1	BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION		
2	TEORIDA TODETO SERVICE CONTIDOTOR		
3		DOCKET NO. 030884-EU	
4	In the Matter of:		
5	OBJECTIONS TO FLOR	A2 DECHECT	
6	FOR PROPOSALS_FILE	D AUGUST 25,	
7	FOR AFFORDABLE COM	PETITIVE SOME	
8	ENERGY (PACE) AND INDIVIDUAL MEMBER		
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12	PROCEEDINGS:	AGENDA CONFERENCE ITEM NO. 15**	
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14	BEFORE:	CHAIRMAN LILA A. JABER	
15		COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON COMMISSIONER BRAULIO L. BAEZ	
16		COMMISSIONER RUDOLPH "RUDY" BRADLEY COMMISSIONER CHARLES M. DAVIDSON	
17		COMMISSIONER OF MICEES III BAR 1966	
18	DATE:	September 30, 2003	
19	PLACE:	Betty Easley Conference Center Room 148	
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21		4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida	
22	REPORTED BY:	JANE FAUROT, RPR	
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FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 978 | OCT-85

PARTICIPATING: JON MOYLE, JR., ESQUIRE, and CATHY SELLERS, representing PACE. CHARLES A. GUYTON, ESQUIRE, representing Florida Power & Light Company. COCHRAN KEATING, ESQUIRE, MARTHA BROWN, ESQUIRE, ANDREW MAUREY, MIKE HAFF and JOE JENKINS, representing the Commission Staff. 

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## PROCEEDINGS

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Let's get back on the record, and we are on Item 15.

MR. KEATING: Commissioners. Item 15 is staff's recommendation concerning Florida PACE's objections to specified provisions of Florida Power and Light Company's recent request for proposals for firm capacity and energy beginning in 2007. This case represents the first time that a request for proposal has been issued under the Commission's recently revised bid rule, and represents the first time that the objection process has been used as set forth in Subsection 12 of that rule.

The objection process provides that your decision be based only on the written submissions of the parties and their oral argument here today. The rule expressly precludes use of discovery or an evidentiary proceeding in reaching a decision on these objections. Accordingly, your findings today are necessarily informal preliminary findings of an advisory nature.

Staff's recommendation addresses two issues. First. is PACE permitted under our rule to participate in the objection process. And, second, if so, do PACE's objections violate any provision of our bid rule. The parties are here prepared to present oral argument on these issues and staff is available to answer any questions concerning its

recommendation.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Let's see. Parties have requested oral argument. Staff, we need to -- do we need to officially vote on that or --

MR. KEATING: On whether oral argument should be granted? I believe the rule itself contemplates that there will be oral argument where it indicates that your decision will be based solely on the written submissions and oral argument. Both parties -- I have talked to both attorneys and we have discussed a time frame of 15 to 20 minutes per side.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioners, I think that is sufficient if we will just allow 15 to 20 minutes per side. Are you all right with that? Okay. Go ahead. We will start with -- let's see, this is objection filed by PACE and a motion to exclude PACE, so who would you suggest I start with, staff?

MR. KEATING: We could take up the issues separately, allow however many of the 15 to 20 minutes the parties would like to devote to the -- for lack of a better term, the standing issue before we get onto the issue of the merits of the objections. It may be reasonable to decide the standing issue first. If you do decide that PACE should not be allowed to participate, then you don't need to address their objections in Issue 2.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Then Issue 1 should be taken up separately. And, FPL?

MR. GUYTON: Thank you, Chairman. Commissioners, my name is Charlie Guyton and I represent Florida Power and Light Company. FPL has filed a motion to exclude PACE from the bid rule exception process, and your staff correctly points out in its recommendation that this is an issue of first impression.

In an effort to keep my remarks short, I will focus on your staff's recommendation on this issue. FPL agrees with much of staff's legal analysis, we simply depart from them as to conclusion. FPL agrees that this is not an issue of whether PACE has standing in a need case. FPL agrees that prior rulings that PACE had standing in a need case were not based on a determination that they were a, quote, participant, end quote, under the bid rule. And we also agree with your staff's observation that PACE is not a potential generation supplier who would submit a proposal to FPL's RFP.

The portion of staff's recommendation that we respectfully take issue with is where your staff goes beyond the explicit and unambiguous language of the bid rule. Your bid rule could not be clearer. The objection process is limited to potential participants in FPL's RFP. The rule states, and I quote, "A potential participant may file with the Commission objections to the RFP," end quote. A participant is further defined as a potential generation supplier.

PACE is not a potential generation supplier.

Therefore, it is not a potential participant within the meaning

of the bid rule. We submit to you that that should be the end of the analysis.

However, it has been suggested that -- and I quote, "PACE is in a unique position to state the concerns of the independent power producers." I urge you not to extend the language of the bid rule in this manner for two reasons. First, it essentially amends the express unambiguous language of the bid rule which limits the objection process to potential generation suppliers. You had the opportunity to draft broader language, you chose not to do so. And absent some ambiguity, there should not be an attempt to look to intent or purpose.

Second, PACE acknowledges in its pleading that it does not even represent the interest of all of its members. Therefore, it is unreasonable to treat PACE as if it speaks for the entire IPP industry. Consider what you don't know from PACE's pleading. You don't know the number of PACE members; you don't know how many of its members it purports to represent, only some; you don't know whether PACE represents the same subset of members on each of the issues; and you don't know whether PACE's members all have the same interest. All you know from PACE's pleading is that it is not representing all of its members in this proceeding.

Now, according to its web page it has five members, which, of course, is a very small subset of the IPP industry. So there is no basis to conclude that it can speak for the

entire industry. Moreover, there would appear to be a conflict among its members. One of the objections that they pose is to a minimum requirement that an eligible bidder must have an investment grade bond rating. Not all five, but some of the five of PACE's members have such a rating. How PACE can represent the interest of all IPPs when some of its members don't have the same interest would suggest to us to seem to be a conflict.

Commissioners, FPL urges you to apply the express unambiguous language of the rule that created this unique proceeding and exclude PACE from participating because it is not a potential participant, it is not a potential generation supplier. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Before we move forward, do you agree that if we agreed with your interpretation of participant and find that PACE is not a potential participant, we still have the discretion to rule on Issue 2 and issue what staff calls an advisory opinion? I mean, do you recognize the administrative efficiency in providing guidance with regard to the objections that have been filed?

MR. GUYTON: I have not looked at that from that perspective, but I would suggest that your objection process seems to be limited to objections by potential participants.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Well, let me let you think about it some more as we move forward, but my question is specifically

understanding your legal position about not expanding the rule, do you agree that there is some administrative efficiency in ensuring the best process for providing guidance to the RFP process would be to go ahead and entertain a ruling on Issue 2, as well?

MR. GUYTON: I can certainly acknowledge that the Commission when it was struggling back with the bid rule seemed to be looking for a way to address some of those issues up front with some administrative efficiency, and that seemed to be an underlying import of what the Commission was ultimately trying to get to, in terms of this process. So to the extent there is an advantage to that, I can say that that appears to me to be consistent with what the Commission was trying to do.

It is a slightly different issue as to how precisely it complies with the language of your argument. I am reluctant to the embrace that because I have just given you a very strict constructionist interpretation of your rule.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioners, do you have questions at this point? Commissioner Bradley.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I'll wait.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Next.

MR. MOYLE: Madam Chairman, Jon Moyle with the Moyle Flanigan law firm appearing on behalf of PACE. For the record with me is Mike Green, the executive director of PACE, and Cathy Sellers is a partner in our firm. I'm prepared to argue

today on the objections that PACE filed. Ms. Sellers is going to address the issue of standing. And in addition to what we have filed with you, she is going to have some oral arguments responding to Mr. Guyton's points.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Go ahead.

MS. SELLERS: Thank you. We are here today on behalf of Florida PACE, which is Florida Partnership for Affordable Competitive Energy, the statewide trade association representing the members, or the interest of its members who are independent power producers in Florida, all of whom may bid in the FPL RFP process.

We believe that PACE should be allowed to submit objections to the bid rule in keeping with the preliminary and advisory and informal nature that staff counsel described the bid rule objection process as encompassing. First, PACE being allowed to submit objections is entirely consistent with the purpose of the bid rule's new objection process. This process is designed to allow potential participants to identify and enable the Commission to address provisions in an IOU's RFP that are unfair, onerous, unduly discriminatory, or commercially infeasible.

As staff counsel and Commissioners have recognized, this helps avoid problems that may arise later in the need determination process, problems such as this Commission has had to address on previous occasions in the need determination

process.

As a trade association representing the interests of several IPPs in Florida who may submit bids in response to FPL's RFP, PACE is in a unique position to represent the concerns with respect to this RFP without requiring each IPP to address its own objections. In this respect PACE is stepping into the shoes of its members and submitting objections on their behalf advances an efficient and less costly objection process to the benefit of IPPs and the Commission.

Rather than having to entertain objections from several different entities, you can efficiently consider the objections of several contained in the document that we submitted on behalf of their association representing their various interests.

Second, PACE previously has been allowed to participate in need determination proceedings on behalf of its members. And this is arguably in derogation, if you will, of the plain language of Subsection 12 of your bid rule which provides that a potential participant -- I'm sorry, Subsection 16, the Commission shall not allow potential suppliers of capacity who are not participants to contest the outcome of the selection process in a power plant need determination proceeding.

I would submit to you the fact that this Commission has interpreted this provision previously to allow PACE to

intervene and participate as a party in various need determination proceedings, including one by FPL last year, and also one by Florida Power Corp recently indicates that the Commission has, indeed, on appropriate occasions gone beyond the plain language of the bid rule. And in this particular case, considering the purpose of the bid rule, we believe that it is very appropriate for them to do so.

I would point out that FPL argues even though it claims not to be arguing the 120 standing, in fact in effect it is by arguing that PACE needs to somehow rather discriminate and describe for the Commission the individual specific injuries and interests of each of its members. In effect, FPL appears to be arguing the 120 standing that it claims doesn't apply.

We would submit to you that in keeping with the advisory informal nature of this proceeding that a stringent 120 injury standard and specific injury standard shouldn't apply. And that given that this objection process was intended to be a more open process without having to meet a stringent standing standard, there is no legal or logical reason to exclude PACE from representing the interests of its members in this particular process.

Finally, to the extent that 120 standing is germane, PACE clearly has standing under 120. We have alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate that we meet the Florida homebuilders

standing test. And, you know, again in keeping with the spirit, and frankly the language of the bid rule, we submit to you that the Commission should allow PACE to participate, to submit its objections, and we would respectfully request that you allow us to. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Who are the PACE members?

MR. GREEN: This is Mike Green. Constellation, Calpine, Competitive Power Ventures, Reliant, and -- this is a test -- Mirant.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mirant?

MR. GREEN: Mirant.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Constellation, Calpine, CPV, Reliant. and Mirant.

MR. GREEN: Yes, ma'am.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Which one of you can respond to the allegation that your participation actually results in a conflict among the members?

MR. MOYLE: I can respond to that, I guess, in this way, in that staff in pointing out this rule -- and we are treading on new ground here, you know, correctly pointed out we are not in an evidentiary proceeding. And I think to the extent that we were trying to establish standing under 120 there could be some discovery on that and whatnot.

You know, the point that Mr. Guyton made with respect to conflict, as I understood it, was that out of the folks

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named only one of them has an investment grade rating sufficient so that it would not be disqualified sort of out of the starting gate. I can tell you that in -- can I just have one minute?

CHAIRMAN JABER: Well, here is my question.

MR. MOYLE: I want to make sure I'm not disclosing any attorney/client --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Well, let me ask the question so that you can consult and get the answer I'm looking for. Mr. Moyle, my question is does your participation result in a conflict among your members, is the first question. The second question is who are you filing on behalf of, if that is the case, which five of these companies are you filing on behalf of?

MR. MOYLE: Well, I think I can answer it this way. which is that -- and the reason I wanted to check is because we have had conversations. Constellation has been in those conversations.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I'm sorry, what did you say?

MR. MOYLE: Constellation has been in conversations we have had. They have not pointed out any problem with respect to us arguing against the minimum requirements as we have in our papers. That was the conflict Mr. Guyton said. There have been no other conflicts raised amongst its members. So we are here today representing PACE on a unified front. The

members are eager to have objections addressed. The pleadings have been reviewed by the members and we think it is appropriate that we be allowed to present substantive arguments on the objections.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I guess when I looked at it the concern staff raised and what Ms. Sellers said in terms of administrative efficiency, I thought you were going to tell me there were 20 or 25 members of PACE, but there are five.

MR. MOYLE: Yes. And I wish I could tell you there were 25. Unfortunately, the industry has had some difficult times in the last few years, but we have five.

CHAIRMAN JABER: It is what it is, and you have five. MR. MOYLE: Right.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Why didn't those five companies file objections?

MR. MOYLE: I think it is in part related to administrative efficiency. Rather than have five sets of objections, five sets of lawyers and whatnot, PACE is an organization that can achieve some efficiencies by bringing the objections to you as PACE.

CHAIRMAN JABER: And my final question. And, Commissioners, I'm sure you have questions, as well. My final question is what as an organization do you do for these five companies? Help me understand your role.

MR. MOYLE: I will defer to Mr. Green on that,

because he is the executive director. My role is with respect to this case, I have been retained to represent their interests pursuant to the amendments to the bid rule to put forward objections.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I don't mean your specific role.

But PACE as an organization, do you do the technical review of the bids and submit the bids in response to the RFP? Mr.

Green, walk me through that.

MR. GREEN: Mike Green, again. Florida PACE doesn't submit bids, we do not do technical evaluations of bids. This is an aggregation of potential competitors, so there is not going to be any comparison of any bidding thoughts or practices. However, there is a common concern when terms or conditions are such that they are deemed to be onerous or unduly discriminatory, and those are common concerns of all five members of PACE today.

The reason why PACE brought forward this concern is purely due to the fact that there are only five members of PACE. We are not flush with money, and these good lawyers cost a lot of money. If we had five people up here representing the same five issues, that is not an efficient use of my members' resources.

CHAIRMAN JABER: You just gave Mr. Moyle a compliment. Your real goal is to have us address Issue 2. You need us to address the objections.

MR. MOYLE: I would think so. And I know you posed the question to FPL, but in having participated in the workshops and the discussions related to the bid rule, it was my thought that this process was designed to get some issues out at an early stage as compared to letting them potentially fester around out there for quite some period of time. I mean, it seems that while you may not be giving a definitive answer, you surely are probably sending signals with respect to some of the initial issues that we flag that could be problematic. And candidly it might give the company the opportunity to make some midcourse corrections as compared to having this type of debate and discussion at a need case months from now.

CHAIRMAN JABER: And the last thing you probably need us to do is to not jeopardize your argument to intervene in the case later on.

MR. MOYLE: That's right. That's right. And I think the other point, and staff has made this just from my way of thinking, and I was planning on raising this at the end, but making clear that what we are doing today is, as I understand it, preliminary agency action, not final agency action. Because, as you know, that triggers a whole another set of rights and processes.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioners, do you have any questions?

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I have one.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Bradley and then Commissioner Deason.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: And maybe I missed the answer. Which companies have submitted bids or which companies are planning on submitting bids?

MR. MOYLE: I can respond to that question this way. I believe that -- well, no one has submitted bids yet because the time frame for which bids are due has not yet come. I think some companies are candidly waiting on some discussions that we have here today, because they are going to have to make judgments depending on decisions or signals that you make as to whether some of the terms and conditions in the RFP need to be adjusted or revised. So, I'm sorry, I can't give you a definitive answer, because I'm not sure that all the companies know as to what they are going to do.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Well, that kind of goes back to what the Chairman asked earlier. How do we really know if there is a conflict? I mean, PACE is intervening, but on whose behalf? I mean, it would seem to me that we would need a company to have already stepped up to -- a company that has already stepped up to the plate and expressed a concern about the terms and the conditions of the bid process.

I would hate for us to just have an intellectual discussion about the bid process and later on we discover that no one intends to bid anyhow. It would seem to me that we

would need to have -- in order for PACE to represent, we need -- to represent the concerns of a company or the companies there needs to be an intent. Some intent to bid or there needs to be a clear reason that someone is bidding, or has bidded, or is going to.

MR. MOYLE: I guess I can respond this way. There was a meeting that was held before the bid documents were released where a number of PACE members participated in that meeting. After the bid document was released, there was a meeting in Miami where a number of PACE members attended and participated in that meeting.

With respect to what companies ultimately may decide to do, I am not sure I can tell you. I can tell you there has been a lot of interest to date. This is an area that these companies want to do business in Florida. This RFP process provides that opportunity, so there is willingness to participate.

Now, I can tell you that I have been retained by PACE, which is a trade organization, and that I have authorized by them to file these objections. I'm not sure that I can go a whole lot beyond that. Now, Mr. Green may be able to shed a little further light on it if you would permit him.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Well, let me just ask one other question, Mr. Moyle. The plain language of the bid rule itself, as a Commissioner, I really -- I, as a Commissioner, I

try really to be principled and to, as much as I possibly can, stick to the plain language of the statute as well as the plain language of a rule that has been promulgated within this Commission process.

And my question is this: Are we setting a terrible precedent by interpreting the plain language of the bid rule to mean something else? Because, I mean, what are we really doing? If we do that, then what type of precedent are we setting in the future when we maybe interpret something just the opposite, that it has the opposite effect on PACE? I mean, it just seems -- it just seems to be inconsistent, in my opinion, for us to get away from the plain language of the bid rule.

MR. MOYLE: Let me try to address that point in this way. In that Ms. Sellers cited Paragraph 16 of the bid rule that I don't believe changed any when any of the amendments last summer were done. And that Paragraph 16 says as follows: "The Commission shall not allow potential suppliers of capacity who were not participants to contest the outcome of the selection process in a power plant need determination proceeding." Okay. And I think that is the language that is of concern to you, correct?

