## APPEARANCES:

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HAROLD McLEAN, General Counsel, and LORENA HOLLEY, FPSC General Counsel's Office, 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850, appearing on behalf of the Commission Staff.

1	PROCEEDINGS
2	THE COURT: Good morning. We're here on a motion for
3	a temporary injunction; is that correct?
4	MR. McLEAN: Yes, sir.
5	THE COURT: All right. Are you ready to proceed?
6	We've got one hour, folks.
7	MR. McLEAN: Yes, sir.
8	MR. RICHARD: If I might preliminarily, Your Honor,
9	Barry Richard representing the Florida Water Services
10	Corporation and the Authority. The Authority filed a motion to
11	intervene on Friday. Opposing counsel informs me that the PSC
12	is not going to object to it.
13	MR. McLEAN: That's correct, sir.
14	THE COURT: I didn't hear you, Mr. Richard.
15	MR. RICHARD: I said I have a motion for the Florida
16	Water Service Authority to intervene as a party.
17	THE COURT: Well, I've got five motions to intervene
18	and I'll grant every one of them.
19	MR. RICHARD: Okay.
20	THE COURT: And we've got one hour to hear these
21	motions; however you want to proceed.
22	MR. RICHARD: The PSC is not objecting to that
23	intervention.
24	THE COURT: And I also have them as it relates to
25	Palm Coast well, I guess that's the only other one. They

just sent me about seven of them. Okay. Are you ready? 1 2 MR. McLEAN: Your Honor, there should be others, and 3 the Public Service Commission supports all of those, for what 4 that's worth. I believe the folks who are filing those 5 interventions are in the courtroom today. 6 THE COURT: Well, anybody -- any one of these cities 7 that want to intervene, I'm not going to stop them from 8 intervening. 9 MR. McLEAN: Yes. sir. 10 MR. RICHARD: We have no objection. 11 THE COURT: I'll admonish you, you've still got one 12 hour to argue your motion. 13 MR. McLEAN: Good morning, Judge Gary. Thank you for 14 taking the time to hear our case. 15 I'd like to introduce counsel. Lorena Holley, who's 16 on our side at the Public Service Commission; Mr. Barry Richard 17 and Bruce Culpepper, who will be hearing the other side of the 18 case. I want to tell you, first of all, Judge, what we're 19 doing here. The Public Service Commission issued a lawful 20 21 order on February the 7th. That order has survived indirect 22 challenge in the 1st District Court of Appeal, as you know, under writ of prohibition. I believe you have been provided 23 24 with the orders in that case.

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Judge, the Public Service Commission issues many

orders every year. It is unusual for those orders to be violated and it is unusual for there to be any notion that they might be violated. We deal with companies like BellSouth, Verizon, Florida Power & Light, Florida Progress, Gulf Power, TECO, the former SSU and the Florida Water, Florida Water Services Corporation. Those orders normally go and they're complied with and it's no big deal.

The Commission has limited remedies with respect to enforcement of our orders. But the public -- strike that. But the Legislature says to us and to you, sir, in legislation that when a violation is likely or when there has been a violation, the Public Service Commission can come to your court and seek to add your authority to our order. And I submit to you that is the only effect of what this injunction does. So it was to add the authority of the circuit court to the order which we have already issued. And the reason for that is I believe the Legislature understood that about all the Public Service Commission can do is fine someone when they don't comply with the order. We have no injunctive powers, we have none of your enviable powers in equity to make people do what you tell them to do. We can only fine them.

I believe you will find that important in this case because we have utterly no authority and we do not allege any authority and our order does not suggest that we have any authority over the Authority itself.

Now before we go too far with authority, I would like to introduce the real players before you, at least tell you who they are. The Florida Public Service Commission, we're an agency of state government. We regulate lots of investor-owned utilities including Florida Water Services Corporation.

