BEFORE THE 1 FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 2 DOCKET NO. 031033-EI 3 In the Matter of 4 REVIEW OF TAMPA ELECTRIC COMPANY'S 2004-2008 WATERBORNE 5 TRANSPORTATION CONTRACT WITH TECO TRANSPORT AND ASSOCIATED 6 BENCHMARK. 7 8 ELECTRONIC VERSIONS OF THIS TRANSCRIPT ARE 9 A CONVENIENCE COPY ONLY AND ARE NOT THE OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF THE HEARING, 10 THE .PDF VERSION INCLUDES PREFILED TESTIMONY. 11 VOLUME 7 12 Pages 781 through 890 13 PROCEEDINGS: HEARING 14 BEFORE: CHAIRMAN BRAULIO L. BAEZ 15 COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON COMMISSIONER LILA A. JABER 16 COMMISSIONER RUDOLPH "RUDY" BRADLEY COMMISSIONER CHARLES M. DAVIDSON 17 DATE: Friday, May 28, 2004 18 TIME: Commenced at 9:00 a.m. 19 Concluded at 6:15 p.m. 20 PLACE: Betty Easley Conference Center Hearing Room 148 21 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 22 REPORTED BY: JANE FAUROT, RPR 23 Official FPSC Reporter (850) 413-6732 24 25 APPEARANCE: (As heretofore noted.)

FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

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INDEX WITNESSES PAGE NO. NAME: MICHAEL J. MAJOROS, JR. Direct Examination by Ms. Kaufman Prefiled Direct Testimony Inserted Cross Examination by Mr. Wright Cross Examination by Mr. Twomey Cross Examination by Mr. Fons Redirect Examination by Ms. Kaufman H.G. WELLS Direct Examination by Mr. Vandiver Prefiled Direct Testimony Inserted Cross Examination by Mr. Wright Cross Examination by Mr. Beasley

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1		EXHIBITS		
2	NUMBER:		ID.	ADMTD.
3	99	(Confidential) Late-filed Exhibit MJM-1 to Mr. Majoros' Deposition	027	857
4		MOM-1 to MI. Majoros Deposition	637	657
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- 1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(Transcript follows in sequence from Volume 6.)
3	CHAIRMAN BAEZ: The next witness is Mr. Majoros.
4	Mr. Majoros, you have been sworn, correct? Okay.
5	Ms. Kaufman, go ahead.
6	MS. KAUFMAN: Mr. Majoros is appearing on behalf of
7	the Citizens and the Florida Industrial Power Users Group.
8	CHAIRMAN BAEZ: I am showing it on behalf of the
9	Citizens and FIPUG.
10	MICHAEL J. MAJOROS, JR.
11	was called as a witness on behalf of the Citizens of the State
12	of Florida and the Florida Industrial Power Users Group, and
13	having been duly sworn, testified as follows:
14	DIRECT EXAMINATION
15	BY MS. KAUFMAN:
16	Q Good afternoon, Mr. Majoros.
17	A Good afternoon.
18	Q Could you please state your name and business address
19	for the record?
20	A My name is Michael J. Majoros, Jr. My business
21	address is 1220 L Street Northwest, Washington, D.C.
22	Q And by whom are you employed and in what capacity?
23	A I am vice-president of the economic consulting firm
24	of Snavely, King, Majoros, O'Connor and Lee, Incorporated.
25	Q And I think we have established that you are

appearing on behalf of the Citizens of the State of Florida and the Florida Industrial Power Users Group, is that correct?

- A That is correct.
- Q Did you cause 30 pages of testimony to be prefiled in this docket?
 - A Yes.
 - Q Do you have any changes or corrections?
 - A No.

- Q If I were to ask you the questions contained in your prefiled testimony today, would your answers be the same?
 - A Yes, they would.
- Q And you also had Appendix A, which I believe is your qualifications, has been denominated Exhibit 13, as well as five additional exhibits which have been denominated 14 through 18. Were those prepared under your supervision and direction?
- A Yes.
 - Q And do you have any changes or corrections?
- 18 A No.
 - MS. KAUFMAN: Mr. Chairman, I think I neglected to ask that Mr. Majoros' prefiled testimony be inserted into the record as though read.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Without objection, show the prefiled direct testimony of Michael Majoros entered into the record as though read, and let the record reflect that his accompanying exhibits running from Appendix A through MJM-1, 2, 3, 4, and 5

1	have	been	alre	eady	ident	ified.		٠	
2			Ms.	KAUI	FMAN:	Thank	you,	Mr.	Chairman.
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1		DIRECT TESTIMONY
2		<u>OF</u>
3		MICHAEL J. MAJOROS, JR.
4		DOCKET NO. 031033-EI
5		REDACTED
6		INTRODUCTION
7	Q.	Please state your name.
8	A.	My name is Michael J. Majoros, Jr.
9	Q.	By whom and in what capacity are you employed?
10	A.	I am Vice President of Snavely King Majoros O'Connor & Lee, Inc. ("Snavely
11		King"), an economic consulting firm with offices at 1220 L Street, N.W., Suite 410,
12		Washington, D.C. 20005.
13	Q.	Have you attached a summary of qualifications and experience?
14	A.	Yes. Appendix A is a brief description of my qualifications and experience. It also
15		contains a listing of my appearances before state and federal regulatory bodies.
16	Q.	At whose request are you appearing?
17	A.	I am appearing on behalf of the Florida Office of Public Counsel ("OPC") and the
18		Florida Industrial Power Users Group ("FIPUG").
19	Q.	What is the subject of your testimony?
20	A.	I will address TECO's RFP process. I will explain why the waterborne
21		transportation rates that Tampa Electric Company ("Tampa Electric," "TECO" or
22		"the Company") has contracted to pay TECO Transport for the waterborne
23		transportation of coal which it seeks to recover from ratepayers in the next five (5)
24		years are excessive. I will also discuss the rate benchmark which the Commission
25		has employed and suggest why it should be eliminated.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

2 Q. Please summarize your conclusions and recommendations.

A.

I conclude that TECO's June 27, 2003 Request for Proposals ("RFP") was not sufficient to establish a market price for waterborne coal transportation. I conclude that the TECO Transport prices for 2004 to 2008, to which TECO has agreed, are unreasonable and I conclude that the waterborne coal transportation benchmark provides bad information and should be eliminated. I recommend that *CON* of TECO's payments to TECO Transport be disallowed entirely. My recommendation assumes a maximum rate of *CON*. This reflects the two obvious adjustments to Mr. Dibner's models which I discuss later in my testimony, and utilizes the *CON* terminal rate from the prior contract. These fairly obvious adjustments suggest that TECO agreed to rates which will result in an annual overcharge of approximately *C* million.

BACKGROUND

Q. Please explain your understanding of the background of this case.

A. TECO is a regulated electric public utility that enjoys a monopoly in its service territory. The Florida Public Service Commission regulates TECO's intrastate service rates. In general, these service rates are based on TECO's costs of doing business plus a return on its investment. TECO is a "full service" electric utility; by that I mean it is engaged in the generation, purchase, transmission, distribution and sale of electric energy. TECO operates two coal-fired plants in Florida: Big Bend and Polk, and a substantial portion of the Company's total annual cost is the coal required to operate these plants. While most of the coal used is domestic coal, TECO

¹ TECO Energy, Inc., 2002 10K Report, p. 5 of 28.

also purchases foreign coal and petroleum coke which are blended with domestic coal for use at the Polk plant.²

Q. How are TECO's service rates established?

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A. TECO's "base" service rates are generally intended to reflect its annual costs plus a return on its investment. Until the early 1970s TECO's base rates were designed to cover all of its annual costs, including fuel. This treatment was changed, however, as a result of the "Arab oil embargo".

Q. What was the effect of the Arab oil embargo?

9 A. The embargo created an oil price spike and an energy crisis which was felt by all
10 U.S. energy producers and consumers. Since oil was an energy price leader, all
11 energy prices spiked concomitant with an ever-increasing demand for electricity.
12 TECO's ability to control its substantial fuel costs was undermined as a result of fuel
13 price volatility combined with growing demand.

Q. What was the regulatory reaction to this loss of control of fuel costs?

A. The energy crises spawned electric base rate proceedings across the nation. In order to reduce the number of electric base rate proceedings resulting from fluctuating fuel costs, most U.S. electric utilities were given authority to recover fuel costs through a separate fuel adjustment charge based on actual monthly fuel expense. In other words, fuel was split out of the electric utilities' total cost pools and recovered separately, currently on an annual basis. Thus, TECO's base rates are now intended to recover its controllable costs; while its fuel charge, which varies with prices and volumes, is to recover its most significant variable costs.

Q. Please provide a brief conceptual description of the practical impact of the fuel adjustment charge process.

² Testimony of Joann T. Wehle, January 5, 2004, page 18.

- A. TECO purchases its fuel and then acts as a conduit through which those costs are passed on to its ratepayers. TECO is, in effect, a purchasing agent for ratepayers.

 Because TECO is a monopoly and retail ratepayers have no service alternative, TECO has a fiduciary responsibility to its retail customers. The regulatory compact and common sense requires TECO to purchase fuel and other related services at the lowest possible cost.
- 7 Q. Is there any historical precedent for this assumption?
- A. Yes. The Commission's Order No. 12645 in Docket No. 830001-EU addressed electric utility's inherent responsibilities regarding fuel adjustment clauses.

 Appendix A to that Order is attached to my testimony as Exhibit___(MJM-1). It is titled "Florida Public Service Commission Fuel Procurement Policy." It is replete with references to "lowest system fuel cost." Item C states "the utility's management has the sole responsibility to procure fuel in the most cost efficient manner possible."
- 14 Q. How do transportation charges relate to TECO's fuel charge?
- 15 A. The transportation cost of delivering fuel to TECO's generating plants is one of the components of TECO's fuel cost. The transportation rates that TECO pays, therefore, have a direct impact on the costs that ratepayers must pay via the fuel charge.
- 18 Q. How does the FPSC regulate TECO's Fuel Adjustment Charge?
- 19 A. Pursuant to its procedure, the Commission conducts a hearing each November 20 to set an annual fuel factor for the following calendar year, January -21 December. At the end of the calendar year, TECO's actual fuel costs and the 22 amounts it recovered from its ratepayers are "trued-up" and any over- or 23 under-recovery is carried forward into the next year's fuel factor.³ In theory, 24 the fuel adjustment clause is intended to protect utilities from volatile fuel

³ Docket No. 980269-PU, Order No. PSC-98-0691-FOF-PU, May 19, 1998.

costs over which they generally do not have control by permitting them to

project their fuel costs for the upcoming calendar year in the prior year. In

reality, TECO (and the other utilities) recover a large portion of their revenues

through the fuel adjustment (and other clauses) and are essentially guaranteed

full recovery of items flowing through the fuel clause.

6 Q. Have you been involved in any of TECO's fuel proceedings?

- 7 A. Yes. I testified, on behalf of the OPC, in TECO's most recent fuel case, Docket No.
- 8 030001-EI. That case was the genesis of this coal transportation proceeding.

9 Q. Is there anything unique about TECO's coal transportation costs?

10 A. Yes, these costs are primarily waterborne transportation costs resulting from a
11 contract between TECO and its unregulated affiliate, TECO Transport. TECO's coal
12 primarily originates from mines in the Illinois Basin area, as well as overseas. In the
13 case of domestic coal, TECO must secure transportation from the mines to its Big
14 Bend plant in Florida. It secures this transportation from its sister company, TECO
15 Transport.

16 Q. Please summarize this transportation.

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There are three legs of this journey. First, the coal is moved from the mine down the Mississippi River via river barges to TECO Transport's Davant terminal near New Orleans. The coal is then either stored at Davant, or moved directly onto an ocean-going barge. Finally, the coal is shipped across the Gulf of Mexico to the Big Bend plant. All of these transportation services have been, and continue to be, provided by TECO Transport, an unregulated affiliate of Tampa Electric. TECO Transport's rates for these three segments: inland river, terminal services, and cross-Gulf shipment, are at issue in this docket because TECO's customers pay these rates on a dollar-for-dollar basis.

