit 3, and projects filed in response to its Supplemental Request for Proposals issued on April 26, 2002, did Florida Power & Light Company properly and adequately evaluate transmission interconnection and integration costs?

<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>: Yes. FPL properly and accurately evaluated transmission-related costs for the RFP projects and FPL's self-build options.

ISSUE 14: Is Florida Power & Light Company's Martin Unit 8 the most cost-effective alternative available? RECOMMENDATION: FPL's base-case self-build plan, in which both Martin Unit 8 and Manatee Unit 3 enter service in summer 2005, appears to be the most cost-effective alternative. Deferring Martin Unit 8 by one year is more costly than FPL's base-case self-build plan. The Commission's decision on Issue 12 (equity penalty) will affect the level of the cost-effectiveness of FP&L's base-case self-build plan.

<u>ISSUE 15</u>: Is Florida Power & Light Company's Manatee Unit 3 the most cost-effective alternative available? <u>RECOMMENDATION</u>: See staff recommendation on Issue 14.

<u>ISSUE 16</u>: Based on the resolution of the foregoing issues, should the Commission grant Florida Power & Light Company's petition for determination of need for Martin Unit 8?

<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>: Yes. FPL's petition for determination of need for Martin Unit 8 satisfies the statutory requirements of Section 403.519, Florida Statutes, and, therefore, should be approved.

<u>ISSUE 17</u>: Based on the resolution of the foregoing issues, should the Commission grant Florida Power & Light Company's petition for determination of need for Martin Unit 3?

<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>: Yes. FP&L's petition for determination of need for Manatee Unit 3 satisfies the statutory requirements of Section 403.519, Florida Statutes, and, therefore, should be approved.

<u>ISSUE 18</u>: Should Docket Nos. 020262-EI and 020263-EI be closed?

<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>: Yes. These dockets should be closed after the time for filing an appeal has run.

PROCEEDINGS

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CHAIRMAN JABER: We're on Item No. 7.

MR. HAFF: Commissioners, Item No. 7 is staff's post-hearing recommendation on the Florida Power & Light petition for determination of need of Martin Unit 8 and Manatee Unit 3. Staff has recommended that the Commission approve Florida Power & Light's petition.

On the front page under "Special Instructions," and on page 4 also of the recommendation, we've suggested an order of discussing and voting the items.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Mr. Haff.

Commissioners, staff has recommended an order that probably works just fine. I have to just let you know, I've got questions from one of the briefs. I think that it may actually be easier for me, at least as one Commissioner, to start with the more general questions, but whatever you all prefer. Is that all right?

Okay. I'm looking -- are there any corrections to the recommendation, staff?

> MR. HAFF: No.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I'm looking at the PACE brief, and -- let me try to find it here.

There's an assertion on page 8 of the PACE brief, and I've got a couple of follow-up questions to this, where it says it provides that -- the allegation is that FP&L can turn around and file a petition for a rate increase if it earns below 10% ROE, according to their revenue sharing agreement, and in fact, if the PSC adds the two units proposed, that it could actually result in an increase in rate base of a billion dollars, and therefore, it could be possible that that would trigger a petition for a rate increase. Is that -- how likely is that, and have you taken all of that into account? That's probably a -- Tim Devlin?

MR. LESTER: I can --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Go ahead, Mr. Lester.

MR. LESTER: The current rate settlement is a revenue sharing agreement, and so base rate revenues need to reach a certain level for sharing to take place. The addition of the plant may affect earnings, but it won't affect the sharing levels.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. So said differently, is there any concern with respect to adding either of the units or both of the

units that customers' rates in any way go up through 2006?

MR. LESTER: No, there's no concern.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Because of these two units. Now, obviously, there are probably fuel adjustments and considerations to take into account between now and 2006. But as it relates to the capital costs of these two units, do you envision any sort of rate increase?

MR. LESTER: No, ma'am.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Now --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Madam Chairman, may I follow up on that question?

CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes. Go ahead.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: As I understand the Chairman's question, I think she prefaced that question by indicating that it was her understanding, and I believe it's my understanding as well, that the settlement provides — there's a provision in which if the ROE falls below 10%, then FP&L has the capability under the stipulation to come forward and to request an increase. So I think the Chairman's question is: Will the addition of both these units cause the ROE to drop below 10

percent?

CHAIRMAN JABER: Such that the company comes in and seeks a rate increase.

MR. DEVLIN: We don't expect it to,

Commissioners, because of the level the earnings

are at right now. We don't expect that it would

trigger a situation where the ROE would drop

below 10%.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Because the ROE is currently at -- but that's what you're saying, that the ROE is high enough now that any sort of drop should not --

MR. DEVLIN: I think the ROE is over 13% right now. I could verify that. But there's sufficient room there to handle these two units during the settlement period.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Now I want to take the reverse of that question. Is it possible that these two units in the long term benefit the customers such that you could actually see some sort of sharing or efficiencies that inure back to the customers because of the addition of these two units in the year 2005?

MR. DEVLIN: Well, to the extent that they're the least-cost option compared to

1 purchased power, I think that's where the 2 benefits come into play from 2005 forward. 3 COMMISSIONER DEASON: But isn't there the 4 possibility of off-system sales which can be 5 flowed through to customers through the fuel 6 adjustment clause? 7 MR. DEVLIN: That's true also, yes, sir. 8 CHAIRMAN JABER: And then with respect to 9 what you said, Mr. Devlin, are you referring to 10 the fact that with PPA purchases, there's an 11 automatic fixed payment that goes through the 12 capacity cost recovery clause? 13 MR. DEVLIN: That's correct. 14 CHAIRMAN JABER: That's not the case with 15 these two units. 16 That's true. Until base rates MR. DEVLIN: 17 are changed, the ratepayers wouldn't see any 18 increase in price. 19 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Now, let's take it 20 just a step further. If Martin is deferred for 21 a year -- the rate settlement, if I'm not 22 mistaken, expires at the end of 2005; is that 23 right? 🗸 24 MR. DEVLIN: That's correct. 25 CHAIRMAN JABER: Deferring Martin for a

year brings the plant in after the expiration of the revenue sharing agreement. What effect does that have, if any?

MR. DEVLIN: Well, it would have an effect on the rate of return, and our plan would be to look closely at their earnings position somewhere towards the end of 2005. So if there is a deferral of a year or so, that would just have an enhancement to the rate of return for some short period of time. But we fully intend to take a very thorough review of the financial position of FPL, and this, of course, would be one aspect of it, in --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay.

MR. DEVLIN: -- about three years.

CHAIRMAN JABER: So does that mean in 2006, if the plant is deferred, through surveillance, the plant would have to be considered in rate base, wouldn't it?

MR. DEVLIN: I'm sorry, ma'am.

CHAIRMAN JABER: If we defer the unit from 2005 to 2006, in considering what the company's revenues would be and to try to figure out if the revenue sharing agreement should be extended, you know, bringing the company in to

take a look at what efficiencies are in place 2006 forward, what effect would a unit coming in rate base at 2006 have on any sort of revenue sharing mechanism?

MR. DEVLIN: Well, I think we would probably be getting into a negotiating position at that juncture, and we would be looking at the impact that that would have on earnings. And, of course, that comes into play in any kind of settlement. And to the extent the earnings are adequate, the company would be more willing to enter into an extension of the revenue sharing plan. That's just one aspect of many we'll have to consider at that time.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. On page 5 of the PACE brief, you know, I think they ask a very good question. Why not simply purchase 15 megawatts of inexpensive peaking capacity for one year?

MR. HAFF: And that's a fair question. FPL was concerned about going through not one, but two RFP processes in this case, and to go outside the RFP to purchase 15 megawatts in their mind would have raised even more, I guess, questions about the credibility of the RFP

process. Certainly they could have gone out and purchased 15 megawatts.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I don't understand what you just said, Mike. They're concerned about going through the RFP process twice. Why? is the first question. The second question is, if they only need 15 megawatts, they only need 15 megawatts, so why would anyone question the credibility of an RFP that seeks 15 megawatts?

MR. HAFF: I'm talking about the original supplemental RFP process for what ultimately was, I think, 1,700 megawatts. FPL was concerned about when they received bids and reviewed their own projects that Martin or Manatee Unit 3 would meet all but 15 megawatts. And then to then say, "Well, we're going to go outside the RFP to purchase the remaining 15 megawatts," in FPL's mind would have called into question, why are they going outside the RFP to find 15 megawatts.

As far as cost-effectiveness, it was more cost-effective to build Martin in 2005 anyway. I know there's questions about the need, and we've raised them. But to defer Martin by a year was \$18 million more costly than to build

it in 2005, so I guess one way of looking at is if they got the 15 megawatts for free, it would still be \$18 million more costly to defer Martin by a year.

CHAIRMAN JABER: On the next page, but along those lines, PACE makes the assertion that FP&L purposefully designed the RFP so as to prohibit bidders from offering proposals of fewer than three years or less than 50 megawatts. So how do you reconcile that statement from what you just said, Mike? I think the allegation here is they never intended to go out of their RFP and seek the 15 megawatts. In fact, the allegation is the RFP was structured such that no one could have bid on anything lower than 50 megawatts. So I can't reconcile what you just said with this.

MR. HAFF: It's sort of just the way it turns out with Manatee being picked or chosen in 2005 that there's 15 megawatts remaining. Of the thousands of combinations of RFP projects and self-build projects that FPL evaluated, there were some combinations that met their identified need in 2005 that did not include Manatee. There were several -- the short list

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included a couple of projects that when combined together would have not resulted in this 15-megawatt deficiency in 2005.

I don't necessarily have a question with how the RFP was designed. I don't know of any of the -- any previous investor-owned utility RFPs that had anything less stringent than this for short-term, because there has to be a certain, I guess, level, minimum level and minimum term for evaluating needs. It just so happened that in this case, with Manatee being chosen in 2005, that there was a 15-megawatt piece left out there.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Are you saying that when they issued the RFP, they did not know that it would be a 15-megawatt deficiency for the year 2005?

MR. HAFF: They couldn't have known conclusively unless Manatee happened to be the winner for the 2005 need.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: But isn't the existence of the 15-megawatt shortfall -- I mean, you can run scenarios and say, "All right. If Manatee comes in 2005, because we know it's out there, this is what's left over." I mean, this isn't a

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case that 15 megawatts kind of appeared out of nowhere, is it?

MR. HAFF: No. They most certainly knew on the front end that they needed 1,100 or 1,122 megawatts in 2005, and they also knew beforehand that Manatee Unit 3 was 1,107 megawatts. They knew if Manatee was to be chosen in 2005, there would be 15 megawatts left. They just -- I don't have evidence that shows that they knew they were going to win their own RFP.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: No, and that's not what I'm suggesting. I'm saying there's -- I guess the shortfall, considering one option possibly, whether it was the best or not, but just within the realm of possibility, it did leave a shortfall that could have been known.

MR. HAFF: Yes.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Okay.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Not knowing what the shortfall would be, but it -- so, see, in that regard -- and I don't know that it necessarily in my mind relates to a concern I have with this case, but just going forward, for that reason alone, I wonder if it's inappropriate to include a minimum amount in the RFP, because you sort of

foreclose, unintentionally or intentionally -you know, I don't -- because you're right, the
record doesn't support any of that, at least not
in my mind.

But it seems to foreclose opportunities of selecting different combinations, which I think is PACE's point. PACE is saying, if we would have known, you know, that sort of combination was possible, we could have provided a -- our members could have provided bids to address that 15 megawatts.

MR. HAFF: Correct.

CHAIRMAN JABER: On page 10 --

MR. HAFF: Is this the brief, Madam Chairman?

CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes, the PACE brief. PACE gives examples of where they believe the RFP process -- the bidding rule process was not met. And I know you covered a couple of these in the recommendation. For the purposes of fleshing out the record, I would like for you to address the rest of them.

The examples addressed in the brief, at the middle of the page, they say FP&L didn't disclose that bids less than FP&L's full need in

any year would be combined with other bids in the evaluation process. That's what we just discussed. FP&L did not disclose that the allocation of the O&M costs between fixed and variable categories would be an important evaluation factor. Can you speak to that?

MR. HAFF: Well, the RFP itself, I guess in order to be flexible, let bidders bid proposals with, among other things, O&M costs fixed and variable. And the RFP, as I see it, it gave the bidder the flexibility to break their O&M costs either into a lot of variable and some fixed, or vice versa. It didn't restrict how the bidders divvied up their O&M pot of dollars, if you will.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Right. But if I understand PACE's argument correctly, it's not that there's an allegation that they were restricted in how they submitted the bid. It's that they didn't know that this would be such a strong evaluation factor. I suppose it goes back to the concern on weighting and ranking. That's the allegation, that if we would have known an importance would be given to the way we separated fixed and variable costs, you know,

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maybe they would have sought clarification.

MR. HAFF: This gets sort of to Issue 11(b) on page 33. And the reason, in my mind, it became an issue is that some of the bids had -- their breakdown of O&M costs, more costs were put into the variable pot and less into the fixed pot. And all else being equal, if a unit has some higher variable costs, it may be dispatched less often.

So in running their EGEAS model and determining the dispatch and ultimately the cost of running an expansion plan, projects with higher variable O&M may have been dispatched less, and I believe that's what this concern is getting to. And the FPL witnesses, Dr. Sim and Mr. Taylor, if I recall, stated only that in running the evaluations, that they used exactly what was bid, and it's up to the bidder to determine how they want to divide the O&M pot of dollars, if you will.

CHAIRMAN JABER: And with respect to how FP&L reviewed the division between fixed and variable categories and the weight they put on that division in evaluating the bid, in your professional opinion, meets the current bidding

1 rule? 2 MR. HAFF: Yes. 3 CHAIRMAN JABER: FP&L provided no assurances that a bidder who took exceptions to 4 5 any provisions in the RFP, the bidder would not be unfavorably evaluated, is the next 6 7 allegation. 8 MR. HAFF: I believe this gets to some discussion where the RFP -- I don't recall 9 exactly what page, but the RFP told bidders if 10 11 they had specific objections to something in the 12 RFP to so state them. 13 I believe this -- I believe the statement stated that FPL would, of course, prefer bids 14 with fewer exceptions, meaning I guess 15 16 ultimately if they got to the negotiation table 17 to negotiate a project, there would be less to overcome if there were fewer objections or --18 19 CHAIRMAN JABER: Were any bidders --20 MR. HAFF: -- exceptions to the RFP. 21 CHAIRMAN JABER: Well, were any bidders, 22 though, immediately removed from consideration 23 because they stated exceptions? 24 MR. HAFF: Not that I'm aware of. In fact,

I'm not aware that there were many exceptions

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1 taken in the responses to the bids.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. FP&L did not disclose that with respect to bids received from other Florida utilities, a reserve margin assessment would be made to determine if in FPL's opinion the utility was able to meet its own 20% reserve margin requirements.

This relates to the testimony we heard regarding TECO's proposal. And I have to tell you, as I heard the testimony, it gave me considerable concern that FP&L didn't consider the TECO proposal because in FP&L's mind, TECO would not be able to meet the 20% voluntary --

MR. HAFF: Yes, and that's --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Voluntary standard on reserve margin.

MR. HAFF: And that's discussed in Issue 11(g) on page 42. And we --

CHAIRMAN JABER: What's discussed in 11(g) on that page is that staff believes there is a legitimate concern with regard to if TECO can't meet their reserve margin, TECO would be placed in an awkward situation of choosing between TECO customers and providing service under a long-term contract with FP&L. What's not

discussed in the recommendation is the concern related to disclosing that in the RFP.

MR. HAFF: Correct.

CHAIRMAN JABER: And I keep coming back to that. I know at the end of the day, FP&L may be correct with respect to the concern. The allegation is, you've got to tell someone ahead of time that you're going to have that concern so they can govern themselves accordingly. And I think that's what PACE's allegation is. Maybe TECO would not have submitted the bid. Maybe the next company would not submit the bid.

MR. HAFF: I guess my first impression is that there's -- so that the RFP, I guess, is flexible where there can be various types of projects proposed, that there be a minimum of restrictions, I guess, on the types of projects that can be proposed. And I guess in my mind, it would be difficult to envision every single scenario such as this thing with TECO. I mean, I guess FPL could lay out every single thing that would cause a concern with a bid, and --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Well, how many customers are subject to the 20% voluntary stipulation?

MR. HAFF: How many utilities?

CHAIRMAN JABER: Uh-huh.

MR. HAFF: Three. It's TECO, Florida Power

I guess if -- I don't know that this

 & Light, and Florida Power Corporation.

particular concern that FPL had with TECO could

have been envisioned on the front end when

writing an RFP. There are a number of things, I

guess, that could have been -- concerns that

could have been envisioned, and the more you put

them in the RFP, I guess, you know, it could

. grow.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. So again, I'll ask you the same question. In your professional opinion, removing a company from consideration because of the fear that the company's reserve margin would not be met is consistent with the current bidding rule?

MR. HAFF: I believe it's consistent. But also what we haven't discussed, and it's not necessarily addressed in this issue, but in the cost-effectiveness issue, TECO was part of a portfolio that was not -- I guess they were sort in the ballpark for being included on a short list. There were a couple of short lists, you might recall from the hearing, one that was the

sort of cut, I guess first draft short list,
which included TECO, I believe, Calpine, Florida
Power Corporation, and El Paso. That wasn't the
official short list. One of the other discussion
or the reasons given for TECO not being included
on the ultimate short list for negotiation was
because they weren't in the grouping that was
cost-effective, competitively cost-effective.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. And TECO did not intervene in this case? They weren't a party in this case?

MR. HAFF: Not at all, no.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. With respect to page 18 of PACE's brief, they say to compare FP&L's availability with peak firing to the proposal of a bidder without peak firing mode is misleading. Could you address that concern, please.

