## BEFORE THE 1 FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 2 3 In the Matter of 4 PETITION BY VERIZON FLORIDA. INC. DOCKET NO. 030867-TL 5 TO REFORM INTRASTATE NETWORK ACCESS AND BASIC LOCAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 6 RATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 364.164. FLORIDA STATUTES. 7 PETITION BY SPRINT-FLORIDA, DOCKET NO. 030868-TL INCORPORATED TO REDUCE INTRASTATE 8 SWITCHED NETWORK ACCESS RATES TO 9 INTERSTATE PARITY IN REVENUE-NEUTRAL MANNER PURSUANT TO SECTION 10 364.164(1), FLORIDA STATUTES. PETITION FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF DOCKET NO. 030869-TL 11 SECTION 364.164, FLORIDA STATUTES, 12 BY REBALANCING RATES IN A REVENUE-NEUTRAL MANNER THROUGH DECREASES IN INTRASTATE SWITCHED 13 ACCESS CHARGES WITH OFFSETTING 14 RATE ADJUSTMENTS FOR BASIC SERVICES BY BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 15 FLOW-THROUGH OF LEC SWITCHED 16 ACCESS REDUCTIONS BY IXCs. PURSUANT TO SECTION 17 364.163(2). FLORIDA STATUTES. 18 19 ELECTRONIC VERSIONS OF THIS TRANSCRIPT ARE A CONVENIENCE COPY ONLY AND ARE NOT THE OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF THE HEARING 20 21 THE .PDF VERSION INCLUDES PREFILED TESTIMON' 22 **VOLUME 8** 23 PAGES 740 THROUGH 932 24 PROCEEDINGS: HEARING 25

FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON COMMISSIONER BRAULIO L. BAEZ COMMISSIONER RUDOLPH "RUDY" BRADLE COMMISSIONER CHARLES M. DAVIDSON  DATE: Thursday, December 11, 2003  TIME: Commenced at 8:40 a.m.  PLACE: Betty Easley Conference Center Room 148 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida  REPORTED BY: LINDA BOLES. RPR	
COMMISSIONER CHARLES M. DAVIDSON  DATE: Thursday, December 11, 2003  TIME: Commenced at 8:40 a.m.  PLACE: Betty Easley Conference Center Room 148 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida	v
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REPORTED BY: LINDA BOLES, RPR Official FPSC Reporter (850) 413-6734	
13   APPEARANCES: (As heretofore noted.)	
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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(Transcript follows in sequence from Volume 7.)
3	CHAIRMAN JABER: Knology requested, Commissioners,
4	that we take up their witness before this evening. I think,
5	since we're at a natural breaking point, if there's no
6	objection, I'd like to go ahead and bring up the Knology
7	witness.
8	Mr. Mann, is there
9	MR. MANN: We, we have no questions.
10	CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you. Well, let me ask that.
11	Ms. Bradley, are you going to have questions of the Knology
12	witness?
13	MS. BRADLEY: No.
14	CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Twomey?
15	MR. TWOMEY: I don't.
16	CHAIRMAN JABER: Companies? I shouldn't have
17	neglected to ask the companies.
18	MR. CHAPKIS: I have a couple of questions for the
19	witness.
20	CHAIRMAN JABER: Staff?
21	MS. KEATING: We have just a few quick ones.
22	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. We move forward.
23	Were you here yesterday when I swore in witnesses?
24	THE WITNESS: I was not.
25	CHAIRMAN JABER: You were not?

1 THE WITNESS: No. ma'am. 2 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Would you please raise your 3 right hand. 4 FELIX L. BOCCUCCI was called as a witness on behalf of Knology, Inc., and, having 5 6 been duly sworn, testified as follows: 7 DIRECT EXAMINATION 8 BY MR. MEROS: Mr. Boccucci, tell me -- tell us your full name and 9 10 business address, please, sir. 11 Yes. My name is Felix L. Boccucci, Jr. I'm the vice Α president of business development for Knology, Inc. My address 12 is P.O. Box 501, West Point, Georgia, zip code 31833. 13 14 Did you cause to be prepared in this proceeding 0 15 prefiled sworn testimony dated, I believe, October 31 of 2003? 16 Α That is correct. Yes. 17 0 Do you have any changes or corrections to that 18 testimony? 19 Α No. I do not. 20 0 If I were to ask you today the same questions found in that testimony, would you give the same answers that are 21 reflected in that prefiled testimony? 22 23 Yes, I would. Α 24 MR. MEROS: Madam Chair, I would request that the prefiled testimony of Mr. Felix Boccucci be admitted into 25

evidence as though read. CHAIRMAN JABER: The prefiled testimony of Felix Boccucci, Jr., shall be inserted into the record as though read. 

1	Q:	Please state your full name, business addresses, and titles.
2	A:	My name is Felix L. Boccucci, Jr., I am Vice President of Business
3	Deve	lopment for Knology, Inc., which is the parent to Knology of Florida, Inc. My
4	busin	ess address is 1241 O.G. Skinner Drive, West Point, Georgia 31833.
5		
6	Q:	What is the purpose of your testimony?
7	A:	The purpose of my testimony is to present the position of Knology of Florida,
8	("Kno	ology"), a competitive local exchange carrier, in support of the petitions subject
9	to thi	s proceeding. The testimony will include a description of the company's
10	opera	tions including other markets it currently serves and will explain the impact that
11	grant	ing these petitions will have on competitive telecommunication services
12	provi	ders in Florida. Section 364.164 of the Florida Statutes sets forth four criteria the
13	Com	mission must consider in its decision to grant or deny a petition filed pursuant to
14	this s	tatute. Knology will focus on the following specific criteria; (a) Remove current
15	suppo	ort for basic local telecommunications services that prevents the creation of a
16	more	attractive competitive local exchange market for the benefit of residential
17	consu	amers; and (b) Induce enhanced market entry.
18		
19	Q:	Please describe your educational backgrounds and business experiences.
20	A:	I have served as Vice President of Business Development since August 1997,
21	and a	s the Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer and Secretary from November 1995
22	throu	gh August 1997. In addition, I currently serve as the Chief Financial Officer for
23	Inters	state and Valley Telephone Companies. From October 1994 until December

1 1995, I served as Vice President Finance Broadband of ITC Holding. Prior to such 2 time, I worked for GTE Corporation, a telecommunications company, which merged 3 with Contel Corporation in March 1991. From May 1993 to October 1994, I served as 4 a Senior Financial Analyst for GTE. From 1991 to 1993, I served as Financial Director for GTE's Central Area Telephone Operations. From 1987 to 1991, I was the Assistant 5 6 Vice President controller in charge of Contel's Eastern Region Telephone Operations 7 comprising 13 companies in twelve states. 8 9 O: Please describe the current corporate structure of Knology of Florida. 10 A: Knology of Florida is a competitive local and long distance telephone company 11 certified by the Florida Public Service Commission. Knology of Florida is 12 incorporated under the laws of Delaware and is a subsidiary of Knology, Inc. 13 14 Q: What is Knology's position on FL Statute 364.164 and the related petitions 15 filed in this proceeding? 16 A: Knology believes that Florida Statue 364.164 creates the framework to promote facility-based local exchange competition. Knology has made a substantial 17 18 investment in the Panama City market to provide competitive services and has been 19 operating its facility-based broadband network there since 1997. In addition to this 20 market, Knology operates in the following states: Georgia, Alabama, South Carolina 21 and Tennessee. In those states, Knology has made the strategic decision to continue to 22 deploy capital to expand its footprint due to the favorable regulatory framework for 23 competition. Previous legislation in these states restricted the Company's ability to

2 the rates for service were legislatively mandated. The new Florida legislation recently 3 signed by the Governor creates the regulatory environment necessary to attract capital 4 investment to expand telephone competition in Florida by allowing the Florida Public Service Commission (FPSC) to begin the process of deregulating rates. Knology 5 6 believes that the petitions filed in these dockets should be granted, because that 7 decision will help to implement the policy underlying 364.14, and it will enhance the 8 competitive choices available to Florida citizens. Knology made the strategic decision 9 to expand its service offerings to other cities in Florida. Shortly after the passage of 10 this legislation, Knology entered into an agreement with Verizon Media Ventures, Inc. 11 to purchase its Cable and Data Asset (Verizon Media) in Pinellas County. This 12 acquisition will provide an additional opportunity for Knology to market voice, video 13 and data services to approximately 275,000 homes and businesses. Knology seeks a 14 market-driven competitive price structure when it makes a strategic decision to deploy 15 capital resources to bring the most updated technology to the marketplace. It is 16 Knology's opinion that granting these petitions will bring new capital investment and 17 additional jobs, in addition to new products and price competition to the State of 18 Florida. 19 20 Q: Please provide a brief history of Knology, Inc. 21 A: Interstate and Valley Telephone Company (IVT) has been providing telephone 22 service in rural Alabama and Georgia for over 100 years. Knology was formed in 23 1994 in anticipation of the emerging demand for bandwidth. The Company began in

attract and deploy capital because investors were unwilling to invest in a market where

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1 the spring of 1995 with a small operation in Montgomery Alabama. In 1999, IVT and 2 Knology merged to combine their resources bringing the highest quality services and 3 the most advanced technology to its customers. Today Knology operates in five states 4 in the Southeastern United States and serves 8 metropolitan markets including Panama City, Florida. Upon close of the aforementioned transaction with Verizon Media, 5 6 Pinellas County Florida will be our ninth market. 7 8 O: In what metropolitan markets does Knology, Inc. have operating 9 subsidiaries? 10 A: Knology currently has broadband networks in Augusta, Columbus, and West 11 Point, Georgia; Huntsville and Montgomery, Alabama; Charleston, South Carolina; 12 Knoxville, Tennessee; and in Panama City, Florida and its surrounding cities. 13 Knology plans to commence operations in Pinellas County, Florida when all the 14 regulatory approvals are granted and the transaction with Verizon Media is complete. 15 16 Are any of Knology's current operations competing in the franchised Q: 17 jurisdictions of the parties in this docket? 18 A: Yes. Knology's Panama City Operations is located within the boundaries of 19 BellSouth's franchised service territory. The recently announced transaction with 20 Verizon Media is in Verizon of Florida's service territory in Pinellas County. 21 22 23

i	Q: What types of services does Knology provide to the markets it serves?
2	A: Knology constructs broadband networks to provide voice, video and data
3	services. Knology has invested a minimum of \$100 million to construct networks in
4	each of the communities it serves. These two-way, high-capacity, hybrid fiber-coaxial
5	(HFC) and Fiber-to-the-Curb (FTTC) networks allow it to provide a product offering
6	that includes local and long-distance telephone service, video service that offers over
7	150 Channels of quality programming along with another 50 channels of CD quality
8	music, and data service that offers variable speed, high-bandwidth access to the
9	internet. Furthermore, from its network operations center (NOC) Knology monitors
10	virtually all elements of its network including the customer's set-top box and cable
11	modem as well as provides 24x7 customer service.
12	
13	Q: Does Knology offer a "bundled" service in its markets?
14	A: Yes. Knology offers the "triple-play" bundle of voice, video and data services
15	over an HFC or FTTC network; all billed on a single bill to the customer. Knology
16	also offers these services on an ala-carte basis; however, the customer enjoys greater
17	discounts as they increase the number of services purchased from Knology.
18	
19	Q: Is there any advanced or new services that Knology offers in its markets?
20	A: Yes. Knology utilizes its advanced networks to provide the latest in
21	technology to all its customers. Knology's Passive Optical Network (PON)
22	deployment allows Knology to deliver in excess of 100mps of scalable bandwidth to
23	business and schools at substantial cost savings to traditional circuit based services

1 such as frame relay service. The seamless fiber optic path from Knology's central 2 office to the customer premises significantly increases network reliability and allows 3 for the delivery of voice and video over the same network connection. The advanced 4 IP/Ethernet bandwidth services provide enhanced upstream and downstream speeds, 5 and it enables scalable access to additional bandwidth for more capacity when 6 business needs dictate (and not according to installation lead times). The Virtual 7 Private Network (VPN) service provides businesses with multiple site locations to 8 create an intranet network, enabling them to exchange information privately within their organization by accessing remote locations or company networks over the public 9 10 Internet network. 11 12 0: Is Knology considered a competitive service provider or an incumbent 13 service provider in its markets? 14 A: Knology is a competitive service provider that has built its network across the 15 territories of both the incumbent telephone companies and incumbent cable television 16 companies ("CATV") in the markets it serves. This network allows Knology to 17 compete with not only the local telephone company, but the CATV provider and the 18 internet service providers in that market; a virtual three-for-one for the consumers with 19 regards to competitive service offerings. Knology also operates two incumbent 20 independent telephone companies in rural Alabama and Georgia. 21 22 23

1	Q: What is the reaction of the incumbent CATV and Telephone providers to
2	the entrance of Knology's into its markets?
3	A: Knology's experience has been that the incumbent providers upgrade their
4	networks to enhance their own service offerings, implement new products and price
5	reductions and increase the level of customer service and marketing to compete with
6	Knology. Given the flexibility offered by this legislation, and should the related
7	petitions be granted, it is Knology's opinion that consumers will experience
8	competitive offerings and the newest technology not only from Knology, but also from
9	the incumbents who will improve their service and products to compete with Knology
10	as a new facilities-based competitor.
11	
12	Q: What is the residential versus business mix of Knology's customer base?
13	A: Knology is currently a consumer-oriented company. Approximately 90% of
14	Knology's overall customer base is residential with the balance of 10% business
15	customers. This compares with traditional Competitive Local Exchange Companies
16	("CLEC") mixes of 58%/42% Residential/Business as reported in United States
17	Telephone Association's Phone Facts Plus 2004.
18	
19	Q: How does Knology rank overall given the markets it serves?
20	A: The first quarter 2003 Kagan report ranks Knology as the 26th largest cable
21	company. This report also ranks Knology number one as having the highest
22	percentage of telephone customers (66%) and internet customers (41%) as a factor of

1 cable customers. Knology's bundle of services and its one company, one bill, one call 2 approach contributes to this success. 3 4 Does Knology serve all customers in its franchised areas? Q: 5 A: Yes, Knology offers service to all customers in its service territories. 6 7 Q: Does Knology only focus on customers in the "urban" setting? 8 A: No. Knology's serves multiple tiers of cities including cities as small as Lynn 9 Haven, Calloway, Parker and Cedar Grove, Florida. 10 11 Q: How does Knology's pricing for services compare with that of the 12 respective incumbent for that service? 13 A: Knology offers a bundled package of services that is competitively priced and 14 includes telephone, internet, and cable services. While not its focus, Knology does 15 offer competitively priced a-la-carte services. However, Knology's bundled offering 16 provides incremental discounts as the customer purchases more services. Thus 17 Knology's customer has an opportunity to lower his or her overall bill for all 18 telecommunications services, while reaping the benefits of dealing with one company 19 and receiving a converged bill detailing all services purchased. In order for the bundle 20 to be successfully marketed and sold, it is necessary for the marketplace to determine 21 prices. Granting these petitions will provide the framework necessary to have market-22 based prices without subsidies. In addition to price, it is my opinion that as result of

1	the gra	ant of these petitions, competitive providers will deploy more capital
2	invest	ments and hence create more jobs.
3		
4	Q:	If Knology is pricing its individual services at or near the incumbent, how
5	is the	consumer benefited by competition?
6	A:	Knology's bundled discount structure gives consumers a discount in direct
7	propo	rtion to the number of services to which he or she subscribes. Basically, the
8	more	the customer buys the greater the discount. It is Knology's experience that
9	consu	mers evaluate prices based on the value of the bundle, not on an a-la-carte basis.
10	Furthe	ermore, additional benefits result from competitive offerings of voice, video and
11	data s	ervices and the customer's ability to choose from multiple service providers.
12	With	the introduction of competitors, all consumers will experience higher levels of
13	custor	mer service and will be offered the newest in technology more quickly.
14		
15	Q:	How do the petitions filed in this proceeding affect Knology and its
16	busin	ess strategy?
17	A:	If these petitions are granted, Knology will be able to attract and deploy new
18	capita	l investment in Florida, thereby offering consumers a choice in facilities-based
19	provid	ders for new and advanced high-tech services.
20		
21	Q:	How is Knology perceived by its customers?
22	A:	Knology is perceived as a quality provider of bundled services (telephone,
23	intern	et, cable). A third-party firm hired to gather customer satisfaction statistics and

1	report the results to our senior management confirms this. These reports indicate that
2	approximately 92% of existing customers would recommend Knology to a friend,
3	which is certainly a statistic that the Company is proud to report.
4	
5	Q: Has Knology had any impact on local economic development in any of its
6	markets?
7	A: Competitive providers of voice, video and data services bring investment and
8	jobs to the communities they serve. Typically Knology deploys capital in excess of
9	\$100 million and hires over 100 employees in a mid size market similar to Panama
10	City. Additional benefits include better customer service and new advanced products
11	coming to market more quickly.
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13	Q: Does Knology provide support to Schools, Libraries and other
14	governmental institutions in the markets it serves?
15	A: Knology provides cable and data services to schools and libraries across its
16	markets. Knology provides connectivity between governmental facilities within the
17	markets it serves. Examples of these services include data services to the Autuga
18	County schools in Montgomery, Alabama, fiber connectivity between satellite offices
19	of the Augusta Medical College and Passive Optical Network service to the
20	Charleston Coliseum.
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1	Q:	Please summarize your testimony.	
2	A:	Knology seeks and supports a competitive marketplace with a price structure	
3	that r	eflects market value and imbedded costs. This environment will give the	
4	incen	tive to Knology and other competitive providers to launch services, deploy	
5	capital, create new jobs and provide consumers and businesses a choice of		
6	teleco	ommunication products with exceptional customer service at competitive prices.	
7	For the aforementioned reasons, Knology believes that the grant of these petitions wi		
8	remo	ve current support for basic local telecommunications services that prevents the	
9	creati	on of a more attractive competitive local exchange market for the benefit of	
10	reside	ential consumers, will induce enhanced market entry and will create more capital	
11	inves	tment and provide more employment in the State of Florida.	
12			
13	Q:	Does this conclude your testimony?	
14	A:	Yes.	

BY MR. MEROS:

Q Mr. Boccucci, would you please summarize your testimony.

A Yes. My name is Felix Boccucci, Jr. I'm currently the vice president for business development of Knology. I am the, one of the original employees of Knology, and built the competitive model for Knology back in 1994. Knology's real-life experience demonstrates, in my view, that granting these positions -- petitions will create a more attractive competitive local exchange market for the benefit of residential consumers. It will also induce enhanced market entry -- it will also induce enhanced market entry by Knology, and would encourage other competitors to enter the market as well.

The current structure for local exchange rates in Florida, in my view, is inefficient and too low to justify further expansion in Knology's present operations in the state. For example, in the Panama City market, the ILEC offers local telephone service for \$9.12 per month. In the four other states where Knology competes the average price for residential service offered by the incumbent telephone company is \$15.02 per month. This disparity plays a critical role in our market analysis in determining future market entry and deployment of capital in the, in the marketplace.

The passage of the 2003 Telephone Competition Act

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prompted Knology to purchase Verizon's media ventures fiber network in Pinellas County. The prospect of rate rebalancing was a significant factor in Knology's consideration of this purchase. As we speak, Knology is raising millions of dollars to purchase and upgrade Verizon facilities and launch facility-based telephone services in Pinellas County for residential consumers.

Knology would like to continue to expand and compete aggressively throughout the State of Florida. When we first came to Panama City, our entry generated increased competition, new service, new services, better service and price discounts for consumers. Real-life on-the-ground experience in that area showed tangible benefits to residential customers arising from, from that competition.

But under the current rates for local services in Florida, Knology has not been able to generate rates of return sufficient to attract the capital necessary to expand in adjacent areas to Panama City or elsewhere in Florida. If rate rebalancing is implemented, Knology has every intention to expand and compete further in Florida. That competition would improve services and prices to residential customers, and would incentivize Knology and other competitors to innovate expanded service options for the consumers in the state.

Our, our, our experience proves the wisdom of the legislative policy in Section 364.164. Rebalancing will induce

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Knology and others to enter and compete in many Florida markets, and that competition will provide tangible benefits to residential customers. Without rebalancing Knology's future lies outside of the State of Florida where we can provide benefits to residential consumers in a more competitive market environment.

MR. MEROS: Madam Chair, I tender the witness for cross-examination.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you.

Mr. Chapkis, you said you had questions?

MR. CHAPKIS: Yeah. I just have a couple of quick question.

## CROSS EXAMINATION

## BY MR. CHAPKIS:

Q Good afternoon. Sir, how would Knology's business plan change if the ILECs' rate rebalancing plans were not granted?

A Knology has better opportunities to deploy capital in other, in other states where the local exchange rates are higher. As I, as I discussed in my summary, the average rate in their other markets is \$15.12. So from a rate of return in order to attract capital to, to build networks, the, the benefit would far exceed the existing benefit in Florida without rate rebalancing.

Q We've heard testimony and concerns about whether the

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rate rebalancing plans will benefit seniors and people with low bills, people in those classes. Does Knology have any experience that would speak to those concerns?

A We do. We've been providing competitive telecommunications services for over, for over nine years, and we find the competitive environment opens up benefits to all demographics in the marketplace, from seniors to high demographics to medium demographics, et cetera. But in order to provide those benefits to the, to the consuming public there has to be a value proposition what the service is worth. And in my view a \$9 local exchange rate in Panama City, if the value proposition is that the service is only worth \$9, it makes it very difficult for Knology to bring the enhanced services and other significant discounts of our, our bundled services, which include cable, Internet and telephone.

Q And when you decide to enter a market, what is it that you decide to look at? Do you look at the residential rate, the total bill? What is it exactly that your company focuses on when entering a market?

A We look at multiple factors in terms of determining our capital. As you well know, capital is a scarce resource and investors want to achieve the maximum returns that they can get by deploying their capital. So one of the big criterias we look at is the underlying residential exchange rates in a particular market, it's one of the major factors, along with

1	other regulatory, the other the regulatory climate, the
2	market, demographics and other such, and other such issues.
3	MR. CHAPKIS: Thank you. That's all the questions I
4	have.
5	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Anyone else here at the
6	bench?
7	Mr. Beck, do you all have questions?
8	MR. BECK: Yes. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
9	CROSS EXAMINATION
10	BY MR. BECK:
11	Q Could I ask you what you offer bundled packages as
12	well as stand-alone residential services; is that right?
13	A Knology's business case is centered around a, a
14	bundled product which includes local and long distance
15	telephone service, Internet service as well as digital and
16	analog cable services.
17	Today, if you look at our existing market, more than
18	83 percent of our customers take at least more than, more than
19	one service from us, either two or three services; i.e.,
20	telephone, Internet and cable or telephone and cable, vice
21	versa.
22	Q Which is your most popular product?
23	A If you look at systemwide in Florida, our cable
24	product competes strongly in the marketplace in conjunction
25	with telephone. Almost every customer that has a telephone

line from us also has our, our cable service.

The interesting fact is the -- our cable service, in conjunction with our telephone service, provides an overall significant benefit to the, to our customers. One is they get a converged bill with all the services on the same bill. Two, we continue to discount services further and further, the more the customer, the customer buys from us.

And to give you, and to give you an example, if you look at the typical prices for cable, for example, are somewhere in excess of \$45. And if you look in the markets that Knology operates in, the cable rates typically are somewhere around \$30. So when you bundle telephone, cable and Internet together, the, the population gets a far better value proposition and competes very well with both the ILECs and the cable providers and the Internet providers.

Q Are there three, three products you offer all together, or how many, how many products do you offer all together?

A On the residential side we offer local and long distance telephone service, we offer analog and digital cable services, including interactive television, video on demand, high, high-definition television, and we also offer high-speed Internet service through a cable modem platform.

Q And is the -- is there a most typical service? In other words, do most people take the whole package or, or just

one extra? What's your typical customer?

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The, the typical customer typically takes local telephone service and cable services from us with a significant portion of other customers taking all three services, which includes the Internet service.

When you look at the, the, our long distance service, we're not an interexchange carrier. We, we provide Knology long distance service provided through, through other carriers, and less than 50 percent of our customers take our own, own long distance. So it's very important for us to have the R1 rate: the value proposition for the R1 rate to be at a market-based competitive, in a market-based competitive type arena.

How long have you been offering services in Panama 0 City?

We, we acquired a, a small cable overbuilt company in Α Panama City Beach in 1997. We expanded to the Panama City metropolitan market through 1998 and began, began offering the bundled services sometime in the 1998 time frame.

And you've recently purchased some assets that were 0 owned by Verizon in Pinellas County; is that right?

Α We currently have an asset purchase agreement with Verizon New Media in Pinellas County, Florida. transaction has not yet closed.

MR. BECK: Thank you. That's all I have.

1	CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr Ms hang on a second,
2	Ms. Bradley.
3	Commissioner Bradley, did you want to wait until
4	later?
5	COMMISSIONER: I'll wait.
6	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Ms. Bradley, Mr. Twomey,
7	anyone else?
8	MS. BRADLEY: Okay. Thank you.
9	CROSS EXAMINATION
10	BY MS. BRADLEY:
11	Q Sir, you mentioned the fact that you offer these
12	various services. Is it necessary to buy telephone before
13	using the other services?
14	A It's not necessary, but most of the, the consumers
15	see the, the advantage of buying telephone service from us with
16	the convenience of one bill. They can talk to one provider and
17	they can also discount their telephone service as well as their
18	other services by buying multiple products from us. So the big
19	draw in terms of the consumer in our markets is telephone
20	bundled with other products is the, is the catalyst for us to
21	be successful in the marketplace.
22	Q Would you agree that in order for a senior or anyone
23	else to enjoy these extra benefits, they would have to be able
24	to essentially afford this increase?
25	A No. I think competition changes the whole, whole

arena. If you look at the history and you look at where we're currently serving, serving customers, is the, the benefits of competition changes.

I heard in, in Mr. Fulp's testimony that nonrecurring charges were an issue. In a competitive world, nonrecurring charges in a lot of cases go away.

The other thing that we see from the competition side and in the telephone arena where we've been doing this since 1998 is that promotional opportunities, win-back opportunities, that the consumer fairs far better.

In addition, when you have a value proposition of the, of a local residential service, one, the service quality gets better. You know, I would throw this out to you from a common sense perspective. If you have a, a low generating revenue unit, is the quality of service to the residential customer that's not producing significant revenues is going to be as good to a, to business customers for example? Is the --without competition is the incumbent operator going to answer the phone in 30 seconds? Is the incumbent operator going to make a service call within 24 hours like we do?

So it happens when you bring competition to the marketplace, everybody gets better, and everybody gets better, and competition will -- provides a catalyst for, for pricing.

And I think -- and if you look at cable as, as a service, for example, in markets where there's competitive

cable products in the marketplace across the country, the rates are somewhere in the, in the neighborhood of \$30. Where there's no cable competition, the rates are \$45. And, and I would offer to you that most of our senior population probably enjoys the benefit of cable television significantly.