Q.	Are these rates based on TECO Transport's costs?
A.	No, as will be discussed in more detail later, they are based on a market price
	estimate. Therefore, since the rates are not based on TECO Transport's costs,
	TECO's customers rely on TECO to obtain the best rates available through this
	market-based arrangement.
Q.	How does TECO Transport charge TECO for these transportation services?
A.	TECO has a contract with TECO Transport for these transportation services. The
	Commission adopted a "market price standard" in Docket No. 870001-EI-A, FPSC
	Order No. 20298, issued November 10, 1988. This Order states that TECO Transport
	may charge and TECO may recover the "market rate" for the transportation of its
	coal. In that proceeding, the FPSC also established a "waterborne coal transportation
	benchmark rate" to be used as a surrogate for a true market rate. I will discuss the
	benchmark in more detail later.
Q.	Did you address Tampa Electric's waterborne transportation rates in your
	testimony in Docket No. 030001-EI?
A.	No. Although initially TECO's waterborne transportation rates were to have been
	addressed in that docket, they were subsequently deferred to this proceeding.
Q.	Why were TECO Transport's waterborne transportation rates deferred to this
	separate docket?
A.	In early 2003, the Staff encouraged TECO to issue a Request for Proposals relating to
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TECO's waterborne fuel transportation needs for 2004 and beyond.⁴ In July, 2003,

the Company prepared a Request for Proposals to provide for waterborne deliveries

⁴ Testimony and Exhibit of Joann T. Wehle, January 5, 2004, Docket No. 031033-EI ("Wehle-Jan. 2004"), Page 14.

1		of coal from suppliers in the Midwest to its Big Bend Station. ⁵ (The flaws in the
2		Company RFP are discussed below as well as in the testimony of Pat Wells).
3	Q.	Did the Company provide testimony describing its RFP process?
4	A.	Yes. In Docket No. 030001-EI, on September 12, 2003, TECO filed direct testimony
5		of Ms. Joann T. Wehle and its consultant, Mr. Brent Dibner, describing the
6		Company's RFP process. In addition, Mr. Dibner indicated that he would
7		subsequently file supplemental testimony containing his calculation of the
8		appropriate "market rates" for TECO's waterborne transportation costs, i.e., his
9		report. ⁶
10	Q.	Did Mr. Dibner ultimately provide his estimate of market rates?
11	A.	Yes, on September 25, 2003, TECO filed Mr. Dibner's supplemental testimony
12		describing his market analysis and resultant rates. Mr. Dibner also discussed the
13		waterborne transportation bids TECO received in response to its RFP. ⁷ In his
14		September 25, 2003 testimony, Mr. Dibner recommended that:
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23		Tampa Electric should <u>present the market rates I have established for each segment,</u> as detailed in my exhibit, to TECO Transport for its decision to meet or beat the market price for services beginning January 1, 2004, as required by the terms of the existing contract. If TECO Transport opts to provide service under the contractual "Right of First Refusal" clause, Tampa Electric should utilize the market rates I have established <u>in negotiating a contract with TECO Transport.</u> ⁸
24		I have underlined portions of the preceding passage to emphasize that Mr.
25		Dibner is TECO's consultant and his recommendations were intended to be used by

⁵ Testimony and Exhibit of Joann T. Wehle, September 12, 2003, Docket No. 030001-EI ("Wehle-

Sept. 2004"), Page 13.

6 Testimony of Brent Dibner, September 12, 2003, Docket No. 031001-EI ("Dibner Testimony"), page 27.

⁷ Ms. Wehle, concomitantly, discussed two rail bids received by TECO.

⁸ Id., September 25, 2003, pages 23-24.

TECO to negotiate with TECO Transport. Mr. Dibner reiterated his recommendation
in his January 5, 2004 testimony in the current docket.⁹

Q. What transpired next?

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4 In late September, both FIPUG and the OPC filed motions in opposition to TECO's A. 5 supplemental (September 25, 2003) testimony due to its late filing and the significance of the issues and the dollars at stake. 10 OPC and FIPUG requested that 6 7 the issues contained in the supplemental testimony be deferred from consideration at 8 the November 2003 fuel clause hearing. In October, two other parties (TECO 9 residential customers and CSXT) filed motions to establish a separate docket to consider the transportation issues addressed by the supplemental testimony. 11 Also, 10 11 on October 23, 2003, Staff member Mr. William B. McNulty filed testimony on behalf of FPSC Staff.12 12

13 Q. What did Mr. McNulty recommend?

Mr. McNulty recommended that "the Commission should determine that the RFP as 14 A. 15 developed and administered by TECO had several shortcomings in generating a 16 reasonable level of information about market price and it should also determine that 17 the RFP nonetheless provided the most certain information regarding WCTS market price for TECO available at that time."13 18 He also recommended that "the 19 Commission should determine TECO's recoverable costs for WCTS provided by 20 TECO Transport for the first quarter of 2004 are the rates appearing in the 21 TECO/TECO Transport contract less *C* %", a reduction based on the fact that the rail bid TECO received was on average *C* % less than the rates TECO agreed to 22

⁹ Id., Docket No. 031033-EI, January 5, 2004, page 47.

In re: Fuel and purchased power cost recovery clause with generating performance incentive factor, Docket No. 030001-EI, Order No. PSC-03-1359-PCO-EI, December 1, 2003, page 2.

¹¹ Id., pages 2 and 3.

¹² Supplemental Direct Testimony of William B. McNulty, October 23, 2003.

¹³ Id., page 4.

pay TECO Transport.¹⁴ In addition, Mr. McNulty recommended that the Commission determine that the waterborne transportation benchmark is irrelevant for determining the prudence of TECO's rates for transportation as paid to its affiliate TECO Transport and that it should be eliminated.¹⁵ He also recommended that the Commission identify "TECO's WCTS cost recovery as an annual issue in the fuel docket to be resolved by an audit of TECO's operating results under its contract with TECO Transport."¹⁶

Mr. McNulty also noted that his recommendation was based on limited information, stating "These recommendations are provided based on the information available to me at the time this testimony was prepared. At that time, I have only limited information concerning TECO's evaluation of an appropriate market rate. However, I believe that the recommendation stated herein provides a reasonable means for establishing that rate.¹⁷

14 Q. What did the Commission decide?

15 A. The Commission determined that the waterborne transportation issues in TECO's supplemental testimony should be addressed in a separate proceeding.¹⁸

17 Q. What issues did the Commission identify for consideration in this proceeding?

18 A. The Commission identified three issues for consideration in this proceeding. They
19 are as follows:

Issue 17E Is Tampa Electric's June 27, 2003, request for proposals sufficient to determine the current market price for coal transportation?¹⁹

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¹⁴ Id., page 5.

¹⁵ Id.

¹⁶ Id.

¹⁷ Id., page 3.

¹⁸ In re: Fuel and purchased power cost recovery clause with generating performance incentive factor, Docket No. 030001-EI, Order No. PSC-03-1359-PCO-EI, December 1, 2003.

¹⁹ Id., page 3.

1		Issue 17F	Are Tampa Electric's projected coal transportation costs for 2004
2			through 2008 under the winning bid to its June 27, 2003, request for
3			proposals for coal transportation reasonable for cost recovery
4			purposes? ²⁰
5		Issue 17G	Should the Commission modify or eliminate the waterborne coal
6			transportation benchmark that was established for Tampa Electric by
7			Order No. PSC-93-0443-FOF-EI, issued March 23, 1993, in Docket
8			No. 930001-EI? ²¹
9	Q.	Do you addre	ess each of these issues in your testimony?
10	A.	Yes.	
11	Q.	What are you	er conclusions?
12	A.	In my opinion	, the RFP process was not sufficient to elicit bids, the rates Mr. Dibner
13		recommends a	are unreasonable, and the benchmark should be eliminated.
14			RFP PROCESS
15	Q.	Were there p	roblems with Tampa Electric's RFP?
16	A.	Yes. In my o	pinion the RFP and the process it followed was obviously flawed. Mr.
17		Pat Wells disc	cusses this in more detail in his testimony. My testimony focuses more
18		on the results	s of the process rather than the process itself. Therefore, I will
19		summarize the	e RFP process as background for my testimony.
20	Q.	Why did Tan	pa Electric issue an RFP for its waterborne coal transportation?
21	A.	In early 2003	the Commission Staff encouraged TECO to issue an RFP for its
22		waterborne co	al transportation. ²²

²⁰ Id. ²¹ Id. ²² January 5, 2004 Testimony of Joann T. Wehle, page 14.

1 Q. Do you think Tampa Electric intended to accept any of the bids it would receive

2 from the RFP?

3 No. Due to the timing and contents of the RFP, as Mr. Wells explains, it appears that A. 4 the RFP was simply a way to attempt to satisfy the Staff and perhaps be used as an 5 information-gathering tool. Tampa Electric witness Joann Wehle states in her 6 January 5, 2003 testimony: "Tampa Electric decided to issue an RFP as part of its 7 good-faith efforts to obtain the most relevant and timely waterborne transportation market data available." Thus, the purpose of the RFP was to gather information 8 9 relating to the appropriate market rates for the three components of Tampa Electric's 10 transportation needs (inland, terminal and ocean), for use in establishing the contract 11 for transportation services beginning in 2004 and not to actually award the bid to any 12 entity other than TECO Transport.

Q. Were there other indications that TECO would not change transportation providers as a result of the RFP?

Yes. Tampa Electric's contract with TECO Transport includes a "Right of First Refusal" clause, which allows TECO Transport to "meet or beat" current market prices. How TECO Transport was not even required to respond to the RFP. Furthermore, the RFP's stated preference for a single provider of end-to-end service suggests that the RFP was tailored towards TECO Transport, the only waterborne transportation provider capable at this time of providing such end-to-end service. It is clear that a new contract was going to be signed with TECO Transport, and the results of the RFP would be used to assist in determining the rates included in that contract.

Q. Did the RFP result in any bids?

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²³ Id.

²⁴ Id., page 22.

A. The RFP generated four bids; one inland river bid, one terminal bid, and two unsolicited rail bids from CSX. It probably should have resulted in more bids, but it did not, due, as Mr. Wells notes, to the RFP's many restrictive and unreasonable terms. Tampa Electric evaluated the bids with the assistance of outside consultants.

Mr. Brent Dibner assisted in the evaluation of the inland river and terminal bids and Sargent & Lundy assisted in the evaluation of the rail bids.

7 Q. Why do you say the rail bids were unsolicited?

A. The bidding railroad was not originally provided with a copy of the RFP. The railroad received one only after contacting Tampa Electric and requesting a copy.

The Company considered the rail bids to be "nonconforming" because they were not for the provision of waterborne transportation. However, the Company did evaluate the bids. The benchmark is based on rail rates. It is appalling that a rail bid was rejected as nonconforming, given that the so-called competitive benchmark is based on rail to begin with.

Q. What was the result of Tampa Electric's evaluation of the bids received in response to its RFP?

17 A. Mr. Dibner reviewed the terminal and inland river bids and Sargent & Lundy 18 reviewed the rail bids. TECO rejected the rail bids for various reasons, including the 19 belief that the bids underestimated the costs for necessary infrastructure additions and 20 improvements and that the Company would incur additional operating expenses in shifting from waterborne to rail delivery.²⁶ The inland river bid was rejected because 21 22 the bidder is in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. Upon analyzing the bid, Mr. 23 Dibner determined that the bidder may be reorganized, broken up or liquidated, the 24 bidder had requested to restructure or terminate contracts, and the bidder's fleet size

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²⁵ Id., page 23.

²⁶ Testimony of Joann T. Wehle, January 5, 2004, page 31.

had decreased dramatically.²⁷ Mr. Dibner opined that the bidder might not be able to meet its obligations should it be awarded the business. While he felt that the bid was not a true market bid due to the financial status of the bidder and the bidder's fleet size, he admitted that the bid could serve as a practical market indicator.²⁸ He did, however, accept the terminal bid as being a viable market rate.

6 Q. Were any of the bids put forth to TECO Transport to "meet or beat?"

7 A. TECO Transport was given the rates provided in the terminal bid to "meet or beat."

REJECTION OF RAIL AND INLAND RIVER BIDS

Q. What is your opinion regarding TECO's rejection of the rail bid?

It appears that the rail bid was rejected primarily due to capital costs. Tampa Electric evaluated the rail bid using the full capital costs which Sargent & Lundy claimed were vastly understated. This was improper because such capital costs are part of base rates and would not and should not be reflected in the fuel adjustment charge, which is what is at issue in this matter. Water facilities, such as docks, are capital items covered in base rates. To get a proper "apples to apples" comparison, the capital costs of the rail bid must be kept on the rate base side of the equation. The rail and dock capital costs are not relevant in this proceeding.

18 Q. Are there any other reasons that TECO rejected the rail bids?

19 A. Yes. After rejecting the bids due to capital considerations, Ms. Wehle layered 20 several new costs on to the rail bids. Thus, TECO's overall approach was to add 21 costs, both capital and operating, to the rail bid as a reason to reject it. The rail bids 22 were at least \$*C* per ton less than Mr. Dibner's rates. TECO should have presented 23 the rail bids to TECO Transport.