MR. HAFF: Are you in the second full paragraph?

CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes, uh-huh.

MR. HAFF: I'm looking for it.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Basically, the assertion is that FP&L's methodology on their peak firing mode is aggressive and optimistic, and to

compare what they did to a proposal of a bidder without the peak firing mode is -- I took it to be like apples to oranges is the assertion that they're making.

MR. HAFF: My understanding of the way these projects were modeled -- and I can give you a little background. The bidders, the bid projects, if they gave a heat rate or an availability number, they were modeled as given for all modes, whether it be peak firing, normal operation, et cetera. I guess you're talking about the 99% unavailability.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Uh-huh.

MR. HAFF: That just assumes that peak firing is available 1% of the time. And in running the EGEAS model for the self-build options, Martin and Manatee, my understanding is that FPL ran the model assuming peak firing 1% of the time, normal operation, 97% availability, et cetera, and that they modeled their own project -- actually, this is a disadvantage to FPL, because if a bidder, say, bid a 98% availability, they ran that percent available for all modes, where as Florida Power & Light for its own units modeled normal mode at 97%,

peak mode at 1%, and it actually was a detriment 1 to FPL's units. 2 3 CHAIRMAN JABER: Is that in the record, Mike? 4 5 MR. HAFF: Yes. CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioners, from the 6 7 briefs, those are the only questions I have. I've got questions on the recommendation, but 8 9 whatever your pleasure is. 10 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Madam Chairman, I 11 would suggest that we just go issue by issue in 12 the order as recommended by staff. 13 CHAIRMAN JABER: Sounds good. Staff 14 recommends that we take up Issue 2 first, page 9. Any questions? 15 16 COMMISSIONER DEASON: I have no questions, 17 and if there are no other questions, I can move 18 staff on Issue 2. 19 CHAIRMAN JABER: I need a second. 20 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Second. 21 CHAIRMAN JABER: There's a motion and a 22 second to approve staff on Issue 2. All those 23 in favor say aye. 24 (Simultaneous affirmative responses.) 25 CHAIRMAN JABER: Issue 2 is approved.

1 Issue 4, page 14. 2 COMMISSIONER DEASON: I have a question. 3 CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Deason. 4 COMMISSIONER DEASON: I'm looking at page 5 15 of the recommendation, the first full 6 paragraph on that page. At the end of that 7 paragraph, there's a statement, and it says, 8 "Commission approval of Manatee Unit 3 does not 9 relieve FPL from its responsibility to prudently 10 manage costs associated with the unit. The Commission will review actual costs in 11 12 subsequent recovery clause or rate case 13 proceedings." 14 And I guess my question to staff is, if 15 this unit is approved and we find ourselves 16 reviewing the costs of the unit in some future 17 rate base proceeding, will we require FP&L to 18 justify any costs over the amount that was bid 19 in this need determination proceeding? 20 MR. HAFF: I believe so, yes. 21 COMMISSIONER DEASON: And it would be your 22 position that FP&L would have the burden to 23 justify any cost differences? 24 MR. HAFF: Yes. 25 COMMISSIONER DEASON: What if the amount

1	that they actually the actual capital costs
2	to construct the unit is less than the \$551
3	million that was projected? We would use the
4	lower number in the rate base proceeding?
5	MR. HAFF: It's my understanding, yes.
6	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Devlin; is that
7	correct?
8	MR. DEVLIN: We would use actual costs.
9	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Actual costs?
10	MR. DEVLIN: I guess if they came in
11	significantly below their projected costs, they
12	may there may be argument for a reward of
13	some sort, but normally we'll go with the
14	original cost.
15	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Normally we use
16	actual costs; correct?
17	MR. DEVLIN: Yes.
18	COMMISSIONER DEASON: But I think in answer
19	to a previous question, if those actual costs
20	are in excess of what was bid in the need
21	determination, there's a burden upon the company
22	to justify that.
23	MR / DEVLIN: That's correct.
24	COMMISSIONER DEASON: There's also a
25	discussion on page 15 dealing with the heat rate

and the availability factors, which I think has been alleged to be fairly on the optimistic side, but I think staff has made the evaluation that this is consistent with recent actual operation; is that correct?

MR. HAFF: That's correct. At Manatee -- or, I'm sorry, Martin Units 3 and 4, they have similar operating experience with those units.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: What will happen in the future if we approve this unit, it gets constructed and it is operating, and it is not available 97% of the time and it does not achieve the target heat rate of 6,850 Btu per kilowatt-hour?

MR. HAFF: That is something that the Commission would address in the fuel adjustment and in the GPIF proceedings. If they aren't meeting their targets, I guess short term, say, over a one-year period, if they're not meeting the target, then we would -- you know, I guess the Commission could give them a penalty. And if it was a consistent concern, I guess we would have to address that in a separate proceeding.

I don't have any evidence that they won't be able to meet these targets, given their

operating experience at other similar units.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So it's your position that these projections that the bid is based upon, the heat rates and availability, is consistent with achievable standards that FP&L has met in the recent past, and that if these amounts are not met, then it would be reviewed in the context of GPIF, and if it's a consistent pattern of nonattaining these amounts, then it could be even reviewed in the context of a base rate proceeding, if possible, if needed?

MR. HAFF: I believe so, yes.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Devlin, you agree with that too?

MR. DEVLIN: Uh-huh.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: That's all the questions I have, Madam Chairman.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I have a question with --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Palecki.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: -- regard to cost-effectiveness and fuel diversity. I've expressed my concerns in past dockets about the lack of fuel diversity we're seeing and the fact that not only in the State of Florida, but

across this country, we're seeing only natural gas combined cycle plants approved, and I'm very concerned for the ratepayers going out into the future. When I see everyone acting in lock step, I think there must be something wrong, and perhaps somebody needs to think in a different manner.

But my question is this: What analysis has staff done with regard to impact on the ratepayers and the cost-effectiveness issue here if natural gas prices exceed the peak that they achieved in January of 2001? And, you know, what I'm reading from many of the projections that I'm seeing is that natural gas prices over the next four years are expected to either meet or exceed that rate, and also that there may be a coming crisis in natural gas in this country exactly because everybody is building combined cycle plants.

MR. HAFF: I guess your question gets to the actual cost of operating units in the ground that consume natural gas, if the prices were to go up some substantial level, what would that do to their costs?

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Well, I guess

generally that's my question, but more specifically my question is, with regard to these two units that we're considering today, have you considered the effect on the ratepayers if we see natural gas prices that exceed the January 2001 price peak?

MR. HAFF: We haven't performed that analysis.

In this case, in comparing alternatives, of course, most all of them were gas-fired combined cycles, so as far as comparing one alternative to another, any change in gas prices would likely affect all of the projects equally. But to get to your question of how it would impact the customers' costs on the end, we haven't performed any sort of evaluation.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Isn't it our obligation as a Commission to do that analysis, to ensure that we're choosing the most cost-effective alternative?

MR. HAFF: Well, I mean, I guess certainly we review fuel costs on a going-forward basis through the fuel clause. But as far as the most cost-effective alternative, comparing, say, a gas-fired combined cycle to a coal unit, you

know, it's really hard to say.

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MR. HARRIS: Commissioner. I think it would be difficult for the Commission to go outside of the record testimony and evidence that was presented and compare those costs.

My understanding of the record is that we did not develop any testimony or evidence as to alternatives to the projects that were bid, which were mainly natural gas combined cycle. To do so, to consider other alternatives, I think there would have had to have been some type of testimony that reflected either the risk of increased natural gas prices or alternatives from other sources of fuel, either fuel oil or That was not a part of this record, and I think it would be very difficult for the staff at the beginning of a need determination to identify that as a proposed issue.

Staff could do it, of course, but in this case, I don't think any of the staff did identify that the increase statewide and nationwide of natural gas combined cycle was a factor to be dealt with as an issue in this need determination, where we were comparing the least-cost alternatives for the 2002 and 2006

need of Power & Light.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Well, who has the burden of making a record that demonstrates that a unit is the most cost-effective alternative?

MR. HARRIS: Commissioners, off the top of my head, and I don't speak for anyone else, I think that perhaps some type of investigations docket might be considered, a generic docket where the Commission could investigate under its own authority the impacts of an increase in natural gas in the state as it affects all the utilities, the investor-owned and the municipals and the independent power-producing industry, because it would be a generic issue that would be applicable to all the power generation in the state, not just one company's proposed need.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: But I thought in a need determination there was a specific obligation on the moving party for the need to demonstrate that the proposed option is the most cost-effective alternative.

MR. HARRIS: That's correct. And on the basis of this record, I believe Florida Power & Light has presented record testimony that their proposals are the most cost-effective

alternatives, given the constraints that we face today, given the bids that they received, their estimates of plants that they could build and the cost for those plants.

I don't believe that the rule and the statute require a company in a need determination to present not only what they believe the best technology is, the most cost-effective technology, but then alternatives to that technology also. I don't believe that Power & Light is under a burden to present, or any utility would have been under a burden to present, "This is what we believe to be the most cost-effective option, but in case there's a concern about the overloading of this technology, here are some other options we have also, coal, fuel oil, nuclear."

MR. HAFF: To add to that point, sort of on the front end before the RFP is even issued, Florida Power & Light looks at all fuel technologies to determine which self-build technology is in their mind the best alternative, and that's when they look at coal and they look at combustion turbine and I guess some other technology. So they do review that.

It's preliminary in the process. And there was testimony in this case from Mr. Yeager, I believe, that they looked -- FPL looked at different technologies, and, of course, on a base case basis, that the gas-fired combined cycle was their best option.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: You know, I think that I probably have to accept responsibility along with every Commissioner here that this was not an issue, because it has come to my attention very recently, mostly through the media and articles that I've read, that we are facing a natural gas crisis going into the future. And I'm very concerned about this Commission approving plants that are just in lock step with everybody else that might just contribute to the problem and, you know, a year or two years out after these plants are already built, we realize that we've made a horrible mistake and that the ratepayers are having to suffer because we've made a mistake.

But I agree with you on one point, that it has not been made an issue in the record in this docket, and I'm kind of -- I have to accept the responsibility for that myself.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Palecki, there's a statement you made I can't let go for purposes of making sure, again, that the record is fleshed and our discussion is fleshed.

I don't think in regard to recent facilities and prior facilities that have gone through the need process where natural gas was the primary fuel factor that that necessarily will ever result in someone looking back and thinking there has been a mistake.

I think it's real important to look at that as a comprehensive -- in a comprehensive analysis and understand and appreciate that companies also do things like hedging and buying at the right time and, you know, maximizing efficiencies and economies of scale.

So I just didn't want to leave the impression that we believe that any of these decisions, you know, in hindsight have resulted in a mistake. Certainly as one Commissioner, I don't think so.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I'm sorry, Madam
Chairman. Perhaps I should only speak for
myself. I'm very concerned, especially based
upon what I've been reading over the past

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several months about a crisis that we may see in the future in the natural gas markets.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Commissioners, any other questions?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Madam Chairman, let me address that for just a second.

You know, I share those concerns, but at the same time, I think it is important for us to realize what we're doing here. We're in a need determination proceeding. We have utilized a bid process, and what we are doing is, we are depending upon the market, market participants, and they are certainly the people that are willing to invest millions of dollars and put it at stake, are certainly -- and with the expertise in the engineering, they're the ones that can evaluate and come forward with proposals. And if someone felt that, for example, a pulverized coal plant was going to be so cost-effective because the price of natural gas was going to escalate, they could put that project together and they could come forward, and we could depend upon the market to provide that information to us.

So either we have to depend upon the

market, or if we think there are deficiencies in the market, well, then we have to make an evaluation that that process is not going to work and that we've got to have something similar to set-asides or something of that nature, a certain percentage of our capacity is going to be from renewables or is going to be from non-natural gas, pulverized coal, or something else.

I don't think we're there yet. And that may be something for a future debate, and I'm open-minded about it. But I don't think it's fair to criticize this process at this time based upon what we have in front of us, and I would just state that for the record.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Commissioners, any other questions on Issue 4 or a motion?

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Madam Chair, I had -- CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Baez.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: -- just one brief question. Going back to the line of questions that Commissioner Deason had, there's three numbers on this page 15, 551 million, 6,850 Btu per kilowatt-hour, and 97%. Is there magic in these numbers? I just want to drive the point

1	home. These are and it's sort of a it's a
2	loaded question, really. But these are the
3	numbers supposedly that in the future will be
4	prior testimony, I guess.
5	MR. HAFF: Held up.
6	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: The numbers that got
7	thrown up.
8	MR. HAFF: Maybe held up for future
9	skepticism.
10	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Exactly, held up for
11	future analysis
12	MR. HAFF: Sure.
13	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: in comparison to
14	what the actuals are.
15	MR. HAFF: Yes.
16	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: All right. Thank you.
17	CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioners, a motion?
18	COMMISSIONER DEASON: We're on Issue 4;
19	correct?
20	CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes.
21	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I move staff.
22	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Second.
23	CHAIRMAN JABER: There's a motion and a
24	second to approve staff on Issue 4. All those
25	in favor say aye.

1	(Simultaneous affirmative responses.)
2	CHAIRMAN JABER: Issue 4 is approved.
3	That takes us to Issue 6, page 19.
4	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I have no questions.
5	I can move staff on Issue 6.
6	COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Second.
7	CHAIRMAN JABER: Motion and a second to
8	approve staff on Issue 6. All those in favor
9	say aye.
10	(Simultaneous affirmative responses.)
11	CHAIRMAN JABER: Issue 6 is approved.
12	Issue 8.
13	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I can move staff on
14	Issue 8.
15	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Second.
16	COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Second.
17	CHAIRMAN JABER: There's a motion and a
18	second to approve staff on Issue 8. All those
19	in favor say aye.
20	(Simultaneous affirmative responses.)
21	CHAIRMAN JABER: Issue 8 is approved.
22	Issue 13? No, 1. I read my 1 and my 3
23	together. That takes us back to Issue 1.
24	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Back to 1? Okay.
25	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. On Issue 1, I just

had a basic mathematical question. 19.92% is 20%, in my mind. Somebody needs to correct me.

MR. HAFF: I agree with you.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. So if you sort of remove yourself from this proceeding and think about prospectively as you take a look at FP&L and whether they are complying with their voluntary stipulation, if you saw the number 19.92% as a reserve margin, would you penalize them, or would you think it was 20%?

MR. HAFF: I would view it as 20%. And additionally, I write the ten-year site plan review for the Commission, and we have -- if I saw it in a ten-year site plan, I would see that as 20%.

CHAIRMAN JABER: And let me tell you why that's important in my mind. Commissioners, if we are going to approve the Martin unit, that may be fine at the end of the day. But I have to tell you, in my mind, it's not because 19.92% of a reserve margin is not sufficient enough for — again, this is one Commissioner speaking, in terms of the company complying with their voluntary stipulation.

What I'm much more inclined to focus on is

whatever benefits the customers derive from the plant coming on line a year earlier from the economies of scale and the efficiencies that are gained and the savings, the cost savings associated with both of those plants being constructed. But I have to tell you, the distinction between 19.92% and 20% reserve margin did nothing for me.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Madam Chairman, may I add to that?

CHAIRMAN JABER: Please.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I agree with you. There's not a significant difference between 19.92% and 20%. Particularly when you're looking at a company the size of FP&L and the diverse resources they have, that's really negligible.

I think what we need to look at, and I think you alluded to this also, is that we've got to look at a broader picture here, and we have to take into consideration other aspects other than just a strict adherence to a target reserve number, even though I think the 20% target is a good target. I don't take issue with the 20%. And I think that we need to be

mindful of the bigger picture.

And, staff, correct me if I'm wrong. Back about four years ago, we were considering the need for a power plant to be constructed by Duke at New Smyrna. Now, we made a decision that was overturned by the Court, and I don't take issue with the Court's interpretation of the law. There was not standing to come forward and even petition for a need determination. However, our decision that we made, I think we looked at a broader picture there, and we looked at need not in the strict sense of a certain reliability or reserve margin target. We also looked in terms of economic need. Am I correct on that?

MR. HAFF: Correct. That's correct.

commissioner deason: And I think that we need to be careful that when we look at need that we don't restrict it simply to a very strict interpretation of a very precise target number, that we also need the latitude to look at economic need and value added, that perhaps there are scenarios in the future that may come forward that there's value added.

And as Commissioner Palecki alluded to, there may be a situation where we get projects

in the future in future bid proceedings and need determinations where we put some value on fuel diversity. Maybe there is a project in the future that has some fuel diversity and we put some premium on that. I think that's some of the discretion we need to keep.

It seems to me that it may be shortsighted to be arguing that we need to look only at a strict target, that we need to look at need in terms of economic need as well. There may be a time in the future, and who knows, where a certain market participant has access to a certain technology, and while we may be at a 20% reserve margin, they can come forward and build a plant that is so economic that we would determine that it is needed simply based upon the economics, that it provides so much cost savings to customers that it is needed based upon the economics of the proposal. And I think we need to retain that discretion as well.

So those are my thoughts, Madam Chairman.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: A question.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Baez.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And I guess I would agree with the comments that have been made. I

just want to understand then what the basis of this decision on this issue would be, because I wouldn't be -- I wouldn't be in favor of endorsing what I also consider to maybe border on pretext. I mean, I don't think -- you know, I need a ride to the corner, so I'm going to buy the car. You know, I mean, there are many different ways of addressing it, and I wouldn't want to accept the premise that a .8 -- .08, is it?

CHAIRMAN JABER: .08.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: You know, shortfall was somehow justifiable for this magnitude of a project.

So I guess my question would be, exactly what does this issue address? Is it something more than that or not?

MR. HAFF: This issue addresses the need for the plant, the need for megawatts, if you will, to meet a load forecast. It's just that, do they need the plant.