There's going to be some confusion in the case because the names are so similar. So what I would prefer to do, with Your Honor's leave, is refer to the Florida Public -- I'm sorry -- the Florida Water Services Corporation as the Corporation because that would stand in contrast to the almost identically named entity who is also before you, the Florida Water Services Authority.

Florida Water Services Corporation, formerly SSU, has been, has been regulated by the Florida Public Service Commission for many years. I handled a case against them in 1977 as a member of the Florida Public Service Commission staff. So they've been around forever; they've been subject to our jurisdiction that whole time.

Florida Services Water Authority, that is the Authority, we assert no jurisdiction over them. Our order tells them to do nothing, suggests that they should do nothing. If this transaction occurs, which you're going to hear about, our remedy is inadequate because Florida Water Services Corporation will be an empty shell. All of their assets will be transferred to the Authority. We can't fine the Authority

and we can't effectively fine an organization that's transferred all its assets away. That's why we come to you for an extraordinary writ and injunction. We need your authority to enforce our order.

I want to tell you a little bit about the order. The order, the Public Service Commission order which was entered on February 7th says to the Corporation, sir, not to the Authority, that you may not sell yourself. Under Chapter 367 -- under Section 367.071, the Public Service Commission can require, and no entity under our jurisdiction that's a water and sewer company can transfer its assets without our prior approval.

Our order says, don't transfer yourself until you come to us for approval. The order again tells the Authority absolutely nothing, requires nothing of them.

You're going to hear some argument, I think, about whether this transfer -- whether the parties are entitled to this transfer as a matter of right.

The Public Service Commission order in essence delays that decision to determine whether they are entitled to a matter of right or whether they are subject to a public interest test, and the administrative process of the Public Service Commission will determine that question in time. There is a hearing scheduled in the matter. We have no motion to continue that hearing, no motion to set that hearing earlier,

no motion to expedite the process. That's what the order says. It says, don't transfer your system until you seek authority from the Commission.

Judge, I want to respectfully suggest that you can't go behind that order. That order is the order of the Public Service Commission. And the only reason that I think -- the only reason we're here for is to add your authority to that order.

Appeal of that order lies in the 1st District Court of Appeal. If that order is flawed, if that order misstates the law, if that order misstates fact, then the appellate route is at the 1st District Court of Appeal.

Returning to our order and the likelihood that it will be violated, there is an existing transfer -- strike that. There is an existing contract to transfer this utility from the Authority -- I'm sorry, strike that -- from the, from the Corporation to the Authority, from a private entity that we have regulated for years to a governmental entity of some sort which we do not regulate under Chapter 163.

So there is an existing contract to transfer would suggest to us that there may soon be a violation. That's not all. There is a statement by Mr. Hoffman, who represented the Corporation at our hearing, who said, in essence -- this is my interpretation. I think it's a fair interpretation. I have the transcript for Your Honor's attention. Irrespective of

what the Public Service Commission does, we intend to carry this through and do this deal. He was very up front with our Commissioners, I certainly give Mr. Hoffman credit for that, but he always has been. He said, "I don't want to be any less than frank, Commissioner Bradley, but, you know, it's our intention at this point to proceed to closing." That's when the deal -- that's when whether the Commission was going to issue the order was under active discussion.

Next, sir, I have a statement by a board member, a Mrs., a Ms. Pollock, I believe, who as recently as this Saturday said, "If they deny the injunction, then I believe we can move toward closing." Mr. Barry (sic.) himself -- I'm sorry. Yes. Mr. Barry himself indicated, Authority officials believe that they have the right to close on the deal prior to gaining PSC approval, which they also reiterate as a perfunctory duty.

Three reasons why we believe our order is going to be violated, but it is not the last, in a statement by Mr. Gray, I believe, Mr. Gray indicated that -- this is my interpretation again. I have his words for Your Honor, if you'd wish to see them. That they may go forward and they may, and there is no requirement that they notice anybody. If the two parties agree between each other, then they can do this deal when they decide to do it with no notice to us. We believe the violation is imminent because there's a contract, because Mr. Hoffman said

they were going to go forward anyway, a board member says they can go forward if Your Honor doesn't enjoin them, our order notwithstanding which prohibits the transfer. And, finally, there's mention that they can do so without notice.