Q. Do you have an opinion regarding TECO's rejection of the Inland River Bid?

²⁸ Id., page 28.

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²⁷ Testimony of Brent Dibner, January 5, 2004, page 27.

1	A.	I cannot understand why it was not submitted to TECO Transport. TECO has a
2		fiduciary duty to negotiate the lowest possible price. TECO Transport would have
3		then had to meet that lower bid under its right of first refusal.
4	Q.	Was the Company correct in rejecting the rail and inland river bids?
5	A.	No. The bids should not have been disregarded in the context of evaluating the
6		validity of the prices resulting from Mr. Dibner's market model. Mr. Dibner's rates
7		are higher, even though he is supposed to represent TECO.
8		AFFILIATE TRANSACTIONS
9	Q	What is the relationship between Tampa Electric and TECO Transport?
10	A.	Tampa Electric and TECO Transport are both subsidiaries of TECO Energy, Inc.
11		Tampa Electric is a regulated utility and TECO Transport is an unregulated affiliate.
12		Transactions between the two companies are "affiliate transactions", that is
13		transactions between related companies with the profits from such transactions
14		flowing to the parent company.
15	Q.	In your opinion, can affiliate transactions be problematic?
16	A.	Yes, when the reasonableness of rates is an issue, affiliate transactions are always
17		problematic, particularly when a regulated affiliate like TECO is making purchases
18		from an unregulated affiliate such as TECO Transport. There are endless
19		opportunities for the unregulated affiliate to derive cross-subsidies from the
20		customers of the regulated affiliate, and the incentive to overcharge always exists.
21	Q.	Are such transactions even more worrisome in this instance?
22	A.	Yes, the transactions between TECO and TECO Transport flow dollar-for-dollar into
23		ratepayers' bills and from there into TECO Transport's cash account. Any cross-
24		subsidies or excessive profits flow from TECO Transport's cash account into its
25		parent's, TECO Energy's, available funds. Therefore, it is in TECO Energy's best

1		interests for TECO Transport to charge as much as possible to TECO for waterborne
2		transportation.
3	Q.	How are affiliate transactions regulated generally?
4	A.	Typically rules exist to ensure that the unregulated affiliate recovers no more than its
5		cost; in fact, I am aware of rules which restrict the prices to the lower of cost or
6		market. Clearly, prices higher than a competitive market rate are at odds with
7		common wisdom.
8	Q.	What is the history of TECO Transport's prices?
9	A.	Until 1988, they were based on cost. Thereafter the Commission adopted a market
10		price standard that places particular emphasis on a valid market price.
11	Q.	What assumptions underlie a focus on a market price?
12	A.	The assumption of a market price assumes that TECO will aggressively pursue the
13		lowest possible competitive price from all available sources. It assumes that TECO
14		will be an aggressive negotiator and work hard to get the best deal for ratepayers,
15		particularly given the fact that its customers bear all of the risks associated with fuel
16		costs.
17	Q.	Are there any obvious abuses of the TECO/TECO Transport affiliate
18		relationship apparent in this proceeding?
19	A.	Yes, recall Mr. Dibner's original recommendation, i.e., to use his recommendations
20		as a basis for negotiations. TECO accepted Mr. Dibner's September 25, 2003
21		recommendation and signed a new contract with TECO Transport on October 6, 2003
22		to continue to provide these transportation services for the next five years. Mr.
23		Dibner's \$*C* average river rate and his \$*C* ocean rate were presented to
24		TECO Transport to meet or beat. TECO Transport accepted the rates and a contract
25		was signed. Mr. Dibner also recommended acceptance of a single \$*C* bid for

1		terminal services as a market proxy and TECO Transport agreed to match that rate in
2		the new contract.
3	Q.	Why is this an abuse of the TECO/TECO Transport affiliate relationship?
4	A.	Mr. Dibner, a consultant to TECO (the regulated entity), in a negotiation with TECO
5		Transport (the unregulated entity) appears to be acting in the best interest of TECC
6		Transport rather than TECO. Rather than helping TECO select and/or negotiate the
7		lowest possible rates, he rejected alternative market bids and proposed his proxy
8		market rates. These proxy rates are based on his model, which clearly overstates
9		prices, particularly in a competitive market. I believe that this is a clear abuse of an
10		affiliate relationship.
11	Q.	Before discussing Mr. Dibner's results in detail, do you have any general
12		recommendations concerning his participation in this proceeding?
13	A.	There is an irony in this proceeding. TECO Transport's rates are at issue, but the
14		evidence in support of higher rates for TECO Transport is sponsored by TECO
15		which has an obligation to its customers rather than its affiliate. Mr. Dibner is
16		TECO's witness, and I am certain that his fees are being treated by TECO above-the-
17		line, i.e., charged to TECO ratepayers. Therefore, my first recommendation is to
18		disallow Mr. Dibner's fees from TECO's regulated costs. The expense relating to Mr.
19		Dibner should be taken "below-the-line." In addition to Mr. Dibner, TECO hired
20		Sargent & Lundy ("S&L") to discredit another bid that apparently is less than Mr.
21		Dibner's proposed waterborne rates. S&L's fees should also be disallowed.
22		TECO's consultants should have been striving to obtain lower, not higher,
23		transportation rates for ratepayers. TECO's consultants should also be explaining to
24		TECO that it is in its ratepayers' best interests to have competitive sources of

transportation for its fuel. TECO should be pitting these sources against one another, not eliminating one source, with a lower rate, merely because it is not waterborne.

Α.

A.

Mr. Dibner's services and fees (and Sargent & Lundy's services and fees) do not help TECO's ratepayers; to the contrary, they help TECO Transport and TECO's parent, TECO Energy, by ensuring that TECO Energy will continue to provide waterborne transportation service to TECO, at higher-than-market rates, with the revenues from the transaction flowing to the parent. Ratepayers do not need the kind of help that increases their costs unnecessarily, and they should not be required to pay for that kind of help.

Q. Before returning to Mr. Dibner, do you have any other comments concerning Sargent & Lundy?

Yes, it is my understanding that S&L's primary problem with the rail bid was that it would cost too much for TECO to build the infrastructure necessary to facilitate rail transportation into its plant. First of all, as I have already discussed, that is capital cost, not variable fuel cost that would flow through the fuel charge. Furthermore, in my opinion, TECO always has the right, in fact the obligation, to negotiate with the rail provider to fund more, if not all of that infrastructure cost, as well as the price.

Q. Do you believe the negotiations between TECO and TECO Transport were"arms length?"

Absolutely not. If these negotiations were arm's length, TECO would have proposed much lower "meet or beat" rates to TECO Transport in the first place. As it is, TECO Transport merely accepted TECO's request to pay rates based on Mr. Dibner's model which are demonstrably higher than they should be in a competitive market. This is precisely why affiliate transactions are so dangerous and must be closely monitored and evaluated.

DIBNER MODELS

- Q. How did the Company determine the appropriate market rate for its
 waterborne transportation services since it rejected all but the terminal bid?
- A. Mr. Dibner evaluated the bids resulting from the RFP²⁹ and then constructed "market rates" for the inland and ocean going portions of the voyage using his own models.

 Tampa Electric relied upon an analysis Mr. Dibner prepared as a "proxy" for the market price. This is the price that was offered to TECO Transport and which it accepted. Mr. Dibner constructed two "models"— one to reflect the inland barge portion of the trip, and the other to reflect the cross-Gulf portion. I discuss his
- 11 Q. Have you reviewed Mr. Dibner's models?

models and the results below.

1

- 12 A. Yes. The Company initially refused to provide the models, stating that they were 13 proprietary. Subsequently, Mr. Dibner and the Company agreed to allow intervenors 14 to review and utilize a copy of the models at the offices of Ausley & McMullen, the 15 Company's attorneys. They also offered a training session.
- 16 Q. Did you attend the training session?
- 17 Yes. At this session, I determined that Mr. Dibner had developed a "front-end" to his Α. 18 models, to allow a user to change certain variables within the model, and view the 19 results. While the formulae in the model itself were available for viewing, they were 20 locked from any editing. Mr. Dibner selected the variables he would allow the user 21 to test, or change. When questioned about this at the meeting, Mr. Dibner indicated 22 that any further changes would result in the model no longer being his proprietary 23 model. In other words, if the user felt it necessary to change any additional variables 24 or calculations within the model, he would have to develop his own model.

²⁹ Mr. Dibner did not evaluate the bid from CSX.

Q. Is this a problem?

- 2 A. Yes. Mr. Dibner made certain assumptions in his models that appear unreasonable
- on their face, for example, his assumptions about backhaul. However, these are not
- 4 included among the variables he opened for change. As the models are being held
- forth as a tool for calculating the proxy market rate in this proceeding, it is reasonable
- 6 that the Commission Staff and intervenors should be able to change all variables,
- based on their recommendations. The Commission could then decide whether the
- 8 changes, and the results they produced, were reasonable.
- 9 Q. What was the source of the data used in the models?
- 10 A. It appears, based on comments that Mr. Dibner made at the technical meeting, that
- the majority of the data is derived from Mr. Dibner's head.³⁰
- 12 Q. Is this a problem?
- 13 A. It could be. While it is true that Mr. Dibner has extensive experience in the area of
- waterborne transportation, data derived from his own experience cannot necessarily
- be verified by others.
- 16 <u>BACKHAUL</u>
- 17 Q. Did you ask any questions at the meeting where Mr. Dibner discussed his
- 18 model?
- 19 A. Yes, I asked at least two questions relating to "backhaul" assumptions.
- 20 Q. What is backhaul?
- 21 A. When TECO Transport delivers a load of coal or petroleum coke from the mines
- along the Mississippi or other rivers to the terminal in New Orleans, or from New
- Orleans to the Big Bend plant, it must then make a return trip to the original
- destination. Sometimes, it carries non-TECO related cargo on that return trip. That

³⁰ Direct response to question in technical session.

cargo is termed "backhaul." TECO Transport earns revenues from these backhaul
movements.

Q. What questions did you ask?

- A. I asked Mr. Dibner if either his River Model or his Ocean Model accounted for backhaul traffic. Mr. Dibner said "no." I also asked if I could actually run the model and change that fundamental characteristic, i.e., could I account for backhaul. Mr. Dibner stated that if anyone wanted to make a backhaul assumption, they could do so in their own model, or they could take out their pencils and paper. Mr. Dibner also stated that he preferred not to discuss the issue of backhaul further in the meeting.
- Q. What did you discover when you ran Mr. Dibner's model later at Ausley &McMullen's office?
- 12 A. It appears that Mr. Dibner priced <u>one-way</u> shipments based on <u>roundtrip costs</u>. For
 13 example, in the river model, his calculation of "@ trip voyage days" consists of the
 14 distance multiplied by two and divided by the miles per hour multiplied by 24. For
 15 some hourly costs, he multiplies the cost by 24 and then by 365, in other words, Mr.
 16 Dibner assigns all costs related to that item to the TECO operation. Likewise, in the
 17 Ocean model, Mr. Dibner calculated his Voyage Time at Sea by doubling the one18 way trip time. This in turn doubles, among other items, the time charter expense.
- 19 Q. Did you see any indication that Mr. Dibner assigned anything to backhaul 20 traffic?
- A. No, I did not see any reduction to the price or any assignment of the generic costs in

 Mr. Dibner's model to backhaul traffic, thus confirming Mr. Dibner's assertion that he

 had not accounted for or reflected backhaul revenue in his market model. In

 addition, OPC's Second Set of Interrogatories, Interrogatory No. 54 asks, "Please

 state specifically how backhaul was handled in both the inland river model and the

ocean model." The Company responded as follows: "As previously stated, Mr.
Dibner does not consider backhaul relevant to either the inland river or ocean
transportation markets. Therefore, it was not considered or included in either
model."

model."

Q. Is this a significant omission?

5

A. Yes, in my opinion this is a significant omission in a competitive market. It seems reasonable to me that the first thing to go in a competitive market is the gravy provided by backhaul. In other words, if I am competing with the next guy and I can allocate a portion of my costs to backhaul, I can reduce my competitive rate and hopefully capture that customer. In a non-competitive market, I can charge all of my costs to TECO, and keep the backhaul revenues as "gravy." That is what Mr. Dibner proposes.