In the local exchange rates, if priced right, it gives us the incentive to move into the market, gives a significant benefit to the seniors in this state to enjoy enhanced and better services in the marketplace.

- Q You provide basic residential services?
- A We do.
- Q Do you provide them at a lower cost than customers are currently paying?

A The, the concept of -- in our view, telecommunications services are converging. You see that with the recent rulings from the FCC in terms of landline to wireless portability. You see the value proposition that the wireless carriers have put out there. The consumer in the wireless world doesn't even think that it's long-distance when they're making a phone call from Pinellas County, Florida, to, to California.

So it's my view that it's the -- the value proposition to the customer is a converged bill with multiple telecommunications services and the convenience of, and the convenience of dealing with one customer in a competitive

environment that, that, that literally creates a great quality of service: Companies answer the phone, networks are upgraded and price, and there's price competition, there's competition entering the market, nonrecurring charges. Because if, if you don't do those things in a competitive world, you're not going to be, you're not going to be around.

Q If we can go back to my question though. Are you offering basic residential services at rates lower than are currently being offered by the companies here?

A In some markets our rates are, are comparable a la carte to the incumbent operators. However, as soon as the customer buys a second service from us, the, the rate gets discounted, as well as the other enhanced features that we talked about earlier in terms of, you know, the popular features in terms of Caller ID and Call Forwarding.

What the, what the local rate does is it enables us to provide bundled packages and to provide really economical prices to seniors to get actually more and better services than they currently have today.

Q Are these bundled services dependent upon basic, having basic residential service?

A It's -- in order to -- capital is a scarce resource. In order to attract the investment necessary, for example --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Do you remember yesterday when I said the witnesses will start their answer with a yes or no,

and then are allowed to elaborate? I need you to do that. 1 2 Here's the guestion, and then you're free to elaborate. 3 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 4 CHAIRMAN JABER: What Ms. Bradley wants to know is is 5 your basic local rate the same or lower, I guess, if I recall 6 the question, to the incumbent basic local rate? 7 THE WITNESS: Yes. on an a la carte basis. 8 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Ms. Bradley, what was your 9 next question? 10 BY MS. BRADLEY: 11 Q I believe my next question was --12 CHAIRMAN JABER: See, that's what happens when you elaborate before the yes or no. I stop listening and I forget 13 14 what the question is. 15 THE WITNESS: My apologies. BY MS. BRADLEY: 16 17 I think my question was in order to enjoy these 18 vertical services, do you have to first purchase basic 19 residential service? 20 Yes. You can't provide vertical services if the 21 customer doesn't have a residential, residential line. 22 So if a person can't afford a rate increase, they're Q not going to be able to afford the vertical services either, 23 24 are they? I really don't understand the question. If you could 25 Α

restate it for me.

Q If a person can't afford a rate increase, if they can't afford to pay more than they're paying now, then they're not going to be able to afford vertical services either, are they?

A I don't view this as a -- I don't view the increase in the local, local rates as a rate increase because I look at telecommunications products as a, as the market is converging into products -- local and long distance services converging into one product, Internet and cable. So when I view the marketplace, I see an overall value proposition for the customer where ultimately they're going to save more money than they're currently, currently saving in today's marketplace, and our history in the business across our markets proves that.

Q So all these rates and figures are confidential. Just take a figure. If somebody is paying \$10 and they've said they can't afford to pay \$12, then they're not going to be able to afford to pay \$10 plus \$20 to maybe get a \$2 discount, are they?

A Well, I make the, the assumption that most seniors watch television. And so the fact that they get television or cable television bundled into their service and the cable television rates in themselves are \$15 lower than in the noncompetitive market, I think that's more than incentive to, to provide to the consumer to, to buy the services.

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So I would take it that your answer is inapplicable 0 to the seniors on fixed incomes that can hardly afford telephone service.

I mean, there's Lifeline services. The great thing Α about competition, if the underlying incumbent telephone company is providing Lifeline services to the, the underprivileged in the marketplace, they have a choice. they want to, to get more than a basic telephone line and they can see the value proposition and can afford the bundle of our services, I think they benefit, benefit greatly. But I still think there's a, that there's a safety net for the, the ultimate consumer with, with the, with the incumbent operator that's what they call an ETC carrier and has universal service responsibility.

I understand your convergence theory, but I'm 0 concerned as to whether you understand what I'm saying, that there has been testimony from consumers coming in before this Commission all over the state that have said they can't afford an increase. And for those consumers I have to assume that your convergence theory is not going to have a lot of meaning; would you agree?

Α No, I would not agree.

So you think they're going to be able to come up with 0 even more money than they can't afford now?

Α The, the public hearings that the Public Service

1	Commission held throughout the state was, was focused in the
2	environment of, in my view, in a vacuum of one
3	telecommunications service, which is the, the local rate.
4	My phone as the vice president of business
5	development at Knology is continually off the hook. I receive
6	calls weekly including folks in Florida asking us to bring our
7	competitive services to the, to the marketplace. And I think
8	the Commission here in Florida has done a great job with the
9	safety net for, for a consumer that absolutely needs Lifeline
10	services out there.
11	Q Are you familiar with some of the surveys that the
12	Commission did a few years ago when they were looking at rate
13	prices and as to how much people would be willing to pay an
14	increase before they would disconnect?
15	A I'm not familiar with those, no.
16	Q Did you hear the testimony yesterday about the fact
17	that BellSouth is disconnecting approximately 2,000 Lifeline
18	customers a month?
19	A I did not hear that testimony.
20	MS. BRADLEY: No further questions.
21	CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Twomey.
22	MR. TWOMEY: Yes, ma'am. Thank you. Just a few.
23	CROSS EXAMINATION
24	BY MR. TWOMEY:
25	O Good afternoon. Over here.

CHAIRMAN JABER: He's over there. 1 2 THE WITNESS: Oh. Thank you. 3 MR. TWOMEY: Good afternoon. 4 THE WITNESS: I apologize. 5 CHAIRMAN JABER: No. It's our microphone system. 6 apologize. BY MR. TWOMEY: 7 Y'all came to Florida in 1997; is that correct? 8 Q 9 Α That is correct. 10 And you bought -- did you say you bought an overbuilt 0 11 cable system? 12 Α That is correct. 13 0 Okay. When you came here, isn't it true that there 14 was no immediate prospect for access local rate rebalancing? 15 In 1997 -- can you repeat the question? Α 16 I think Commissioner Jaber wanted me to answer yes or 17 So before I elaborate, can you ask the question again? 18 Q Was your, was your move to Florida -- let me ask it differently. 19 20 Was your move to Florida premised on the expectation 21 that the local telephone company in Panama City would have 22 increased rates to make your rates appear more viable or 23 whatever? 24 Α Yes. 25 It was premised, it was premised -- in 1997 you Q

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expected, you expected the local telephone companies' rates to go up?

I did. And the reason -- we took a calculated risk Α in entering the Panama City market. If you recall, in 1996 the Telecommunications Act was passed. Part of my responsibilities with, with Knology is two ILECs that we currently own in rural Georgia, in Alabama. And when I looked at what was going on in those states at that particular time, they were moving forward with rate rebalancing issues back in the, in the 1997 to 1998 time frame. As a matter of fact, the Georgia Legislature actually passed legislation prior to the, to the '96 Act positioning the State of Georgia for, for competition. And so the premise we were seeing across the, across the states was that there was a movement afoot to reduce, reduce the access rates and rebalance the rates in conjunction with, with at that time, time costs. So we took the calculated risk coming to Florida that Florida was going to move on the, the same, same path that the other states that we were looking at were currently moving.

0 Let me see if I understand that. You just testified. if I understood you correctly, that, that the State of Georgia was making moves to, to balance, rebalance rates, and that based upon the experience then in Georgia, you decided to invest your money in the panhandle of Florida.

No, that's not correct. We had already invested in, Α

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in a property in Montgomery, Alabama, which was the first competitive market that we invested in, which was in 1995. We saw the, the Alabama Commission moving in that, that arena. We had also invested in markets in Georgia as well and were expanding our business to other states in the region. And Florida being in our own background, we thought, was a, would be a great place for us to, to do business.

Q If the, if the Florida Public Service Commission denies these petitions and access rates are not reduced and, as a consequence, local service rates are not increased, will you leave Panama City?

A We will not. We have deployed the capital in Panama City. The impact that it would have in the State of Florida is -- for example, we have just raised significant amounts of -- we're currently raising significant amounts of money to rebuild the properties or the networks that Verizon constructed in Pinellas County. We will meet our commitments in the State of Florida, but further expansion in Florida would be competing with expansion in other states where we would deploy the capital in a more favorable environment and create jobs and capital investment in those particular markets.

Q I mean, you're saying, if I hear you, you'll go to wherever locations, whatever states you expect to get the greatest return on your capital; correct?

A We will go to the states. In order to -- was that a

yes or no? The answer is no.

We go -- capital -- in order for investors to invest in network, they have to be assured that they can earn the required rate of return for them to, to invest. The opportunity for the assurance (phonetic) for them to earn the necessary return on their capital would be far greater in a market that had more competitive value R1 rates than if the rebalancing petitions weren't granted by, by this Commission.

Q Yes, sir. The -- if the Commission -- same premise, in the Commission denies the petitions here, would it be your intention to try and get out of your asset purchase agreement with Verizon?

A No. We -- no. We have a value system as a company. Part of the consideration for us acquiring the Pinellas County property was the, the passage of the legislation this summer.

In business you have to take calculated risks, and this is a calculated risk that we took that the petitions here are going to be granted and that we will fulfill our commitments that we have made to the communities in Pinellas County.

Q In -- on Page 8 of your testimony, the question at Line 4 asks, "Does Knology serve all customers in its franchise areas?" And your answer is, "Yes. Knology offers service to all customers in its service territories."

Would I be correct in assuming that your franchise

service territory is smaller than the, than the incumbent LECs in that area?

- A Let me find the testimony so that we can be accurate.
- Q Yes, sir.
- A Thank you.
- Q Page 8, Line 4.

A Okay. The answer to that question is yes. Knology constructs -- in terms of the franchise agreements that we negotiate with the local municipalities, the local municipalities, in granting the franchises, typically require an ubiquitous bill throughout their entire municipality. So as a result, our networks almost mirror the exact same path as the incumbent cable company and the incumbent telephone company as well. So, so we pass almost every, every residential house within the franchise area as required by the grant of the franchises by the municipalities.

Q And just out of curiosity, in Panama City is your franchise area the City of Panama City or is it the county or what is it?

A We have multiple franchises in Panama City. We have a franchise for Bay County, Florida, we have one for Panama City, we have one for Panama City Beach, we have one for the City of Lynn Haven and we have one for the City of Springfield.

Q Okay. As I understand it, your -- essentially the thrust of your testimony is, is that -- let me ask you, is your

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company profitable now in Panama City?

A The company is not profitable from a net income basis in Panama City.

Q The, the -- am I correct in understanding the thrust of your testimony is, is that the local exchange company having their rates increased will either make your current rates look more favorable to your potential customers or allow you, and/or allow you to raise your rates as well?

A No, I don't agree with that. In the marketplace there's a value perception for services. So if the perception of, of a consumer, of a residential consumer in Panama City is that their telephone service is worth \$8, it makes it very difficult for us to have the total value proposition of bundling services which provides, in my view, significant benefits to all consumers: The senior citizens, the high demographics, low demographics, medium demographics in the marketplace.

MR. TWOMEY: Okay. That's all. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Staff.

#### CROSS EXAMINATION

# BY MS. KEATING:

Q Good afternoon, Mr. Boccucci. I've really just got one clarification question and then a couple of follow-ups from our discussion in the deposition.

First, I just want to clarify, is Knology going to

generally be, have a little more incentive to enter low density or rural markets if the petitions are granted?

A If -- you know, we currently -- the answer is yes.

Thank you. We currently --

CHAIRMAN JABER: You're doing great.

THE WITNESS: Pardon me?

CHAIRMAN JABER: You're doing great.

THE WITNESS: Thank you. We currently -- we built the -- we acquired and built the market in Panama City. We've looked at historically about expanding our markets in the past. You know, we looked at expanding to Tallahassee, for example, when Tallahassee was competing against Knoxville, Tennessee. And as a result of the fact that the local rates in, the R1 rates in Knoxville, Tennessee, the Knoxville, Tennessee, won out over Tallahassee.

But what rate rebalancing would enable us to do is to continue to extend our networks in the -- we would look at the possibility of extending our networks through the, through the panhandle of Florida. Specifically some of the territory that Sprint currently serves, with rate rebalancing, it makes the competition for the capital in that particular market arena compete with other markets that we have or other opportunities we have for, for capital since we already have the infrastructure in Panama City that we could leverage off of. BY MS. KEATING:

1	Q All right. And just to follow up from a discussion	
2	that we had in your deposition. If I understood correctly,	
3	Knology keeps its switched access rates in Panama City in line	
4	with those of BellSouth's; isn't that correct?	
5	A Yes. Our, our switched access rates are in parity	
6	with the local incumbent telephone operator, which in this case	
7	is BellSouth in Panama City.	
8	Q And if the Commission approves BellSouth's petition,	
9	will Knology adjust its own access rates?	
10	A We would. I would state that access revenue for our	
11	competitive properties is a smaller part, and it's not very	
12	significant to our operations.	
13	MS. KEATING: Thank you, Mr. Boccucci.	
14	THE WITNESS: You're welcome.	
15	CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Bradley.	
16	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Yes. I want to ask you the	
17	same question that I asked earlier, and if you can't answer it,	
18	then I'll respect that.	
19	THE WITNESS: I will do my best.	
20	COMMISSIONER: And I don't think it's a yes or no	
21	question.	
22	THE WITNESS: I just didn't want to offend the	
23	Chairman.	
24	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: What percentage as it relates	

to your customer base, and I'm speaking of residential and, and

business customers, if you had to apportion the percentage of long distance calls, and if you, if you are able to put a percentage to my question, what percentage of the calls that, that you all handle, long distance calls that you all handle would you attribute to your business customers as compared to your residential customers?

THE WITNESS: Okay. First, let me -- we're a little bit different than a, than an ILEC. Our primary business is the consumer market. Approximately 90 percent of our customers are consumers, with some business customers. So the long distance that we provide, which we like to do it in a bundled package with all-you-can-eat packages, is primarily related to the 90 percent of the consumers that we currently provide services to.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: So you can't break it out by residential versus business?

THE WITNESS: I would tell you that almost all of it is, approximately almost all of it is residential, to our residential customers, because our primary, our primary business plan is to serve the, the residential market with some small businesses.

For example, in Pinellas County, Florida, it's -- as we look and do the due diligence in Pinellas County, Florida, I think there's more small businesses and mom and pop stores that I think I've seen in any market that we operate in. And we

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think there's a great opportunity in the business arena in that particular market because the larger telephone companies tend to, tend to ignore the, the smaller businesses than, than we do because that's our bread and butter. So as a result, more and more long distance, if we're successful or when we're successful in Pinellas County, will be generated by these small business customers.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Okay. Thank you.

THE WITNESS: Did that help. I don't --

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Yes.

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Davidson.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Thank you, Chairman. Just a couple of questions.

One of our upcoming witnesses, Carl Danner, testified at Page 13 of his direct that for those who might commit new capital to Florida, this pricing reform signal will be important not just for what it says about current business opportunities, but also for what it says about the Commission's likely future approach to issues that may affect these investments in the future. Do you agree with that statement?

THE WITNESS: Yes, I do.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: If the petitions were granted in this proceeding, can Knology commit on the record to continue its expansion in Florida?

THE WITNESS: I cannot commit. I can make the commitment that Florida will compete extremely well for capital. The process for capital, where we deploy capital, without rate rebalancing, I feel very comfortable in saying that Florida would not compete in terms of attracting more capital into, into the, the state.

Now I will add I won't make a commitment that I'm absolutely, can't 100 percent commit, commit to, but we are currently exploring several other opportunities in the State of Florida. We think these opportunities will be great opportunities for, for Knology as well as the state. And when the rate rebalancing petitions are approved, I think there's a significant likelihood that we'll pursue those opportunities.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: If Knology ultimately competes with companies like Florida Digital Network and with Brighthouse and with BellSouth Telecommunications and other LECs and cable companies, how will this process, in your view, impact consumers in Florida, if at all?

THE WITNESS: Oh, I mean, historically we've been doing this since 1995. The benefits are -- we talked -- I'll give you an example. I know the Chairman talked about nonrecurring costs. It's very difficult to charge a \$30 installation charge when you have a competitor sitting behind your neck trying to get the same, the same business.

What we find, too, is in the marketplace from a, from

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a service call perspective that we gain significant market share when our competitors didn't answer their phone in 30 seconds and we answered our phone in 30 seconds. So ultimately the competitors aren't going to let that business get away from them, so they're going to answer the phone and they're going to be able, the consumers are going to be able to talk to the company representative.

Service calls, if you take a residential R1 rate today, and the value proposition is, let's say, \$8 for that R1, and the incumbent operator, and this is just my view, you know, I'm not speaking for the incumbents, has a business customer that's creating tremendous more margin or opportunity for them and, you know, they have to compete in terms of work force to serve that customer, who are they going to serve first? It would be the business customer.

What competition does is that you can't afford to do that because if you don't serve the residential, the senior citizen or the low demographic customer, it goes away because they're going to switch their service to, to another provider.

And the other thing that we, we see in the marketplace -- we compete primarily in the telephone arena with BellSouth across the southeast. BellSouth is a very formidable competitor. And BellSouth is -- they have win-back procedures, they have promotions to compete against us, and the customer gets great value out of the competition between providers.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: You had mentioned earlier, you had mentioned earlier in your testimony that in your experience seniors subscribe to cable. Do you have any feel or evidence as to the extent of take rates among seniors?

THE WITNESS: I do not have that, that information.

But I could look at our statistics and forward it to the, to
the Commission. if I can find it.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: I'll tell you one, one piece of information for the parties and staff that would be useful for me would be any facts or data regarding the extent to which senior citizens subscribe to any communication service, whether it be cable modem, Internet service, dial-up, DSL, the extent to which they subscribe to any communication service beyond basic telephone service. So I don't know if it would be possible to gather that information from the cable associations or if we have that data here at the Commission in the demographic breakdown amongst age categories. And that's just something I would like to see before the end of the proceeding. We don't need to pull that out now. Thanks.

No further questions, Chairman.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Bradley, you had another question; right?

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Commissioner Davidson's last question was, was going to be my question. I was going to ask if you could give a breakout as it relates to a percentage of

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your customers, the elderly -- well, all categories of customers. And I was -- my question was going to be how many of your customers subscribe just to basic phone service and how many -- and what percentage of them subscribe either to a package or bundled services? So his question was my question.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: And I've got one follow-up to that. I would also like to see, and I think we do have this information, the extent to which Lifeline subscribers subscribe just to basic service or have opted to pay additional sums to subscribe to enhanced services. Thanks.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. On Page 7 of your testimony you made me think of two of the service hearings that we went to in the panhandle: One was Pensacola, the second one was Fort Walton Beach, and then throughout those two, and then yesterday we heard from customers from Lynn Haven. And one of the things that struck me in the panhandle in particular, it's not that it didn't come up everywhere else, but in the panhandle in particular, was the assertion from customers that they are not getting solicitation calls or, or advertisements from competitors, that they don't believe they have a choice, regardless of how they felt about the rate proposals. And it's made me think a little bit about how competitors are marketing their services.

So my first question to you is how is it you marketed your services to the residential consumer, and does that

service extend outside Panama City to Pensacola, Fort Walton
Beach and Lynn Haven? I'm not real clear with your answer
there.

THE WITNESS: Okay. Can I take it one step at a time?

CHAIRMAN JABER: Absolutely.

THE WITNESS: First, our, our marketing sales is a combination of direct mail pieces as well as feet on the street in terms of direct, direct sales reps.

We talked about the, the, the value proposition of the rates. So if we look at Panama City, for example, we have embedded plant there. But in terms of marketing dollars, our marketing dollars probably create more value in markets where the local exchange or the local rate is higher. So there's probably in my view more focus in the markets that have a more competitive structure than they have in Panama City. Not to say that we don't do direct mailing and, and direct sales in, in Panama City.

We also focus a little stronger in the business market in Panama City because we have to have the opportunity to increase our margins. So we have a, not a large base, but we focus a little bit more on the business customers in Panama City to offset the low local exchange rate in Panama City.

CHAIRMAN JABER: So what would you say -- how many residential customers then do you serve in Panama City?

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THE WITNESS: I would say -- I don't have the numbers exactly in front of me, but approximately probably, in that market probably 15 to 20,000.

CHAIRMAN JABER: And, and that is landline residential service? Are you serving anyone through cable telephony or anything like that?

THE WITNESS: We currently use our roots as a local exchange telephone company in Georgia and Alabama. So we currently provide to our residential customers a full facility-based circuit-based TDN switched platform for the customers in Panama City across all of our networks.

From an IP telephony perspective, we do have a product that we use in the business arena which is a, is an IP Centrex product. And the technology there is we use basically the loop as packets or data stream which moves through to a media gateway in the marketplace, and then we use the switched network to switch those calls. So the, the Internet protocol we use today is primarily related to a, a business customer that wants to buy an IP Centrex type product.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Then as I look on Page 7 of your testimony, it is not correct then based on what you just said, in Panama City it is not correct that 90 percent of your customer base is residential and 10 percent is business, that's not Panama City. You're talking companywide --

THE WITNESS: Yeah.

1	CHAIRMAN JABER: that may be the percentage.	
2	THE WITNESS: No, but I would no. No. I would	
3	still I still believe that the percentage in Panama City is,	
4	approximates the 90 percent, the 90 percent range. But what	
5	I'm saying is that we aggressively pursue more small businesses	
6	in Panama City because of the low local exchange rate.	
7	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. So that 12 I think you	
8	told me 12,000 is what you guessed?	
9	MR. MEROS: Madam Chair	
10	CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Meros.	
11	MR. MEROS: I apologize. With respect to specific	
12	numbers, we may be getting into areas of confidential	
13	information. We would be happy to provide that in writing	
14	under some protection, but that kind of jumped out and I	
15	probably should have said something first. But I would	
16	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. No. And I appreciate you	
17	saying something now.	
18	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I was about to say it was	
19	refreshing to hear a company give numbers and not claim	
20	confidentiality.	
21	CHAIRMAN JABER: I know it. I know.	
22	MR. MEROS: Well, and then I messed it up. I	
23	apologize.	
24	CHAIRMAN JABER: No. And I appreciate your saying	

something. Here's what I'm trying -- this is why I'm asking

these questions. Again, going back to Pensacola, Fort Walton Beach, Lynn Haven, one of the things that struck me as attractive in your strategy is that you are, it does appear that you're targeting the residential consumer whether you're using your IP telephony or your landline technology or even cable. And I heard from Pensacola, Fort Walton Beach and Lynn Haven customers that they have local service, some had long distance, some were talking about using more e-mail instead of phone service, and some did say that they have cable and, when they considered all of their bill, there was that affordability issue. And company -- companies like yours are not marketing to those areas, and I'm trying to understand why Panama City? Why not other parts of the panhandle?

THE WITNESS: That's a great question. I don't think it's yes or no. But, again, we made the -- we took the calculated risk in 1997. Panama City from our home office in West Point, Georgia, is a, is a short drive. We had an opportunity to have a base of cable customers there which we, we acquired. We have looked at extending our services to Pensacola and other markets on the panhandle: As I testified earlier, Tallahassee versus the Knoxville issue.

But from our investors' perspective, in the competition for the valuable CAPX or the capital expenditures, it was tough to make a business case to expand into the panhandle when we could expand into Georgia. Tennessee, Alabama

1 and North Carolina and be more assured that we could meet the 2 returns that our investors expected in the marketplace. 3 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. And my final question, we did hear, again in all of those territories I just described, from 4 5 Lifeline customers who do subscribe to ancillary services. 6 Caller ID, Caller Waiting, the three-way calling, that package. 7 And my question to you is do you have a bundled offering that actually meets or beats what the BellSouth or Sprint local rate 8 would be in the panhandle plus those three ancillary services? 9 THE WITNESS: Can I repeat the question to make sure 10 I answer it correctly? 11 12 CHAIRMAN JABER: Sure. Absolutely. THE WITNESS: You're, you're asking me if our bundle 13 14 in Panama City, for example, competes with BellSouth, Comcast 15 Cable and all the Internet providers. 16 CHAIRMAN JABER: No. I'm asking if your bundled package in Panama City can compete with the BellSouth or Sprint 17 18 Lifeline customer who also takes Caller ID, Caller Waiting and three-way calling? 19 20 THE WITNESS: Yes, if the, if the consumer buys multiple services from us. 21 22 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. So the missing piece is if 23 that customer also has Internet service and cable, perhaps your

FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

THE WITNESS: I'm going to throw -- for example, a

services are comparable or better.

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bundle, we'll eliminate the Internet and the cable in Panama City. You know, we would have a bundled package for local and long distance telephone company in features that probably approximates somewhere between \$30 and \$35. And so we think that probably competes.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Take that \$30, \$35 package and tell me what all is in it.

THE WITNESS: Okay. It's, it's my understanding it could change. You could go to our Web site at Knology.net and get the specifics, but it would include a package of features, which I believe would include features such as Caller ID, Call Waiting, Call Forwarding, as well as a package of minutes. So it would be an all-you-can-eat type package. So if the, the customer in Panama City wanted to call Pensacola, it would all be included in that bundled rate.

CHAIRMAN JABER: And cable and Internet?

THE WITNESS: Cable and Internet is also available.

And if the customer would like to provide those services, they would get, the prices would continue to get discounted and then the customer gets a converged bill with all services on one bill which shows the discounts.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you. Commissioners, do you have any -- Commissioner Deason.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Earlier in answer to a question you mentioned ETC status for incumbent companies.

	I THE WITNESS: 165.		
2	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Is Knology an ETC in any of its		
3	territories?		
4	THE WITNESS: We are an ETC carrier so that we can		
5	compete for the E-Rate money for schools and libraries. For		
6	example, in Prattville, Alabama, we just provided 100 megabits		
7	of bandwidth to the schools through an E-rate program. But,		
8	again, I'm fully aware that an ETC status requires universal		
9	service.		
10	CHAIRMAN JABER: So what does that mean in Florida?		
11	They're not?		
12	So in Florida you are not an ETC?		
13	THE WITNESS: Let me correct that. I know we have a		
14	spin number in Florida, but I don't think we have ETC status.		
15	CHAIRMAN JABER: Well, are you required to provide		
16	Lifeline, for example?		
17	THE WITNESS: No.		
18	CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Deason.		
19	COMMISSIONER DEASON: So you have no Lifeline		
20	customers in Florida; is that correct?		
21	THE WITNESS: None that I'm aware of.		
22	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I believe Commissioner Davidson		
23	asked some for some information concerning senior citizen		
24	subscriptions to various services. I don't know where we're		
25	going to get all that information from but I think it would be		

1 interesting to know, if we have it available, how many senior 2 citizens subscribe also to cable television services. 3 CHAIRMAN JABER: I think that was part of the 4 request. 5 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Is that part of your request? CHAIRMAN JABER: Yeah. That was part of the request. 6 And, you know, for whatever it's worth, staff and 7 parties, would you take a look at the Advanced Services Report 8 that the FCC puts out? I don't -- I know obviously there's a 9 breakdown. Is it specific to seniors? I just can't recall. 10 MR. MEROS: Commissioners --11 12 MS. WHITE: Madam Chair. 13 CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes. 14 MS. WHITE: I'm sorry to interrupt you, but it goes directly to what Commissioner Davidson and you and Commissioner 15 16 Deason asked. I thought I remembered something in the Fair and 17 Reasonable Report. Now, granted this is as of February 1999. 18 It does have in the Affordability Survey that the staff hired to have done, it has breakdowns of services, including cable, 19 20 satellite, security alarm, cellular, and based on age levels 21 and income levels. 22 CHAIRMAN JABER: What was the source for that. Ms. 23

White? I can't imagine we've updated it, but maybe if there's a source.