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Yes.

MR. MOYLE: This language was in place when PACE intervened in the Florida Power and Light/Manatee/Martin need

case and the Florida Power Corporation Hines 3 case. We viewed that as -- talking about precedent, we viewed that as precedent that that provision has been construed liberally to allow intervention of organizations like PACE to protect their members' interests.

So, you know, kind of picking up on the same point, we believe that that language allows PACE to come in because, candidly, it has been granted intervention in two other need determination cases. You know, that coupled with sort of the informal nature of it.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: And one other question, and maybe I didn't hear the answer to this one, either. How are you all going to -- how is PACE going to deal with any intra -- well, I wouldn't say intraagency, but any conflicts that might arise among the members as it relates to who is going to bid and to how you are going to separate out the individual companies if one decides to bid.

It would seem to me that by having PACE at the table representing everyone it automatically creates a conflict of interest for PACE as it relates to PACE's relationship with the members of the organization. And who is going to -- if there is a grievance, I mean, who is going to give redress to any grievance that might arise?

MR. GREEN: This is Mike Green again. As executive director of PACE, you know, it is my responsibility and my role

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to collect the concerns of the collective membership and represent them as efficiently as possible. This discussion, debate, this informal guidance that we seek here is not to determine which individual company is going to bid or not bid. It will be determined by those individual companies, but PACE is not going to direct or participate in any decision-making by an individual company.

But the revised bid rule asked for this Commission to do two things. Number one, to make sure that the information in an RFP is clear. And, number two, that that clearly stated information is, you know, not unduly discriminatory, is fair, is not onerous, and is, I guess, commercially feasible. Those are the four tests. All members of PACE are looking for this informal judgment from this Commission, because this is the only checkpoint right now in this process on the fairness issue. If you remember we did not -- there was some talk about an independent evaluator that would kind of take that role, that was not chosen to go forward with, and this Commission at this step at this time is the one check for fairness, and all members have that same concern that the RFPs that are issued are truly fair, not onerous, are not unduly discriminatory, and are indeed commercially feasible. And there is no conflict in what we are seeking for this discussion today.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Deason.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Yes. It's a question for Mr.

1 | Guyton.

Mr. Guyton, I understand the thrust of your argument to be that PACE does not meet the strict definitional requirements of the bid rule, that being that PACE is not a potential participant, correct?

MR. GUYTON: That's correct.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: But you also added further argument concerning the fact that it's your understanding that PACE is not representing all of it members and PACE has an internal conflict of interest. My question to you is why is that relevant? Not the definitional standing or the definitional requirement in the bid, but the fact that you make the representation that PACE has a conflict of interest?

MR. GUYTON: The reason I addressed that was your staff in ultimately making the recommendation that it does, says that it is -- that PACE essentially represents the interest of the IPP industry. That is their logic chain to say, therefore, it makes sense for you to extend this rule beyond its plain language.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I understand that, but I didn't read Staff's recommendation to say that, and maybe I should direct it to them that the reason they were recommending that PACE be allowed to file objections was that they were representing the industry.

MR. GUYTON: The sentence that I was keying on,

Commissioner Deason, on my copy it's on Page 5 of the staff recommendation, but it's about the third sentence in a paragraph that begins, "PACE, while not a potential generation supplier," and the sentence reads, "PACE is in a unique position to state the concerns of independent power producers under the bid rule's objection process in an efficient manner without the necessity of each independent power producer to file its own set of objections."

I concluded from that that staff thought it was appropriate to have a representative of the industry speak on behalf of the industry. I was concerned about how representative PACE was of its industry because their pleading on its face says that they are acting only on behalf of some of their members, an unidentified subset. And it wasn't clear to me that they necessarily represented the interest of all of their members, given that they explicitly said that it was only some of their members. And I was very concerned about extrapolating that to say that they represented the entire industry as staff seems --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I guess I'm trying to -is there a requirement that an industry association or trade
organization has to representative 100 percent of its members
before it can participate in any representative capacity?

MR. GUYTON: No, there is not, particularly not under standing law. But here staff is taking the explicit language

that seems to limit and preclude trade associations from acting at all and attempting to expand it by saying you ought to expand it to a representative. And it just seemed to me that I was concerned about kind of reading too much into what PACE actually represents. That was my purpose in raising that aspect of the argument, Commissioner Deason.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I guess I'm at a little bit of a loss. You know, it seems to me that that is an internal situation for PACE to work out between it, its executive director, and its member as to whether and to what extent they are going to participate. And it doesn't really matter as to whether it is 100 percent, or half, or even a minority. But I understand this is a case of first impression. You are concerned about how it is going to be applied, I assume, in future objections in these type of cases.

MR. GUYTON: Certainly.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I have a question, but let me start with a foundation comment. I want to get to Issue 2. I absolutely want to address the concerns raised in Issue 2. But, in reading Issue 1, the staff recommendation, the parties have done it in their presentation, you use intervention and participant as defined in the bid rule interchangeably, and I don't. I am looking perhaps narrowly, and perhaps incorrectly limiting the definition of participant to what is found in Section 1(d) of the rule.

And I see a distinction between finding what a participant is for purposes of filing an objection with intervention in the proceeding when we get to hearing. I really see a difference. I see one standard being whether you are substantially affected -- whether your interests are substantially affected, an Agrico standard for purposes of determining standing different from looking at deciding whether you are a participant pursuant to 25-22.082. So I don't want any misunderstanding with regard to my question or concern. I want to find the best way to get to Issue 2 without opening up a door for abuse of this rule, frankly. We worked hard to get where we are.

Saying that, don't you agree there is a distinction between participant -- parties, I am giving you an opportunity to clarify -- and intervention status for purposes of a proceeding, Mr. Guyton?

MR. GUYTON: Commissioner, I agree entirely that there is a distinction between participant and a party whose interests are substantially affected under the APA, which is the standard for intervention. And it is clear that this proceeding is not a proceeding in which parties' substantial interests are to be determined, because there is no evidentiary hearing, and there clearly are disputed issues of material fact. So that standard we don't think is appropriate. So that leaves you with the standard of looking to the bid rule, and

the bid rule is very specific in how it defines participants, and who is limited, and who could and who couldn't raise the objection through this process. So I agree with you, there is a distinction between the intervention standard in a need case and the objection standard here.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. And I don't know if the Commissioners will agree or not. But, again, for the sake of administrative efficiency, this is the first time we have addressed this. So to PACE's credit and its five members, if we say PACE is not a participant, I still think in the abundance of fairness and caution we should get to Issue 2, and at the very least whatever we find for Issue 1 serves as guidance. One way or the other they should be afforded guidance. Do you have any problem with that?

MR. GUYTON: Madam Chairman, my client does not.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Moyle or Ms. Sellers. And then, Commissioner Davidson, you have a question? Can you respond to my -- do you see a distinction between participant under the bid rule and standing pursuant to Agrico and 120 for purposes of intervention in a hearing?

MS. SELLERS: Commissioner Jaber, yes, I do agree that there is a distinction there. And the point that I was trying to make was in response to Mr. Guyton's plain language argument. And my point was that you, the Commission, previously has interpreted a provision that appears limited on

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its face to participation only by participants in the need determination process.

And if you look at the language strictly of participants, it contemplates potential generation suppliers, and PACE is not that. however its members are. And --

CHAIRMAN JABER: I think you have made my point for me.

MS. SELLERS: Well, the point that I'm trying to make is I think that you previously in need determination processes have -- notwithstanding the fact that your rule by its plain language arguably would limit participation to exclude organizations like PACE, you nonetheless have, you know, allowed people to -- or PACE to come in and participate on behalf of its members as a party who is representing the interest of its members who are substantially affected, or substantial interests are affected.

CHAIRMAN JABER: My concern, Ms. Sellers, and I want you to respond to it, is you are arguing the future. Our allowing intervention was under a previous rule. And notwithstanding the fact that that same provision shows up in this rule, it is nevertheless a new comprehensive rule. And what I am suggesting to you is we are not at the point of deciding your intervention, so you are arguing the future when there may not be a concern.

MS. SELLERS: Okay. I think, Commissioner Jaber, the

fact that this is an early preliminary process in the whole continuing need determination process even militates more in favor of allowing PACE to participate on behalf of its members. This is a preliminary process. It was intended to be open to allow the Commission to receive the objections and concerns of parties or persons who may be bidding at some point in the future.

And as Mr. Green told you, for efficiency purposes and frankly for cost-efficiency purposes, you know, that is why PACE is here instead of its individual members. From the Commission's perspective, frankly, it is more efficient, as well. And I would return to the idea that the spirit of the objection process should be such that it is more open than a need determination process, you know, regardless of how you get there I guess is I what I'm saying.

You know, I think that from a public policy perspective it probably makes more sense to, you know, allow objections to be registered now by persons who may be bidding in the future, notwithstanding that they may not meet some, you know, formalistic wooden interpretation of a rule. And I'm not implying that that is what you are saying, but my point is that, you know, the spirit of the bid rule objection process, in our opinion, would be violated if you wouldn't allow PACE to participate.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Davidson.

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COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Thank you, Madam Chair. I have to say I agree with the chair on the analysis, and I appreciate counsel's pointing out how a similar rule has been applied in prior cases. And I have to tell you that had I been on the Commission, I probably wouldn't have applied it as such. I'm a fairly strict constructionist. And here participant is defined specifically as a potential generation supplier. That is not PACE. I understand, however, that PACE represents potential generation suppliers.

And here is where I am at on this issue. I agree wholeheartedly I want to get to Issue 2. I note, as other Commissioners have, that this is the first case under this rule, and going forward I think the parties will know that actual potential generation suppliers will be appearing. Going forward I don't want to unduly extend the definition of a potential generation -- of a participant as specifically defined to an association. And that concept doesn't apply for me just in this case, it is in every case. There are differences between individual standing and associational standing.

But that said, I think this discussion will send a signal to the market. I think that will let participants, as defined, know that they should appear. I, too, would like to get to Issue 2, that is the meat of this. I would also suggest that no member of PACE be precluded from raising issues that

they could have done had they been here. And I have a question for staff. Do we have the equitable discretion to allow PACE, on behalf of its members, to participate just in this hearing, noting that we do not consider them a participant within the meaning of the rule?

MR. McLEAN: Yes, Commissioner.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Bradley, you had a question?

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Well, a question and a statement. I'm still struggling with the questions that I asked at the beginning. And I'm even a little bit more perplexed as it relates to PACE's participation as we have gotten further off into the discussion, and I will tell you why. You know, PACE through its own admission says that it is not representing all of its members, only a few. Is that true?

MR. MOYLE: There is a statement in the pleading that Mr. Guyton references. Mr. Green is the executive director of that, and I think he can represent that we are here on behalf of PACE and all of its members, if you need him to.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Okay. Well, where did I hear that PACE is not representing all of its members, but some of its members?

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Guyton. FPL initially made the assertion that that was the case.

MR. MOYLE: And I think it is in a pleading to say

that some of its members and whatnot. And I think in terms of that, some members of PACE have more concerns about particular issues than others. For example, competitive power ventures has more of a concern about the requirement that says you cannot bid unless you have been in the market for five years, you have been an active participant in the market for five years. That is not to say that other members of PACE haven't supported that position from CPV and others to say, well, wait a minute. Okay, we are okay on all of these objections. You know, I think that may have been part of what Mr. Guyton was seizing on.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: So, then is it my understanding that all of the members of PACE don't have equal objections to everything on the list that PACE has given to us, is that true or untrue? I mean, some members object to some things and not others and vice versa.

MR. GREEN: This is Mike Green. Yes, that is true. Each member of PACE supports PACE being up here. All members of PACE support PACE being up here representing their collective concerns. As John Moyle just said, some of the members have more concerns about certain issues than other issues, but they all support the representation of all the issues that we have brought forth in these pleadings or this the discussion. I don't know how more plainly to say it.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Deason, you have a

question?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I have two questions, one for Mr. McLean and one for -- I will address it to Mr. Guyton first. I'm just trying to understand where we are, and let me pose this hypothetical to you. If Mr. Moyle had simply come up here today and said I am representing Reliant, Constellation, CPV, Calpine, and Mirant, and here are our objections, would you have indicated that he doesn't meet the test to file those objections?

MR. GUYTON: No, Commissioner, I would not.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: What I'm hearing him saying is that that is who he is representing. It just so happens PACE is the entity that got Mr. Moyle to represent their members in that capacity. So why are we so concerned about this?

MR. GUYTON: Well, it is a case of first impression. My client feels that this should be construed narrowly. We are concerned about a broad expansive interpretation of it, and we thought it was appropriate to go ahead and raise the issue, get it addressed and get it decided. But I don't want to unnecessarily prolong this. I mean, I responded to the Chairman earlier, FPL is prepared to move to Issue 2 regardless of how you rule on the participants. I mean, we think the right ruling is the strict interpretation of the language, but we see the advantage and we are willing to get to Issue 2.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And then my question for Mr.

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McLean. Did I understand you correctly to respond to Commission Davidson that we could determine that PACE does not meet the potential participant definition and still allow them to file objections?

MR. McLEAN: Yes, sir, you could, but there is probably no need to. We can permit them into this process that is going on right now today and draw the order such that it does not confer the broad sort of standing that they are concerned about, that FPL is concerned about. I don't think we have any problem with that at all.

I don't think you should really address whether they have standing with respect to the case in chief. I think that you can -- we can fashion the order such that they appear here today rightfully to make these suggestions to you, voice their objections, and not reach the issue of whether they have standing in the case in chief. That is to offer no promise --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: When you say case in chief, are you talking about the ultimate RFP process and the need determination?

MR. McLEAN: Yes, sir, that is what I mean by the case in chief.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Is that particular issue at stake here today?

MR. McLEAN: No, sir, I don't think it is. COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Okay.

MR. McLEAN: But there is a legitimate fear that if you confer standing, if you will, just for this process that you have conferred it in a general sense later in the case. And I think that is a legitimate concern and we can craft the order such that it does not do that.

the Chairman's concern, going forward I don't think that we need to without a lot of thought and perhaps changing it, which now is not the time for it, inadvertently expand the definition. I mean, the definition here is clear. So my goal is to, you know, move forward and get to Issue 2, but put the parties on notice in future cases such as this if particular companies do have an interest and want to participate, to just make sure they go through the formalities. It may be all five, and, Mr. Moyle, they can hire you and you can bill each one separately and make a lot of money.

CHAIRMAN JABER: There you go.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: But that is, you know, my thoughts.

MR. McLEAN: Commissioner, I believe that we can craft the order to accomplish your purpose and to address your concern.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. McLean, that would help me out, too. Because, you know, truthfully it has nothing to do with PACE. My concern has nothing to do with PACE as an

organization. You should be concerned about a broader application of the definition of participant. You should be. You need to go back and think of all the clever ways that associations can be formed. Associations that might not be potential generation suppliers, but would want to come in in favor of an RFP that was submitted. However you get me there, Harold, I would be appreciative. But I would like to get to Issue 2. I want to resolve your concerns. I'm not interested in opening up that rule for abuse.

MR. MOYLE: And we are prepared to make the argument. If I could just make two quick points.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Go ahead, Mr. Moyle.

MR. MOYLE: One, I understand about creativity and associations, but I think you can tie it to the fact that this association represents suppliers. It's not like I could --

CHAIRMAN JABER: And I want to hear from your suppliers.

MR. MOYLE: -- represent an association of home builders and whatnot, you know, that would come in because they are not referenced in that rule.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: And that was the example I was thinking of also. Bad experience with home builders in the past.

MR. MOYLE: Right. They get in a lot of things. But the other point that we just need to clarify for the record,

Mr. Green pointed out that another member of PACE is National Energy Group that he failed to indicate to you and wanted the record to be clear.

MR. GREEN: I failed in my test. I went with Mr. Guyton's list of five and only listed five. There are six members of PACE.

CHAIRMAN JABER: We won't tell National Energy Group.

MR. GREEN: Thank you very much.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Just one other question.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Bradley.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Just for the record, Mr. Green, what type of authority have you been given by the members of PACE, the individual members of PACE to come before this body and to represent their concerns as it relates to this particular bid process? Do you have a written statement or do you have a word of mouth statement or --

MR. GREEN: We have meetings of the board members of PACE. I present to them the proposed issues that we would raise based on the conversations that I have had with each of the members. They vote on that and approve it, which they did. We then route outlines of what this oral argument will cover. They vote endorsement of that, which they did. It is all done by vote.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. McLean, or Martha, anybody, we have focused on Harold here, but on Issue 1 is there something

that requires us to make a specific finding that they are a participant or can we just recognize -- can we just recognize they have filed the objections, this is a case of first impression, put in the qualifications you suggested earlier.

MR. McLEAN: Yes, ma'am. Yes, I believe you can do that. I don't think you have to resolve that broad question as to whether they have standing in the case in chief. You don't have to resolve that today. You can simply address their objections and decide their objections on the merits without reaching the issue of whether they have standing. And that is the way we would craft the order if you decided to move forward to Issue 2.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I understand what you're saying about whether they have standing in the case in chief. That is not what I am talking about. Do we have to make a specific finding today that they are a participant pursuant to the rule?

MR. McLEAN: No, ma'am, you don't.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioners, do you have any questions or a motion? Commissioner Baez?

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I had a couple of questions, and first I want to apologize to Commissioner Deason because I interrupted him. I don't know if he had anything else. He has been sitting there quietly.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I didn't even notice. But now you owe me one.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I want to get something straight, because Mr. McLean keeps using case in chief, and I want to make sure if I am understanding the way the rule works. And, you know, the parties can chime in if they want. Standing, for lack of a better term, to challenge the RFP at this preliminary stage isn't connected to the issue of standing to intervene in the need case, correct, once it is filed, because at this point we don't have anything?