13 Q. Does TECO Transport have backhaul traffic?

14 A. Yes, TECO Transport has a substantial amount of backhaul traffic. For example, 15 information from the Port of Tampa indicates that the very vessels that Mr. Dibner 16 shows as being dedicated to TECO actually transport materials from Tampa back to 17 Louisiana, after making the trip to Tampa to deliver TECO coal. In calculating his market rate, Mr. Dibner assigns *C* days (with the remaining days being 18 19 maintenance time) worth of the operating costs for these ships to TECO operations, 20 despite the fact that these vessels spend some of their time carrying cargo for other 21 companies. Exhibit___(MJM-2) is an analysis I conducted of the Port of Tampa 22 data. I will discuss this analysis later in my testimony

Q. Does TECO have inland river backhaul traffic in addition to its ocean backhaul?

³¹ Company response to OPC's Second Set of Interrogatories, Interrogatory No. 54.

1	A.	Yes. It appears that TECO Transport relies upon this backhaul in its business.
2		For instance, TECO Transport's web site states:
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15		TECO Barge Line is growing. Its fleet is rapidly expanding, and has grown by more than 20 percent in 1998. Its geographic market coverage and cargo mix are diversifying. This is evidenced by the success TECO Barge Line has enjoyed with its northbound shipping. Also, TECO Energy's 2002 10K Report states the following: Northbound river shipments of steel-related raw materials are expected to improve in 2003 as the U.S. economy improvesIn the meantime, TECO Transport expects to move increased volumes of fertilizers and petroleum coke northbound on the river system.
17	Q.	Is there any precedent in Florida concerning backhaul traffic?
18	A.	Yes. Backhaul traffic was addressed in Docket No. 850001-EI-A, Order No. 14782,
19		issued August 28, 1985. In that case, involving Florida Power Corporation ("FPC"),
20		the Commission found that "profits or losses derived from the transportation of
21		commodities in the barges considered dedicated to FPC will be used to offset the cost
22		of coal transportation for FPC."34 This was in addition to the fact that Electric Fuels
23		Corporation, the subsidiary of FPC providing the transportation, only assigned a
24		portion of the return trip costs to FPC, not the entire trip (as Mr. Dibner has done).
25	Q.	Is Mr. Dibner's model a cost model?
26	A.	No, it is a market model and has no relationship to TECO Transport's costs. That is
27		why his failure to recognize backhaul is a significant omission. In a truly competitive
28		market, it is questionable whether TECO Transport would be able to assign all of its
29		costs to one-way movements and still remain competitive. A good case in point is

http://www.tecobargeline.com/TRMSTAbout.html. Printed March 5, 2004.
 TECO Energy, Inc., December 31, 2002 10K Report, Item 7. Management's Discussion & Analysis of Financial Condition & Results of Operations, TECO Transport, page 34.
 Docket No. 850001-EI-A, Order No. 14782, issued August 28, 1985, page 4.

the difference between the rail bids and Mr. Dibner's so-called market rates. The rail bids are lower than Mr. Dibner's rates, and perhaps could be lower still.

Q. Should backhaul traffic be reflected in a market model?

3

14

4 A. Yes. Backhaul should be reflected in a competitive market model because 5 that is one of the first places that competition would have an impact, i.e., in 6 the ability to assign 100 percent of the backhaul cost to the originating 7 movement. Furthermore, Mr. Dibner, as TECO's consultant, is the one who 8 should have raised the issue. The only parties to the negotiation who benefit 9 from not recognizing backhaul are TECO Transport and TECO Energy. 10 Clearly, TECO and its ratepayers are harmed from this benign approach to 11 negotiations. The contract was up for renewal – there were over four million 12 tons of backhaul a year. What a perfect opportunity to renegotiate and lower costs for ratepayers. 13

PREFERENCE TRADE PREMIUM

- Q. Can you provide another example of an assumption that Mr. Dibner has not allowed users of his models to change?
- 17 A. Yes. Mr. Dibner also increased his ocean-going market price to include a Preference
 18 Trade Premium.
- 19 Q. What are Preference Trades?
- A. Preference trades are U.S. government-impelled grain export programs that donate grain, expedite grain donations, or finance grain purchased to developing and less-developed nations.³⁵

³⁵ Testimony of Brent Dibner, January 5, 2004, page 38.

1 Q. Why did Mr. Dibner increase the ocean-going market price for preference

2 trade?

6

3 Mr. Dibner claims that preference trade hauls tend to be more lucrative than coal A.

hauls.³⁶ As such, he considered the earning potential related to these types of hauls in 4

5 developing his market rate. According to Mr. Dibner, this represents an opportunity

cost to TECO Transport of deciding to serve Tampa Electric's needs.³⁷

7 Q. How did Mr. Dibner assign this opportunity cost?

8 A. Mr. Dibner analyzed more than 135 preference trade voyages of U.S. flag Jones Act 9 vessels between years 2000 and 2003 to estimate the time charter earnings for the full range of differently sized vessels.³⁸ He used the pattern of time charter earnings to 10 11 establish a trend curve by which each size vessel could have a preference time charter rate assigned to it. 39 Mr. Dibner then assigned a "maximum" time charter rate for 12 13 each of the vessels that are "dedicated" to serving TECO's needs. He averaged those 14 maximum rates with his "minimum" time charter rates calculated by his model, to 15 arrive at his recommended time charter rate for each vessel.

16 Do you agree with this premium? Q.

17 A. No. In my opinion, such a premium would not be used in the model of a competitive 18 market. Again, on behalf of TECO and its ratepayers, Mr. Dibner makes an 19 adjustment to increase charges to ratepayers. It would seem that this would be more 20 appropriate for TECO Transport to suggest than TECO's consultant.

ADJUSTMENTS TO DIBNER'S MODELS

22 Q. Have you made any adjustments to the results of Mr. Dibner's model?

³⁶ Id. ³⁷ Id., page 39. ³⁸ Id., page 40. ³⁹ Id.

1 A. Yes. I have made two very basic adjustments to those results. First, I have made an adjustment to recognize backhaul in both the river and ocean models. Second, I have eliminated the preference trade premium from the ocean model.

However, I would like to note that the fact that I made only these two adjustments does not mean that I agree with the rest of the assumptions in Mr. Dibner's models. The two adjustments I make are so significant as to cast grave doubt on the rest of the model. In addition, as discussed above, since it was impossible to change many significant variables in the model due to the "locked" nature of the critical assumptions, the models prevented users, like myself and Staff, from testing many of the inputs and assumptions.

11 Q. Please explain how you arrived at these adjustments.

A.

I began by adjusting Mr. Dibner's ocean model to remove the preference trade premium. I did this manually by simply using Mr. Dibner's TECO time charter rate in the calculations, instead of the average of the TECO time charter rates and the preference time charter rates.

Next, I adjusted the ocean model for backhaul. Using data from the Port of Tampa, I was able to determine, by vessel, TECO Transport's actual percentage of roundtrips from Louisiana to Tampa and back that involved some sort of backhaul. In other words, I calculated how many times a given TECO Transport vessel carried cargo on its return trip to Louisiana, after dropping off a load in Tampa for TECO. Because some of Mr. Dibner's calculations in his ocean model are based on time, I adjusted the voyage time to account for the backhaul percentage.

For instance, Mr. Dibner's model calculates a voyage based on the round trip time involved. If a given vessel had a 50% backhaul ratio, meaning 50% of the trips involved backhaul, I removed 25% of the time involved (50% of the return trips.)

These adjustments affected the Voyage Time at Sea, the Delay at 15% of Voyage

Time at Sea, and the total Time Charter Expense. I also similarly adjusted the Fuel at

3 Sea, Tug Generating Fuel, Barge Fuel and Lube Oil.

4 Q. How did you adjust the river model for backhaul?

5 A. As mentioned above, I did not have specific information regarding river

backhaul. Due to the lack of data quantifying this backhaul, I have used the

average backhaul ratio of the ocean vessels, which is 69.34%, to adjust Mr.

8 Dibner's river rates. 40 I reduced Mr. Dibner's inland river rates by one-half

9 this amount, or 34.67%.

11

10 Q. What are the results of these adjustments?

A. As a result of my adjustments, Mr. Dibner's average ocean rate is reduced from

12 \$*C*/ton to \$*C*ton.41 Although Mr. Dibner recommended individual inland river

rates depending on the origin point, he calculated an average rate for comparison

purposes on page 41 of his report. This was based on the average of all regions of

interest to Tampa Electric. 42 I have calculated an adjusted average inland river rate

using these same origins, and reducing Mr. Dibner's rates by 34.67% as discussed

above. As a result, Mr. Dibner's average inland river rate has been reduced from

\$\cdot C^*/\ton to \cdot C^*/\ton. My calculations are shown in Exhibit___(MJM-3).

19 Q. What do you conclude?

20 A. Mr. Dibner's model overstates any reasonable market rate.

⁴² Dibner Report, page 41.

⁴⁰ This is my best estimate of the river backhaul. Clearly, data relating to TECO Transport's actual river backhaul would be preferable for use in making this calculation.

^{41 \$*}C*/ton is the initial rate proposed to TECO Transport, before errors were fixed.

1	Q.	Do you have any corroboration, in addition to the rail bid, the inland river bid,
2		and the adjusted Dibner results, to confirm that Mr. Dibner's market rates are
3		vastly overstated?
4	A.	Yes. I also have data relating to the rates JEA pays its suppliers for transportation of
5		petroleum coke from East Texas to Jacksonville, Florida. Mr. Dibner proposed a rate
6		of \$*C* per ton to TECO for the transportation of petroleum coke from East Texas to
7		the Big Bend plant in Tampa. On the other hand, JEA only pays \$9.00 for
8		transportation all the way to Jacksonville, over 500 miles further. 43 Significantly,
9		TECO Transport is the carrier providing this \$9.00/ton transportation to JEA! ⁴⁴
10	Q.	Is this a problem?
11	A.	Yes. Mr. Dibner is proposing that TECO ratepayers pay higher prices to TECO
12		Transport than TECO Transport charges other utilities! I consider this to be a serious
13		problem and further evidence of the problems inherent in this affiliate transaction.
14	Q.	Do you have a summary of all of the available rates that you have considered in
15		evaluating Mr. Dibner's proxy market rates?
16	A.	Yes. I have created a matrix of all of the available rates for consideration. The
17		matrix is attached as Exhibit_(MJM-5 pg 1). The first five columns relate to the rates
18		TECO had at its disposal for consideration. These include the current rates, Mr.
19		Dibner's rates, and the three bids TECO received. The sixth column is Mr. Dibner's
20		rates adjusted for preference trade and backhaul as discussed above. The next
21		column is the rate paid by JEA for transportation of petroleum coke from East Texas.
22		The last column is the Snavely King proxy market prices.

What do you recommend?

23

Q.

⁴³ Distance taken from http://www.maritimechain.com/partners/port_distance_call.asp.
⁴⁴ The vessels identified in the JEA invoices are TECO Transport vessels: Sheila McDevitt, Marie Flood and Pat Cantrell. See Exhibit___(MJM-4).

1 A. I recommend that *C* % of TECO's payments to TECO Transport be disallowed
2 entirely. My recommendation assumes a maximum rate of \$*C*/ton. This reflects
3 the two obvious adjustments to Mr. Dibner's models described above and the \$*C*
4 terminal rate from the prior contract.

5 Q. Why are you keeping the current rate for terminal costs?

A. It is my understanding that the contract has a "meet or beat" provision. I find no reason to justify a higher rate than is currently being charged. This is supposed to be a competitive process. TECO Transport's current rate beats the competition.

THE WATERBORNE TRANSPORTATION BENCHMARK

10 Q. Please provide a brief history of the waterborne transportation benchmark.

A. In Docket No. 870001-EI-A, FPSC Order No. 20298, issued November 10, 1988, the Commission established a waterborne coal transportation benchmark to which Tampa Electric would compare its coal transportation costs each year. The purpose of the benchmark was to measure whether or not the amounts Tampa Electric paid to its affiliate, TECO Transport, for the transportation of its coal were reasonable. The benchmark is the average of the two lowest comparable publicly available rail rates for coal to other municipal utilities in Florida. As long as TECO Transport's rates are lower than the benchmark, they are considered reasonable and recovered through the fuel clause. If the rates exceed the benchmark, Tampa Electric must justify the higher rates before recovery is allowed. A stipulation reaffirming the benchmark was included in Order No. PSC-93-0443-FOF-EI, issued March 23, 1993 in Docket No. 930001-EI.