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MS. WHITE: It was called an affordability survey --

it was called the Affordability Survey. I believe the staff 1 had it performed by the -- now I'm going to get in trouble. 2 CHAIRMAN JABER: University of Florida. 3 MS. WHITE: It was either someone at FSU or --4 5 COMMISSIONER DEASON: University of Florida. CHAIRMAN JABER: No. the Gators. I remember that. 6 MS. WHITE: University of Florida. See, I knew I was 7 8 going to get in trouble. CHAIRMAN JABER: I remember that. So clearly we 9 10 can't rely on that. 11 MS. WHITE: And it was a survey performed by them. 12 It was called the -- and they did -- you do have tables in here 13 that look at like, for example, in February of '99 the 14 households over age 65, with two or more members over the age of 65, 64.8 percent had cable television service. So there are 15 tables that go to that. Now granted it is 1999 information, 16 17 but it is in this report. 18 COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Well, my preference would be to put that together with whatever the best information is you 19 20 can find. You've got a good staff. Go on Google, do some research. I know there's a lot of information out there on the 21 22 digital divide and efforts to bridge the divide and how many

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take rates among seniors of different services. So there's

bound to be some current information. If that ultimately is

the most current, great. But if y'all can put together some

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1 good information with perhaps a summary table that just lays 2 out whatever might be the most relevant, that would be helpful. 3 MS. WHITE: And I would like to point out that 4 BellSouth did ask the AARP if they had information on their 5 members as to whether they subscribe to cable TV, as to income 6 levels, as to questions like that, and they responded that they 7 did not have information like that. 8 CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Davidson though makes a 9 good point that we need to get this in, in the record if that's 10 the desire. And staff has been trying to say something as well, so we'll let Ms. Keating address your question, 11 12 Commissioner. MS. KEATING: I was just going to point out that the 13 14 stuff that Ms. White referred to is in the record. You have 15 taken official recognition of the Fair and Reasonable Rate 16 Report. We can get you copies right now of the charts that Ms. White referred to, and we're also still checking to see if 17 18 we can't find some more current information. 19 CHAIRMAN JABER: But at the very least that study is 20 in. is in the record? 21 MS. KEATING: This is already in the record, yes, 22 ma'am.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Great.

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All right, Commissioners. Do you have any other questions of this witness? Commissioner Bradley.

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COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Packaging and bundling, who, who can give me, tell me the difference, specific differences between the two? And I'm just wondering if --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Do you want to ask the witness so we can get it in the record?

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Can you -- is there a difference between packaging and bundling? And if so, would you be so kind as to explain the difference or the differences?

THE WITNESS: Yes. I can explain it from my company's marketing strategy and point of view, if that would help.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Thank you.

THE WITNESS: We look at -- there's, there's really subsets of our bundle. We'll take cable television first since that's on the top of everybody's mind.

The customer can purchase typical analog cable service from us, which is typically around 75 or 80 channels. They can also upgrade that service to digital service, high-definition television, interactive television, video on demand, et cetera. So as part of the bundle there's multiple levels within cable.

From a telephone perspective our customers could take R1. And if you look at the statistics, less than 50 percent of our customers today take long distance from us. Or they can buy local and long distance from us on an a la carte basis and

1	bundle it into the, the mix, or they can buy a bundled		
2	telephone package that's bundled in with Internet and cable.		
3	Does that help?		
4	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Well, yes. But		
5	THE WITNESS: So there's		
6	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Are you saying that there's n		
7	difference between packaging and bundling, the two are		
8	interchangeable, they mean the same?		
9	THE WITNESS: If I understand if you could help m		
10	understand packaging from because I might, I might be		
11	explaining it from my understanding of packaging versus what		
12	the question you want answered.		
13	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Okay. Basically what you're		
14	saying is that the terms may have a different meaning as we go		
15	from company to company and how they market their services.		
16	THE WITNESS: Yes. Knology markets its service as a		
17	bundle provider.		
18	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Okay.		
19	THE WITNESS: However, we do offer a la carte to the		
20	consumers that would like that.		
21	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Okay. You just answered my		
22	question.		
23	THE WITNESS: Thank you.		
24	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Mr. Meros, do you have		
25	redirect?		

1	MR. MEROS: Just a couple, Madam Chair.
2	REDIRECT EXAMINATION
3	BY MR. MEROS:
4	Q Mr. Boccucci, do you does Knology advertise in the
5	mass media, TV and radio, in the Panama City/Lynn Haven area?
6	A I believe that we run advertising through our cable
7	network through the, through the media in Panama
8	City.
9	Q TV and radio?
10	A Ad insertions into the, into our cable system.
11	Q Okay. Now make sure it's clear, is Knology presently
12	in the Fort Walton/Pensacola area?
13	A We are not.
14	Q Okay. If rate rebalancing were to occur, would
15	Knology like to consider and to possibly invest in those areas
16	as further expansion in the Florida market?
17	A Yes. We have considered those markets in the past
18	and have eliminated the possibility because of the local rate
19	structure in those particular markets. So with rate
20	rebalancing, we would again go back to the chalkboard and
21	reevaluate our strategy in the panhandle of Florida.
22	MR. MEROS: No further questions, and I appreciate
23	the Commissioners' and the parties' indulgence in letting
24	Mr. Boccucci testify. Thank you.

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CHAIRMAN JABER: You're welcome.

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THE WITNESS: Thank you for your accommodation of my 1 2 schedule. 3 CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you for your testimony. And 4 you had no exhibits, so that takes us to the next witness. 5 How about. Verizon, you bring up the next witness. And. Commissioners, if you need a short --6 7 MR. MEROS: And I apologize. If Mr. Boccucci can be 8 excused. 9 CHAIRMAN JABER: Sure. Uh-huh. MR. MEROS: Thank you. 10 11 (Witness excused.) 12 CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioners, do you need a short 13 break while we're putting the witness on the stand, just five 14 minutes? Yeah. We'll take a five-minute break and take up the 15 next Verizon witness. 16 (Recess taken.) 17 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Let's get back on the record. Commissioners, I've looked at how many witnesses 18 19 we've gotten through, and obviously all of this is information we need and we're, we're doing what we need to do in delving 20 21 into the information before us and asking all the questions we 22 need to ask, but it gives me -- having done that, it gives me 23 an opportunity to reiterate to folks that we will be working late tonight and late tomorrow and we still have a long way to 24 25 go.

It is my understanding though, Commissioners, if we could go ahead and take this up, that staff witness Ollila, her testimony can be stipulated into the record; is that correct?

CHAIRMAN JABER: Sue Ollila, Suzanne Ollila, second page. Right. And, Ms. Keating, if you want to go ahead and introduce her testimony, I'll insert it into the record and I'll give you an exhibit number and we'll get that out of the way.

MS. CHRISTENSEN: That is correct.

MS. CHRISTENSEN: Commissioners, staff would ask to have Ms. Ollila's testimony admitted into the record as though read. And I believe she has one exhibit that is attached to her direct testimony. I believe that's SMO-1.

CHAIRMAN JABER: The prefiled direct testimony of Suzanne M. Ollila shall be inserted into the record as though read. And the exhibit number again?

MS. CHRISTENSEN: I believe the exhibit number is SMO-1, and that's the 2002 competition report.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Exhibit SMO-1, 2002 competition report, will be identified as Exhibit 61, and Exhibit 61 is admitted into the record.

(Exhibit 61 was marked for identification and admitted into the record.)

## DIRECT TESTIMONY OF SUZANNE M. OLLILA

Q. Please state your name and business address.

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- A. My name is Suzanne M. Ollila and my business address is 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399:
  - Q. By whom are you presently employed and in what capacity?
- A. I am employed by the Florida Public Service Commission (Commission) as an Economic Analyst in the Office of Market Monitoring and Strategic Analysis.
- 8 Q. How long have you been employed by the Florida Public Service 9 Commission?
- 10 A. I have been employed by the Commission since January 1997.
- 11 Q. Please briefly review your educational and professional background.
- A. I received a Bachelor of Arts degree from Columbia University (Barnard College) in 1975. I received a Master of Arts degree in Applied Economics from the University of Michigan in 1978.

I have almost 18 years professional experience in telecommunications, including approximately 7 with the Commission and 11 in the industry.

My telecommunications industry experience began in 1985 when I was employed by Bell of Pennsylvania (a part of Bell Atlantic, now Verizon, which included the states of Pennsylvania and Delaware) in Product Line Management as an Assistant Manager in the Analytic Support Group. In that capacity, I developed econometric models and forecasts for the Centrex and Operator Services product lines for use in the product plan. In 1987, I moved to the Carrier Access group and was responsible for switched access demand and revenue analysis for Pennsylvania and Delaware. When Bell Atlantic regionalized its Carrier Access groups in 1988-1989, my responsibilities were

expanded to include, in addition to Pennsylvania and Delaware, the states of New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia, and the District of Columbia. In that position, I was responsible for the measurement and analysis of switched access billed revenue (\$1.3 billion annually) and demand.

From 1992 to 1996, I was employed by Cincinnati Bell Telephone as a Specialist in Capital Recovery and Asset Management. I managed depreciation and performed asset management for approximately \$615 million of outside plant facilities, primarily fiber and copper cable.

In January 1997, I began employment with the Commission in the Division of Communications, now the Division of Competitive Markets and Enforcement.

While employed in the Division of Communications, I worked on arbitration dockets between incumbent local exchange companies (ILECs) and competitive local exchange companies (CLECs), and an arbitration and unbundled network element (UNE) pricing proceeding between BellSouth and CLECs. I also worked on other dockets, including the determination of the cost of basic local telecommunications service (universal service cost proxy model) and switched access rate reductions and interexchange company flow-throughs. I was the docket coordinator for BellSouth's UNE pricing proceeding through the end of 2000. Additionally, I was a part of the team that wrote the 1997 Local Competition Report.

In December 2000 I moved to the former Division of Policy Analysis and Intergovernmental Liaison. In January 2002, I began work in the Office of Market Monitoring and Strategic Analysis.

- 24 Q. Please describe your current responsibilities.
- 25 A. I am an Economic Analyst with responsibilities including the research,

- analysis and evaluation of regulatory issues affecting competition in the telecommunications market. I am also involved in monitoring, analyzing and evaluating the impact of Commission decisions on market development in the area of telecommunications.
- 5 Q. What is the purpose of your testimony today?
- 6 A. The purpose of my testimony is to sponsor the Annual Report on Competition as of June 30, 2002 (Competition Report) issued in December 2002.
- 8 The Competition Report is filed with my testimony and is identified as SMO-1.
- 9 Q. Did you prepare the Competition Report?

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10 A. The Competition Report was a collaborative effort by staff in the Office 11 of Market Monitoring and Strategic Analysis; I coordinated the project as well 12 as contributed to the content. Staff from the Divisions of External Affairs 13 and Competitive Markets and Enforcement also contributed to the report.

As coordinator, I supervised production of the data requests and accompanying letters to over 400 companies, responded to questions from companies, tracked and received the responses, performed the initial review of the responses and distributed the responses to the appropriate staff members. I was responsible for the compilation of the report, reviewing and editing it both for format and content, incorporating review comments and preparing it for publication. As a contributor to the report, I developed the initial outline and worked with other team members developing the data requests and writing the report.

- 23 Q. Why was the Competition Report prepared?
- A. This report is prepared annually to satisfy the statutory requirements set forth in Section 364.386 and Section 364.161(4), Florida Statutes.

- $1_{1}Q$ . How was information included in the Competition Report obtained?
- A. The information contained in the Competition Report was obtained from several sources. These sources include responses to data requests from ILECs and CLECs, the FCC, surveys and market research conducted by staff. These sources are more fully described on pages 15 16 of the report.
- 6 Q. What conclusions were identified in the Competition Report?

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- A. The conclusions identified in the Competition Report are included in Chapter III. Responses from ILECs and CLECs indicated the following:
  - Competitors obtained a 13% market share in 2002, up from 8% in 2001.
  - CLECs made impressive gains in the business market in 2002, increasing their share to 26% of business access lines, up from 2001's share of 16%.
  - The CLEC residential market share increased to 7% in 2002 from 4% in 2001.
  - Two percent (260,000) fewer access lines were reported in service in 2002 compared to 2001. Much of this decline is believed to be from customers discontinuing traditional lines in favor of wireless or broadband service.
- 20 Q. Please describe other information contained in the report.
- A. Chapter II of the report contains a brief overview of the local telecommunications exchange market-opening provisions of the Telecommunications
  Act of 1996 and the ongoing changes occurring in the marketplace. Chapter IV of the reports highlights current issues in local telecommunications competition such as what factors influence CLEC market entry decisions and the

1 economic impacts resulting from the surge of bankruptcies. Chapter V of the Competition Report covers the six issues required to be addressed by Chapter 364, Florida Statues. The attached appendices provide tables listing the CLECs providing service in Florida, the exchanges with providers, the percentage of CLEC access lines by exchange, state activities, federal activities, the summary of CLEC complaints, and a list of certificated CLECs as of June 30, 2002. Does this conclude your testimony? Q. Α. Yes, it does. 

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1	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Verizon, was Mr. Danner
2	sworn?
3	MR. CHAPKIS: Yes. Dr. Danner has been sworn
4	yesterday.
5	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay.
6	CARL R. DANNER
7	was called as a witness on behalf of Verizon Florida Inc. and,
8	having been duly sworn, testified as follows:
9	DIRECT EXAMINATION
10	BY MR. CHAPKIS:
11	Q Dr. Danner, could you please state your name and
12	address for the record.
13	A Yes. My name is Carl R. Danner. I'm a director with
14	Wilk & Associates/LECG. My business address is 201 Mission
15	Street, Suite 700, San Francisco, California 94105.
16	Q By whom are you employed and in what capacity?
17	A I'm a director with Wilk & Associates/LECG LLC.
18	Q And have you caused to be filed amended direct
19	testimony consisting of 28 pages in this docket?
20	A Yes, I have.
21	Q And do you have any changes to that testimony?
22	A Yes. There's one missing word on Page 13, Line 12.
23	The last word on the line should be options. So it would say,
24	"more options." I apologize. That was left out somehow.
25	Q And if I were to ask you the questions contained in

1	that testimony today, would your answers be the same with the			
2	exception of that one change?			
3	A Yes, they would.			
4	MR. CHAPKIS: I would ask that the testimony be			
5	entered into the record as though read from the stand.			
6	CHAIRMAN JABER: The prefiled direct testimony of			
7	Carl R. Danner shall be inserted into the record as though			
8	read.			
9	BY MR. CHAPKIS:			
10	Q Dr. Danner, did you cause to be filed one exhibit			
11	numbered CRD-1 to be filed as an attachment to your amended			
12	direct testimony?			
13	A Yes, I did.			
14	Q Was this exhibit created under your supervision and			
15	control?			
16	A Yes.			
17	Q Do you have any changes to that exhibit?			
18	A No.			
19	Q I would ask that that exhibit be numbered for the			
20	record, please.			
21	CHAIRMAN JABER: CRD-1 will be identified as Exhibit			
22	62.			
23	(Exhibit Number 62 marked for identification.)			
24				
25	II			

1 I.

## INTRODUCTION AND WITNESS BACKGROUND

# 3 Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, TITLE AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.

A. My name is Carl R. Danner. I am a Director with Wilk & Associates/LECG
 LLC. My business address is 201 Mission Street, Suite 700, San
 Francisco, California 94105.

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#### Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR BACKGROUND AND QUALIFICATIONS.

I was Advisor and Chief of Staff to Commissioner (and Commission President) G. Mitchell Wilk during his tenure at the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), where I played an important role in the initiation of a successful pricing reform effort with many parallels to that which Verizon's petition will accomplish in Florida. Since leaving the CPUC, I have provided consulting services to various clients on regulation and policy, with emphases on the telecommunications and energy industries. I hold a Masters and Ph.D. in Public Policy from Harvard University, where my dissertation addressed the strategic management of telecommunications regulatory reform. At Harvard, I served as Head Teaching Assistant for graduate courses in microeconomics, econometrics and managerial economics. I hold an AB degree from Stanford University, where I graduated with distinction in both economics and political science. Recently, I co-taught classes on UNEs and impairment to new state commissioners and staff at Michigan State University's annual "Camp NARUC" educational program. My experience includes researching and teaching regulation, advising regulators, testifying in regulatory

1		proceedings, and advising clients on regulatory issues. My complete
2		resume is attached as Exhibit CRD-1.
3		
4	Q.	HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY TESTIFIED BEFORE STATE REGULATORY
5		COMMISSIONS?
6	A.	Yes. I have testified regarding various telecommunications and energy
7	-	issues before state commissions in Florida, Hawaii, California, Oregon,
8		Washington, Illinois, and Indiana, and filed written comments at the FCC. I
9		have also testified in Federal District Court on economic valuation and
10		regulatory issues regarding a water company.
11		
12	Q.	HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED PRICING REFORM ISSUES
13		BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
14		(COMMISSION)?
15	A.	Yes. I was instrumental in preparing comments filed by GTE Florida
16		Incorporated (currently, Verizon Florida Inc.) in an undocketed special
17		project regarding fair and reasonable residential basic local
18		telecommunications rates (Special Project 980000A-TP). In addition to
19		preparing comments, I participated in workshops in that special project.
20		
21		Based on my experience with pricing reform in Florida, I am aware that this
22		issue has been debated in Florida for a number of years. I am also aware
23		that this debate has now culminated in the decision by the Florida
24		Legislature and the Governor, as a matter of public policy, to create a
25		process by which reform can go forward.

1 II. 2 OVERVIEW OF TESTIMONY 3 Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY? 4 A. The purpose of my testimony is twofold. First, I demonstrate that Verizon's 5 rate rebalancing plan meets the first two criteria established in Florida 6 Statutes, Section 364.164. More specifically, I show that Verizon's plan 7 will: 8 1. remove current support for basic local telecommunications services 9 that prevents the creation of a more attractive competitive local 10 exchange market for the benefit of residential consumers (Section 11 364.16(1)(a)); and 2. 12 induce enhanced market entry (Section 364.16(1)(b)).1 13 14 Second, I apply economic principles to show that Verizon's plan will have 15 beneficial effects on customers and the Florida economy. 16 17 Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR TESTIMONY. 18 Α. My review of Verizon's plan confirms that it meets the foregoing statutory 19 criteria, and will create substantial benefits for (1) competition in local 20 telephone service, (2) telephone service customers, and (3) the Florida 21 economy. I draw from a range of sources to document the sources of 22 competition the plan will encourage. In my opinion, the Commission 23

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Verizon witnesses Fulp demonstrates that Verizon's rate rebalancing plan meets the remaining criteria established in Florida Statutes, Section 364.164.

1	shoul	d embrace Verizon's plan for the benefit of the people of Florida.
2	_	
3	Q.	VERIZON HAS AMENDED ITS RATE REBALANCING PLAN, FILED
4		ON AUGUST 27, 2003, TO EXTEND THE TIME OVER WHICH
5		INTRASTATE NETWORK ACCESS AND BASIC LOCAL
6		TELECOMMUNICATIONS RATES WILL BE REFORMED. DOES
7	_	THIS AMENDMENT AFFECT YOUR ANALYSIS OF VERIZON'S
8		PLAN?
9	A.	After reviewing Verizon's amended plan, I find that it does not affect my
10		analysis.
11		
12		III.
13		VERIZON'S RATE REBALANCING PLAN REMOVES SUPPORT
14	F	OR BASIC LOCAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES (SECTION
15		364.164(1)(A))
16		
7	Q.	IS VERIZON'S BASIC LOCAL RESIDENTIAL SERVICE A SUPPORTED
8		SERVICE?
9	A.	Yes. A supported service is one that is priced below cost. Even if a
20		service covers its incremental cost, it is still supported if it does not make
21		an appropriate contribution towards joint and common costs. <sup>2</sup>
22		
23		A contribution is any amount that a firm receives from the sale of a service
24		Tree in the same and a minimum of the same of the solution

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Verizon cannot profitably sustain its services merely by covering only their incremental cost.

1		that exceeds the incremental cost of that service. The incremental cost is
2		the total cost (including a return on investment and depreciation) that a firm
3		will directly incur (or avoid) by deciding to offer (or withdraw) a service.
4		
5		Verizon's basic local residential service is a supported service because, as
6		Verizon witness Fulp describes, it is priced below its incremental cost, and
7	_	thus makes no contribution to the recovery of Verizon's joint and common
8		costs.3
9		
0		
1	Q.	WILL VERIZON'S RATE REBALANCING PLAN REMOVE SUPPORT
2		FROM THE COMPANY'S BASIC LOCAL SERVICES?
3	A.	Yes. Increasing the price of a supported service decreases support for
4		that service. Verizon's rate rebalancing plan will increase the price of basic
5		local services, thereby removing support from those services.
6		
7		IV.
8		VERIZON'S RATE REBALANCING PLAN (1) FACILITATES
9		THE CREATION OF A MORE ATTRACTIVE LOCAL EXCHANGE
20	M	ARKET FOR THE BENEFIT OF RESIDENTIAL CONSUMERS AND
21	(2) 11	IDUCES ENHANCED MARKET ENTRY (SECTION 364.164(1)(A)– (B))
22		
23	Q.	WILL VERIZON'S RATE REBALANCING PLAN FACILITATE THE
24		CREATION OF A MORE ATTRACTIVE LOCAL EXCHANGE MARKET

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Fulp Direct Testimony at 26:10-16.

#### FOR THE BENEFIT OF RESIDENTIAL CONSUMERS?

Yes. Verizon's rate rebalancing plan will remove support for its basic local residential services by reducing the contribution made by its intrastate access rates. Because the reformed rates will more closely reflect the actual cost of providing these services than do the existing rates, the reformed rates will send more accurate price signals to the market. The existence of more accurate price signals will increase consumer welfare by (1) making the local exchange market more attractive to competitors, thereby inducing enhanced market entry and (2) giving consumers improved economic incentives to demand services based on comparing their value (to a consumer) against their actual economic cost.<sup>4</sup> As I discuss further below, an important benefit of these improved economic incentives will be the ability for consumers to use their telephones more by making more intrastate long distance calls at lower prices.

Α.

## Q. DOES YOUR ANALYSIS OF ENHANCED MARKET ENTRY EXAMINE ALTERNATIVE MARKET DEFINITIONS AND A VARIETY OF TYPES OF

### **ENTRY?**

Yes, it does. I examine the market from the standpoint of basic service only, and also from the standpoint of a basic/non-basic service bundle. In addition, I examine a variety of types of entry with respect to a range of

Verizon's proposed basic business rates will in certain zones make a substantial contribution to common costs (based on the cost standard used in Mr. Fulp's testimony). The increased basic business service and non-recurring installation charges will create a risk for Verizon, because these prices may be more difficult for Verizon to sustain than its reformed residential service prices. Verizon's willingness to assume this risk is evidence that these prices are reasonable in light of the market conditions in Verizon's Florida service areas.

technologies, and how competitive providers using such technologies may approach a basic service-only market, or a more expansive market definition focused on bundles.

### Q. HOW WILL MORE ACCURATE PRICE SIGNALS INDUCE ENHANCED MARKET ENTRY AND WHY IS THIS GOOD FOR CONSUMERS?

A. \_ Verizon's current residential basic monthly rates are well below incremental cost, and therefore impair competition for residential customers. The availability of local service at these below-cost or supported prices limits the prices that competitive local providers can charge. To the extent other providers' costs are similar to Verizon's, the existing supported prices make it economically infeasible for those providers to compete.

If a provider had a cost structure similar to Verizon's, the existing supported prices would be below that provider's costs to provide the same or a similar service. Therefore, to win customers from Verizon, that provider would be forced to price its services at below-cost levels. Absent a support flow similar to Verizon's, it is not rational or profitable for the provider to price its services below cost. For this reason, competitors that have cost structures similar to Verizon's simply cannot compete against Verizon's existing supported rates.

Prices that more closely reflect underlying costs, such as those in Verizon's rate rebalancing plan, will increase the likelihood that other

1	providers can offer services at a price equal to or lower than that offered by
2	Verizon, and still remain profitable. As a result, reformed prices will make
3	the local exchange market more attractive to competitors and induce
4	enhanced market entry.⁵

O. UNDER VERIZON'S RATE REBALANCING PLAN, THE INCREASE IN

BASIC LOCAL RATES WILL BE OFFSET BY A DECREASE IN

INTRASTATE ACCESS RATES, AND CORRESPONDING REDUCTIONS

IN INTRASTATE LONG DISTANCE PRICES. IN LIGHT OF THIS FACT,

IS IT REASONABLE TO CONCLUDE THAT REFORMING PRICES WILL

INDUCE ENHANCED MARKET ENTRY?

12 A. Yes. Reforming Verizon's rates will induce market entry even though the
13 basic local rate increases will be offset by decreases in intrastate long
14 distance prices.

15

16

First, the prices of individual services can stimulate market entry.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> For example, FCC Chairman Michael Powell has observed the following: "...there's been talk for years about rate rebalancing. I happen to believe strongly that if a state doesn't take on seriously the question about how to examine the issue of rate rebalancing, it's all for naught. You don't know how many competitors are going to find a way to compete if they can't get their retail rate at some level of economic reasonableness..." (Phone+ Magazine, Interview With FCC Chairman Michael Powell, April, 2002, <a href="http://www.phoneplusmag.com/articles/241INTERVIEW.html">http://www.phoneplusmag.com/articles/241INTERVIEW.html</a>). Moreover, Economists Robert Crandall and Leonard Waverman described the impact of pricing in this way: "An obvious explanation exists for the lack of competition in residential lines: regulated flat rates are so low that no new entrant is interested in pursuing such customers. Only when rates are rebalanced toward cost will these entrants attempt to compete for residential customers." (Crandall, Robert W. and Leonard Waverman. Who Pays for Universal Service? When Telephone Subsidies Become Transparent (Brookings Institution Press, 2000), page 137).