MR. McLEAN: No, sir. And what I'm staying is I think it is staff's responsibility, given your discussion on the issue, to make sure that it doesn't address it, to make sure that they are not connected and not linked together. This is for a different purpose. This is a rather informal gig we have got going here, when you want to consider the --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Exactly.

MR. McLEAN: Now, it doesn't make sense to resolve that larger question at this point, in my opinion.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And I want to make sure that Power and Light has the same understanding. And they are conferring, but if the other parties want to comment on that, you know, the two concepts of participation or involvement at the different stages of this, the nascent need case, they are separate, correct?

MR. GUYTON: Absolutely. That was the question that the Chairman asked earlier.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And here is the trouble that I am having, Commissioners, and I think I'm having problems in opposite order to what I have been hearing from you all. I think I am one of the former prehearing officers that actually signed an order granting intervention to PACE on previous need cases, I think a couple of them. And I firmly believed that as the law applied, the associational standing cases applied, they were fully entitled to intervene on that basis. And I think that they brought and they have always brought a lot of value to the proceedings.

Now comes the bid process. In my mind the bid process is where people have skin at stake here. And it seemed to me, you know, at least the way that I was looking at it, it seems to me that when you are going to go and challenge an RFP, I think that becomes a much more personal situation, a much more personal relationship with the RFP. Obviously we have heard some conversation, albeit hypothetical, that maybe some members have different objections to some terms and not others, and this is where their resources should get focused, and it always seemed to me that this informal protest period was going to be where potential participants would prove their -- it is sort of a rite of passage, you know, to prove your interest. Are you committed to the project, are you committed to the participation in the process enough to commit resources to challenge something, because that is going to test your

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commitment to participate, to actually participating if you are willing to flight over it.

Now. I don't discount, and certainly not in this instance, the value that PACE as an aggregate of its members brings to the process. And I think that they were probably not wrong in doing it that way. I think going on into the future, it is better in order to keep the two things clear and to keep the two concepts, the two conceptual parts of this process clear and separate, I think it would be important for us to somehow acknowledge the fact that I don't -- at least in my mind, I don't think PACE is properly as an association, the concept of an association. I think it is kind of hard to get over that hurdle with only five members involved.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Six.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Six members, I'm sorry, I too failed the test. And it's kind of hard to get over that hurdle. But I don't think we need to be discussing, and I don't think we certainly need to be arranging for associational standing at this stage of the process. I think this stage of the process should stand as one of those tests of a participant's commitment. If you are a company, if you are a generator that wants to participate in the RFP that wants to file a bid and has problems with the bid, that should be a test of your willingness to come forward individually and say I'm Mr. Generator and I've got a problem with this RFP, because

otherwise I would be in here so fast bidding on this project it would make your head spin. I think that is one of those hurdles that you have to jump through. We need to test commitment on these people's participation.

I am fully in favor of and have been in the past of PACE being an intervenor on need cases, because there are certain policy issues that have to be discussed. This is a much more minute set of details. So I'm struggling with that. If Mr. McLean's advice to us is true, and I'm sure it is, that we can somehow get past this issue, that's fine. If we do need to address it, I would address it in the negative.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Baez, that is exactly where I am. Any other questions or is there a motion?

Mr. McLean, let me talk to you about strategy. Can we find that PACE is not a participant, recognize this doesn't preclude intervention when the time is appropriate, but for the sake of administrative efficiency and because this is a case of first impression still get to Issue 2?

MR. McLEAN: I believe so. I think a better course perhaps would be is not to make any finding about PACE and whether they are a participant. I don't think you have to reach that point. You are at a very informal stage of your proceedings. I don't see anything wrong with an order that says we are going to deny the motion because in the exercise of our discretion we want to hear from organizations, interested

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parties who have something at interest here. I mean, you are not talking about an adjudication of substantial interest. We are not in the APA yet.

CHAIRMAN JABER: And that was my recollection of designing this objection process. I remember being very vocal about not wanting this to turn into litigation at this stage. Commissioner Deason, you had a question?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I have a question for Mr. Guyton. Mr. Guyton, if you agree that we just need to get to Issue 2, are you willing to simply withdraw your motion to exclude PACE?

MR. GUYTON: Commissioner Deason, my only reservation -- I think ultimately the answer will probably be yes. My only reservation is this, that you have come a long way towards defining who should and shouldn't be allowed to go through this objection process. I think you would be well served in the future to have some precedent that would point to to say participant is -- we meant what we said, it is a potential generation supplier. In this instance FPL was willing to acquiesce to going to Issue 2. I would like to see you do that so that we don't find ourselves arguing this again in a subsequent objection procedure, heaven forbid. But with that, yes, we would be willing to do what we can to get all of us to Issue 2.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: I think in my view we have

got that, that clear statement. The law is clear. I mean, I think we are all in agreement here that PACE is not --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: No, we're not.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Oh, I apologize.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me set the record straight that right now I endorse staff's recommendation and I will be voting for that, or at least be voting against the motion that I anticipate will be coming absent Florida Power and Light simply withdrawing their objection, or their motion to exclude.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: I missed the last point.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Deason does supports staff's recommendation is what he was saying, and he throws as an alternative the possibility of FPL withdrawing their motion.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Well, my preference as we sit here, because this is a case of first impression, I would like to really just sort of punt this go around and get to Issue 2. I think that hopefully next time in a case like this we would have the individual sort of stakeholders here. I do agree with Commission Baez. That is how I saw this. People that were really interested in participating in this process would come up here and file their objections. It is not really sort of a test the water, see what happens, and then go back to parties and have them decide whether to file or not, or whether to participate. Have those folks up here now.

But, again, this is the first time this rule has ever

been implemented, so my view is I definitely want to hear from PACE. But my preference would to be not have -- my preference would be for FPL to pull the motion, frankly, but if they are not prepared to do that, the second preference would be to have the ruling that we discussed with general counsel, getting to Issue 2 without, you know, addressing that. But that is just one Commissioner's thoughts.

MR. GUYTON: Madam Chairman, I can simplify this. I withdraw the motion.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. FPL has agreed to withdraw the motion to exclude PACE, Commissioners, so I don't think there is any action to be -- we should acknowledge the withdrawal of FPL's motion for the record?

MR. McLEAN: Yes, ma'am.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Ms. Brown.

MS. BROWN: Madam Chairman, we can also put some background discussion in our advisory preliminary order about the talks that you all had today and what you expect and how you interpret that provision for participants.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: No, you can't do because I can't write a dissent to just additional language without a vote.

MS. BROWN: That's true.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I would oppose that.

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MS. BROWN: All right.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I think just at this point -- hang on, Commissioner Bradley, I will come back to you. I think at this point all we have done is acknowledge the withdrawal of FPL's motion in light of Mr. Guyton's statement.

Commissioner Bradley.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I am just trying to understand Commissioner Deason's concern.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I understood Ms. Brown to say she was basically going to include language in her order consistent with the discussion, and we have not had a vote, the motion has been withdrawn, we are not taking action, and I can't very well write a dissent --

MS. BROWN: You are right, Commissioner. You are absolutely right.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: -- to language that you are just willing to include in an order with no vote.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: You are going to dissent?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: No, I'm not going to dissent because she is not going to have the language in there.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Okay. I understand.

CHAIRMAN JABER: If there is an order, which I want to get to at the end of Issue 2, I don't even know what it is we exactly will issue. But if there is an order it is only going to acknowledge that Mr. Guyton on behalf of FPL withdrew his motion. Yes. So that takes us to --

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: One more comment. I don't want to -- with what I just said, I wouldn't open up this process again, but I do note that this association, while it is not within the definition, it is an association for the most part of generators. So if you ever feel that policies and procedures need to be addressed to address this issue, I mean, feel free to bring that to our attention.

MR. MOYLE: In the form of a rule amendment I take it.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Or something. Not in the immediate future because there might be more things that we discover. I mean, the good news about this --

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Perhaps in February.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Perhaps the last week of February. Since there are statutory time lines to deal with petitions for rules, yes. I'm sure they expire like the end of March or something. The good news about having this discussion is we are all applying this rule as we go along here, so it is very helpful. But the other thing I want you to take away from me is I want to see Calpine in that chair, I want to see Reliant in that chair, and CPV and Mirant. And you should be comforted knowing that -- look, the more the merrier.

Sometimes it is completely impossible to be administratively efficient. Hearing feedback from your members may not be an area where we can be all that administratively

efficient, especially on a first case like this. I would have loved to see all six members there.

Issue 2.

MR. MOYLE: Now that we have disposed of that minor procedural issue, let me jump into the substance of the matter. Again, for the record, Jon Moyle on behalf of PACE. And as we have heard, this is a case of first impression, and I thought I would take just a quick minute to set the stage as to how we got here today.

And most of you may know this, but the bid rule was originally enacted in 1994. It has been on the books for nearly nine or ten years or so. It has been used. PACE argued in supporting amendments to the bid rule that it needed some revisions, that it could work better. They pointed out that it had not ever resulted in the award of any capacity to an entity other than the IOU who was proposing a self-build, so this Commission went through the rulemaking process which concluded last summer.

We are traveling under the revised rule today, and I wanted just to take a quick moment to point out two particular provisions that you are going to be hearing quite a bit about today, and it is what we are traveling under, what PACE is traveling under with its objections. The first is Paragraph 12, and I will just read what Paragraph 12 says. A potential participant may file objections with the Commission limited to

specific allegations of violations of this rule within ten days of the issuance of the RFP. Within 30 days from the date of the objection, the Commission panel assigned shall determine whether the objection as stated would demonstrate that a rule violation has occurred, based on the written submission and oral argument by the objector and the public utility without discovery or an evidentiary hearing. So that is kind of the charge that you have before you today which is to consider the objections that PACE has filed. And as mentioned, PACE is a trade organization which represents a number of independent power producers.

Before I get into a lot of the provisions that PACE has objected to, just about all of the objections that PACE has raised focus on Paragraph 5 of the bid rule. And Paragraph 5 states in pertinent part, I'm quoting, "No term of the RFP shall be unfair, unduly discriminatory, onerous, or commercially infeasible." Again, this is the first time that you all are being asked to make judgments under this new rule.

And candidly you are being asked to make some tough calls, what I would call value judgments. Fairness, onerous, those are not terms that are something that you can just plug in a formula and find out whether a term is unfair or onerous. You have to weigh things, consider things, listen to argument.

And I thought I might be helpful before we get into this just to refer to what Webster's, how they define these

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terms. Unfair is defined as not just or even-handed. Onerous is defined as troublesome or oppressive, burdensome. Discriminatory means marked by or showing prejudice, biased. Unduly means excessive. Commercially means of, pertaining to, or engaged in commerce. Infeasible means impracticable. I think keeping in mind those terms and those definitions as we go through the objections that PACE has raised, PACE hopes will be helpful.

FPL and PACE have not been able to agree on a lot of things throughout this objection process, but I'm happy to report that I believe there is one thing that we have been able to agree on, and that is that a comparison of the self-build that FPL proposes at Turkey Point, which is south Dade County, should be compared to bids on an apples-to-apples basis. And you have heard that term tossed around at the FERC conference that you all had here a couple of weeks. One of the Commissioners asked about the bid rule in the process and I think made reference to an apples-to-apples comparison. And I don't think that there is disagreement that the goal is to have an apples-to-apples comparison. FPL was asked that question in a process where they are able to provide answers on a website, and I believe they indicated yes, the comparison should be apples-to-apples.

So, with that in mind, I would like to get into the substance of the argument. We have raised a number of issues

in the filing. I'm going to walk through some of them. Some of them will require a little detail, and so with that let me talk about the first one, which is the geographic preference that FPL states. FPL wants to build its self-build facility in south Dade County. And as indicated, they are proposing it be at Turkey Point, which is located in south Dade County.

Their RFP says, and I'm quoting, that they express a strong preference for plants located in southeast Florida based on, one, recognizing the current load generation and balance and the associated system losses; two, understanding that system requirements need to achieve reliability standards and minimize operating costs; and, three, desiring to maintain future fuel diversity options as viable.

You may say, well, how is that unfair? And I think sometimes a picture can demonstrate, and I wanted to direct your attention to the picture that we have blown up out of the RFP. We have some handouts that we will provide to you that shows one way that this is unfair to companies such as members of PACE who are trying to get in here and win this RFP.

FPL, for the first time -- they didn't use this in the Manatee and Martin case, and are now in the process of imposing what they call a transmission load loss factor. And what is depicted on this chart shows the impact of the transmission load loss factor. You will see down in Miami there is a number 1.0. And really what that means is if you

are located right there and you produce 100 megawatts, you are going to get credit for 100 megawatts the way we understand it. If you go up on this chart and look up at Lake Okeechobee, the number is 93.5. That means if you locate a facility up there and you are generating 100 megawatts, you are only going to get credit for 93 megawatts. The same goes if you are over in Manatee County over there near the Tampa Bay area, you would only get credit for 85 megawatts.

This transmission loss factor really works a competitive disadvantage on companies that have sites outside of Dade County. As you can see there is one magic spot and that is Turkey Point. And FPL will not consider allowing other entities to locate at that Turkey Point spot.

During some of the discussions a suggestion was made, well, rather than putting such what we view as a penalty for not being able to locate there, why don't you site 600 megawatts at Turkey Point and 600 megawatts outside southeast Florida. At least evaluate that as an option. FPL indicated that they did not want or would not consider that as on option. We think that still is a viable option and ought to be something that is pursued.

Compounding the difficulties with this transmission loss factor is site certification problems. And in the site certification process, many of you may know it is a lengthy process you go through to get the environmental application

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ready, you file it with DEP, it is a six to nine-month process. It can take up to a million bucks to put it all together. It is very intensive.

The schedule that FPL has proposed has bidders filing a site certification one and a half months before negotiations are concluded and presumably a winner is announced. PACE maintains it is commercially unreasonable to require bidders to go through all of that expenditure not knowing whether they are going to be selected or not. And by way of illustration, Florida Power Corporation just recently issued a draft RFP, they are going to be coming in shortly as well, and their schedule had a process where they would make a final decision, announce a winner, and then you would have the site certification be filed two months after they announced who was going to win. Which we believe is more reasonable than a process where people have to go through expenditures and time, energy, and effort to file a site certification a month and a half before negotiations are concluded and presumably a winner announced.

Part of what PACE tried to do in its filing was not just to criticize, but to offer suggestions. And given that, I would like to just point out what we believe would be improvements in the current RFP. One would be to push back the date of FPL's April 1st filing for site certification to July 1, 2004. This would give bidders more time to be able to go

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Another would be to suggest that FPL consider locating 600 megawatts of combined cycle power outside of southeast Florida to go along with 600 megawatts of power located in southeast Florida presumably at the Turkey Point facility. This would level the playing field and help balance the transmission impacts that are shown on the chart.

We would also request that the Commission suggest or indicate to FPL that it review its decision and consider accepting bids that propose to be collocated at the Turkey Point facility. And, again, if we are truly having an apples-to-apples comparison, that will level the playing field significantly. It would reduce a lot of variables. You could see whose pencils were sharpest and would be giving ratepayers the best deal with the most cost-effective alternative, if you encourage them to pursue collocation. You will hear that, well, we can't do that legally and whatnot, but I think you could potentially send a strong signal in that regard.

Let me talk for minute about financial issues. There are a number of financial issues that are --

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: (Microphone off.)

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Bradley.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Yes, just a couple of questions while we are on siting. Mr. Moyle, isn't siting always a difficult problem to solve? Is it ever simple?

MR. MOYLE: Having worked on siting power plants, I would tell you it is not an easy thing. And I would tell you it is particularly difficult in southeast Florida, and southeast Florida being Dade, Broward, Palm Beach Counties. It is not an easy thing.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: And your statement says that the RFP is unfair because of difficult finding sites in southeast Florida. Isn't it difficult to find a site anywhere in the State of Florida at this point?

MR. MOYLE: I would say it is not as difficult as it is in Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach with the population growth down there. I will tell you like Okeechobee County, they have a portion, as I understand it, of their local land use map that is zoned for power plants. So it is much easier to put a plant in Okeechobee County where there is more cows than people than it would be to put a plant in Dade County, or Broward County, or Palm Beach County.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I guess what I'm struggling with is the adjective difficult and unfair as a result of difficult. I think that this process is a difficult process anyhow, no matter how you to try to apply it. Even in Okeechobee County it is going to be a difficult process. And I don't think that that is a valid argument for your purposes at this point, at least not with me. At least the word difficult is not valid. I think the siting is always going to be

difficult. I think that -- well, siting in my opinion involves getting the permits, locating the site, dealing with zoning.

And location itself is always going to be difficult, you know.

I'm just struggling with your argument that it is difficult and that the RFP is unfair.

MR. MOYLE: Maybe I didn't do a good job of explaining it. But the point I'm trying to make is the way FPL has set this up is there is one location down there that gets 100, and it is Turkey Point. Now, if you wanted to go in there and say I want to get 100, too. You can't locate down there, so if you were a bidder, you would have to go in there and all of a sudden starting whenever they release the RFP back at the end of August, you would have to go in there and try to negotiate and secure land to get right next to there just to control the land, okay?

Now, that process would take quite a bit of time. But then, the way they have their schedule, you would have to not only go and control the land, find somebody willing to sell it, then you have to file a site certification on April 1, which candidly is not enough time. It doesn't give bidders enough time to do what I believe is necessary to do to be able to compete, particularly given things like this transmission loss factor.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Where is the load?

MR. GUYTON: The load -- I'm sorry? It is a

system-wide load and need that, as I understand it, they are trying to meet. You know, they answered a question in response to some of the questions that were presented on the website that said their centroid is, I think, north Broward or whatnot, but they could probably better address where their centroid is.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Okay. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JABER: You were moving on to finance.