Q. How has the benchmark compared to the waterborne transportation costs actually incurred by Tampa Electric?

- 1 A. The benchmark has been consistently higher than the rates paid by TECO to TECO
- 2 Transport.
- 3 Q. Do you believe the benchmark is useful in evaluating TECO Transport's
- 4 waterborne transportation rates?
- 5 A. No. The benchmark is clearly out of date and is highly overstated at the present time.
- We know that based on the results of even a flawed RFP process. According to Mr.
- 7 McNulty's Exhibit WBM-3 in Docket No. 030001-EI, the average benchmark from
- 8 1988 to 2002 was \$*C*. This was *C* percent higher than TECO's average
- 9 waterborne transportation cost of \$*C* during the same period. It is *C* percent
- higher than the rail bid received in response to the RFP.⁴⁶ It is*C* % higher than
- Mr. Dibner's market model and *C* % higher than Mr. Dibner's market model as
- adjusted for obvious judgmental errors as discussed above.⁴⁷
- 13 Q. Do you have any empirical data or information demonstrating that the
- benchmark is not a useful surrogate in today's market?
- 15 A. Yes. The current (2002) benchmark of \$23.87 is *C* percent higher than the recent
- 16 rail bid received by TECO.⁴⁸
- 17 Q. Please summarize your testimony.
- 18 A. The RFP process TECO used was flawed and it also presumed that its affiliate would
- 19 "win" the bid. Therefore, the prices which TECO has contracted to pay TECO
- Transport for the next five years are unreasonable and overstated and should not be
- flowed through to ratepayers. I recommend the rates that I have proposed for the
- reasons set-forth above. On the other hand, I remind the Commission that

⁴⁵ Supplemental Direct Testimony of William B. McNulty, Docket No. 030001-EI, October 23, 2003, Exhibit WBM-3.

⁴⁶ Average rail rate of \$*C* per ton as calculated on McNulty Exhibit WBM-1.

⁴⁷ See Exhibit___(MJM-5).

⁴⁸ Average rail rate of \$*C* used.

- 1 TECO/TECO Transport have opposed the use of actual costs in this docket. The use
- of actual costs, verified by an audit, is always a viable alternative.
- 3 Q. Does this conclude your testimony?
- 4 A. Yes, it does.

BY MS. KAUFMAN:

Q Mr. Majoros, do you have a summary of your testimony this afternoon?

A Yes, I do. Again, good afternoon. My name is
Michael J. Majoros, Jr. Appendix A to my testimony contains a
summary of my qualifications, my education, my background for
about the last 30 years. Of that, about 23 years has been
devoted to studying public utility rate issues.

My testimony addresses several flaws in the waterborne transportation rates that TECO is paying to its unregulated affiliate, TECO Transport, under the new contract it signed effective 1/1/04. The issue we are faced with now is how much of those rates will be allowed as charges to ratepayers in the fuel adjustment clause. Whether or not there is a market is a bogus issue. The contract has been signed, the deal is done.

Based on the information available in this

proceeding, and any reasonable common sense interpretation of

what constitutes competitive waterborne transportation rates,

this Commission should disallow a significant percentage of

TECO's waterborne transportation costs for the next five years.

The quantification and reasons for the disallowance are

explained in my testimony. TECO hired a highly educated

consultant who has vast experience in waterborne costs to help

it in its deliberations with TECO Transport. Unfortunately,

while Mr. Dibner may be well-versed in barge and tug costs, he seems to know nothing about public utility ratemaking.

TECO was granted a privilege with respect to its fuel cost recovery as a result of the early 1970s Arab oil embargo. It is allowed to collect its fuel costs, including transportation, as a direct dollar-for-dollar passthrough to its ratepayers. In return for this privilege, TECO has the fiduciary responsibility to aggressively negotiate for the lowest possible fuel and transportation prices. That is this Commission's charge to TECO, and it is this Commission's obligation to ratepayers to ensure that this occurs.

Instead, TECO hired a consultant on behalf of its ratepayers who thinks that higher prices are better. Mr. Dibner built a market proxy model for the waterborne transportation, but before presenting that model to TECO Transportation to meet or beat, he increased the resulting prices -- and please follow me on this -- he increased the resulting prices to charge TECO's ratepayers, TECO's captive ratepayers, for the cost of backhaul for which TECO Transport is already receiving unregulated revenues.

He did this by doubling the one-way or so-called headhaul costs. Next, he increased that price for an opportunity cost which is equivalent to additional profit for TECO Transport that he alleges may be lost. After increasing these prices, Mr. Dibner recommended on 9/25/03 that TECO

should submit these inflated rates to TECO Transport to meet or beat. What do you think TECO Transport did? They accepted them. They also met a higher terminal bid. There was no negotiation. And ratepayers don't need this kind of help. Ratepayers want someone to negotiate for lower, not higher prices.

I have removed a portion, but not all of the backhaul allocation to ratepayers from Mr. Dibner's model, and I have removed that unnecessary increase to the terminal price. What I want you to understand, in my opinion, this is not rocket science, Mr. Dibner may know a lot about the transportation industry, but his proposal is offensive to this Commission's obligation to protect the ratepayers. His recommendations are offensive to this Commission's common sense. His proposals fly in the face of common sense, and that is what my testimony proves.

- Q Does that conclude your summary?
- A Yes.

- MS. KAUFMAN: Mr. Majoros is available for cross examination.
 - CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Go ahead, Mr. Fons.
- MR. FONS: It is my understanding that I will be the last to cross-examine the intervenor witnesses.
- CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Yes, it is. I didn't ask if there was friendly cross.

1	MR. WRIGHT: Yes, I do have some cross. We will see	
2	if it is friendly.	
3	CROSS EXAMINATION	
4	BY MR. WRIGHT:	
5	Q Good afternoon, Mr. Majoros.	
6	A Good afternoon.	
7	Q I have a question for you relating to your testimony	
8	at Page 11, Lines 15 and 16, at which you discuss the right of	
9	first refusal in the TECO Transport contract.	
10	A Yes.	
11	Q Would it be your opinion that for Tampa Electric to	
12	agree to that particular right of first refusal in its contract	
13	with TECO Transport is prudent or imprudent?	
14	A For Tampa Electric to agree to that?	
15	Q Yes, sir.	
16	MR. FONS: I object to the form of the question.	
17	CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Restate it, please.	
18	BY MR. WRIGHT:	
19	Q Do you have an opinion regarding the prudency of	
20	Tampa Electric Company's having entered into the contract with	
21	TECO Transport, including the right of first refusal clause?	
22	MR. FONS: Again, I will object. There has been no	
23	foundation laid that this particular witness has the requisite	
24	expertise to render such an opinion.	

FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

 ${\tt MR.}$ WRIGHT: You know, my understanding is that ${\tt Mr.}$

Majoros has testified a number of times on regulatory policy matters. I think this is a regulatory policy matter, and I was trying to avoid the voir dire predicates.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Mr. Fons, Mr. Majoros has testified here. If your objection is on the basis of whether he has the expertise, I think he has --

MR. FONS: On this particular subject matter. There has been no establishment that he has had any experience with regard to either the preparation, dissemination, or review of requests for proposals or with contracts in this particular industry.

MS. KAUFMAN: I don't know if it is appropriate for me to comment, but I think that Mr. Majoros is opining in regard to the prudent or imprudent actions of a regulated utility in entering into this transaction, and he has more than ample experience to give that opinion.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Mr. Fons, and that is the question I heard, so I am going to overrule the objection. Go ahead and ask your question. Or, Mr. Majoros, do you need the question repeated?

THE WITNESS: No, I remember the question; and some folks may not like the answer.

I don't particularly object to that provision as long as this company exercises prudent business acumen when it deals with that. You don't go in when you have a meet or beat clause

with the highest possible price you can get. You go in with the lowest possible price you can get. And that is why Mr. Dibner, who also knows that they have a meet or beat clause, did a disservice to this company and to these ratepayers. It was an abuse of an affiliate transaction, in my opinion.

BY MR. WRIGHT:

- Q Thank you. On Page 12 you discuss Tampa Electric's handling of the bids it receives from CSX Transportation?
 - A Yes.

Q You there make the statement, "It is appalling that a rail bid was rejected as nonconforming given that the so-called competitive benchmark is based on rail to begin with."

My question for you is this: Are you aware of testimony in this case that CSX had presented price and quantity proposals to Tampa Electric earlier, including in October of 2002?

- A I would say I understand that you submitted two bids.
- Q Do you know whether -- you have been present both days. Do you know whether CSX submitted bids in October of 2002 as well as in response to the RFP?
 - A Yes, I heard that testimony.
- Q Okay. What do you think about the way Tampa Electric handled those proposals that were submitted in October of '02?
- A I think that it was -- I explained, I think in my testimony, what I would do if I were Tampa Electric, and what I

would expect as a ratepayer of this company. I want Tampa

Electric pitting your clients against TECO Transport, that is

what I want. That is the way I would handle it.

- Q Are there other utilities of which you are aware that pit the railroad company against the barge company?
- A Well, this is the first time that I have been involved in a case in which that was an issue. I have been in various projects where the utilities, you know, take coal by barge and rail, but I don't know whether they were as aggressive as I would like them to be, but I didn't address that issue.
- Q I was just trying to follow up on your idea of pitting the railroad company against the barge company.
 - A Right. It seems to make sense.
- Q Yes. Would it be better to pit them against each other in hypothetical contract negotiations or pit them against each other with facilities on the ground?
 - A I guess I don't understand what you mean there.
- Q Well, if you had rail delivery capability at Big
 Bend, wouldn't it be a more effective means of competing rail
 against barge?
 - A Yes.

Q You discuss some flaws, on Page 13 you discuss some flaws in Ms. Wehle's analysis of the rail bid. Do you know whether her analysis of the rail bid included any consideration

of the volume discounts available through the rail bid?

A No, I didn't -- you know, I only read what was available to me. And it was my understanding that it was rejected sort of out of hand due to capital considerations.

And then Ms. Wehle in her testimony added -- we were looking at it today, added layers of additional costs on what you had proposed.

Q In your opinion, in evaluating the costs that were proposed by CSX, would it be appropriate to include volume discounts that were included in the bid?

A I would think so.

Q Would it be appropriate to include escalation factors applicable to the water transportation costs?

MR. FONS: Mr. Chairman, I'm going to object. He has not set a foundation that this witness knows anything about the contracts. The witness has already testified he merely reviewed the testimony, he has not looked at the documents themselves, and has not established that he has any expertise in this area.

MR. WRIGHT: Mr. Chairman, I believe in response to a previous question he testified that he was looking at earlier today Ms. Wehle's analysis that a rail bid versus the water bid in which he pointed out that she layered some additional costs on that. I'm asking about other related cost factors.

MR. FONS: I think other costs, just because she

related to some doesn't give him an opening to ask about others.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Well, look, I think this is where we are replaying, again, your objection to his being able to comment on Ms. Wehle's analysis and Mr. Dibner's analysis, and I think I have already addressed that. So I don't know that he is getting so far afield with the previous objection that he can't comment on this. Overruled. Go on.

THE WITNESS: And I think you should try to make an apples-to-apples comparison.

BY MR. WRIGHT:

Q Would you believe that it would be appropriate to include the cost to get the coal from the mine to the river barge in any such comparison?

A You know, I heard that testimony today, too. And if it is common, you know, I think -- I mean, you should, if it is not common to both, yes. But the testimony I heard was that it is common to both, and I would have to look at some documents to --

Q This is a predicate question to a follow-up question that I intend to ask you. At Pages 28 and 30 you discuss your views on the benchmark, and I would ask you without revealing any of the confidential information there to summarize your views on the benchmark, please?

A Well, my views on the benchmark are at this point it

is irrelevant because the deal is done and it is demonstrably high, and it is just -- it is providing meaningless information. It is not useful. And to rely on that benchmark merely results in overcharges to ratepayers.

And, as I heard today, it was supposed to be a sanity check. And I was thinking it is perhaps an insanity check at this point. We ought to ditch it. It is not doing anybody any good. Ms. Wehle said that the fact that the rates that they just agreed to are so far less than that benchmark shows that they have been -- that they are good for ratepayers. And I have demonstrated that the rates that Mr. Dibner calculated are bad for ratepayers.

- Q Sticking with the benchmark for one more question.

 Would you agree that actual railroad rates, coal-by-rail rates available to Tampa Electric would be a better measure of a benchmark than what they were using, i.e., than this conglomerated rate of publicly available information?
 - A Used as what?

- Q As a benchmark, as a test, a sanity check?
- A I don't like benchmarks, sir, at all. But what I do know, my firm has a transportation division, and it is common knowledge -- well, I don't deal over there all the time. It is common knowledge that those benchmarks in that industry are vastly overstated because they don't reflect volume discounts of things like that. And it was my assumption when I first got

into this proceeding, without knowing much about this benchmark at all, that it was probably not a reliable indicator of anything because it didn't reflect what would happen in a competitive market through tough negotiations.

