JAMES E. "JIM" KING, JR.

PRESIDENT



Charles J. Beck Interim Public Counsel

ORIGINAL

JOHNNIE BYRD

### STATE OF FLORIDA OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC COUNSEL

c/o the florida legislature 111 west madison st. room 812 tallahassee, florida 32399-1400 850-488-9330



November 19, 2003

Blanca S. Bayo, Director Division of Records and Reporting Florida Public Service Commission 2540 Shumard Oak Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850

HOV 19 PH 3: 04

Re: Docket Nos. 030867-TL, 030868-TL & 030868-TL

Dear Ms. Bayo:


Enclosed for filing in the above-referenced docket are original and 15 copies of the Rebuttal Testimony of Dr. David J. Gabel.

Please indicate the time and date of receipt on the enclosed duplicate of this letter and return it to our office.

Sincerely,

1) Beck

Charles J. Beck Deputy Public Counsel



DOCUMENT NUMBER-DATE 11648 NOV 198 FPSC-COMMISSION CLERM

#### DOCKET NOS. 030961-TI, 030869-TL, 030868-TL and 030867-TL

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing Rebuttal Testimony of Dr.

David J. Gabel has been furnished by U.S. Mail, hand-delivery and/or overnight delivery

to the following parties on this 19th day of November. 2003.

Charles J. Beck

Beth Keating, Esquire Division of Legal Services Fla. Public Service Commission 2540 Shumard Oak Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850

Michael B. Twomey Post Office Box 5256 Tallahassee, FL 32314-5256

Lyn Bodiford State Affairs Coordinator AARP 200 West College Street Tallahassee, FL 32301

Donna McNulty MCI WorldCom, Inc. 1203 Governors Square Blvd. Suite 201 Tallahassee, FL 32301-2960

Michael Gross Florida Cable Telecomm. Assn. 246 East 6th Avenue Tallahassee, FL 32303 Nancy B. White c/o Nancy H. Sims BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. 150 South Monroe Street, Suite 400 Tallahassee, FL 32301

Mark Cooper 504 Highgate Terrace Silver Spring, MD 20904

Tracy Hatch/Chris McDonald AT&T 101 North Monroe, Suite 700 Tallahassee, FL 32301

Richard Chapkis Vice President & General Counsel Verizon Florida, Inc. 201 North Franklin Street FLTC0717 Tampa, FL 33601

Susan Masterton, Esquire Sprint-Florida, Incorporated P.O. Box 2214 Tallahassee, FL 32316 Charles Rehwinkel, Esquire Sprint-Florida, Incorporated 1313 Blair Stone Road FLTH00107 Tallahassee, FL 32301

.

Brian Sulmonetti MCI WorlCom Concourse Corporate Center Six Six Concourse Parkway, Suite 3200 Atlanta, GA 30328 John P. Fons, Esquire Ausley & McMullen P.O. Box 391 Tallahassee, FL 32302

Harris R. Anthony 400 Perimeter Center Terrace Suite 350 Atlanta, GA 30346 BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA

IN THE MATTER OF

THE PETITIONS OF VERIZON FLORIDA INC.,

BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS INC., AND SPRINT-FLORIDA INC.

TO REFORM THEIR INTRASTATE NETWORK ACCESS

AND BASIC LOCAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS RATES

IN ACCORDANCE WITH FLORIDA STATUTES, SECTION 364.164

DOCKET NOS. 030867-TL, 030868-TL, 030869-TL

**REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF** 

DR. DAVID J. GABEL

ON BEHALF OF

THE OFFICE OF PUBLIC COUNSEL (OPC)

NOVEMBER 19, 2003

DOCUMENT NO COMPANYE 11648 (102190

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

1	Introduction And Witness Background3
2 №	Rebuttal Of The Testimonies Of Dr. Mayo, A Witness For AT&T And ICI, And Mr. Fonteix, A Witness For AT&T6
	2.1 Dr. Mayo And Mr. Fonteix Provide No Evidence On Whether Residential BLTS Is Subsidized Or Supported
	2.2 Dr. Mayo And Mr. Fontiex Do Not Provide A Coherent Explanation Or Evidence As To Why The Proposed Rebalancing Would Induce CLEC Entry 10
	2.3 AT&T's Position On Price Setting In This Case Is Inconsistent With Dr. Mayo's Own Testimony As Well As How AT&T Sets Its Own Prices In Competitive Markets
3 L	Staff Witness Mr. Shafer On Legislative Intent, Entry And Bundled And ong Distance Rates
	3.1 The Legislation In No Way Presumes BLTS Is Supported
	3.2 Mr. Shafer Takes No View As To Whether BLTS Or Residential BLTS Is Supported
	3.3 Mr. Shafer Is Incorrect In Asserting That If BLTS Was Priced Below Cost This Would Necessarily Discourage Entry
4	A Rebuttal Of The Testimony Of Mr. Boccucci, Jr
	4.1 Mr. Boccucci, Jr. Claims The ILECs' Petitions Will Increase Competitive Entry, But Provides No Material Evidence For This, And What He Says Is Inconsistent With Public Statements From Knology, Inc

1	1	Introduction And Witness Background
2		
3	Q.	Please state your name and business address.
4	Α.	My name is David Gabel. My business address is 31 Stearns Street,
5	Ne	wton, Massachusetts 02459-2441.
6		
7	Q.	On whose behalf are you appearing?
8	Α.	I am appearing on behalf of the Florida Office of Public Counsel (OPC).
9		
10	Q.	Are you the same individual that submitted direct testimony in this
11	pro	ceeding on behalf of the Florida Office of Public Counsel (OPC)?
12	Α.	Yes.
13		
14	Q.	What is the purpose of your testimony?
15	Α.	The purpose of my rebuttal testimony is to address the direct testimony of:
16	Dr.	Mayo,1 on behalf of AT&T Communications of the Southern States, LLC
17	("A	$\Gamma$ &T") and MCI Worldcom Telecommunications, Inc. ("MCI"); Mr. Fonteix, <sup>2</sup> on
18	beh	alf of AT&T Mr. Shafer, <sup>3</sup> and Ms. Ollila, <sup>4</sup> on behalf of staff for the Florida

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Direct Testimony of Dr. John W. Mayo on behalf of AT&T Communications of the Southern States, LLC and MCI Worldcom Communications, Inc., October 31, 2003.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Direct Testimony of Mr. Wayne Fonteix on behalf of AT&T Communications of the Southern States, LLC, October 31, 2003.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Direct Testimony of Mr. Gregory L. Shafer on behalf of Staff for the Florida Public Service Commission, October 31, 2003.