I've explained briefly why we believe our existing remedies are ineffective. It is a fact argued by, ably argued by Mr. Jacobs at our agency that you can't unring the bell. Once this deal goes down, the Corporation is empty; we can't fine it, we can't take a lien against it, we can't do anything. The Authority, we have no jurisdiction over them at all. We can't enforce any remedy against them.

But, Judge, I don't think that the provisions that permit you to issue your injunction require us to show that our existing remedies are ineffective. You'll notice the statute which we have quoted in our petition finds, I believe, as a matter of law that there is irreparable injury and that there's no adequate remedy involved.

I'd like to turn my attention briefly to the bond because normally when Your Honor issues an injunction, the parties seeking the injunction ought to post bond.

I'd like to urge upon Your Honor that the existing Commission order operates as a prohibition to this sale until the Commission sits in judgment on either whether it is a matter of right or whether it serves the public interest. But in any case, our order clearly on its face prohibits this

utility from selling itself to anyone, including the Authority.

If Your Honor should see fit to issue an injunction in this case, there is no marginal harm -- if there were any harm at all, there's certainly no marginal harm occasioned by your injunction. All your injunction will do is tell this utility under the authority of this Court that they had better honor our order, and beyond that it doesn't do anything else. It doesn't move the date a moment, it doesn't, it doesn't lift the prohibition, it doesn't do anything except tell this company that they must comply with a Commission order and, Judge, it adds your authority to that, to that prohibition. And that's what we're here for. We can't make them do it without your authority.

The Legislature has found that a violation would present irreparable injury and the Legislature has found that the Commission has no adequate remedy at law.

I'd like to conclude. Again, with all due respect, sir, I don't believe that you can go behind the order. I don't believe that you could or should hear anything from the party that suggests any infirmity in the order. First of all, they took that item to the 1st DCA last week and lost almost summarily.

Secondly -- second, this is not an appeal of our order. If they bring you words of infirmity about our order, they should take that argument back to the 1st DCA in the form

of appeal, in a writ of mandamus or something where jurisdiction over the Public Service Commission lies in matters such as this. This is not an appeal. I, again, suggest to you, sir, with respect, you can't and ought not go behind the order itself. It is a lawful order of the Commission. It's unchallenged. It was challenged briefly at the 1st DCA. The 1st DCA signed off on it.

We believe the violation is imminent. I think the things that I mentioned to you show that the violation is imminent. But I would also tell you, sir, that your authority to issue the injunction does not depend on whether violation is imminent. It simply enjoins a violation. That said, the Commission remedy is ineffective. We can't enforce this order without your help. We can't enforce this order without your authority.

Judge, I believe we have shown that we're entitled to an injunction, and we'd like to add the Court's authority to our order. And, finally, I believe that a nominal bond is appropriate. We're not asking for a zero bond. We're asking for a nominal bond. And we'd urge upon you the notion that your injunction adds no adverse consequences to either the Authority or to the utility because it orders them to do that which they're already obliged to do and simply orders them to do so under your authority, sir. And I thank you very much.

MR. RICHARD: May it please the Court. I appear here

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-- Barry Richard, and I appear here today as counsel for both the Florida Water Services Corporation, which is the seller, and the Florida Water Services Authority, which is the buyer.

Counsel suggested at the beginning of his remarks that this is a basic garden variety case in which the PSC has issued an order that the parties are subject to and that it is unusual, to say the least, for parties to be disregarding that order. In fact, this is not a garden variety case. The reason that my client is contemplating closing despite the order is that the PSC has no jurisdiction in this case. At its inception it has no authority to have issued the order in Section 367.071, 367 being the chapter that provides addition. whatever authority exists to the Public Service Commission, provides in unambiguous terms that, "An application which is an application for sale or transfer of assets by a private regulated entity shall be disposed of as provided in Section 367.045, except that, A, the sale of facilities in whole or in part to a governmental authority shall be approved as a matter of right," period.

