1	BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION			
2				
3	In the Matter of			
4	PETITION BY VERIZON FLORIDA DOCKET NO. 030867-TL INC. TO REFORM INTRASTATE	İ		
5	NETWORK ACCESS AND BASIC LOCAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS RATES IN			
6	ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 364.164, FLORIDA STATUTES.			
7	PETITION BY SPRINT-FLORIDA, DOCKET NO. 030868-TL			
8	INCORPORATED TO REDUCE INTRASTATE SWITCHED NETWORK			
9	ACCESS RATES TO INTERSTATE PARITY IN REVENUE-NEUTRAL			
10	MANNER PURSUANT TO SECTION 364.164(1), FLORIDA STATUTES.			
11	PETITION FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF DOCKET NO. 030869-TL			
12	SECTION 364.164, FLORIDA STATUTES, BY REBALANCING RATES			
13	IN A REVÉNUE-NEUTRAL MANNER THROUGH DECREASES IN INTRASTATE			
14	SWITCHED ACCESS CHARGES WITH OFFSETTING RATE ADJUSTMENTS			
15	FOR BASIC SERVICES, BY BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.			
16	FLOW-THROUGH OF LEC SWITCHED DOCKET NO. 030961-TI			
17	ACCESS REDUCTIONS BY IXCs, PURSUANT TO SECTION 364.163(2),			
18	FLORIDA STATUTES.			
19	/			
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22	THE .PDF VERSION INCLUDES PREFILED TESTIMONY.			
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25	PROCEEDINGS: HEARING			

FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

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1	BEFORE:	
2		CHAIRMAN LILA A. JABER COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON
3		COMMISSIONER BRAULIO L. BAEZ COMMISSIONER RUDOLPH "RUDY" BRADLEY COMMISSIONER CHARLES M. DAVIDSON
4		COMMISSIONER CHARLES M. DAVIDSON
5	DATE:	Wednesday, December 10, 2003
6	TIME:	Commenced at 11:29 a.m.
7		
8	PLACE:	Betty Easley Conference Center
9		Betty Easley Conference Center 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 148 Tallahassee, Florida
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11	REPORTED BY:	MARY ALLEN NEEL, RPR
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APPEARANCES:

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The Florida Legislature, 111 West Madison Street, Room 812, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1400, appearing on behalf of the Office of Public Counsel.

RICHARD CHAPKIS, ESQUIRE, Verizon Florida Inc., 201 N. Franklin Street, FLTC0007, Tampa, Florida 33602, appearing on behalf of Verizon Florida Inc.

JOHN FONS, ESQUIRE, and MAJOR HARDING, ESQUIRE, Ausley Law Firm, P.O. Box 391, Tallahassee, Florida 32302, and SUSAN MASTERTON, ESQUIRE, Sprint-Florida, Incorporated, (MCFLTLH00107), P.O. Box 2214, Tallahassee, Florida 32316-2214, appearing on behalf of Sprint-Florida, Incorporated.

CHARLES REHWINKEL, ESQUIRE, Sprint-Florida, Incorporated, P.O. Box 2214, Tallahassee, Florida 32316-2214, appearing on behalf of Sprint Communications Company Limited Partnership.

NANCY WHITE, ESQUIRE, R. DOUGLAS LACKEY, and MEREDITH E. MAYS, BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., c/o Ms. Nancy H. Sims, 150 South Monroe Street, Suite 400, Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1556, appearing on behalf of BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.

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on behalf of the Office of the Attorney General.

HARRIS ANTHONY, BellSouth Long Distance, Inc., 400 Perimeter Center Terrace, #350, Atlanta, Georgia 30346-1231, appearing on behalf of BellSouth Long Distance, Inc.

GEORGE MEROS, ESQUIRE, Gray, Harris & Robinson, P.O.Box 11189, Tallahassee, Florida 32302, appearing on behalf of Knology of Florida, Inc.

TRACY HATCH, ESQUIRE, Messer Law Firm, 101 North Monroe Street, Suite 700, Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1549, appearing on behalf of AT&T Communications of the Southern States.

DONNA C. McNULTY, ESQUIRE, Messer Law Firm, 1203
Governors Square Blvd., Suite 201, Tallahassee,
Florida 32301-2960, appearing on behalf of MCI
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FLOYD SELF, ESQUIRE, and GARY EARLY, ESQUIRE, Messer Law Firm, P.O. Box 1876, Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1876, appearing on behalf of AT&T Communications/MCI WorldCom.

APPEARANCES CONTINUED:

MICHAEL B. TWOMEY, ESQUIRE, P.O. Box 5256,
Tallahassee, Florida 32314-5256, appearing on behalf
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Association.

PATRICIA CHRISTENSEN, ESQUIRE, BETH KEATING, ESQUIRE, LEE FORDHAM, ESQUIRE and FELECIA BANKS, ESQUIRE, FPSC General Counsel's Office, 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850, appearing on behalf of the Commission Staff.

PROCEEDINGS

CHAIRMAN JABER: All right. We're going to go ahead and get started with the evidentiary portion of the hearing. Staff counsel, please read the notice.

MS. KEATING: By notice issued November 17, 2003, this time and place have been set for a hearing in Docket Nos. 030867, 030868, and 030869, and 030961. The purpose is as set forth in the notice.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you.

If there are any conversations in the back of the room, I respectfully request that you all take them outside. We are about to start the evidentiary portion of the hearing.

And with that, let's take appearances.