Basic service and other offerings are priced separately, and customers routinely mix and match basic service from one provider with other offerings from different providers. Moreover, regulators treat basic service and long distance services as distinct offerings, and for many years have required that carriers have equal access to local exchange customers. As a result, competitors may choose to compete in the basic local market, the long distance market, markets for specialized offerings, or all of the above.

Historical patterns of entry and competition show that the prices of individual services influence competition. There is a reason, for example, that long distance providers often bombard customers with competitive service solicitations, but express little or no corresponding interest in supplying the same customers' basic service: the long distance offering is profitable, while the basic local service is not.<sup>6</sup>

Second, the distribution of customer bills affects competition.

The inaccurate pricing inherent in Verizon's existing rate structure tends to skew the distribution of customer bills. By overpricing intrastate long distance calling, current rates increase bills for high volume toll and long distance users by an amount greater than the added costs such users impose on carriers. As a result, high volume toll and long distance users are made artificially attractive to competitors, while others (whose bills are

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The price of an individual service may also affect competitors that want to assemble retail bundles for customers from a variety of wholesale providers (including providers of basic service).

thereby reduced) are made artificially unattractive.

This skewed distribution of customer bills has implications for the entry decisions made by competitive providers. For example, a carrier deciding whether to build facilities to a neighborhood must consider factors such as the number of customers it can attract, and their likely spending on its services. The skewed bills that result from the current rate structure reduce the number of potentially compensatory customers available to the new provider, and therefore force that provider to try to attract the relatively small pool of potentially compensatory customers to help cover its costs. By decreasing the size of the pool of potentially compensatory customers, the current rate structure increases the risk of such investment. Verizon's plan will level out the distribution of customer bills to better resemble the actual costs of service, thus making a greater proportion of customers potentially compensatory for a new provider.

WILL VERIZON'S PRICING REFORM PLAN ENCOURAGE INCREASES Q. IN TOLL AND LONG DISTANCE USAGE, AND THEREFORE MAKE **RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS MORE ATTRACTIVE TO COMPETITION?** A. Yes. Because the newly enacted legislation requires long distance providers to flow through access reductions, toll and long distance prices will fall, which in turn would stimulate toll and long distance usage. This reaction will increase the size of the market opportunity for competitors, and therefore also promote competition for residential customers.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Section 364.163(2).

1 2 Q. ARE THERE ANY OTHER BENEFITS ASSOCIATED WITH VERIZON'S 3 PRICING REFORM PLAN? 4 Α. Yes. Competitive pressures will likely force Verizon to reduce its toll prices. Such reductions will not be offset with increases under §364.164 5 6 and will therefore serve as an additional customer benefit. 7 IS THERE A PARTICULAR CLASS OF RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMER 8 Q. 9 THAT BENEFITS THE MOST FROM VERIZON'S PLAN? 10 Yes. Verizon's plan will benefit existing Lifeline customers and additional 11 customers who will qualify for Lifeline under the expanded provisions of §364.164.8 Lifeline subscribers will see the price they pay for basic service 12 13 preserved at its current level, while at the same time enjoying the benefits 14 of reduced prices for long distance calling created by the pass through of access charge reductions.9 15 16 17 Q. WHAT ADDITIONAL ECONOMIC BENEFITS WILL FLOW TO 18 CUSTOMERS, INCLUDING RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS, WHEN 19 **VERIZON'S PLAN IS APPROVED?** 

20 A. There are two important additional economic benefits that customers will

At present, Verizon serves just over 21,000 Lifeline customers in Florida, and Verizon expects that its Lifeline subscribership will nearly double under the new criteria that make more low income customers eligible for the program's benefits.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Some of these customers may also benefit from the elimination of fixed monthly instate access charge recovery fees imposed by long distance carriers.

receive under Verizon's plan.<sup>10</sup>

First, as I suggested above, customers will respond to lower toll and long distance prices by increasing their use of those services. It is well established in economics that such volume increases benefit customers; in the instant case, customers will benefit from being able to use the phone more than they did before at lower prices. This point can be demonstrated by a consumer surplus analysis, or by the common-sense observation that a customer who freely elects to make more calls would do so only if he or she is made better off as a result.

Second, customers will benefit from increased availability of competitive options. Increased competition is likely to provide at least some customers with options they find preferable to their existing Verizon wireline service, including innovations that Verizon may then be encouraged to adopt for its

For an outstanding quantitative analysis of some of the benefits of pricing reform, see Hausman, Jerry, Tardiff, Timothy, and Alexander Belinfante. "The Effects of the Breakup of AT&T on Telephone Penetration in the United States," <u>American Economic Review</u> 83, Volume 2 (May, 1993), 178-184. Professor Hausman and his co-authors documented a small, but meaningful increase in universal service due to a Federal pricing reform that was similar to Verizon's plan. The reason was that undercharging for basic phone service through overcharging for long distance calls (the same situation Verizon's plan will remedy in Florida) was a bad bargain; on average, it degraded the value of telephone service to consumers by more than the basic service price discount they thereby obtained.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> By increasing the value of phone service to customers, such benefits can even cause an increase in universal service (an effect that has previously been documented, <u>e.g.</u>, by Hausman et.al).

<sup>12</sup> This additional calling may increase customer phone bills somewhat, but any such increased bill amounts will be more than offset by the consumer benefits of the added calls.

remaining customers. Increased competition will also place increased pressure on Verizon to operate efficiently, thereby promoting the efficient use of resources in Florida's economy.

### Q. FROM A BROAD PUBLIC POLICY PERSPECTIVE, WILL PRICING REFORM CREATE BENEFITS FOR THE PEOPLE OF FLORIDA?

A. \_ Yes. Floridians will see net economic benefits and an increase in competitive alternatives. As stated above, more economically rational prices will stimulate local competition based on a sound economic footing, rather than stimulating competition based on the arbitrage of inaccurate prices. As a result, customers (including those who may have been deterred in the past by high prices) will be able to take advantage of more

at affordable prices.

Pricing reform will also signal investors that the Governor, Legislature and this Commission are serious about promoting competition and removing impediments to its success. <sup>13</sup> For those who might commit new capital to Florida, this signal will be important not just for what it says about current business opportunities, but also for what it says about the Commission's likely future approach to issues that may affect these investments in the future. Reform will thus build confidence in the investment climate for local competition in Florida.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> An even stronger positive signal will be sent if the Commission approves pricing reforms at the same time for Verizon, BellSouth and Sprint, which collectively serve 98 percent of ILEC lines in Florida.

1	V.
2	POTENTIAL COMPETITORS ARE POISED TO ENTER
3	THE MARKET IN RESPONSE TO PRICING REFORM
4	(SECTION 364.164(1)(B))
5	Q. HAS THE ENACTMENT OF PRICING REFORM LEGISLATION
6	ALREADY LED TO A SPECIFIC, PRO-COMPETITIVE MARKET
7	_ DEVELOPMENT THAT BENEFITS RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS IN
8	VERIZON'S SERVICE AREA?
9	A. Yes. On July 18, 2003, Knology, Inc. announced that it had agreed to
10	purchase Verizon's broadband cable assets in Pinellas County. Knolog
11	already offers bundled video, Internet and phone service in eight othe
12	markets in the southeast, and is now positioned to offer these bundles in
13	Pinellas. <sup>14</sup> In its press release regarding the transaction, Knology made
14	clear the potential for future pricing reform influenced its decision to
15	expand. Specifically, the press release states:
16	the Tele-Competition Act recently enacted in Florida
17	positively influenced [Knowlogy's] decision to expand
18	operations in the state. This Act, as written by the Florida
19	Legislature and supported by Governor Bush, laid the
20	foundation for companies like Knology to enter the Florida
21	market, and offer competitive services and products to
22	consumers.
23	
24	The <u>Tampa Tribune</u> reported that Knology's senior director of marketing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> "Verizon Finds Cable Buyer," <u>St. Petersburg Times</u>, July 19, 2003.

"said the deal was facilitated by the state law approved by the Legislature
this year that raised local phone rates as a way to stimulate telephone
competition."

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## 5 Q. DOES VERIZON'S CURRENT RATE STRUCTURE DISCOURAGE 6 COMPETITORS THAT ARE WELL POSITIONED TO SERVE 7 RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS FROM ACTUALLY DOING SO?

A. Yes. The evidence demonstrates that Verizon's distorted rates discourage such competitors from serving residential customers.

Facilities-based competition has developed for business customers but not for residential customers. In Verizon's Florida service area, competitors now serve approximately 10 business lines for every one residential line, and facilities-based competitors now serve more than one hundred business lines for every residential line.<sup>16</sup>

The scarcity of residential competition cannot be attributed to an absence of viable competitors. Verizon's competitors have deployed extensive facilities (including numerous circuit and packet switches, and more than 15 competitive local fiber networks) in geographic locations that include virtually all of Verizon's residential customers.<sup>17</sup> This is significant because, as a technical matter, it is just as feasible to serve residential

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> "Verizon Sells Cable television Units to Ga. Company," <u>Tampa Tribune</u>, July 19, 2003, Business section page 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Leo Direct Testimony, Exhibit ETL-1at 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> In many of these locations, four or more CLECs are providing service today.

1		customers using these facilities as it is to serve business customers.
2		
3		The disparity in the level of competition for business and residential
4		customers is attributable, at least in part, to distorted residential prices.
5		Fortunately, as explained above, Verizon's rate rebalancing plan will
6		reduce this disparity by making residential customers more attractive to
7		competitors.
8		
9	Q.	SHOULD THE COMMISSION CONSIDER A VARIETY OF
10		TECHNOLOGIES AND BUSINESS MODELS WHEN EVALUATING THE
11		COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPE IN VERIZON'S SERVICE TERRITORY?
12	A.	Yes. Given the diversity of customers, providers, technologies, and
13		possible competitive strategies that exist in the market, a wide range of
14		competitive approaches will be used to reach residential customers. Most
15		of these competitors will not closely copy Verizon's existing network or
16		specific service options because offering something new or slightly
17		different is (1) consistent with many of the available competitive
18		technologies and (2) a good way to attract customers' attention.
19		
20		Customers themselves will be likely to differ in the features and services
21		they prefer and how much they will be willing to pay for them. Some
22		customers will opt for less costly, lower-quality alternatives, while others
23		will choose to pay a premium for higher quality service.
24		
25		Accordingly, when evaluating the potential impact of Verizon's rate

1	rebalancing plan, the Commission should consider all potential substitutes
2	for Verizon's basic local service.
3	
4	Q. ARE LOCAL CABLE TELEVISION SERVICE PROVIDERS WELL
5	POSITIONED TO COMPETE FOR BASIC RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS
6	IN VERIZON'S FLORIDA TERRITORY?
7	A Yes. Cable television providers in many parts of the nation have already
8	upgraded their networks to provide a variety of two-way services (including
9	local telephone service) to residential customers.
10	· ·
11	Bright House Networks, the principal cable television provider in Verizon's
12	service area, is well on its way to being able to offer cable telephony
13	services. It already provides cable modem service over its network in
14	Tampa, which makes clear that it has completed many of the upgrades
15	needed to provide telephony service and has already gained experience in
16	provisioning and billing non-cable television offerings to its customers.18
17	
18	Moreover, the corporate owners of Bright House Networks have
19	experience with cable telephony services. Before Time Warner sold its
20	Tampa cable system to its venture partner Advance/Newhouse, Time
21	Warner (which is still one of Bright House's owners) completed a trial in
22	Tampa of cable telephony that relies on Internet Protocol (IP)-based

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> A natural competitive evolution for cable television providers has been to first offer digital cable and cable modem service, and then to begin offering local telephony.

packet switching, rather than conventional circuit switching. 19

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Time Warner's reliance on IP Protocol is particularly significant because:

(1) IP-technology can permit a cable provider to add a telephone line for a one-time cost of about \$300-600, 20 which is less expensive than the circuit-switched technology that has been used to provide most of the cable telephony offered to date; 21 and (2) concerns with the quality of voice-over-IP service have recently diminished, as evidenced by IBM's recent decision (in March, 2003) to transition its workforce to voice-over-IP telephone service. 22

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### Q. IS IT IMPORTANT TO TAKE ACTION TO ENSURE THAT CABLE

### 13 TELEVISION PROVIDERS INVEST IN FLORIDA?

14 A. Yes. Cable television providers, especially those like Time Warner (a 15 subsidiary of a diversified media, entertainment and information technology 16 company with worldwide operations), have a plethora of investment

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Time Warner's experience is not limited to that single trial. It has begun offering commercial versions of IP cable telephony in other parts of Verizon's service territory. Of course, Time Warner is not alone in this endeavor, as Cablevision, Comcast and Cox are also conducting trials of this service in various markets. <u>Id.</u> at 12.

Merrill Lynch Global Securities Research & Economics Group. "Voice Over Broadband," (June 24, 2003), page 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Using circuit-switched technology, Cox estimates a per-customer investment of \$610 to provide the average 1.3 lines a residential customer demands (\$498 per line); for voice over IP, the corresponding figures are \$564 per customer and \$462 per line. "Cox Communications VoIP Whitepaper," February, 2003, pages 6-8 (<a href="http://www.cox.com/PressRoom/supportdocuments/VOIDwhitepaper.pdf">http://www.cox.com/PressRoom/supportdocuments/VOIDwhitepaper.pdf</a>, viewed July 31, 2003). If the VOIP service is powered from home electricity (i.e., no network backup power), the cost falls to \$404 per customer and \$310 per line.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Goldman Sachs Global Equity Research. "VoIP – the enabler of real telecom competition," (July 7, 2003), pages 6, 15-19.

opportunities available to them. Even cable television providers that have decided to offer telephone service on a broad basis have the opportunity to invest in a number of different markets outside of Florida. Given that there is competition for the cable companies' investment dollars, it is important for the Commission to improve the attractiveness of investing in telephony in Florida by approving Verizon's pricing reform petition. Pricing reform can move Florida markets ahead in the queue, bringing more telephone service options to consumers sooner.

Α.

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## Q. WILL THE INCREASE IN VERIZON'S BASIC LOCAL RESIDENTIAL RATES BE PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT TO CABLE TELEVISION PROVIDERS?

Yes. Cable television providers typically have a market share for cable television service of about two-thirds of all homes passed. The cable provider starts with an access line already in the home, onto which telephone service can be added on a purely incremental basis. The start-up cost (of \$600 or less per service) is thus an important benchmark against which a cable provider will evaluate the attractiveness of its residential service offering. Given their high market penetration and this relatively low start-up cost, an increase of four to five dollars on the basic monthly rate is a significant inducement for cable television providers to enter the basic local service market.

Cable telephony is one alternative for which the stand-alone increase in the basic rate may be particularly significant. Cable television providers

use a different technology than a customer may be accustomed to, and therefore may have difficulty capturing all of a customer's local telephone business at first. For example, one option for a cable provider could be to use non-powered equipment, which does not have a battery to permit service during power outages.<sup>23</sup> Cable telephony also uses a different technology from that which a customer may be used to. Reasons like \_ these may cause customers to hesitate to commit to cable telephony as their primary line before gaining experience with the offering. To the extent a customer initially may wish to try cable telephony as a second or third line rather than a full replacement for existing service, the customer may generate few additional usage charges (e.g., for second lines used for fax or Internet connections). Because the cable provider will need to rely almost entirely on the basic rate to try to recover its investment in these cases, a more cost-based Verizon basic service price will make it easier for cable providers to charge a basic service rate that offers an acceptable investment return.24

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Accordingly, the adoption of Verizon's rate rebalancing plan is particularly important to stimulate market entry among cable television providers.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> This approach may become more acceptable given the enormous customer penetration of wireless phones that will function in a blackout (as long as their batteries are charged).

As a simple illustrative example, the payback period needed to recover a \$600 investment is reduced by nearly a year if one compares a \$20 basic rate (600 / 20 = 30 months), versus a \$15 basic rate (600 / 15 = 40 months). Other things equal, a shorter payback period generally indicates a more attractive investment opportunity.

Α.

# Q. ARE OTHER PROVIDERS THAT MAKE USE OF ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES WELL POSITIONED TO ENTER THE MARKET IN RESPONSE TO PRICING REFORM?

Yes. Vonage (<a href="www.vonage.com">www.vonage.com</a>) employs voice over IP technology to offer flat-rate local service for \$25.99 per month, including a large local calling area, 500 minutes of long distance, vertical services and voice mail, and deeply discounted long distance and international calling rates. Vonage will add unlimited long distance calling for \$39.99 per month. Vonage already has gained over 20,000 subscribers nationwide, and plans to acquire 100,000 customers before the end of 2003. Pricing reform will make residential customers more attractive to Vonage (and to other providers that might use similar technology), because Verizon's basic local rate will more closely approach the competitive price that Vonage charges for its local service alternative.

A.

## Q. WILL PRICING REFORM PROMOTE CUSTOMER INTEREST IN BROADBAND INTERNET CONNECTIONS IN FLORIDA?

Yes. Today, broadband connections to the Internet are increasingly available to customers. Florida's current prices for local telephone service systematically under-price the old, less capable network connections, and thus discourage consumers from upgrading to something better. When presented with prices that more closely reflect the genuine costs of their choices, some consumers will doubtless elect to stay with what they have, but others will recognize a better value in upgrading to a broadband

connection that may allow them, among other things, to obtain basic telephone service through the same connection over which they access the Internet at high speed. Thus, pricing reform will promote the goal of making broadband use more ubiquitous.

A.

#### Q. WILL VERIZON'S PLAN PROMOTE INCREASED COMPETITION BY

#### \_ WIRELESS PROVIDERS?

Yes. Wireless services already compete extensively with wireline services, and pricing reform will increase the attractiveness of wireless as a substitute for wireline services. Increased competition from wireless providers will benefit a large number of Floridians because: (1) wireless phones are close substitutes for wireline phones;<sup>25</sup> (2) wireless phones are prevalent in this state;<sup>26</sup> and (3) a growing number of customers are abandoning their wireline phone service for a wireless phone, and an even larger share of traffic minutes are migrating to wireless networks.<sup>27</sup>

### Q. WILL PRICING REFORM MAKE RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS IN VERIZON'S SERVICE AREA MORE ATTRACTIVE TO REGIONAL

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> A majority of Florida residents already considered wireless to be a "close substitute" to wireline service in 1998. Florida Public Service Commission. "Telecommunications Markets in Florida," Annual Report on Competition (as of June 30, 2002), pages 7-9.

Nationally, there is a wireless phone in service for every one out of two people (including children), and, in Florida, wireless phones are even more prevalent than in the nation as a whole. FPSC Annual Report on Competition, supra note 25. As of year-end 2002, the FCC estimated a penetration of 55.73 percent for Tampa – St. Petersburg – Clearwater, FL. FCC, Eighth Report on CMRS Competition (July 14, 2003), Appendix D, page D-4 (Table 3).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> For its part, the Commission has already recognized that "Florida ILECs are perhaps more vulnerable to wireless competition than most other states," due to seasonal residents discontinuing landline connections in favor of wireless.

### WIRELESS PROVIDERS?

2 A. Yes. Verizon's plan will encourage competition from smaller, regional
3 wireless providers that can compete directly with wireline basic service
4 through local calling plans with unlimited wireless minutes.<sup>28</sup>

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In other jurisdictions, regional wireless providers offer packages that are designed to replace wireline service. For example, in Sacramento, California, SureWest Wireless offers a wireless plan with unlimited local minutes and five vertical services for \$33 per month, which can be upgraded to include unlimited long distance calling within northern California for another \$4 per month.<sup>29</sup> Similarly, Cricket Wireless in Columbus, Georgia offers unlimited local usage for \$32.99 per month, which can be upgraded to include three vertical features and 500 minutes of long distance for an additional \$7 per month.<sup>30</sup> In their marketing, such carriers make clear that their service is intended as a replacement for a wireline phone, not just an adjunct to it.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> See a discussion of this strategy at pages 51-52 of the FCC's <u>Eighth Report</u>, supra note 21.

SureWest "Unlimited" plan from http://www.surewestwireless.com/products/plans/unlimited.htm; SureWest "Unlimitedplus" plan from http://www.surewestwireless.com/products/plans/unlimitedplus.htm (pages viewed July 2, 2003). Both plans require two-year contracts, and include discounts on wireless phones (including some "free" handset options).

http://www.cricketcommunications.com/service.asp#cricket (viewed July 2, 2003). A one-year service commitment is required; customers purchase handsets for prices starting at \$99.

For example, a recent survey revealed that 37 percent of Cricket customers have no wired phone. Other research indicates that wireless usage (on all wireless carriers) has displaced 25 percent of U.S. landline phone minutes. "Leap Continues to Lead National Trend of 'Cord Cutters'", May 12, 2003 Leap Wireless International press release found at <a href="http://www.leapwireless.com/dindex.html">http://www.leapwireless.com/dindex.html</a> (viewed July 30, 2003).

At present, such wireless alternatives do not appear to be available to Verizon's Florida customers, even though Alltel (which does offer wireless service in the area) offers similar plans in several other states.<sup>32</sup> A belowcost wireline basic rate obviously impairs competition for residential consumers from this source.

By reducing the gap between the basic wireline monthly rate and the price of this alternative, pricing reform will encourage current (or potential) wireless providers to offer these services in Florida, either by repricing existing service or by building out facilities that may be needed to use existing wireless licenses to provide service.

- Q. WILL PRICING REFORM ALSO ENCOURAGE CUSTOMERS WITH EXISTING WIRELESS PLANS TO CONSIDER EXPANDING THEIR WIRELESS USE TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT THEIR WIRELESS SERVICE BECOMES A COMPLETE SUBSTITUTE FOR THEIR WIRELINE SERVICE?
- A. Yes. Pricing reform will encourage such expansion by making it more economically attractive for these customers to shift all of their telephone usage to a wireless service. The average wireless bill is about \$50 per month.<sup>33</sup> In Verizon's Florida service area, a wireless rate plan of about

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Supra note 26; the FCC reported such Alltel plans in Arizona, New Mexico, North Carolina, Nebraska and Arkansas.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> The average was \$48.40 per month for 2002. FCC, <u>Eighth Report (supra note 26)</u>, Appendix D, table 9.

\$75 per month can substitute for a residential wireline telephone. Thus, for the average customer who already uses a wireless phone, the incremental expense to disconnect the wired phone is approximately \$25 per month. A customer with less than average line usage (or whose wireline usage already tends towards off-peak times as rated for wireless plans) will have an even greater inducement to shift entirely to wireless. By bringing Verizon's wireline basic rate to a more cost-based level, pricing reform will make the replacement of wired service with wireless service (for those who already have the latter) potentially attractive to an even greater cross-section of residential customers, and therefore encourage wireless providers to refine and market such plans.

Α.

### Q. WILL PRICING REFORM CREATE INCREASED COMPETITIVE RISK FOR VERIZON?

Yes, Verizon will face increased risk, just as the statute intends through its stimulus of local competition for residential customers. For this reason, it is not possible to predict with any precision what revenues Verizon will ultimately receive following pricing reform, or how those revenues will change in the following months or years. The great uncertainty (and controversy) that would be inherent in any such forecasting effort helps highlight why the Florida Legislature made a wise choice to base pricing reform on recorded revenues and units for a defined period, absent demand stimulation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> For example, T-Mobile offers a plan with 1000 peak minutes, unlimited off-peak minutes and the full set of features (including long distance) for \$59.99/month. <a href="http://www.t-mobile.com/plans/national/plus.asp">http://www.t-mobile.com/plans/national/plus.asp</a> (viewed August 7, 2003, for Tampa, Florida).

2		·VI.
3		PRIOR EXPERIENCE WITH PRICING REFORM
4		INDICATES THAT IT CAN PROCEED WITHOOUT
5		NOTABLE DIFFICULTIES FOR CUSTOMERS
6	Q.	DOES PRIOR EXPERIENCE WITH PRICING REFORM SUGGEST THAT
7	_	IT CAN PROCEED WITHOUT CAUSING NOTABLE DIFFICULTIES FOR
8		CUSTOMERS?
9	A.	Yes. In California, for example, the Public Utilities Commission pricing
10		reform order in 1994 <sup>35</sup> raised basic rates for Pacific Bell and GTE California
11		customers in exchange for reductions in access charges and toll prices.
12		The basic rate increase for Pacific Bell customers was slightly smaller than
13		the increase Verizon proposes for Florida, while the GTE California basic
14		rate increase was larger (from \$9.75 per month to \$17.25 per month). As
15		is proposed here, prices for in-state toll and access charges were also cut
16		sharply to promote competition and to encourage economic efficiency.
17		Lifeline customers were among the biggest beneficiaries of pricing reform
18		in California (as they will be in Florida), and pricing reform was understood
19		to be an essential component of a pro-competition regulatory policy (at that
20		time for toll service in California, and now for basic residential service in
21		Florida). <sup>36</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> CPUC decision 94-09-065, September 15, 1994.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> It is noteworthy that the ratepayer advocacy arm of the CPUC staff (then the Division of Ratepayer Advocates) supported pricing reform as beneficial to consumers.

Following the implementation of these rate changes in California, there was no apparent impact on universal service, and no widespread expressions of concern from customers that were evident either to me as a close observer of the situation, or to the companies themselves.

There are other examples that suggest pricing reform does not undermine universal service. For example, Professor Hausman and his co-authors<sup>37</sup> noted that the Consumer Federation of America and the U.S. Public Interest Research Group predicted that 6 million subscribers would give up their phone service during 1984-86 due to Federal telephone pricing reform (that again paralleled the reform Verizon proposes for Florida). Contrary to this claim, subscribers actually increased by 4.1 million during this period, in part due to the reform's beneficial impacts on universal service.

**VII.** 

Α.

CONCLUSION

### 19 Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS.

Verizon's pricing reform plan conforms with the requirements of §364.164, and will result in telephone service prices that are more fair, accurate, economically efficient, and consistent with local telephone service competition for residential customers. Through its compliance with §364.164 and in my independent judgment, Verizon's plan will advance the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Hausman et. al, (op. cit.), page 182 note 7.

1		public interest and should be approved.
2		·
3	Q.	DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY AT THIS TIME?
4	A.	Yes, it does.
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- 1	DI PIK. CHAFKIS.
2	Q Dr. Danner, did you cause to be filed in this docket
3	rebuttal testimony consisting of 50 pages?
4	A Yes, I did.
5	Q And did you cause to be filed an errata revising
6	Pages 42 and 43 of your rebuttal testimony on December 2nd,
7	2003?
8	A Yes, I did.
9	Q And other than the errata changes, do you have any
10	other changes to that testimony?
11	A I do not.
12	Q And if I were to ask you the questions contained in
13	that testimony today, would the answers be the same with the
14	exception of the errata portion?
15	A Yes, they would.
16	MR. CHAPKIS: I would ask that the testimony be
17	entered into the record as though read from the stand,
18	including the errata sheets.
19	CHAIRMAN JABER: Prefiled rebuttal testimony of Carl
20	R. Danner, including the errata sheets to said testimony, will
21	be inserted into the record as though read.
22	MR. CHAPKIS: Thank you. And I will just note for
23	the record that Pages 42 and Pages 43 of that rebuttal
24	testimony contain confidential information.
25	CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you.