CHAIRMAN JABER: No, but I think

Commissioner Baez's question goes to, which is

precisely why I brought up my concern, that

staff's recommendation that there is a need for

this plant because FPL has to meet a strict 20% reserve margin. I hope that's not staff's recommendation. I read --

MR. HAFF: No.

CHAIRMAN JABER: -- into staff's recommendation that it's also because there are cost savings that benefit the consumers in the long run by putting this plant into service in the year 2005, the latter part of the recommendation statement, Commissioner Baez.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And I understand that.

But my way of taking the recommendation, Madam

Chairman, was that these were somehow in

addition to, and -- or, in essence, thinking of

all things being equal, it does add reliability.

So I'm also uncomfortable -- I'm uncomfortable

even with that thought process as well.

And moreover, I'm uncomfortable -- I want to get clear the effect of the decision on this issue, because I want to understand what the fallouts are. And this issue -- and certainly voting on this issue now may be putting the cart before the horse on some level. Do you designate something as more cost-effective if your issue is saying do you need a 700-megawatt

plant?

MR. HAFF: This issue -- if you vote no on this issue, it just means that you're deciding that they don't need -- that FPL does not need Martin Unit 8 in 2005. I apologize if it wasn't clear. I'm recommending that they don't need the full capacity of Martin 8 on a reliability basis until 2006. Voting this issue has no effect on, at least from this person, from this point of view, on cost-effectiveness, which you would vote in another issue.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, again, I just want to understand what the statement of a positive or negative decision is. I mean, it says --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I think part of the problem is that in answering this question, our staff has deviated from our own instruction.

It's a yes or no question, and they didn't answer yes or no. They explained without -- and I'm not faulting them. They really did not answer, in my opinion -- at least looking at the one-paragraph recommendation, they really didn't answer yes or no. I think the message is that it's not needed on a strict reliability

standard, but there are other considerations which justify the construction of the plant.

CHAIRMAN JABER: For 2005. That's the other distinction he's trying to make.

MR. HAFF: Correct.

CHAIRMAN JABER: It doesn't need it for the reliability standard in terms of the year 2005, but staff recommends that there is a need in terms of integrity and reliability for 2006.

MR. HAFF: Correct. And the last sentence in the recommendation statement is just meant to say that adding Martin 8 in 2005 doesn't adversely affect reliability, it enhances it. Whether it's all needed in 2005 is the other question.

CHAIRMAN JABER: We could, of course,

Commissioners --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, now, let me ask a question in that regard. We did have testimony, did we not, though, that looked at the transmission upgrade costs that may be necessary if you staggered these units and built one on one side of the state and then waited a year and built another one on the other side of the state? With units of this magnitude, there

would be transmission cost impacts. And I guess that may go to the cost-effectiveness of the timing of the construction of the plants.

MR. HAFF: Yes, that's correct.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Does it have -- I guess to maintain the reliability of building one plant of this size on one side of the state, that there would be needed transmission upgrades to make sure there's no detrimental effect upon reliability; is that correct?

MR. HAFF: And that's correct, when you assume that the units are split by year. If you're adding one one -- adding Manatee in 2005 and Martin in 2006, you're correct, that transmission line is needed really only for that one year.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Commissioners, here's -- I guess as clearly as I can define it in my mind, here's the concern that I have.

First of all, the issue has Martin Unit 8.

Okay. Martin Unit 8 is a plant of some -- of considerable capacity, and the question is, do you have a need for it. And I think we've as much as -- we've discussed the comparable or the exaggeration of the 15-megawatt shortfall and

how that creates a conflict in you to say,
"Well, there's a shortfall on the 20% margin,
and so by addressing that, are we going to
answer an ultimate question of a plant of some
magnitude to address that need?" And I guess
I'm uncomfortable with this issue in particular
being so specific.

I mean, is there -- because to me, the ultimate question that the issue is asking is, do you need 700 megawatts to cover a 15-megawatt shortfall? And if we ask it that way, the answer to me is clear. Regardless of whether it's more cost-effective for 2006, those questions remain to be seen, and I see it as -- that's where the efficiencies of perhaps avoiding some transmission costs and so on come into play. But I'm a little uncomfortable with this question that's being asked here, at least in the way --

CHAIRMAN JABER: I understand your point,

Commissioner Baez. I understand, and I think

where also I'm not willing to agree with

something you just said -- and I think we're

saying the same thing. On the shortfall, the

reserve margin shortfall, I don't even think

there's a reserve margin shortfall.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, yes, I agree with you.

CHAIRMAN JABER: For the reasons we all articulated.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I don't think that the differential is -- I think it's de minimis. I don't think that in any -- if the company came in and said, "Hey, guys, we're .08 short," that anyone was going to take issue at the end of the day.

MR. HAFF: No, we didn't.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: So I'm convinced of that. I sense that the rest of you are as well, so I'm worried about giving it that kind of --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Well, here's an idea.

This same discussion -- in terms of the record evidence, this is critical. But Commissioner Baez's good point about this record evidence really goes to the cost savings and the cost-effectiveness of the Martin unit. And I notice the next issue has us voting on need for the unit at a reasonable cost. You guys need to correct me if we're on thin legal grounds. It seems to me making sure this discussion occurs

in some part of the order negates, may negate
the need to vote with respect to finding a need
for Martin Unit 8 as it relates to reliability
and integrity. Commissioner Baez, that's one
option, until Martha tells me we're wrong.

The second option may be that, obviously, we modify staff's recommendation to encompass what we just --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, and I guess I see it as a timing -- I see it as a timing issue. I mean, by saying yea or nay to an existing need of -- and again, I can't stress enough, you know, the unit says Martin Unit 8. Martin Unit 8 has a specific -- there is a specific concept. It is a project of known size and capacity, you know, so I guess to me it's a timing question. Do you need that project for 2005? And I see it as that -- I mean, maybe it's a matter of breaking it down --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Ms. Brown?

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: -- along those lines.

MS. BROWN: Commissioner, it seems to me that we can take care of this when we get to writing the order. These issues are determined in part by statute, and they are confining to

some extent.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I understand.

MS. BROWN: But when we get to writing the order, it seems to me to be possible to say in response to this question, is there a need, a reliability need for this plant in 2005, you can say, "No, but it will be more cost-effective if it is constructed, and therefore we are approving it for those reasons." And that way -- I think that's what you want to get at, isn't it, pretty much?

CHAIRMAN JABER: That's partially it, but I think there's also agreement with respect to the second part of staff's recommendation. And, Commissioner, Baez, you need to correct me if I'm wrong. There is -- you would agree that there is a need in the year 2006?

MS. BROWN: (Nodding head affirmatively.)

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: A need for capacity?

CHAIRMAN JABER: A need for capacity in

2006.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Madam Chair.

MS: BROWN: Right, right, and that could be -- yes, you're exactly right. That would go into the explanation as well. It would be there

1 is -- in the years 2005 and 2006, there is a 2 need for this amount of capacity that can be 3 filled by these plants. While the Martin plant is not strictly needed in 2005, it makes 4 5 cost-effectiveness sense to build them all at 6 the same time, and therefore you approve it. 7 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Madam Chair. 8 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: If that's what -- and I 9 forgot what issue we're on now. 10 CHAIRMAN JABER: Now we're on Issue 1. 11 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: We are on Issue 1. 12 MS. BROWN: You know, when --13 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Okay. If that's what 14 Issue 1 is --15 MS. BROWN: And when the order is drafted, 16 it won't be so exactly specific as to these 17 issues, and there will be the flexibility to 18 write it the way you want to. I think that we 19 all know and all agree what you want to say. 20 It's just that these issues, statutory issues 21 are hard to mesh all the facts into, but it can 22 be done. 23 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And I appreciate the 24 difficulty. I just -- I mean, I've heard a 25 considerable amount of discomfort with what

could possibly -- with what it could possibly mean as opposed to what it should. And as long as at the end of the issue there's some understanding of that, I --

MS. BROWN: Now, if you want more specific language in the recommendation for that issue that you want to vote on, you could modify the statement to include that, and I haven't --

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I have a -CHAIRMAN JABER: Hang on, Commissioner

Bradley. Hang on.

MS. BROWN: While you're talking about other things, I can sit here and try to propose something if you want.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I think we've covered it.

The only thing I want to add to what you just said, Martha, before we leave this topic relates to that reserve margin. I also heard consensus — and again, we haven't voted — that the reliance with respect to the reserve margin being strictly 20% as it relates to need is not — it's not as critical.

MS./ BROWN: Right. And it has been a while since the hearing, but I think there were some questions and discussion about that at the

hearing as well, whether the Commission was going to be -- had to be bound by this voluntary strict interpretation of the strict 20%. And I think the feeling was that, no, depending on the facts and circumstances in this case, it's a pretty clear example that --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes. I mean in terms of the order, you need to modify this section to not make it sound like that's why we are finding that there is a need --

MS. BROWN: Yes, I understand that.

CHAIRMAN JABER: -- as opposed to 2006.

MS. BROWN: Yes.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Bradley.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Yes. While I can appreciate what staff just said, I think that there's a constitutional consideration that we haven't put into this discussion that was not a part of the equation when we had the initial hearing, and that is the class size amendment.

MS. BROWN: I'm sorry. The what?

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: The class size amendment that just recently passed for sure is going to create an additional need for capacity, which may really throw these figures off

completely. So I think that when you factor that in, that's an intervening variable that we did not give consideration to, as I said, when we had the initial hearing. When you factor that in, we may not have a 20% margin here. We may be below that. So I think just that constitutional amendment itself, because it did pass, is going to throw these figures off. So I see most definitely that if we -- I mean, is it possible to factor that in and determine what the reliability will be?

MS. BROWN: I wouldn't say perhaps at this
point --

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: That that's included in the discussion?

MS. BROWN: Well, certainly you can discuss
it. I would think that --

CHAIRMAN JABER: You can't rely on it.

MS. BROWN: Any proceeding before the Commission when something occurs that is unanticipated or there is an egregious problem that develops, the utilities can come before us, and we can address something. And if that comes up, if this class size amendment affects this, then I'm sure the utilities will come before us

to ask for some sort of dispensation or change in how we deal with it. CHAIRMAN JABER: Those kinds of things get picked up in their ten-year site plan review every year. MS. BROWN: Sure. MR. HAFF: Right.

CHAIRMAN JABER: But the answer to

Commissioner Bradley's question would be, it

can't be considered now because we don't have

testimony in the record.

MS. BROWN: You're right.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Bradley, because there are other things probably that we're not even thinking of right now that companies pick up every year in their ten-year site plan that they have to file here, and demand expectations change every year.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: And that's true.

But I think in anticipation of us having to

build more classrooms, I think that we could

probably prognosticate the fact that we are

going to have more of a demand need, and that

approving the Martin 8 plant is a prudent thing

to do in anticipation of us having new and

expanded need.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me say, I think that's a very good point, and I think it can kind of be captured in the assessment, that staff has said that while it might not meet the strict reliability requirement in terms of a stated reserve margin, it does add reliability to the FPL system, and so we get an extra cushion of reliability. That's one of the added benefits of that, and I think that it probably makes that added benefit even more valuable, realizing that there are changes such as you just described that are taking place.

MR. HAFF: Right.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Commissioners, any other questions to Issue 1 or a motion? Or are you in agreement that no vote is necessary on Issue 1, we make sure the discussion we had gets incorporated possibly in the cost-effectiveness issue, or wherever else it may be appropriate in the body of the order?

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Well, if it's more cost-efficient, or effective, that is, in order to build it in 2005 rather than 2006, I would like to make a motion to move staff, staff's

recommendation on Issue 1.

issue, though, I -- yes. I think your motion goes to the final issue about whether both plants should come in at 2005. This particular issue, staff is recommending that we find a need exists because Martin Unit 8 brings FP&L to a 20% reserve margin and because Martin 8 will help enhance reliability in 2006. So I think, Commissioner Bradley, we may get to exactly where you want to be at the conclusion of all the votes. Obviously, we don't know how the Commission will vote, but --

MR. HAFF: Madam Chairman.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Mr. Haff.

MR. HAFF: I apologize if it's not clear, but inherent in the discussion is that there is a need in 2006, a reliability need in 2006.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Did I misstate that? I didn't mean to. Okay.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Madam Chairman, I think when you speak of enhancing reliability, the incremental, I think it's referring to 2005. Is that correct?

MR. HAFF: That's correct, and that it

absolutely is needed in 2006.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let me ask this question, Commissioners. We've had extensive discussion on this, and I'm in agreement with the general direction of the discussion.

I think counsel has indicated that she can incorporate that into the order. I don't really have a problem the wording of staff's recommendation, as long as we're clear that the order is consistent with the discussion we've had here. I'm reading the exact language of the recommendation. I don't find anything in there that is inconsistent with our discussion. And if there is, I would just ask someone to point it out to me, and maybe we can make a modification to that. But I don't have a problem with the recommendation as stated in the recommendation paragraph on page 5.

Now, if it's decided we don't need to vote on this at all and we can still get -- you know, we still can meet the statutory requirements, the requirement we have for this need determination, I'm not opposed to that either. But I do not find the recommendation language objectionable.

1	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, I
2	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Let me ask a
3	question.
4	CHAIRMAN JABER: The recommendation
5	statement, Commissioner Baez, is what
6	Commissioner Deason is looking at, page 5.
7	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I don't have a problem
8	with the first half of it. I think that not
9	having voted on Issue 14 to accept a
10	recommendation that presupposes that and
11	again, I just want to keep things in order,
12	because I initially had a slight bit of
L3	confusion as to what exactly we were deciding
14	with this Issue 1.
L5	CHAIRMAN JABER: Oh, okay. So your point
16	would be you would stop the recommendation after
17	"Summer 2006"?
18	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: In my mind, it's the
19	only accurate statement legally
20	CHAIRMAN JABER: To respond to this issue.
21	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: that we can make,
22	because otherwise, we're deciding Issue 14.
23	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I tend to agree with
24	that. I think staff was just aiding the
25	Commissioners, as we read this recommendation,

kind of giving us an up-front position concerning subsequent issues so we would kind of follow the flow of the recommendation, and that would make it easier.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And don't misunderstand. I'm glad they actually wrote the recommendation this way, because it does give you an easy reference point, and I appreciate it. There were enough issues, and statutorily there are enough confusing issues that need getting answered. However, because of the order of the issues, and because of the point in the conversation that we're in --

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I want to ask a question to get clarity.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Let me go back and explain something, Commissioner Bradley, because you made a reference to a motion, and I want to explain to you what Commissioner Baez just pointed out. It's not that the bottom part of staff's recommendation in Issue 1 is completely taken out. Commissioner Baez's point is that it's premature to vote on that statement when we haven't gotten to Issue 14 yet. So I wanted to

make real clear, Commissioners, that we're not taking staff's recommendation out completely here. We're just reserving the vote until we get to Issue 14.

commissioner BAEZ: Not at all. That's exactly right. I mean, if Issue 14 still needs discussion -- and it may be that this ultimately applies, and if that's the case, I don't have a problem with it. But again, we are taking a vote here, and I think that we at least have to be as accurate as we can with what we are voting on.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let me -CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Bradley, does
that satisfy your concern?

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Well, I need to just get something clear in my mind. Is it that you're concerned about the 19.92% reserve margin, the fact that we in the past have clearly established that 20% is the agreed-upon number, and that if we vote for the 19.92% reserve margin, then what we're doing is re-establishing the precedent?

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, here's my problem. In a vacuum, I am not willing to say

that for a recognized 15-megawatt shortfall, there is a need for 789 megawatts, strictly speaking. When we get to Issue 14 and we discuss the cost-effectiveness of possibly that option, I may be willing to say that after we discuss it.

But I'm not going -- I'm unwilling to say that we have to meet -- that a 20%, which has been voluntarily established, it is an agreement, is not the same thing as 19.92. I'm not willing to say that. And I'm also not willing to say, as I stated before, that in order to meet that .08 shortfall in year 2005, we absolutely need a 789-megawatt plant.

Again, it may turn out that it's more cost-effective. As we will discuss, I'm sure, at length later on, it may turn out that it's more cost-effective to do it in 2005 rather than 2006. But I think that that's an issue for later on in the discussion under Issue 14 as referenced in this recommendation. I'm not willing to decide it before.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Wouldn't it just be easier to vote on this issue after we vote on Issue 14?

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: It may be.

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CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioners, listen, we get to the same place. This issue asks us to take a vote on a very limited part of this case. I think Commissioner Deason's suggestion, or whoever, between he and Commissioner Baez, you hit the nail on the head. If we delete from "However" to "integrity," we're going to get to the same place.