Q Understanding that you generally don't like benchmarks, I'll just ask you, would you think that the actual rail rates that would be available to a utility company, in this case Tampa Electric Company, would be a better benchmark if one were going to be considered than some average of publicly available information?

A Yes.

MR. WRIGHT: Thank you. That's all I have.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Go ahead, Commissioner Bradley.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Yes. I would like to just ask a question about the benchmark method and what Mr. Majoros was suggesting in lieu of the benchmark. And let me tell you what I'm getting at. I read just briefly up top in your testimony, and you made the statement that the benchmark method provides bad information that should be eliminated. And what I have not been able to locate in your testimony is the method by which you would suggest that -- and I'm just curious -- what method the competitors would use that would be more accurate than benchmarking to determine the value of the transportation service.

THE WITNESS: And you understand that Mr. Dibner built what he called a market proxy model. This isn't based on TECO's costs, this is based on some generic cost that he has gathered from publicly available information about the industry. And so he built what he called a market proxy model. That is what he proposed be used on behalf of ratepayers and offered -- essentially offered to TECO Transport. Once that is used, the benchmark has not much more meaning anyway. So my proposal is -- and you have to understand this, I hope you follow me -- the deal is done, they have signed the contract.

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If they don't operate under that contract -- you heard all of that talk about liquidated damages and dead freight, if they obviate that contract, you will have this company in here in a year or two trying to collect money from ratepayers for liquidated damages. So the deal is done.

My recommendation -- and I don't care about the benchmark. I'm telling you that Dibner's market proxy model did not reflect a competitive market. Mr. Dibner's model, believe it or not, and if you read through the transcripts of his -- and even think about what he was saying to you yesterday. What he was saying to you, that the market that he is talking about is a monopoly market, and in that market he is proposing that TECO Transport maximize its profits. The deal is done. TECO Electric is already paying those charges, and they want to pass them through the fuel adjustment clause.

What I am saying is you have to now reflect a competitive market, because those are the adjustments I made, and anybody, everybody knows it.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Commissioner Bradley, let me get some clarification from you. If I could ask you, Commissioner, what your question -- your question was what method would the competitors use, is that accurate?

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: The competitive market use in order to determine --

THE WITNESS: I think the competitors would do essentially the same model that Dibner did, but it would make the same two adjustments that I made. That is what a competitive market would do. That should have been Dibner's starting point in the negotiations with TECO Transport, but they didn't even negotiate. They went in with inflated prices, and then they want to pass that through to ratepayers. It makes no sense.

through to the ratepayers. Let's assume that the contract is bid out and TECO accepts a contract from a bidder. What are some of the components, or some of the clauses that would need to be in that contract in order to ensure that the ratepayers are going to have a reliable source of transportable coal in this instance, one that is sustainable, one that is reliable, one that is going to be available to power up the generators?

And this is exactly what I am getting at. Sometimes, you know, when you low bid, that is not a good means of doing business even though government tends to sometimes think that it is. But then you have instances where individuals will bid low and decide later on that the bid is inadequate. What is there that should be included in this contract that would ensure that if this component of transportation is bid out that the bidder is not going to renege on his or her, that the company will not renege on its contract?

THE WITNESS: Well, first of all, remember this -COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Would you suggest a bond or
what?

THE WITNESS: What I would suggest -- I'm not a lawyer, I don't write contracts, but I would say this. If I were TECO negotiating with TECO Transport, I would have huge penalties if TECO Transport didn't deliver what it was supposed to do. That is what I would do. But the thing is --

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I'm not talking about TECO
Transport. I'm saying if --

THE WITNESS: That's what I'm talking about.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: -- someone bids and gets the bid, and I am thinking what needs to be included in the contract to protect the ratepayers and makes sure they have -- the lights are not going to go off because TECO has now bidded out this portion of their operation and the person who won the

bid decides that maybe the bid was too low and they want to renegotiate or maybe -- and I'm just --

THE WITNESS: You need the reverse of those liquidated damages clauses or those dead freight. Here is a proceeding in which -- well, this plus the prior one -- the dead freight almost got paid for -- in fact, I think it is embodied in these new rates, but what you need is TECO Electric, if it was prudent, should be able to sue the heck out of TECO Transport if they don't provide the service that they contract for. That should be built right into the contract. But, again, remember this, you know, I agree with you on that, and that is the provision that I think should be in there, something like that.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Right. But I'm not -- and I guess maybe I'm not understanding. What I'm trying to get from you is what if an independent company wins the bid and later on, you know, it is determined that it bid it too low, TECO has liquidated all of its barges, and tug boats, and gotten rid of its staff, what is there that is going to be in place to make sure that the ratepayers are not going to suffer if that company decides that it can't deliver at the price of its bid?

THE WITNESS: Well, what is in place is their franchise obligation to provide electricity.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Beg your pardon?

THE WITNESS: What is in place is TECO's franchise

obligation to provide electricity. They bear that risk because 1 we are allowing them a privilege, we are allowing them to pass 2 that cost through. 3 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: 4 5 CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Where were we? COMMISSIONER JABER: Commissioner, do you mind if I 6 7 follow up on that? CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Not at all. 8 9 COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Majoros, let me start by 10 telling you I appreciate your expertise in this matter and certainly thank you for being here. 11 12 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 13 COMMISSIONER JABER: And I have been listening very 14 carefully to your answers, and I do understand that you believe the deal has been done. So with that out of the way --15 16 THE WITNESS: Okay. COMMISSIONER JABER: -- I think we are looking for a 17 different answer here to a very good question. 18 19 THE WITNESS: Okay. 20 COMMISSIONER JABER: You have two concerns. One, as 21 I understand it, is that this company has included -- in your 22 opinion, the model includes backhaul revenues. Your second concern is that the model inappropriately includes -- your 23

In that regard, Commissioner Bradley's question is an

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words -- opportunity costs.

excellent one. If we agree with you and the opportunity costs are not appropriate, costs that are designed to cover what TECO Transport believes it needs to be dedicated solely for TECO, right?

THE WITNESS: Uh-huh.

COMMISSIONER JABER: The question is a good one.

What do ratepayers expect when TECO Transport goes away and
there aren't very many competitors in the market to provide
transportation service that is needed to make those lights go
on?

THE WITNESS: See, I just -- I don't know where you are -- I was with you right up until the final question. I do not understand the point of your question. What do we expect -- the ratepayers expect TECO to provide service. You understand that -- you know about base rates. This company has --

COMMISSIONER JABER: Let me interrupt you, Mr. Majoros. I have been accused of knowing just a little bit about base rates, so I want you to assume that I know just little bit of what I'm talking about. And let me try to rephrase my question.

If TECO Transport frees itself up to provide transport service to companies other than TECO, and it is not available when TECO needs to have its coal transported, the question is a simple one, what do we do. What choices are

available?

THE WITNESS: Well, they will have to get coal some other way.

COMMISSIONER JABER: And what might -- give me an answer, how?

THE WITNESS: Well, I mean, they could either get it from, you know, across the water or they can get it from the railroad.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Mr. Twomey, you had indicated that you had a couple of questions.

MR. TWOMEY: Yes, sir, I do.

CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. TWOMEY:

Q My first question, Mr. Majoros -- and good evening to you, or afternoon, or whatever it is. My first question is would you agree that what TECO is actually paying to rail ship coal to Gannon, for example, in the year 2001, which presumably would include any volume discounts it was able to obtain, would be a better sanity check on transportation rates than using the published rail rates for shipping to municipalities which don't include volume discounts?

- A It sounds reasonable.
- Q Do you know what those rates were most recently when they were declassified?
 - A No, I don't.

MR. TWOMEY: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask that 1 the Commission accept a late-filed exhibit that would consist 2 3 of the most recent 12 months of declassified 423 data from 4 Tampa Electric Company that would show, in fact, what the rail 5 rates to Gannon were on a dollar per ton basis. 6 CHAIRMAN BAEZ: For the most recent --MR. TWOMEY: Twelve months that are declassified. 7 8 CHAIRMAN BAEZ: The most recent 12 months that are 9 declassified. 10 MR. TWOMEY: Yes, sir. As you know, Mr. Chairman, they maintain their classification for 24 months. 11 12 CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Right. I just wanted to get your 13 request clear. Mr. Keating, help me out here. We need TECO to provide that? Now I'm --14 15 MR. FONS: We don't even have a witness on the stand. 16 CHAIRMAN BAEZ: It is 5:00 o'clock, so, Mr. Keating, 17 how do we need to entertain Mr. Twomey's request? 18 MR. KEATING: I'm not real sure. I was kind of pausing waiting for Tampa Electric to jump in. I have a 19 20 concern that it looks a little to me like making a direct case 21 at this point in time. 22 MR. BEASLEY: It does. And Mr. Twomey had an 23 opportunity to cross-examine all of our witnesses. 24 CHAIRMAN BAEZ: And this is my quandary; I'm in a 25 gray area because we are here on cross from -- I mean, it is

not really cross now, is it? So, I don't know who would provide that --

MR. TWOMEY: Mr. Chairman --

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CHAIRMAN BAEZ: -- based on the witness who is sitting there.

MR. TWOMEY: A quick answer, and I will, of course, accept whatever your ruling is. I would observe -- first of all, I would offer to collect the documents and get them certified by your clerk, they are in your possession. And I would note, additionally, that the documents that I will collect were prepared -- I'm not sure if they are certified, but were prepared by the utility itself. There is nothing -- this is their own information, so there is nothing terribly complicated about it.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Well, there wasn't anything terribly complicated about Mr. Wright's proffer, and I didn't think that that was appropriate either, because this is almost tantamount to building a direct case, as Mr. Keating has suggested. So I think at this point I'm going to deny the request, and you can go on and ask your questions.

MR. TWOMEY: Yes, sir. I've got an exhibit I would like to pass out, please. Mr. Poucher.

Mr. Chairman, this is a confidential exhibit. It is the late-filed deposition Exhibit MJM-1 to the deposition of Michael J. Majoros. And I would ask that it be identified,

1	please.
2	CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Show the late-filed deposition
3	Exhibit MJM-1 to the deposition of Michael J. Majoros marked as
4	Confidential Exhibit 99.
5	MR. TWOMEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
6	(Confidential Exhibit 99 marked for identification.)
7	BY MR. TWOMEY:
8	Q Mr. Majoros, I presume I am correct in understanding
9	that you prepared this document, is that correct?
10	A It was prepared by my associate.
11	Q Yes, sir. And what does that I see that all the
12	numbers on that page are apparently all of them are
13	confidential, correct?
14	A Yes.
15	Q The front page?
16	A Yes.
17	Q I understand why Mr. Dibner's rate on Line 1 is
18	confidential. Why is your apparent recommended rate on Line 2
19	confidential, the result of your model?
20	A Because I made adjustments to his model, I take it.
21	Q I see.
22	A I didn't put these yellow marks on it, so
23	Q Okay. In any event, Line 1 shows Mr. Dibner's

A That's correct.

proposed rates, correct?

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1	Q	Line 2 shows yours?
2	A	Yes.
3	Q	Three is the difference, correct?
4	A	That's right.
5	Q	And apparently Line 4 through 8 are what, an
6	explanation	on to explain the difference?
7	A	Yes. They break out the difference by reason. The
8	first reas	son is the difference between Mr. Dibner's and my
9	backhaul 1	rate on the river. The adjusted Dibner model with
LO	backhaul d	on the river. The second on Line 5 is the impact of
L1	the ocean	preference trade premium increase included in Mr.
L2	Dibner's n	model. Line 6 is the difference in the ocean rate
L3	resulting	from Mr. Dibner's increase, and then my adjustment to
L4	that incre	ease to allocate some of those costs.
15	Q	But you didn't take it all out?
16	А	I didn't take it all out; no, sir.
L7	Q	Okay. And the last?
L8	A	And the last one is the difference between the new
L9	terminal n	rate and the existing terminal rate.
20	Q	And the remaining pages of the document which are
21	apparently	y all classified, that is supporting data to the
22	A	That is correct.
23		MR. TWOMEY: Thank you, sir. Nothing further, Mr.
24	Chairman.	_ ,

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Thank you, Mr. Twomey. I think we

were going to do staff's questions first and then have Mr. Fons 1 2 wind up with cross. MR. KEATING: Staff has no questions. 3 CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Okay. Mr. Fons. I could hold you 4 off no longer. 5 CROSS EXAMINATION 6 7 BY MR. FONS: I will say good evening, Mr. Majoros. 8 Good evening, Mr. Fons. 9 Α 10 0 We are not strangers, are we, Mr. Majoros? 11 No, we aren't. Α 12 We have been in other proceedings like this, have we 13 not? 14 Yes, we have. Α 15 And when I say other proceedings, proceedings before 16 this Commission? 17 Α That is correct. 18 We have never been in a proceeding like this before, 19 have we? 20 Α No, sir. 21 Let me just ask you a little bit about your 22 background and experience. As I understand it from your exhibit to your testimony, your Attachment A -- Appendix A, 23 24 that your testimony is basically in the area of cost of service

with regard to regulated utilities, isn't that correct?