MR. MOYLE: Financial issues. There is a requirement in the RFP that an entity that is proposing to build a new plant to compete with FPL's self-build option must have a minimum unsecured debt rating of BBB from Standard & Poor's or BAA2 from Moody's with a stable outlook. This requirement was not in the previous Manatee/Martin RFP in a way that it would serve as an automatic disqualification if you did not have those rating requirements. It has not been seen in an RFP before in Florida that I am aware of, and it has not been seen anywhere in the country with respect to that level of rating being required.

PACE believes that this requirement is too restrictive. It will effectively eliminate a lot of potential bidders. And I think there was discussion earlier. Out of PACE's six members, only one currently would meet that requirement. And it is so restrictive that one of the investor-owned utilities that you all regulate that is active in the state would not even currently meet that requirement.

It would not be eligible to bid.

We don't believe that this is consistent with the purpose of the bid rule to try to see whether the best deal is out there for the ratepayers by effectively knocking out a lot of potential competitors before the game even starts, and would suggest that this requirement be eliminated completely. And you may say, well, wait a minute. Eliminate it completely, that is something that you want to know who you are doing business with and what protections you have.

But we would suggest that there are a lot of other ways that you can ensure that protection, such as a completion security requirement which is in the draft RFP, step-in rights which allow the utility to come in and take over a project if it runs into difficulty, performance security, which is in the draft RFP which requires people to post money in the event that they are not able to perform. So we would ask that you all send a clear message that the minimum requirements that are being proposed by FPL that would serve as a threshold requirement are too restrictive. FPL in their response attached excerpts from RFPs issued by other utilities around the country, but it is interesting, if you would look at those none of them have the same high rating that FPL proposes, the BBB level.

I mentioned completion security. And while PACE doesn't disagree that some level of completion security is

appropriate, it believes the amount sought by FPL are too high and out of line with recent RFPs. FPL is currently seeking to impose 188,000 per megawatt as completion security. This, we believe, is commercially unreasonable and infeasible, especially in light of the recent RFPs. FPL's Manatee/Martin RFP, \$50,000 per megawatt. TECO's recent RFP, none. FPC Hines 3, 50,000 per megawatt. The draft of the Hines 4 RFP, 50,000 per megawatt. FPL is seeking three times that amount for its completion security and we think that is too high.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Excuse me, Madam Chair.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Go right ahead.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I missed my opportunity, and I need to apologize to Mr. Moyle.

MR. MOYLE: That's quite alright.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Because you have gotten off into financial security. I have a question as it relates to financial viability. And the BBB rating, the requirement of a BBB rating, does that violate any section of the bid rule that this august body passed several months ago?

MR. MOYLE: I would make the argument that it is unfair, that it is commercially infeasible, and that it is unduly discriminatory if you do a survey amongst all the RFPs issued in the country, and that this level is the highest level that has ever been required. So, yes. Mr. Green would like to add something, if you would permit him.

MR. GREEN: If you will permit me to add, I mean, if the concern is financial viability, are they going to be able to finance the project with the PPA with FPL with its strong credit, Commissioner Deason and I can get financial backing to build a plant. I mean, that is a financeable project. You can get project financing with the PPA. So if the concern is financial viability and being able to finance a project, project financing is available with the PPA.

If the goal of the RFP is to solicit those competitive bids and see what works, I would look at Progress Energy Florida's draft RFP, which is what they do. They don't have a minimum requirement. If Commissioner Deason and I decide to put together a joint venture and propose a power plant, they will ask to see our pro forma, and they will look at that pro forma and make a determination if that is financeable or not. And if they feel it is, then they will go forward. If they feel, no, this is not -- you are not making any money, you are just covering your debt, they will probably say, no, it is not. But do not exclude potential bids on the front end by putting an exceptionally high level that will really preclude five of the six PACE members, for example, from being able to bid.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Do you own the bank the Bristol? Is there something you need to be telling me?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I just think that Mr. Green is

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24 25 making an argument why there should be an equity penalty, but we will discuss that when we get there.

MR. MOYLE: All right. I talked briefly about the completion security requirement, 188,000. All the other RFPs in Florida we have seen are 50,000. Three times, more than three times the amount. We think it is excessive. A similar argument with respect --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Moyle, you said some numbers with regard to what other companies have required completion security, but you did that quickly. Can you tell me what the other companies have required?

MR. MOYLE: Sure. You have got that FPL is currently seeking 188,000 per megawatt. FPL in the Manatee/Martin case sought 50,000 per megawatt. TECO recently issued an RFP where there was not a completion security requirement. Florida Power Corporation's Hines 3 need determination was 50,000 per megawatt; and the Hines 4 draft that has just recently been put on the street is 50,000 per megawatt.

CHAIRMAN JABER: And then with regard to the BBB rating, do you know which traditional investor-owned utilities have a rating of BBB or higher?

MR. MOYLE: In Florida?

CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes.

MR. MOYLE: I believe Progress Energy does and Florida Power and Light. Am getting conflicting information on

Progress. I thought Progress did. I'm not sure on that one.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Definitely Power and Light,
perhaps Progress. No one else that you are aware of?

MR. MOYLE: No. And I did research, and one I know does not. I can affirmatively state one does not.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Is that the holding company or the operating electric utility bond rating you are referring to?

MR. MOYLE: The one I checked it was throughout all entities. I think it was the holding company.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Maurey, while we are on this point, before we get too far, Andrew, I'm talking Florida electric IOUs. You gave me this information in the past, and I have forgotten it. What Florida electric companies have BBB or higher?

MR. MAUREY: Florida Power and Light, Progress Energy Florida, and Gulf Power Company. Tampa Electric Company is BBB-.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you.

MR. MOYLE: There is a requirement in the RFP for a performance security, and that is different from completion. Completion provides the security to make sure the plant is constructed and provides power when it commits to providing power. Performance security is to make sure it continues to

provide power over the course of years. FPL's RFP that we are talking about today has a 95,000 per megawatt figure, which is the most we have ever seen in Florida. And by reference, Florida Power Corporation uses a sum that is a third of that, less than a third of that, 30,000 per megawatt. So we would argue that that is commercially infeasible and out of line with what we have seen in other RFPs.

Commissioner Deason mentioned the equity penalty. We have raised that in our pleading, and I think that the equity penalty will probably be something that will be discussed. We recognize the Commission's decision in the previous FPL Manatee/Martin case, but would point out this, which is FPL when they will file information at the Securities and Exchange Commission and are building their own power plants, they identify to their investors a whole series of risks, such as construction risk, permitting risk, equipment failure risk, equipment under-performance risk, and these are all risks that they will have to incur if they select the self-build.

PACE argues that those risks are mitigated if they contract with an IPP or third party to provide that, and that those risks -- there should be an effort made to monetize those risks and to counterbalance those with any equity penalty considerations that we subsequently discuss.

I have a few more items and I will wrap up. There is a regulatory-out provision that is in the document that we

think is unfair and unreasonable. Briefly, a regulatory-out provision provides that if the PSC, or the legislature, or a judicial body finds that FPL cannot recover from its ratepayers all of the monies that it contracted for with a builder of the power plant, that FPL can reduce those payments. This places a tremendous amount of burden on an IPP, that it is wholly at risk should the Commission disallow recovery or should the legislature change the law.

And we would argue that it can be more even-handed and more fair if the reg-out provision simply allows either party to opt out of the contract should there be a change in law up until the date the Commission approves the need determination and the associated purchase power agreement. After the Commission approves the purchased power agreement, it has, in effect, made a judgment about whether these are reasonable costs, and the reg-out provision ought to go away at that point in time. FPL proposes to have a reg-out provision that is there throughout the life the contract.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Mr. Moyle, is the suggestion that you -- first of all, my first question was how are reg-out clauses, how have they been treated in the past? Reg-out clauses aren't new. I mean, they have been parts of PPAs for years here. What is the difference between their treatment or their being a burden back then and being a burden now? What is it that makes these reg-out clauses different?

MR. MOYLE: Well, these, we believe, are pretty pervasive in terms of not sharing the risk any. But you are right, there are reg-out provisions in contracts. What that does, though, when you are talking to lenders, and if you say, hey, I'm forced to take this language, I don't have been any option on that, it is a risk factor that they then have it take into account. And it is my belief that that then causes additional cost to the project if you have onerous reg-out provisions that impose all of the risk of a legislative change, or a PSC change, or a judicial change on the IPP that is bidding.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Would there be any -- is there any problem to -- and I don't know what the answer is to what I'm going to say now, but if we maintained a consistent treatment of reg-out clauses, the suggestion that you are making saying the reg-out clause evaporates upon the need determination being granted, I would probably go a little further and say until recovery is awarded, whatever it is. But is that the normal way of treating -- what has been our treatment? And maybe staff can help me with this. How have we treated reg-out clauses in the past?

MS. BROWN: Well, in the distant past when we -- COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Way back when we needed them.

MS. BROWN: Yes. When we adopted our rules on negotiated contracts for cogeneration and purchased power, we

spent a lot of time discussing reg-out clauses, and determined that they were appropriate in our negotiated contracts because the Commission had a history and intended to support those contracts and the recovery of capacity costs under them. And that has been the way it has been. The Commission said then that it would honor the terms of the contract and the costs that are recovered under them unless there was some demonstrated misrepresentation or fraud under the theory of administrative finality. And that has been the way the Commission has acted basically ever since. I think Andrew would tell you that that is one of the things that gives rating agencies some confidence when they are evaluating purchased power agreements that the State of Florida is involved in. Does that answer your question?

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, I guess I'm trying to understand how our efforts to lend certainty to the use of reg-out clauses in the past doesn't translate, or is not helping, or is not helping mitigate what PACE or what the IPP, potential bidders are seeing as an unreasonable term or requirement. I'm trying to understand that.

MS. BROWN: Let me ask Andrew to come and answer that question for you, because you are more interested in that angle of it, aren't you, on the risk angle?

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, I guess I'm just not -- I mean, I will agree that it is a risk, but I am failing to see

how it is any more of a risk today than it has ever been before --

MS. BROWN: I don't think it is.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: -- when all of these projects have been financed.

MS. BROWN: I don't think it is. In fact, it might even be a little less because of the past history of the Commission supporting cost-recovery under PPAs.

MR. MOYLE: I would just have to --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Bradley. I'm sorry, Mr. Moyle, hang on a second. Commissioner Bradley, you had a question?

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I will go ahead and hear his answer to his question and then I will ask my question, because she may answer mine while she is answering his.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Andrew.

MR. MAUREY: Yes. The rating agencies still look to companies recovery of these expenses and they look favorably upon states that have higher certainty than less certainty on the recovery of these costs. That hasn't changed.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And I think Mr. Moyle was --

MR. MOYLE: And you have had those regulatory-out provisions in previous contracts. I don't know this for sure, staff may know it, but I would suspect they are limited to action by the Public Service Commission. The regulatory-out

clause that FPL proposes as a minimum requirement doesn't just limit it to the Public Service Commission, but has it related to any legislative action, any administrative action, any judicial action, or any regulatory body which now has or in the future may have jurisdiction over FPL's rates and charges. That is very broad, very expansive. We think it adds a cost. PACE surely would not be opposed to limiting, you know, in cases of fraud or misrepresentation. I think your bid rule provides for that. You know, that rates wouldn't be recovered in those situations. But we don't think it is fair to impose this broad of a reg-out provision on the IPP industry.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Bradley, are you ready?

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I would like to ask Mr. Moyle if he has completed his presentation.

MR. MOYLE: No, I have about four more points to make.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Okay. I will wait.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Davidson.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: It was a question on the reg-out and I think Mr. Moyle just answered it. And my question was would it at all be beneficial if FPL placed language in the PAA that tracked the bid rule provision in Section 15 with respect to clear authorization to recover prudently incurred costs absent evidence of fraud, mistake, et cetera?

MR. MOYLE: I think to the extent that language would go in the RFP as the regulatory-out language, that would be fine.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: And my question to FPL when they get up, would FPL be willing to include such language in the PPA so that banks hopefully could clearly see at least the Commission's intent to allow all prudently incurred PPA costs to be recovered.

MR. MOYLE: Madam Chair.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I'm trying to digest Commissioner Davidson's question. Would FPL be allowed -- would be to include language that would make clear that the PSC would allow --

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Prudently incurred PPA costs to be recovered. I mean, it was a question to FPL recognizing that we don't necessarily -- we wouldn't necessarily have jurisdiction over all reg-out scenarios, but to the extent we are involved, if language was included tracking the bid rule Section 15.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I think the lack of understanding I have is what they put in their PPA doesn't bind us, so does it go without saying that we would only allow the prudently incurred costs? Maybe I'm missing something.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Well, I think it goes without saying. I'm trying to think if there was some language that

would be acceptable to the different stakeholders that would send a right signal to the banks to help, to at least help bidders overcome any financing difficulties they may encounter as a result of the reg-out provision. And ultimately I understand this is subject to the parties' negotiation, but I wanted to put that issue out on the table for discussion.

MR. MOYLE: Thank you. And just to conclude that point, I mean, there obviously are concerns about the financeability of such broad reg-out provisions, and we would welcome a pulling back or a restriction that tracks the bid rule and is not so expansive.

The next point I wanted to briefly touch on is the requirement for dual fuel. FPL in its original RFP required as a threshold item that all new power plants that are proposed have dual fuel requirements. PACE objected on the grounds that FPL did not have dual fuel at its Manatee plant and whatnot. We thought that term was onerous, and unreasonable, and unfair.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Isn't this moot now? Hasn't FPL revised that?

MR. MOYLE: They have. And the way they have revised it is to say that you don't have to have dual fuel, but what you do have to have is a firm transportation contract on two separate pipelines. And we would submit that FPL doesn't have a complete double redundancy. Say if you have a 500-megawatt plant, the way we read what FPL proposed is you would have to

have firm transportation for 500-megawatts on Gulfstream, firm transportation for 500 megawatts on FGT, double redundancy. We think that is commercially unreasonable. We don't think FPL has complete system double redundancy in terms of firm transportation contracts.

While we appreciate the dropping of the dual fuel requirement, we think that a better suggestion is to require that you have firm transportation on one pipeline system with an enabling agreement allowing for interruptible transportation on the second pipeline.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Chairman, I have a question on this issue. Is there any industry standard on this particular issue? I mean, you have offered up a proposed alternative, but can you point us to what maybe occurs in other parts of the country?

MR. GREEN: Yes. This is Mike Green. I have been in this business about 31 years, and I don't know of anybody that would go off and pay firm transportation on two separate pipelines. In other words, have 500 megawatts firm transportation on one pipeline and pay for firm transportation on the other. The redundancy you seek is for those rare occasions when, like Florida had one lightening strike at a compressor station, I don't know it was five years ago or something like that. Some very rare occasion when that transportation is going to be interrupted. An enabling

agreement with a second pipeline to provide you the coverage for that very, very rare occurrence that you would see. I don't know of anybody that has full transportation, firm transportation on two pipelines for a given capacity.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Well, that sort of addresses what you feel is in the clearly unreasonable, and you have given me one example of what would be in the reasonable. Are there other sort of -- is there some type of general scenario that you could point to that reflects in similar types of transactions what may be the industry standard for the degree of redundancy?

MR. GREEN: Well, I don't know if there is an industry standard for it. I mean, everybody -- you want to have a reliable transportation system for national gas. I think both -- I believe and PACE believes that FGT is a reliable transportation system. We also think that the Gulfstream is a reliable transportation system. I'm not sure you need something else. Florida Power and Light has said for this RFP, though they did not say it for Manatee nor did they say it for Martin, that now you need dual fuel, and they have backed off from that saying, well, you need to have two firm contracts.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: What did they say for Manatee and Martin?

MR. GREEN: It is single fuel. And I do not believe,

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and Mr. Guyton can represent it, but I don't believe that Martin or Manatee has firm transportation contracts with two pipelines.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Complete your presentation, Mr.

Thank you. I have three more points to MR. MOYLE: make. There has been some back and forth between the parties with respect to the proposed PPA agreement that FPL attached to the RFP. It is a very voluminous document and whatnot. And the way PACE is reading that is that it asks proposers to basically accept this agreement, to be bound by its terms unless it notes an exception to any provision in here that it does not wish to be bound by. And that they have to do that when they submit their bid.

We believe it presents a Catch-22 situation. Because if you were to spend the time and effort to go through and really redline this document and, in effect, negotiate it as a way, if you are sitting across the table, not only would it cost you a lot of money, the impact of your taking exception is not clearly known. FPL indicates that what they will do is if you take exceptions, that will be evaluated in the noneconomic portion of the evaluation. But there is not an indication as to how it will be evaluated, whether if you took, you know, a whole bunch of exceptions that would serve to knock you out,

because they would say, golly, these guys have taken 50 exceptions. This is too much. Let's not continue to negotiate with them.

We think that is unreasonable and unfair to present it that way, and would suggest that this be a starting point for negotiations, or would simply seek clarity that if you fail to object to something that it is then not completely off the table for subsequent negotiations. That is the point I want to make with respect to the draft contract.

Briefly, there is a \$10,000 fee, an evaluation fee. Previous RFPs, FPL allowed you to submit a proposal with a variation or two, I believe, and they would allow you three options to be evaluated, all for the \$10,000 fee. Florida Power Corp in their RFPs allow you a couple of options, and if you have a variation that goes beyond, I think, three you pay an extra thousand bucks. We think that is reasonable and that FPL's position that they take now, which is any variation in price, or term, or whatnot constitutes a new proposal and you are subjected to another \$10,000 is onerous, and it ought to be revised so that you can submit slight variations, say one or two within the same \$10,000 fee.

The final point, and I mentioned it briefly in the arguments was there is a requirement, a threshold requirement now that a proposer have at least five years experience in the operation, construction, development of a power plant. And if

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they don't have that five years, they are ineligible to bid. We think that is going to be a limiting factor, it is going to potentially take other bids off the table, and don't believe that a lot of people would be able to satisfy that as it relates to construction.