1	Public Service Commission ("the Commission"); and Mr. Boccucci, Jr., on behalf
2	of Knology of Florida, Inc. ("Knology").5 I will address several issues in my
3	rebuttal testimony, referring to the testimony of: Dr. Mayo on competitive pricing;
4	Dr. Mayo and Mr. Fonteix on residential basic local telephone service (BLTS),
5	support and entry; Mr. Shafer on legislative intent, entry and bundled and long
6	distance rates; Ms. Ollila on the "Competition Report";6 and Mr. Boccucci, Jr. on
7	BLTS support and competitive entry.
8	
9	Q. Can you succinctly summarize the positions of AT&T, MCI, Staff and
2	
10	Knology as stated in the testimony of their expert witnesses and your
10	Knology as stated in the testimony of their expert witnesses and your
10 11	Knology as stated in the testimony of their expert witnesses and your responses to these positions?
10 11 12	Knology as stated in the testimony of their expert witnesses and your responses to these positions?
10 11 12 13	<ul><li>Knology as stated in the testimony of their expert witnesses and your responses to these positions?</li><li>A. Yes. AT&amp;T and MCI:</li></ul>
10 11 12 13 14	<ul> <li>Knology as stated in the testimony of their expert witnesses and your responses to these positions?</li> <li>A. Yes. AT&amp;T and MCI:</li> <li>Assert that BLTS rates are subsidized;</li> </ul>
10 11 12 13 14 15	<ul> <li>Knology as stated in the testimony of their expert witnesses and your responses to these positions?</li> <li>A. Yes. AT&amp;T and MCI:</li> <li>assert that BLTS rates are subsidized;</li> <li>are concerned that existing access prices prevent competitive local</li> </ul>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Direct Testimony of Ms. Suzanne M. Ollila on behalf of Staff for the Florida Public Service Commission, October 31, 2003.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Direct Testimony of Mr. Felix L. Boccucci Jr. on behalf of Knology, Inc., October 31, 2003.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Florida Public Service Commission's, Office of Market Monitoring and Strategic Analysis, "Telecommunications markets in Florida: Annual Report on Competition as of June 30, 2002" December 2002.

1	<ul> <li>recommend that regulation should emulate prices that would emerge in a</li> </ul>
2	competitive market, a position consistent with that of the OPC, but that the
3	proposed BLTS prices are correct, and that access services should be
4	priced at incremental cost.
5	
6	It is the OPC's view that:
7	
8	<ul> <li>AT&amp;T and MCI present no evidence that BLTS is subsidized or that the</li> </ul>
9	proposed rate rebalancing is consistent with competitive prices (and note,
10	Staff do not present any evidence or findings on whether BLTS or
11	residential BLTS is subsidized); and
12	<ul> <li>AT&amp;T's and MCI's view on what they believe constitute correct BLTS and</li> </ul>
13	access service prices is inconsistent with competitive practice.
14	
15	Mr. Shafer argues that if residential BLTS is subsidized, then entry would be
16	difficult, but this conclusion does not hold if BLTS is an important complement to
17	other services (as Mr. Shafer points out in his testimony) or is supplied as part of
18	a bundle.
19	
20	Knology claims that the rebalancing will generate competitive entry, but in no way
21	demonstrates this, and indeed its testimony appears to contradict its position in a
22	filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

1	
2	2 Rebuttal Of The Testimonies Of Dr. Mayo, A Witness For AT&T And
3	MCI, And Mr. Fonteix, A Witness For AT&T
4	
5	2.1 Dr. Mayo And Mr. Fonteix Provide No Evidence On Whether
6	Residential BLTS Is Subsidized Or Supported
7	
8	Q. What are your views of Dr. Mayo's and Mr. Fonteix's statements
9	about whether residential BLTS is subsidized or supported?
10	A. Mr. Fonteix asserts, without providing any supporting evidence, that BLTS
11	is subsidized. <sup>7</sup> Dr. Mayo claims, again absent evidence, that BLTS is supported. <sup>8</sup>
12	-
13	Q. Why is it important to provide evidence?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Fonteix Direct, p. 2, lines 15-18, p. 4, lines 2-4. Mr. Fonteix does not define subsidized and cites Mayo ibid. as supplying evidence of this without providing a specific location in that testimony. Mayo only once uses the language of subsidy in this context (Mayo, p. 15, lines 3-10), arguing that cross-subsidies prevent entry, but providing no evidence of a cross-subsidy—see also footnote 8 below. Moreover, the view that cross-subsidies prevent entry is in general incorrect—see my discussion on entry below on pp. 8 ff. (Section 2.2).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Mayo Direct, p. 11. Mayo provides no definition of support or evidence that BLTS rates are supported or subsidized, but does argue that BLTS rates are inefficient because of the history of regulatory development (p. 8, lines 6-17, p. 9, lines 1-16). His only evidence to this effect is a paper published 7 years ago (p. 5, footnote 5), presumably written even earlier and based on evidence collected at least a year earlier, so hardly applicable to Florida in 2003. In any case, inefficient rates do not imply supported rates. On Dr. Mayo on "cross-subsidy", see footnote 7 above. Dr. Mayo also provides no support for his view that the proposed rebalancing "unequivocally 'removes support for basic local telecommunications services' in Florida... Thus, it is quite clear that the statutory requirement of removing support for basic local services will be met by the plan described in the ILECs' petitions" (Mayo Direct, p. 11, lines 11-12 and lines 16-17).

A. As a general matter, the Commission should not rely on the unsubstantiated 1 2 opinion of an expert. An expert should provide a foundation for his/her conclusion.9 Neither Mr. Fonteix nor Dr. Mayo have provided any evidence to 3 support a finding that residential BLTS is subsidized or supported.<sup>10</sup> The material 4 5 presented by Dr. Mayo and Mr. Fonteix on these points adds nothing to what was said by the ILECs' witnesses. In particular, their testimony does not show 6 7 residential BLTS rates are currently priced below total service long run 8 incremental cost.

9

10 Q. You say that Dr. Mayo and Mr. Fonteix provide no evidence for their 11 positions on whether BLTS is subsidized or supported. Is it possible that 12 Dr. Mayo and Mr. Fonteix relied on the results submitted by the ILECs?

A. It is possible but would contradict AT&T's view of the relevant economic costs. AT&T has routinely asserted, for example, in unbundled network element (UNE) dockets, that ILEC evidence overstates costs and have argued that the true economic cost of service is lower than the costs estimated by regulatory Commissions. AT&T has also contended that the same cost estimates should be used for determining the cost of basic telephone service.<sup>11</sup> In this case, the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> I have shown the residential BLTS is not subsidized: Direct Testimony of Dr. David J. Gabel on behalf of the Office of Public Counsel for the Florida Public Service Commission, October 31, 2003, *passim*.