A Cost of service, it is summarized there. Divestiture accounting, I guess. You know, cost of service, taxation, revenue requirements, rate base, nuclear decommissioning, that sort of thing. I do a lot of work in the depreciation area.

- Q This is not a depreciation case, is it?
- A No.

- Q And it is not a tax case, is it?
- A No, sir.
 - Q What experience do you have, Mr. Majoros, in the maritime backhaul market?

A As I stated in the deposition, about a year or year and a half ago, I assisted the Hawaii Consumer Advocate in its analysis of a barge company's barge costs, and that did involve backhaul.

- Q And am I correct that this particular proceeding that you participated in before the Hawaii PUC regarded a company called Young Brothers?
 - A That is correct.
- Q And were you hired to analyze a model that was used by Young Brothers developed by a company called Marsoft (phonetic)?
 - A Yes, sir.
- Q And is Young Brothers a common carrier regulated by the Florida -- I'm sorry, the Hawaii Public Utility Commission?
 - A Yes, it is.

Q And what is its business?

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- A Oceangoing barge hauling.
- Q Would it be classified as intrastate barge traffic?
- A It has intrastate -- what we did was a fully allocated cost of service study that reconciled to a revenue requirement, but they did have an interstate aspect to that business. And it is quite complicated, and I don't recall exactly all the details of what costs were inter versus intrastate, but it is primarily an intrastate carrier, much like a telephone company.
- Q And the only rates that the Hawaii Commission were interested in were the intrastate rates charged by Young Brothers, is that correct?
- A Yes, but the inter versus intrastate allocation was an issue.
- Q And were the Young Brothers' rates with regard to the transport of personal property and merchandise like refrigerators and other things?
- A Automobiles, dry bulk, agricultural products. They had refrigerated agricultural products, as well, so there were about 20 product lines that they transported.
- Q And this regulation of the prices was pursuant to state statute, was that correct?
 - A Yes, sir.
 - Q Does Hawaii PUC regulate any other intrastate water

carrier other than Young Brothers?

A I don't think so. I think that Young Brothers is -you know, it's them and then a bunch of -- one or two
interstate carriers.

- Q Now, are the water carriers, the barge carriers in this proceeding, are they regulated by the Florida Public Service Commission?
 - A No.

- Q Are they regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission or any federal agency?
- A I don't think they are regulated by the ICC. I don't even think that exists anymore. But, you know, I'm not an expert in maritime law, and so I don't know the extent of any federal or international regulation of the maritime field.
- Q Are oceangoing vessels regulated by the State of Florida?
 - A I don't believe so.
- Q And other than the oceangoing vessels that Young Brothers has for transporting goods between the various Hawaiian islands, they are not regulated by any agency, are they?
- A I think they are subject to federal regulation, that is the distinction between inter and intrastate.
- Q You are saying that oceangoing vessels are regulated by some federal agency?

1	A	There is some law and, yes, they report they have	
2	tariffs an	nd, yes. I'm not an expert in it. I mean, I'm not	
3	even profe	essing to be, but	
4	Q	Okay. That's what I'm trying to get at.	
5	A	I know they have tariffs and that was the big	
6	issue abou	at the inter versus intra split, what was that all	
7	about.		
8	Q	And now with regard to the backhaul market that you	
9	say exist	ed with regard to Young Brothers, was that backhaul	
10	market for	the intrastate portion regulated by the Hawaii PUC?	
11	A	Yes.	
12	Q	Okay.	
13	A	And there it was a cost allocation issue more than a	
14	market issue, I would think.		
15	Q	So that is the limit of your experience, it was an	
16	allocation	n issue on the backhaul, is that correct?	
17	A	How to allocate costs, and that is what I am talking	
18	about in m	my testimony in this case.	
19	Q	What costs are you seeking to have allocated in this	
20	proceeding?		
21	A	I'm seeking as I explained earlier, Mr. Dibner	
22	increased	the headhaul costs by a factor of generally two,	
23	which resulted in an increase in cost for return trips.		

A I want to finish answering the question.

Now, you are talking --

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- Q I'm sorry, I thought you were finished.
- A That cost, that increased cost, my recommendation is that a portion of that, and it is based on the actual data, the Port of Tampa data, should be allocated to the backhaul. I know yesterday Mr. Willis said that I had incorporated backhaul revenues in my calculations. That was not a true statement. That was a false statement. All I'm doing is I don't want all of those costs allocated to ratepayers. This company can keep all the backhaul revenues it wants. I hope it earns more, and more, and more, and more, but I don't want all of those costs allocated to the regulated ratepayer.
 - Q Let's talk about those so-called costs. What costs are you talking about that are allocated -- that Mr. Dibner includes in his model?
 - A Voyage time at sea he doubled, and this is in the -this is all in the oceangoing barge costs, but the voyage time
 at sea he essentially doubled; delay time at 15 percent, avoids
 time at sea, fuel at sea, tug generating fuel, barge fuel, and
 lube oil.
 - Q Those are costs that are incurred in backhaul, are they not?
 - A Yes.

- Q Okay. And those costs would be deducted from the revenues from backhaul?
 - A I don't care what TECO Transport does with the costs.

You have to understand here is what Mr. Dibner did. He started out figuring out, for example, what is the voyage time at sea for a one-way trip. Then he doubled that to account for the return trip. That doubled -- that cost, the doubled cost is what he wants to charge to ratepayers. Now, what I know, based on the information we got from the Port of Tampa, is that 70 percent of the time that return trip has backhaul, and they get -- I don't care how much revenues, I don't care. Keep them, but I don't think it is fair. It is not even reasonable, particularly in a competitive market, to assume that TECO Transport could charge twice the amount of the cost in a competitive market.

I'm not trying to do a cost allocation. I understand, I understand because Mr. Dibner told us all he never looked at any of TECO Transport's costs, he did a market model. A market proxy model. But do you think that in a competitive market when everybody in the market knows that backhaul exists that they are going to allow you to charge twice the amount of the headhaul? Do you think you would get the business? I don't think so.

Q Mr. Majoros, your study that you relied upon from the Port of Tampa, that information?

A Yes.

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Q The information that you relied upon merely shows that the barge was going from Louisiana to Tampa, and then from

Tampa to Louisiana. Do you know where the barge on its return trip was going in Louisiana?

A No.

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- Q So you don't know whether it was going back to Davant or was going somewhere else?
 - A No.
- Q And if it was going somewhere else other than Davant, then it would not be a backhaul, would it?
 - A Well, I guess I disagree with you.
- Q Well, on what basis do you disagree with that, Mr.

 Majoros? Either it is going back to the same terminal that it originated from and if it didn't, wouldn't you agree with me it was not backhaul?
- A No.
- 15 Q Suppose the vessel was going up the Mississippi River 16 to a fertilizer plant?
 - A Suppose it was.
 - Q It wouldn't be backhaul, would it?
- A We can call it what you want. We will call it a return trip.
 - Q But it is not backhaul?
- A If it is going back loaded, it is backhaul in my mind.
 - Q Suppose it was going merely a portion of the way to Louisiana and then on to Houston, Texas. Wouldn't that be a

different trip, it would not be backhaul?

A Not in my mind. And so what? I mean, the issue is a market rate.

- Q Exactly. The market rate and --
- A The market rate. A competitive market rate, not a monopoly market rate.
- Q And you would agree that the model that Mr. Dibner created was a proxy for the competitive market?
- A Absolutely not. He said essentially, it is a proxy for a monopoly market rate, and he said you can use that as proxy for a monopoly market rate because we have captive customers.
 - Q Where did he say that?
- A I've read it. I think he said it several times yesterday, but you had to listen.
 - Q Mr. Majoros, would you turn to Page 28 of your testimony, please. Look at Lines 6 through 8. Is this your testimony with regard -- and your only testimony with regard to the terminal cost or the terminal rate?
 - A Yes.
 - Q And am I correct that you are saying that the terminal rate should be adjusted because even though TECO Transport, Tampa Electric got a bid from another terminal that Tampa Electric could not accept that bid?
- A No, I'm not saying that at all. What I am saying

is -- I'm not going to use the same word that Mr. Dibner used, you know, the D word. But if you want to agree to a higher rate and not negotiate it down, fine. But that difference should be disallowed as far as the fuel adjustment charge is concerned.

- Q Now, wasn't this bid that Tampa Electric received an arm's-length bid?
 - A Sure.
 - Q It was a market price bid, was it?
- A I guess.

- MR. FONS: I have no further questions.
- CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Commissioner Bradley.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I have a question. And, Mr. Majoros, I'm just trying to get a grasp on some things, and you seem to be an excellent witness who has a lot of expertise in this area. Headhaul and backhaul.

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: When headhaul occurs, does backhaul always also happen?

THE WITNESS: No. When headhaul occurs, that is going from the origination to the destination. That is the headhaul. And typically, at least in this operation as I understand it, what you have is a return trip. And I think that always happens. We can assume that the return trip always happens. When that return trip has cargo on it, that is

backhaul.

Said about costs and profit that is made by the transportation company when backhaul occurs, and how that maybe should be factored in in order to create a better financial deal for the ratepayers. But my question is this: A competitive bidder, how would we factor in the issue of headhaul and backhaul, if a competitive bidder was allowed to transport coal to TECO? How would we factor this in so that the ratepayers would also participate in the backhaul factor, if backhaul, if we don't know if backhaul is going to occur every time headhaul occurs? I'm trying to get my hands around the conceptual issue here.

THE WITNESS: I apologize. I wasn't trying to argue,

THE WITNESS: I apologize. I wasn't trying to argue I was trying to answer.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: You may not be able to answer that.

THE WITNESS: I think I could. I think I can. First you have to understand that what we have here is a regulated utility making purchases from an unregulated affiliate. If that were not an affiliate, if it were not an affiliate, and if that market for that waterborne transportation, forget the rail for now, were competitive, and TECO Electric issued an RFP for that transportation service, what you would expect to happen, since all of the competitors, given that there is a substantial amount of backhaul in Florida, would recognize that in their

bids and they would have come down relative to what Mr. Dibner calculated. Now, that is what we would expect.

I believe, and I'm trying to understand, I think that your concern is that you are worried that if you were to disallow the percentage that I am recommending here, which is, I believe, a competitive rate, not just by the calculations, but by comparisons to all kinds of other real rates. But your concern is that you are afraid -- I mean, not afraid, but is that probably the company has somehow suggested that if you disallow that much, TECO Transport will dry up and go away and then the ratepayers will have a big problem and they will be subject to -- and this is what Dibner was saying, too -- to the railroads and they will be captive customers to the railroad.

Now, I think that one way you might want to solve that, I haven't dealt with it, is you can, you know, force them -- I don't know. I mean, I'm not a lawyer. They have signed that contract, they have already signed the contract, maybe you ought to reregulate them. You know, backhaul, the way I'm talking, and if you want to -- you have them do an actual cost study, and you could do the allocation like that. Maybe you ought to require them to build a facility, or consider requiring them to build the facilities to allow rail transportation. It is my understanding from my partners in the transportation business that that is one industry where competition works.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Commissioners, any other questions?

No? I'm sorry, Commissioner Deason.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Majoros, from your testimony here today I take it that you don't like benchmarks, you don't like Mr. Dibner's study, but you would agree that transporting coal is a necessary cost. It is a question of what is a reasonable necessary cost. How do we determine, what is your recommendation as to how we determine what a reasonable cost would be to allow to be included in the fuel adjustment factor?

THE WITNESS: Well, that is what I am recommending here. I mean, I don't know -- Mr. Dibner did the model, and I made two basic adjustments to them, and they were fairly conservative. I did not eliminate -- I did not allocate all of the backhaul, you know, all of his increase to that backhaul traffic.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So if we make the two adjustments, even though you disagree with the study, if we make the two adjustments you recommend you think that is a reasonable rate to be included in fuel adjustment recovery?