If FPL's position is you have to have at least five years of experience developing and constructing power plants, we believe a lot of people don't construct their own power plants, but contract that out, just like they contract out operations, and would like to see the experience requirement either removed or revised so that it didn't limit you to having to have five years of experience in constructing a power plant.

That is the final point. I just want to conclude by thanking the Commission for the time they have given us. This is a new process. We have laid a lot on the table. You are confined to listening to arguments, and so that puts a premium on the time that we spend before you today. And I wanted to make a point, and it is a little frustrating. PACE has been involved in lot of these RFPs. None of the members have ever won the first megawatt on them. We keep coming back to you. And somebody was saying, well, the apples-to-apples comparison. Yes, but the refined point is that, you know, it seems now FPL wants a yellow apple located at Turkey Point and all we have are the red apples that are not located there. And we truly are asking for your help and your guidance and for you to

exercise the powers that you have to try to give us a fair shake in this process. So with that I would conclude, and thank you for your patience and your attention.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Mr. Moyle. Commissioner Bradley, you had a question and then, Commissioner Davidson, you had a question.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I want to ask this question of staff, Mr. Moyle, Mr. Green, and of Florida Power and Light. Of the 14 objections, and we spent a lot of time on this bid rule several months ago, and at the conclusion of that I thought that Mr. Green was of the opinion that it was an excellent piece of work, even though I voted against it. Of the 14 objections -- and I would like to start with staff, PACE, and Florida Power and Light -- how many of these 14 objections violate Subsection 5 of the bid rule that this Commission put forth?

MR. HAFF: Again, we have talked about this being a case of first impression, and based on our first impression we don't believe any of PACE's objections violate Subsection 5 of the bid rule.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: You don't believe that any of them violate Subsection 5 of the bid rule?

MR. HAFF: No, sir.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Okay. Thank you. And I'm just asking this question for the record. Mr. Green.

MR. GREEN: And I will let Jon Moyle speak, as well, but it is my opinion that all 14 violate the rule. Again, the rule talks about is the term and condition fair, unduly discriminatory, is it commercially feasible, whatever the other one was. But those are qualitative decisions that need to be made. And with no other independent party, no other independent evaluator that is capable of stepping in and making that judgment, that judgment is made here. It is PACE's position that all 14 qualify and violate Paragraph 5 because they are either not fair, or are unduly discriminatory, or are, you know, commercially infeasible.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Florida Power and Light. Mr. Moyle, I'm sorry.

MR. MOYLE: That's alright. I would echo what Mr. Green said. And you have heard us a lot, I mean, we have tried to be constructive and propose suggested alternatives, not just be up here saying it is unfair, it is unfair, but say here is what would be an improvement on it, would make it more fair. But we believe that the ones that we have identified in the pleading run afoul of the bid rule.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: What was that last statement?

MR. MOYLE: The ones that we have identified in our objections, that they run afoul of the bid rule.

MR. GUYTON: Commissioner Bradley, none of the objections, none of the provisions that are objected to run

1 | afoul of the bid rule.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Davidson.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Shocking that the parties aren't in agreement on this, but thank you, Chairman. I'm going to hold off on my questions until the end of the presentations so that both sides can jump in. I have quite a few, though, on the issues.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. FPL, let me pose a question to you and maybe that can serve as an introduction to your presentation. Based on what you have heard Mr. Moyle as it relates to this suggested language, is there anything that you could agree to? Based on where we are now, is there anything that you would voluntarily agree to before we move forward with your presentation? I can refresh your memory, if you would like.

MR. GUYTON: Madam Chairman, the answer to that is no.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Finish your presentation and I will have more specific questions for you later.

MR. GUYTON: All right. Commissioners, the sole issue before you today is whether FPL's RFP complies with the bid rule or the amended bid rule. That is all that is appropriately addressed within the narrow scope of this proceeding. And as your staff correctly points out, not only does this RFP appear to comply with the bid rule, it does. It

indeed exceeds the requirements of the bid rule in several significant respects.

Not all 14 objections have been addressed orally today. I'm going to address ten. Actually maybe a couple more, since I thought a couple were moot, but apparently they are still in play. But let me focus initially on three that I think are related. Those have to do with FPL's statement of a geographic preference. It's the allegation by PACE that FPL is somehow attempting to reserve transmission capacity for future options in FPL's decision to recognize transmission losses and operating efficiency costs in its economic analysis. And I take those three because they are related to each other.

At Pages 3 through 6 of the RFP, FPL explains in detail why it has a geographic preference for generating options located in southeast Florida. Even though -- and it is very important to understand this -- we are entertaining bids from any location. We have not restricted the bids to southeast Florida. Now, PACE argues that this violates the bid rule.

I am going to take you to the bid rule because the bid rule actually contemplates that a utility might have a geographic preference. Section 5G of the rule requires FPL to disclose, and I quote, the best available information regarding system-specific conditions which may include, but not be limited to preferred locations proximate to load centers,

transmission constraints, the need for voltage support in particulars areas, and/or the public utility's need or desire for greater diversity of fuel source. Commissioners, that is exactly what we did when we stated a geographic preference.

After disclosing our southeast Florida generation and load imbalance and the related transmission constraints that arise from that, we also disclosed on Page 6 the fact that if that growing imbalance of load and generation in southeast Florida happened to be addressed by a southeast Florida capacity addition in 2007 that would probably have the effect of freeing up transmission capability into southeast Florida in future years. And that, in turn, might facilitate more diverse fuel sources into or the transfer of those into southeast Florida.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Chairman, I'm sorry, I want to sort of jump in here, because you hit on an issue that I had a question on. The Turkey Point site has been -- or the load has been in southeast Florida for years, and I'm wondering how did the Turkey Point suddenly become available for construction, if you can sort of walk me through that process.

MR. GUYTON: The Turkey Point site has been available for construction for a number of years. The company has additional land and resources available there at which it could site a generating plant. It was once FPL became aware of the need to address this increasing generation load and generation

imbalance in southeast Florida.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: When did that need come about, when was it identified, all right, this is what we need to do?

MR. GUYTON: The first time that that was addressed in a transmission analysis was -- correct me if I'm wrong, but as I recall was fall of last year. And as that became -- as FPL became aware of that, we started publishing that information on our OASIS website. Through that, and then ultimately through our Ten-Year Site Plan where we also discussed this imbalance, we were apprising potential bidders as well as entities that might want to locate that we had recognized that by 2007 and certainly in later years, that unless transmission facilities were built or there was an addition of southeast Florida generation that there were going to be increasingly greater transmission constraints into southeast Florida.

So that information was based on a series of transmission planning studies that were accomplished last year and were initiated in the early part of the year and became available, as I recall, in the fall of 2002. And once we knew it, we published it. We made the IPPs and everybody else aware of it.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Just on those now since we are on the geographic preference. Can you sort of walk me

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through how the bids are or may be discounted based on distance from the load in southeast Florida?

MR. GUYTON: Yes, Commissioner, I think I can. Ιt will be addressed in the economic evaluation through two aspects. Well, actually three. In our last RFP we recognized that there are location-related costs associated with generating units, and one of those are transmission integration costs. Not the costs to interconnect, but once you have interconnected how does that cascade down your system in terms of upgrades that are required throughout your transmission That we recognized in our last RFP. It was system. uncontested essentially in our determination of need case.

This time we are going to do that as well. And in addition to that we are going to recognize transmission losses that are associated with location as well as operating costs of southeast Florida combustion turbine units that are required because of the transmission constraints into southeast Florida at certain times of the year.

Because of those transmission constraints that arise from this generation load imbalance, the company finds itself that it is having to dispatch units, combustion turbines at a very high cost out of economic dispatch to be able to maintain system reliability within southeast Florida. So we are going to capture the costs associated with having to do that, too.

Now, each alternative that is bid into the RFP will

have a different impact on that. Turkey Point will have one point, another unit that is built in southeast Florida that may be bid in may have a similar impact. It may be combined with another unit it North Florida or another unit in Martin, we don't know, and we can't begin to anticipate all the permutations. But we do know from trying to decide what our next planned generating unit should be that those costs are likely to be significant. And because we know that, we published it in our RFP so that the IPPs would be fully apprised of it. That is how we intend to address that issue in the economic analysis. It is not going to be a nonprice factor, it is going to be decided head up.

And what is important, I think, for you to understand is that it will be decided the same way. This same evaluation will be done to all the alternatives, whether they be FPL or proposals that are bid in by prospective bidders. The calculations will be performed the same.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: That is very helpful. Two follow-ups on that. One, has that methodology -- and I apologize if I don't know the RFP as well as you do -- but has that methodology been laid out so that competitors, potential bidders know what is going to be expected and they can map out their bid around it so that they can sort of figure out their own number crunching and hopefully put in the most competitive bid possible. That is part one.

And then part two, is this economic analysis in which FPL is going to engage based on some generally accepted industry practice on how these types of -- on how geographic location is handled. I suspect that this comes up across the industry as you build is created, and I would also suspect there is some type of general standard that would discuss how location is dealt with and discounted, if at all.

MR. GUYTON: The answer to your first question is yes, that is explained, I would suggest in excruciating detail in Appendix E to the RFP. Which we went to great lengths because it was a new element of the economic analysis to provide a far more detailed description of that methodology than your bid rule even requires. That is one instance where we have exceeded the requirements of the bid rule.

And, yes, my understanding of that is that this economic analysis that we undertake to perform is based upon recognized standards within the industry, and we have retained a third-party transmission consultant to help us assess these costs. We have run the methodology by him, we have refined it before we issued the RFP, and we are convinced that it reflects industry standards. And I don't want to suggest it's simple, it's not in terms of the actual methodology. But the concept, I think, is simple to embrace. Does the company experience losses on its transmission system? Yes. Are they affected by location? Yes. Generally, the longer distance that you have

to move power the greater your losses are going to be.

And, similarly, this imbalance has resulted in this dispatch problem of combustion turbines in southeast Florida. And that, in turn, is a cost that is different for different types of alternatives that may be bid in. Can we say up front what the exact cost is going to be? No. That is going to have to be the result of running load flow studies, and then costing out the transmission integration costs that have to be added. But then once they have done that, they can run these analyses to capture those costs, as well.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: One follow-up on this, Chairman. Has FPL performed any internal cost analyses of if you bid on self-build at different locations what the cost differentials would be?

MR. GUYTON: Yes, we did. And it's an important point to understand. Because had FPL not done that analysis, it would have chosen the wrong generating unit as its next planned generating unit. If it had ignored those costs, it would not have chosen Turkey Point, it would have chosen another generating site which enjoyed some other cost advantages relative to Turkey Point. But because the losses are real and have to be captured, and the dispatch costs are real and had to be captured, we have done that analysis and that analysis, which is the same analysis that we are going to use to analyze the RFP proposals, suggested that Turkey Point

was the best option for our customers.

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And that is the same analysis that we are going to undertake in the RFP when we analyze Turkey Point against all the other competing options. The other thing you need to understand in that regard is that this is another instance where we have exceeded the requirements of the bid rule. We have put in play, if you will, not only our next planned generating unit, but we said we are going to analyze another 600-megawatt option at Turkey Point. It doesn't meet all of our need, but we know that it has some transmission advantages, and we are going to analyze that in conjunction with RFP bids that could make up the remainder of the bid so that perhaps someone that is not in southeast Florida combined with that nonetheless may be able to provide an attractive proposal. So we have gone beyond the requirements of the bid rule by injecting that option, not something we are required to do, but we thought it would be beneficial and we ought to take a look at it.

I was discussing the language that we had where we observed what we think is rather obvious that if you add southeast Florida capability or capacity in 2007 it may free up transmission capability and an amount may allow for the movement of more fuel diverse resources into southeast Florida. That language is not an attempt to reserve transmission capacity for a future option as PACE would have you believe.

The only transmission costs that we will analyze in this RFP are costs that are associated with the RFP generating alternatives that we consider, whether they be FPL or self-build. We are not injecting in this analysis any future costs for any future capacity additions.

Commissioners, I will depart from some of my prepared remarks because we have addressed them, but I do want to -- through questions, but I do want to make the point that these are these transmission losses as well as the inefficient dispatch, these are real costs. They are not properly characterized as a penalty. They are costs associated with location. Like any other costs, some alternatives are going to have advantages and some are going to have disadvantages, but that hardly makes them a penalty. But what is most important is that real costs must be reflected if the most cost-effective option is to be selected in the process.

The other thing that I wanted to mention briefly in response to something Mr. Moyle suggested is --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Guyton, give me an idea of how much more time you need for your presentation.

MR. GUYTON: I need about ten minutes, assuming no questions.

CHAIRMAN JABER: We are going to take a ten-minute break and see if during that time you could expedite your presentation.

MR. GUYTON: All right. I'll do my best.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioners, let's take a ten-minute break.

(Off the record.)

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Guyton, you were finishing up your presentation.

MR. GUYTON: Thank you, Madam Chairman. Before I move on to the next series, I want to mention one thing that was addressed by PACE's counsel, and that was a plea to impose collocation. We have addressed at great length in our response all the various problems that are associated with collocation. I will not take you through those, but I do think you need to be aware. PACE originally advocated collocation as a rule provision and they chose to withdraw it in the most recent amended bid rule proceeding. I just find it remarkable that they would press for it now, given that they chose to take it out of the bid rule. Be that as it may, clearly the fact that we don't have collocation clearly does not violate the bid rule.

There are four provisions to the RFP that are designed to protect customers to which PACE objects. The first is having a minimum requirement of an investment grade bond rating if a proposal relies upon construction of a new generating asset. The second is completion security for proposals with new assets and performance security from all

proposals. The third is an April 1, 2004, Power Plant Siting Act application milestone. And the fourth is minimum proposer experience requirements.

Perhaps the best way to view PACE's objections is to consider what PACE would have the RFP provide as an alternative. Under PACE's approach, FPL should entertain proposers who enjoy junk bond ratings, who have never successfully developed, permitted, constructed, and operated a single power plant, who provide no or only nominal completion or performance security, and who are willing -- who are not willing to meet a PPSA filing deadline that is essential if the in-service date of the unit is going to be achieved.

Commissioners, these objections are merely self-serving. And, quite frankly, if FPL signed a contract without these basic customer protection provisions, I would be concerned that you would hold my client accountable for being imprudent.

Let me address each one briefly. Why should FPL insist upon a minimum level of financial viability for entities financing and building \$100 million power plants, because the default risk of entities that are below investment grade is frighteningly high. Companies with an initial rating of B have historical 5, 10, and 20-year default rates of 32, 50, and 61 percent respectively. This default risk can and should be minimized by limiting potential contract entities to those that

have investment grade ratings.

There was a suggestion that we didn't require that in the Martin and Manatee RFP. It wasn't a minimum requirement, but it was indeed invoked when we selected the short list. We decided that we were not going to advance anyone to the short list that didn't have an investment grade rating of BBB. That was not contested at all in that case, as you may recall. Also I would point out to you that this is simply limited to entities that are building new assets. It is not limited to entities that have assets in the ground, and indeed it is not applicable to existing utilities in the state that might not have that bond rating as long as they are bidding a system sale.

So we are not precluding the Calpines, the Reliants, the TECOs, all of these entities that might not have that. We are not precluding them from participating, we are only precluding them from bidding a new generating asset that challenges significantly their financial position.

Why should FPL insist upon performance and completion security, because step-in rights don't provide any funds for customers if a developer fails to perform or complete on time and there will be increased costs associated with that failure. Security arrangements are necessary if there are going to be monies available to protect or at least mitigate against costs from customers.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Guyton, in response to my question on this subject, staff said that all of the IOUs in Florida have at least a BBB or higher. There is one that I think Andrew said had a BBB-. Do you still believe that is the case?

MR. MAUREY: I verified that, yes. There is one utility, TECO has a BBB-, all the other three are BBB and above. One thing I did not add was that the designation of a stable, negative, or negative credit watch. Tampa Electric is BBB- credit watch negative. Progress Energy Florida is BBB stable. FPL is A-. Gulf is A stable.

CHAIRMAN JABER: All credible companies have done real well in Florida, and I can't imagine you have a concern about any of those companies. And you added Calpine and Reliant in that mix. With regard to -- and I appreciated your clarification that to the degree they are already in the state they are not precluded from submitting proposals. If they are good enough ratings to consider for proposals, recognizing that that is not for a new generating unit, then can't you accept that perhaps that BBB- is good enough for a new facility? It seems like we should, at the very minimum, capture TECO.

MR. GUYTON: Commissioner, I would have to defer to essentially the chief financial officer of a company that set these, but there is a reason to differentiate between entities that are building new facilities as opposed to entities that

have the assets in the ground.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Well, I need to understand it, because as I said earlier, this is one of the specific questions I had related to my earlier question. Isn't there something you would voluntarily agree to change? Because I personally don't see the difference between BBB versus BBB-. And if there is a difference, I don't think there is a huge difference in terms of credibility.

MR. GUYTON: And as I say, this really goes to entities that would actually be building new generating assets, but that is all that this particular minimum requirement is applicable to. And that is an important distinction that I think you need to pick up on. And the reason we draw that distinction is because you are talking about going out into the market on a company that is already stretched financially, does already have a below investment grade bond rating, and asking them to raise capital in the order of magnitude of a couple hundred maybe \$300 million for a proposal. That puts further stress on the entity. Unlike a situation where they would just simply be building, or they would just simply be bidding in a system sale that doesn't put additional stress on their financial situation. And that was the rationale for drawing the distinction.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Well, then what is the purpose of the security package requirement? We had this same discussion

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during the bid rule process, and I keep coming back to the point. That is their problem. If you are covered from a security package standpoint, I just don't see what the real concern is. And I am giving you an opportunity to help me understand. If it is good enough for the system sales, the BBB-, why isn't good enough for a new generation unit?