My client is a governmental authority, Your Honor.

Governmental authority is defined by the same chapter,

367.021(7), as a political subdivision as defined in Section

1.01(8) of the Florida Statutes, which includes municipalities.

My client, by the way, is an interlocal authority composed of two Florida municipalities and no others.

And then it goes on to say, "or a nonprofit corporation formed for the purpose of acting on behalf of a political subdivision with respect to a water or wastewater facility." The Authority is also a Florida nonprofit corporation which exists for the sole purpose of acting on behalf of the two cities that are its members for the purpose of creating and managing water and wastewater facilities.

There's no question that my client, the Authority, is a governmental authority and, and at the very least is a nonprofit organization acting on behalf of two cities with water and wastewater facilities. And, consequently, it is unambiguously true that by Florida Statute, the very chapter that provides and limits the authority of the PSC, it must grant this application as a matter of right.

Second, there's a provision in Florida Statute 367.071, which is the provision relating to the sale or assignment of assets, and requiring that a private entity which is regulated by the PSC submit the proposed sale to the PSC for a determination of probable cause of, of public interest which it does not have the authority to do when it's being transferred to a governmental authority. But even when it's being transferred from a private entity to another private entity, the provision says that the PSC has the authority to make a determination of public interest. However, it says the sale, assignment or transfer, and I'm reading only the

pertinent portions, may occur prior to Commission approval if the contract for sale, assignment or transfer is made contingent upon Commission approval. The contract between the Public -- the Water Services Corporation and the Water Services Authority include that contingency.

In its order in which the Public Service Commission required that or prohibited that the sale be closed prior to the Public Service Commission's approval, it said that it considered the contingency clause that was included in the contract was insufficient to meet the requirements of that statutory exemption that I just read to you. In my mind it was not insufficient. It said exactly what the statute said. All it did was add in addition a statement that the Public Service Commission was required as a matter of right to transfer.

However, to remove that issue from the table, my client, both of my clients have now amended their contract so that the provision now reads as follows: "The sale and transfer of the assets pursuant to this agreement is contingent upon approval by the Florida Public Service Commission and other applicable county regulatory agencies," period. There can be no question that the contingency provision of the contract meets the requirements of the Florida Statute, which expressly states that they are entitled to close on this deal as long as they have that contingency provision prior to Commission approval.

The Florida Supreme Court in Hernando County versus -- I'm sorry. The 1st District Court of Appeal in Hernando County versus the Florida Public Service Commission, a 1997 case, made the following statement which was quoted from a decision of the Florida Supreme Court and that has been reiterated in Florida law a number of times.

"Any reasonable doubt as to the lawful existence of a particular power that is being exercised by the Commission, referring to the Public Service Commission, must be resolved against the exercise thereof, and the further exercise of the power should be arrested." Interestingly, the Florida Public Service Commission itself in 2002 utilized, quoted that same provision in refusing to exercise power. And when the case was appealed to the Florida Supreme Court, the Supreme Court said the Public Service Commission was correct, that any reasonable doubt regarding the Public Service Commission's authority must be resolved against the Commission and that the exercise of that power must be resolved.

Now what is the significance of that to this case?

The significance of it is that there is no presumption here, as counsel would suggest, that there should be deference to the Public Service Commission. As a matter of fact, in the Supreme Court case I was referring to, the first thing they say is that the usual deference to be accorded to the Public Service Commission disappears when there's a question as to the PSC's

authority and jurisdiction, and that that must be addressed first. And, second, this goes to the question of one of the heavy burdens that the PSC has in this case in which they seek a temporary injunction.

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Before I reach that, however, there's another issue that counsel addressed that I want to call to the attention of this Court.