MS. WHITE: Nancy White on behalf of BellSouth Telecommunications. Also appearing on behalf of BellSouth is Doug Lackey and Meredith Mays.

MR. CHAPKIS: Richard Chapkis on behalf of Verizon.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I'm sorry. Let back up. Nancy White, Doug Lackey.

MS. WHITE: And Meredith Mays, M-a-y-s.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Go ahead.

MR. CHAPKIS: Richard Chapkis on behalf of

1 | Verizon.

2 | CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you.

MR. FONS: John P. Fons of the Ausley law firm on behalf of Sprint-Florida. Also appearing with me is Susan Masterton of Sprint, and also appearing with me today is former Chief Justice Major Harding with the Ausley law firm.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you.

MR. BECK: Harold McLean, Rick Mann, and Charlie Beck, Office of the Public Counsel, appearing on behalf of Florida's citizens.

ATTORNEY GENERAL CRIST: Charlie Crist,
Attorney General, appearing on behalf of the people of

MR. TWOMEY: Madam Chairman and
Commissioners, Mike Twomey appearing on behalf of
AARP, Common Cause Florida, and Sugarmill Woods Civic
Association, Inc.

MR. MEROS: Commissioners, George Meros on behalf of Knology of Florida, Inc.

MR. EARLY: Gary Early of the law firm of Messer, Caparello & Self, appearing on behalf of AT&T of the Southern States and MCI. I would also like to enter an appearance for Floyd Self, also with the firm of Messer, Caparello & Self, also appearing on behalf

of AT&T and MCI.

MS. McNULTY: Donna McNulty appearing on behalf of MCI WorldCom Communications, Inc.

MR. HATCH: Tracy Hatch appearing on behalf of AT&T Communications of the Southern States, LLC.

MR. REHWINKEL: Madam Chairman, I've already entered an appearance, but Charles Rehwinkel on behalf -- appearing in this phase on behalf of Sprint Communications Company Limited Partnership.

MR. ANTHONY: And Harris Anthony on behalf of BellSouth Long Distance.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Give me your first name one more time.

MR. ANTHONY: It's Harris, H-a-r-r-i-s.

MS. KEATING: Beth Keating, Patricia
Christensen, Felecia Banks, and Lee Fordham, appearing
on behalf of the Commission.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you. Are there other appearances that need to be made?

Ms. Keating, it's my understanding that there are several preliminary matters that this Commission should entertain this morning, and let me make sure that we have all of them before we get started. I've got as the first preliminary matter the joint motion of Verizon, Sprint, and BellSouth seeking

reconsideration or clarification of the Prehearing 1 2 Officer's Second Order Modifying Procedure. MS. KEATING: That's correct. 3 CHAIRMAN JABER: And it looks like we have 4 responses to that filed by Public Counsel. 5 MS. KEATING: Yes, Madam Chairman, that is 6 7 the only response. CHAIRMAN JABER: And we have a request for 8 oral argument related to that same motion. 9 MS. KEATING: That's correct. 10 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. And, parties, if 11 you think you filed something and I haven't stated it, 12 13 you need to go ahead and interrupt me and let me 14 know. We have AARP's motion for reconsideration 15 of Order 03-1331, with Citizens' similar motion for 16 17 reconsideration of that order. MS. KEATING: That's correct. 18 19 CHAIRMAN JABER: We have responses from 20 Verizon, Sprint, and BellSouth in opposition to those motions. 21 We have notice of General Crist joining in 22 the Citizens' motion for reconsideration. 23 MS. KEATING: That's correct. 24 CHAIRMAN JABER: We've got the Attorney 25

1 General's Motion for Summary Final Order, with a 2 joinder filed by AARP, Citizens' joinder. I have 3 BellSouth's response to the Attorney General's motion, Verizon's response to that motion, AT&T MCI's response 4 5 to that motion, Sprint's response to that motion. MS. KEATING: That is correct. 6 7 CHAIRMAN JABER: We have a Request for Official Notice filed by AARP. I thought I had a 8 9 response to that. I do. I have a response filed by Verizon, Sprint, and BellSouth in opposition to that. 10 MS. KEATING: That's correct. 11 12 CHAIRMAN JABER: And I have a joint motion by Verizon, Sprint, and BellSouth to strike portions 13 of witness Cooper's direct testimony. 14 15 And, Mr. Twomey, I don't have a response to 16 that motion from you. He's your witness; right? 17 MR. TWOMEY: Yes, ma'am, that's correct. 18 We oppose it, of course. 19 CHAIRMAN JABER: But you don't have a 20 written response; right? MR. TWOMEY: No. I think the -- I don't. 21 22 I'm trying to think. I think that came in just -- if 23 this is Wednesday, it may have come in Monday or

CHAIRMAN JABER: It did. I just wanted to

yesterday. I'm not sure.

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make sure if there was a written response.

MR. TWOMEY: No, ma'am, there's not, but we oppose it and would like to speak against it, of course.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioners, with your indulgence, what I would like to do is take up the Request for Official Notice first, because we have the request. I've read that, and the response. Frankly, I'm ready to rule on that.