MR. GUYTON: One has to be concerned about default risk, particularly when you look at the default risk that I outlined to you awhile back. Security provisions do not provide a provision for default risk. Dealing with investment grade entities does protect not only FPL, but more importantly its customers from the potential for a default risk. If somebody goes out and builds a power plant and then decides it is going to default and seek bankruptcy protection as is becoming remarkably commonplace these days, our customers need a protection from that risk. The way we protect them from that risk is dealing with entities that don't have such a great deal of default risk, that being investment grade entities.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Well, what is the purpose of performance security and step-in rights and a competition of a security requirement if that doesn't capture default risk? You know, candidly it sounds like you are being unreasonable on the point. We may agree to disagree, but I would encourage you to think about it some more.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: And, Chairman, I had a

follow-up on this --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Davidson.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: -- point of the security package requirements, and it is a question to staff. I would like to know what determination, if any, staff has made as to the reasonableness of the requirements set forth in the bid?

MR. MAUREY: Are you dealing with the objection of financial viability and security requirement specifically?

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Yes. Well, I am actually talking about the whole security package of requirements; performance security, completion security, and I'm trying to figure out there are certain amounts that have been set forth by FPL, and I just want to know if staff has looked at those and said, you know what, those are reasonable based on this, they make sense, or we don't know, we are just really deferring to the company.

MR. MAUREY: I will have to defer to Mike on that.

MR. HAFF: You're right, Commissioner, that as PACE has said that these completion security and performance security numbers are higher than in the prior FPL Martin and Manatee RFP, and are also higher than the other RFPs that were mentioned earlier from Power Corp and TECO. FPL has represented that these numbers are calculations based on its best estimate of completing a power plant that is not completed, the completion security, or if the plant does not

perform as it is projected to perform for FPL to buy replacement capacity and energy to meet its needs. So while they are higher than we have seen in the past --

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Well, has staff done an independent analysis of the reasonableness of their requirements or assessed their requirements? Do you have any applicable industry standards?

MR. HAFF: Not based on this first impression, no, we do not.

MS. BROWN: If I may interject here, Commissioner Davidson, that is because in part of the bid rule, which provides that the Commission will make these determinations based upon the oral arguments of the parties and the written submissions. So we haven't gone out to collect a lot of our own facts. If you don't believe that you can make some sort of a preliminary -- give some sort of a preliminary view on it, part of that may be that you need more facts, and that would then take place in the need determination hearing. But we are not supposed to have an evidentiary proceeding here, so it is kind of an odd duck.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: What are we doing? I wasn't here during the bid rule. Is this just sort of a nothing strikes us as bad, so move forward type of exercise?

CHAIRMAN JABER: Or this gives me heartburn and you need to consider changing it. And if you don't, you go forward

at your own risk in the need determination. Again, each Commissioner needs to speak for himself/herself, but from my perspective, Commissioner Davidson, in response to your excellent question, it was on its face does the RFP violate the rule. And then I'm looking at it from -- and in violating the rule is it onerous, commercially infeasible, unduly burdensome, and whatever that fourth one is. And then there are some things that may defy logic or may give you concern above that. And the whole idea was to provide guidance so that we can eliminate a lot of the controversy when we get to the need case. Commissioners, have I left anything out? That was the intent, right? In a very expedited fashion. You had a question, Commissioner Baez?

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Yeah. And, Mr. Guyton, I don't know, if in addressing the issue of the security package requirements you answered my question, the question I'm going to ask. I may not have heard it, but you did hear counsel for PACE throw out some numbers. Obviously the previous Martin/Manatee RFP and what the requirements were there, and also I think Progress Energy had a Hines project where he offered some numbers there. And I'm not sure I heard you address what the reason for the differences might be. Did you do that?

MR. GUYTON: No, I haven't quite got there.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: You hadn't gotten there. Okay,

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great. Then I will let you go on, then.

MR. GUYTON: Well, let me address that right now. Yes, Florida Power and Light Company has requested a higher completion security amount in this RFP than it did in the last RFP. Two reasons. We went back and looked at the completion security requirement in the last RFP, recognized that it would be exhausted in five months, and we didn't think that was enough protection for our customers.

So we went out and we did an analysis which I have laid out in detail in the text of our response that said if we had to go out at the end of -- or about the time this unit was going to come on and secure an alternative, what would it cost us. And it would cost us the cost of going out and building some CTs to supplant it, and then ultimately building a combined cycle unit on an expedited basis. There would be a phased construction. What money would we save? Well, we would obviously save what we would have paid under the contract, so you have to offset that from that expedited construction cost.

And then you have to go out and calculate using production costing models essentially how much you would be paying for placement energy and replacement capacity while you were out building this and you weren't having capacity delivered to you. That is the calculation that we performed. Then we divided that by our total need to get a dollars per megawatt basis. And that is the basis for our completion

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Deason.

security. We thought that was the risk that our customers faced for a failure to complete on time, and that is what we should attempt to mitigate in terms of cost. It is not exactly a worst-case scenario, but it is enough to protect our customers in most instances if that happens.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And when you came -- and forgive me, but what changed between this RFP and the last to make you say, you know, five months is not enough? Or did you have any idea that it was five months the last time when you set \$50,000 per megawatt?

MR. GUYTON: Two things changed. One, this is an acknowledge in hindsight that we didn't ask for enough last time. We didn't get out there and ask enough to necessarily protect our customers in the event of a failure to complete. And, I mean, it is not easy to admit that, but that is where we found ourselves. And we did not want to make that mistake again. Secondly, the nature of the industry that is bidding into this has changed remarkably. The risk profile of the entities that are bidding into this has gone up dramatically as is evidenced by the fairly significant downgrades that you have seen in the IPP industry. And there is a much higher risk of somebody not completing a unit now than there was 18 months ago when we established the completion security for the last RFP. So those two factors are the ones that have changed.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Yes. In relation to the completion security and the performance security, have you in any way offset your equity penalty adjustment or your proposed equity penalty adjustment for the fact that these risks would no longer be borne by you and your customers, but would be transferred over to the winning bidder? So is there any adjustment to the equity penalty?

MR. GUYTON: The short answer is that we have made a specific adjustment to the methodology that we used to calculate the equity adjustment to offset for reduced risks that are associated with there being a performance and a completion security for proposals that we might contract with as opposed to one that if we were to build ourselves. So the answer to that is yes. And, indeed, in Appendix C where we have outlined the equity adjustment, we have explicitly captured those mitigating risk factors, as the Commission instructed us to the last time in our last need case.

I have touched briefly on the Power Plant Siting Act deadline, the application filing deadline. It is very simple. For somebody to meet a June 2007 in-service date, they need to file that application by April of 2004, or they are going to be at risk of missing the in-service date. It is a way to ensure that. And we are not imposing anything on proposers that we are not proposing on ourselves. We are doing the pre-PPSA site work, as well. We'll have to expend those costs just like a

proposer will. That is a cost of doing business. There are development costs associated with getting units in a position where you can bid them into an RFP or use them in an RFP.

Should we insist upon a minimum level of experience? I think the answer to that is obvious. We want to protect our customers from the risk of somebody that is totally inexperienced coming in and building and operating a plant. But PACE's counsel is a bit confused about what we have required. We have not required five years of experience with prior building construction, development, and permitting of a power plant. They only have to do that activity once before. They have just had to go through the development and building construction process once. What they need five years experience on, either they or a party they are willing to contract with, is the operation of a similar power plant. That is because you just need to have a track record. That is a relatively brief track record, but we think it is necessary to protect our customers.

PACE argues that an equity adjustment violates the bid rule. Here is what you had to say in our most recent need determination case. "Consideration of an equity adjustment is appropriate." Now, I know you didn't embrace an equity adjustment in that case, but you did say that in future dockets -- and I am quoting here, "A case-by-case examination of the entire circumstances surrounding the evaluations of PPAs

and the presence or absence of any mitigating factors shall be considered." And as I pointed out, Commissioner Deason, we have captured mitigating factors in this analysis.

Also, I would remind you, you chose not to amend your bid rule to prohibit equity adjustments when you revisited it just the first part of this year. An equity adjustment does not violate the bid rule. PACE takes issue with our proposed evaluation fee. We have showed you that it is cost-based as required by your bid rule, and we have also explained in supporting affidavits that there not appreciable variations in cost as opposed to a variation in our proposal as versus an entirely different proposal. They still require essentially the same analytical effort.

That leaves me with the regulatory modification clause and then a couple of things that Mr. Moyle addressed that I want to brief you on. I'm very cognizant of the time, Madam Chairman. I am trying my best.

PACE objects to us including a regulatory modification clause. Understand what that clause does. One, it requires FPL to defend the validity of a contract and its right to recover capacity or contract payments. Two, in the event of a disallowance, it passes the disallowance to the seller. And, three, it allows the seller, not FPL, to terminate the contract in the event of a disallowance being passed to them.

Now, we pointed out in a supporting affidavit in our pleading that this provision does not stop an entity from being able to finance a project unless they are remarkably weak anyway. We have a number of contracts, purchased power agreements that have regulatory modification or regulatory-out provisions in them. They were all able to be successfully financed. But just a year ago we had a regulatory modification provision in our RFP to which developers could take exceptions. Only four out of 13 took exceptions during that period of time.

You will recall what was happening in the IPP industry. There were almost constant downgrades at that time. Only four of them apparently thought that they might not be able to finance if that was in there. We think that is compelling evidence that these provisions do not make a contract or a project unfinanceable.

Commissioner Davidson, you asked the question would we be willing to take a look at language in the PPA that is consistent with the bid rule. Actually what we are trying to address with the modification, the regulatory modification is that risk of disallowance over and above the bid rule. The bid rule has addressed what should be recoverable, but it leaves a small amount, a modest exposure, if you will, potentially unrecoverable, a disallowance.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Does the RFP itself, though, sort of track the language of the bid rule so that if bidders

are taking out, seeking financing they can at least point to this and say, look, there is only what you have described as a modicum over and above what might be at issue here at the Commission, but we can at least get the biggest chunk of it through this language.

MR. GUYTON: It does not, but it doesn't need to because they can take the bid rule itself to their financier and say this is a very modest risk.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Well, is there a problem, though, including that in the contract documentation itself? I know bankers don't want to look at statutes, they want to look at the deal documents.

MR. GUYTON: As long as it has the other provisions that allocate that risk in a fashion that we have, I think that could be perhaps recrafted. That certainly is something that I can take look at. It has also been suggested that this is discriminatory, that this is not imposed upon utilities. But the fact of the matter is the entity that performs and earns the return is the entity that ought to assume the risk of disallowance. We do it with our own units and IPPs that bid in should do it with their units.

Briefly, the dual fuel requirement that was raised that we thought had been put to rest. We have modified the dual fuel requirement to essentially allow an entity to bid in a Manatee type alternative, just like we had in our last RFP.

Our Martin unit was dual fuel, and it had the dual fuel capability. You may recall that Manatee could draw potentially on two different pipelines, and we thought was an adequate substitute for dual fuel capability. The question was raised do we have -- does FPL have firm transportation that it could use under both pipelines to serve Manatee, and the answer to that is yes. And we have imposed that same requirement to be consistent with the Manatee proposal. We have the capability and we have firm transport available on both pipelines to be able to serve that plant.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Guyton, on that point it was suggested that instead of firm contracts which come with that an expense on two separate pipelines, that perhaps a more prudent approach would to have a firm transportation contract on one pipeline with a commitment that there is a right to interrupt on a second. What's wrong with that?

MR. GUYTON: Well, interruptible gas is not a firm supply of gas. And if you are relying upon this unit for reliability purposes for most of the hours of the year, you need to have firm transportation to the unit. That is what we have under Manatee. We can draw on both pipelines because we have an allocation of firm transportation. If you have firm --

CHAIRMAN JABER: You are not drawing on both pipelines at the same time, though.

MR. GUYTON: No, you are not.

CHAIRMAN JABER: So if any bidder could present you with a contract between it and the pipeline that there is a -- I will get away from using firm -- that there is a written commitment, agreement, contract to interrupt on that second pipeline, what's wrong with that?

MR. GUYTON: I want to make sure that we are talking about the same thing here. There are two types of transportation, one is firm and one is interruptible.

Interruptible is a lot like as-available energy. You buy it when it is available. And the proposal that has been made here is that one should be firm and one should be interruptible.

But they also say they want to be consistent with Manatee.

Well, Manatee has firm right to draw on both pipelines, and that is what we have tried do. We have revised this RFP to make it consistent with the position that we took in the Manatee need determination case.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Guyton, I understand the difference between firm and interruptible.

MR. GUYTON: I'm sorry. I didn't mean to insult you.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Saying that, aren't gas pipelines
always available? I mean, isn't that why you use Gulfstream
and FGT?

MR. GUYTON: No, gas pipelines are not necessarily available. Interruptible is there when it is there and sometimes the pipeline is maxed out. That is why one contracts

for firm transportation.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Well, then if that is the case, then how firm was your contract for Manatee/Martin?

MR. GUYTON: We had firm capability on both pipelines, to my understanding, and I will certainly correct it if I am misrepresenting this in any fashion. We had firm transport capability under both pipelines into Manatee.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Via contract?

MR. GUYTON: Or tariff. But whatever the contractual arrangement is, whether it be special agreement or tariff. I would have to check. But, yes, there is a contract, right.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Moyle, I want you to respond to this. I want to make sure I understand this point. Why can't you enter into a contract with both pipelines for firm capacity understanding that you would only go to the second one when capacity wasn't available for the first one?

MR. GREEN: Rather than Mr. Moyle, I will try to answer it. Firm capacity -- and don't quote me on figures, maybe it is 70 cents a thousand Btu or something. You have to pay for it. And you would pay for it whether you use it or don't use it. It is a reservation that you have got some capacity out there. The Manatee plant relies on -- and it is true, Florida Power and Light has firm capacity, and they pay these capacity payments for their system capacity needs. And I don't know what their total gas system capacity needs are, but

let me guess it is 4,000-megawatts. I don't know if that is right. So they probably have 4,000 megawatts combined between FGT and Gulfstream on firm capacity payments they are paying. They don't have 8,000 megawatts of firm capacity payments for gas, they have 4,000. And they can mix and match that. That is true.

But to require an IPP to basically reserve twice as much as it will ever need is not an apples-to-apples comparison to FPL. They are not reserving twice of what they will ever need. They are not reserving 8,000 megawatts if 4,000 is the amount of gas generation they have. You know, the more commercially feasible way for an individual project, not a total system, is to have firm transportation on one pipeline. And, again, keeping in mind this is just -- and then to have an enabling agreement to get on the other.

A signed agreement that says we are enabled either through a direct interconnect to that second pipeline or because the two pipelines physically crossover, Gulfstream and FGT tie together somewhere, that there is some interconnection possibilities. That is more feasible to show in that rare occasion that one of the pipes has a transportation problem. And these are two very, very reliable gas pipelines. This is a very rare occurrence that you are considering. And to require an IPP to basically pay two 75 cent/1,000 transportation charges on 100,000 Btus a day is unrealistic. It is

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commercially infeasible.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Guyton, you have reserved your total capacity through both of those pipelines, there is no duplication there. You use both -- you have the ability to use both pipelines to achieve your total capacity needs, is that correct?

MR. GUYTON: Yes, Commissioner. That is my understanding is that we can use both pipelines to serve plants and that we have some uncommitted transport on each in the event of a failure of one.

CHAIRMAN JABER: But that is to achieve your total capacity needs.

MR. GUYTON: I'm reluctant to answer that only because I'm afraid I may mislead you. I don't know the answer to that.

CHAIRMAN JABER: No problem.

MR. GUYTON: My impression is it is slightly greater, but I don't want to -- I just don't want to answer because I may mislead you.

CHAIRMAN JABER: No problem. But you would also agree that -- are you paying for that capacity whether or not you use it?

MR. GUYTON: If it is firm, yes.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Deason, you had a question?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I guess the question that I have is are you open to look at alternatives to a strict requirement that there be -- using Mr. Moyle's terminology -- double redundancy in the sense that if for some reason a pipeline would go down, and that is the particular pipeline that the winning bidder would be using, that if there were a provision in the contract that would require them to repay you for replacement energy in that rare event that that pipeline would go down, would that meet your needs?

MR. GUYTON: Quite frankly, I'm not authorized to respond to it, but I can get an answer to that, Commissioner Deason.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me ask Mr. Green. Is that something that would be a cheaper alternative? You say it is a very unlikely event, and I agree, it is an unlikely event for a pipeline to go down. It happened once about five years ago, and it was a lightning strike, and I think there have been provisions put in to hopefully prevent that type event from occurring again, but obviously other things could happen in the future. But would you be willing, would you be willing to put together a bid that would -- if you were a bidder -- that would protect FPL and its customers in the unlikely event that the pipeline you relied upon went down and FPL had to go and get replacement energy?

MR. GREEN: Absolutely. And I think the enabling

agreement does that. I mean, you show the investor-owned utility that you have a firm transportation contract. In that very rare occasion, if it goes down, look, I am interconnected -- I paid for the interconnection to the second pipeline, perhaps you do that. Or, look, I'm within a certain distance of the physical connection of the two pipelines already, so if one goes slow, the valves can still get gas to me. And I have the ability to go out there and shop for interruptible. You know, I think FPL has the same problem if a gas pipeline goes down.

Again, Florida Power and Light does not have firm capacity, double redundancy, to use my attorney's term. I mean, they don't reserve 8,000 megawatts for a 4,000 megawatt unit, so if one goes down they have the same problem. It is a rare occurrence. And to require an IPP to basically reserve twice as much as the plant needs when the FPL system is not reserving twice as much as what their system needs seems unfair.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Guyton, I can count half a dozen people sitting in the audience, including Mr. Litchfield sitting next to you, is there someone that can answer that question for me about whether you have got double redundancy as it relates to Martin/Manatee?