Commissioners, what we've all said is, from a strict reserve margin perspective and to address the 15-megawatt shortfall, no one is willing to support the notion that the entire 789-megawatt unit is needed. However, perhaps we're going to consider from a bigger, larger comprehensive standpoint the need for that unit. So this issue, I would remind everyone, does not preclude that vote.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I'm just interested in keeping them -- you know, let's have some linear -- I know it's hard enough to do, but let's try and maintain some linear pattern to our votes.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let me ask a question on that. You know, you did identify -- subject to my question and my request, you

identified objectionable language within the 1 recommendation, and I agree with you that it's 2 3 presupposing something. And maybe this is not 4 the -- but the question that I have is, what is 5 objectionable about the very last sentence in the recommendation? It's not saying that it's It's just finding -- it is finding that the added capacity will enhance the reliability and integrity. COMMISSIONER BAEZ: In an objective sense, without prejudging cost-effectiveness and

whether --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I don't think the last sentence really goes to cost-effectiveness at all.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I think in theory, absolutely, even if Martin -- if Martin 8 were a 4,000-megawatt plant -- and I don't know that that exists, but if it -- you know, in an absolute sense, yes, of course it enhances reliability and integrity. You know, I would have to say yes. My only concern is not deciding one before the other, that's all.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I'm open to a motion, and maybe if Commissioner Baez can make

1 a motion, I might could second it. 2 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I would -- and again, 3 in an objective sense, we can keep that last 4 sentence, so I would --5 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Okay. I made a 6 motion. Why don't I withdraw my motion. 7 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Oh, I'm sorry. 8 didn't know that you had made a motion. I'm willing -- if you want to restate your motion, 9 10 I'm willing maybe to second your motion. 11 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Well, I made a 12 motion to move staff's recommendation, and we 13 were waiting on a second, and then we got into a 14 discussion. So why don't I withdraw my motion, 15 and we'll see what Commissioner Baez wants to 16 propose. So I --17 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: My motion --18 CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Commissioner 19 Bradlev. 20 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Thank you. 21 Commissioner. 22 My motion would simply be to remove the 23 second -- no, I'm sorry, the third sentence, the 24 one that says, "However, as discussed in Issue 25 14, it is more cost-effective for FPL to place

Martin 8 into commercial service in 2005 rather than 2006." And I'm willing to maintain the "enhancing" language. And I would move staff with that modification.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Do we have a second?

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I'll second that.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. There's a motion and a second to modify staff's recommendation such that the sentence that reads, "However, as discussed in Issue 14, it is more cost-effective for FPL to place Martin Unit 8 into commercial service in 2005 rather than 2006," is deleted. And there was a second. All those in favor say aye.

(Simultaneous affirmative responses.)

CHAIRMAN JABER: Issue 1 as modified is approved. That takes us to Issue 3. And that's page 11, and this is need for the unit, taking into the account the need for adequate electricity at a reasonable cost. Questions?

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I just would like to reiterate my concerns about fuel diversity. And I think it's especially more appropriate with regard to Martin Unit 8 than it is to the previous unit. I'm just hoping that for all

1	future need determinations we see a very, very
2	thorough look at what an increase in natural gas
3	prices can do to the ratepayers' obligation and
4	consider what other alternatives are available
5	outside of natural gas combined cycle plants.
6	CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Commissioner.
7	Commissioners, any questions or a motion on
8	Issue 3?
9	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I think it
10	would be I had questions on Issue 4
11	concerning heat rates and availability factors
12	and capital costs. I think the same would apply
13	for this particular unit as well. And with that
14	understanding, I can move staff on Issue 3.
15	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Second.
16	CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Baez, did you
17	have questions?
18	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I have the same
19	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. There's been a
20	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I had the same
21	questions.
22	CHAIRMAN JABER: motion and a second.
23	All those in favor say aye.
24	(Simultaneous affirmative responses.)
25	CHAIRMAN JABER: Issue 3 is approved.

1 Issue 5.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Move staff.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I'm sorry, Commissioner

Deason. I had one clarifying question. On page

18, staff, the sentence, "Stated another way, if

15 megawatts of additional DSM were available to

FP&L for free, it would cost FP&L ratepayers \$18

million more to defer Martin Unit 8," you're

going to have to explain that sentence to me.

MR. HAFF: That just means that deferring it -- as we discussed, deferring Martin Unit 8 by a year would be \$18 million more costly overall, and that is a scenario where you don't even address the 15-megawatt shortfall. And this statement is just meant to respond to some of the intervenor positions that they should have looked for 15 megawatts of conservation. That conservation, if it were available, would come at a cost, which would make that \$18 million even more than \$18 million.

CHAIRMAN JABER: If that could be either deleted from the order or clarified for the order, I would feel a lot more comfortable,

Ms. Brown, because you -- to turn it into what you said with respect to costs associated with

DSM offsetting any sort of savings, you know, associated with the \$18 million is something I can --

MR. HAFF: Actually, more DSM would add to the \$18 million. The cost of splitting them up, adding -- if we were to address -- if we were concerned about the 15-megawatt shortfall -- and I've heard that we're not, but if we were, and we asked the utility to go find 15 megawatts of conservation, it would cost a certain amount of money, which with \$18 million, it already costs more to defer the unit, and it would cost even more than 18 --

CHAIRMAN JABER: I understand what you're saying. Even with the DSM conservation goal being met, it's not going to completely defer the necessity for the plant, and the longer you put it off, the more it may cost.

MR. HAFF: Well, I'm just -- not exactly.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let see if I can help you. The difficulty we have here is, normally when you talk about deferring a unit, you're talking about cost savings.

MR. HAFF: Correct.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And that is the

normal analysis, and we start comparing DSM and other things. This is a very strange situation, in that we have a proposal for two plants.

There are certain synergies and efficiencies that are in the record about building two plants. And when you're talking about deferring a plant, you're not talking about -- in this situation, based upon the evidence, you're not talking about about cost savings. You're talking about added costs of deferral.

MR. HAFF: That's correct.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So that's why it's a little -- the analysis is a little contrary to what we normally are accustomed to reviewing it in.

MR. HAFF: That's correct, yes.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Well, but is that sentence necessary for the order, Commissioner Deason?

Do you see the confusion? Am I the only one --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I don't think it's necessary. I think the staff was just trying to — actually was trying to help us understand and maybe have slightly confused the issue, but I don't think that it's necessary to have that sentence in the recommendation or in the order.

1	MS. BROWN: I won't put it in, Chairman
2	Jaber. There's plenty of discussion of the
3	rationale above it.
4	CHAIRMAN JABER: Exactly. That's exactly
5	right.
6	Okay. Commissioner Deason, you made a
7	motion to approve staff on Issue 5.
8	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Madam Chair, for the
9	record, why don't we specifically identify the
10	sentence? Would you read it?
11	CHAIRMAN JABER: It's page 18. It's the
12	last sentence of the first paragraph, "Stated
13	another way, if 15 megawatts of additional DSM
14	were available to FP&L for free, it would cost
15	FP&L ratepayers \$18 million more to defer Martin
16	Unit 8." I think that's confusing. It doesn't
17	add to the previous discussion, which is real
18	clear, and it will be removed from the order.
19	Commissioner Deason, you made a motion.
20	Did I hear a second?
21	COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Second.
22	CHAIRMAN JABER: All those in favor of
23	approving staff on Issue 5 say aye.
24	(Simultaneous affirmative responses.)
25	CHAIRMAN JABER: Issue 5 is approved.

1 we'	re going to take a ten-minute break,
2 Commissi	oners.
3 (Sh	nort recess.)
4 CHA	AIRMAN JABER: Okay. Let's get back on
5 the reco	ord, and we are on Issue 7.
6 COM	MMISSIONER DEASON: Move staff.
7 CHA	AIRMAN JABER: There has been a motion.
8 We need	a second.
9 COM	MMISSIONER BRADLEY: Second.
10 CHA	AIRMAN JABER: Motion and a second to
11 approve	staff on Issue 7. All those in favor
12 say aye.	
13 (Si	multaneous affirmative responses.)
14 CHA	AIRMAN JABER: Issue 7 is approved.
15 Issue 9.	
16 COM	MMISSIONER DEASON: I can move staff.
17 COM	MMISSIONER BAEZ: Second.
18 CHA	AIRMAN JABER: There has been a motion
19 and a se	cond to approve staff on Issue 9. All
20 those in	favor say aye.
21 (Si	multaneous affirmative responses.)
22 CHA	AIRMAN JABER: Issue 9 is approved. Ten.
23 COM	MMISSIONER DEASON: Which one are we on?
24 CHA	AIRMAN JABER: Right now we're on 10.
	The state of the s

1	CHAIRMAN JABER: Page 26. Doesn't it feel
2	like a Monday? Am I the only one that thinks
3	this is a okay. I heard a motion on Issue
4	10.
5	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Second.
6	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. All those in favor
7	say aye.
8	(Simultaneous affirmative responses.)
9	CHAIRMAN JABER: Issue 10 is approved.
10	Issue 11.
11	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Move staff.
12	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I have one question.
13	CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Baez.
14	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And then I'll second
15	it. The first line of the staff analysis on
16	page 29 we are on 11; right?
17	CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes, uh-huh, 29, page 29.
18	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I was just curious as
19	to the implication of saying that the statute
20	does not expressly require FPL's I mean, is
21	there anything other than that they should
22	be being? You know, should they be doing
23	anything other than that?
24	You can say no. That's all right.
25	MS. BROWN: I don't really know how to

answer this question.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: It just -- I'm sorry.

It just struck me. That's the kind of --

MS. BROWN: We don't have to put this in the order.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I just listen to my child saying, "You didn't say I couldn't," you know.

MS. BROWN: This is kind of an internal staff discussion about how do you deal with this when the statute doesn't say fair, just, and reasonable, like so much of ours do. But we don't have to put this in the order if you don't want it. It really doesn't help anything.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: It was more a rhetorical question than anything else.

And then lastly, can you clarify for me the 1.3% spread?

MR. HAFF: Yes, Commissioner Baez. In the evaluation of all of the projects and the combinations of projects that FPL evaluated using the EGEAS model and everything else, one of the exhibits had each of the groupings of projects in order from the FPL self-build, and they went down 36, I believe, groups of projects

1	and the total system revenue requirements
2	associated with each of those combinations. From
3	the best group, which was FPL's self-build, down
4	to the most costly group was 1.3% difference.
5	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And that was the next
6	question I was going to ask. When you say all
7	proposals, that includes the self-build option?
8	MR. HAFF: Yes.
9	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: In that spread.
10	MR. HAFF: In that spread, that includes
11	groupings of every single bid.
12	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Thank you. I can
13	second it.
14	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. There has been a
15	motion and a second to approve staff on Issue
16	11. All those in favor say aye.
17	(Simultaneous affirmative responses.)
18	CHAIRMAN JABER: Issue 11 is approved.
19	Now we have 11(a) through 11(g).
20	Commissioners, I don't know if you want to take
21	those up separately or
22	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Madam Chairman, I
23	have some questions, so
24	CHAIRMAN JABER: Go ahead.
25	COMMISSIONER DEASON: maybe we can do it

1 separately. 2 On 11(a), this alludes to questions I've asked earlier. And, staff, I would direct you 3 4 to PACE's position on page 31. It indicates 5 there that FP&L has not committed to stand by 6 these values for ratemaking purposes, and these 7 values I assume are heat rate, availability 8 factors, things of that nature. 9 MR. HAFF: Uh-huh. 10 COMMISSIONER DEASON: And that the 11 Commission must consider the risk of 12 nonperformance by FPL. 13 Just because FP&L has not committed to 14 stand by these, we have the ability to review 15 those in the context of GPIF in a rate base 16 proceeding? 17 MR. HAFF: Correct. That's correct. 18 COMMISSIONER DEASON: And FP&L would have 19 the burden to demonstrate variances from those? 20 MR. HAFF: Yes. 21 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Or not just to 22 demonstrate, but to justify. 23 MR / HAFF: Correct. 24 COMMISSIONER DEASON: I can move 11(a). 25 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Second.

CHAIRMAN JABER: All those in favor say
aye, of approving staff on 11(a).

(Simultaneous affirmative responses.)

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Staff, I need some help on 11(b). There's a wide discrepancy between the variable O&M cost that was bid by FPL in their proposals and the amount of most of the other bidders. And I think that you may have alluded this to in your recommendation, or maybe I just recall some discussion at the hearing itself, but I think it was represented that the bidders obviously were free to bid what they thought was appropriate.

CHAIRMAN JABER: 11(a) is approved. 11(b).

MR. HAFF: Yes.

requirements or restrictions within the bidding process, that they could have bid lower numbers if they felt that were appropriate, and there was some concern that perhaps the non-FP&L bidders were looking to allocate costs between fixed and variable in some way that perhaps they felt advantaged them when it came to revenue streams.

MR. HAFF: I believe that's correct. We

discussed earlier that there was some variation
in the bids. Some of the bids had low variable
costs, and some of them had high. And I had
discussed before, it was strictly up to the
bidder to decide how that pot is divided.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: If a bidder consciously decides to put more cost recovery in fixed amounts as opposed to -- I'm sorry, wanted to put more costs in the variable amount as opposed to the fixed amount, would that be reflected in the price that FP&L would have to pay if that unit were constructed and was actually dispatched, or how would the contracts provide for cost recovery of fixed versus variable costs?

MR. HAFF: My understanding is that if there was more, as you premised, more of the amount in the variable O&M costs, there would be more -- more of the payment would be tied to the energy payment and less to the fixed capacity payment if this bid were indeed chosen and carried forward.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So to model their system, if one of these other bidders had won, then when it came to actually dispatching that

plant, FP&L would have to take into consideration the variable costs that were contained within the bid?

MR. HAFF: Correct.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And if they placed more of their costs on the variable side, well, then you would think that then they would have an advantage on the capital side, would you not?

MR. HAFF: I would believe so, yes.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: That's all my questions.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I'm concerned about the sheer difference between 3.7 cents per megawatt-hour and \$2 per megawatt-hour. Are the FPL variable O&M values artificially low, or are they realistic?

MR. HAFF: I don't believe they're low.

They were on the low end of the range. Not all bidders identified \$2 per megawatt-hour. Some of the bids had lower variable O&M costs, and some of them were higher. This \$2 per megawatt-hour, if I recall, was probably the highest of the variable O&M costs that one of the bidders bid. Again, the wide difference, if you will, between them just goes to how the

1 individual bidders and FPL decided to split up a 2 pot of O&M dollars, if you will. 3 COMMISSIONER PALECKI: What are the 4 repercussions if FPL is unable to achieve the 5 3.7 cents per megawatt-hour? 6 MR. HAFF: That goes into the variable 7 energy costs, and I believe that is something that we would look at in the fuel adjustment 8 hearings when they determine the cost of fuel 9 for their units. This part of the pot of 10 11 dollars for fuel adjustment would be variable 12 о&м. 13 COMMISSIONER PALECKI: So variable 0&m 14 would be a fuel clause issue rather than a rates 15 issue? 16 MR. HAFF: That's my understanding, yes. 17 Yes. 18 COMMISSIONER PALECKI: And going into the 19 future, does this Commission have the ability to 20 hold FPL or any other bidder that might in the 21 future request a need determination to a given 22 quantity such as this variable O&M cost? 23 MR. HAFF: I can't picture where we would 24 hold them to a specific subcomponent of overall 25 costs. In other words, this variable O&M is a

piece of the variable costs of operating a unit. Fuel is far and away the big piece of it. Variable O&M is a small piece of it. As far as holding them to a specific number, we in subsequent fuel adjustment proceedings would look to see if their energy payments, if you will, are out of line. I can't envision a situation where we would be homing in on just the 3.7 cents, though.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: What if there was a non-utility bidder that had prevailed on the RFP process and a bidder came in with a contract? In that case, certainly we would hold the bidder to the quantities in the RFP, would we not?

MR. HAFF: For this variable O&M piece or for their total costs?

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: For total costs.

MR. HAFF: For total costs, my understanding is they would be paid what was in their bid or whatever contract was signed at the time that the bid was approved or accepted by FPL.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: So if they exceeded their variable O&M estimates, they would have to make it up somewhere else in order to, quote,

1 make a profit on the project? 2 MR. HAFF: Yes. 3 COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Thank you. CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Baez and then 4 5 Commissioner Bradley. 6 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Excuse me. Back on the 7 discrepancies. And I'm trying to understand how 8 the information is made known to potential 9 bidders. Is the 3.7 cents attributed to 10 variable O&M known beforehand? 11 I believe it's a line item on MR. HAFF: 12 one of the last pages of the RFP where the 13 utility will list out the criteria for its self-build alternatives, and among them are cost 14 15 and performance data. 16 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Okav. And can the 17 highness or lowness of a variable O&M number 18 suggest perhaps a weighting, perhaps the 19 possibility that it can skew an evaluation of a 20 proposed bid one way or another? 21 MR. HAFF: I believe -- in other words, 22 could the wide disparity in variable O&M cause a 23 bid to maybe cost-effectivenesswise result 24 differently? 25

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Yes.

MR. HAFF: Yes.

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COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: And --

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MR. HAFF: I may -- I'm sorry.

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COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I'm sorry, Mike. guess the point -- I guess my ultimate question is, can you by seeing a number -- and, for instance, let's take the 3.7, and if you're a proposed bidder and you're saying, "Well, you know, it looks kind of low," can you tell from that gut instinct or gut determination what kind of adjustments or what kind of focus you need to give your proposal perhaps in order to make sure that you're skewed perhaps in a more positive light than you would otherwise be?

MR. HAFF: Let me try to answer it this way. And it sort of gets to one of your previous questions. I may answer your last question. You were asking about how the cost-effectiveness would possibly vary according to this piece of cost.

Higher variable O&M typically equates to a unit that's not dispatched as frequently because of its variable operating and maintenance costs associated with operating a unit. And if it's high, then that unit may not be dispatched as

long or as frequently. And typically, if you're 1 talking about the same type of power plant, 2 3 combined cycle, and the O&M -- I keep going back 4 to the pot of dollars -- is somewhat equivalent. 5 then you must be making up for that high 6 variable O&M by having lower fixed O&M, which would go into lowering, I guess, the capacity 7 8 payment that the bid project would make. 9 As far as impacting cost-effectiveness, it just more impacts how it's dispatched, projected 10 11 to be dispatched. 12 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And is the allocation 13 decision affected, or does the allocation 14 decision affect financing in any way, if you 15 have more projected on the capacity payment side 16 or --17 MR. HAFF: I'm not aware of where it would 18 have any impact on financing. 19 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Okay. Well, it has 20 impacts on the revenue streams; right? 21 MR. HAFF: I'm sorry? 22 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: It does have impact on 23 the revenue streams? 24 MR. HARRIS: Commissioner, I think that's 25 correct. What the company would be looking --

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we have to presume that the bidders knew what the RFP said, what FPL said, and they had the decision to model their rates. We have to presume that being financial decision-makers, they looked at what was best for their project.