The Public Service Commission was notified in November of 2002. November of 2002 of the fact that my client intended to go through with this closing, and all of the documents were provided to the Public Service Commission: The interlocal agreement, contract for the sale and transfer. And the Public Service Commission was advised in November of 2002 that my client at that time intended to close in December of 2002. That date has been moved forward and was eventually moved forward until February 14th, yet the Public Service Commission took no action until last week, which on the eve of the February 14th closing, they finally, after over \$5 million had been spent by my client in preparing to sell bonds and conclude this closing, on the eve of the closing they suddenly issued an order telling us not to close.

If there is an emergency in this case, which I would suggest and will explain in a moment there is not, but if there is one, it is one created not by my client, but by the Public Service Commission, which, despite full knowledge of my

client's intentions as early as November of last year, did nothing until literally the eve, two days or three days, before the closing was expected to take place.

Now there are two burdens that the Public Service Commission has here. They've come before this Court to ask this Court to order my client not to fulfill this closing. They really have three burdens. The first is to show that they have the authority to come to the Court in the first place, and the second is to show this Court that there is irreparable injury, and the third is to show the Court that they have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; the elementary burdens that a plaintiff has seeking a temporary injunction.

In the motion that they filed with the Court, the Public Service Commission cites Section 367.121(j), which authorizes the PSC to seek judicial relief under appropriate circumstances. And the one in particular that they referred to is the one that authorizes it to seek in circuit court relief including temporary injunction. But what that provision says, and it is a provision I would have cited if they had not, is that they have the power to seek relief in circuit court, including temporary and permanent injunctions, restraining orders or other appropriate order because the Legislature finds that violations of Commission orders or rules in connection with the impairment of the utility's operations or services constitute irreparable harm.

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There's nothing in that statute to begin with that says that the PSC has no requirement to show the existence of irreparable harm, if not for the temporary injunction. But the Legislature has simply made a finding that when we are dealing with the threat of impairment of the utility's operations or services, that the Legislature has created a presumption of irreparable harm. That's not what's before this Court today. There is no suggestion in this record, there is no evidence in this record to suggest that there's any threat to the impairment of any utility's operations or services, which means two things. The first is that the PSC has no authority to be seeking this in the first place since they do not have general authority to seek a temporary injunction. But the second is that there's no reason why they should be relieved of the obligation to show irreparable harm.

Now the PSC counsel suggests to the Court that there's irreparable harm because he tells this Court, as he told the PSC, that once this bell is rung, it cannot be unrung. But he has failed to explain why that's true, and I honestly, Your Honor, cannot understand what that means.

What we're dealing with here is a proposed sale of an asset from one corporation to another corporation. If the Courts ultimately, as unlikely as I believe it is, determine that the PSC does have authority despite the clear language of Florida Statutes, and if the PSC ultimately determines that it

will not approve this sale, why can it not be undone? That asset will revert to the Corporation, Water Services Corporation.

The only ones that stand to suffer any loss, if that occurs, are the bondholders. And if anybody buys these bonds, they buy them with full knowledge of the risk.

Why can't it be undone? The ownership reverts back to the Corporation. The money received, if any money was received, because no money will be received unless bonds are sold, but the money received by the Corporation from the Authority would be returned to the Authority. Presumably the only one who would lose or the only thing that would be lost would be whatever the loss on investments would have been by the bondholders who purchased them. But the Public Service Commission loses nothing. The customers of the utility lose nothing. The suggestion that this cannot be undone is a suggestion that is beyond my understanding, and perhaps counsel could explain it to Your Honor when he returns to the rostrum. There is no question that somebody might lose some money if it's undone, but the somebody can only be the bondholders who are buying them with full understanding of that risk.

So counsel has failed, not only failed to prove irreparable injury, but failed to, to carry the very elemental burden of introducing any evidence to establish irreparable harm.