I would like to start there and get that procedural motion out of the way and then take up next the motion to strike testimony, because, frankly, I'm ready to rule on that as well. And my ruling as it relates to the request for official recognition, after reading both the motion and the response, is to grant the request for official recognition. To be very clear, it's transcripts of the floor debates of the Florida Senate and Florida House surrounding their respective passage of Senate Bill 654 and House Bill 1903.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Madam Chair, I would like to comment also. I think that ruling is very well supported by Rule 90.803(8) relating to public records and reports, which rule provides that records, reports, and statements reduced to writing of

public offices setting forth the activities of the office are admissible. And I think that that provides additional good guidance for your ruling on that. What's sought here is clearly, at a minimum, statements reduced to writing of a public office, namely, the Florida Legislature, and I think we will be well advised to take official notice of those.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Commissioner

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Commissioner Davidson.

Mr. Twomey, I heard you say you opposed the motion to strike portions of Mr. Cooper's direct testimony. I consider that your response to the motion. And having considered your response and the original motion, my ruling is to deny the joint motion by Verizon, Sprint, and BellSouth to strike the witness's testimony.

MR. TWOMEY: Thank you, Madam Chair.

MS. WHITE: Madam Chair --

CHAIRMAN JABER: I don't need oral argument, Ms. White.

That takes us, Commissioners, to the motions for reconsideration. And I would note, Commissioners, that there is a request for oral argument, and frankly, this one I want to open up for full Commission discussion. I think that that's

appropriate, the motions for reconsideration and the motion for summary order.

Staff has suggested to me, and I agree, that the first motion for reconsideration should be the one that seeks reconsideration or clarification of the Prehearing Officer's Second Order Modifying Procedure. I've asked staff to make sure that you have copies of those motions and those responses. I hope by now that you do and that we are ready to entertain oral argument.

And in that regard, companies, without having to put a time limit on you or the respondents to the motion, I would just ask simply that you stay to the point, make your arguments, try not to repeat yourself, and we'll get started with that.

Sprint, are you going to make the argument first?

MR. FONS: Major Harding will make the argument for Sprint, Verizon, and BellSouth.

MR. HARDING: Madam Chairman and members of the Commission, thank you for the opportunity to be here.

I speak first to this motion of the petitioners for reconsideration or clarification of that order reflecting additional docket issues. And I

1 think in speaking to that motion, I also speak to all 2 of the pleadings, including the motions of the 3 Attorney General for summary final order. 4 The Legislature has set forth --5 CHAIRMAN JABER: I'm sorry. Let me make 6 sure I understand. You want to go ahead and address both motions? 7 8 MR. HARDING: In effect, the first three 9 motions fall within the scope of the same argument, 10 and so if you permit, I will just speak to all three 11 of them at the same time. 12 CHAIRMAN JABER: You know, I'll leave that 13 choice up to you all, but I will tell you that we will 14 entertain each motion in terms --15 MR. HARDING: Certainly. 16 CHAIRMAN JABER: -- of the vote separately. 17 MR. HARDING: That will be --18 CHAIRMAN JABER: And if the parties choose 19 not to take the approach, if you do all choose to 20 address each motion separately, I'll allow that as 21 well. 22 MR. HARDING: Thank you very much. 23 CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Chapkis, you had 24 something to say? 25 MR. CHAPKIS: Yes. I just wanted to make

clear that Justice Harding is speaking on Verizon's behalf with respect to this motion, but with respect to the Attorney General's summary judgment motion, Verizon would like to be heard separately.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay.

MR. HARDING: Thank you. I had the privilege of being here earlier and hearing some of the testimony offered to you today concerning the rate increases for local service and that these increases may be offensive to many. It may be appealing to consider these concerns, and that they express the will of the people, and that they should govern your decision-making. It may also be appealing to consider that my friend, the Attorney General, has come here on behalf of the individual consumers, and thus that he expresses the will of the people.

Determining the will of the people has been a troublesome issue since the beginning of our country. Our founders struggled with it in developing our form of government, and they determined that the Legislature would be the best way to express the will of the people. They had lived under the domination of a monarch who did not give them the opportunity to effectively express their will otherwise.

These legislative bodies are elected by the

people, and they have traditionally provided the opportunity for concerns of the people to be expressed for and against ideas under consideration.

However, when all is said and done, the Legislature expresses the will of the people, and it does so in the form of statutes. And unless those statutes violate some constitutional provision, the legislation stands. And we've lived together in this great land and in this great state for many years in freedom and liberty because decision-making bodies such as this Commission have followed the rules of law as expressed by the Legislature which has been elected by the people. The rule of law governs us. We do not settle our disputes with tanks in the streets or determining who has the biggest Army, nor do we heed the clamor that is oftentimes governed or contributed to these decision-making processes.

A bill was pending before the Florida

Legislature. There were committee hearings. There
were debates on the floor of the chambers considering
a bill, and a bill was passed and signed by the
Governor, and it became law. Like it or not, the
Legislature governing your consideration does not
indicate that your decision should be made only
because individual customers will bear an increased

cost in local service. The legislation is clear, and you have set out previously in your orders that you

3 understand this, what you are to consider.

The Legislature has said you must determine whether the reduction in rate -- access rates will,

(a) remove current support for basic local services that prevents the creation of more competitive local exchange market for the benefit of residential customers; secondly, will it enhance -- induce enhanced market entry, and on and on.

The statute is clear. It is unambiguous. It does not lend itself to any other interpretation. And the testimony before committees and the debate on the floor of the legislative bodies cannot be used to create ambiguity or uncertainty.

And we suggest that it is for that reason that you should reconsider the order adding issues to the docket and delete those items. They do not relate to the statutory considerations that you are required to make in this determination. And for the same reason, we think you should also deny Public Counsel's and AARP's motion to reconsider your order denying their motion to dismiss.