I think that, as we discussed in the recommendation in other sections, the streams of payment, whether it's a variable payment or a fixed payment of capacity or an energy charge, would affect the revenue streams. If a company has a high fixed O&M and that's part of their guarantee, they're every year going to get -hypothetically, they're going to get \$50 million a year cash money just for having that capacity and then a variable charge on top of that, that's \$50 million the financiers know are If, however, their capacity charge coming in. is 10 million, with the rest being the variable, the financiers don't know where that 40 million is going to come from, so that would affect, I would think, financing.

However, that's not part of the record before us. The bidders were able to make that decision based on their financing, what they thought their costs would be, what they thought the correct allocation would be, and they were able to submit that. And the record indicated that FPL picked up the costs as submitted by not only their own self-build, but all of the individual bidders, and modeled those as the costs, and the record, I believe, reflects

So to argue that there's a large difference I think is relevant, but the Commission would have the ultimate authority. Rates would be -- the total energy costs, the total energy costs, the fixed and the variable, and the total equipment costs and operation costs would be a base rate charge, I believe.

And as long as -- as Commissioners Palecki and Deason commented on, if that total amount is right, then I don't think there would be a disagreement that the costs weren't. So if FPL's rate was wrong, but their total costs were backed out, I don't think we could necessarily allege that that's that big of a problem, outside of the dispatching, and that could have affected it. But the companies -- in this record, the bidders knew what those rates were going to be when they made those bids.

that.

1 And so based on the record we have before 2 us, I don't think that we can say that the 3.7 3 cents put forward by FP&L compared to a \$2 per 4 megawatt-hour put forth by a bidder could have 5 been a significant enough decision, in the 6 absence of some testimony to the contrary that 7 it was the determining factor, and had a company known that the 3.7 cents by FP&L was going to 8 disadvantage it and wasn't able to adjust that 9 10 themselves. And I don't recall that there was 11 any record testimony that any bidder said, "we 12 knew that they were bidding 3.7, and that's 13 unrealistic. We bid what we thought was 14 realistic, and their failure to bid what we 15 think was realistic disadvantaged us." I don't 16 recall that testimony being in the record. 17 CHAIRMAN JABER: Did you read the PACE 18 brief? 19 MR. HARRIS: I did, yes, Commissioner. 20 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Commissioner Baez, 21 did --22 I'm done. COMMISSIONER BAEZ: 23 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Commissioner 24 Bradley. 25 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I have a question

of staff. How does a bidder predict specifically what the O&M charges are going to be? Is that possible? I used the word "specific."

MR. HAFF: Could you repeat your question, sir?

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: How does a bidder predict specifically what the O&M charges are going to be? Is that possible?

MR. HAFF: The total O&M is based upon the type of power plant. In this case, primarily we saw gas-fired combined cycle power plants being bid and some combustion turbines. And it's pretty commonly known the predicted costs and operating parameters associated with that plant. So to know what the typical fixed and variable O&M costs are associated with a unit, yes, they can tell that in advance.

Really, I think what the issue here gets to is the fact that there was such a variation between the bids, and that's because the bidders have the opportunity, if you will, to make those changes in putting forth a bid.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: So it's staff's belief then that everybody had the same

1 opportunity to deal with O&M charges --2 MR. HAFF: Yes. 3 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: -- as part of their 4 bid procedure? 5 MR. HAFF: Yes. 6 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Okay. 7 COMMISSIONER PALECKT: What if the 3.7 8 cents turns out ten years down the line to be 9 not even close to realistic, that it doesn't 10 turn out to be correct, that the actual amount 11 is, let's say, ten times more, 37 cents per 12 megawatt-hour? Is this Commission empowered in 13 the fuel docket to simply say, "Well, Florida 14 Power & Light, back in the year 2002, you told 15 us it was going to be 3.7 cents per 16 megawatt-hour, and we're going to hold you to 17 that 3.7 cents"? 18 MR. HAFF: Yes, my understanding is the 19 Commission has the authority to limit cost 20 recovery through fuel adjustment because of 21 diverting, if you will, from some projection for 22 fuel or variable O&M. 23 COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Mr. Devlin? 24 MR. DEVLIN: Commissioner, I think we may 25 have an incorrect premise here that this O&M is

really a base rates item. And it's similar to 1 2 the discussion we had before on the capital. Of 3 course, the burden is always on the company to 4 show their costs are reasonable. And to the extent they significantly exceed the 3.7 cents, 5 that could be an issue in some future base rate 6 7 proceeding. 8 COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I think Mr. Haff told me that it was an issue for the fuel docket 9 and not a rates issue. 10 11 MR. DEVLIN: I believe it's a base rates 12 issue. 13 I stand corrected. MR. HAFF: 14 COMMISSIONER DEASON: I was going to ask 15 you about that, because I thought that O&M costs, whether fixed or variable, were part of a 16 17 base rate proceeding. 18 MR. HAFF: I stand corrected. 19 COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Thank you. 20 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: O&M charges are 21 non-fuel related expenses, though. 22 MR. DEVLIN: Correct. 23 Correct? COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: 24 MR. DEVLIN: That's correct.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Palecki, were

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you done?

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COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Yes.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I have just one question, staff, and Mr. Harris alluded to it a minute ago, and I want to just follow up with Mr. Haff and Mr. Devlin.

On page 20 of PACE's brief, they do make the allegation that there was some gaming -- and again, it's the allegation that there was gaming with respect to how FP&L looked at fixed costs versus variable. And in fact, they're suggesting that there was -- you know, that FP&L would not have minded if a bidder did the same thing. And nothing I've heard in terms of your responses to the Commissioners' questions indicate to me that you believe there was any opportunity for gaming the evaluation process, depending on how fixed and variable costs are divided. Look at page 20 at the very top.

MR. HAFF: Are you alluding to about two-thirds of the way down where it says, "In other words, FPL says it is all right to manipulate the process"?

CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes.

MR. HAFF: I don't find any evidence of

gaming. All I heard at the hearing is simply that the bidders bid a certain value for variable O&M. FPL's amount for variable O&M was in their RFP, so the bidder should have known what it was. And FPL simply input that into its EGEAS run, and the results came out. I heard no evidence of any gaming.

CHAIRMAN JABER: So in your assessment of the record that we have, there wasn't testimony with respect to how the selected division of O&M would somehow favor the results one way or the other?

MR. HAFF: No.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. They cite to transcript 377.

MR. HAFF: I don't have the transcript, but my understanding is -- in fact, I may have said this in the recommendation, that there's no one way to divide O&M dollars. In fact, yes, Dr. Sim stated that there's no single correct method of dividing O&M costs between fixed and variable. In this transcript, at 377, if I recall, it just mentions that the bidders can break it up however they wish. And however that number was given to FPL in an RFP response,

1	that's how it was modeled.
2	CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Mr. Haff.
3	Commissioners, do you have any other
4	questions on 11(b), or a motion?
5	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I move staff.
6	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Second.
7	CHAIRMAN JABER: Motion and a second to
8	approve staff on 11(b). All those in favor say
9	aye.
10	(Simultaneous affirmative responses.)
11	CHAIRMAN JABER: 11(b) is approved. 11(c).
12	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I just have a
13	question. Within FP&L's position, it indicates
14	that Mr. Taylor did a sensitivity analysis using
15	brownfield filler units, and it didn't change
16	the bottom line conclusion. What is staff's
17	position on that?
18	MR. HAFF: That's correct. It didn't
19	change the end result.
20	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. I move staff.
21	COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Second.
22	CHAIRMAN JABER: All those in favor say
23	aye.
24	(Simultaneous affirmative responses.)
25	CHAIRMAN JABER: 11(c) is approved. 11(d).

1 COMMISSIONER DEASON: And likewise, there 2 was a sensitivity analysis showing that 3 Gulfstream -- utilization of Gulfstream as the 4 gas supplier did not change the economic choice? 5 MR. HAFF: That's correct. 6 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Move staff. 7 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I had questions. 8 CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Baez. 9 There's a statement on COMMISSIONER BAEZ: 10 the bottom of 37, a clause saying, "Most RFP 11 bidders stated that they would be served by 12 FGT." And that's consistent with how FPL 13 modeled? 14 MR. HAFF: Yes, yes. 15 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And forgive the ignorance on how modeling works, and I'm sure it 16 17 would have been difficult, but did any of the 18 bidders specify other than FGT, or was it just a 19 question that they left the supply blank? 20 MR. HAFF: Some of them had Gulfstream, the Gulfstream line, which has a -- my understanding 21 22 is there's a different tariffed priced 23 associated with Gulfstream transportation as 24 opposed to FGT. 25 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Is that a burden or a

1 benefit? 2 MR. HAFF: A burden to use Gulfstream? 3 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Uh-huh. 4 MR. HAFF: My understanding is the price 5 for Gulfstream is lower, so whoever would have 6 bid Gulfstream would have actually had a 7 benefit. Is it --8 MR. HARRIS: FGT is higher. 9 MR. HAFF: FGT is higher. 10 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: FGT is higher. 11 MR. HAFF: Gulfstream is lower. 12 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: The bids -- I just want 13 to be sure, because it wasn't clear to me from the recommendation. The proposals that 14 15 specifically identified Gulfstream, they were 16 modeled with those numbers? Is that --17 MR. HAFF: With Gulfstream's numbers, yes. 18 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: With Gulfstream's 19 numbers. 20 MR. HARRIS: That's correct, yes. 21 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Okay. And I had a 22 comment there, but I think you answered my 23 question. That's all right. Thank you. 24 MR. HAFF: Yes. Whoever put FGT, FPL 25 modeled using FGT, and whoever put Gulfstream,

1 FPL modeled using Gulfstream. 2 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And whoever didn't, I 3 quess whoever didn't specify -- were there any 4 that didn't specify, to your knowledge? 5 I don't recall right now off the MR. HAFF: 6 top of my head, but that would have been 7 something that FPL would have had to follow up 8 to the bidder and say, you know, "I need to know 9 what your gas transportation options are so I 10 can model the gas transportation costs in 11 running your bid." So that would --12 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And maybe I'm asking a 13 question about something that just rarely 14 happens. I mean, the proposals usually 15 designate a supply --16 MR. HAFF: Yes. There's a line item in the 17 RFP where they have to put their gas 18 transportation costs, and it's either a number, 19 or they write FGT or Gulfstream. 20 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: So to your knowledge, 21 there wasn't any modeling done that substituted 22 perhaps FPL's judgment for --23 MR, HAFF: No. 24 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: For options that may 25 have been available.

1	MR. HAFF: I understand they were modeled
2	as bid.
3	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: All right. Thank you.
4	Those are all my questions.
5	CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioners, questions
6	or a motion?
7	COMMISSIONER DEASON: We're still on 11(d);
8	correct? I can move staff.
9	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I think there was a
10	motion.
11	COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Second.
12	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Second.
13	CHAIRMAN JABER: All those in favor of
14	approving staff on 11(d) indicate by saying aye.
15	(Simultaneous affirmative responses.)
16	CHAIRMAN JABER: 11(d) is approved. 11(e).
17	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Move staff.
18	COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Second.
19	CHAIRMAN JABER: All those in favor say
20	aye.
21	(Simultaneous affirmative responses.)
22	CHAIRMAN JABER: 11(e) is approved. 11(f).
23	. COMMISSIONER DEASON: Move staff.
24	COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Second.
25	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Second.

1 CHAIRMAN JABER: All those in favor say 2 aye. 3 (Simultaneous affirmative responses.) 4 CHAIRMAN JABER: 11(f) is approved. 11(q). 5 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Move staff. 6 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Second. 7 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I don't have a problem 8 with this issue, but can I just say something 9 that caused me concern? It's something that the 10 Chairman had raised earlier in her general 11 questions, the whole notion of exporting one's business judgment. 12 13 You know, I don't know how we clarify that 14 or how the rest of the Commissioners feel about 15 that, or whether we even need to pay attention 16 to it for purposes of this docket or this 17 matter, but I think that kind of -- the whole thought of we know better, and yet there are a 18 19 lot of issues here that were modeled as bid. 20 whether there could have been judgment exported 21 to say, well, this is more advantageous, or this 22 isn't, you know, the idea of giving a helping 23 hand, so to speak --24 MR. HAFF: This gets --25 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Where is the

discretion, or how much, you know?

MR. HAFF: Right. And this gets back to the discussion we had earlier about a draft short list, if you will, and then the ultimate short list, and why TECO didn't make the ultimate short list.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, I'm not -- and again, I'm not necessarily taking issue with the end result.

MR. HAFF: Right.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: But notwithstanding, I guess the reasons or the basis given, you know, if we're going to hold all proposals, whether they happen to be an IOU or not, to -- let me back up. Whether they have a reserve requirement or not, let me state it that way. I mean, isn't there at least some responsibility to model them as bid and let's not say, "well, it's a good idea that you be in this, because, by the way, you're going to have a problem with this one"?

MR. HAFF: And FPL did model TECO's bid as was bid. And when FPL came up with groupings of projects, in one of the exhibits in the hearing, there were basically five groupings of projects.

I don't know if you recall, but TECO was not among the group that was among the top two, I guess, alternatives to the all-FPL plan, so it was also not the most cost-effective alternative to FPL anyway.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And again, I think you've identified perhaps a proper basis for their exclusion. We can take that at face value.

But I guess I'm looking at the recommendation, page 43, and we have, "Witness Silva testified that TECO was not included on the short list due to FPL's concern that TECO could not supply the 200 megawatts contained in its bid and simultaneously meet its own 20% reserve margin criterion." And I think that speaks to a much more specific issue outside the context of a need determination, but here it is.

MR. HAFF: Right.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: You've got the idea or the concept of a bid evaluator, in essence, deciding what's good or not for a bidder. And I wish we had a line more clearly drawn as to whether that's appropriate or not.

MR. HAFF: This was -- as I'm sure you

know, this was strictly a decision of whether to add TECO to the short list for possible negotiations. It had nothing to do with changing their bid or anything.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: No, I understand that.

But that kind of -- I think when that kind of discretion or that kind of attitude pervades, it can bleed to other places. And I guess I'm making more of a finer point on this than perhaps I even have to, but I think that in particular troubled me. I'm not concerned about the result, practically speaking, necessarily, but, you know, having that as a basis. I guess going back to an earlier debate, I'm not interested in taking a vote based on something that I don't agree with.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Right. Commissioner Baez, actually, I agree with everything you said, and obviously I expressed my concern in this regard early on in the process, so I certainly agree.

But I would go further. My fundamental concern is that there are two companies other than FP&L that are subject to the voluntary stipulation. To the degree that reserve margin was going to be considered, that's so obvious

that I think it should have been included in the original RFP, and then certainly in the supplemental RFP, which is what we're discussing. But I also think, that being said, it wasn't, and we have to deal with what we have.

That being said, I would like to take an opportunity in this order to say that is the kind of example that should be included, foreseen, you should have known to include in a future RFP -- I mean, it's not like -- I mean, there's a handful. And perhaps it doesn't even apply to the handful of companies that are in the voluntary stipulation, because if you think about why we even have the reserve margin, it's to make sure that all the electricity needs are met for the citizens of the State of Florida. So that overall concern needs to be taken into account, I suppose, just generally speaking.

But with respect to the way the issue is, I know, Commissioner Deason, you made a motion. I wonder if you would consider amending it.

Here's my concern. I can accept at the end of the day that the bottom line decision FP&L made with respect to TECO was perhaps fair and

reasonable. I don't know that we've articulated that it was appropriate in conjunction with the fact that it wasn't prestated in the RFP. So I think it's fair and reasonable in the general assessment of how the evaluations occurred. I think what would have been more appropriate is for that kind of notation to be made in the RFP.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Madam Chairman, I think it should be -- it should have been listed in the RF -- I would agree with you that that's the kind of thing that has to be noticed in the RFP, to the extent that we're willing to accept that in this case, TECO's ability to meet its reserve margin is a proper grounds for evaluating, for FPL evaluating TECO's proposal. And I'm not sure that I'm comfortable with that.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I see your distinction.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I'm not sure that that is the type of criteria that -- to me, that opens a very wide door.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I see the distinction you're making. It's a very good one. Here's the difference. Well, analogize it to it's no different from eliminating some companies off the top because they might have some financial

viability concerns. I mean --

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COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I thought you were

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going to say that.

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where I'm drawing the line in my mind, or

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finding the similarities. If a company is not

CHAIRMAN JABER: That's sort of -- that's

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financially viable such that it can't meet its

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margin can't meet the long-term obligation.

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COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, I see the analogy, first of all. But I guess the way I'm looking at it is this. Take this particular criteria, and in the case of the two other companies that are subject to the margin reserve stipulation, I guess that's discriminatory. And I'll tell you why: Because if you want to bid. as you're free to do, then all of a sudden you've got to say, "Oh, and by the way, now all of a sudden the character of my bid as an IOU in Florida changes, because now I'm not allowed to bid on the same playing field as IPPs, for instance, because now all of a sudden I've got to bring a note from my mom" --

CHAIRMAN JABER: A note from the PSC.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: From the PSC to say,
"Oh, and by the way, this is how I'm planning on
taking care of any potential margin reserve
issues." What, in essence, you're doing is
creating an additional hurdle that certainly the
IOUs in this state would have to create.

So that's why I have go back to the whole philosophy of that being a legitimate criteria. And I understand the broader aspect, and I certainly understand FP&L's reason for looking at that in a more general good sense, and that may be valid.