Now if there's irreparable harm that would be suffered in this case or harm at least, because there's some question as to whether or not financial damage is ever considered irreparable, but it clearly would be my clients. Any movement in the interest rate in this volatile market that currently exists can mean a difference of millions and millions of dollars and, in fact, can mean the difference of the ability to even carry through this transaction.

My clients dutifully notified the Public Service

Commission in November of last year of their intention to go
through with this. Months and months have now gone by. The

Public Service Commission has waited without explanation all of
this time and if -- and they have now scheduled a hearing in
July. In July. And counsel says, well, Your Honor, nobody has
moved to expedite this. But the Public Service Commission had
an all-day hearing several weeks ago in which it was made
patently clear to them that time is of the essence by both
sides. Scheduling this in July is a message that they don't
intend to rush. So if anybody stands to be harmed in this
case, it's my client.

THE COURT: Excuse me, Counsel. I thought May was when the scheduled hearing was.

MR. RICHARD: My understanding is it's July, Your Honor. On the calendar that's posted on the web site for the Public Service Commission, it's shown in July. But if it's

May, that's still, that's still a long time and could mean, it could mean the death of this deal, far more expense in the deal.

Finally, Your Honor, they've got to prove substantial likelihood of success. We have heard nothing. By the way, there's nothing even in that statute that says that they're relieved of the obligation to prove substantial likelihood of success. And I cannot imagine how they're going to prove it in this courtroom today given what the statutes say.

And that leads me to one comment on the 1st District Court of Appeal decision so that it cannot be suggested that the Court did more than it did. I saw it from the Public -- from the 1st District Court of Appeal on an emergency basis, a writ of prohibition to keep the Public Service Commission from attempting to stop this sale.

One of the responses, as a matter of fact, I think the primary response made by the respondents, which was not only the Public Service Commission but a group of cities, was that the public -- it was not appropriate for the 1st District Court of Appeal to consider this because of the lack of an evidentiary record before the Court. And the primary response that I believe -- although the Court gave us no reason, it just denied the petition. I think the primary reason for the Court's concern was because a lot of issues were raised, factual issues in the responses that were filed. Of course,

the 1st District Court of Appeal has no way of resolving factual disputes. That has nothing to do with the obligation of the Public Service Commission now that it comes before this Court, nothing to do with its obligation to show this Court that it has a substantial likelihood of success on the, on the merits. And considering the fact that the statutes are crystal clear that my client is entitled to this transfer as a matter of right, number one, and that, number two, we are entitled to close prior to approval because of the contingency clause in the contract -- I'm not saying that Your Honor can determine that we're going to win, but surely the PSC cannot come before you and tell you today that there's a substantial likelihood that it's going to succeed on the merits.

Your Honor, this motion for a temporary injunction is inappropriate. It comes much too late. If the PSC intended to do this, they should have done it in November. They didn't consider it an emergency at that time, despite the fact that the closing was then scheduled for December. And they -- it's inappropriate for them to be before the Court asking for this relief now.

MR. McLEAN: Judge Gary, I believe you heard
Mr. Barry concede at the opening of his remarks that he would
violate the order unless this Court enjoined his client from
doing so. I want to again make the point that I'm not sure
Mr. Barry has yet that we have told his client, the Authority,

to do nothing, they need do nothing to comply with our order. We didn't tell them to do anything.

Mr. Barry brought a number of supposed infirmities of our order to your attention. He should bring those to the attention of the 1st District Court of Appeal that has a full menu of remedies before it, including a stay, including mandamus and any other writ that seems appropriate in the premises. He has not challenged a valid order, which he now says he is prepared to violate in the absence of an injunction from this Court, sir, and that's why we need your injunction.

The lawful doubt argument is an argument that is made before the 1st District Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court cases -- and in the Supreme Court when our orders are challenged routinely. Those are appellate arguments which he should make to that court.