CHADKIC.

1		l.
2		INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF REBUTTAL TESTIMONY
3	Q.	PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, TITLE AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.
4	A.	My name is Carl R. Danner. I am a Director with Wilk 8
5		Associates/LECG LLC. My business address is 201 Mission Street
6		Suite 700, San Francisco, California 94105.
7		
8	Q.	ARE YOU THE SAME CARL R. DANNER WHO SUBMITTED DIRECT
9		TESTIMONY ON BEHALF OF VERIZON IN THIS PROCEEDING?
10	A.	Yes.
11		
12	Q.	WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY?
13	A.	The purpose of my testimony is to respond to certain issues raised by
14		Citizens' witnesses Drs. David Gabel and Bion Ostrander, AARP
15		witness Dr. Mark Cooper, AT&T witness Mr. Wayne Fonteix, AT&T and
16		MCI witness Dr. John Mayo, and Commission Staff witness Mr. Gregory
17		Shafer.
18		
19	Q.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY.
20	A.	Opposition witnesses have made a variety of claims regarding Verizon
21		Florida's pricing reform plan. I review these claims, and find them to be
22		unwarranted for a variety of reasons.
23		
24		First, the criteria under Section 364.164(1) are factors for the
25		Commission to consider, not standards that must individually be

satisfied. Moreover, these criteria are clear and unambiguous on their face and therefore require no elaborate exercise in interpretation. In particular, Section 364.164(1)(a) provides that the Commission must consider whether Verizon's rate rebalancing plan removes pricing support that stands in the way of increased competition that would benefit residential customers. It does not require that Verizon must show that residential customers will immediately receive lower monthly bills, as opposing witnesses contend.

Second, Verizon has submitted evidence demonstrating that granting its rate rebalancing plan will remove current support for basic local services that prevents the creation of a more attractive competitive local exchange market for the benefit of residential customers. The claims of opposing witnesses to the contrary rely on strained analysis, suggest unrealistic scenarios, and are contrary to observed fact.

Third, Verizon has demonstrated that its basic local residential services are supported. The claims of opposing witnesses to the contrary either misapply or contradict fundamental principles of costing and economics.

Fourth, Verizon has shown that granting its rate rebalancing plan will provide a variety of benefits to residential customers. The evidence does not support claims that pricing reform will harm universal service or cause undue customer hardship.

1		Finally, although this testimony is necessarily devoted to the rebuttal of
2		mistaken opposition positions, the Commission should keep in mind the
3		positive opportunity Verizon's petition provides for the people of Florida.
4		Moving telephone service prices towards their true costs is an important
5		step that will benefit customers and the economy, will promote
6		competition, and will not cause disruption or hardship. The Commission
7		should take this opportunity to approve Verizon's balanced and
8		reasonable reform plan.
9		
10		II.
11		THE STATUTE'S MEANING IS CLEAR AND FOLLOWS DIRECTLY
12		FROM THE COMMISSION'S OWN ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
13	Q.	DR. COOPER CONTENDS THAT PORTIONS OF THE ACT ARE
14		UNCLEAR AND REQUIRE CLARIFICATION FROM THE
15		LEGISLATIVE RECORD (COOPER PAGE 4, LINES 3-6). DO YOU
16		AGREE?
17	A.	No. The statute is clear and unambiguous on its face.
18		
19	Q.	WHAT IS THE MEANING OF SECTION 364.164(1)(A), THE
20		PROVISION THAT PURPORTEDLY CONFUSED DR. COOPER?
21	A.	Section 364.164(1)(a) directs the Commission to consider whether
22		granting these petitions will:
23		Remove current support for basic local
24		telecommunications services that prevents the
25		creation of a more attractive competitive local

1		exchange market for the benefit of residential
2		customers.
3		
4		This provision is clear in both of its essential regards.
5		
6		First, it is clear that Section 364.164(1)(a) is only one of four criteria the
7		Commission must consider in evaluating Verizon's petition. The statute
8		does not create a "pass fail" test regarding this or the other specified
9		criteria. Under the Act, the Commission retains discretion to evaluate
10		and balance these criteria as it sees fit.
11		
12		Second, Section 364.164(1)(a) is equally clear in the substance of what
13		the Commission is to consider. This provision encourages the removal
14		of pricing support that stands in the way of increased competition that
15		would benefit residential customers. It is a fundamental principle of
16		economics that subsidized prices impair competition. In this provision,
17		the Legislature has recognized this basic principle and asked the
18		Commission to pursue the related remedy of pricing reform to address a
19		well-recognized fact - that basic service competitors are largely ignoring
20		residential customers in Florida.
21		
22	Q.	HAS THE COMMISSION PREVIOUSLY RECOGNIZED THAT BASIC
23		RATE INCREASES MAY REDUCE HISTORICAL SUBSIDIES AND
24		MAKE RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS MORE ATTRACTIVE TO LOCAL
25		SERVICE COMPETITORS?

Yes. In 1998, the Legislature requested that the Commission conduct a comprehensive study of competition in Florida. In response to the Legislature's request, the Commission complied and issued its Fair and Reasonable Report. See "Report of the Florida Public Service Commission on the Relationships Among the Costs and Charges Associated with Providing Basic Local Service, Intrastate Access, and Other Services Provided by Local Exchange Companies, in Compliance with Chapter 98-277, Section 2(1), Laws of Florida," and "The Conclusions of the Florida Public Service Commission as to the Fair and Reasonable Florida Basic Local Telecommunications Service Rate, in Compliance with Chapter 98-277, Section 2(2)(A), Laws of Florida" (February 15, 1999).

Α.

In that Report, the Commission addressed the exact questions that are at issue here — <u>i.e.</u>, where subsidies exist, what effect they have on competition, what a fair and reasonable remedy would be, and various related technical issues of costing and economics. Significantly, the Commission reached a number of conclusions in the Report that directly influenced the Legislature. Indeed, it is striking how closely the statute mirrors this Commission's conclusions:

#### **FPSC Fair & Reasonable**

Rate Report

1. A three to five year phas	se-in 1. Two to four year phase-in of
of basic rate increases of u	p to basic rate increases acceptable
\$5 would be acceptable to	to remove subsidy support.

The Act

1	reduce subsidies.	
2	2. Access charges should be	2. Two to four year phase-in of
3	reduced to interstate parity over	access charge reductions to
4	three to five years.	interstate parity.
5	3. A basic rate increase and	3. Purpose of removing support
6	rebalancing would help stimulate	from rates is to promote
7	local competition for residential	competition for benefit of
8	customers.	residential customers.
9	4. Protection for vulnerable	4. Lifeline eligibility to be
10	customers is important.	expanded along with pricing
11		reform.
12	(Source: Report Executive	(Sections 364.164, 364.10(3))
13	Summary, and Conclusions)	
14	As shown above, the Legislature follows	owed the road map for pricing
15	reform laid out by the Commission in re	esponse to the Legislature's prior
16	request for a study and report. The 0	Commission and the Legislature
17	have been engaged in this process	for over five years, and it has
18	produced a reasonable result that	is ready to implement. The
19	Commission should now follow through	n and approve Verizon's plan to
20	put this road map into action.	
21		
22	Having participated in a portion of	this process and had some
23	understanding of its overall scope and	extent, I can affirm that reform is
24	overdue and should occur now. Indeed	d, reform was already overdue in
25	1998 - the first time I helped add	Iress these issues before the

1		Commission.
2		
3	Q.	WHAT IS STAFF'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE LEGISLATURE'S
4		INTENT?
5	A.	Staff correctly observes that the Legislature recognized that subsidized
6		basic local rates inhibit competition:
7		the Legislature subscribed to the notion that
8		access charges subsidize basic local rates, or that
9		access charge rates far exceed cost and basic local
10		service rates are on average below cost. To the
11		degree that basic local service rates are below cost,
12		that is a significant deterrent to market entry for that
13		particular service. (Shafer, Page 6, Lines 13-17).
14		
15	Q.	DO DRS. COOPER AND GABEL ACKNOWLEDGE THE FAIR AND
16		REASONABLE REPORT?
17	A.	No. They do not acknowledge the extensive study and debate that led
18		to the Report, nor do they acknowledge the Report itself. I suspect the
19		reason for this omission is that the Report's conclusions contradict the
20		arguments that they wish to present here.
21		
22	Q.	DR. COOPER OFFERS SNIPPETS FROM SELECTED
23		LEGISLATORS IN AN ATTEMPT TO REWRITE THE STATUTE. IS
24		THERE ANY RELEVANCE TO THIS EXERCISE?
25	A.	No. The Florida Legislature expressed itself clearly in the statutory

1		provisions that it enacted. Dr. Cooper's attempts to misconstrue the
2		plain meaning of an unambiguous statute should be given no weight.
3		
4	Q.	DR. COOPER CLAIMS THAT THE STATUTE REQUIRES VERIZON
5		TO SHOW THAT RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS WILL RECEIVE
6		OVERALL LOWER MONTHLY BILLS. IS HE CORRECT?
7	A.	No. The statute says nothing of the kind. By mandating the pass-
8		through of access charge reductions, the elimination of fixed monthly
9		fees, and an expanded Lifeline program, the Legislature has separately
10		addressed the question of total bill benefits for customers.
11		
12	Q.	IF THE STATUTE IS GIVEN ITS COMMON SENSE MEANING, WHAT
13		OTHER CONSUMER BENEFITS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE
14		COMMISSION?
15	A.	Competition provides the potential for many customer benefits, including
16		innovative new services and capabilities, reduced prices, and new
17		price/quality tradeoffs that may better fit consumers' preferences.
18		Competition also spurs greater operating efficiency that will improve the
19		general economy of Florida. Benefits such as these underlie the public
20		policy choice that has been made nationally and in Florida – in favor of
21		competition rather than regulated monopolies in telecommunications. If
22		the Commission attempts to rewrite the statute, as Dr. Cooper urges, it
23		will forego these clear benefits.
24		
25		

1		
2		. <b>III.</b>
3		THE OPPOSITION WITNESSES' ASSERTIONS ABOUT
4		COMPETITION ARE STRAINED, UNREALISTIC, AND CONTRARY
5		TO FACT
6	Q.	WHAT DO OPPOSITION WITNESSES ASSERT ABOUT THE NEED
7		TO CREATE A MORE ATTRACTIVE COMPETITIVE LOCAL
8		EXCHANGE MARKET FOR THE BENEFIT OF RESIDENTIAL
9		CUSTOMERS?
10	A.	Drs. Gabel and Cooper present a variety of assertions that fail to
11		recognize the significance of competition, and criticize Verizon's rate
12		rebalancing plan for mistaken and/or insufficient reasons. These
13		assertions will be discussed and rebutted below.
14		
15	Q.	HOW DOES DR. COOPER RESPOND TO CONCERNS ABOUT THE
16		EXTENT OF COMPETITION FOR RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS IN
17		FLORIDA?
18	A.	Dr. Cooper does not see a problem. He suggests that while local
19		competition in Florida is only "mixed," it is good enough and the
20		Commission should not be particularly concerned (Cooper, Page 26,
21		Line 22).
22		
23	Q.	DO DR. COOPER'S OWN STATISTICS SHOW THAT COMPETITORS
24		IGNORE RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS IN FLORIDA?
25	Α.	Yes. Dr. Cooper calculates a measure he refers to as "balance," which

1		compares the proportion of CLEC residential customers to those of
2		ILECs (Cooper, Page 27, Lines 7-11). On this measure, Dr. Cooper
3		finds that Florida ranks 33 <sup>rd</sup> out of 39 states reviewed. In other words,
4		there were only six states in this group that ranked worse than Florida in
5		skewing competition away from residential customers. Accordingly, Dr.
6		Cooper's own statistics highlight that the existing pricing structure
7		inhibits competition for residential customers.
8		
9	Q.	DO THE TERMS OF THE ACT CONTRADICT DR. COOPER'S
10		PERSPECTIVE ON RESIDENTIAL LOCAL COMPETITION?
11	A.	Yes. The Legislature was concerned enough about the level of
12		residential competition in Florida to enact a specific provision to spur
13		residential competition. That is hardly in keeping with Dr. Cooper's
14		assessment of the situation.
15		
16	Q.	DOES THE DRAFT 2003 FPSC COMPETITION REPORT SHOW
17		THAT COMPETITORS ARE DISPROPORTIONATELY TARGETING
18		BUSINESS CUSTOMERS, AND IGNORING RESIDENTIAL
19		CUSTOMERS?
20	A.	Yes. The Report highlights the ongoing disparity between competitive
21		interest in business and residential customers:
22		CLEC business market share increased to 29%
23		from 26% in the previous year. CLEC residential
24		market share increased to 9% from 7% in the
25		previous year. (Draft FPSC 2003 Competition

1		Report, Page 8).
2		The Report makes clear that the disparity is especially apparent in
3		Verizon's territory:
4		Figure 4 shows CLEC share of the residence and
5		business markets by ILEC. The figure highlights
6		that the only substantial residential competition is
7		taking place in BellSouth's territory. Figure 4 show
8		that CLECs serve only 1% of the residential market
9		in Verizon's service territory. (Draft FPSC 2003
10		Competition Report, Page 10).
11		Moreover, the Report shows that facilities-based competitors have been
12		especially unwilling to serve residential customers:
13		As of June 30, 2003, thirty CLECs were serving
14		992,990 lines in Florida from their own switches;
15		however, 90% of these lines served business
16		customers. (Figure 11). Figure 12 shows that these
17		switch-based CLECs served an additional 364,391
18		lines through ILEC switches (UNE-P and resale
19		lines) for a total of 1,356,381 lines served. (Draft
20		FPSC 2003 Competition Report, Page 20).
21		Thus, there is ample evidence from a variety of sources to rebut
22		Dr. Cooper's claim that the lack of residential local competition is of no
23		particular concern.
24		
25	Q.	DRS. GABEL AND COOPER CLAIM THAT LOWER UNE PRICES,

1		AND NOT VERIZON'S PLAN, WOULD STIMULATE FURTHER
2		LOCAL COMPETITION (GABEL, PAGE 38, LINE 7 – PAGE 42, LINE
3		2; COOPER, PAGE 30, LINES 13-15). PLEASE ADDRESS THIS
4		CLAIM.
5	A.	Reducing UNE prices even further might stimulate an increase in resale
6		competition. Whether any resulting increase in competition would be
7		economically sustainable or even beneficial to Florida is a debate for
8		another day. Verizon's plan will create more economically rational retail
9		prices, which in turn will create positive incentives for facilities-based
10		(and other) competitors to target consumers.
11		
12		Indeed, AT&T and Knology each made clear that their entry into the
13		Florida local market was linked to the passage of the legislation
14		authorizing pricing reform (Fonteix, Page 7, Lines 4-9). Such
15		statements by actual competitors demonstrate that pricing reform will
16		stimulate local competition for the benefit of residential customers.
17		
18		The Draft 2003 Competition Report also contradicts Dr. Gabel's claim
19		that UNE-P rates are the critical factor in stimulating residential
20		competition:
21		Table 7 also reveals that low margins may be more
22		a result of low local rates than high UNE-P rates.
23		UNE-P rates are based on the ILEC's forward-
24		looking costs to provide local service, while local
25		rates historically have been subsidized in order to

make them more affordable. Residential rates in
Florida are lower than most other states. Thus,
even though Florida's UNE rates may be
comparable to other states, CLECs may find the
residential market less attractive. (Draft FPSC 2003
Competition Report, Page 18).

Α.

Q. DR. GABEL CONTENDS THAT RATE REBLANCING WILL NOT ENCOURAGE COMPETITION BECAUSE POTENTIAL ENTRANTS EVALUATE "EXPECTED TOTAL REVENUES," NOT THE PRICES OF INDIVIDUAL SERVICES SUCH AS BASIC LOCAL SERVICE (GABEL, PAGE 46, LINES 15–16). PLEASE COMMENT.

Dr. Gabel's contention is incorrect. In reality, competitors also consider the prices of individual services when making entry decisions. This is demonstrated by the fact that IXCs spent years fighting regulatory entry barriers to target long distance customers – a single part of the bundle – whose prices more than adequately covered their costs. And today, IXCs still make considerable efforts to sell stand-alone long distance service. That competitors consider the prices of individual services is also demonstrated by the fact that competitors compete in the market for a host of stand-alone services (e.g., unbundled handsets, customer premises equipment, operator services, directory assistance, calling cards, inside wire, and voice mail) because the prices of these stand-alone services produce a sufficient margin. That competitive focus on the source of the subsidy highlights Dr. Mayo's point that a policy of low

1		residential basic service prices "actually acts to prevent the introduction
2		and growth of competition." (Mayo, Page 14, Lines 21–22).
3		
4		In my direct testimony, I recognize that individual prices and total
5		customer bills both influence entry decisions. Moreover, by reference to
6		a range of specific competitors and technologies, I demonstrate that
7		Verizon's proposed rebalancing plan encourages market entry from both
8		perspectives. Dr. Gabel's testimony fails to rebut the specific evidence
9		that I present except to offer an irrelevant comment on the FCC's
10		Triennial Review order. Accordingly, the evidence makes clear that
11		rebalancing rates will provide an incentive for competitors to target
12		residential customers.
13		
14	Q.	DOES MR. SHAFER TESTIFY THAT THE PRICES OF INDIVIDUAL
15		SERVICES AFFECT MARKET ENTRY?
16	A.	Yes, Mr. Shafer presents an analysis similar to mine, and concludes that
17		the price of basic local services directly affect market entry:
18		[T]he price of local exchange is a critical element for
19		competitors to consider when choosing whether to
20		enter a particular market One can reasonably
21		expect that there will be additional market entry,
22		particularly in markets that have previously been
23		only marginally profitable or slightly unprofitable
24		[if the ILECs' petitions are approved] (Shafer, Page
25		8, Line 18 – Page 9, Line 7).

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Α.

Q. DR. GABEL ARGUES THAT YOUR TESTIMONY ON INCENTIVES
FOR COMPETITIVE ENTRY CONFLICTS WITH VERIZON'S FCC
TRIENNIAL REVIEW COMMENTS (GABEL, PAGE 52, LINE 17–
PAGE 55, LINE 8). PLEASE RESPOND.

I see no such conflict. In the excerpts Dr. Gabel cites, Verizon asserts that CLECs will look beyond basic rates in making their competitive entry decisions. I agree that entrants will not ignore possible revenues. At the same time, the prices of individual services have had an undeniable influence on patterns of entry in this industry, and will continue to influence entry into the future. Just because an entrant is going to consider the entire picture of possible opportunities does not mean it will overlook significant cross-subsidies within that picture.

14

- 15 Q. DR. GABEL OFFERS SEVERAL EXAMPLES (E.G., RAZORS AND 16 BLADES, COMPUTER PRINTERS AND INK CARTRIDGES, AND 17 WIRELESS PHONES AND SERVICE) IN AN ATTEMPT TO ARGUE 18 THAT SUBSIDIZED BASIC RATES DO NOT IMPEDE COMPETITION 19 AND THAT SUBSIDIZED PRICES MAY **ACTUALLY** 20 PREFERABLE TO COMPETITORS (GABEL, PAGE 61, LINE 10-21 PAGE 66, LINE 6). PLEASE COMMENT.
- A. The examples offered by Dr. Gabel are irrelevant because they relate to products that have different characteristics than telephone service.

  Dr. Gabel's examples relate to the phenomenon of "lock-in" where a customer's initial purchase commits him to further purchases (e.g., of

supplies, parts, software upgrades, and so forth) from the same supplier. The ability to "lock in" a customer is why it can make sense to give away the razor to sell the blades, or to sell a low-priced printer to encourage the purchase of high-priced replacement ink cartridges.

However, there is little or no lock-in for initial purchases that do not commit customers to ongoing use of the supplier's proprietary parts, upgrades, or supplies. For the most part, that description fits local telephone service in an equal access environment. To minimize lock-in, regulators have spent decades assuring that customers can access any competitor's services from an ILEC telephone. In particular, ILECs cannot rely on any ability to overcharge customers for toll and long distance service (the services at issue here) to make up losses on basic residential service. Verizon's "razor" also accepts AT&T's blades.

The dissertation excerpt Dr. Gabel cites about razors makes this point, by referring to discounted sales of sophisticated, innovative (perhaps patented) "shaving systems" to encourage customers to buy high-priced Gillette replacement blades. (Gabel, Page 64, Lines 8–11). By contrast, one would hardly expect Gillette to subsidize the sale of old-fashioned razors that use commodity double-edged blades. Likewise, computer companies intend only their own ink cartridges to be used in their low-priced printers. And while wireless providers do not offer equal access (and so create some lock-in), I have never seen a "free" wireless handset offered without a mandatory term contract (including a

substantial early termination fee) that appears to offset the handset subsidy. Rather than getting something for nothing on the prospect of future usage, wireless customers pay for their handsets on the installment plan.

In sum, the examples cited by Dr. Gabel are not relevant here because telecommunications carriers cannot "lock in" their customers.

Α.

# 9 Q. DOES MARKET BEHAVIOR CONTRADICT DR. GABEL'S CLAIM 10 ABOUT THE MARKET SUITABILITY OF SUBSIDIZED BASIC 11 SERVICE PRICING?

Yes. A good test of Dr. Gabel's speculative claim is whether those companies that would purportedly benefit from basic service pricing actually embrace it. To believe that Dr. Gabel's suggested pricing strategy made sense, one would have to conclude that the ILECs would be doing themselves more harm than good through the present petitions, and that Knology and AT&T are mistaken as to their own best interests. Dr. Gabel does not cite any examples of competitive local telephone service providers that voluntarily practice such pricing absent either a regulatory requirement to do so, or lock-in contracts to assure cost recovery (as with wireless). Thus, the facts contradict Dr. Gabel's claim.

### Q. DOES MR. OSTRANDER DIRECTLY ADDRESS THE ISSUES IN THIS PROCEEDING?

1	A.	No. On most subjects, he provides no evidence of his own, but merely
2		complains that the LECs have not satisfied him. For example, he
3		complains that "the LEC proposals cannot prove that residential
4		customers will gain a net benefit," in areas that include "enhanced
5		competition," "rate changes," "new or unique service introductions,"
6		"uniquely associated benefits of capital investment," and "uniquely
7		improved service quality." (Ostrander, Page 5, Lines 8-Page 6,
8		Line 12). These unsupported complaints do not address the evidence
9		submitted by the ILECs.
10		
11	Q.	DOES MR. OSTRANDER PROVIDE ANY EVIDENCE REGARDING
12		COMPETITION AND VERIZON, SUCH AS THE COMPETITORS
13		WITHIN VERIZON'S SERVICE TERRITORY, THE TECHNOLOGIES
14		THEY USE, OR THEIR POSSIBLE COST STRUCTURES?
15	A.	No. Moreover, he makes no reference to the extensive evidence on
16		competition presented by Verizon.
17		
18	Q.	DOES MR. OSTRANDER'S TESTIMONY REFLECT A
19		MISUNDERSTANDING OF A SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC PRINCIPLE
20		REGARDING COMPETITION?
21	A.	Yes. Mr. Ostrander repeatedly refers to "LEC inelastic basic service
22		revenues," as some kind of safe entitlement for Verizon and the other
23		petitioners (e.g., Ostrander, Page 4, Line 20 - Page 5, Line 14). This
24		demonstrates a misunderstanding of a basic economic principle.
25		Customer demand for basic monthly service is highly inelastic (i.e., the

1 demand by customers for basic service is not very sensitive to its price). 2 However, that is not the same thing as an inelastic demand for a When customers have choices, their 3 particular ILEC's services. 4 determination to have some kind of basic service does not extend to a similar determination to buy it only from a particular provider. 5 6 7 For example, the demand for some level of food and nutrition is presumably also highly inelastic (general price increases will not deter 8 9 customers from buying a basic amount of food). That is not the same, 10 however, as saying that a particular restaurant or supermarket can raise 11 its prices sharply and not lose customers. 12 13 LECs have been losing access lines, and their basic service revenues 14 are not quaranteed in the manner that Mr. Ostrander asserts. 15 economic terms, we can correct Mr. Ostrander's error by noting that the 16 demand for a given LEC's basic service is more elastic than is the 17 overall market demand. 18 19 Q. MR. SHAFER EXPRESSES CONCERN THAT IT MAY NOT BE GOOD 20 FOR SOME CUSTOMERS TO MIGRATE FROM NARROWBAND TO 21 BROADBAND NETWORK CONNECTIONS (SHAFER, PAGE 13, 22 LINES 3-19). PLEASE COMMENT. 23 There is both a customer-specific and societal dimension to my Α. 24 observation about how reform will bring the prices of basic access lines 25 and broadband connections more in line with their relative costs. More

economically sensible prices will allow individual customers to recognize that the step up to a more capable service is not as costly as they might have thought. This will encourage them to obtain broadband, and benefit from its use.

Florida will gain two benefits from accurate price signals that will accelerate broadband subscription. First, more customers will have broadband sooner, advancing the various social goals that are usually discussed for such deployment. Second, the scarce resources required to provide and maintain such connections will be used more efficiently if customers choose between them based on prices that more accurately reflect costs.

Q. MR. FONTEIX (PAGE 2, LINES 18–22) EXPRESSES CONCERN
ABOUT AN "ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRICE SQUEEZE" HE BELIEVES
IS CREATED BY CURRENT ACCESS CHARGES. IS HIS CONCERN
VALID?

No. Mr. Fonteix argues that an ILEC charging an above-cost access charge might price its own toll service below that access charge – thereby freezing out competitors – and still make a profit on the service. His claim ignores a basic principle of economics – that of opportunity cost. If an ILEC were to divert traffic from IXCs in the manner suggested, the ILEC would forego the access charges paid by the IXCs. As a result, the ILEC would make a smaller profit (i.e., it would receive less money than it did from the IXC, and it would have to provide the

1		long distance service in place of the IXC). Accordingly, an ILEC would		
2		not engage in the behavior that purportedly concerns Mr. Fonteix		
3		because it would be economically irrational to do so.		
4				
5		The only possible incentive an ILEC could have to engage in the		
6		suggested behavior would be to drive the IXC out of business, re-		
7		monopolize the market, and then raise prices to sufficient levels to		
8		recoup at least as much money as it had lost in the process. However,		
9		predatory pricing is illegal, virtually impossible to perpetrate for a wide		
10		variety of reasons (including the oversight of this Commission), and		
11		rarely seen in reality. It is thus widely recognized as an irrational tactic		
12		by many authorities, including the U.S. Supreme Court. (Brooke Group		
13		Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. (92-466), 509 U.S. 209		
14		(1993)). Accordingly, Mr. Fonteix's purported concern about a "price		
15		squeeze" is unfounded.		
16				
17		In any event, since the pro-competitive benefits of pricing reform do not		
18		hinge on this claim, there is no need to consider this issue further.		
19				
20		IV.		
21		BASIC LOCAL SERVICE RATE SUBSIDIES		
22		ARE GENUINE AND UNDENIABLE		
23	Q.	ARE DRS. COOPER AND GABEL CORRECT IN ASSERTING THAT		
24		BASIC RESIDENTIAL RATES ARE NOT SUBSIDIZED?		
25	A.	No. The loop is a cost of basic service (as the Commission has found),		

and the Commission's own approved UNE cost calculations reveal the subsidy (as Mr. Fulp has described). It remains true that basic residential rates are subsidized, and therefore supported.