MR. GUYTON: There is no one here. We will have to try to contact someone in Juno. I mean, it is a fairly

1	technical question about fuel capability on the pipeline.
2	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Isn't that something that shows
3	up in fuel filings?
4	MR. HAFF: Repeat that question, I'm sorry?
5	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Wouldn't that information be
6	something that showed up on fuel filings?
7	MR. HAFF: You mean the amount of gas that Florida
8	Power and Light
9	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: If you were paying for firm gas
10	twice, twice over?
11	MR. HAFF: Well, the amount would show up and
12	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: The amount would show up but not
13	confirmation of whether there was firm reservation on two
14	separate lines?
15	MR. HAFF: I don't understand that the fuel filings
16	show that.
17	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Okay.
18	CHAIRMAN JABER: I missed Commissioner Baez'
19	question.
20	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: No, I was just curious if that is
21	not the type of information I mean, I guess that strategy
22	and that policy, while it might be good, might be subject to
23	all sorts of scrutiny at some point as to whether it was
24	absolutely necessary.
25	MR. JENKINS: I really can't unfortunately, I

can't answer the question. What we focus on in the fuel clause is if the amounts going through, and I really can't tell you now if there is a separate reservation charge.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Have you ever heard of that?

MR. JENKINS: Yes. Yes, I have heard of it. And also I would like to point out --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Have you heard of it like I have heard of UFOs? I mean. is it common?

MR. JENKINS: Our real concern is not with no much with two pipelines, but having two separate fuels. Every time there is a durn hurricane in the Gulf, we spend afternoon after afternoon because they are shutting down all the wells for gas operator safety on the platforms. And what comes into play is not so much pipeline capacity, but just the sheer availability of natural gas from the Gulf. Now, in the future, it may be a little bit different with -- I don't think we will have a hurricane in the Gulf and a hurricane in the Bahamas if we ever get the pipeline under the Gulfstream built. That is probably not what you wanted to hear.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Davidson, you have got a question?

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: I have got couple of questions. Have you finished the main part of your presentation?

MR. GUYTON: I have one more point, but I would be

happy to entertain questions.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Okay. Well, let me go ahead and get a couple of these out. Developer experience requirements.

MR. GUYTON: Uh-huh.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Is there a way to provide for language that would not exclude creative and innovative management teams or arrangements of people and companies that could bring to you the experience you feel you need even though the company itself may be newly created, there may be a wholly-owned subsidiary that is brand new that perhaps wouldn't qualify under the rule. I think in an emerging market there are lots of executives out there that bring a lot of experience to the table, but it might not come in a form that would have as a form five years of experience. And I want to make sure that the language is drafted such that it does allow for something that brings to the table the experience even though it may not be in the form of an entity that has got the exact, as an entity, experience that you seek. If you could comment on that.

MR. GUYTON: We have in the website questions as follow-up to our pre-bid proposal we have been asked about this minimum experience requirement. And we have pointed out the response there are two different elements. One is that you have to have been able to develop, permit, and construct, and

you have only got to show that you have done it once. And then separately you have to have five years of operational experience, either you or somebody you contract with. Or as we pointed out in this, another entity that is willing to guarantee your performance. So we have tried to capture that.

We have stopped short of taking and trying to look at individual resumes of individual people because that is problematic and difficult and subject to all sorts of criticisms about how subjective that process is. We tried to come up with a brighter line to be able to address what passes and what does not rather than putting ourselves in the position of having to defend a decision about subjective judgment.

But there is another aspect here. There needs to be some entity, not just individuals, but some entity that has a track record, as well. That can be the proposer, or it could be another entity that they may want to joint venture with, but they are willing to guarantee it. But we think the customers ought to have some experience to be able to look to that could be guaranteed on an organizational basis. I hope that is responsive. And we have tried to take a look at that and craft language that addresses that.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Just one additional question, Madam Chair. Thank you. Turning to the issue of the evaluation fees. There is a fee of \$10,000 for each bid, any variation in key terms are treated as a separate project and

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there is another \$10,000 assessed. How did FPL arrive at that \$10,000 fee?

MR. GUYTON: We took a look at the external costs that were incurred in the last RFP. outside consultants, notice requirements, software requirements, and priced that out and then divided it by the number of proposals that were received to come up with a figure. And there is more detail of just how we did this in our response, but that calculation came out to \$9,600 per proposal. That did not capture the internal FPL costs in terms of Mr. Litchfield's time, or the analysts time. or the resource planning, or -- it was an external cost. And we did that because we thought that was favorable to the developers. Had we included those internal costs, the fees would have been significantly greater than the \$10,000 that we required. But we did that because the bid rule says that the fee needs to be cost-based.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: I appreciate that. A follow-up question to PACE on this point. Do you have any evidence as to why -- that supports your contention that this amount is excessive or is it just your opinion at this point?

MR. MOYLE: Well, we have the evidence from what Power Corp has done in their past ones, there past two, I believe, where they said 10,000 plus you get a couple of variations on that and anything addition to that is 1,000. you know, we haven't been able to conduct any discovery, but it

tells me that there is a pretty big divergence in cost with respect to how one utility evaluates bids and what it does and then how Light does it. I don't know what their costs are, how much they are paying consultants. You would have to really dig into that number. It just seems to us in terms of looking at what Light did last time, what Power Corp did the previous time and is doing now that it is out of whack.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Another hopefully minor point. Cash deposits and interest accrued. I am a little bit unclear on the language there. Is it FPL's intent to keep or not keep -- to keep or return the interest earned on cash deposits that are paid by a bidder who ultimately follows through with its end of the contract?

MR. GUYTON: That is not addressed in the RFP. I mean, we are silent on that. That is a PPA provision, that is a purchased power agreement provision that is negotiable between the parties. That is not a minimum requirement. We have not taken a position one way or the other on that.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: I'm assuming FPL, though, would have no problem returning interest on a deposit from a performing party?

MR. GUYTON: I would be surprised if they did, but the fact of the matter is we have not taken a position one way or another on that. That is a negotiable term.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Go ahead, Mr. Moyle. Did you

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2 MR. MOYLE: I guess, you know, we raised the point 3 about the contract terms and whatnot, that you are basically 4 deemed to have accepted them unless you specifically note them. 5 And this just kind of points that out, that if somebody didn't 6 go through the contract and pointed that out as an exception, 7 when you are sitting at the table they are going to say, hey, 8 you didn't come in here on the interest deal. You know, you have got to put 100 grand in, or whatever the number is, and 9 10 the language in the proposed PPA says for the benefit of FPL. And they would argue for the benefit means us. You have deemed 11 to have accepted it. And I think that sort of highlights the 12 13 unfairness of the process that was set up. 14 COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: And perhaps language can be

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: And perhaps language can be drafted that differentiates between parties that perform and parties that don't perform. I hope so. A question for Florida Power and Light on the equity penalty. As I understand it, in the last FPL case the Commissioners expressed a desire to see evidence on other mitigating factors related to the cost of capital. Did FPL address any such mitigating factors in the RFP?

MR. GUYTON: Yes, Commissioner, we did. In Appendix C we set forth in detail the methodology that we will employ. There is an entire subsection there that addresses mitigating factors and the way we are going to attempt to

monetize those as PACE's counsel has suggested would be appropriate. That is a term of the RFP.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: One last question, I believe. A policy question to PACE. You have raised some issues with regard to the PPA, but would you all rather see a PPA in an RFP or not? I mean, it seems to me that that sort of brings to the table and at least raises issues for negotiation, additional topics that it gets the parties a little bit further along in the discussion. So I'm curious as to your thoughts on the PPA.

MR. GREEN: Commissioner, I think PACE members and any IPP appreciates the fact that Florida Power and Light or any investor-owned utility would give out the PPA or a draft PPA as an indication of what might be expected of them. I think that is very good. But the language is such that it is almost like if you don't take exception of this -- and this is not a minimum document, this is a fairly lengthy draft PPA -- if you don't review it and take exception to things now, you basically might be held to all of those things right now.

In most PPA negotiations the final contract is negotiated just as you would expect in the contract negotiation phase, and that is what we would seek. I mean, we appreciate the idea that there are -- and we have been able to identify several issues that concern us, and I would envision that bidders if and when they do bid would raise several of those issues. But to say that if you don't raise them all now

forever hold your peace is sort of an unrealistic expectation. And we would -- you know, we appreciate the fact that the PPA is there, but don't lock it in. You know, let the two parties when it gets to the contract negotiation stage negotiate the final PPA. That is what contract negotiations are. The PPA is a contract.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Guyton, I think it is good you have included the PPA in the RFP, too. That wasn't required. I think as Commissioner Davidson says, it lends itself to additional discussion. But PACE has identified at least one example, and you acknowledge that that example lends itself to additional negotiation. For the record, did you intend to restrict the negotiations on the PPA in any way by including the PPA in the request for proposal?

MR. GUYTON: We intended to facilitate the negotiations by including that. And we did it in two ways. One, we said here are the terms that we would like to see. And obviously it is limited to a particular type of power plant, so obviously other things could be bid in and it doesn't address every conceivable type of proposal. But here is the conceptual framework that we would like to have.

And we said to the extent that you can't agree to this, state an exception and give us alternative language, all of which is helpful in terms of facilitating negotiations if we get to that point. We said also that we need to know those

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exceptions to be able to assess the risk associated with this alternative relative to other alternatives. PACE argues, well, we don't know how that is going to be evaluated. Well, it is going to be part of our risk assessment, we told them that. But we can't tell them how we are going to assess the risk completely, because we don't know to what terms they are going to accept and how many versus what somebody else takes an exception to.

CHAIRMAN JABER: How is it a bidder -- frankly, how is it that the Commission staff in a need proceeding would be able to understand what is part of the conceptual framework versus a specific term of a PPA that would allow that interest be returned? And I see the point. I think it is a valid point. There was a specific term not included in the PPA. Did they need to take exception to that, i.e., the interest being returned? I mean, how did you make the distinction between this is the conceptual framework versus we expect that you would have raised this as a concern or you are forever precluded from it?

MR. GUYTON: Well, the primary way we did that is that if we felt like that this was an absolute no go alternative, or a must have alternative. We took it out of the PPA and made it a minimum requirement in the RFP, okay? So they know up front that those -- and there is at least the regulatory modification provision as an example of that.

Everything else is on the table to negotiate, but they need to let us know that they take exception to it, because we are assessing the risk associated with contracting with this entity. And unless they state that exception, we are under the distinct impression that it is fine with them.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Guyton, either it is, like, late in the day, and I am finding you to be particularly difficult or you are talking in circles because you don't realize who you are talking to. I don't know. Either way, it is not good for you.

MR. GUYTON: I apologize. It is not my intent.

CHAIRMAN JABER: So let's start over. My question is -- and I thought you answered that if it is not -- if it was important enough to you and part of the conceptual framework you put it into a minimum requirement and disclosed it vividly in the RFP and that everything else was negotiable.

MR. GUYTON: That's correct.

CHAIRMAN JABER: But then you followed up with but the onus is on them to raise an exception otherwise we can't measure the risk. What does that mean, that the ability to have your interest returned is a measure of risk that you want to evaluate later?

MR. GUYTON: To use the interest is not something that had even occurred to us, it was just simply a matter that was going to be subject to negotiation. And, in fact, quite

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frankly it wasn't important enough to even find its way into the PPA.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Would you agree that there might be other things like that that are just negotiable and --

MR. GUYTON: Absolutely, Commissioner. We are trying to find out whether we have a meeting of the minds, or whether we are going to have to negotiate a thousand things, or ten. That is what we are trying to find out.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Can I ask probably a repeat of your question, Chairman?

CHAIRMAN JABER: Please.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Thank you. Is it accurate or inaccurate to state that a bidder who does not object to a specific term in the PPA will, as a matter of contract law and interpretation by FPL, be bound by the PPA? If they don't object they are bound, there ain't no negotiations? Accurate or inaccurate and then explain.

MR. GUYTON: I think inaccurate. I don't think it goes quite that far.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: How far does it go?

MR. GUYTON: I think it goes to the point of we need to understand, not as a matter of contract law, but what you are offering us. And the way to do that is we have told you what we would like to see in a contract, that is not an offer, this is what we would like to see. You are going to bid in and

we would like to know the elements of contract that you are offering us based upon this price and then we can take that and can assess that heads up against all the other proposals. Without that, without requiring them to state exceptions, without requiring them to tell us alternatives, we can't assess the relative risk of one proposal to the other.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: A follow-up on that and then I will hush. The PPA is just a negotiating document. Bidders put in, then you engage in contract negotiations with those bidders, but they are not bound by the PPA, and you are not going to say they are bound by the PPA. Rather, you are saying these topics are topics we need to address and here is our position on it, now give us yours.

MR. GUYTON: Well, it's not quite that simple, because if they were to, for instance, sandbag and raise no objection, get to the PPA, and it turns out that there is a host of exceptions that they -- that this bid is not what it appears to be, then I suspect the risk assessment that we have done of coming -- of the ability to come to contract with this entity is going to change dramatically. Is that binding in the negotiations, does it create a contract? I don't think it does. It changes the risk assessment, and that is what we are trying to do. We are trying to find out how close to terms we are with this Bidder A versus Bidder C.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Finally, and this really will

be a final comment. I'm not saying one approach is better than the others, I'm just trying to understand what it is so that it is either binding or not, and the parties have similar and consistent expectations about the role of the PPA. That is really my focus of these questions.

CHAIRMAN JABER: As were mine, Commissioner. And really it is also for the purposes of the need case. I want to make sure that our staff understands, too, and that we do. I thought it was a simple question.

MR. GUYTON: I'm sorry, I thought I had given a simple answer. And I am obviously not striking a responsive cord here. But there are two elements; one is that we need to be able to perform a risk assessment one against the other and the extent to which they have stated exceptions gives us an idea of the risk that we might anticipate in terms of contract --

CHAIRMAN JABER: I think the difficulty might be none of us know what is not in the PPA that is subject to negotiation. But if you can just give me reassurance or a commitment that what was important and what was worthy of evaluation, what you will consider for evaluating the bids has been clearly identified in the RFP, I can be fine. Isn't that simple? Is that not simple?

MR. GUYTON: Yes, it is simple. What was in the RFP was the minimum requirements that we absolutely had to have.

What was in the PPA is what we would like to have. We are going to evaluate relative to each other whether somebody has taken an exception to two things or 100 things in the PPA. That is part of the evaluation of the risk assessment and that was the only reservation that I had with trying to respond to your question.

CHAIRMAN JABER: But for purposes of our evaluation of what you did, we are going to look at the RFP and what you used as criteria delineated in the RFP, and that is what is consistent with the bid rule. Are we clear on that?

MR. GUYTON: Absolutely.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Moyle and then Mr. Guyton -- Commission Baez.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I'm sorry, I had a question. Mr. Guyton, it sounds to me like you are trying to present this PPA as just a little something extra. But the way you describe it, its purpose, starts sounding like in the aggregate, although any one of the terms of the PPA, any one of the remaining terms that didn't make it as a full-fledged minimum requirement on the RFP, but in the aggregate they all become a minimum requirement. And I see a nodding, or a shaking your head, but here is what I'm hearing. You are assessing, you know, how many objections, whether you are dealing with ten objections or a thousand objections to these little things, all right, and you are assessing a value to that. And that has to become -- I

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: A what?

this PPA thing or he is not and that makes him --

mean, there has to be a purpose to it. And in my mind that all

aggregate, something that gets broken down and says, you know

also, you know, he is either going to be a pain in the A on

what, Bidder A has seven out of ten on the RFP requirements and

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: You heard me. He wants his

interest back. He is going to be a -- he is going to want his

interest back, whereas the other guy doesn't. And that is

going to make that bidder more attractive or less attractive

accordingly. So, it doesn't matter that you are holding out

into the RFP as minimum requirements, that PPA itself is a

minimum requirement to varying degrees, but it is. You are

using it to evaluate, aren't you?

all of these other terms that didn't make it on their own merit

of a sudden starts becoming a minimum requirement in the

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MR. GUYTON: There is a distinction that I want to draw, because the last part of your question is the important distinction. The answer to the last part of your question is are we using it to evaluate it? Yes, absolutely. Is it a minimum requirement? No. I mean, minimum requirement, pass or fail. Either you agree to it and you fail, or you pass. The other are shades of gray and they go into the nonprice evaluation that we are asked and expected to undertake as we take a look at this. And that is what we have tried to capture

here. Is it part of the evaluation? Absolutely. I don't want to mislead you there. We are going to evaluate and assess the risk. Is it a minimum requirement in the sense that if you raise an objection and propose alternative language, we are not going to consider it? Absolutely not. We are going to consider it and we are going to consider the entire risk and assess the risk of the entire contract as it comes out, both as to itself and in relation to others.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Can the relative number of objections taken to the PPA compared to -- can it add or subtract from other minimum requirements? I mean, can it help you or harm your relationship --

MR. GUYTON: It won't add or substract to the other minimum requirements. It will go into an assessment of risk of dealing with this particular bidder. And taking an exception is not something that will necessarily be held against someone. They may take an exception and propose alternative language that we like better than we put in the PPA. That improves their risk profile. It suggests to us that we have a greater likelihood of getting to contract for that entity than another entity. One entity may only except to ten, and another may except to 100, but 99 out of 100 are de minimis. But two or three of the ten are very important. In that instance, the risk may be greater with the entity that has fewer objections.

But there is no way that we can anticipate at this

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point in time, you know, what that risk assessment would appropriately be. So what we have done is we have set it out here and said we are going to evaluate this and we are going to do our best to assess the risk, but we can't tell you more than that until we know what we are in agreement with and what we are not.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Do you say in the RFP, which the rule does require, that the inclusion of the PPA may be an attribute, criterion, or a methodology we are going to employ in evaluating the bid? Is that clearly articulated?

MR. GUYTON: Yes, Commissioner, we indicate in the discussion of the evaluation criteria of the nonprice evaluation that that is one of the three elements that we are going to assess.