In your order, you acknowledged that the language of the statute is clear and that under

principles of statutory interpretation, the Commission does not look further, need to look further to divine the Legislature's intent. You've correctly determined that motion to dismiss should fail for that reason, and therefore, we suggest that the motion of Public Counsel and AARP to reconsider that order should be denied.

In a like manner, the Attorney General's Motion for Summary Final Order indicates that the Commission should summarily rule against the petitioners because the petitions and records indicate residential consumers will be forced to shoulder additional cost for local telecommunications services without receiving any corresponding benefit. This is not a determination that should be made according to the statute. The determination is whether there will be more competitive local exchange market for the benefit of residential consumers and whether the change will induce enhanced market entry.

Not only is the motion based on an incorrect premise, but the record reflects that there is abundant evidence from the testimony, interrogatories, and the depositions that have been filed which point out that there is benefit to the customers consistent with the statutory requirement.

There is also evidence in the record to address all of these concerns, and therefore, a summary final order would not be appropriate, and the motion should be denied.

I think it should also be pointed out that not only is there a great deal of evidence from the Commission -- for the Commission to consider, but that the motion of the Attorney General is legally insufficient. Your own decisions have pointed out that there must be two prerequisites for summary judgment. First, there must be no genuine issue of material fact, and second, one of the parties must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the undisputed facts.

Our response to the Attorney General's motion contains numerous citations that set forth the requirement of a motion for summary judgment, and we feel like the motion does not live up to those requirements and thus should be denied.

The Attorney General, bottom line, disagrees with the statute and would like for you to rewrite the statute, and I respectfully submit that you do not have that privilege. I also respectfully suggest that the Motion for Summary Final Order should be denied and that this matter should proceed to be

resolved on the merits with the evidence presented. 1 2 Thank you very much. 3 CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Justice 4 Harding. 5 Ms. White, Verizon said that the Justice spoke on their behalf. Do you have a separate 6 presentation, or was he speaking on your behalf? 7 8 MS. WHITE: No, Justice Harding spoke on BellSouth's behalf on all three motions. 9 CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you. And let's see. 10 who has filed a response? Citizens' response. 11 12 Mr. Mann. 13 MR. MANN: Thank you, Chairman Jaber. This is Rick Mann for the Public Counsel's Office. I 14 15 am going to address solely the joint motion at this 16 time. 17 I think one comment to make on counsel's argument about the clarity of the language of this 18 19 statute I will get into in a little more detail, but I would have to say up front that flat out the lack of 20 21 clarity of the wording, particularly of subsection (1), subsection (a), stands out I think very clearly. 22 23 At the Commission's November 3 agenda 24 conference, the Commission determined that the subject

matter of Docket 030961 should be concurrently

considered with the ILECs' petitions in their consolidated dockets. The Commission also determined at that agenda conference that it lacked sufficient information upon which to base a decision in any of the respective dockets in front of it, and consequently, all four dockets were consolidated.

The companies are arguing in their joint motion that the issues that the Prehearing Officer has brought into the consolidated docket for the ILECs, Issues No. 6 through 10, are beyond the scope of these dockets, that the Commission lacks a statutory foundation to consider these issues, that the Prehearing Officer overlooked or failed to consider a point of law in rendering his order, and that the Prehearing Officer's order imposes additional criteria for the ILECs to prove up pursuant to the statute, which expands the Commission's delegated legislative authority.

The Citizens believe that the Commission should reject in its entirety the companies' motion. The Prehearing Officer followed the directive of the Legislature. He was provided a clear statutory foundation for this Commission to consider Issues No. 1 through 11. The five issues complained about by the companies impose no additional criteria onto those

listed in Section 364.164(1). And the inclusion of these issues will not cause the Commission to act beyond its delegated legislative authority. The Prehearing Officer has not overlooked or failed to consider any point of law in issuing the second procedural order, which follows the guidance of these Commissioners during the agenda of November 3, as well as its Order No. 1240, which consolidated the dockets.

Notwithstanding counsel's argument, the companies in their motion have boldly asserted that the only consideration that the Commission -- I'm sorry. The only consideration by the Commission beyond the elimination of support of basic service rates in a revenue-neutral manner is consideration of whether reduction of the access rates will induce enhanced market entry. That's it. The only consideration is elimination of support of basic service rates in a revenue-neutral manner and whether reduction of the access rates will induce enhanced market entry, nothing about benefits whatsoever. Benefit to the companies is a given.

The Citizens contend that this assertion is flat wrong. What the companies seek is to impose constraints upon this Commission and the regulatory process that would shield from public view the

relevant and critical issues that must be investigated by this Commission. The statute clearly provides that the Commission shall consider whether granting the petition will benefit the residential customers.

At the November 3 agenda, the Commission made clear the importance of the Legislature's requirement that the ILEC petitions must result in a benefit to residential customers, as well as the necessity that the Commission receive sufficient evidence that that requirement will be met before the Commission may, if the other requirements of the petition are met, grant any of those petitions. The Commission highlighted the critical nature of establishing the ILECs' petitions will either or not create a benefit for residential customers, and also highlighted the close association of access charge reductions with the creation of this benefit.

The Citizens acknowledge that Chapter 364.163 limits the Commission's authority to influence the decisions of the IXCs, and the Prehearing Officer has acknowledged this limit by providing Issues, not criteria, No. 6 through 10, as guidelines for the IXCs, not directives.