A.

## Q. THE STATUTE SPEAKS OF REMOVING "SUPPORT" FROM RESIDENTIAL RATES. HOW IS SUPPORT RELATED TO SUBSIDY?

"Support" is the difference between current rates and those that would fully recover costs (including common costs) — which are, in a competitive context, competitive market rates. The Telecommunication Act of 1996 ("TA96") distinguishes the term "support" used in Section 254 (when discussing universal service support for prices) from the prohibition of "subsidy" of competitive services as discussed in Section 254(k). When I use the term "subsidy," I refer to prices below marginal or incremental cost. Therefore, even rates that are not subsidized can be supported, if they are required to be set below market levels. Additionally, since competitive market prices must recover common costs, the calculated size of a subsidy is a lower bound for the actual extent of support, a point Dr. Gabel does not appear to recognize in his testimony.

### Q. IS THERE A GENERALLY ACCEPTED UNDERSTANDING THAT RESIDENTIAL BASIC SERVICE RATES ARE SUPPORTED?

23 A. Yes. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals recently observed that implicit 24 support flows have tended to result in rates that are lower than they 25 otherwise would be for residential and rural customers. *Report and* 

Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, In the Matter of Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers; Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; of Wireline Offering Advanced Deployment Services Telecommunications Capability, CC Docket No. 01-338; 96-98; 98-147, August 21, 2003, Para. 156. The Commission's Fair and Reasonable Rate Report also reported subsidy levels in LEC basic rates, showing that those rates are supported in Florida. FPSC Report, Pages 23-24.

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### DR. GABEL'S DISCUSSION OF COST STUDIES AND STANDARDS 11 Q.

### 12 GOES ON FOR MANY PAGES. IS THIS DISCUSSION BASED UPON

### 13 A FALSE PREMISE?

A. Yes. Dr. Gabel takes an incorrect assumption, or perspective, and follows it through to its logical conclusion. Little more than that occurs in his entire discussion of TSLRIC, TELRIC and cost studies (i.e., Sections 3.1–3.2). As discussed below, the Commission should disregard this erroneous reasoning, and the unreliable results it produces.

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### 20 WHAT IS DR. GABEL'S INCORRECT ASSUMPTION? Q.

Α. Dr. Gabel confuses the costs of a service with either the identity of the 22 customer who happens to be using it (as with business and residential 23 basic service), or the manner it is used (as with data services). He 24 assumes erroneously that, from a costing standpoint, the components 25 used to provide basic residential and basic business service are different. Based on that incorrect assumption, he severely underestimates the cost of basic residential and basic business service by excluding from his cost calculation any facilities that these services have in common.

Α.

### Q. WHAT IS THE CORRECT APPROACH TO DETERMINING THESE COSTS?

Rather than starting with a use or a user, as does Dr. Gabel, one should start with the costs of the facilities or activities that comprise each service. The principal cost item, as Dr. Gabel reluctantly acknowledges, is the loop. Loops are the general means of providing access to an ILEC network; and whether a loop is used to serve a residential or a business customer, its engineering and physical characteristics are the same. Moreover, whether a loop is used to serve a business or a residential customer depends on which customer happens to be at a location, not something inherent in the design of the loop itself.

It is therefore correct from a costing standpoint to calculate the incremental cost of a loop as a single kind of facility that is used to provide network access to a variety of customers, or uses. That is what this Commission (like its peer agencies across the country) has done for UNE pricing purposes. All the equipment and expenses that are incremental to creating loops should be included in the cost of the loop. Then, to calculate the cost of a particular service that includes the loop (such as residential or business basic service), one should add up the

1	cost of the loop, plus the cost of other components of the service (such
2	as local usage) – just as Verizon has done in this proceeding.

Α.

## 4 Q. HAS DR. GABEL'S ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTION ALSO BEEN 5 REBUTTED BY AN EMINENT AUTHORITY?

Yes. Dr. Alfred Kahn addressed this argument directly in an extended analysis of the fallacies of loop allocation in telephone service costing. See Kahn, Alfred E. Letting Go: Deregulating the Process of Deregulation (Institute of Public Utilities and Network Industries, Michigan State University, 1998), Pages 73-76. Dr. Kahn made two observations consistent with my analysis above: (1) that the loop is the heart of basic telephone service, to which its cost obviously belongs ("...to define basic service as not essentially equivalent to the loop is to define Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark"); and, (2) that the proper estimate of the cost of a service is the higher of the TSLRIC result, or the LRIC (long run incremental cost) of the various elements (such as the costs of the loop and the costs of associated local usage) that comprise the service. Verizon's approach, unlike Dr. Gabel's, is consistent with the methodology advocated by Dr. Kahn.

# Q. DO DR. GABEL'S RESULTS FOLLOW FROM A DIFFERENCE IN TIMING (E.G., THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOME COSTS MIGHT BE FIXED IN THE SHORT-RUN)?

A. No. Dr. Gabel asserts that he is providing a TSLRIC analysis (<u>i.e.</u>, one based on Total Service *Long Run* Incremental Cost), as opposed to a

1		short-run analysis during which some costs might reasonably be
2		assumed not to vary.
3		
4	Q.	HOW DOES DR. GABEL MISUSE HIS INCORRECT ASSUMPTION?
5	A.	To determine the incremental costs of serving residential customers,
6		Dr. Gabel starts by assuming (in effect) that a whole network
7		infrastructure has already been built to provide loops to business
8		customers. He then relies on this erroneous assumption to exclude
9		costs that are common to both services from his calculations.
10		
11	Q.	IS THERE A SELF-FULFILLING ASPECT TO DR. GABEL'S
12		ANALYSIS REGARDING SUBSIDIES AND THEIR IMPACT?
13	A.	Yes. The existence of separate tariffs for residential and business
14		customers is one factor that has facilitated the creation of subsidies, by
15		allowing residential and business customers to be charged different
16		prices for essentially the same service. Rather than acknowledging this
17		situation for what it is, Dr. Gabel claims (in effect) that creating the
18		different pricing categories eliminates the subsidy - because everything
19		that exists in common between the two services is no longer relevant for
20		determining incremental costs.
21		
22		Dr. Gabel's analysis is erroneous because the choice of how network
23		access is priced to different customers does not affect the underlying
24		network costs of providing it. For example, if the pricing categories were
25		combined (so that there was just one basic service applicable to all

1		customers), then according to Dr. Gabel's method the subsidy would
2		once again exist - because those costs would no longer be allocated
3		between pricing categories. If, subsequently, a category of business
4		customer persuaded the Commission to create a separate tariff for its
5		purchases, the subsidy would again vanish. In this way, calculations of
6		basic service costs would fluctuate widely, even though nothing had
7		changed about how the phone network was actually built or maintained,
8		or how these services were provided.
9		
10		The ability to make subsidies seem to appear and disappear in this
11		arbitrary fashion is another indication of the fundamental problems with
12		Dr. Gabel's approach. The Commission should disregard the costing
13		approach advocated by Dr. Gabel, and the unreliable numerical
14		calculations it produces.
15		
16	Q.	DR. GABEL CRITICIZES THE LECS' USE OF TELRIC UNE COST
17		ESTIMATES TO DETERMINE THE LEVEL OF SUBSIDY IN
18		RESIDENTIAL BASIC SERVICE RATES. DID THE FCC
19		ENCOURAGE STATES TO COORDINATE THE DEVELOPMENT OF
20		UNE COST STUDIES WITH THOSE USED TO CALCULATE
21		UNIVERSAL SERVICE SUPPORT?
22	A.	Yes. The FCC encouraged states to relate these studies:
23		[T]o prevent differences between the pricing of
24		unbundled network elements and the determination
25		of universal service support, we urge states to

1 coordinate the development of cost studies for the 2 pricing of unbundled network elements and the 3 determination of universal service support." 4 Report and Order. In the Matter of Federal-State Joint Board on 5 Universal Service, CC Docket No. 96-45, May 8, 1997, Para. 251. 6 Verizon's use of approved FPSC UNE costs for determining the extent 7 of subsidy is consistent with that encouragement from the FCC. 8 9 DR. GABEL OBJECTS TO VERIZON'S USE OF UNE RATES TO Q. 10 CALCULATE THE SUBSIDY IN BASIC RESIDENTIAL SERVICE 11 PRICES (GABEL, PAGE 21, LINE 8 - PAGE 23, LINE 7). DOES HIS 12 **OBJECTION HAVE MERIT?** 13 No. The UNE prices employed by Verizon represent approved FPSC Α. 14 calculations of forward-looking economic costs; they are appropriate for 15 use in calculating the subsidy in basic residential services prices and 16 should be presumed to be correct here. Further, since residential 17 services are generally provided in less dense areas than business 18 service and therefore tend to have longer and more costly loops, the 19 statewide average UNE loop rate is a conservative estimate of the cost 20 of loops used to provide residential basic service. 21 22 Dr. Gabel's only specific criticism is to remove the common costs from 23 However, while neither TELRIC nor TSLRIC by the UNE rates. 24 themselves includes common costs, the proper cost standard for 25 measuring support is competitive market prices, which must recover

1 common costs: therefore, common costs are a reasonable factor to 2 include in measuring support. Additionally, the level of common costs 3 that is included in these UNE rates is less than the retailing costs that 4 are left out, but which belong in a TSLRIC study. Adjusting for both of these factors would thus increase, not reduce calculated incremental 5 6 costs. 7 8 DOES DR. COOPER ALSO ADVANCE AN ARGUMENT TO DENY Q. 9 THE EXISTENCE OF SUBSIDIES? 10 Α. Yes. He reargues a claim that was exhaustively debated (and rejected) 11 in the Commission's fair and reasonable rate study process - that the 12 loop should be considered a common cost, rather than a cost of basic 13 service (Cooper, Page 17, Line 3 - Page 26, Line 5). As one who 14 participated in that process, it is apparent to me that that Dr. Cooper is 15 merely repeating arguments that were already addressed at length in a 16 debate that led to the Commission's conclusion that the loop Is 17 appropriately considered a cost of basic service: 18 the principle of cost causation leads one to the 19 unavoidable conclusion that the decision to have 20 local service leads to the incurrence of loop costs. 21 (Fair and Reasonable Rates Report, Page 51). 22 23 In responding to Dr. Cooper's arguments, it is difficult to know to what 24 extent one should rebut such claims given that the Commission has

already ruled on this dispute in a study process in which Dr. Cooper and

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his client both participated. Briefly, the cost of the loop is incurred – in its entirety – by providing basic service to a customer. The decision to have basic service is what causes the cost to be incurred. The essence of the economic definition of "cost" is causation; and a customer's decision to use a loop to buy other services, or to call other people, no more "causes" the cost of that loop than does a mail carrier "cause" the cost of one's driveway by walking down it to deliver a package. This is the correct analysis with which the Commission agreed in the fair and reasonable rate study process, and nothing Dr. Cooper states here (An extensive discussion and refutation of the loop changes it. allocation fallacy can be found in Kahn, Pages 70-89).

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REFERRING TO THE EARLY 1900S, DR. COOPER STATES THAT Q. TELEPHONE NETWORKS, "INCLUDING THE LOOP," ARE NOW ENGINEERED TO HANDLE MULTIPLE SERVICES THAT SHOULD BE ALLOCATED SOME OF THE LOOP'S COST (COOPER, PAGE 18, LINE 22 - PAGE 19, LINE 1). IS THIS RELEVANT?

No. The incremental costs of network access, in the manner service is provided today, are caused by the subscriber's decision to have network access. Therefore, the fact that today's loop can handle multiple services is irrelevant, and musings about 1900-vintage systems are beside the point.

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24 DR. COOPER CLAIMS THAT A VARIETY OF AUTHORITIES Q. (INCLUDING "THE FCC, THE STATES, AND THE COURTS") HAVE "CONSISTENTLY AND REPEATEDLY" FOUND THAT THE LOOP IS
A COMMON COST (COOPER, PAGE 21, LINES 5-6). PLEASE
COMMENT.

Dr. Cooper offers a selective, dated list of filings, comments and a few decisions to support his incorrect claim. It is true that some authorities have yielded to confusion (or an apparent desire to justify a preference for subsidized basic rates) and come to such a conclusion. But by way of state counter examples, Dr. Cooper's list does not include California, or (most importantly for present purposes) Florida. Dr. Cooper's claim about the FCC is particularly odd, since the FCC has been the most consistent and effective regulatory proponent of shifting loop costs from access charges to fixed monthly fees paid by the subscriber – as the FCC did when it created the subscriber line charge, which involved the same kind of reform that is proposed here by Verizon.

A.

Dr. Cooper's employer (the Consumer Federation of America) was one of the organizations that opposed the subscriber line charge based on a claim that it would drive millions of subscribers off the network. As reported by Professor Hausman and his colleagues, not only was that claim proved wrong, millions more subscribers would have been kept off the network if the FCC had abandoned that reform at the CFA's behest. Hausman, Jerry, Tardiff, Timothy, and Alexander Belinfante. "The Effects of the Breakup of AT&T on Telephone Penetration in the United States," American Economic Review 83, Volume 2 (May, 1993), 178-184. The Commission should disregard this tired argument from an

advocate whose employer's prior advice on the same subject would have demonstrably harmed consumers and universal service.

As for the views of the courts, in its 1984 opinion reviewing the FCC's decision to impose per-line subscriber line charges (NARUC v. FCC, 737 F.2nd 1095 [1984]), the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals made the following statement about the cost characteristics of local loops, and how those relate to appropriate recovery of those costs:

Plant costs are nontraffic sensitive when they do not vary with the extent to which the facilities are used. The basic cost of installing and maintaining a local loop, for example, remains the same whether the subscriber, or 'end user,' uses the loop to make one call or a hundred, and whether those calls are local or long-distance. (Opinion, Page 1104).

The end user charge reflects costs caused not by a subscriber's actually making interstate calls, but by the subscriber's connection into the interstate network, which enables the subscriber to make interstate calls. The same loop that connects a telephone subscriber to the local exchange necessarily connects the subscriber into the interstate network as well. Under Smith, a portion of the costs of that loop are assigned to the

interstate jurisdiction, for recovery under the regulatory authority of the FCC, on the basis of a complex division taking into account statistical calling patterns. That separations decision, however, does not affect the cost of the loop. Local telephone plant costs are real; they are necessarily incurred for each subscriber by virtue of that subscriber's interconnection into the local network. and they must be recovered regardless of how many or how few interstate calls (or local calls for that matter) a subscriber makes. (Opinion, Pages 1113-14).

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Every telephone subscriber is automatically connected through the same subscriber plant into both the local exchange and the interstate network. No subscriber can avoid 'causing' those costs of its telephone line allocated to the interstate jurisdiction.

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(Opinion, Page 1115).

In defending the FCC's CALLS order on appeal, the Department of Justice made these same points in March, 2002. See Brief for the Federal Respondents in Opposition (to a petition for writ of certiorari), National Association of State Utility Consumer Advocates v. Federal Communications Commission and United States of America, (U.S. Supreme Court No. 01-968), March, 2002, Pages 14-15 ("...It has long

been accepted that the customer 'causes' the costs of the loop...[b]ecause the costs of the loop are not traffic-sensitive, the costs caused by a particular customer do not vary depending on how many calls he or she makes...[T]he SLC requires consumers to pay only for that they cause...[l]t is end-users of the the loop costs telecommunications network, not their long-distance carriers, that ultimately cause the costs associated with interstate access."). These facts and citations flatly contradict Dr. Cooper's claim that state and federal authorities have uniformly found that the loop is a common cost. V. RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS WILL BENEFIT FROM VERIZON'S PLAN DID ANY WITNESS PRESENT EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT Q. CUSTOMERS HAVE BEEN FORCED OFF THE NETWORK BY PRICING REFORM, OR THAT ANY PARTICULAR CUSTOMERS HAVE EVER SUFFERED ANY RELATED HARDSHIP? No, they did not, even though pricing reform in places such as A. California, Massachusetts, Maine, and across the nation (through the

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Federal subscriber line charge, and related access charge cuts) should

have produced such results if there was any credence to such claims.

In actuality, the evidence shows that pricing reform has improved

universal service, and not caused any notable difficulties for customers.

A.

Q. DR. GABEL SUGGESTS THAT THE BENEFITS TO RESIDENTIAL

CUSTOMERS OF REDUCED TOLL AND IN-STATE LONG DISTANCE

PRICES WILL BE "MINIMAL" (GABEL, PAGE 66, LINE 8 – PAGE 72,

LINE 8). PLEASE COMMENT.

During my time at the California Public Utilities Commission, I observed a very consistent response in personal discussions with residential customers about telephone service pricing. Most had little to say about their rates and bills, except to complain about the high prices they paid to make toll calls within the state. Based upon these discussions, I firmly believe that, contrary to Dr. Gabel's contentions, customers care about the price of calling, and can distinguish between various kinds of toll calls and their prices. It was this belief, along with an understanding of the economics of telecommunications pricing, that motivated me and the Commissioner I advised to pursue pricing reform.

Dr. Gabel minimizes the economic benefits to customers of the additional calls they will make if prices are reformed. He cites Dr. Tardiff's one-year elasticity estimate for California of -.24, suggesting that price responsiveness will be modest -- in part because the value of a customer's time will become the limiting factor on call volumes when prices get low enough. I disagree with the claim that customer response to price changes will be minimal. Call volume increases will be more than trivial considering that (1) the access charge reductions proposed here are substantial and (2) call volumes will increase over time (multi-

year responses will exceed the first year's worth). In any event, reaching the point at which the value of one's time is the limiting factor on toll calling (rather than the resulting phone bill) would be a welcome development for customers in Florida.

Dr. Gabel also fails to recognize the benefits to residential customers of abolishing IXC in-state long distance monthly fees (e.g., \$1.88/month for AT&T residential customers), or the expanded eligibility for Lifeline. Moreover, he fails to recognize the benefits to customers of additional local competition. Of course, these are very real benefits that should be considered in the Commission's analysis.

A.

# Q. WOULD DR. GABEL'S ALTERNATIVE REBALANCING APPROACH BE BETTER FOR CONSUMERS AND COMPETITION THAN VERIZON'S PLAN (GABEL, PAGE 74, LINES 2–10)?

No Dr. Gabel's alternative approach embodies the unrealistic view of the market I addressed above. Such an approach would fail to reduce network access subsidies to the same degree as Verizon's plan, while merely shifting around (to different services) other substantial support that now exists in access charges. From the standpoint of economic efficiency and promoting competition for the benefit of residential customers, more progress towards economically rational pricing is better.

### Q. DR. COOPER WOULD PREFER THAT BUSINESS RATES RECEIVE

SUBSTANTIALLY HIGHER INCREASES SO THAT RESIDENTIAL 1 2 CUSTOMER TOTAL BILLS COULD DECREASE (COOPER, PAGE 3 30, LINE 18 - PAGE 34, LINE 5). MR. OSTRANDER ATTEMPTS TO 4 ESTIMATE WHETHER AVERAGE RESIDENTIAL BILLS WILL DECLINE ON AN INITIAL BASIS (OSTRANDER, PAGE 18, LINE 4 -5 6 PAGE 32, LINE 7). PLEASE COMMENT. 7 No particular short-term bill impact is required by the statute, nor by Α. 8 Moreover, focusing solely on such short-term goals and fairness. 9 ignoring the very real benefits of competition would be wrong. 10 11 First, the statute says nothing about total customer bills, or a monetary 12 accounting of benefits. There is no pass-fail test that has to be satisfied 13 with respect to any particular set of customer bills. 14 15 Second, the statute refers specifically to removing "...current support for 16 basic local telecommunications services that prevents the creation of a more attractive competitive market for the benefit of residential 17 18 customers." (Section 364.164(1)(a)). This can only mean raising below-19 cost basic residential rates. Raising basic business rates will do nothing 20 to help residential customers become a more attractive market to 21 competitors; and, basic residential rates are the services that are 22 supported in Florida. 23 24 Third, there is no doubt that customer bills will change, both as a direct 25 result of the plan, and increased competition and changes in customer behavior once the new rates are put in place. Whatever customer bills may be a month after pricing reform is concluded, they will be different a year later, and different again a year after that. Customers will use their phones more, and will respond to new competitive options and offers in ways that are difficult to predict precisely, but will certainly occur.

Fourth, it is not surprising that a proportion of residential customers, and perhaps residential customers as a whole, might come out with small average bill increases. Basic residential rate subsidies are substantial for Verizon's customers in Florida. The benefits of competition will more than offset the small initial bill increases experienced by residential customers.

Fifth, it is fair for consumers to cover the costs of the services they use. While no one wants to pay a higher bill for service, customers whose bills increase will only be paying their fair share of what it costs to provide service. Other customers who have been overpaying will see their bills reduced. Although there is more to the benefits of this plan than a short-term dollars and cents calculation, the bill shifts that occur between customers will be inherently fair.

Finally, reforming prices will make residential customers more attractive targets to competitive providers. Already, AT&T and Knology have entered the Florida local market in anticipation of this reform and other competitors will follow. The benefits that will flow from increased

1		competition will more than outweigh a few percent of an average
2		residential bill.
3		
4	Q.	HAVE YOU CALCULATED THE CHANGE IN AVERAGE
5		RESIDENTIAL TELEPHONE BILLS THAT WOULD OCCUR UNDER
6		VERIZON'S PLAN?
7	A.	Yes. I should, however, highlight some important caveats before
8		reviewing these results.
9		
10		First, under the statute there is no obligation to review average customer
11		bills, or consider any related changes in bills.
12		
13		Second, the objective of the statute is to accelerate the transformation of
14		the residential local telephone market from a monopoly to a competitive
15		environment. As a transformative measure, Verizon's plan will create
16		new opportunities for customers both through reduced toll and long
17		distance calling prices, as well as new competitive options and
18		technologies over time. By contrast, a bill impact analysis is static – it
19		takes customers' current purchases and calling habits and projects them
20		into a future in which we know their habits will change. Therefore, the
21		validity of any such bill analysis is only short-term at best, and its results
22		will overlook many of the benefits of pricing reform.
23		
24		Third, as customers adjust to the new prices and opportunities they
25		face, they will become progressively better off as their purchasing and

consumption decisions (and phone bills) change. For example, a customer who chooses to make more long distance calls (in response to a lower price) or switches to a new competitive entrant will receive an economic benefit that helps to offset any initial bill increase that the customer may experience. And, of course, a customer whose bill goes down initially will only gain further benefits of this kind over time. Although these effects can be difficult to quantify, they more than offset any small initial bill increases that residential consumers may experience.

Finally, as Mr. Fulp has explained, the actual price changes that occur in the second and third phases of reform will be determined based on the most recent 12 months' billing units (as the statute requires). This means the actual rate changes will vary somewhat from those used for this analysis. For example, if Verizon's access minutes of use continue to decline, the amount of revenue to be rebalanced will be less. Other variables may also change. This is another reason why the bill impacts noted below are only initial projections.

A.

## Q. HAVE CUSTOMERS ALREADY RECEIVED BENEFITS OF THE KIND THAT VERIZON'S PLAN WILL CREATE?

Yes, they have, by diverting long distance calls from wired to wireless networks to take advantage of a low (or free) price for such calls. Estimates are that customers have already shifted about 30 percent of wired long distance traffic in this fashion, thereby saving the access

charges on those calls (since wireless carriers do not pay the same kind of access charges the Commission has required for Verizon in Florida). In this fashion, Florida customers have already received a down payment on the benefits of Verizon's plan that is not captured in the average bill figures I report below. Moreover, the fact that customers have already begun diverting long distance calls from wired to wireless demonstrates that consumers will avail themselves of the benefits of competition that will flow from Verizon's rate rebalancing plan.

Α.

## 10 Q. DOES THE STAFF RECOGNIZE SOME OF THE DYNAMIC 11 BENEFITS OF REFORM THAT RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS WILL

### **RECEIVE?**

Yes. Mr. Shafer recognizes that intermodal competition has benefited customers and that approving the LECs' petitions should lead to more competitive activity of this kind. (Shafer, Page 10, Line 13 – Page 11, Line 7). The competitive interplay between wireless and wireline carriers is one example of benefits for residential customers that will be ignored if the Commission focuses solely on an initial average bill analysis. This benefit will be enhanced by the recent affirmation by the FCC that local number portability will permit customers to take landline phone numbers to wireless phones (FCC News Release, "FCC Clears Way for Local Number Portability Between Wireline and Wireless Carriers," November 10, 2003).

### 25 Q. WHAT RESULTS DID YOU OBTAIN FROM YOUR AVERAGE BILL

ANA	_YSIS?
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With respect to the population of residential customers Verizon now serves, the initial, static effect of Verizon's plan will be to increase the average telephone bill by about \$1.00/month. This result includes the initial customer benefits (i.e., flow-through of access charge reductions and elimination of long distance carrier monthly access fees), but not any of the dynamic benefits over time that I described above – which are an important focus of the legislation, and of Verizon's plan. These results are also more accurate than the preliminary results I discussed at a deposition in this proceeding.

A.

Existing Lifeline customers will see their bills reduced by \$3.15 per month, and about 20,000 additional, new Lifeline subscribers will receive not only that benefit, but an additional \$13.50/month for qualifying under the expanded eligibility standards.

A similar calculation was performed that focused on the age distribution of Verizon's Florida customers, and produces the results below. These results are only approximate, because age data was not available for a significant proportion of customers (as the table shows).