But, you know, you've got to make a decision here. Can the company that's bidding take care of their own business and stand behind their bid or not? And I think that the margin reserve is an issue for TECO to consider when they're making a proposal, because they're going to sign — you know, theoretically, they could be signing a contract which they're going to have to live up to, and it's going to have financial consequences to people that would rather not have financial consequences. So who's got the burden in this? So I think to me

1 it's a broader issue of, you know, who are we 2 lending our business judgment to or not. 3 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. I know Commissioner 4 Bradley has a question, but do I hear you saying 5 that you would support denying staff's 6 recommendation on this issue? Is that what I 7 hear you saying? 8 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I think -- I don't --9 MS. BROWN: May I make a suggestion here? 10 CHAIRMAN JABER: No. Commissioner Bradley 11 has a question. Hang on. 12 MS. BROWN: All right. 13 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I think that for me to 14 accept it -- although, again, I'll say I'm not 15 concerned about the result necessarily. I'm 16 concerned about the precedent that we set. And 17 if we could change it somehow to --18 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Martha, I am going 19 to let you address Commissioner Baez in just a 20 minute. 21 Commissioner Bradley. 22 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Right. And as I 23 listen to the discussion that's transpiring 24 between the two of you, I'm beginning to wonder 25 if we add that language if maybe we wouldn't be

-- well, if we add that language, would that language discourage other IOUs from entering into the bid process? And I think I heard Commissioner Baez say that, you know, IOUs are in the business of generating and transmitting and distributing power. I think they're quite capable of giving consideration to their reserve margin and that as an intervening variable.

Again, I'm just wondering if that tightens the process down to the extent that we might discourage them from --

CHAIRMAN JABER: That's a very good question. I would agree with both of the concerns you have raised with respect to can they -- they're big boys; they can make that business decision on their own. My point is, if they knew that they had to take that into account. You know, that's really my only --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes. That's my only hangup.

that also.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I think we can live peacefully with it.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I think as long as the

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: And I agree with

order cautions folks and puts people on notice that this is one of those "should have known," you know, you would look at this at the end of day, and it needs to be determined on a case-by-case basis, I could be happy with it. The language that troubles me is making a finding that this was handled in the most appropriate manner, and I don't think it was.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I --

MS. BROWN: My suggestion -- oh, I'm sorry.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I think I agree with Commissioner Baez, but I have a real problem that TECO didn't intervene in this case. I think the ruling I would like to see on this issue is, well, maybe yes, maybe no. The affected party did not intervene, and I don't know if that makes the issue moot, but it certainly doesn't appear that TECO came in and made any kind of record that it was prejudiced or that, you know, it was discriminated against. So the fact that TECO didn't intervene in this case to me, really, it seems to resolve the issue. And I'm not sure we need to rule on the issue, really.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Who did identify the issue, staff? Remind me.

MR. HAFF: I believe it was CPV Gulf Coast.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Commissioner

Palecki, you raise a very good point.

Commissioner Deason, you do have an outstanding motion.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I have a motion to approve staff. And let me say that the basis for that motion is that while it may be preferable if the RFP had included a reference to an evaluation of an incumbent or an IOU's reserve margin, it wasn't there. But I don't think that that one item renders this entire -- renders it unfair or unreasonable or inappropriate.

I just wonder, if we were in a situation right now where FP&L did not make that review, and somehow in the evidence in the record it came out that TECO was the most cost-effective, but they're bidding 200 megawatts that they're including in their reserve margin, I think we would be on FPL's case pretty hard saying, "Why didn't you look to determine if that full capacity was available for your use or was it

committed to someone else's retail customers"? 1 2 So I think --3 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I'm don't think we 4 would be on FPL's case. 5 CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes. I think it would --6 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I would be on TECO's 7 case. 8 CHAIRMAN JABER: Or our bidding rule. 9 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Or the bidding rule's 10 case. 11 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I think that we 12 would be on FPL's case, TECO's case, and staff's 13 case too. I mean, I don't think it is right for 14 us to indicate that somehow it was unfair or 15 unreasonable for FP&L to ask the simple 16 question, "This capacity that TECO is bidding, 17 is it committed to their own reserve margin, or 18 is it going to be fully committed to our own 19 reserve margin?" 20 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, that's a fair 21 question to follow up on. I may have missed the 22 follow-up portion of the recommendation. Was 23 there --24 MR. HAFF: I apologize. Would you repeat 25 the --

CHAIRMAN JABER: No follow-up with TECO.

MR. HAFF: No.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: There wasn't any follow-up with TECO.

MR. HAFF: No. FPL did not contact TECO to discuss this concern, and TECO did not intervene in this case, no.

quarrel with whether it's a consideration or not. Obviously, it does, because we're the only ones that can benefit and be harmed, we, Florida. But I'm not sure that it's the evaluator that needs to be making that judgment. I think that's the company's -- the proposing company's issue to deal with. And for reasons I've already stated before, to have that be a requirement, in my mind, wouldn't put them on a level --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, you know, I can respect that. We just have a difference of opinion. I think that it's the appropriate thing for -- because we're going to hold FP&L responsible that the capacity they either build or they contract for is there and is reliable and is going to be providing cost-effective

energy to the end-use customer. So if they're going to be held accountable, I think it's fair for them to ask that question and make that judgment, just like if someone else had come in, an IPP, and had bid a project that had been committed, half of it to Georgia Power. I don't see a difference in that.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Then we get back to where the Chairman is. Subject to it being a discrete criterion, then maybe everybody is on notice.

I still -- I think that as it is, though, as it was handled, it creates a precedent for too much discretion in areas that have to be off hands. I mean, I think we have to take proposers', yes, financial viability, fine. There are discrete criteria for that. But now all of a sudden, you've got too many jets, so we're going to -- you know, I mean, a business judgment is a business judgment. I mean, it just happened to be a reserve margin here that it became germane to our situation.

But, you know, I don't -- just like you don't see a difference with having that be a criteria as much as anything else, I think that

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out in the open, I don't see a difference with it being anything else either.

And I'm concerned about that. If we're looking at this process as a way of, you know, trying to provide certainty for the participants to know where they stand as much as is reasonable, then I think we have to give those -- and maybe the solution is to have it -- you know, just say it wasn't appropriate how they handled it, it should have been followed up, for starters. And in the future, perhaps this is something that needs to be spelled out in an RFP, like the Chairman suggests.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Deason, you've made a motion, and in the interest of disclosure, I'm not going to support it, not because I don't agree with you that at the end of the day it was fair or reasonable, or perhaps, you know, when it came time to assess that hypothetical situation we would find that FP&L acted in a responsible fashion. distinction is just whether it should have been included in the RFP, and therefore, everyone would be on notice.

And for me, as I looked at the entire case,

1	I kept in the back of my mind, did FP&L evaluate
2	these proposals in the appropriate context with
3	the current bidding rule. And, you know, that's
4	where I make a distinction with this particular
5	issue.
6	So just in the interest of disclosure, I
7	won't support your motion. But for whatever
8	it's worth, Commissioner Palecki, I think, threw
9	out an idea that results in a compromise, but
10	we're going to vote on Commissioner Deason's
11	motion first. And I heard a second by
12	Commissioner Bradley?
13	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Uh-huh.
14	CHAIRMAN JABER: All those in favor say
15	aye.
16	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Aye.
17	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Aye.
18	CHAIRMAN JABER: Opposed, nay.
19	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Nay.
20	CHAIRMAN JABER: Nay.
21	Commissioner Palecki, did you vote?
22	COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Yes, I voted nay.
23	And I would make
24	CHAIRMAN JABER: The motion fails.
25	COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Before I make an

alternate motion, let me tell you what my -- how I feel about this issue. I don't want to create a precedent that says that this is a proper criteria to consider to keep a bidder off the short list. I don't want to set that precedent. At the same time, I believe this is a non-issue, because TECO did not intervene in this case.

So I guess what I'm saying is that no party in this case has made a record that they were treated in a fair or unreasonable manner. TECO didn't intervene. This is an action that only took place, to my knowledge, on TECO's bid. They have not contested the bid.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Excuse me. Did you say that they were or were not treated in a fair and reasonable manner?

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I haven't made any decision either way. I just don't believe the criteria that was considered with regard to TECO's reserve margin and how this unit would have affected TECO's reserve margin should have been considered in keeping TECO as a bidder off of the short list. At the same time, TECO didn't intervene in this case, and they didn't preserve this issue for us to decide. That's, I

guess, the problem I have. I don't believe this is really a proper issue for us to decide, in light of the fact that there was no party in this docket who was substantially affected that intervened in the case.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Are you suggesting no vote is necessary?

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I can support no action.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I believe that's what I'm suggesting. I don't think it's necessary for us to take a vote.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Ms. Brown, from a legal perspective, why does this -- not voting on this issue, I suppose, has the effect of striking the issue?

MS. BROWN: I want to enlist Mike's help in this. The only thought I had where it might be important for you all to vote on it, even though TECO didn't raise it and hasn't brought it forward, is that TECO was combined with other bidders in combinations for consideration and evaluation, and the fact that FPL didn't further review TECO's bid could have affected other bidders' bids. That's the only concern that I

1 would have. 2 CHAIRMAN JABER: That have intervened in 3 the proceeding? MR. HAFF: That have not intervened; right. 4 5 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: That have or have not? 6 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Yes, but with TECO 7 in combination, TECO with the most favorable cost-effective combination was still \$87 million 8 9 more costly. 10 MS. BROWN: That's correct. That's 11 correct. But in terms of whether you're going to even address the issue or not, that was my 12 13 one concern, and I didn't know whether --14 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. But to address your 15 concern -- let me make sure I heard you 16 correctly. The combination of companies that 17 were matched with TECO, they are or are not intervenors in the case? 18 19 MR. HAFF: Calpine was the other one, and 20 they withdrew from the case and withdrew their 21 bid. 22 MS. BROWN: Well, then I don't have a 23 concern, From my point of view, I think I agree 24 with Commissioner Palecki. This issue was 25 raised by an intervenor who really wasn't

affected by FPL's decision on TECO's reserve margin.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. And I don't know if this is the correct direction or not. You need to talk to Mr. McLean and think about this going forward. If legal staff believe that issues are not appropriate for consideration, you really shouldn't hesitate to bring that to the Prehearing Officer's attention.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, Madam Chairman, this particular issue was brought to my attention, and I erred on the side of including it. In fact, there was a motion, I believe, made by FP&L that all of the subparts of Issue 11 were not needed, and I ruled that they were. And I probably should have paid more attention to each individual subpart, and maybe (g) was really not needed. But I did feel like the subparts, earlier subparts of Issue 11 were certainly relevant, so I included the subparts of Issue 11.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Commissioner
Deason. I wholeheartedly understand with erring
on the side of bringing it to the Commission.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: But I have no

1 objection to not taking a vote on this issue and 2 finding that it's not relevant to the 3 determination that it's in front of us. 4 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. I don't either. 5 That sounds like a way of --6 COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I would second that 7 motion. 8 CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Baez, do you 9 have any concerns? 10 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: No. As to the point 11 that it wasn't relevant, I think we had a good 12 discussion on it, and I think we've at least 13 been able to air out what could possibly be a 14 recurring theme, you know, at some point in the 15 future and perhaps nip it in the bud. So I do 16 appreciate the fact that it was included. 17 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: So how do we 18 procedurally do --19 CHAIRMAN JABER: So we're not voting on 20 Issue 11(g), and we're moving on to Issue 12. 21 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Does there have to 22 be a motion that we --23 CHAIRMAN JABER: No. Traditionally, we 24 just find that no vote is necessary, although I 25 do recall hearing Commissioner Palecki interpret

1 what Commissioner Deason said as a motion, and 2 Commissioner Palecki did second it. 3 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And I third. 4 COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I guess the only 5 motion is that we not take a vote. 6 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: And I second that. 7 CHAIRMAN JABER: So no vote is taken, and 8 we're on Issue 12. 9 I do have questions on Issue 12, 10 Commissioners. This is the equity penalty 11 issue, staff, and --12 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me ask one quick 13 question up front. 14 CHAIRMAN JABER: Go ahead. 15 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Consistent with our 16 decision in 11(g), I'll just lay this out. I'm 17 not making a motion. I just think as we discuss this, I think we need to consider if a vote on 18 19 this issue is necessary either. 20 CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes, exactly. 21 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Given that the 22 economics work out like they do, that excluding 23 the penalty does not affect the bottom line 24 cost-effectiveness. And I just throw that out 25

for our consideration. I'm not trying to

short-circuit this, and I'm interested in hearing viewpoints and things. But I think we need to enter this with the understanding that the bottom line cost-effectiveness is really not -- does not hinge upon the question of whether there is or is not an equity penalty in this case.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes. Let me tell you -first of all, I was going to ask staff that
question. But with respect to the distinction I
see, Commissioner, let's go ahead and hit that
up front.

The distinction I see with the equity penalty and the TECO situation is that FP&L did seek the penalty adjustment, and in an effort to send a strong signal with respect to -- and again, this is one Commissioner speaking -- this issue needs to be looked at on a case-by-case basis, and here's what we would be looking for, I see a benefit to including it in the order. Now, how that gets included in the order, I'm not wed to.

But, you know, my whole philosophy as it relates to these proceedings, regardless of industry, is let people know what they've got to

deal with going forward. And to the degree the economics fell out in this case that even with the equity penalty, there wasn't another bid that was close to the FP&L self-build option, so be it, but reserve the right to disallow equity adjustments in the future for the following reasons, or to allow equity adjustments for the following reasons. And I do want that articulated in the order in some fashion.

Maybe that doesn't take a formal vote. But I would note that there was extensive testimony on this issue, and I think going forward, it may have significant dollar impacts, and that is the kind of direction that we're obligated to give these companies.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Madam Chair, I would --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Bradley.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I don't disagree with what you said, and my concern would be -- and this is a question of staff. And this may entail another docket altogether, but I can see the concern that a bidder would have, and I can see the concern that a person who's going to accept that bid would also have in terms of the

bidder having maybe concerns about certain things being revealed about their financial status. But on the other hand, I would think that a company that's going to accept a bid would also be entitled to adequate information about the solvency of a company and their ability to perform if in fact their bid is accepted as being the most cost-effective bid.

And I know probably staff has had some opportunity to think about this, but what is the alternative that would make this fair and equitable to everyone, that would allow a company to prognosticate fiscal solvency and indebtedness to determine if a company does in fact have the ability to perform if they are chosen?

MR. HARRIS: I'm sorry, Commissioner. If I understand your question correctly, Issue 12 that's up for consideration is a portion of a financial analysis. My understanding of your question is what would allow a company soliciting for proposals to evaluate the financial viability of the bidders, and I think that is an explicit part of the RFP process.

In this case, I believe Florida Power &

Light, the record reflects, did make some specific statements in its RFP as to what they would look for and what they would consider.

One piece of record evidence that comes to mind is that they required a specific bond rating and said we wouldn't consider bids -- or "wouldn't" is too strong a word, but they would not be very comfortable with bids below a certain bond rating unless that company could produce some type of security to bring them back up to a comfort level FP&L would have.

And so if I understood your question correctly, the RFP document itself would specify what type of criterion we're looking for, what we would be concerned about, and what we would require a company to do in order to make us comfortable with you as a bidder.

The equity penalty issue, Issue 12, doesn't go to that criterion so much. It's not a financial viability of the bidding company that the equity penalty addresses. It's an effect that the bidding -- that the award of that bid would have on Power & Light's capital structure, if that was your question, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Well, no, not

exactly. And correct me if I'm interpreting this incorrectly, but a company's indebtedness for other obligations should or should not be given consideration with respect to what the company who -- in terms of what the company that's going to accept the bid would consider as it relates to their ability to perform if the bid is given to them.

MR. HARRIS: That's absolutely correct, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Right. So my question is this: What alternative method might be used to get at that assessment and determination in lieu of an equity penalty?

MR. HARRIS: Again, Commissioner --

CHAIRMAN JABER: I think here's where I'm confused, Commissioner Bradley, with your question. The equity penalty is an adjustment that FP&L makes for its own financial accounting. So I think the difficulty in answering the question, and certainly the difficulty I'm having is, this isn't about the obligations that the bidder has. It's about how rating agencies take a look at FP&L when FP&L enters into a purchased power agreement with

another company.

So it's really about how rating agencies look at Florida Power & Light when they select their own -- when they choose another company to enter into a long-term contract, rating companies, according to the testimony, consider that debt, and Power & Light makes an adjustment for that in evaluating the bids.

And in that regard, my two questions are this, Larry.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Well, let me acknowledge this. I stand corrected then.

MR. HARRIS: Thank you, Commissioner.

CHAIRMAN JABER: My question is exactly, though, where Commissioner Bradley was getting. Are we confident with the record that FP&L would not be downgraded?

MR. HARRIS: That's the testimony that Mr. Maurey presented, and I believe the recommendation makes that statement, yes.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. And then remind me again what the language regarding equity penalty was in the supplemental RFP. There was some reference to it. I don't think they used the exact terminology.

MR. HARRIS: My recollection is,

Commissioner -- I don't have a copy of the RFP in front of me. I do recall, I believe, based on the record testimony, there was a line in there --

MS. KENNY: I have it, Larry.

MR. HARRIS: Okay.

MS. KENNY: In the RFP, it states the evaluation will examine each proposal's impact on the entire FPL system, including the estimated impact on FPL's cost of capital associated with entering into a purchased power agreement.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. And you've taken those words and that rationale, and on page 55 of the recommendation, you've identified why in this case, under these circumstances, you believe an imputation of equity penalty is not appropriate.

MR. HARRIS: That's correct.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Commissioners, if I could be real clear on my concern here, here my concern is not one of notice or that the language was not included in the RFP. It's really providing an opportunity for the future

process to include direction or guidance -- I
think "guidance" is a better word -- that
companies could follow on the situations where
an equity penalty may be appropriate or where it
may not be appropriate.