ILECs used UNE prices to estimate the cost of BLTS. If AT&T was to rely on the ILECs' total element long run incremental cost (TELRIC) estimates it would imply to me that either it is reversing its position regarding what is the economic cost of service or that AT&T will select a number that rationalizes its position in a particular case. In any case, AT&T should not rely on TELRIC studies since they include shared costs (as pointed out in my direct testimony).<sup>12</sup>

7

## Q. Has AT&T provided the Commission with its estimate of the 9 economic cost of the loop?

A. Yes. for example in docket PSC-01-1181-FOF-TP, AT&T estimated the costs as ranging from \$5.25 to \$34.24 for BellSouth's service level 2 loops. If we take AT&T's loop estimate for the lowest cost zone, \$5.25, and add on the cost of switching, transport, and retail incremental costs (approximately \$3.00) we get a cost estimate of \$8.25 that is significantly less than the ILECs' TELRIC-based

<sup>12</sup> Gabel Direct, at p. 11, lines 8-10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> AT&T sponsored the Hatfield Model in DOCKET NO. 960833-TP, order released December 31, 1996. The Commission order in that proceeding notes that the proponents of the Hatfield Model "purport that the model develops forward-looking network investments and costs for unbundled network elements and basic local exchange service." *Id.* Furthermore, AT&T has regularly argued that the economic cost of service is lower than the rates proposed by the ILECs and established by the Commission. See, for example, in docket PSC-01-1181-FOF-TP, AT&T contended that the economic cost of a loop was in the range of \$6.76 to \$8.00, or approximately one-half the rate established by the Commission. Table A, May 25, 2001 If a subsidy analysis was done by AT&T using what it has represented is the correct economic cost of service, it would have estimated that the cost of providing BLTS that was lower than the values identified by the ILECs. This, in turn, would have reduced the likelihood of a finding that residential service is supported or subsidized.

estimate for the lowest cost zone of (approximately) \$20.<sup>13</sup> This is also less than
 residential BLTS charges of \$20.24. Therefore, it is unclear how Dr. Mayo
 concludes that BLTS is supported.

4

5 Q. Perhaps Dr. Mayo's endorsement of raising BLTS rates is based on 6 his belief that it is appropriate to raise residential rates to make up for any 7 ILEC access revenue loss?

A. I would be surprised if that was his view. In a recent Massachusetts
proceeding, Dr. Mayo stated that it would be "unjust and unreasonable" to link
access price reductions with an offsetting increase in the price of basic
residential service.<sup>14</sup>

12

13 Q. Perhaps AT&T believes that when testing for the existence of a 14 subsidy or the degree of support it is appropriate to use UNE rates to 15 prevent a price squeeze?

A. AT&T's witnesses claim that BLTS is subsidized or supported. The economic test for determining if BLTS is subsidized involves comparing the <u>ILEC's BLTS price with the ILEC's total service long-run incremental cost for</u> BLTS. A price squeeze test is irrelevant to determining the existence of a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> The difference between the BellSouth cost estimate and the \$8.25 value is only partially attributable to retail costs.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Verizon – Massachusetts, Price-Cap Regulation, Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy, DTE 01-31, Phase II, Department of Telecommunications and Energy, October 24, 2002, Vol. 3, pp. 290-293.

subsidy because the price squeeze test involves consideration of the <u>CLEC's</u>
costs, rather than the <u>ILEC's</u> costs. It is the ILEC's costs that are of relevance in
this proceeding because of the legislative requirement to consider the degree to
which ILEC rates are subsidized or supported.

5

6

7

8

2.2 Dr. Mayo And Mr. Fontiex Do Not Provide A Coherent Explanation Or Evidence As To Why The Proposed Rebalancing Would Induce CLEC Entry

9

10 Q. Please summarize Dr. Mayo and Mr. Fonteix views on the impact of 11 current and rebalanced prices on entry. What is your view of their 12 positions?

A. Both Dr. Mayo and Mr. Fonteix contend that current prices prevent entry,<sup>15</sup> and that the proposed rebalancing will lead to more entry.<sup>16</sup> However, their arguments are moot to the extent that they rely on the rebalancing moving BLTS rates from below TSLRIC to above it (since there is no record evidence that BLTS is priced below TSLRIC).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Mayo Direct, p. 12, lines 4-6; pp. Fonteix Direct, p. 2, lines 19-23, p. 3, lines 1-11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Mayo Direct, p. 11, lines 19-23, p. 12, lines 1-8, p. 14, lines 1-4, and p. 18, lines 3-5; Fonteix Direct, p. 5, lines 8-13, p. 7 lines 4-9 (note the provided example in this last case shows entry prior to, rather than caused by, access rate reductions), and p. 7, lines 14-16; implicit in p. 2, lines 19-23, p. 3, lines 1-11.

Further, despite arguing that retail telecommunications firms increasingly, and indeed necessarily, must compete through the supply of bundles,<sup>17</sup> neither Dr. Mayo nor Mr. Fonteix discuss the impact of rebalancing on revenues a CLEC might earn in bundling local long distance service and any other services, let alone total revenues a CLEC could expect to earn, including revenues from intra-LATA access charges.

7

Yet, such revenues, most importantly, total revenues from the broad range of a CLEC's operations would not be significantly changed because the proposed rebalancing is required to be revenue neutral and intra-LATA access charge savings must be passed on in retail long distance prices.<sup>18</sup> Consequently, from the perspective of expected total profitability, the proposed rebalancing will not have a substantial impact on entry incentives.<sup>19</sup>

14

I also note that Mr. Fonteix's presents evidence from other states that he claims shows that the proposed rebalancing would lead to more entry.<sup>20</sup> However, the evidence he presents has little if any bearing on this question. No meaningful conclusions can be drawn by comparing different states and/or time periods

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> For example, see Mayo Direct, p. 12, lines 18-22; Fonteix Direct, p. 2, line 23, p. 3, line 1; p. 5, lines 17-21, p. 6, line 1; p. 8, lines 12-13; and implicitly at p. 12, lines 18-20. Staff also take this view, for example, see footnote 63 below.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> For example, see Gabel Direct, Section 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> These comments apply specifically to Mayo Direct, p. 11, lines 19-23, p. 12, lines 1-8 and lines 18-21, p. 15, lines 1-14; references for Fonteix are as in footnote 17 above.

1	without an adequate statistical analysis that controls for the factors that differ
2	from state to state and from one period of time to the next. <sup>21</sup>
3	
4	It is also odd that AT&T would represent that high access fees are harmful to the
5	CLECs when the CLECs have typically supported high access fees,22 and the
6	FCC has had to issue orders requiring the CLECs to lower their access fees.23
7	
8	Q. Have Dr. Mayo and Mr. Fonteix added any arguments on entry not
9	adduced by the ILECs' witnesses? If so, please indicate your view of
10	these.
11	A. Yes, Dr. Mayo and Mr. Fonteix raise some lines of reasoning not made by
12	the ILECs' witnesses, in particular that:
13	
14	<ul> <li>efficient entry may be precluded due the difference between the ILECs'</li> </ul>
15	physical cost of supply of intra-LATA calls and its access prices for the
16	same; and
17	<ul> <li>the prospect of anti-competitive behavior on the part of the ILECs.</li> </ul>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Fonteix Direct, pp. 12-13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> See Gabel Direct, Section 5, especially pp. 67-69.

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 22}$  Discussed below, on pp. 8 and also footnotes 103 and 104.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> FCC 01-146 (CC docket Number 96-262), Seventh Report And Order And Further Notice Of Proposed Rulemaking, Adopted: April 26, 2001 (Released: April 27, 2001).