Concomitantly, these issues are designed to gather information in this consolidated docket, to

gather evidence of and enlighten the Commission about the intentions of the IXCs in flowing through the access charge reductions. A determination as to whether residential customers will actually derive the benefit of toll reductions as a result of the access reductions that are bestowed upon the IXCs is crucial to the Commission's decision to grant an ILEC's petition.

The Commission's authority to consider Issues No. 6 through 10 is inherent in Chapter 364.164(1), in light of the key importance expressed by the Legislature in that statute, finding there to be in the ILECs' rebalancing plans a resultant benefit to residential customers. Contrary to the ILECs' assertion, Nos. 6 through 10 are essential to the Commission's ability to make its obligatory finding in Section 364.164(1)(a), to find out what benefits may come to residential customers from the access charge reductions.

The Prehearing Officer has not ignored a legislative directive on what issues must be considered. In fact, the Prehearing Officer has carefully followed both the directive of the statute, as well as the resolution of the full Commission and the ensuing Order 1240 that memorialized that

resolution of this Commission.

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The companies assert that the clarity of the legislative directive is further illustrated by comparing the language of last year's bill, themselves looking at legislative history. Last year's bill, Committee Substitute for House Bill 1683, outlined the findings the Commission was required to make in deciding to grant a petition for rate rebalancing. The companies argue that in that 2002 bill, the Legislature granted authority to the Commission to determine whether an ILEC plan would result in benefits to toll customers. They argue that this grant of authority has been eliminated in the new But the removal of that criterion (f) from statute. the 2002 bill regarding toll customers does not remove the grant of authority for the Commission to investigate the full parameters of what, if any, assurances of benefit to residential customers the ILECs' plans contain.

what the Legislature actually did in its clarification of that 2002 bill was to remove a secondary item of focus, toll customers, many of whom would not be paying for the reduction in access charges through any increase in their basic local rates. For example, many of them may be multi-line

big business customers who will not be saddled with any increase in basic rates.

The new statute pointedly refocuses the attention of this Commission on residential rates specifically. It also enhances that criterion itself through its new word edition and arrangement providing for the removal of any subsidy that would itself prevent the creation of a more attractive competitive local exchange market for the benefit of residential customers. This -- it seems obvious the Legislature's desire is for the Commission to grant a rebalancing plan only if it is demonstrated by evidence that there is a current subsidy for the residential basic local service, and only if that subsidy then is demonstrated to prevent a more competitive local exchange market, and then, if so, that that plan benefits residential customers.

Notwithstanding the companies' arguments to the contrary, they themselves have indicated that they recognize the importance of demonstrating that their residential customers will benefit from their rebalancing plan. Attached to my response to the joint motion is an executive summary issued by BellSouth that is directed to the new act. This document that was obtained by the Citizens through

discovery addresses the proposed ILEC petition.

BellSouth itemizes six, not the four, but six

individual criteria that the Commission must find that
the petitions will achieve before the Commission may
grant the petitions. Indeed, BellSouth understands
and makes very clear that, quote, this bill clearly
gives the PSC the authority to deny petitions if any
of the above criteria are not met.

Item B of those six criteria, the second one which the Commission must find, asserts that a petition must benefit residential customers. That criterion stands alone. It has no connection to any specific market, local or long distance. In other words, the clarity that was achieved in the new statute from the old bill is that the Commission is charged with ensuring that residential customers are not just penalized with higher basic local rates by the ILECs' rebalancing plans, but rather that they are also benefited by those plans.

It is insufficient for the ILECs to posit with an assumed air of authority that customers will benefit because IXCs are required to reduce their intrastate long distance revenues by the amount necessary to return the benefits of such reduction to both its residential and business customers. That

statement alone does not comprise the evidence that this Commission must have before granting the Commission's (sic) petition. The ILECs have presented no evidence of any benefits that will flow to residential customers due to the increase in their respective residential basic local rates.

For the Commission to fulfill its statutory obligation to the residential customers, the Commission must track the path of the ostensible flow-through of the access charge reductions to the residential recipients of those flow-through reductions. At that November 3 agenda, the Commission made clear the urgency and the necessity of doing so.

Contrary to the companies' assertion, the Prehearing Officer has not modified this proceeding to dictate how reductions will benefit certain customers. Rather, with the issues identified in his second procedural order, he has appropriately provided the mechanism by which the Commission may use its available delegated legislative authority to gather sufficient evidence to determine whether the ILECs' plans will in fact benefit residential customers.

The companies' arguments that the

Prehearing Officer has positioned the Commission to

exercise an ultra vires act by exceeding its

legislative authority are unfounded. The Prehearing Officer has not added to the criteria listed in 364.164(1) to be considered by the Commission. The Commission will not be second-guessing the findings of the Legislature. They will instead be diligently following the directive of the Legislature to actually determine what granting the petitions would provide in the way of benefits to residential customers.

For those reasons, the Commission should deny in its entirety the companies' joint motion for reconsideration.

Thank you, Commissioners.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Mr. Mann.

Commissioners, do you have any questions of the parties or of staff, or a motion?

Again, this is on the joint motion of the companies to seek reconsideration or clarification of the Prehearing Officer's Second Order Modifying Procedure.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Madam Chair, a motion to deny the joint motion for reconsideration.

CHAIRMAN JABER: There's a motion to deny.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Second.