22	Age Strata	Florida Lines (confidential)	Net Change (confidential)
23	18-25 years		
24	26-35 years	REDA	CTED

25 36-45 years

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1		46-55 years
2		56-65 years
3		66-75 years REDACTED
4		76 + years
5		unknown
6		
7		Finally, although we did not calculate this data, from experience I know
8		that every demographic group of customers will contain high, low, and
9		average bills that reflect the varying ways people use their telephones.
10		So, for example, there are certainly some low-income customers with
11		high bills who effectively subsidize some high-income customers with
12		low bills. Likewise, among individual customers the subsidies will flow in
13		every direction with respect to age groups, ethnicity, or any other
14		demographic characteristic. Additionally, given the large volume of long
15		distance calling that has moved to wireless phones, some low-bill
16		customers will merely be those who no longer use a wired phone for
17		these calls - and who have already received related benefits, as I noted
18		above.
19		
20	Q.	SHOULD THE COMMISSION BE CONCERNED BY AN INITIAL
21		CHANGE IN AVERAGE RESIDENTIAL BILLS OF ABOUT \$1 PER
22		MONTH OCCURRING OVER A PERIOD OF MORE THAN TWO
23		YEARS?
24	A.	Based on my experience helping reach a wide variety of rate decisions
25		at the largest state commission in the country, a phased-in rebalancing

1		of this modest amount will not be disruptive to customers and will fall
2		well within the realm of ratemaking decisions and adjustments that
3		regulatory commissions regularly undertake.
4		
5		Indeed, the modest size of this effect highlights several important facts
6		about customer bills and rates:
7		
8		Residential customers do cross-subsidize themselves on the
9		same bill, and will benefit substantially from lower calling prices
10		that result from reform;
11		The elimination of long distance carrier monthly access fees
12		directs substantial benefits towards residential customers;
13		The notion that residential customers are affected only by basic
14		monthly rates is a myth.
15		
16	Q.	IS THE SLIGHTLY HIGHER INITIAL CHANGE IN THE BILLS OF
17		OLDER CUSTOMERS A PARTICULAR CONCERN?
18	A.	No, it is not. These amounts are also not large in light of the extent of
19		reform that Verizon's rate rebalancing plan will produce, and, they reflect
20		only averages that do not address the distribution of high, low, and
21		average bill customers that will exist among these age groups. The
22		targeted benefits of the expanded Lifeline program will also provide
23		added protection for the low-income elderly.
24		
25	O	MR OSTRANDER CONTENDS THAT OFFSETTING RATE

1		REDUCTIONS TO TOLL AND LONG DISTANCE PRICES MAY ONLY
2		BE TEMPORARY, AND THAT LECS OR IXCS MAY RAISE RATES IN
3		THE FUTURE TO OBVIATE THE BENEFITS OF VERIZON'S PLAN
4		(OSTRANDER, PAGE 32, LINE 9 - PAGE 35, LINE 14). IS THIS A
5		VALID CONCERN?
6	A.	No. The competitive toll and long distance market will not permit
7		carriers to raise prices back to levels that would obviate the sharp
8		access charge reductions that are proposed by Verizon and the other
9		LECs. Whether or not a carrier may have the legal authority to attempt
0		such increases under the Commission's authority to supervise the pass-
11		through, there is too much competition - both from wired and wireless
12		alternatives – to permit that to occur.
13		
14	Q.	MR. OSTRANDER POINTS TO A SPRINT PRICE CAP FILING THAT
15		INCREASED SOME MTS RATES AS EVIDENCE FOR HIS
16		CONCERNS. HE ALSO STATES THAT "THE TOLL RATE
7		REDUCTIONS SHOULD DEFINITELY NOT BE SKEWED TOWARDS
8		CALLING PLANS USED BY LARGE VOLUME RESIDENTIAL TOLL
9		CUSTOMERS, THE TOLL RATE REDUCTIONS SHOULD IMPACT
20		THOSE PLANS USED BY THE AVERAGE RESIDENTIAL TOLL
21		CONSUMER." (OSTRANDER, PAGE 36, LINES 6-9). PLEASE
22		COMMENT.
23	A.	While I will leave it to Sprint to discuss its own rate adjustments, it is
24		common for long distance competitors to adjust the prices of various

25

plans in response to competitive conditions, and the underlying costs of

serving customers. This is a healthy and normal part of competition that involves discounts and attractive packages in addition to increases such as the one Mr. Ostrander chose to highlight. The elimination of monthly long distance carrier fees will provide a baseline benefit for many residential customers, including (presumably) many low-volume callers. Customers can also move between the many different calling plans that long distance carriers offer. In light of these factors, the Commission should hesitate before accepting any invitation to specifically target price reductions towards particular customers, or those Mr. Ostrander might consider "average."

Q.

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MR. OSTRANDER COMPLAINS THAT "THE POTS CUSTOMERS ARE BEING ASKED TO PAY FOR SOME OF THE ACCESS RATE REDUCTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH BUSINESS CUSTOMERS AND THE ESTIMATED RATE REDUCTION ASSOCIATED WITH SUBSCRIBERS TO BUNDLED GOODS." (OSTRANDER, PAGE 37, LINES 18–20). IS THIS AN APPROPRIATE CONCERN?

No. It would be more accurate for Mr. Ostrander to characterize possible complaints of business customers who have been asked to subsidize below-cost residential service for many years. Remedying a subsidy requires, to at least some degree, an increase in the price of the service that has been subsidized. Additionally, given that over half the population of Florida now has a wireless phone, it is becoming less clear to what extent the stereotypical "POTS customer" still exists. Finally, as the average bill analysis shows, Verizon's plan is balanced and will have

1		only a modest short-term effect on the average bills of residential
2		customers.
3		
4	Q.	MR. OSTRANDER CLAIMS THAT LECS DID NOT "PROVIDE
5		SPECIFIC AND TANGIBLE DOCUMENTATION" TO DEMONSTRATE
6		THAT THEIR PLANS WILL RESULT IN "INCREASED
7		MODERNIZATION," OR NEW SERVICE INTRODUCTIONS IN
8		FLORIDA. (OSTRANDER, PAGE 39, LINE 11 - PAGE 41, LINE 8).
9		PLEASE COMMENT.
10	A.	Mr. Ostrander's claim is incorrect. Verizon's showing provided
11		extensive, specific information on competitors and technologies that will
12		be encouraged to focus on Verizon's residential customers. Mr.
13		Ostrander provided nothing except his personal skepticism about some
14		data responses. Verizon's showing is more than enough to demonstrate
15		the competitive potential for innovative services and investment that will
16		be encouraged by its plan.
17		
18		VI.
19		CONCLUSION: THE COMMISSION SHOULD
20		APPROVE VERIZON'S BALANCED PLAN
21		FOR LONG-OVERDUE PRICING REFORM
22	Q.	DR. COOPER CLAIMS THAT THE ILECS ARE PROPOSING A
23		"RADICAL AND RAPID RATE REBALANCING BASED ON A
24		NARROW, THEORETICAL VIEW OF THE ANCIENT HISTORY OF
25		THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY." (COOPER, PAGE 2,

## 1 LINES 20–21). IS THIS ACCURATE?

No. Verizon's plan would reduce the current subsidy of residential basic service rates by less than five dollars per month over three adjustments during a period of just over two years. It would do so through revenue-neutral offsets to access charges that will ultimately cost Verizon somewhat more in rate reductions than the increases will raise, and will benefit residential customers in the variety of ways I and others have described. The national average wired residential telephone bill is on the order of \$50/month, in addition to nearly comparable amounts that half the population (and more in Florida) spends on wireless phones. Against this, pricing reform creating an initial impact of about a dollar cannot be disparaged as "radical." With respect to Dr. Cooper's other characterizations, Verizon's plan is historical in only one sense – pricing reform is overdue in Florida, and Verizon's plan will advance it.

A.

Α.

## Q. TAKEN TOGETHER, DOES THE TESTIMONY OF DR. COOPER AND DR. GABEL LEAD TO A CONFUSED AND CONTRADICTORY RESULT?

Yes. Dr. Cooper claims that residential bills must actually decline as part of a process to stimulate additional competition for residential customers whose subsidized basic service is now largely overlooked by competitors. Dr. Gabel claims that only total customer bills matter to competitors in deciding which customers are attractive. Left unanswered is how the lower customer bills on which Dr. Cooper insists will do anything but drive the competitors Dr. Gabel sees further away

1		from residential customers.
2		
3		In other words, by their own assertions and proposals, Drs. Cooper and
4		Gabel essentially ask the Commission to make a nullity of the statute's
5		goal of stimulating more competition for the benefit of residential
6		customers. But as I have described, a common sense reading of the
7		statute combines with a reasonable analysis of the economic issues to
8		show that Verizon's plan will deliver the improved competitive incentives
9		the Legislature seeks, on a basis that is reasonable and fair to
10		customers.
11		
12	Q.	NOTWITHSTANDING OPPOSITION CLAIMS, DOES VERIZON'S
13		PETITION OFFER THE COMMISSION A POSITIVE AND BENEFICIAL
14		OPPORTUNITY ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF FLORIDA?
15	A.	Yes. Most of what I have described in testimony reduces to two key
16		points.
17		
18		First, it is undeniable that telephone service prices are skewed in
19		Florida, as they once were across the country. What is also undeniable
20		is that reforming those prices to make more economic sense will create
24		to that resembly these process to make more desired and contract the create
21		genuine benefits and stimulate competition. This is the right thing for
22		
		genuine benefits and stimulate competition. This is the right thing for
22		genuine benefits and stimulate competition. This is the right thing for

1		problematic. Shifts in phone bills will be modest, gradual, and soor
2		modified by the responses of customers to beneficial new opportunities.
3		
4	Q.	WHAT ACTION SHOULD THE COMMISSION TAKE?
5	A.	The Commission should approve Verizon's petition, along with those of
6		BellSouth and Sprint. Verizon's petition conforms with the statute, with
7		the Commission's own conclusions on pricing reform, and with the
8		interests of Florida's consumers and its economy.
9		
10	Q.	DOES THAT CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY AT THIS TIME?
11	A.	Yes.
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BY MR. CHAPKIS:

Q Dr. Danner, would you please summarize your testimony?

A Thank you very much. Good afternoon, Madam Chairman and Commissioners.

When Verizon asked me to participate in this docket, I looked back at the earlier comments I provided to this Commission in its Affordable Rates Workshop process. That was in 1998. I spoke then about the same issues that confront us here today: The harm caused to customers and competition by cross-subsidies, the benefits of pricing reform and the false suggestions that something terrible would happen if progress was made toward basing rates on what telephone service actually costs to provide. That study process led to a carefully considered report by this Commission to the Legislature in which the Commission concluded that the problem was real, that a phased-in solution would make sense and, indeed, that such a result would be affordable and reasonable.

The Legislature and the Governor eventually responded with a new law that was based rather closely on this Commission's recommendations, which led us to today discussing a proposal from Verizon which closely resembles the reform approach that the Commission endorsed.

Let me briefly describe some of the analysis from my testimony that shows why Verizon's proposal should be approved.

I would just note that this evidence is not just theoretical. It's also highly factual and empirical. We have a great deal of information about specific competitors in Verizon's service territory in general and specific alternatives.

To begin with, it is undeniable in my view that basic residential rates are supported and, therefore, encourage local service competitors to ignore residential customers in Florida. Among other sources, as you've heard, these facts are established by the Commission's own UNE cost decisions and competitive analysis. There is a real problem with rates and competition when there are 100 business customers served by competitive facilities for every one residential customer served by competitive facilities in Verizon's service territory: 100-to-1 ratio.

Verizon's reform proposal will address these problems and create a host of benefits. Customers will be able to call all over Florida for much lower prices. They will call more and they will worry less about their bills. That's a clear economic benefit. Competitors will give residential customers new and innovative local service options that current pricing prevents. That's a clear economic benefit. Specific local service alternatives from voice over Internet protocol to cable telephony to wireless providers and even UNE-P will be stimulated for residential customers. Indeed, as you've just heard from Knology and as AT&T has also affirmed, specific

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competitors have already entered the market based on their expectation of pricing reform. That is powerful proof of a clear economic benefit. Some customers are now charged more for phone service based not on the actual costs they're responsible for, but just because they use the phone more. Overcharging customers on that basis creates an important fairness issue, and I think we should not forget equity to those customers as well who will gain from pricing reform.

More competition will also place increased pressure on incumbent providers to cut costs and be efficient, creating another economic benefit. And Verizon's proposal will promote demand for broadband Internet connections in Florida, furthering yet another important goal.

Against all these benefits, what arguments have been raised? Essentially there are two claims. The first is that economics should be stood on its head to deny that subsidies really exist. That is a claim that's incorrect, as the Commission has previously found and as I again point out in my testimony.

The second concern is that residential customers will be harmed, perhaps severely and irreparably, by Verizon's proposal. That claim is also incorrect for several important reasons worth mentioning here.

We already have pricing experience with pricing reform in other states and at the federal level. I can affirm

personally that the implementation of pricing reform in California caused no harm to universal service and no customer outcry. Pricing reform at the federal level actually benefited universal service. That's right. Brought more people onto the network, in the millions.

The opposition to Verizon's proposal has produced no evidence. Yes, I believe that's literally no evidence that such reform has ever caused significant customer harm where it has been implemented before. In my rebuttal testimony I point out that I reviewed opposition testimony in vain for any such specific evidence. I believe no such evidence was produced because there's none to be found.

There have also been claims that residential customers would suffer large increases to their bills. The facts again show this to be incorrect.

Let's start with Lifeline customers. Commissioner Davidson raised a concern earlier asking about the extent to which Lifeline customers actually use service. If you look at the bills of Lifeline customers, you find out they consume quite a lot of service. Indeed, one of the benefits of Verizon's proposal is the average bill for current Lifeline customers and for the number of Lifeline customers who will join the program based on the expansion that's tied to this proposal. They will get \$3.15 each a month reductions in their bills due to pass-through of toll and long distance and

1 | benefits such as that.

2 CHAIRMAN JABER: Say that one more time.

THE WITNESS: Current Lifeline customers as well as customers who join Lifeline, presuming they're similar customers, will see their bills fall by \$3.15 a month due to pass-through of benefits from Verizon's proposal.

CHAIRMAN JABER: \$3.15 a month because of the interstate long distance reductions?

THE WITNESS: Yes. Yes. That's right, Commissioner.

CHAIRMAN JABER: How do you know that?

THE WITNESS: We know that through a bill analysis of current Lifeline customers.

CHAIRMAN JABER: No. How do you know that's what the reduction will be? What are, what are you looking at?

THE WITNESS: Pardon me, Madam Chairman. What we did in the analysis was we looked specifically at current Lifeline customers on an aggregate statistical basis with actual bill data and assessed the level of toll and long distance calling they were doing in Florida with respect to their access charges, made assumptions about the pass-through of the \$1.88 or \$1.90 benefit that the long distance carriers will provide them, and simply rerated their bills.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I just wanted to get that out through your summary. I'm sure we'll have more questions later. but --

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Chairman, I have one follow-up on that just related to my prior question. And it's for the non-Lifeline customers, and I don't know if you have this data or if you could identify. You were identified as the person who would have it. If you don't have it, if you could identify the right witness.

If you know, what impact would Verizon's local rate increase coupled with Verizon's long distance access charge reductions have on the average Verizon customer's residential monthly bill?

THE WITNESS: Thank you very much, Commissioner. You anticipated my, my next statement.

For the average residential customer in total, the initial bill impact at the end of the process, after the two years, will be an increase of about \$1 a month or 50 cents for each year of the proposal.

It is important to remember, however, that those increases will occur as against average phone bills that, at least measured on a national basis, we don't have the total bill information for Florida, but on a national basis average phone bills for residential customers are almost \$50 a month, average wireless bills for customers are almost \$50 a month, and in Verizon's service territory in Florida nearly 60 percent of all people have wireless phones. That's not 60 percent of all households or businesses. 60 percent of all men, women and

1	children of all ages have wireless phones. And as I said,
2	those bills on a national average are nearly \$50 a month.
3	CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Davidson, repeat your
4	question one more time so I can make sure I understand what the
5	witness's response was. What's the impact to the average
6	Verizon residential customer; right?
7	COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Yes, Chairman. It's, if you
8	know, what impact would Verizon's local rate increase coupled
9	with Verizon's access charge reductions have on the average
10	Verizon customer's residential bill?
11	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. So that question your
12	response to that question then includes the long distance
13	flow-through?
14	THE WITNESS: Yes, Madam Chairman. That was, that
15	was \$1 a month cumulative effect after the full implementation
16	of the proposal, or about 50 cents for each of the two years.
17	CHAIRMAN JABER: And this assumes the average Verizon
18	residential customer has both local and long distance.
19	THE WITNESS: This is again based on actual bill
20	data, actual statistical examination of their bills and
21	rerating them to take effect of what the proposal will
22	accomplish.
23	CHAIRMAN JABER: And what assumptions did you make as
24	it relates to the flow-through?
25	THE WITNESS: We did two things, Madam Chairman.

First, we needed to make an assumption for the elimination of 1 2 the customer charge that the legislation requires be done. 3 didn't have access to exactly what proportion of customers are 4 charged that charge, so we did the following. We knew that 5 AT&T charges all their residential customers this charge. We 6 knew that MCI WorldCom charges most of their customers this 7 charge. So to be conservative, we assumed -- we also knew that 8 Verizon's customers, certain Verizon customers who have certain 9 packages don't pay these charges, so we excluded those 10 customers. Then we assumed that two-thirds of the remaining 11 customers would receive that benefit. Now that may be a little 12 low. And if that's a little low, then the average bill impact 13 will be even less. But that's the assumption we took. So we 14 assumed that two-thirds of those customers would receive that 15 benefit. Then we took the money that was remaining and 16 apportioned it across all access, reduced all access by the 17 amount you could, and then attributed those reductions as well.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay.

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THE WITNESS: So that was the best we could do. It is a little bit approximate, as I have described, but I don't think it's very bad either.

CHAIRMAN JABER: To arrive at the \$1 a month estimated increase, you also made the assumption that the long distance reductions were happening simultaneously with the increases to local rates, didn't you?

THE WITNESS: Well, yes and no, Madam Chairman.

That's a cumulative total, so it assumes that the pass-through will occur by the end of the period. Personally, and I've testified to this, I don't think there will be any way the long distance carriers can keep those, those monies and I think they'll have to pass them through rather quickly. But the assumption we made in the analysis was that by the conclusion of the transition, the money would have been passed through.

CHAIRMAN JABER: By the end of what period? The two-year period proposed by Verizon or by your first 12-month period?

THE WITNESS: Well, the analysis is cumulative. So it says when we get to the end of the transition, we looked at the rate increases that would occur versus the pass-throughs and decreases that would occur, added them up and set them against each other in that manner.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Can I ask a question?

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Deason, yeah.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Since we're asking questions during the summary. Your \$1 per month average increase is a net amount after taking into consideration the local, impact of the local rate increase netted against your two-thirds assumption on the elimination of recurring customer charges and an assumption concerning the pass-through of the reduced access

1 charges on a usage basis: is that correct? 2 THE WITNESS: That's correct, Commissioner. 3 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. How did you -- what 4 assumptions or how did you determine the impact of the reduced access charges on a per-minute-of-usage basis for the average 5 6 customer? THE WITNESS: We have billing records in the system 7 8 or Verizon does. I should say, that reflects the number of 9 access minutes in the Florida jurisdiction that each customer 10 uses. And we picked a particular month, and I think, I believe it was March of this year, and looked at the number of access 11 12 minutes that actually appeared on customer bills for that 13 month, and didn't do it obviously customer by customer, but did 14 it through an automated process, and then applied those 15 reductions in the manner I described. 16 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Did you make any assumption about how the long distance carriers were going to apportion 17 the benefits between small residentials and small business and 18 19 large business customers? 20 THE WITNESS: For this purpose, Commissioner, we 21 assumed that a minute was a minute. And so if a customer used 22 a minute, they'd get a minute's worth of benefit. 23 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Thank you. 24 CHAIRMAN JABER: Go ahead.

THE WITNESS: Yes. Thank you.

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I should note that the bill impacts we've just asked discussed and I suspect we'll discuss a little further are not the end of the process. They're just the beginning of the process because it's a static analysis to get to that point. The prices change, the bills change, then things start to happen with respect to competition.

We heard today from Knology in terms of the large benefits that customers can get from their services. Those benefits aren't counted in these bill numbers. And we'll reduce them and turn them positive for customers who have any opportunity for those services.

We've talked about the ability to make additional calls that will occur because long distance prices will be reduced. Those benefits are not included in here. Those will be economic benefits to customers that will offset, work to offset that dollar. We talked about a variety of competitive and wireless and other alternatives that will be stimulated or will become more attractive and interesting to customers. We'll provide them benefits that are not counted in terms of that dollar.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Danner, the reason I allowed the expansion of the summary on the previous question is because the Commissioners asked the question related to Lifeline. I need you to wrap up your summary and keep it focused on what's in your written testimony.

1	THE WITNESS: I apologize, Commissioner. That
2	discussion is in my rebuttal testimony. But I am virtually
3	done, except with one last observation that another way to look
4	at this is, even disregarding, disregarding those other
5	benefits that I've spoken to, this Commission and the country
6	generally have been through a very involved, very costly, very
7	lengthy process to try to stimulate local competition. Florida
8	was a leader in the nation, as we've heard discussed earlier.
9	A tremendous amount has been done at great expense and great
10	contribution of your time and effort as well, yet we haven't
11	succeeded. We don't have residential competition for Verizon's
12	customers. Economic theory and a great deal of actual evidence
13	shows that these reform proposals will get us in that, move us
14	in that direction and help get us the results that everyone has
15	been working for, and I encourage the Commission to support
16	this proposal for that reason.
17	MR. CHAPKIS: Thank you, Dr. Danner. The witness is
18	available for cross-examination.
19	CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Fons. Mr. Hatch.
20	MR. HATCH: No questions.
21	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Public Counsel.
22	MR. BECK: Thank you, Madam Chairman.

BY MR. BECK:

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Q Good afternoon, Dr. Danner.

CROSS EXAMINATION

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- A Good afternoon.
- Q My name is Charlie Beck with the Office of Public Counsel.

In response to questions by the Commissioners about your summary and about how you, what assumptions you made on the access charge reductions, you know --

A Yes.

Q -- regarding your conclusion about the effect on customer bills, did I understand you correctly that you said you first assumed that the interexchange carriers applied the access reduction first to reduce the in-state connection fee?

A Yes, sir. That's right.

Q Okay. And did you do that in three increments, so you --

A No, sir. It was a cumulative analysis, as I mentioned. So the result I spoke of is the end result by the end of the transition.

Q Okay. What portion of the access charge reduction was used in your analysis to, to -- that was applied to the reduction of the in-state connection fee?

A I don't recall the specific proportion of the money.

I think we have some work papers that would speak to that.

What we did, as I mentioned earlier, was to assume that two-thirds of that group of residential customers who would be eligible for it would obtain that reduction. Since the statute

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required that reduction, we assumed that was the first call on the money. And then we, in essence, gave the long distance carriers credit for having done that before they started reducing other per minute rates.

Okay. So you first -- I guess off the top then you first assumed they applied all of that to benefit solely their residential customers by reducing the in-state connection fee; is that right?

Yes. that's correct.

And then the balance you distributed proportionately between residence and business?

Based on -- yes, sir. Based on how many access Α minutes they had.

So in effect what you've assumed then is that the, the interexchange carriers would apply more than the relative business and residential split to benefit their residential customers?

Well, that does seem to be the intent and effect of Α the legislation, and that's the way the analysis worked out. Yes.

Okay. So let me understand then. Off the top, and you can't tell me what the proportion was, but off the top you assumed that they would flow it all through benefit residences, and then they would simply take the portion and, the remaining portion and apportion that between residence and business to

the, in the same proportion that they use access charges?

A Well, yes, with a qualification. I -- when you said that they would pass it all through, what we assumed was that they would meet their statutory obligations to eliminate those connection fees, and that that would be a principal call that they'd have to meet.

Q Was that a significant, the amount that you put toward the in-state connection fee, was that a significant portion of the access charge reduction?

A Without being able to recall specifically the proportion, I think it was.

Q Okay. And then it was the balance that was left over that you, you decided would be go proportionately between residence and businesses?

A Well, again, in proportion to their usage of long distance services within Florida, yes.

Q Now does that assumptions that you used match what any of the interexchange carriers have proposed to your knowledge?

A My understanding is that it generally does in the sense that the interexchange carriers are agreeing to reduce the connection fees, and they would like credit for that in terms of their pass-through obligation.

Q Okay. Do you --

A I can't say that it specifically matches them. It is

my best opinion as to what will actually happen.

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Okay. Did you review the testimony by AT&T to see 0 how they were reducing their access, or flowing through their access charge reduction?

No. I didn't have a chance to review their specific proposal.

How about MCI? 0

You know, I think I read the testimony from each of Α them but did not see the numbers. I can't say I reviewed their proposal in detail, no.

Did you see their confidential testimony describing 0 how they were going to pass it through?

I don't believe so, no. Α

MR. BECK: Okay. Madam Chair, I'd like an exhibit to be marked for identification, if I could. The cover sheet for this is very generally described as documents produced by Verizon Florida.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Let me wait until all the parties have it.

MR. BECK: What I've asked Mr. Poucher to do -- this is a document claimed to be confidential by Verizon. We're handing it out to the witness and to the Commissioners. We're going to give the remaining copies to Verizon and let them distribute it to parties that they have given permission to see this to.

- L	CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Chapkis, is there a, is there a
2	short title? Is there, you know, another way of identifying
3	this document without revealing confidential information?
4	MR. CHAPKIS: May I have one moment, Madam Chairman?
5	CHAIRMAN JABER: Sure. Uh-huh.
6	(Pause.)
7	CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Chapkis, just to make it easier
8	for you, all I propose would be something like document
9	number do you see what it says at the top left-hand side,
10	document number
11	MR. CHAPKIS: That would be fine.
12	CHAIRMAN JABER: Report 3A?
13	MR. CHAPKIS: That would be fine.
14	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Documents produced by Verizor
15	Florida, Report 3A will be identified as Exhibit 63.
16	(Exhibit Number 63 marked for identification.)
17	MR. BECK: Thank you, Madam Chairman.
18	CHAIRMAN JABER: Confidential, it's a confidential
19	exhibit.
20	BY MR. BECK:
21	Q Dr. Danner, are you familiar with Confidential
22	Exhibit for Identification 63?
23	A Yes, I am.
24	Q Did you oversee an analysis prior to Verizon filing
25	its first petitions in this case that, that attempted to

analyze the effect of Verizon's petition on customer bills?

A Yes, I did.

Q And does this -- this report has a print date of August 8th, 2003, at the top. Does that reflect the time period about when this was done?

A Yes, I believe that's right.

Q In your, in your analysis that's reflected on these pages, you had some different assumptions concerning the flow-through of access charges, did you not?

A Yes. I did.

Q Could you explain how your flow-through that you assumed on this document differs from the flow-through you described during your summary?

A Yes, I can. And, generally speaking, my opinion was that this was not actually as accurate as we would like for this purpose. But this document looked only at a subset of residential customers, those whose bill would be directly affected. It did not take account of Lifeline in any respect in terms of overall impacts or benefits. I believe there is some breakout of Lifeline customers at some point.

But most importantly it did not consider the in-state connection fee in any fashion. So this assumed a simple pass-through on a minute-for-minute basis without taking account of the Legislature's mandate to eliminate the in-state connection fees.

Q Okay. Let me make sure I understand. This document, the exhibit we've identified, assumes that all interexchange carriers in Verizon's territory would flow through the access reductions in their permanent charges to residential customers; is that right?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Now the way that different -- and they would do it proportionately, you know, residential and business proportionately to, to how those charges are incurred by residential and businesses; is that right?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Now this differs from the method you mentioned in your summary because you've assumed in that other analysis that the carriers would first use it, use their access reductions solely to reduce that residential in-state fee, and then they would apply the balance for residence and businesses according to the proportions that access charges are used by those categories?