•

2 On the first matter, Dr. Mayo makes two points. First, he thinks that high intra-LATA access rates mean CLECs "face asymmetrically higher costs" than the 3 ILEC,<sup>24</sup> making it impossible for CLECs to press price to actual cost, but only to 4 their perceived cost, the intra-LATA access rate.<sup>25</sup> Secondly, Dr. Mayo argues 5 that high intra-LATA access rates make it impossible for the CLEC to bundle 6 7 retail services, and in particular offer very low priced retail intra-LATA calls competitively with the ILEC, since the CLECs are said to face intra-LATA access 8 9 prices that exceed the incremental cost of supplying intra-LATA calls, so the ILEC's costs are lower than the CLEC's.<sup>26</sup> Mr. Fontiex expresses a similar view.<sup>27</sup> 10 11 12 Both of these arguments are wrong for two reasons:

13

14 1. CLECs earn as well as pay termination charges.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, the intra-

LATA termination charge incurred by the CLEC will on average net out-

15

<sup>24</sup> Mayo Direct, p. 13, line 2.

<sup>25</sup> Mayo Direct, p. 12, lines 22-23, p. 13, line 1-10.

<sup>26</sup> Mayo Direct, p. 13, lines 11-23 and p. 14, line 1.

<sup>28</sup> The argument here also applies to origination charges for recipient pays calls.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> "[E]xcess access charges further depress competition by limiting competitors' ability to compete across the full range of service categories," Fonteix Direct, p. 2, lines 21-22 (but see also 19-20). As with Dr. Mayo, Mr. Fonteix's argument is that higher intra-LATA access charges force competitors to charge higher retail rates for such calls, but that the ILECs do not incur such costs, so can compete at much lower prices, especially through bundles (Fonteix Direct, p. 2, line 23, p. 3, lines 1-11; on how undoing this alleged source of a price squeeze is said to improve outcomes see p. 5, lines 8-13, and p. 7, lines 14-16).

so long as calls are reasonably random, even a very small network's outbound traffic will match in bound traffic—but even if they do not, net payments will be substantially less than gross payments and a very small proportion of the CLEC's total costs. As a result, moderately high termination charges do not represent a high total cost, most especially one that could prevent make bundling, even with very low or even zero rates on retail calls, unprofitable.

8

2. While the termination rate, being a real marginal cost to the CLEC, is 9 10 relevant to the CLEC's retail pricing decision, this will not prevent the CLEC from bundling with low rates on retail calls, if this is what the market 11 demands (as both Mayo and Fonteix suggest).<sup>29</sup> Competitive markets 12 13 often set rates above or below marginal cost as is necessary, most especially (but not necessarily) on "gateway" goods, such as retail line 14 rentals,<sup>30</sup> and on items supplied as part of a bundle (for example, BLTS as 15 16 part of a bundle with long distance service).<sup>31</sup> In these circumstances, the relevant cost to the supplier is, respectively, the cost of the gateway and 17 18 the expected cost of products bought through the gateway ("such as caller

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> See footnote 17 above.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Shafer uses the term (Shafer Direct, p. 8, line 10) and defines at lines 11-15. The relevant quote is reproduced below on p. 8, where I also discuss pricing in this context.

	ID to set the top of the top of the top to the top of
1	ID, long distance service, or dial-up Internet access"), <sup>32</sup> or the bundle. In
2	short, the cost of the bundle should be compared with its revenues.
3	
4	2.3 AT&T's Position On Price Setting In This Case Is Inconsistent With
5	Dr. Mayo's Own Testimony As Well As How AT&T Sets Its Own
6	Prices In Competitive Markets
7	
8	Q. Dr. Mayo argues regulated prices should be reflective of prices in
9	competitive markets. <sup>33</sup> What are your views on this?
10	A. An important aspect of my earlier testimony was the view, "that
11	rebalancing, if it occurs, should result in prices that reflect the operations of a
12	competitive market, rather than prices that are sustainable due to a lack of
13	competition." <sup>34</sup> Dr. Mayo takes a very similar stand:
14	
15	"it is important to note that price regulation is a substitute for rates
16	set by competitive market forces. That is, economists commonly
17	recommend that the rate setting exercise should, insofar as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> For a more general discussion on goods that complement others, see Gabel Direct, Section 4.3, pp. 61 ff. Note such bundles typically rendered profitable by a hefty monthly charge and high marginal prices for call minutes beyond a certain level.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Shafer Direct, p. 8, lines 13-14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Mayo Direct, at p. 7, lines 14-17.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Gabel Direct, at p. 11, lines 8-10.

possible, try to establish rates that mimic the rates that would be set by competitive market forces."35

3

1

2

Q. In your view are Dr. Mayo's recommendations—that residential BLTS prices should not be subsidized<sup>36</sup> (recognizing you have shown that residential BLTS is not subsidized) and that usage prices, such as intra-LATA access charges, should be set to exactly cover their LRIC<sup>37</sup> consistent with prices that would emerge due to competitive market forces?

10 A. No. As I noted in my testimony, it is common in competitive markets for 11 prices, such as those for residential BLTS, to be kept low, sometimes even below 12 their long run incremental cost (LRIC), and for usage charges to be set above 13 LRIC to recover subsidies, where they occurred, and make any necessary 14 contribution to fixed costs.<sup>38</sup>

15

16 This is well evidenced by AT&T's own pricing behavior in competitive mobile 17 telecommunications markets. For example, AT&T typically offers free and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Mayo Direct, at p. 7, lines 14-17.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> See, for example, Mayo Direct, p. 14, lines 17-19, p. 15, lines 1-14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Mayo Direct, p. 20, lines 8-11: "The relevant target, however, for the establishment of competition-enabling intrastate switched access charges in Florida is the economically efficient rate as approximated by incremental cost."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> For example, because of the gateway nature of the service—see footnote 30 above, and more generally footnote 31.

1	heavily subsidized mobile telephone handsets to new subscribers, thereby
2	pricing handsets below their incremental cost. On 9 November 2003, AT&T
3	offered three different handsets for free to new subscribers. <sup>39</sup> Mobile firms also
4	typically offer handsets at below cost prices, even when a price is charged. For
5	example, the AT&T cited web page that offers the Nokia 3560 handset for free
6	indicates its normal price is \$99.99. However, if bought directly from Nokia, the
7	handset is priced at \$139.99.40 In either case, it is likely that AT&T prices the
8	handset well below its LRIC. <sup>41</sup> Of course, AT&T expects, on average, to recover
9	the cost of such discounts through subsequent usage charges which exceed the
10	incremental cost of supplying that usage.

11

12 Q. Please comment on Dr. Mayo's views on the right level for intra-LATA

## 13 and inter-LATA access rates.

14 A. Dr. Mayo concludes his testimony:

15

<sup>16</sup> "My understanding is that interstate access charge rates continue

- be set at rates that exceed the economic cost of providing access.
- 18 The relevant target, however, for the establishment of competition-

http://www.attwireless.com/personal/products/phones.jhtml;dsessionid=KOY5BO1NV4SB3B4R0 GZSFFA?titleNumber=2& requestid=75073.