CHAIRMAN JABER: And a second. All those in favor say aye.

(Simultaneous affirmative responses.)
 CHAIRMAN JABER: The motion carries
 unanimously. Thank you, Commissioner.

The next motion I have is the AARP motion for reconsideration of Order No. PSC-03-1331.

Mr. Twomey, the same request of you all. I won't establish a time certain for oral argument. I would ask that you not repeat anyone and be concise in your delivery.

MR. TWOMEY: Thank you, Madam Chairman.

I'll be extremely brief. Actually, I would probably be briefer if I followed Mr. Beck on his motion.

The problem with the order -- and perhaps we haven't got the title correct in the motion, whether it's a motion for reconsideration, or a motion to have the order reflect the actual Commission vote, or I think as suggested by some of the companies, a motion to clarify the order.

The problem is, and what we would seek to have you address is the fact that there are conclusions reached in the order that the consuming parties believe weren't warranted by the discussion at the agenda conference and the discussion leading up to the vote.

The first is the conclusion that the

reference or reliance to the legislative history. I think as Mr. Mann said, the fact that that language is unclear should be obvious by the very reading it, which is "remove current support for basic local telecommunications services that prevents the creation of a more attractive local exchange market for the benefit of residential consumers." I'm not an English major. I'm not sure what modifies what in that.

Irrespective of what I think, the position of the AARP is that the language is ambiguous at best. And if it's ambiguous, then the Commission has the right, and indeed the obligation, to consider evidence from the Legislature that would evidence their intent of what's intended by the statute.

Now, you've already ruled that the three transcripts of the three floor debates can be recognized, and we appreciate that and think that's the correct ruling.

But more importantly, we didn't hear any discussion amongst the Commissioners in the agenda conference in the debate that led to this order that discussed clarity of the statute. In fact, in conjunction with the second finding in the order that the impact on the residential consumers as a result of

1 in-state toll reductions weren't connected, the passages I've in my motion quoted from Commissioner 2 Deason, and then seconded apparently by Commissioner 3 4 Baez, seem to reflect just the opposite, which is to say that they considered, and I believe Commissioner 5 6 Davidson considered, and I believe Chairman Jaber considered it as well, even though she was on the 7 losing end of the vote, that you all considered, those 8 9 of you that spoke to it, that whether or not there 10 would be benefits to the residential consumers flowing 11 from the reductions that the IXCs had to make was a 12 viable issue, not one that many of you thought was a 13 sufficient basis on which to dismiss the companies' cases, but that, as Commissioner Deason said 14 repeatedly, and I think all of you did, that it was a 15 16 matter of burden of proof.

And if you found it was a matter of burden of proof that should be addressed at hearing, then you necessarily, in my view, didn't decide that it was not an issue. And if you intended it be an issue at this hearing, then the conclusions that are reached in the order are, in my opinion, contrary to your vote.

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And the last point again, or the first point, you didn't discuss in any place at the agenda conference that you thought that the issue on the

clarity of the statute was such that it was clear that it didn't require reference to the legislative floor debates or any other indication of legislative history.

So I would ask you to find that the order

so I would ask you to find that the order needs to be corrected to reflect your true vote. You all know what you intended, but what you intended as seen by the transcript seems to be contrary to what was reflected on those two points in the order.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Mr. Twomey.

Mr. Beck, you filed a motion for reconsideration a few days before Mr. Twomey, so if you have oral argument you would like to make in that regard, let's go ahead and take that up, and then I'll come back to the Attorney General's Office and then allow the companies to rebut.

MR. BECK: Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Mr. Mann will be addressing that motion.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Go ahead, Mr. Mann.

MR. MANN: Thank you, Chairman Jaber.

I second the comments made by Mr. Twomey and emphasize that indeed our rights have been affected by the order as it is written.

And let me read the pertinent part of that

order which concerns us and why we filed the move -the motion, rather, for reconsideration. And it's not a clarification. It's -- we believe the order flatly states something that this Commission did not decide at that agenda. The pertinent language in that is found at page 11 of the order, and the Commission addresses that for our consideration, we do not -- the statute does not direct the Commission, the statute being 164(1), to consider how the ILECs' proposals will affect the toll market for the benefit of residential consumers. Instead, the plain language states that consideration should be given to whether granting the petitions will. And then subsection (a) is cited there, with an emphasis added to "that prevents the creation of a more attractive local exchange market for the benefit of residential consumers."

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The order goes on to state that as such, the relevant market for use in making the final determination on these petitions is the local exchange market. Thus, we find that for purposes of 364.164, consideration of the impact on the toll market and resulting impact on toll customers is not required for the Commission's full and complete determination of the petitions.

Now, we recognize there's a footnote
there, number 3 at the bottom. "In reaching this
conclusion, we do not find that we are precluded from
such consideration. Rather, we conclude only that we

are not required to do so."

Well, looking at the transcript, and having been here in person to begin with and listening to the discussions going on at the agenda conference on November 3rd of 2003, I have affixed to the motion for reconsideration what I believe is the pertinent portion, and that is pages 54 to 66, Item 4A.

The final keynote section of that regards page 64, and a question very pointedly asked by Commission Deason after very much deliberation had taken place over the issue. Commissioner Deason says, "Staff, you're not making any interpretation as to the amount of discretion" -- "on," I believe -- "on the reading of the terminology benefit of residential consumers as it relates to whether this should or should not be dismissed. That's a matter which we are going to ultimately address, but you are not making any recommendation on that at this point. So if I vote to approve staff's recommendation, that issue remains open."