A That's correct as a description of the method. I don't think there's any particular timing implied by it.

Q Okay.

A But that's the method, yes.

Q And so the assumptions that you used in your, in the procedure you mentioned in your summary allocate more of the reductions to residential customers than do the assumptions you

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used in the document in front of you?

A That's correct. And, and my -- it's my belief that that's a more accurate representation of what's required by Verizon's proposal in the legislation.

Q Now what caused you to prepare or conduct the analysis that's reflected in the Exhibit 63 for identification?

A It was a couple of different things. Having experience in this kind of process before, I know that a lot of exaggerated and sometimes false claims are made about impacts on customers of bill pricing reform, and so I had an intellectual curiosity to see what the impacts might be. There was consideration of whether we might want to file this with direct testimony or not, considering that the analysis was incomplete, and also that in our view the, the statute didn't require such analysis. We didn't file it. But that's basically where it came from.

Q Okay. So you conducted this analysis prior to Verizon filing its first petitions, but decided not to include the results of that in the petitions?

A Yes. For the reasons I stated, that it wasn't as realistic as it should be and because it didn't seem required by the statute.

Q Now the first two pages -- you've broken down the impact on customers in various ways in this analysis, have you not?

1	A Yes.
2	Q One is by rate groups?
3	A Yes.
4	Q Okay. Now Pages 5 and 6 break down the impact on
5	rate groups in a way that appears similar to Pages 7 and 8,
6	does it not?
7	A Yes.
8	Q Okay. In the analysis on Pages 5 and 6 you included
9	both the impact of the petitions Verizon was filing, as well as
10	the impact of some price cap increases that Verizon had
11	implemented; is that right?
12	A That's correct. So Pages 1 and 2 really include more
13	than the proposal even in the limited way that it was analyzed.
14	Q Okay. But Pages Bate stamped 7 and 8, those are
15	limited to the, the impact of the petitions; is that right?
16	A Yes, in the manner I described with the limitations 1
17	mentioned, yes.
18	Q On Page 8 there's an overall total that's listed, is
19	there not, as the impact on customer bills?
20	A Page 8?
21	Q Right. Let me ask you to go to Page 8 and look at
22	the row entitled "Total."
23	A Yes.
24	Q Okay. And on that row, staying on that row, there's
25	a column total, what, circuit switched units?

1	A Yes.
2	Q Okay. And that's all the, the residential nonbundled
3	customers in Verizon Florida's territory, is that right,
4	residential customers?
5	A Yes, that's correct.
6	Q Okay. Now at the time you were doing this analysis,
7	Verizon had proposed two increases one year apart, had it not,
8	to implement the Act?
9	A Yes.
10	Q And so you show two changes here that reflect what
11	Verizon was filing at that time; right?
12	A That's correct.
13	Q And, and after both changes were implemented, that
14	would have been the total implementation of Verizon's proposal
15	is that right?
16	A Yes.
17	Q Okay. And did you conclude that the result from the
18	first installment on, on that total group would be the amount
19	shown on the net change dollars per unit year one rates?
20	A Again, given limited and not fully accurate
21	assumptions, yes.
22	Q And then there's a similar number for year two rates
23	is that right?
24	A Yes.
25	Q And so would it be true that the total of those two

columns was your estimate, given the limitations you said, of the impact Verizon's petition would have on residential customers bills; is that right?

A Given the limitations, yes.

Q Okay. Now you excluded bundled packages from your analysis in this analysis, did you not?

A Yes.

Q In the analysis you mentioned in your summary, did you include bundled packages?

A Yes. Because that analysis is an impact on the average residential bill for all residential customers.

Q And Verizon does not propose to increase any of the prices for bundled packages; is that right?

A That's not part of their proposal, although I don't know what will happen in the market afterwards. But, yes.

Q Okay. And what impact did you assume would occur on the bundled packages as a result of the petitions?

I didn't know. I didn't make an assumption because I'm not sure whether they will gain or lose bundled packages, whether they'll be able to charge more, be forced to charge less for them. I -- you know, it depends on how, on the pace that competition takes. Additionally, they're nonbasic services and, you know, outside the gamut of the proposal. So I didn't know what to assume about them, so I left them where they were.

Q Okay. So your assumption was is that their prices would stay the same as a result of the petition; is that right?

A For this purpose, yes.

Q Okay. And so, and so when you added them in, it made a broader base. That reduced the average increase then on the, on that larger customer base; is that right?

A I suppose you could say that, yes. And going from a subset of residential customers to all residential customers, yes, that would have that effect.

Q Okay. Let me make sure I understand the differences between what, the analysis you mentioned in your summary and this. One difference is the flow-through in access, which we've discussed already.

A Yes.

Q Okay. And another is in your, the process you mentioned in your summary, you included package customers at no increase in determining the average increase for customers.

A Yes. Because they'll get neither the increases nor the benefit of the reduced flow-through either.

Q Okay. Are there any other differences between the analysis?

A Yes, there's one other difference. There's a small change. Given that the legislation and proposal are related to an expansion of the Lifeline, I took Verizon's forecast for the increase in Lifeline subscribership, took that times the

1	Lifeline benefit and prorated that benefit across all
2	residential customers since that'll be part of the impact on
3	the total residential bill.
4	Q Okay. And what was the increase in Lifeline
5	customers that you used in that assumption?
6	A 20,000.
7	Q Okay. And how many Lifeline customers does Verizon
8	have currently?
9	A Just over 21,000. The estimate is that that
10	population will double due to the expanded eligibility
11	criteria.
12	Q Okay. As part of the analysis you did that's
13	reflected in the exhibit, you also broke down the impact on
14	customers in different age groups; is that right?
15	A Yes.
16	Q Okay. And you've you had various strata. And
17	this is on Bate stamp Page 9 of the analysis?
18	A Yes. And a similar analysis also appears in my
19	testimony, as you know, with the full population.
20	Q Well, let's go through this, and then we'll also go
21	through your rebuttal on, on that.
22	Now the strata themselves are not confidential, is
23	it; it's just the impact that the company is claiming is
24	confidential?

A That's my understanding, yes. That's correct.

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1	Q Okay. Okay. Which age strata has the highest
2	increase in their total bill?
3	A Let's see. It would be 76 plus years is slightly
4	higher, I think, than the next one, next highest one.
5	Q Okay. I'm sorry. The 76 plus years is slightly
6	higher than the 66 to 75 year group?
7	A Yes.
8	Q Okay.
9	A Well, actually I beg your pardon. Let me just
10	check.
11	No. Pardon me. I just did a little incorrect math
12	in my head. Yes. I think you're right.
13	Q So the impact in this analysis on the age group
14	76 years old and older would be the sum of the amounts shown in
15	the column for net change in year one rates and the net change
16	for year two rates; is that right?
17	A Yes. Again, under the assumptions we've discussed.
18	Q Okay. Which would be the which age group would
19	have the lowest impact on it?
20	A You know, I think it might be the 26 to 35 years.
21	Does that agree with your eye?
22	Q I'm just asking.
23	A I believe it's the 26 to 35 years. I should make one
24	other note just for reference, that this average bill price
25	plan rates is incomplete over here because it doesn't include

long distance bill, just so there's no misunderstanding. But 1 2 that doesn't include the retail long distance charges. But I 3 believe it's, it would be 26 to 35 years. Okay. You did take into account the long distance 4 Q 5 reductions in determining the total impact that's shown in the 6 columns, did you not? In the manner we describe. 7 Α Right. 8 Q 9 Α Yes. 10 It's just that the total bill doesn't have those 0 charges, doesn't have which charges in it? 11 The total bill reflects only Verizon charges. 12 Α 13 Okay. 0 14 A substantial portion of what customers pay are bills 15 to long distance carriers. So these numbers are considerably low in terms of average customer bill levels. But, again, it's 16 17 just to avoid confusion I wanted to make that clear because the column is somewhat misleading the way it's titled. 18 Now you've testified, if I take it correctly, 19 0 Okay. that the largest increase would be on the age group 76 plus and 20 the lowest increase would be in the age group 26 to 35 years in 21 22 your analysis?

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Okay. And you've added up the two-year, or the total

Based on these assumptions, yes.

impact on both of those age groups?

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1	A I can do it now.
2	Q Okay.
3	A Yes.
4	Q Okay. And you've claimed that those actual numbers
5	are confidential, or the company has claimed that, has it not?
6	A Yes.
7	Q Okay. Could you tell me what the multiple is of the
8	impact on 76-year-olds as compared to the impact on 26- and
9	35-year-olds?
10	A The multiple? Huh.
11	Q For example, what would you have to multiply that
12	impact on the age group 26/35 years to come up with the answer
13	or come up with the amount that applies to 76-year-olds?
14	A Well, you're starting with a pretty small base, but
15	guess you'd have to multiply it by a little more than three in
16	this analysis.
17	Q Okay. So the impact on the age group 76 years old i
18	three times the impact on the age group 26 to 35; is that
19	right?
20	A In that way of calculating, yes.
21	Q Would you turn to your rebuttal testimony, please.
22	And this is
23	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I'm sorry, Mr. Beck. Before
24	you leave this, can I ask a question?
25	MR. BECK: Sure.

1 COMMISSIONER DEASON: The, the last column, "Average 2 Bill Price Plan Rates," and I know you qualified what that 3 number represents, but is there any explanation for the amount 4 of that for 76 plus years in comparison to the amount for 26 to 5 35 years? 6 THE WITNESS: You know. Commissioner. I'd have to 7 speculate a little bit, but I suspect the younger customers buy more features since this is principally, as I said, this is 8 just what's paid to Verizon. This does not include what's paid 9 10 to AT&T or other long distance carriers. So I would suspect that the difference has something to do with features and a 11 12 little bit of different usage level. 13 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okav. 14 BY MR. BECK: Dr. Danner, in your rebuttal testimony at Pages 15 0 42 and 43. 16 17 Α Yes. 18 If you'd turn to those, please. And Verizon has 0 19 claimed that this data is also confidential in the charts that 20 you have on Pages 42 and 43 of your testimony, does it not? 21 Α Yes. 22 This shows the result on age groups that, using the 0 23 assumptions that differ from the ones in the exhibit that we've

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discussed: is that correct?

Yes.

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Q Okay. In other words, this data in your rebuttal testimony reflects the assumptions that you discussed in your summary of testimony.

A Yes. It's more accurate.

Q Okay. But you have the same age strata, is that right, that you have in your initial analysis?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And, again, in this analysis the impact on the 76-plus-year-old age group, how does that compare to the others?

A Well, it's slightly smaller than the unknown group or people who wouldn't respond and give their ages. It's slightly more than the average. It is the highest of the numbers.

Q Okay. You state in your testimony, in the public testimony that the average is about \$1 using those assumptions; is that right?

A Yes.

Q And you state that the impact of the confidential number or the impact shown in your confidential numbers for 76-years-old is slightly more than the average?

A Yes. Yes. Slightly more.

Q And could you give us a multiple to give us an idea of what you mean by slightly? How much more -- what's the multiple of the average that you, that is reflected in this data for the 76-years-olds?

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A My opinion is not based on a multiple. It's based on a value of dollars and cents. If you -- you know, I believe that the difference between the average and that number there is only slightly more. That's my characterization of it. And I don't think it's susceptible to a multiple when you're dealing with small numbers like this.

Q Do you recall when I asked you about the exhibit, I'd asked you what multiple the impact on 76-years-olds was compared to the age group 26 to 35?

A Yes.

Q And you mentioned about three.

A Yes.

Q Could you give us the same multiple that, that would be reflected in your rebuttal testimony?

A Yes. I think the multiple is slightly smaller, but it would still be about a three. Again, in numbers that I generally consider to be not, not very large.

Q Dr. Danner, the impact -- do you have the number on Line 24 of your rebuttal testimony, Page 42 that shows the impact on 26-to-35-year-olds?

A Yes.

Q And have you compared that to the number that's shown on Line 4 of Page 43 showing the impact on 26-year-olds? I'm sorry. On 76-year-olds.

A Yes.

1	Q And you're telling me that the number on Line 24 of		
2	Page 42 is less than three of the numbers shown on Line 4 of		
3	Page 43?		
4	A Oh, you know, I'm sorry. I misspoke. I was looking		
5	at Line 23.		
6	If you looked at Line 24, no, it would be, if you		
7	insist on a multiple, 5-and-a-half times maybe. But, again,		
8	with relatively small actual dollar differences.		
9	MR. BECK: Dr. Danner, thank you. That's all I have		
10	CHAIRMAN JABER: Go ahead, Ms. Bradley.		
11	CROSS EXAMINATION		
12	BY MS. BRADLEY:		
13	Q Dr. Danner, I just have a few questions.		
14	When you were talking about the benefits to		
15	consumers, you mentioned that they would have a greater choice		
16	of companies and that they would have available more services		
17	that would be available to them; correct?		
18	A Yes. That's correct.		
19	Q Are you familiar with the report that the Public		
20	Service Commission did in February of '99, the Fair and		
21	Reasonable Rates Report?		
22	A Yes, I have read that.		
23	Q That report talks about the fact that if they raise		
24	rates \$2, that approximately 7.1 percent said they would		
25	discontinue service. And if they raised it by \$5,		

approximately 13.4 percent of the consumers said they would discontinue service. And then they also looked at low income consumers and found that if they raised it by \$2, that approximately 9.5 percent would discontinue service, and approximately, if they raised it by \$5, approximately 20.5 of low income seniors would have to, I mean, low income persons would have to discontinue service.

Now for the folks that are going to have to discontinue service because of this rate increase, they're not going to enjoy any of these benefits, are they?

A I'm afraid I have to disagree with the conclusions of the report. I understand it was prepared in good faith and there is a good effort made to do so, but those numbers are wildly incorrect. Actual experience with price changes in telecommunications confirms that the effect of pricing reform or price increases will be nothing like those numbers you have read to me.

In fact, when the FCC pursued pricing reform very much like this pricing reform through creating the subscriber line charge in, in the federal jurisdiction, millions of customers were actually added to the network as a direct result of that reform.

I have some experience in my graduate work with studies and surveys of the kind that were used to develop that information. And it's unfortunate that when you ask people

1	questions like that, you know, would you give up the service
2	for a certain amount or how much would you pay for this, you
3	just don't get accurate information. The accurate information
4	that we can rely upon is that which has been determined by
5	observing actual customer behavior in response to actual price
6	changes, and, for example, resides in books such as Lester
7	Taylor's book on demand studies that was referred to by some of
8	the other, other witnesses earlier.
9	So I'm afraid I can't accept the premise of your
10	question because those data are not correct.
11	Q Did you hear the testimony yesterday?
12	A Yes.
13	Q Did you hear the testimony that BellSouth
14	discontinues approximately 2,000 citizens on Lifeline per
15	month?
16	A Yes. And I am familiar with detailed empirical
17	research as to why customers actually give up service.
18	Q Those that are going to have to or have testified or
19	feel that
20	MR. CHAPKIS: Objection. Could you please let the
21	witness finish his answer to your question?
22	MS. BRADLEY: I'm sorry. I thought he was through
23	with it.
24	CHAIRMAN JABER: Excuse me, Mr. Danner. Ms. Bradley,
25	I noticed that, too. So let's wait until the witness finishes

the answer, and you're welcome to ask the next question. 1 2 MS. BRADLEY: Certainly. 3 CHAIRMAN JABER: Go ahead. THE WITNESS: Thank you, Madam Chair. In. in a 4 5 number of places, in particular in California and in Texas, 6 there has been detailed research performed as to why customers 7 actually give up phone service. This has gone through investigation of those very customers through researching the 8 9 actual reasons why they give up phone service. 10 Overwhelmingly the reason why customers give up phone service when they fall off the network is uncontrollable toll 11 and long distance bills. It dwarfs any other concern. 12 13 The second most prevalent reason is high connection 14 charges and credit requirements. When customers fall off the 15 network, they tend to have very high bills, they have high 16 unpaid bills, they may have bad credit due to other problems 17 they have in their lives and their jobs and their finances, and 18 they're unable to meet the credit requirements and the 19 connection charges to get back in the network. 20 Almost never in those studies and that empirical 21 research is the basic rate ever mentioned as an actual factor 22 in customers losing phone service. 23

BY MS. BRADLEY:

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I guess it's a good thing we're not in Texas. 0 Sir, let me ask you a question. For those people

1	that are going to have to give up service because they can't
2	afford the increase, they're not going to enjoy the benefits
3	that you're talking about, are they?
4	A To the extent there are any such people, I would
5	agree with your premise. But another again, as I've said, I
6	don't believe that's going to be a, a genuine concern in the
7	end.
8	MS. BRADLEY: I don't think I have anything else.
9	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay.
10	CROSS EXAMINATION
11	BY MR. TWOMEY:
12	Q Good afternoon, Dr. Danner. I'm Mike Twomey.
13	A Good afternoon, sir.
14	Q The first thing I'd like to do is refer you back to
15	the confidential exhibit Mr. Beck was asking you about.
16	A Yes, sir.
17	Q And he I believe you acknowledged that the 76 and
18	above age strata was the group that had the most adverse
19	consequence as a result of this analysis; is that correct?
20	A Yes. And presumably I guess they're one of the most
21	heavily subsidized and that's why that occurs, yes.
22	Q Okay. Now would you agree with me that the
23	66-to-75-degree strata is the second most adversely impacted?
24	A Yes. In this analysis, that's correct.
25	Q And then after that would you agree with me that the

1	150-10-05-year-old strata is the next most adversely affected:
2	A Yes. In this analysis, that's correct.
3	Q And then finally not finally, but finally for my
4	purposes, the 46-to-55-year strata would be the next.
5	A Yes.
6	Q Okay. The were you in the room this morning when
7	I asked the, the BellSouth witness a hypothetical of
8	Commissioner Deason coming back from the airport?
9	A Yes. I understand it is truly a hypothetical because
10	Commissioner Deason would never come back from the airport in
11	the manner that was described.
12	Q That's true. And I've learned from that, Dr. Danner,
13	so
14	COMMISSIONER DEASON: He catches on fast.
15	MR. TWOMEY: Well, I have, I have, too, Commissioner
16	Deason. So
17	CHAIRMAN JABER: He's changed the hypothetical.
18	BY MR. TWOMEY:
19	Q The what I propose to do to make it more real life
20	is to substitute Commissioner Deason for AARP's volunteer
21	worker in Tallahassee, Mr. Ed Paschall, who testified yesterday
22	in the public part of the hearing who said that he was
23	COMMISSIONER DEASON: You know, I have traveled
24	extensively with Mr. Paschall in years past when he was a
25	pilot.

MR. TWOMEY: Yes, Commissioner, so I have.
BY MR. TWOMEY:

Q So let's substitute, let's substitute Mr. Paschall for Commissioner Deason and just say -- do you recall the, the premise of my hypothetical?

A Yes.

Q That, that Mr. Paschall would be coming back from the airport coming here for this hearing, jumps into the cab, three telephone executives, vice presidents jump in, hitch a ride, they get here, the cabby says the fair is \$20. And I asked the BellSouth witness, which would BellSouth use, which option: The divide \$20 by four, each person pay five bucks as their share or, B, say, Mr. Paschall, you were coming here anyways, 20 bucks is yours you were going to spend, we don't owe you anything?

A Well, there are two ways to look at your hypothetical, which, if I can beg your indulgence, I'd like to amend slightly as well in a moment.

Q Sure.

A The -- we need to distinguish the actual decision to purchase the ride versus how it's used by whoever we've decided has purchased it once they're done. So if it's clear that the first individual bought the cab ride and then decided to use it by sharing it with others, then I suppose it would all be his responsibility.

If the four gentlemen purchased it collectively, said 1 2 let's, you know, go get a ride together, then, you know, they 3 could bargain among themselves as to who would pay what but the 4 ride would be their joint responsibility. 5 I think to bring it back to the telephone analogy 6 though, if the -- your suggestion, I think, would be that if 7 the, if the cab stopped at Burger King on the way home to pick up some hamburgers, that the Burger King ought to pay for part 8 of the ride too because the cab was also being used to buy 9 takeout food. I apologize. I couldn't resist. 10 11 BY MR. TWOMEY: 12 CHAIRMAN JABER: I wish you would have. It's dinner 13 time. 14 BY MR. TWOMEY: 15 You have a degree in economics amongst your other Q degrees: right? 16 17 Α Yes. sir. 18 COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Mr. Twomey, could you just 19 identify what you handed to the witness, please? 20 MR. TWOMEY: I'm sorry. It's the it's the Twomey 21 artwork also known as Exhibit 54. I believe. 22 BY MR. TWOMEY: 23 The, the same questions on that. The, the --0 24 without, without regard, for purposes of my question, issues of

cost causation, can any of the services indicated on that

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1	exhibit be provided by a LEC to its customers without
2	utilization of the local loop?
3	A Pardon me for asking for one clarification. When you
4	say without use, use by whom?
5	Q By utilization of the loop. Let me ask you this way.
6	The can the LEC in this example sell, provide
7	through it intraLATA long distance service to its customers
8	without utilization of the local loop?
9	A Well, yes, it could if it had some other way to
10	access the network. The usual manner though I think you have
11	in mind would be that the customer would have a loop and the
12	customer would use the loop to access the service and/or call
13	its accountant or order a pizza or whatever, yes.
14	Q But your I take it you mean another method would
15	be wireless or something; right?
16	A Yes. Or there are companies like AT&T that, you
17	know, offer long distance service to customers who have loops
18	they got elsewhere.
19	Q Okay. I said the LEC. But now can the LEC provide
20	interLATA long distance service without utilizing the loop?
21	A I would assume that in the usual case a customer
22	would have to have a loop to access the LEC to get long
23	distance service, yes.
24	Q Okay. And the vertical services, same thing?
25	A Yes.

- Q Okay. Directory assistance?
- A Well, again, there are a lot of ways to access directory assistance. But in the scenario you're imagining, I assume you could use a loop to do that.
- Q Do these companies or does Verizon provide DSL service as utilizing the local loop?
- A I believe Verizon's DSL service is carried over customer loops, yes.
- Q Okay. And do they to your knowledge receive revenues for those services, DSL?
  - A They sell it, yes.
- Q Okay. Now I had asked Mr. Fulp, I think it was, if, if you had revenues of \$10 for access and -- I'm sorry, \$10 for local service, \$5 for access and a total of \$10 for vertical services combined for a total of \$25, could the Commission, if it wanted to, allocate cost of the services, those services utilizing the local loop based upon the proportion of revenues earned through it?
- A You know, if you abandon economic principles, I guess you can -- it's hard for me to tell you what to do based on economics for setting those prices.
  - Q Yes, sir. But let me repeat the question.
- Could you -- absent cost causation and all the rest of that, can the, could the Commission mathematically apportion cost to these various services based upon the revenue they earn

1 through the utilization of the local loop? If that's within their legal authority, I assume they 2 3 could. So that would be a yes, correct, Dr. Danner? 4 0 5 Again, I, I don't mean to guibble. Yes, assuming Α they have the legal authority to do that. 6 7 Q Okay. 8 Α I'm not an attorney. 9 0 10

Well, you're not. But you say in your rebuttal testimony that you think the statute is real clear; is that correct?

Α Yes. I do.

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Excuse me. When you say that the statute is not a --I'm trying to find the words you used. On Page, Page 4 of your rebuttal testimony at Line 6 you say, "First, it is clear that Section 364.164(1)(a) is only one of four criteria the Commission must consider in evaluating Verizon's petition. The statute does not create a 'pass fail' test regarding this or the other specified criteria. Under the Act, the Commission retains discretion to evaluate and balance these criteria as it sees fit." And that's your testimony; correct?

Yes. Α

Now what I want to know is do you mean by that that 0 it's your opinion, whether legal or not, that, that this Commission could find that Verizon met two or three of the four 1

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criteria and still authorized the rate increases sought?

The statute says, "The Commission shall consider the following criteria." In my experience when legislatures intend for an agency to meet each individual criterion or make that a requirement, they say it shall meet this and this and this or some such language. I'm not saying the Commission, you know -obviously in considering those criteria the Commission can evaluate the petition, and if they feel that it doesn't meet one of them, they can say no for that reason. This is not -but it's not mandatory based on the statute.

Well, let's look at that again. Let's go back to 0 your Page 3 of your rebuttal, please. Because isn't it true. Dr. Danner, that the statute doesn't exactly say the way you paraphrased it -- isn't it true, as you have it quoted in your testimony, that it says, directs the Commission to consider whether granting these petitions will: is that correct?

Α Yes.

0 Okay. And, again, is it your testimony that it's your belief that the Commission mandatorily doesn't have to find that each one of those conditions is met?

In my view, if each of these was to be absolutely mandatory, which, again, is not to suggest that the Commission shouldn't interpret it the way, you know, it sees fit, it would say, and/or some such language between each or would say, you know, will -- whether the petition will satisfy all of the

1	following criteria or pass all of the tests individually and
2	collectively or something like that.
3	Q Is are you finished? Is, is that the, is that
4	Verizon's legal position in this case, or do you know?
5	MR. CHAPKIS: Objection. Calls for speculation.
6	CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Chapkis
7	MR. CHAPKIS: Calls for a legal conclusion.
8	CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Chapkis, the question concluded
9	with "do you know," so I'll allow it.
10	THE WITNESS: I don't know.
11	BY MR. TWOMEY:
12	Q So it would be your testimony, would it, Dr. Danner,
13	that, that if the Commission found for some reason that there
14	were no subsidy or support to be removed by rate increases,
15	that it could still go ahead and increase local rates
16	notwithstanding that?
17	A I think it's that's they're not precluded from
18	doing that based on the statute as far as I can see. Whether
19	they would or not, I don't, I wouldn't say. But in this case
20	we don't have to reach that question.
21	(Transcript continues in sequence with Volume .)
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1	STATE OF FLORIDA )
2	COUNTY OF LEON CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
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4	I, LINDA BOLES, RPR, Official Commission
5	Reporter, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceeding was heard at the time and place herein stated.
6	IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that I stenographically reported the said proceedings; that the same has been
7	transcribed under my direct supervision; and that this transcript constitutes a true transcription of my notes of said
8	proceedings.
9	I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor am I a relative
10	attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor am I a relative or employee of any of the parties' attorneys or counsel connected with the action, nor am I financially interested in
L1	the action.
L2	DATED THIS 12th DAY OF DECEMBER, 2003.
L3	
L4	LINDA BOLES, RPR
L5	FPSC Official Commission Reporter (850) 413-6734
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21	(Transcript continues in sequence with Volume 9.)
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1	STATE OF FLORIDA )
2	: CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER COUNTY OF LEON )
3	
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5	Reporter, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceeding was heard at the time and place herein stated.
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10	I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor am I a relative or employee of any of the parties' attorneys or counsel connected with the action, nor am I financially interested in
11	the action.
12	DATED THIS 12th DAY OF DECEMBER, 2003.
13	
14	LINDA BOLES. RPR
15	FPSC Official Commission Reporter (850) 413-6734
16	(030) 413 0/34
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