<sup>40</sup> http://www.nokiausa.com/phones/3560.

enabling intrastate switched access charges in Florida is the economically efficient rate as approximated by incremental cost."42

3

1

2

4 Such a conclusion cannot be reached, as Dr. Mayo does, by merely comparing 5 price to incremental cost. Rather, total earnings of the ILEC must be considered. 6 as well as evidence on demand elasticities. A competitive carrier, to be 7 successful in the long run, must cover its costs. In telecommunications, costs 8 include a substantial fixed component,<sup>43</sup> which pricing at incremental costs would 9 not cover. Consequently, service prices typically must exceed their long run 10 incremental cost. In a competitive market, carriers would be pressured to ensure 11 the necessary mark-up over long run incremental cost minimizes harm to their consumers. In particular, mark-ups would be made taking account of firm level 12 13 demand elasticities. As I have indicated,<sup>44</sup> this typically implies, for example, low prices on "gateway" services such as line rentals. 14

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Since the retail price is \$139.99, this is the opportunity cost to AT&T, which does not manufacture the handset, but could resell it at the retail rate.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Mayo Direct, p. 20, lines 7-11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> See, for example, on loop costs, FCC, 03-36 (Triennial Review Order), Report And Order And Order On Remand And Further Notice Of Proposed Rulemaking, February 20, 2003 (released August 21, 2003), paragraph 205.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> See footnote 30 above, and more generally, including the case of bundling, see footnote 31.

1	3 Staff Witness Mr. Shafer On Legislative Intent, Entry And Bundled And
2	Long Distance Rates
3	
4	3.1 The Legislation In No Way Presumes BLTS Is Supported
5	
6	Q. Can you comment on Mr. Shafer's views on the theoretical
7	underpinnings/premises of the Act?
8	A. Yes. Mr. Shafer claims, without evidence, that:
9	
10	"the theoretical underpinnings of the statute are that the cost/price
11	relationships for intrastate access charges and basic local service
12	rates are seriously misaligned. More simply put, the Legislature
13	subscribed to the notion that access charges subsidize basic local
14	rates, or that access charge rates far exceed cost and basic local
15	service rates are on average below cost."45
16	
17	and that:
18	

<sup>45</sup> Shafer Direct, p. 7, lines 5-11.

-

1	"The premise under which the Legislature passed the Tele-
2	competition Act is that basic local service rates are subsidized by
3	intrastate access charges."46
4	
5	The Act, however, appears agnostic on this, directing the Commission to
6	consider rebalancing more favorably if it were to "remove current support for
7	basic local telecommunications services (BLTS) that prevents the creation of a
8	more attractive competitive local exchange market for the benefit of residential
9	customers; [and] [i]nduce enhanced market entry."47
10	-
10 11	3.2 Mr. Shafer Takes No View As To Whether BLTS Or Residential
	3.2 Mr. Shafer Takes No View As To Whether BLTS Or Residential BLTS is Supported
11	
11 12	
11 12 13	BLTS is Supported
11 12 13 14	BLTS Is Supported Q. What are Mr. Shafer's views on whether BLTS is priced below cost or
11 12 13 14 15	BLTS Is Supported Q. What are Mr. Shafer's views on whether BLTS is priced below cost or otherwise supported and does he provide any evidence on the question?

- <sup>46</sup> Shafer Direct, p. 16, lines 6-8.
- 47 Section 364.164 (1) (a) and (b).

1	direct	or implied comments on whether residential BLTS is subsidized. My direct
2	testin	nony demonstrates that the available evidence indicates that residential
3	BLTS	is not cross-subsidized. <sup>48</sup>
4		
5	3.3	Mr. Shafer Is Incorrect In Asserting That If BLTS Was Priced Below
6		Cost This Would Necessarily Discourage Entry
7		
8	Q.	What are Mr. Shafer's views on entry if BLTS was priced below cost
9	and c	to you agree with these views?
10	Α.	Mr. Shafer incorrectly believes that:
11		
12		"To the degree that basic local service rates are below cost, that is
13		a significant deterrent to market entry for that particular service."49
14		
15	And t	hat:
16		
17		"The challenge of making a profit in a market in which a key product
18		is priced below cost is clearly a deterrent to entry."50

48 Gabel Direct, passim.

<sup>49</sup> Shafer Direct, p. 6, lines 11-14.

<sup>50</sup> Shafer Direct, p. 6, lines 23-24. Shafer repeats these views in many places—see p. 6, lines 18-21, and lines 23-25, continued on p. 8, line 1, p. 9, lines 5-12, p. 10, lines 2-5, and p. 11, lines 13-17. Mr. Shafer is not correct that prices in a competitive market cannot be below cost, most especially on, in Shafer's words, a "gateway good".<sup>51</sup> As Mr. Shafer points out:

6 "Many products cannot be viewed in isolation, and I believe basic 7 local exchange access is one of those services. Basic local 8 exchange service is a gateway product... it provides access to an 9 array of other products or services that cannot stand alone or have 10 no value without local exchange access. For example, services 11 such as caller ID, long distance service, or dial-up Internet access 12 are unavailable to consumers without local exchange service."<sup>52</sup>

13

1

In such cases, it is common for prices to be below cost without
 discouraging entry.<sup>53</sup> As Shafer puts it:

16

"The profitability of these other services ['such as caller ID, long
distance service, or dial-up Internet access'] also plays a role in the
market entry decision. This phenomenon also explains why some

<sup>51</sup> Shafer Direct, p. 8, line 10.

<sup>52</sup> Shafer Direct, p. 8, lines 8-15.

,

<sup>53</sup> As per discussion above associated with footnotes 30 and 31 (at p. 14).

residential competition persists even in light of the evidence that
 basic local exchange service on its own is priced below cost on
 average."<sup>54</sup>

4

I add that residential BLTS is not subsidized based on my review of the data presented by the ILECs.<sup>55</sup> Consequently, even if Mr. Shafer were right that a subsidy prevents entry (and he is not), entry into residential BLTS would not be discouraged in present day Florida based upon the record evidence.

10

Moreover, on the question of entry, in Shafer's words, "the primary factor for a competitor to consider is whether they will be profitable in the foreseeable future in any particular market".<sup>56</sup> Yet, profitability of entry is not significantly changed by a revenue neutral price adjustment, thus the proposed rebalancing provides little or no incentive for increased entry.

16

17 Finally, even if the proposed rebalancing increased the profitability of

18 entry, it does not automatically follow that new entry will occur. Given

<sup>55</sup> Gabel Direct, *passim*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> Shafer Direct, p. 8, lines 23-25, continued on p. 9, lines 1-2. The quote in square brackets is from p. 8, lines 13-14.