And maybe staff has ideas on how that could be included if it's the Commissioners' desire not to vote on this issue. I have to tell you, I would think that the company would want a vote on this issue, because if anything, it strengthens the fact that the bids -- even with an equity penalty, the self-build option was the most cost-effective approach. Am I missing something?

MR. HARRIS: No, Commissioner. Speaking for myself, I think that as a bidder or as a company, I would want to know the types of situations where the Commission was interested. There was a significant amount of record testimony and record evidence as to whether the Commission has applied it in the past, and if so, what it meant when they did apply it, and what other states might or might not have done with this.

I believe that some type of decision or

even guidance from the Commission, some type of language in the order, whether it be a holding or some dicta that explains what the Commission would look at, would help in the future with RFPs, with bids, with future need determinations, for companies to understand what the Commission was going to be looking at in making these determinations, and that would help to focus testimony and record evidence in future proceedings and help bidders in the State of Florida and solicitors of RFP proposals in the State of Florida to understand what types of things are going to matter.

We have some record evidence as to

Commission votes in the past, but it's staff's

position that there's no definitive statement as

to when it will be applied, when it won't, if it

should be applied at all. And some type of

guidance would be very helpful, I believe, for

not only staff, but the industry as a whole,

both suppliers and purchasers, or suppliers and

sellers -- purchasers.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioners, I don't have any other questions on this issue.

Commissioner Bradley.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Yes. And I'm still struggling with this issue. I'm trying to understand why, if all the stars align as it relates to the bidder, why this would have a negative impact upon -- based upon your statement, upon Florida Power & Light's bond rating.

MR. HARRIS: I can answer that, or I can have one of our finance people, who might be able to answer that question also more accurately.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Lester.

MR. LESTER: If Florida Power & Light enters into a purchased power agreement, they're going to have to make capacity payments, and those capacity payments are fixed, so they're like debt. And the bond rating companies view that in part as debt.

So if it was a take-or-pay contract with capacity payments, that's going to be considered a very debt-like purchased power agreement, and so they impute debt to the balance sheet. They put something on the balance sheet, an off-balance-sheet obligation for calculating financial ratios. They essentially treat the

purchased power agreement in part as something that creates a debt-like obligation. That can therefore impact FPL's bond rating, and if it did, it could raise the cost of capital.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: So it seems to me that what you've explained to me justifies Florida Power & Light having a concern about this issue and the equity penalty.

MR. LESTER: Yes, sir, they're justified in having a concern. In all the testimony that we've considered, there is testimony from their witness and from the staff witness that this will not cause a bond rating downgrade. And to me, that's where it really gets to the idea of is this going to be a real cost, or is this just something that is not a real cost. I mean, it can only be a real cost if it impacts the company's financial flexibility or their bond rating.

And this company has a cushion, so to speak, with an equity ratio of 63% that will allow them to take on the additional obligation, we believe, and not face any type of bond rating downgrade.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: But staff's

recommendation is no.

MR. LESTER: Actually, it's just a case by case. We think in this case, it hasn't risen to the level of showing a need to be included.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I think that one of the unfortunate things is that we're deciding this issue today rather than before the RFP was issued. And right now we're moving forward on a rulemaking, and it still remains to be seen where that rulemaking will go. But one of the directions that we're looking at is to have the terms and the conditions defined up front and an opportunity for the Commission then to decide whether they're appropriate. And this is something that at the time of the RFP, neither FPL or any of the bidders would know how this Commission was going to react to the equity penalty, and I think it's a real good indication of why changes to our RFP process are required.

I just have one concern with the recommendation itself, and that's the sentence that even without the implementation of the equity penalty, FPL's self-build option still appears to be the most cost-effective method.

I'm just not sure that that portion of the

recommendation doesn't have to wait until we

vote on Issues 14 and 15. I think that's the

whole basis of Issues 14 and 15, is what is the

most cost-effective option. But other than that

concern, I have no problem with the staff's

recommendation.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let me say

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let me say this. You know, if we're going to get into all the nuances of this issue -- and I don't object to that -- I cannot support staff's recommendation. I think it is faulty.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I had a question, but if you're not going to get into why you think it's faulty -- and I don't want you to.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I can do that now or -- I can do that now or later.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Well, go ahead, Commissioner, if it helps.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I think that staff has done a very good job of analyzing the issue and has a very thorough discussion. I think it's pretty well encapsulized on page 55 of the recommendation. There are four bullet points there. I disagree with three of the bullet points.

First of all, to take the first bullet point, I don't think it is relevant whether there will or will not be a bond downgrade. That should not be the criteria for determining if there is a cost which needs to be imputed so that you have an accurate apples-to-apples comparison of the cost of a self-build versus a purchase.

The testimony is in the record that the bond rating agencies view these long-term fixed-cost contracts as the equivalent of debt, so we know it's going to have that pressure on the company's capital structure. And I don't think it's relevant whether this particular one is going to cause a downgrade, or the next one, or the next one.

What's going to happen if you allow two purchased power contracts to be signed, and neither one of those cause the downgrade, but the third one does, and all of a sudden the bidders on the third one, they have the equity penalty imposed on them, but the first two didn't. Is that being -- it seems to me you're being discriminatory in your bidding process. You need to consider -- if you're going to

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consider it, you need to consider it every time, not just whether there will or will not be a bond downgrade. I think that is the wrong criteria to apply.

The fact that the PAAs which are currently within FPL's portfolio will be declining over time, I don't think that's relevant either. First of all, there's testimony in the record that there's a likelihood that some of those agreements are going to be renewed or be replaced. But the fact of the matter is that there's going to be pressure upon the company's capital structure, and either there will eventually be a bond downgrade, or else there's going to be a requirement to issue more equity capital. And we know that equity capital is more expensive than debt because of the higher cost of capital and the income tax effects of the equity being in the capital structure. disagree with that.

I disagree with the fourth bullet point.

I don't care what is common regulatory practice.

Either it's right or it's wrong. We make

decisions based upon the evidence in this state,

and we make those decisions. That carries no

weight whatsoever with me, what has been done in another state.

what does cause me some concern is the third bullet point. We have some very sketchy evidence that there are other cost saving attributes of entering into purchased power agreements. I think that record should have been more fully developed, and there should have been some attempt to try to quantify that. I think where all that comes out is that it probably is going to have a bearing as to the factor that we apply as to the impact of the imputation.

I know that we have made decisions in the past where I think we used a 10% factor, and we have evidence in this case from Florida Power & Light that the bond rating agencies are looking at a factor for these particular type contracts of anywhere from 60 to 40%, and I think FP&L suggested using 40%.

I don't think we have enough evidence in this record to say that 40% is accurate or 10% is accurate or 60% is accurate, because I don't think we have enough evidence on these offsetting amounts, and I would have liked to

have had more evidence on that. But absent that, I have no alternative but to utilize the 40%. And if we're forced to vote on this in this particular case, that's what I would support, is a 40% factor for the imputation.

And I think it is a real cost. It has an impact upon the company's capital structure, and that in turn has an impact on capital costs for the retail customer. And I think that we would not be having an apples-to-apples comparison if we adopt staff's recommendation in this case.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Baez, you you a question.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Of Commissioner Deason.

Now, having said that, with respect to bullet 3, do you agree that the equity penalty, as it's being called, and perhaps we can find a kinder, gentler name for that, but the equity adjustment is part of a bigger consideration? I mean, it is subject to mitigation?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I think it is subject to mitigation. And I, in all honesty, wish I had had more evidence --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Me too.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: -- developed in the record on the --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Absolutely.

attributes. I mean, they're listed here, and I think there's merit to these arguments concerning some of the mitigation things, about reduces cost of obsolescence and things of that nature because you have a contract as opposed to having your own mortar-and-concrete facility.

But we had no quantification whatsoever.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I agree with you on the concept. I think it does have to become part of -- if we're going to consider it at all, I think it does have to become part of a broader picture, including any mitigating or aggravating factors, frankly. I mean, there are more out there. This is not the "end all, be all" of it. It just happened to have some impact in this determination.

Now, what I'm having trouble with, (a) is how can we quantify these other things, and whether we can quantify them. I hope that we can, because that is the kind of thing that certainly I would like to see, the kind of

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information, the kind of case built in the future.

I do have a little bit of concern or heartburn over something that you said about -that was stated about bullet 1. I think, you know, while it is true that it is possible that the third RFP down the line is going to be prejudiced by an equity adjustment potentially, where the predecessors wouldn't have, to me, I think that's just a process of the future unfolding. You know, you have to take -- it's the same thing as the existence of the RFP itself. I mean, it just so happens that the RFP exists because there's a need for capacity, and dimensions based on things -- you know, who's going to control that. So I think the downline effect perhaps isn't as much of a concern to me, assuming that were --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me say this. Ι don't mean to interrupt, but I think it's important to say right now. I would hope that FP&L, and as far as that goes, any of the large companies that we regulate, that they would never be in a position where the signing of one purchased power agreement would cause a bond

downgrade.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Absolutely.

manage their capital structure and are aware of their financial position such that that would never happen, that the signing of one contract is going to cause a bond downgrade. I think that the companies that reasonably manage their capital position would look at that, and they would have an equity cushion in there such that that would not happen, because you're talking about increasing costs to customers.

And so I think this is the wrong criteria, to say that you don't make this adjustment unless there's a downgrade, because I hope our companies would never find themselves in a situation that a downgrade would result from signing a purchased power agreement.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Can I add to that,

Commissioner Deason, which is, I hope that our

companies explain to the analysts and the

investors that they meet with on a regular basis

that purchased power agreements should never be

viewed as something similar to your off-sheet,

balance, normal debt obligations.

And that's sort of my problem with going forward with the equity adjustment. You also don't want to send through any decision-making process the reverse signal of never go beyond your self-build option, because regardless of how many times we change the bidding rule, we want it to be effective, and we don't want our decisions to ever be counter-productive.

Now, obviously, I'm not suggesting that this one will be -- I hope that it is not, but that is that fine line I'm trying to keep in the back of my mind. I don't want to send the wrong signal to the investment industry via the companies that purchased power agreements are bad, because in fact, what you're saying is absolutely true. We probably don't have enough evidence in the record on a hypothetical situation to know what the benefits and the --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me clarify.

Purchased power agreements are not bad at all.

The only thing I'm saying is that you need to evaluate the true cost of the purchased power agreement in making your evaluation.

CHAIRMAN JABER: That's a very -- yes, absolutely.

Now, in that regard, Commissioner Deason, is that why in the beginning you were suggesting we need to think about whether the issue needs to be voted on, because you believe that the benefit side of the equation is not completely vetted in the record?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I don't think voting on this is necessary. Now, I see the merit in staff's argument that the participants need some guidance as to how we're going to view the equity penalty adjustment. And I agree that that terminology may be lacking or prejudicial to some degree. So I think that the best thing that we can do is to indicate that there is a legitimate real cost associated with the signing of a purchased power agreement, that it puts pressure on an incumbent utility's capital structure.

I'm not so sure that we have to get into all the nuances today of what factor we're going to use, or whether we're going to try to have any offsets or mitigating factors, because it's not relevant to the bottom line determination.

CHAIRMAN JABER: But would you add to that, which is where I could be comfortable -- I mean,

to staff's credit, I think they were just feeding off of my concern. I want this articulated someplace so that companies know what we looked at in this case, what was looked at in the Florida Power Corporation case, and what may be looked at going forward. Would you add onto what you said, though, that it is a legitimate cost, and the application of that cost would be determined on a case-by-case basis?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I agree with that.

CHAIRMAN JABER: In Commission proceedings.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Until we get more experience and we feel comfortable going to some type of a rulemaking, that's the way we're going to have to make these decisions.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Well, it may be included in the rule.

Commissioner Bradley and Commissioner Baez.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I agree with everything that has been said, but I'm really thinking about this, and I see the equity penalty maybe as being a preemptive strike, because after all, what we are here to do is to ensure that consumers get the best deal. And if

not having the equity penalty is going to have an adverse impact upon the IOUs' bond rating, what I foresee is that at some point we as a Commission will be dealing with a rate case to make up the difference between what has been lost as a result of having downgraded their bond rating in terms of capital.

CHAIRMAN JABER: That's a very good point.

I think, though, Commissioners, we need to come back and remember this case. In this case, the FP&L witness testified and acknowledged that in this case, there wouldn't be a bond downgrade.

But the reason I'm insisting on putting the language about a case-by-case basis is absolutely for the point you just stated. I don't want to have a generic policy decision out there that has this Commission committed to how we're going to look at equity adjustments.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: How much -- and this is just a question that occurred to me now after hearing most of the discussion. How much are we willing to validate the whole concept of treating PPAs as debt, or is that our responsibility or obligation, I guess?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: You know, I'm

comfortable with that concept, but there may not be a majority of Commissioners here who are willing to do that, you know.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I mean, if there's -- and I heard some disagreement expressed with the way wall Street treats them, and if that's a position that we're adequate taking -- I'm not comfortable saying that, mind you. I feel like staying in the real world for a while.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, the fact remains, it doesn't matter what we think about wall Street's analysis. They're the ones that make the analysis, and they make the recommendations to the investors, and they determine the cost. And that's what we have to determine, if there is a cost impact on the company's capital.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: In reality.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: In reality.

CHAIRMAN JABER: But the only distinction I would make, Commissioners, I think Wall Street would look at our decisions to see if we have stated that purchased power agreements should be considered debt or treated like debt.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I don't think our

decision should be that. I think our decision should be a recognition that the bond rating agencies treat it that way, and no decision whatsoever as to we agree that that is the appropriate treatment.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Then I think we're at the same place.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Then can we make that statement as well?

CHAIRMAN JABER: I would like to, but that is precisely the guidance and the direction I'm talking about, and I don't know if we do that in terms of a vote on the motion, but --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And let me just say one other thing while I'm thinking about it. I think when it comes to these mitigating factors, another things that needs to be factored in -- and I think that to some extent, the bond rating agencies do that.

They may not have as great an appreciation of our particular regulatory policies and procedures and the commitment of this Commission as we do, and we know that we have a very strong record of passing through purchased power costs through adjustment clauses, so we may be more

comfortable that it is less like debt than the rating agencies, and maybe there should be some education there.

But the fact remains that the rating agencies provide their recommendations, they provide their ratings, and that impacts what investors are willing to pay for the bonds and for the equity of the company, and that impacts the company's cost of capital.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Right. And you might recall the cross-examination with the FP&L witness where the Commissioners, we were asking if in his opinion the rating agencies might take into account or, you know, assess the risk, knowing that Florida has a very stable, consistent clause recovery. And you recall he said that did not come up, but, yes, absolutely, he thought it would be a very good point with respect to how rating agencies looked at purchased power agreements.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Well, would it be inappropriate or appropriate to make a motion then that we take this issue off the table?

CHAIRMAN JABER: It's never inappropriate to make whatever motion you want, Commissioner

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Bradley.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I'm trying to get a feel for --

CHAIRMAN JABER: I would hope that you not -- thank you for asking. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Get a feel for it.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I would hope that we not take the issue off the table completely. My hope would be that one of you makes a motion to include a discussion in the order that goes like this: The company and the stakeholders have put sufficient testimony in the record to indicate that rating agencies have considered purchased power agreements debt-like. And obviously, we can work on this language, Commissioners, but that the Public Service Commission via this decision believes that the testimony in the record indicates that while there are costs, legitimate costs associated with entering into a purchased power agreement, that some of those costs may be mitigated by other factors that are part of the Florida statutory scheme. We would add that this issue would be looked at on a case-by-case basis.

What else did we talk about? I'm

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forgetting something. There seemed to be three.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I cannot agree with the concept as expressed by staff that you don't make the adjustment unless there's going to be a downgrade, and that we look at -- try to look into the future whether there's going to be a decline in the number of purchased power agreements in the future. I don't think that's particularly relevant.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Right. We weren't going to include that. I'm talking about just a general --

> COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay.

CHAIRMAN JABER: This is my wish list. Τ would hope for a very general two-paragraph discussion that says this issue was litigated here, there was sufficient testimony to indicate that there are costs that a company incurs, but that in this case, we don't believe the record supported an equity adjustment, and then making clear that this would be handled on a case-by-case basis in the future, and that making -- we would make some sort of statement that we do not believe that purchased power

agreements should be viewed as normal business debt.

I don't think, staff and Commissioner

Deason, I'm using the right terminology, but it

would be -- that's the spirit of what I would

like to accomplish.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I would so move.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Well, let's make sure I'm saying all the right things.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: What type of signal does that send to the bond -- the rating companies?

CHAIRMAN JABER: Hopefully the right one.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: In spite of the fact that we may not believe that, is that going to change their cost --

CHAIRMAN JABER: I hope so. You know what the industry has beat into me the last two and a half years since I've been here? Be careful what you do in your decisions, because the market is looking at you. If you make a poor decision, the market is going to react. You send them the right signal, and stock prices and our bond prices are going to reflect it.

So I want to send a very strong signal to

the analyst world that this agency has a stable, consistent mechanism through the fuel clause, capacity clause, recovery mechanisms to address expenses associated with entering into purchased power agreements. So when you look at FP&L and take a look at their bonds, the risk associated with entering into a purchased power agreement, S&P, should also be considered in conjunction with those fixed payments that are going to be passing through the capacity clause.

There you have it. I don't know much more than that.

MS. BROWN: Chairman Jaber, if I might just add that a lot of that is already in the record, so it should be possible to use that.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Well, that's where I got it from, Martha.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, Madam Chairman,
I cannot -- well, I guess the motion has been
made by Commissioner Palecki. I cannot second
the motion.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Because I believe -fundamentally, I believe that the record does
support an adjustment, the concept that there

should be an adjustment, based upon the way Wall Street or the rating agencies look at it now. Whether we agree with that or not, that's the way they look at it. There is testimony in the record that these particular contracts would be given a weighting factor of somewhere between 60 to 40%. I think that's basically unrefuted, in my opinion. So I think that the record does support an adjustment.