Mr. Barry made much of the bell ringing argument that I gave you, so let me give it to you again. And I take his invitation to take the rostrum to tell you why we can't enforce it: Because when the deal goes down, the Corporation is an empty shell. All we can do is fine them. That is our ultimate remedy without your, without your injunction. They will be gone. I don't know that we can make them answer our process. All the assets are somewhere else and the money for the assets will be in Minnesota. They don't have to answer us because we can't make them answer us. We can make them answer us with

your injunction. You, sir, can make them answer you very well if they should choose to violate your injunction, and that's why we're here.

The expedition, they can take a petition for writ of mandamus to the appropriate appellate court and mandate us to hold a hearing sooner, if they care to, although they'll be subject there to the defense of having failed to exhaust administrative remedies. They haven't asked us. They said nothing to us about speeding the matter up. They still can. And they may well get relief in that regard, if that's what they want. The Commission calendar is a somewhat crowded calendar, but we have made arrangements many times to hear matters early of great public interest.

And, again, if, if the order doesn't set the hearing soon enough for their tastes, the order can be attacked in the appellate court or it could be attacked at our level. They could ask us to expedite.

Last, I don't quite understand the likelihood of success. What we're asking for is the opportunity to have a hearing. We're definitely going to succeed in that with the help of your injunction, should you choose to issue it. We're not trying to prevail, we're not trying to seek damages, we're not trying to get gain time. We are in the business of trying to hold a hearing to determine some issues of great public interest which have been presented to our agency and upon which

our Commissioners have ruled.

And, lastly, it is our fear, and I believe now more well-founded than ever, that our lawful order which stands as the law of Florida has not been challenged, that our lawful order will be violated. And I believe you've heard that from Mr. Richard this morning, sir. Thank you very much.

MR. GROOT: Your Honor, Lonnie Groot representing the City of Palm Coast. Just briefly, we would adopt the arguments of the PSC, but we would also just point out to the Court that it's our view that the issue of whether Florida Water Services Authority is, is or is not a governmental authority is not before the Court. And it's the position of the City of Palm Coast that it clearly is not, it clearly doesn't meet the definition set forth in the statute, and that that matter has been and will continue to be presented to the Public Service Commission. And we believe that that determination will be appropriate by either a rule adoption or order of the Public Service Commission. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Very well.

MR. JACOBS: Good morning, Your Honor. My name is Arthur Jacobs. I'm here on behalf of the Amelia Island Plantation Community Association, Inc., and we have asked the Court to allow us to appear as amicus curiae in our pleadings before the Court.

I represent 2,500 users of, of Florida Water Services,

the Corporation. There's some several hundred thousand in 26 counties in Florida users of Florida Water Services water and sewer.

Your Honor, I think it's important to note that, that the two cities that formed this particular, attempted to form this Authority, none of the users of Florida Water Services are in those cities.

Your Honor, the arguments that I've heard today from Mr. Richards regarding their position, these are the same arguments that were made in the 1st District Court of Appeals, and for whatever reason the 1st District Court of Appeals did not grant their writ of prohibition.

I would submit to you, Your Honor, that particularly in my folks' instance there's \$171 million of contributions in aid of construction, which are part of this deal, as Mr. Richards calls it, the deal. In this deal there's \$171 million of contributions in aid of construction. My little folks over on Amelia Island only have about \$500,000 tied up in that. These are monies that are being utilized, as we understand it, to purchase -- these are, these monies are being utilized in this deal, and we will lose those monies as they would be applied to future growth of our utility. So we're certainly in imminent danger and peril. We do not have any vote or any authority to react to people out in Milton and Gulf Breeze as to how they're going to regulate the utilities

over in Nassau County.

So I submit to you, Your Honor, that the injunction is the appropriate measure for this Court so that the Public Service Commission can determine whether or not, number one, do they have this as a matter of right or, number two, is it in the public interest that this deal, as Mr. Richards calls it, goes down? So I would ask you to grant this injunction. We adopt the comments of the Public Service Commission. Your Honor, I think we have no other remedy but this, particularly whenever the shot's been fired over the bow and they say, no matter what the Public Service Commission is doing, they told them, I think it was on February the 7th, I was there, they said, we're going to go ahead and close anyway. And Mr. Richards told you, said to you today that without this injunction they would proceed to closing in spite of what the Public Service Commission wishes to do.