- sunk costs and other entry barriers, even higher profits may still be too low
   to result in significant new entry.
- 3

4

## Q. Did Mr. Shafer present evidence to support proposition that

- 5 current rates are a significant deterrent to market entry?
- A. No, he did not. However, as I discuss below (1) Knology, Inc. in its SEC
  filings, does not list this as an impediment of entry or expansion;<sup>57</sup> (2) as is also
  the case for CLECs in a survey conducted by Staff;<sup>58</sup> and (3) CLECs generally
  consider lower access rates, even in return for higher BLTS charges, as having a
  negative impact on their profits.<sup>59</sup>
- 11

## 12 Q. Does any other evidence from Staff provide insights into the drivers

- 13 of CLEC entry?
- 14 A. Yes, the 2002 "Competition Report" sponsored by Staff witness, Ms.
- 15 Ollila, is relevant, and even more so, the "2003 Competition Report,"<sup>60</sup> containing
- 16 similar, but more recent evidence.

- <sup>57</sup> See below pp. 8 ff. and footnotes 94 and 95.
- <sup>58</sup> See below pp. 8 ff. and footnote 96.
- <sup>59</sup> See below pp. 8 ff. and footnotes 103 and 104.

<sup>60</sup> Florida Public Service Commission's, Office of Market Monitoring and Strategic Analysis, "Telecommunications markets in Florida: Annual Report on Competition as of June 30, 2003", revised draft, October 27, 2003; <u>http://www.psc.state.fl.us/general/publications/reports.cfm</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> Shafer Direct, p. 7, lines 1-3. Note the question asked was, "What would be the basis for competitors choosing to enter markets they had previously elected not to enter?" (p. 6, lines 24-25).

1 2 Q. Please summarize the 2002 Competition Report discussion of drivers 3 of CLEC entry. Α. 4 The report's section on entry begins with the views of the regulatory 5 commissions from the two states with the most CLEC entry. New York and Texas: 6 7 "The New York Commission stated that its ALEC market share may 8 9 have been the result of the introduction of the UNE Platform... and 10 the FCC's decision to allow Verizon to operate as a long distance 11 carrier in New York (271 approval)... 12 "The Texas Commission provided several reasons for its relatively 13 high ALEC market share: prevalence of UNE-P, 271 approval..., 14 15 existence of a standard, 4-year interconnection agreement..., 16 performance measures, uniform state-wide municipal right-of-way 17 compensation, and building access regulation."61 18

<sup>61</sup> Competition Report, p. 25.

1 These are the only reasons given by the New York and Texas 2 Commissions that the Report cites. In particular, neither Commission is 3 cited as mentioning low BLTS rates.

4

5 The authors of the Florida Competition Report conclude that CLEC entry 6 tends to rise with 271 approval, larger margins between UNE prices and 7 retail prices, and lower differences in UNE rates across zones.<sup>62</sup>

8

9 It is the view of the OPC that these factors are important, but with an 10 important caveat on the margin between retail and UNE rates: the 11 appropriate margin should be measured by a comparison of total revenues with the total cost of entry.<sup>63</sup> For example, retail supply through 12 13 purchase of UNE-P entitles the supplying carrier to access charges and 14 these must be accounted for. Consequently, a fall in access charges accompanied by a revenue neutral rise in BLTS rates is unlikely to have a 15 substantial positive impact on the profitability of UNE-P entry.<sup>64</sup> 16

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> Competition Report, pp. 25-26. Discussion is provided in pp. 26 ff. The 2003 Competition Report provides lists 10 factors that impact on CLEC entry decisions, including most of those already mentioned (pp. 13-14).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> This is recognized in the Report—"This analysis also does not include any additional margins that competitors could obtain by selling long distance and ancillary services such as voice mail, caller ID, call waiting, etc." (p. 29)—but not discussed in further detail, and is recognized more explicitly in the 2003 Competition Report—"Both ILEC and CLEC business plans depend on the average subscriber purchasing more than basic local service" (p. 18). For more on OPC's view that a broad view of entry decisions must be taken, see pp. 8 ff. (Section 2.2) above.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> See below pp. 8 ff. and footnotes 103 and 104.

1 2 Q. Does the Competition Report present any evidence about actual CLEC entry in Florida? 3 4 Α. Yes, and this evidence strongly suggests that 271 approval and the 5 availability of UNEs at affordable rate are central to CLEC entry decisions. 6 The Report indicates that important reductions in UNE rates occurred in May and October 2001, and then in September 2002.65 At the time of 7 8 writing the Report, only pre-September 2002 data was available, but on 9 that basis, the Report concludes: 10 11 "the May and October 2001 rate changes have had a dramatic effect on the Florida market. The number of UNE-P lines in service 12 in BellSouth's territory grew more than 259%."66 13 14 You indicated evidence that is more recent was available in the 2003 15 Q. Competition Report. Please summarize that evidence as it is relevant to 16

the level of entry.

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 65}$  Competition Report, p. 34, especially Table 8; the change in May see p. 35.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> Competition Report, pp. 35-36, including Figures 14-16. My direct testimony also concluded that recent line growth had surged, and also attributed this to lower UNE prices (Gabel direct, pp. 41-42).

A. Substantial CLEC entry in Florida continued—"switched based lines…
 grew 34%… in the 2002-2003 reporting period."<sup>67</sup> In BellSouth's six major
 markets, CLEC penetration rates were 18%, 24%, 26%, 27%, 28%, and 28%.<sup>68</sup>

- 4
- 5 **Q.**

### A. Please comment on these rates.

A. Several comments are relevant here. First, rapid growth in entry is hardly evidence of entry failure. Second, this rapid growth is no doubt in part explained by the September 2003 UNE rate reductions which left UNE-P prices at levels less than BLTS rates alone, that is, before accounting for other revenue sources.<sup>69</sup> Third, entry and market expansion decisions in telecommunications take substantial time. As a result, increased entry due to the September 2002 changes will continue well beyond the impact reported at June 2003.

13

Q. You have indicated the 2003 Competition Report showed rapid rates
 of growth in entry levels. Did it contain any relevant evidence on the mix of
 entry?

A. Yes. Even more striking than the rapid levels of entry, were three aspects
of the mix of entry:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup> 2003 Competition Report, p. 20; more generally see pp. 20 ff.

<sup>68 2003</sup> Competition Report, p. 23, Table 9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> 2003 Competition Report, p. 18.

(1) "[F]acility-base carriers have mainly targeted metropolitan areas,"<sup>70</sup> a trend 1 unlikely to be significantly impacted by the proposed rebalancing.<sup>71</sup> 2 3 (2) Entry occurred to a much greater extent in BellSouth territory than in areas 4 serviced by Verizon and Sprint.<sup>72</sup> For example, whereas CLECs have 5 penetration rates 18-28% in the major markets served by BellSouth's 6 7 exchanges, they only have 6-18% of Verizon's markets, and 11% of 8 Sprint's.73 9 (3) "UNE-P only comprises 3% of CLEC lines in Verizon's territory and only 10 5% in Sprint's," but 48% of BellSouth lines.<sup>74</sup> 11 12 13 Q. Is it likely that the ILECs' petitions, on their own, would change the mix of entry? 14 15 Α. No, not at all. The petitions are intended to be revenue neutral, so they would have a very limited impact on the relative attractiveness of entry into one 16

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> 2003 Competition Report, p. 21; see also p. 15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> David Gabel, "Why is There So Little Competition in the Provision of Local Telecommunications Services? An Examination of Alternative Approaches to End-User Access," <u>MSU-DCL Law</u> <u>Review</u>, 2002, 651-670.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> 2003 Competition Report, pp. 22 ff.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> 2003 Competition Report, p. 23, Table 9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> 2003 Competition Report, p. 16.