And staff counsel replies, "That's correct,

Commissioner. We have tried very hard to make sure that we are not prejudging any issues."

Now, pages 54 through 64 do reflect comments by Commissioner Deason, as well as comments by, of course, the Chair, Commissioner Jaber, who, as Mr. Twomey points out, was the only nay vote in this vote. But Commissioner Baez and Commissioner Davidson also voiced respectively their agreement with Commissioner Deason's concern.

Let me pull to page 57 of that transcript, the attachment to your motion. Chairman Jaber on line 6 says, "Well, it seems to me the general discretion is how it gets allocated in terms of percentages between residential and consumers, and perhaps the discretion the IXCs have relates to where the specific rates in the residential bill and in the consumer bill will be reduced."

Commissioner Davidson says on line 14, "I mean, you're reading my mind on this, and this does get into number 5 a bit, but a follow-up on one of your answers to the Chairman's question. If we have the discretion to make sure that the flow-through is in an amount necessary to return the benefits of such reduction to both its residential and business customers, and you say we have that discretion, if we

have that discretion, then don't we also have a fiduciary obligation to, to the extent possible, reflect the intent of the legislation in exercising that discretion?"

Now, Mrs. Keating says, "Commissioner, again, I think that's an argument that you can certainly make. I just feel obligated, though, to point out that that language as stated actually says that the IXCs may determine the specific rate. But again, that's not to say that the argument that you make isn't a viable one."

Commissioner Davidson on page 58, line 4, says, "No, I understand that. As I sit here, I have to tell you I don't think there was one member who voted for this bill who thought that 90 percent of the benefit would go to large business customers and 90 percent of the burden would go to individual customers. They just didn't think that when they were talking about their parents not having bill increases, and they were talking about the customers. So I was comforted by your general statement that we do have the discretion to address at some broad level that allocation, and then what perhaps is the best way of doing that we'll have to take up."

On page 62, actually, at the bottom of 61,

Commissioner Baez -- I'm sorry. Let me start at page 61, Commissioner Deason, line 1, saying, "Let me say where I am. I agree with much of what you said, Madam Chair," in lines preceding, "but I cannot reach the conclusion that we need to dismiss the petitions that are in front of us. And the reason for that, to me, is one of burden of proof. Now, we all know that there are criteria set out in 164(1)(a) through (d).

"In (a), there is language which refers to benefit of residential customers. I'm a little bit concerned with the very narrow interpretation the incumbent LECs are taking of that particular provision. I would point out to them that they have a burden to meet, and it may behoove them to look at that a little bit more broadly to make sure they meet their burden. And they may have to get that information, provide it to this Commission that we need from the IXCs, who also want to see these petitions granted.

"But, Madam Chair, while I share in your frustration and share with you that the information is needed for us to make -- to exercise whatever discretion we have, and we have not determined how much we have, how much discretion we have as of yet, but it falls down to the burden. I don't think we can

dismiss the petitions at this point. We may very well deny them after the hearing because the burden's not been met, but that's their burden."

Commissioner Baez then, back to what I originally started with, responds to that on line 24, "Commissioner Deason, I guess I'm hung up on the same thing you are in part. Something I said earlier is that this motion to dismiss, at least in my mind, has placed one of those ultimate questions squarely before us as to what we consider to be benefits. And to decide one way -- certainly to decide in favor of the motion to dismiss, in my mind, would answer that question, which I believe is better left as part of the entire case."

The expressed will of the Commissioners on the record was that their votes not be interpreted as to the reading of the terminology "residential consumers" as it relates to whether they should or should not be dismissed. Ms. Keating explicitly answered to Commissioner Deason on the record, "That's correct, Commissioner. We have tried very hard to make sure that we are not prejudging any issues."

Nevertheless, the language that I cited earlier is contained in that order.

The Citizens contend that a point of fact

and possibly of law was overlooked in the issuance of Order 1331, as demonstrated by the transcript portion attached to this motion. In fact, an issue does appear to have been prejudged, that is, the benefit to residential consumers.

The Citizens have been adversely affected by this order, as evidenced by now all three of the petitioners' responses to the AG's Motion for Summary Final Order, which suggests that Commission Order 1331 has been interpreted to have already determined and circumscribed prior to hearing, contrary to the will and the votes of the Commissioners at agenda, the meaning of "for the benefit of residential consumers."

And I'll also point out that the response that I received late last night to our motion for reconsideration from the three ILECs once again has said in paragraph 8, "The Legislature has already determined that removing the revenue support of local rates provided by access charges prevents the creation of a more attractive competitive local exchange market for the benefit of consumers. The Commission's task is to determine whether the requested rebalance is likely to create a more attractive local exchange market."

The benefit to residential consumers once

again is left out. It's a given. It has already been defined, as far as the ILECs are concerned, by Order 1331 as a given, not an issue.

The Citizens respectfully request that this Commission grant reconsideration of Order 1331, revise it to the extent necessary to eliminate the prejudgment of the definition of "benefit of consumers."

Thank you very much, Commissioners.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Mr. Mann.

Mr. Shreve.

MR. SHREVE: Thank you, Madam Chairman.

The Attorney General has joined in support of the motions for reconsideration. I'll be very brief and adopt everything that Mr. Mann said and Mr. Twomey said. I think they did an excellent job in pointing that out.