So, Your Honor, we ask that you do grant this injunction. Thank you for your time.

MR. TWOMEY: May it please the Court. Your Honor, I'm Mike Twomey appearing on behalf of Collier County, Florida, and the Sugarmill Woods Association, Inc., which is located in Citrus County.

Your Honor, I want to stress again that as best I can tell Mr. Richard has told you and told us all indeed that this deal, as he called it, is going to go through, they're going to close this. It's going to require \$550 million worth of the issuance of bonds. I heard him tell you it's going to happen unless you or someone else enjoins the transaction.

The question, Your Honor, of governmental authority that Mr. Richards so, so confidently told you was out of question was clear is indeed not. That is a question of fact and law. It'll be considered by the Florida Public Service Commission at the time they have their hearing.

Likewise, whether or not the contingency clause that Mr. Richard spoke to, Your Honor, whether it is adequate or not is, again, a question of law and fact that has to be determined by the Florida Public Service Commission, the agency, as Your Honor is aware, which is charged with interpreting the utility statutes it's charged with enforcing.

Again, Your Honor, likewise, the nonprofit status of the Authority corporation, which was entered into at the last minute at the Public Service Commission hearing on February the 4th, whether that meets the requirement of the statute that would allow for a matter of right transfer, Your Honor, is, again, a question of law and fact to be considered by the Public Service Commission in their expertise.

The -- consequently, Your Honor, the, the issues to be heard, to be decided have to be heard at the Public Service Commission. And as pointed out by Mr. McLean, if the utility, which is the only body that is regulated by the Public Service

Commission, if the utility finds fault with the Commission's decisions on those three points and its ultimate decision on whether this sale is in the public interest or entitled to a matter of right transfer, then it should take it to the 1st District Court of Appeals, which by constitution and by statute is the sole court to hearing water and sewer cases.

My, my clients and Sugarmill Woods have many millions of dollars of this contributed property, CIAC, that will be lost to them if this deal goes through. There's more even for the customers that reside in Marco Island.

So, Your Honor, we think there's irreparable harm.

The deal will go down, the money will be lost, we think, and we would urge you, for the reasons given by the Public Service Commission and others, to grant the injunction and protect us from the deal closing. Thank you, sir.

THE COURT: Anything else? Okay. I think it's pretty well conceded by both sides that the PSC may have no authority over the Florida Water Services Authority. I think that's conceded by everyone.

However, the Public Service Commission does have authority under the statute over the Florida Water Services Corporation, and the Court so finds.

The Court also finds that there will be irreparable harm and that there is a substantial likelihood of success. I will grant the temporary injunction with a nominal amount in

the amount of \$5,000 required.

Judge Francis will hear this case further. I'm kind of a pinch hitter first. So I would suggest that you get with his judicial assistant to set up the, whatever further hearings you may have.

I will have an order entered today and available for all parties. Okay. Thank you. Good luck to all of you.

(Hearing concluded at approximately 10:15 a.m.)

1	STATE OF FLORIDA ) : CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
2	COUNTY OF LEON )
3	
4	I, LINDA BOLES, RPR, Official Commission
5	Reporter, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceeding was heard at the time and place herein stated.
6	IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that I stenographically
7	reported the said proceedings; that the same has been transcribed under my direct supervision; and that this transcript constitutes a true transcription of my notes of saproceedings.
8	
9	I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee,
10	I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor am I a relative or employee of any of the parties' attorneys or counsel connected with the action, nor am I financially interested in
11	the action.
12	DATED THIS 19th DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2003.
13	
14	- Tima Boles
15	FPSC Official Commissioner Reporter (850) 413-6734
16	(030) 413 0/34
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