- ILEC's market over another's. They would also have little impact on the choice
   of UNE-P over other means of entry.
- 3

# Q. Does the 2003 Competition Report suggest any likely causes of the sharply different rates entry into different ILEC territories?

A. Yes. The 2003 Competition Report explains the difference in CLEC entry rates in a manner similar to the New York Commission:<sup>75</sup> the availability UNEs at reasonable prices and the 271 process appear to be crucial to CLEC entry.<sup>76</sup> For example, the Florida Commission has only recently set UNE prices for Sprint and Verizon, and the Verizon rates have been stayed by a court order, while the Sprint rates only just came into effect, so have not yet affected penetration rates,<sup>77</sup> though ten new entrants now operate in Sprint territory.<sup>78</sup>

13

#### 14

#### Q. What is the OPC's view of this question?

A. The OPC concurs that the chief causes of CLEC entry in Florida have
 likely been the 271 process,<sup>79</sup> and the availability of permanent cost-based UNE
 prices at levels that make profitable entry feasible. As a consequence, it is likely

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> See p. 8 above.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> 2003 Competition Report, pp. 14-16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> 2003 Competition Report, p. 16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> 2003 Competition Report, p. 18.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> In part because it forces inter-exchange carriers to compete through bundles, and in part because the ILEC, in seeking the right to retail long distance services in its own territory, provides a range of competitive guarantees, including UNE availability.

1	that entry will continue in the BellSouth territories, and likely will grow in Sprint's
2	areas of operation. Entry in Verizon's territory, however, may remain stalled
3	while UNE prices are a matter of court proceedings.
4	
5	Q. Can you discuss Mr. Shafer's views on bundled service offerings,
6	and pricing of long distance services, especially by wireless carriers?
7	A. Yes. Mr. Shafer claims:
8	
9	"achieving parity between intrastate access charges and interstate
10	access charges will lead to more competitively priced bundled
11	service offerings for residential consumers, which will provide
12	benefits to those consumers whose calling patterns match those
13	offerings." <sup>80</sup>
14	
15	And later that:
16	"it is likely that there will be a significant number of residential
17	consumers that will see benefits in expanded choice and new and
18	innovative services."81
19	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> Shafer Direct, p. 13, lines 5-9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> Shafer Direct, p. 14, lines 11-14.

1 He also says that "a *significant number* of residential consumers... will see

- 2 benefits in expanded choice and new and innovative services."82
- 3

4

### Q. In your view, does Mr. Shafer support these strong claims?

5 A. The only explanation Mr. Shafer offers for these claims seem 6 related to wireless competition in long distance supply pressing down long 7 distance rates and leading to lower wireline bundle prices.<sup>83</sup> Two points 8 should be made here:

9

 The statute requires that retail long distance suppliers pass on any reductions in intra-LATA access rates implemented in the proposed rebalancing. Therefore, assuming the law is appropriately implemented, no competitive pressure from wireless carriers is necessary for long distance rates to be lowered.

15

It may be that competition among wireless providers provides some link
 between total wireless firm revenues and costs. But the impact of
 Florida's rebalancing on long distance prices, or bundled telephony prices
 in wireless, let along for the somewhat more distant substitute, wireline
 services, is likely to be quite small. Wireless pricing plans apply to wide

<sup>82</sup> Emphasis added. Shafer Direct, p. 14, lines 11-14.

<sup>83</sup> Shafer Direct, p. 13, lines 10-25, continued on p. 14, lines 1-6, and 15-24.

geographic areas, often at the national level. Consequently, lowering
 intra-LATA access rates in Florida are likely to have only a limited impact
 on prices of such plans.

4

5 Similarly, the price of wireless service is for a bundle of products—for 6 example, as per Shafer, "the pricing strategy employed by wireless 7 carriers... treats long distance minutes the same as local minutes"—so the 8 effect would be further diluted.<sup>84</sup>

9

In this light, Mr. Shafer provides no evidence for proposing that "a *significant number* of residential consumers... will see benefits in expanded choice and new and innovative services,"<sup>85</sup> and indeed, admits that he doubts "that all residential consumers affected by the proposed rate changes will experience the benefits of increased competition and additional service offerings"<sup>86</sup> It is OPC's view that better evidence than this is required to show consumers will benefit from the proposed rebalancing.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup> Shafer Direct, p. 14, lines 4-6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup> Emphasis added. Shafer Direct, p. 14, lines 11-14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> Shafer Direct, p. 14, lines 9-11.

- 1 4 A Rebuttal Of The Testimony Of Mr. Boccucci, Jr.
- 2
- 4.1 Mr. Boccucci, Jr. Claims The ILECs' Petitions Will Increase
   Competitive Entry, But Provides No Material Evidence For This,
   And What He Says Is Inconsistent With Public Statements From
   Knology, Inc.
- 7
- 8 Q. Can you summarize Mr. Boccucci, Jr.'s testimony?

9 A. Yes, Mr. Boccucci, Jr., in his own words, presents "the position of Knology 10 of Florida, ("Knology"), a competitive local exchange carrier, in support of the 11 petitions subject to this proceeding."<sup>87</sup> He concludes:

12

13 "Knology believes that the grant of these petitions will remove 14 current support for basic local telecommunications services that 15 prevents the creation of a more attractive competitive local 16 exchange market for the benefit of residential consumers, will 17 induce enhanced market entry and will create more capital 18 investment and provide more employment in the State of Florida."<sup>88</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>87</sup> Boccucci Jr. Direct, p. 1, lines 7-9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup> Boccucci Jr. Direct, p. 11, lines 7-11.

1 Q. Does Mr. Boccucci, Jr. show that that BLTS or residential BLTS are 2 supported?

A. No. Mr. Boccucci, Jr. nowhere demonstrates that BLTS or residential
BLTS are supported. Moreover, I have shown that the record evidence indicates
that residential BLTS is not subsidized.<sup>89</sup> Consequently, Mr. Boccucci, Jr.
conclusions, which I quote in my answer to the preceding question, not only are
not demonstrated, but do not follow as a matter fact.

8

9 Q. Can you please highlight what you think is the central reason why 10 you found no support of residential BLTS in contrast to the ILECs that 11 found support (as also claimed by Mr. Boccucci, Jr.)?

A. Yes. The basic reason for the difference between my estimates and those of the ILECs was the treatment of shared costs. The ILECs inappropriately included, in their BLTS costs estimates, costs shared by business and data services.

16

Q. Does Knology, Inc. provide any insights into the treatment of shared
 costs and hence of the proper way to test for support or subsidy?