CHAIRMAN JABER: You said you had one more point you needed to address or were you done?

MR. GUYTON: Actually, Commissioner, this last discussion addressed that.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioners, do you have --

MR. MOYLE: Madam Chair, I just feel compelled. I've got to make a point.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Go ahead, Mr. Moyle. I was going to come back to you. I forgot.

MR. MOYLE: This clearly presents I think the quandary that the IPP community is in, because you have heard

what Mr. Guyton explained, but if go to the core document, which is the RFP that they issue, on Page 26 under proposer exceptions, it says, and I quote, "Failure to state exceptions, impose alternative language shall constitute acceptance of the terms and conditions set forth in the RFP and/or the PPA." I read that to say if you don't object, then this is what you will be bound by.

But then as we go through the document and we use the interest provision because it was one that I thought was particularly unfair, but it was really designed to be illustrative. There is a taxes provision that says that the bidder has to agree to pay all future federal, state, county taxes. I mean, you don't know what these taxes would be. If you come in and say, you know what, I will pay the property taxes, but I shouldn't have to pay all future federal taxes. Let's not do that. You really don't know how that is going to be evaluated. It goes into this noneconomic evaluation and it could be the death knell for a proposal or not. And that is sort of the uncertainty.

I mean, one bidder may say, you know what, I think I can just get in there. If I can get in there I can negotiate, so I won't take many exceptions. Another bidder may say you know that clearly says I am deemed to accept it, so I am go through and put in all of these exceptions, and they may get knocked out in the noneconomic evaluation portion.

CHAIRMAN JABER: And, Mr. Guyton, the only thing I would add to that as it relates to my concern is the weight you would place on that objection versus the guy who wants his interest back. I mean, how do they know that? We wouldn't innovate that. Not that we are smarter, but if they don't know it, we are not going to know it. Commissioner Baez would know.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: I agree, Chairman, we don't know it. And that is really what I'm trying to focus on is just getting a process in place so everybody's expectations are on the same page as to how this is evaluated. I want to emphasize that I think it is great putting the PPA in there. Don't be deterred from doing it again by this discussion and all the issues. My thought is now, and, again, I am sort of back to what it is we are supposed to do.

I think going forward we are going to here a lot of detail. I mean, there is so much detail on each of these. Ultimately we just have to trust that the process will work, and if it doesn't, act as a check on that and hope that as this process moves forward the company walks away with some guidance from our comments as to what needs to be addressed. I am sitting here thinking and, you know, I could take two weeks on my own and study each of these criteria and probably come up with a solution. Each of you may do the same thing and they may slightly differ and it wouldn't make any of them necessarily unreasonable, or it wouldn't make of any of them

reasonable.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Is Commissioner Davidson suggesting or volunteering to take two weeks of his time to solve all this, because if he is I will move that right now.

CHAIRMAN JABER: We heard it.

there, right, to help? So I guess I'm looking still, since I wasn't involved in the bid rule, on some guidance in terms of what it is that we are sort of passing on today and stamping. If it is more of a, you know, general this passes the most sort of general smell test, but then we are really going to look at this as the process moves forward, or if now is the time to sort of go through and say security package, we don't have an analysis regarding reasonableness, thus we can't support it. If they are sort of prima facie, if we are either focused on a clear negative, a clear positive, or if we are right on the fence and it is neutral.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, Madam Chairman, I was just going to mention, I'm sorry, that there is some waiver of claims to the rule. I mean, if you raise them and they were settled a certain way, then that claim doesn't survive to the need determination. I don't know if that helps you.

MS. BROWN: Commissioner, I don't think --COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Of if maybe you can clarify for

me then.

1 MS. BROWN: I think we talked about that and 2 suggested that in one of the early iterations. 3 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: That didn't make it into the 4 rule? 5 MS. BROWN: It didn't make it into the rule. You are 6 not waiving claims. 7 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: So everything survives? 8 CHAIRMAN JABER: Well. it is not a waiver of the But if we find that a term is unfair, onerous, unduly 9 claim. burdensome, the rule does contemplate that we would say, look, 10 11 this does not pass the smell test. 12 COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: What if we don't know at this 13 point -- I'm sorry. CHAIRMAN JABER: Let's take up Commissioner -- well, 14 let's get clear on that, Martha, in response to Commissioner 15 Baez's question. 16 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: If this -- now we have been 17 discussing the PPA issue, for instance, and by the Commission's 18 19 decision that says, you know, it is all right for them to attach the PPA, and it is all right for them to use the PPA as 20 21 they intend. That discussion doesn't take place at the need 22 determination. 23 MS. BROWN: Yes. it does. 24 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: It does?

MS. BROWN: No rights are adjudicated here. This

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process we are doing, as I said, is an odd duck. It is a preliminary advisory procedural process where you take a flash-cut, first cut, general, yes or no, passing the smell test, Commissioner Davidson said look at it. And then you say this stinks or, no, this is all right. But you can bring it back. You can bring it back.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Let's get away from smell test, using those words, and let's use what the word says that through the objection process we are going to review whether there has been a rule violation. And I always thought that if we found that there was a rule violation and, therefore, the objection should be entertained, then the company may go forward legally via our process, but they operate under their own risk. I mean, there is -- I don't want your comment to be misconstrued by these companies.

MS. BROWN: No, I understand, and I agree with you on that.

CHAIRMAN JABER: It is serious for us to find that there has been a rule violation.

MS. BROWN: Yes, I think that is true. But remember that you are doing that without any evidentiary backup. And to determine whether something is commercially feasible, you really need some evidence. No one is foreclosed from raising these issues again in the need determination. What you are doing here is giving them a very good idea about how you feel

about it, and it is going to be incumbent upon them to present competent substantial evidence to change your mind when we get to the need determination.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commission Davidson, your initial question, I thought you raised good questions, and what I always envisioned was exactly what I articulated. That if we clearly found a rule violation that we would use this expedited process to send those signals, and that may result in a modification to the RFP. It may be that we find things that don't rise to a level of rule violation. You said middle ground, but doesn't rise to the level of a rule violation, but it just doesn't look right from a prudency -- from a -- I don't know, logical logistical standpoint. So it really was designed to provide guidance without holding up the need process.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Yes, I do. The way I look at it is at this phase we have to -- to declare something a rule violation it has to be fairly egregious, something that rises to a level that we are confident that this provision, whatever it may be is unfair, onerous, or whatever the standards may be. And it is an attempt to go ahead and identify that so that the parties can adjust accordingly, and hopefully we don't have to find ourselves spending unnecessary time at the need determination on matters that could have been clarified up front. That is the way I look at it. I think that was my

intent when we adopted the rule. Of course, when I adopted the rule I didn't know that this process was going to take four hours of an agenda conference, but I think it has been time well spent.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Exactly. I was going to say the good news about that is it is hopefully preventing us from four days of hearing. Starting backwards, I have to tell you there is nothing in here that to me smacks of a rule violation. There are some areas that give me grave concern.

The one that came closest to me, Mr. Guyton, and I would encourage the Commissioners to have the same dialogue with you all, the one that came closest to me is your reliance on the purchased power agreement. And I look at the part of the rule that says you need to provide the criteria and the ranking factors, and maybe you have articulated in the RFP that the PPA will be used in terms of assessing risk, but it doesn't sound like how those factors in the PPA will be ranked has been clearly articulated.

What stops me short of saying it is a rule violation is a recognition that you weren't required to include the PPA. I appreciate that you have done that, but when you made the decision to do that, I don't know if it has created more confusion or not. The other area that gives me concern is the comprehensive analysis on security. The security passage requirements combined with financial viability. I would ask

that you consider at the very minimum recognizing that all of the IOUs don't meet your standard, much less IPPs. And then --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me say I don't share that, so we are getting things out here, and we are probably going to be sending mixed signals to everybody. I don't share that view, so that is just one Commissioner speaking.

CHAIRMAN JABER: And, see, this is a good dialogue, too, because you need to know I am going to have that concern at the hearing. Commissioner Deason may not, I don't know. Maybe the two of us change our mind, but --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: But I do agree with your statement that I don't think anything rises to a rule violation at this point.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes. The dual fuel requirements give me concern. Maybe I'm being naive, but I think an enabling agreement that would clearly show a commitment to interrupt that second pipeline is sufficient. Again, what makes it hard for me to make this rise to the level of a rule violation is I didn't get a concise answer from you on what you did for Martin and Manatee. Maybe you have by now, but I couldn't get an answer.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me say I share that one. That is a good signal. I don't know how we want to handle this. I just feel compelled to at least speak up.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I welcome that, yes.

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COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: I completely disagree with everything that has been said. I'm kidding, kidding.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: That gives me great comfort that I'm right.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Strike that from the record, please.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I think this is the way we should handle it. I mean, this is informal. This is informal. think my direction to you would be to be reasonable in looking at our alternatives. I understand the goal. I understand that you are looking for a commitment on capacity required. What I wasn't real clear on, FPL, was why that took two firm contracts with two separate pipelines. So my direction would be that you take a look at that from a how-can-we-be-more-reasonable standpoint.

And then finally on the completion security, the 188,000 per megawatt, I didn't ask you what that would come out to be, but I would suggest to you that there is a huge jump between 50,000 per megawatt to 188,000. And I would leave it at that. I don't know what the right number is. That's all I had.

Commissioner Davidson.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: I have a couple of comments. I will try and get through these quickly. And please jump in, everyone except Commissioner Deason.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Geographic preference. I head the analysis, fine there. Regulatory-out clause. And, again, I agree with the other Commissioners, nothing here strikes me as, per se, egregious. And my test for all of these throughout, from both sides, is going to be what is the commercial reasonableness of this. So to the extent FPL can demonstrate, or bidders can demonstrate, one side or the other, that will be important.

But regulatory-out clause, if you all could consider adding in language similar to Section 15 of the bid rule, if that makes economic sense, I think that could help send a signal to the investment community.

Financial viability and security package, I share a little bit of the Chairman's concerns. I think I'm closer to Commissioner Deason. I would like to see how the equity penalty, though, is addressed as part of the security package requirements, and, again, demonstrate that the whole package is commercially reasonable.

PPA, we have talked about that at great length. Equity penalty I just commented on.

Cash deposits and interest accrued, again that is part of the PPA. If that could be addressed sort of up front.

The evaluation fees, again, whatever makes sense in

the industry. The \$10,000 for a variation in any key term and being assessed another 10,000 strikes me as high, but that is just one opinion. And, again, point to evidence in the industry in the market as to what is typically charged for such variations.

Developer experience requirements. Again, to the extent that you are not going to leave out creative management teams, even though some entity itself may be new, if that can be done in a commercially feasible way, it makes sense. The market has changed and we have got a lot of great executives and managers out there, and if they can marry up a great team with capital, don't exclude a creative or innovative approach just because it is not the way it has always been done.

And those are my comments.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Again, I will join the rest of the Commissioners in saying that I didn't see any outright violations of the rule, but I will give my two cents worth in no particular order. I think the use of the PPA, while it was well intentioned -- let me preface by saying this. I think the bid rule -- one of the effects now we are seeing of the bid rule is that it has forced the RFP issuer to -- since the bid rule sought to make it more transparent, make it more objective, make it more -- have more information available as to the evaluations and so forth, took a lot of discretion out of the utility's hands, and you see the result. There is an

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objections you see as being unreasonable were once thought too much -- were once placed in the discretion, or once had remained in the discretion of the company. So I think you are seeing some progress along that line. It is things that have to be refined. So that is why all the problems this first time out. I think.

The PPA. I think it was a good idea. but I think what was also necessary is an explanation as to what it was going to be used and how it was going to be used. Because I think there is too much speculation on a potential bidder's part to figure that out. The security package, specifically the performance and the completion securities, I know, Mr. Guyton, you mentioned that it was -- you know, the numbers were boosted after you all took a realistic look. I don't know what you could do about it now, but I would note that the boost is troublesome. It was troublesome to me to see the considerable difference from one year to another. I know that you have already admitted that you probably made mistakes in the past, and are trying to get it right. Let's hope that this is the last time that that kind of adjustment takes place, because I think it does have a severe effect on bidders' decisions to participate.

The regulatory-out clause, I would join Commissioner Davidson's comments if there is something that can be done. I

sense that there was a broadness that might not be entirely necessary. I mean, something -- I'm trying to harken back to the reg-out clauses that existed in the old power purchase agreements. I mean, to the extent that there is any changed circumstances that need to be addressed, I understand, but I think it should be a progression of that and it is very difficult to try and speculate about all of the changes that can come down the pike.

And the evaluations fee, I think it needs to be a little bit more reasonable in increments. I was persuaded by Mr. Moyle's points on that. Any new variation, I don't know that it would cost \$10,000. And remember that this is a cost-based -- this is a cost-based fee. It's supposed to be. So, I think more attention needs to be paid there. Other than that, I am okay with everything else.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Do you have anything to add, Commissioner Deason?

add. First of all, let me just reiterate that I don't anything rises to the level of a rule violation. The question of the unsecured debt rating requirement and the completion security, and performance security, I tend to agree that what is being proposed with this caveat, and that is I think that we need --perhaps in this case Florida Power and Light needs to look at the combination of all of these requirements if it is going to

have the effect of severely diminishing the pool of applicants to provide a bid such that we do not have an adequate number of bids that we then are unable to make an adequate determination of most cost-effective unit in a need determination. It seems to me that there may be some flexibility, could be some flexibility given. Perhaps a company with a higher bond rating perhaps would not have to have as much completion security or performance security. I don't know, these are things I'm .iust --

CHAIRMAN JABER: That would satisfy my concern. That kind of review of alternatives would satisfy my concern recognizing that we are just looking for proposals that would give the least-cost alternative.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So we do agree.

CHAIRMAN JABER: We do agree.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I am comforted by the fact with the equity penalty that there have been mitigating factors identified and that has been included in the analysis. I agree with Commissioner Davidson's thoughts on the regulatory-out provisions. The one area that almost rises to the -- I guess it rises to the highest level of concern, and that is the requirement to have dual firm capacity on pipelines. I'm not convinced that is a requirement that FPL puts on their own units. I would like more information on that. I would not want this to have the effect of a bidder not putting a bid in

because of the fact that they feel like that if they were required to do this that they would not be cost competitive. And I think that the likelihood of a major pipeline interruption is small, and that this could have the effect of increasing costs unnecessarily. So that is a concern, but I don't think it rises to the level of a rule violation. And I will end it at that.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Bradley.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I'll be brief. I think that I made most of my comments at the beginning of our discussion relative to this particular issue. However, I will, again, make the statement that after listening to the discussion that we have had here today and after listening to PACE's concerns as it relates to the 14 objections that they put forth, again, I don't think that any of them rise to the level of a violation as it relates to Subsection 5 of the bid rule.

How do we mitigate this situation? That is the question I can't answer. It always seems to me that relationship building is maybe one consideration that might be given. The other question that came to mind as I listened to the discussion is what is the most appropriate venue for addressing the issues that are included in the bid rule. I said during our discussion of the bid rule this spring that I thought that the appropriate venue is the legislature, and I still firmly believe that that is the appropriate venue. And I

just don't ever, in my opinion, feel that some of the issues that have been put forth today will be adequately addressed by this body, because after all, this body's sole purpose is to implent the will of the legislative -- the representatives of the legislature, vis-a-vis the Florida Statutes. And I just would, again, strongly suggest that you all give consideration to that venue as it relates to your issues.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Staff, what do we need to do from here? You need a motion. Is there an order that needs to be issued?

MS. BROWN: We were talking about that just a little while ago, because you mentioned it very early on, and having considered it, we don't think that you do need to issue anything in writing. This process is really separate from the Administrative Procedures Act which would require any final decision that you make to be put in writing. But this is an advisory preliminary procedural decision. It reminds me of a preliminary hearing in a court where the judge will give his opinion or make his ruling but never write it down.

I mean, you have all said, each one of you, that you don't believe that any of these objections rise to the level of a rule violation, bid rule violation, and that is what this process asks of you. I don't think anything more needs to be done.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Just from one Commissioner,

I would benefit from a written order from Commissioner Deason's office. I think he could really capture --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: You just go back to your office and wait for it.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes, exactly.

MS. BROWN: We think you can close the docket at this point. You have given lots of guidance.

MR. MOYLE: And, Commissioners, I would add that -CHAIRMAN JABER: Wait, wait. I was just going to
tell my colleagues that I tend to agree with Ms. Brown,
commissioners, I don't think -- unless you all disagree
strongly, I don't think we need an order. The parties have the
transcripts, and we have the transcript. And in the spirit of
keeping this informal, I don't think this rises to a level of
an order. The docket, you need us to close the docket --

MS. BROWN: Yes.

CHAIRMAN JABER: -- as an administrative function?
MS. BROWN: Yes.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Can I just direct you to close the docket?

MS. BROWN: Yes, I think so. I'll be happy to.

CHAIRMAN JABER: And we will leave the writing of order to Commissioner Deason for another docket. Okay. That resolves Item 15.

Parties, thank you.

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1	STATE OF FLORIDA )
2	: CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
3	COUNTY OF LEON )
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5	I, JANE FAUROT, RPR, Chief, Office of Hearing Reporte Services, FPSC Division of Commission Clerk and Administrative Services, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceeding was
6	heard at the time and place herein stated.
7   8	IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that I stenographically reported the said proceedings; that the same has been transcribed under my direct supervision; and that this
9	transcript constitutes a true transcription of my notes of said proceedings.
10	I FURTHER_CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee,
11	attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor am I a relative or employee of any of the parties' attorney or counsel
12	connected with the action, nor am I financially interested in the action.
13	DATED THIS 9th day of October, 2003.
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15	Mueduno
16	JANE FAUROT, RPR Chief, Office of Hearing Reporter Services FPSC Division of Commission Clerk and
17	ll Administrative Services
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