Now, I'm not comfortable coming out with a particular amount. And forced to do so, I would. I believe that given the record that we have that the best alternative is the 40% factor.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: What's the number?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: But I wish the record had been more complete on some of the mitigating factors.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: 40%.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: 40%?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: It's a weighting of 40%. In other words, as I understand it, that the fixed payments under these contracts, that 40% of that amount would be considered a debt obligation. It would be imputed into the

capital structure as such, and then there has to be an equalization of the capital structure so that it maintains its equity-to-debt ratio. And there's a cost associated with that, and that cost has to be imputed to the bid price of that particular contract.

Now, I may be oversimplifying it, but I think that in essence, that's basically what happens.

I think that the record does support an adjustment, so I cannot support a motion that says that the record does not support an adjustment.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Then that is a very big difference.

And Commissioner Palecki, I know you were making a motion consistent with what I said. Since we have that big difference then, I have to tell you, I was prepared to accept staff's recommendation. So let's throw out a motion, and let's just --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: There is a motion, and it may be seconded, but I just felt compelled at least --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Right.

1 COMMISSIONER DEASON: -- so nobody would be 2 surprised where I am. 3 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: And before we second 4 the motion, if there is going to be a second, I 5 would agree with Commissioner Deason. Reality 6 is fact right now, and until the culture does 7 change, then I think that an equity penalty is 8 justified. 9 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Commissioner 10 Palecki? 11 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I have to accept 12 reality. 13 COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I would maintain my 14 initial motion that was consistent with the 15 statement made by Chairman Jaber. 16 CHAIRMAN JABER: Which is really to accept 17 staff's recommendation. 18 Tell me -- Martha, you just said everything 19 I said was in the recommendation. I think the 20 difference is --21 MS. BROWN: I think I said it was in the 22 record. 23 CHAIRMAN JABER: Oh, in the record. Thank 24 you.

MS. BROWN: Not in the recommendation.

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There is a lot in the record. Well, there is some indication in the record, discussion in the record about the Commission's first case, the Hines 1 case where --

CHAIRMAN JABER: And the clauses.

MS. BROWN: Yes. And there are some good quotes in there from Mr. Maurey's testimony about the use of purchased power contracts and how rating agencies view them and that they are legitimate to some extent. That could be used. And then there is more in the record about how the rating agencies view different regulatory bodies and their performance over time and the consistency and support of decisions. And clauses are mentioned in there as well, and I was going to look there for some of what you were looking for.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Baez, it's going to be up to you to make a second to the motion. Let me just tell you --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Can you restate it for me, please?

CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes. And for your benefit, let me tell you, Commissioner Deason convinced me on relying on what other states

do. Absolutely, if what other states do is in the record and completely explored, that would be good guidance, but I think the Commissioner made an excellent point about it not being right to include it in something we're going to automatically look at.

With respect to the downgrade, I think that from my standpoint, that's illustrative, not necessarily the tell-all. So I don't know how -- if you all want to work that into your motion, or the discussion at least.

But to restate it, it was that I would want the order to articulate that there was a significant amount of testimony in the record -- basically, it's staff's recommendation with the exceptions I just indicated.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: With the exceptions being that one was appropriate or not in this case?

CHAIRMAN JABER: Right, and --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: See, because I'm not convinced that we need to reach that decision.

I'm not averse to sending the messages to the -you know, to expose our views and how we believe that they should be treated and how we may be

treating it in the future, and indeed, how they have to be part of a broader consideration.

The trouble I'm having, again, going back to something that Commissioner Deason has said, is, where do you draw a line? I mean, a lot of the work that we do here is based on snapshots, with some kind of, you know, eye towards the future. But we have to deal with what the reality is now. One of those realities is that the market treats these contracts as it does, and we need to address that. But a reality also has to be present in the fact that there is going to be an adjustment or there isn't.

So I'm not sure how my feelings on it fit into the motion that you're suggesting, and if you can show me where it does, I would be happy to make it.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I don't know, and I certainly don't mind seconding the motion. But my understanding, Commissioner Palecki, of what you agreed to, what I wanted to accomplish is a finding that this record did not support including an equity adjustment, but that there was significant testimony indicating that rating agencies consider it to be a real cost and an

off-balance-sheet debt. The PSC does not believe that purchased power agreements should be treated as such, and that the application of the equity adjustment would be resolved on a case-by-case basis.

Looking at three of the things that are articulated on page 55, whether there will be a downgrade -- and again, not any one in my mind is more significant than the other, but just illustrative of what we might be looking at, actually, two of the things, and then whether there are benefits or detriments to the consumer. And that's it.

Commissioner Palecki, did I forget anything?

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Just to be on the safe side, I would modify my motion to be consistent with the Chairman's statement.

CHAIRMAN JABER: And honestly, if you all keep making me repeat it, it's going to change every time.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Maybe it will change to one -- /

CHAIRMAN JABER: Maybe we need a break and let me get some medicine.

1	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: No, you don't want the
2	NyQuil talking.
3	COMMISSIONER DEASON: So the gavel has
4	been passed. We do have a motion
5	CHAIRMAN JABER: Second.
6	COMMISSIONER DEASON: A motion and a
7	second. All those in favor of the motion say
8	aye.
9	COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Aye.
10	CHAIRMAN JABER: Aye.
11	COMMISSIONER DEASON: All those opposed say
12	nay.
13	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Nay.
14	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Nay. I'm sorry,
15	Commissioner Baez.
16	CHAIRMAN JABER: Nay.
17	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Nay.
18	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. The motion
19	fails, and I will pass the gavel back.
20	CHAIRMAN JABER: And we're looking for a
21	new motion.
22	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Okay. I'm back to not
23	see, /I can't completely agree with the fact
24	that one is appropriate, based on the premise
25	that the record only supports an adjustment of

that magnitude, without having fully considered it. I'm not willing -- where we're always willing to say, "You know what? This is the only thing that was in the record, and this is what we have to go with, and it was unopposed," I'm not comfortable doing that in this sense, because I do believe it did have some considerable effect, not an ultimate effect.

I don't think it changes necessarily the number, the absolute cost-efficiency, but there is a particular -- you know, there's a big percentage of discrepancy between the numbers which I guess we'll discuss later. So I'm uncomfortable saying that 40 was it, which is why -- you know, the fact that -- maybe one might have been necessary. We're just not ready -- I'm not ready to accept 40 as the number. I guess that's where I am, and I can't get off that.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, why can't we say something to the effect that we consider the debt imputation to be a legitimate cost because it is treated such by the rating agencies, we find that making a specific adjustment in this case is not necessary because of the

cost-effectiveness as it exists in this case, and we do not make an adjustment for that reason, and pretty much leave it at that? But I think there needs to be a statement and put everyone on notice that we consider it a legitimate cost because the rating agencies consider it a legitimate cost.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And I'm comfortable with considering it a legitimate cost, you know, subject to -- I mean, I've got to hear something. There has to be some signal that it is going to happen.

I think that these kinds of -- we have seen in this example in particular that it can account for a lot of the cost-efficiency of a particular proposal, not all of it, but a good portion of it. And I think that it has to be something more than accepting it on faith that one will occur, where we can pretty much -- and I had a question for staff.

I mean, are these things like scalable?

There's no way to know in advance whether you're brushing up against a situation -- and I'm assuming that's what you tried to do here, but there's no way to know in advance as to whether

1 a particular proposal a certain way is going to 2 cause the company to brush up against, you know, 3 some reaction by Wall Street? I can't -- I'm not smart enough on those matters to tell you, 4 5 you know, that's something that anybody should 6 know walking into it, you know, that there's 7 enough --8 MR. LESTER: I believe there would be a way 9 of evaluating, you know, a proposed purchase 10 power agreement to determine the balance sheet 11 impact, the financial impact. 12 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: According to a 13 methodology? 14 MR. LESTER: Yes. 15 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And a combination of 16 such and so on, even perhaps how it's going to 17 leave them for the next -- even perhaps in 18 contrast or in conjunction with any future additions on a ten-year site plan? I mean, even 19 20 those calculations can be done; correct? 21 MR. LESTER: They could probably be done. 22 That would be more uncertain, in my opinion. 23 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Understood. 24 MR. LESTER: Just because of the estimate, 25 you know.

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COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Of course. See, I -you know, I can't go the length of saying one is appropriate in all instances as a matter of course without knowing that it's going to happen or not.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Deason, let me ask you a question based on something you said. Actually, I guess it's a question to staff.

Commissioner Deason in articulating the position said we're not making an adjustment. We're not making the adjustment. The company made the adjustment. We're finding -- we would be finding that it wasn't appropriate in the evaluation process; right? The fact is, the adjustment doesn't really get made until when?

MR. HARRIS: In this process, I believe it was the third stage of the evaluation, if I recall correctly. The first stage was the cost, the second was transmission integration, and the third was the equity penalty, so it would have been a third tier, if I recall the record correctly.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Until the evaluation.

CHAIRMAN JABER: But it's an adjustment the

company makes in evaluating bids.

MR. HARRIS: They did make that in the bid evaluation, yes.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. So the result of this recommendation is after the fact, we take a look at the evaluation process, and we say it was inappropriate for you to consider an equity adjustment in this case for the following reasons.

MR. HARRIS: That was staff's recommendation, I believe.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. I'm sorry. I just needed that sanity check.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I'm not sure how much we all disagree with each other. I certainly believe that the additional risk that wall Street imputes when a company enters into a purchased power agreement is something that we should consider.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Agreed.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I also think that in each case, we should consider any offsetting benefits of buying power that Wall Street might consider. I think this Commission should also determine and consider whether or not our

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exemplary history of allowing these costs to be passed through through our clauses should also be considered and whether that's something Wall Street might take into consideration. And I believe these should all be considered on a case-by-case basis. And I'm not unwilling to send out that signal today by our vote.

what I am unwilling to send out is to say
that the exercise of a certain percentile in the
RFP process and penalizing some of the
proposals, or all of the proposals, was
appropriate here. So I guess it's not the
consideration of the equity penalty that I have
a problem with. It's the exercise of the
penalty in this RFP process that I have a
problem with.

CHAIRMAN JABER: And, Commissioner Baez, that's what you've been articulating; right?

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: In a manner of speaking, yes. And I think that the way that -- the solution that Commissioner Deason proposed, which is, you know, we don't make one here, we recognize that it's appropriate for consideration, and it's up to us to decide whether the application is appropriate. You

know, it wasn't necessary, or I don't know what word you use, but it wasn't -- it's not applied here, or it shouldn't have been applied. I don't know what the term is without being pejorative to the company. But in essence, what we're doing is, we're not accepting it for purposes of evaluation.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Well, one of the three of you needs to make a motion then.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And I would move that we acknowledge the appropriateness of considering impact on cost of capital by the evaluating utility, and that we also recognize that our evaluation does not acknowledge the application of it in this case, the application of a penalty in this case.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Say that again, the second statement.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: That in this case, the Commission doesn't acknowledge the -- for purposes of our evaluation, we're not recognizing the application of the equity adjustment.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I think that begs the question, because why? If you indicate that

1 there is -- you recognize that there is an 2 impact on cost of capital, why are you not 3 applying it? 4 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: What I said was that 5 it's a proper consideration. 6 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Oh, it's a proper 7 consideration. 8 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Again, I'm not -- as I 9 said before, I'm not ready to go so far as to 10 say it was definitely impacting or it would 11 definitely impact in this case. I'm not 12 convinced. 13 COMMISSIONER DEASON: I understand. 14 you're not convinced that it would have an 15 adverse impact upon the company's cost of 16 capital. 17 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And certainly not at 18 40 -- you know, not requiring 40%. As I said, 19 I'm not comfortable with that number. So if I 20 can't be comfortable with the only number in 21 record, where does that leave me? 22 comfortable with not recognizing it. 23 COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I second the motion. 24 CHAIRMAN JABER: There has been a motion 25 and a second to modify staff's recommendation

1	with regard to Issue 12 made by Commissioner
2	Baez. Go back to the transcript and read it.
3	All those in favor say aye.
4	(Simultaneous affirmative responses.)
5	CHAIRMAN JABER: Opposed, nay.
6	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Nay.
7	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Nay.
8	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. The motion on Issue
9	12 passes, three-two vote.
10	I've got to take a ten-minute break.
11	Sorry.
12	(Short recess.)
13	CHAIRMAN JABER: Let's get back on the
14	record, and we are on Issue 13.
15	COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I can move staff.
16	CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you. There has been
17	a motion to approve staff on Issue 13.
18	The only thing, staff, I would ask that you
19	discuss further, going back to the record in
20	regard to the benefits associated with the
21	off-system sales.
22	No, that's the next issue. I'm sorry. No,
23	it is. /It is.
24	MR. HAFF: Yes. This issue is transmission
25	integration.

1 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Where is the discussion on --2 3 MR. HAFF: Page 61, Madam Chairman. Page 61, that's 4 CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes. Issue 14, isn't it? 5 6 HAFF: Yes. MR. CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. There has been a 7 motion and a second on Issue 13. All those in 8 favor say aye. 9 (Simultaneous affirmative responses.) 10 11 CHAIRMAN JABER: Issue 13 is approved. 12 On Issue 14, I don't have a question. My 13 request, though, is that that section, because I know there was more testimony than this, staff, 14 that really needs to be fleshed out. 15 16 MR. HAFF: There was a discussion that the 17 potential cost-benefit to the customer of off-system sales, that FPL did not model that in 18 19 its base case. The assumption or I guess the 20 impression that FPL gave was that if they had 21 somehow modeled revenues from off-system sales, 22 that it would only benefit the customer more, 23 but that FPL did not carry out that calculation. My understanding is that Mr. Taylor, their 24

consultant, did a sensitivity off some limited

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amount of off-system sales revenue. This was simply just noting that there are other items that may benefit the FPL proposal that weren't part of the cost-effectiveness calculation in this case.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Was it Avera? I don't recall whose testimony it is, but there was testimony with respect to the efficiencies and the savings associated with bringing Martin 8 on, and significant discussion related to, you know, anything over the 15 megawatts primarily will inure to the benefit of the ratepayers because that is subject to the off-system sales. Who testified to that?

MR. HAFF: That might have been Dr. Sim, or it may have been Mr. Silva, but there was no quantification of potential benefits to FP&L's customers, so I didn't -- you know, that's why there's no number here, if you will.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I understand that, but the fact that there are benefits, and that can be tied to the application of Martin 8 coming on line in preparation for the need that's required for 2006, I think is significant to include in the order. Even in you can't quantify the

benefits, they're certainly qualitative. 1 2 MR. HAFF: Oh, sure, sure. 3 CHAIRMAN JABER: For me, that was -- and it 4 goes back to what I said earlier. It's not so 5 much of a reserve margin issue for me. 6 really the bigger comprehensive analysis of the 7 benefits that the customers receive, and that 8 was one of them. 9 MR. HAFF: Okay. 10 CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioners, I hope you 11 agree with that. 12 MR. HAFF: Yes. 13 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I'm going to put staff on the spot. So is that a yes or a no? 14 15 MR. HAFF: That we will put it in the 16 order? Yes. 17 MS. BROWN: That was a yes. 18 MR. HAFF: That was a yes. 19 CHAIRMAN JABER: I'm sorry. 20 MR. HAFF: Well, the attorneys will put it 21 in the order. 22 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Is there a motion 23 for Issue 14? COMMISSIONER DEASON: I move staff on 24 25 Issues 14 and 15.

1	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Second.
2	CHAIRMAN JABER: And 15. There has been a
3	motion to approve staff on Issues 14 and 15.
4	All those in favor say aye.
5	(Simultaneous affirmative responses.)
6	CHAIRMAN JABER: Issues 14 and 15 are
7	approved. Issue 16.
8	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I can move staff on
9	Issues 16 and 17.
10	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Second.
11	CHAIRMAN JABER: There has been a motion
12	and second to approve staff on Issue 16. All
13	those in favor say aye.
14	(Simultaneous affirmative responses.)
15	CHAIRMAN JABER: Issue 16 is approved. I'm
16	sorry.
17	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I moved 16 and 17,
18	but we can do it separately.
19	CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you. All those in
20	favor of approving staff on Issue 17 say aye.
21	(Simultaneous affirmative responses.)
22	CHAIRMAN JABER: Issue 17 is approved. And
23	Issue 18, Commissioner Deason, you don't have
24	any problems with closing this docket?
25	COMMISSIONER DEASON: NO I move staff

1	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Second.
2	CHAIRMAN JABER: And a second. All those
3	in favor say aye.
4	(Simultaneous affirmative responses.)
5	CHAIRMAN JABER: Issue 18 is approved.
6	Good work.
7	MR. HARRIS: Thank you, Commissioners.
8	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I want to compliment
9	the staff on the quality of the recommendation
10	and the conciseness, to the point, accurate,
11	relevant discussion. Maybe you can show the
12	telephone people how to write such a
13	recommendation.
14	CHAIRMAN JABER: Well, just walter, don't
15	you think?
16	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Yes.
17	MR. HAFF: Thank you.
18	(Conclusion of consideration of Item 7.)
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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

5 COUNTY OF LEON)

STATE OF FLORIDA)

I, MARY ALLEN NEEL, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings were taken before me at the time and place therein designated; that my shorthand notes were thereafter transcribed under my supervision; and that the foregoing pages numbered 1 through 178 are a true and correct transcription of my stenographic notes.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, or relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or financially interested in the action.

DATED THIS 23rd day of November, 2002.

MARY ALLEN NEEL, RPR

100 Salem Court

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

(850) 878-2221