A. Yes, it does. For example, the following quote is consistent with economic theory (and my position), but not the ILECS' cost studies; nor does it

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> Gabel Direct, passim.

support Knology's claims that BLTS is supported. It states that shared costs
 should not be allocated when evaluating the profitability of a service:

3

4 "While management of the Company monitors the revenue 5 generated from each of the various broadband services, operations 6 are managed and financial performance is evaluated based upon the delivery of multiple services to customers over a single network. 7 As a result of multiple services being provided over a single 8 9 network, many expenses and assets are shared related to various broadband services 10 providing the to customers. Management believes that any allocation of the shared expenses or 11 assets to the broadband services would be subjective and 12 impractical."90 13

14

Q. What else did Mr. Boccucci, Jr. have to say on what would induce
 entry?

17 A. Mr. Boccucci, Jr. testified that "Knology believes that Florida Statue 18 364.164 creates the framework to promote facility-based local exchange 19 competition",<sup>91</sup> that Knology, Inc. invests where the regulatory environment is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> Knology, Inc., 10-Q report, September 30, 2003, p. 8, http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1096788/000119312503070040/d10g.htm.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> Boccucci Jr. Direct, p. 2, lines 16-17.

favorable (which given its prior investment in Panama City,<sup>92</sup> presumably included the State of Florida) and that "[i]f these petitions are granted, Knology will be able to attract and deploy new capital investment in Florida, thereby offering consumers a choice in facilities-based providers for new and advanced high-tech services."<sup>93</sup>

6

Q. Is Mr. Boccucci, Jr.'s testimony on entry consistent with the
 information Knology, Inc. supplies to investors in its 10-K reports?

9 A. No. In discussing impediments to entry, Knology, Inc. provided a range of 10 difficulties that would adversely affect its operations.<sup>94</sup> None of these include too 11 high access rates, too low BLTS rates, or existing legislation in any state. 12 Similarly, none of these matters were raised in discussing difficulties in growing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> Boccucci Jr. Direct, p. 2, lines 21-23, this investment was made prior to June 2001 (see <u>http://www.knology.com/news/index.details.cfm?pkey=128).</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup> Boccucci Jr. Direct, p. 9, lines 17-19.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>94</sup> Knology, Inc., 10-K report, December 31<sup>st</sup>, 2002, p. 23. http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1096788/000093176303000824/d10k.htm:

<sup>&</sup>quot;We may encounter difficulties expanding into additional markets, which could adversely affect our results of operations.

<sup>&</sup>quot;To expand into additional cities we will have to obtain pole attachment agreements, construction permits, franchises and other regulatory approvals. Delays in entering into pole attachment agreements and in receiving the necessary construction permits and in conducting the construction itself have adversely affected our schedule in the past and could do so again in the future. Further, as we are currently experiencing in Louisville, we may face legal or similar resistance from competitors who are already in these markets. For example, a competitor may oppose or delay our franchise application or our request for pole attachment space. These difficulties could significantly harm or delay the development of our business in new markets."

1	the company that would harm its operations.95 Nor were these matters raised in
2	Staff discussion of a survey of CLECs on impediments to entry. The top four
3	concerns of CLECs, ranked starting with the often cited, were UNE rates,
4	interconnection agreements, service outages and billing. <sup>96</sup>
5	
6	Q. Does Mr. Boccucci, Jr. provide any evidence for his assertions on
7	entry that you cite?
8	A. Knology claims it was motivated by the Act to invest in Florida through the
9	purchase of "Cable and Data Asset (Verizon Media) in Pinellas County,"97 but
10	provides no evidence to this effect, except for the timing of that purchase.
11	·
12	Q. Mr. Boccucci, Jr. testified that on entry by Knology "incumbent
13	providers upgrade their networks implement new products and price
14	reductions and increase the level of customer service and marketing to

- successfully implement our strategy;
- evaluate markets;
- secure financing;
- construct facilities;
- obtain any required government authorizations; and
- hire and retain qualified personnel."

<sup>96</sup> 2003 Competition Report, p. 56-57, including Figure 26.

<sup>97</sup> Boccucci Jr. Direct, p. 3, lines 9-11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>95</sup> Knology, Inc., 10-K report, December 31<sup>st</sup>, 2002, p. 25. http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1096788/000093176303000824/d10k.htm.:

<sup>&</sup>quot;Our ability to grow will depend, in part, upon our ability to:

# compete with Knology." Does this indicate that the proposed rebalancing will lead to CLEC entry?

A. No, it does not. This is a standard result of competitive entry, but provides
no indication of whether the proposed rebalancing encourages entry.

5

Q. Mr. Boccucci, Jr. testified that Knology actively bundles "voice,
 video and data services"<sup>98</sup> and provides "advanced or new services."<sup>99</sup>
 Does this indicate that the proposed rebalancing promotes bundling and
 advanced or new services?

A. No. According to Mr. Boccucci, Knology currently bundles and offers such
 services in Panama City, Florida<sup>100</sup> where it has been operating since at least
 June 2001,<sup>101</sup> so these decisions can hardly have been a result of the Act.
 Similarly, Knology's parent, Knology, Inc. provides these kinds of services in
 number of other locations outside of Florida,<sup>102</sup> that is, in jurisdictions where the
 Act does not apply.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>98</sup> Boccucci Jr. Direct, p. 5, lines 13-15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>99</sup> Boccucci Jr. Direct, p. 5, lines 19-23, continued on p. 6, lines 1-10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>100</sup> Boccucci Jr. Direct, p.5, lines 13-23, continued on p. 6, lines 1-10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>101</sup> <u>http://www.knology.com/news/index.details.cfm?pkey=128</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>102</sup> Boccucci Jr. Direct, p. 4, lines 10-12.

Office of Public Counsel

Q. You indicated that Mr. Boccucci, Jr. claims that rebalancing will be 1 2 helpful to facility-based entrants. Were you surprised by Mr. Boccucci, Jr. 3 testimony and if so why? Α. Yes, I was surprised. Access rate reductions have been perceived to be 4 not in the best financial interest of many CLECs.<sup>103</sup> Indeed, this is Knology's own 5 position in its 10-K report to the Securities and Exchange Commission: 6 7 8 "Access Charge Reform. The FCC is in the process of reducing access charges imposed by local telephone companies for 9 10 origination and termination of interstate long distance traffic. Overall decreases in local telephone carriers' access charges as 11 contemplated by the FCC's access reform policies would likely put 12 downward pricing pressure on our charges to domestic interstate 13 and international long-distance carriers for comparable access. 14 Changes to the federal access charge regime could adversely 15 affect us by reducing the revenues that we generate from charges 16 to domestic interstate and international long-distance carriers for 17 originating and terminating traffic 18 interstate over our 19 telecommunications facilities."104

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>103</sup> FCC 01-146, paragraph 27; Gabel Direct, p. 57-58, which cites Pre-Filed Testimony of F. Wayne Lafferty on Behalf of Cox Connecticut Telecommunications, L.L.C. given on June 3, 2003.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>104</sup> Knology, Inc., 10-K report, December 31<sup>st</sup>, 2002, p. 19, <u>http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1096788/000093176303000824/d10k.htm.</u>

- 1
- 2 Q. Does this conclude your testimony?
- 3 A. Yes.