I would like to point out that our decision to intervene was made after this hearing, when we heard the expressions of the Commissioners, and after hearing all of the public hearings. I attended this hearing and have reviewed the transcript in depth, and there is no indication from any Commissioner that would go the other way and support the order. All of the indications from the Commissioners were to keep

this item, this issue open, and I was very surprised to see the order on that point. I almost slipped by it, because after hearing the Commission's deliberations, you really would not expect that order, and it's supposed to be representative of this Commission's deliberations.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Mr. Shreve.

Okay. I have a joint response by Verizon,

Sprint, and Bell on both motions for reconsideration.

Have you selected someone to make your presentation?

Justice Harding.

MR. HARDING: Thank you. Madam Chairman and members of the Commission, we would respond by saying that the order is legally correct, it is appropriate, and that it follows the statute and sets forth the requirements for a determination in this issue. I think it is up for you to determine whether or not it appropriately reflects your decision. I can't make that judgment for you, except that it came out as an order from the Commission, and we certainly think that it was legally correct. It was well founded and appropriately states the law that applies to this issue.

Anything else my counsel -- CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you.

Mr. Chapkis, you had an additional statement? And then, Commissioners, we'll entertain questions from you all.

MR. CHAPKIS: I'll try to be very brief.

I would just say that the Commission should deny petitioner's motion for reconsideration because it fails to identify any new fact or any new law overlooked by the Commission, and it correctly reflects the Commission's vote. That is, it says that the Commission is not required to consider the IXC flow-through issue in reaching its decision, but it's not precluded from doing so either. And I would refer you to Footnote 3 of your order.

And that's all I have to add.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Mr. Chapkis.

Commissioner Deason, you had a question?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I have a question

for Mr. Mann.

Mr. Mann, you're seeking either reconsideration or clarification. How would you propose we clarify the order if we were so inclined? I know that there's a certain passage that you have included in your motion. Would it just simply be the deletion of that particular language, or should that language be changed in some way?

MR. MANN: Commissioner, the most glaring concern, at least to me, and I'll certainly ask for any difference of opinion by Mr. Beck, is the paragraph on page 11 under the subsection where it cites to subsection (a). "As such, the relevant market for use in making the final determination is the local exchange market. We find that consideration of the impact on the toll market is not required for the Commission's full and complete determination of the petitions."

I believe that that particular paragraph prejudges the definition of the residential -- benefit for residential customers. It defines the local market that this Commission should be looking at, and that is simply and exclusively the local market, because it comes at the end of subsection (a).

But as I've said earlier, the most important part of subsection (a) is that if there is current support found, and if that current support is then found to prevent the creation of a more attractive local exchange market, then benefit of residential customers is the importance of that subsection (a). And I think that paragraph below that circumscribes this Commission's delving into what exactly the benefits -- what the benefits are that

should be looked at in order to determine whether 1 2 benefits to residential customers is provided by the 3 ILECs' plans. And again, if Mr. Beck has any difference 4 of opinion or addition to that, I would certainly 5 welcome it. 6 CHAIRMAN JABER: I think Mr. Beck is tired 7 8 of people referring to him. MR. BECK: I'll make a proposal, 9 Commissioner Deason. In the decision section of the 10 order, there's a first paragraph, and what I would 11 12 recommend is simply deleting everything after that 13 until you get to the "Therefore, the motion is denied." So it would be deleting the last paragraph 14 on page 11 of the order, as well as page 12 and the 15 16 top of 13. 17 CHAIRMAN JABER: Were you done with your 18 questions, Deason Commissioner? 19 MR. MANN: Let me -- I'm sorry. CHAIRMAN JABER: Were you done with your 20 questions? 21 22 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Yes. 23 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Commissioner 24 Davidson, I see your hand go up. Let me let Mr. Mann

finish his thought, and I'll come back to you.

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Go ahead.

MR. MANN: I'm sorry. And I don't know that Mr. Beck has cited that specifically, but it has been brought to my attention that just beneath the paragraph that I referred to that comes underneath subsection (a) there, "As such, the relevant market," the next paragraph begins, "The language of Section 364.164, Florida Statutes, appears clear. Thus, under principles of statutory interpretation, this Commission need not look further to divine the Legislature's intent."

CHAIRMAN JABER: So let me see if I can make this a shortcut. Is it your position that you agree with Mr. Twomey's suggested deletion? If you look at his motion on page 11, he's suggesting deleting everything found on his motion on page 11. Tell me — it may be easier for you to tell us where you disagree, because you've absolutely lost me on what you want deleted and what you don't.

MR. MANN: I'm sorry. When you say page 11, Chairman, are you speaking of his motion or the --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Uh-huh. Commissioners, just so we're all on the same page, in AARP's motion for reconsideration, on page 11, Mr. Twomey makes a

suggestion on what language should be deleted. MR. MANN: I see. CHAIRMAN JABER: If you want to take a look at that and think about it, I can go to Commissioner Davidson's question. MR. MANN: If you would, please. Thank you. (TRANSCRIPT CONTINUES IN SEQUENCE WITH VOLUME 2.)

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

STATE OF FLORIDA)

COUNTY OF LEON)

I, MARY ALLEN NEEL, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings were taken before me at the time and place therein designated; that my shorthand notes were thereafter transcribed under my supervision; and that the foregoing pages numbered 1 through 47 are a true and correct transcription of my stenographic notes.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, or relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or financially interested in the action.

DATED THIS 10TH day of December, 2003.

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