THE WITNESS: Well, I'm not sure. I think that is the rate that I have seen here that is most -- you know, assuming that Dibner's model is good to begin with, that is the rate that is reflective of a market price. That is the market proxy.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And we should allow that rate for the five years of the contract?

THE WITNESS: My position is you should disallow the ratio that I have shown in my testimony.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And you believe that is reasonable because it is a market rate with necessary adjustments to reflect --

THE WITNESS: A competitive market.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: -- a competitive market?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. And that is what I think the standard is in Florida.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Do you have a position on whether an RFP process is superior to the model, or is the model a necessary given the limited amount of bidding that took place?

THE WITNESS: I have accepted the model. I have told you my qualifications, but I have accepted it. The RFP process obviously didn't work. And my associate, Pat Wells is really the expert on that, but it didn't work. But regardless of that, I mean, I'm operating under the assumption, I'm operating under the assumption that Mr. Dibner made a calculation of the charges that TECO Transport should give to -- I mean, that TECO Electric should provide to TECO Transport to meet or beat.

TECO Transport elected to meet them, and now they have a contract and those are the prices that are being charged.

And what I have made -- and so the basis of those 1 2 charges is Dibner's model. And there are two very fundamental problems with that model as far as a competitive market is 3 They allocate 100 percent of the backhaul costs to 5 ratepayers. They don't recognize, they don't recognize that 6 they would not be able to do that -- they don't recognize that 7 you wouldn't be able to double cost in a competitive market, Я and they don't recognize that you wouldn't be able to add an 9 opportunity cost in a competitive market.

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So unless we don't -- you know, Dibner's model set the price and that is what is being charged. The contract has been signed. Given what we have heard, if we abrogate that contract, this Commission -- I'm afraid the company is going come in and start charging ratepayers for liquidated damages. So it seems to me, you know, that is why I made this recommendation. From the ratepayers' perspective, okay, you are paying that, but you have to reduce it by a significant percentage to reflect a competitive market price.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Thank you, Commissioner Deason. We are on redirect, Ms. Kaufman.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I want to ask one more.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Oh. I'm sorry, Commissioner Bradley.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Mr. Majoros, let me ask this question. If the contract is put out to the -- I wouldn't say the lowest bidder, but I would say the best bidder, what

1	portion of that should be allocated or allotted to TECO
2	Electric as a part of its rate base to administer the contract
3	and to well, to administer the contract?
4	THE WITNESS: Whatever I mean, I don't know.
5	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Was that included in your
6	calculations?
7	THE WITNESS: Are you asking me what part should be
8	allocated to TECO Electric
9	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Right.
LO	THE WITNESS: For administering that contract?
11	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: For monitoring or
L2	administering.
L3	THE WITNESS: Through the fuel clause?
L 4	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Yes.
15	THE WITNESS: Nothing. That is all base rate
16	activity. You know, Ms. Wehle, her salary is in base rates,
L 7	and she is the one that does that.
L8	CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Ms. Kaufman.
L9	MS. KAUFMAN: Just really two mercifully short
20	questions.
21	REDIRECT EXAMINATION
22	BY MS. KAUFMAN:
23	Q Mr. Majoros, do you still have I guess it is
24	Exhibit Number 98. Mr. Twomey asked you about the late-filed
25	deposition exhibit?

1	l A	Yes

- Q Without articulating obviously any of the numbers, if you look on Lines 4, 5, 6, and 7, am I correct that those are the adjustments you recommend to each segment of the move? For example, is Line Number 4 the adjustment that you recommend to come to a competitive rate for the river backhaul?
 - A Yes, that is correct.
- Q And are those numbers -- they would be on a per ton basis, correct?
 - A Yes.
- Q So if you wanted to get an order of magnitude, you would multiply the total times, for example, the 5.5 million tons Ms. Wehle talked about, correct?
 - MR. FONS: May I object? It is clearly leading.
- MS. KAUFMAN: I will rephrase it.

16 BY MS. KAUFMAN:

- Q How would you calculate the amount of disallowance that you are recommending from your late-filed exhibit?
- A The amount of disallowance -- overall, or for each component?
- Q I think you can just tell you us, how would you do it to get the total dollar amount on an annual basis? And don't reveal any of the numbers; tell us methodologically.
- A Well, the total per ton is shown on Line 8. And on an annual basis, you would multiply that by the 5.5 million

- 1	
1	tons. On a percentage basis you would divide that by
2	Mr. Dibner's (confidential number).
3	CHAIRMAN BAEZ: I wish you hadn't done that,
4	Mr. Majoros.
5	THE WITNESS: Sorry.
6	CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Can we have that stricken, please.
7	Your next question, Ms. Kaufman.
8	MS. KAUFMAN: I'm kind of scared to ask anymore
9	questions.
10	CHAIRMAN BAEZ: I'm scared of asking more questions
11	too.
12	MS. KAUFMAN: Okay. This question doesn't go near
13	any confidential information.
14	THE WITNESS: All right.
15	BY MS. KAUFMAN:
16	Q Several the Commissioners were asking you, I think,
17	what they could do to protect the ratepayers. Do you recall
18	the dialogue that you had with the Commissioners?
19	A To protect the ratepayers?
20	Q Right, from abuses from affiliate transactions, for
21	example?
22	A Yes.
23	Q In addition to what you have recommended in your
24	testimony, is there any other approach that the Commissioners
25	could adopt to figure out what the appropriate charges should

1	be from TECO Transport to Tampa Electric?		
2	A Well, I think that also available is the audit		
3	process that exists and used by other utilities. That is one		
4	way. But I don't know if that well, that might be one way.		
5	MS. KAUFMAN: Thank you. That's all I have.		
6	CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Thank you, Ms. Kaufman.		
7	Thank you, Mr. Majoros.		
8	THE WITNESS: Thank you.		
9	CHAIRMAN BAEZ: We have some exhibits. Mr. Twomey,		
10	think you had an exhibit.		
11	MR. TWOMEY: Yes, sir. I move Confidential 99.		
12	CHAIRMAN BAEZ: I've got you, Confidential 99.		
13	Without objection, show Confidential 99 admitted.		
14	(Confidential Exhibit 99 admitted into the record.)		
15	MS. KAUFMAN: Excuse me. I think we move 13 through		
16	18, I believe.		
17	CHAIRMAN BAEZ: I am showing 13 through 18. Without		
18	objection, show them admitted into the record.		
19	(Exhibits previously admitted.)		
20	MR. VANDIVER: The Citizens would call H.G. Wells.		
21	CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Mr. Wells.		
22	H.G. WELLS		
23	was called as a witness on behalf of the Citizens of the State		
24	of Florida and the Florida Industrial Power Users Group, and		
25	having been duly sworn, testified as follows:		

1		DIRECT EXAMINATION
2	BY MR. VAI	NDIVER:
3	Q	Good evening, Mr. Wells.
4	A	Good evening.
5	Q	Could you state your name and address for the record,
6	please, s	ir?
7	А	My name is H.G. "Pat" Wells, 38 Beach Street,
8	Homosassa	, Florida.
9	Q	Did you cause to be filed in this proceeding 11 pages
10	of testimo	ony with five exhibits, sir?
11	A	Yes, I did.
12	Q	Do you have any changes to that testimony or exhibits
13	at this t	ime, sir?
14	A	No, I do not.
15		MR. VANDIVER: Mr. Chairman, I believe those exhibits
16	have been	denominated as Exhibits 8 through 12, and at this
17	time I wo	ald like to ask for the insertion of Mr. Wells'
18	testimony	as though read.
19		CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Without objection, show that the
20	direct te	stimony of H.G. "Pat" Wells entered into the record as
21	though rea	ad. And let the record reflect that his accompanying
22	exhibits 1	have been previously numbered as Exhibits 8 through
23	12.	
24		MR. VANDIVER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Go ahead, Mr. Vandiver.

	1		TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS
•	2		<u>OF</u>
•	3		H.G. WELLS
	4		DOCKET NO 031033-EI
	5		:
-	6		I. INTRODUCTION
•	7	Q.	Please state your name and business address.
	8	A.	My name is H.G. (Pat) Wells and my business address is 38 Beech Street,
~	9		Homasassa, Florida 34446.
	10	Q.	On whose behalf are you appearing?
	11	A.	I am appearing on behalf of the Florida Office of Public Counsel (OPC) and the
-	12		Florida Industrial Power Users Group (FIPUG).
-	13	Q.	Please describe your educational and work experience.
	14	A.	For more than 10 years with Florida Power Corporation (FPC, currently known as
-	15		Progress Energy Florida), I served as Transmission Engineer, Director of
	16		Transmission Engineering, Director of System Planning, Director of Corporate
	17		Planning (includes Rate Department), and Assistant Vice President of Corporate
-	18		Planning. Then for over 12 years, I served as President, CEO and member of the
-	19		Board of Directors of Electric Fuels Corporation (Electric Fuels), a subsidiary of
	20		FPC. Attached as Exhibit No (HGW-1) is a brief description of my
-	21		qualifications and experience.
-	22	Q.	Describe your work experience in the area of fuel procurement and
	23		transportation.

A. For over 12 years, I was involved in coal procurement and transportation, both rail and barge, at Electric Fuels. Electric Fuels was responsible for all of FPC's coal procurement and delivery, including ownership and operation of mines and transportation equipment. Electric Fuels also supplied coal and transportation services to other companies, including Tennessee Eastman (Kodak), General Electric, General Motors and others.

Q. What experience do you have handling competitive bids?

A.

At FPC, I procured contracts for the final design and construction of large steel towers for high voltage and extra high voltage power lines through competitively bid contracts. At Electric Fuels, I was involved in arranging for transportation of waterborne coal on a competitive basis. Our requirements were made known through the coal trade media, meetings with interested parties, and acceptance of proposals. In addition, I was involved in contracting for the design and construction of the IMT terminal below New Orleans on the Mississippi River and the design and construction of barges and tugboats for the marine leg of the coal shipment to FPC's Crystal River Station. I was also involved in contracting for the design and construction of the rail unloading equipment at the Crystal River Station, which was done by Electric Fuels and turned over to FPC upon completion. I assisted in some of the contracting for the coal mining and preparation equipment as well as the rail loading facilities at Electric Fuels' mines in Kentucky and Virginia.

21 Q. What is your understanding of the issues in this case and how they arose?

A. My understanding is that in the fuel adjustment proceeding last year, issues arose as to the appropriateness of TECo's Request for Proposals (RFP) and the amount TECo

	1		wants to collect from ratepayers to pay to its affiliate, 1ECo Transport, to bring coal
	2		to its plants. My testimony will address the following two issues:
	3		• Is Tampa Electric's June 27, 2003, request for proposals
	4		sufficient to determine the current market price for coal
	5.		transportation?
	6		• Are Tampa Electric's projected coal transportation costs for
	7		2004 through 2008 under the winning bid to its June 27, 2003,
	8		request for proposals for coal transportation reasonable for cost
'	9		recovery purposes?
ı	10	Q.	Please summarize your testimony.
,	11	A.	I will address whether the RFP TECo issued was appropriate and whether it
	12		maximized competitive bidding. I will also address whether the proposals that were
ı	13		received were given appropriate consideration and whether the end result of the
	14		process provided the lowest delivered cost for ratepayers. Finally, I will discuss some
	15		of the recommendations of OPC/FIPUG witness Mr. Michael Majoros, which I deem
	16		to be reasonable for use by the Commission. In my view, TECo's handling of the
	17		RFP process was flawed and therefore resulted in few responses. The process
	18		appears to have been a "rush to judgment" designed to reward TECo's affiliate, TECo
•	19		Transport, with the entire transportation contract at rates that are excessively high and
	20		unfair to TECo's ratepayers.
	21		II. TECO's RFP PROCESS WAS FLAWED
	22	Q.	Have you reviewed the TECo coal transportation solicitation, responses and
	23		award?

	1	A.	Yes.
	2	Q.	Please summarize the problems with the RFP.
-	3	A.	The RFP was flawed from the outset. In order for an RFP to be fair and provide an
	4		appropriate response from the marketplace, the bid process must encourage full
	5		participation. TECo's RFP contained provisions which discouraged independent
-	6	•	bidders, and by that I mean non-affiliated companies, from submitting a proposal.
-	7		The problems included:
	8		A preference for integrated bids;
-	9		• An unreasonably short response time;
-	10		• Failure to provide the RFP to the railroad;
_	11		Failure to address the Commission Staff's suggested changes; and
	12		• Lack of dialogue with the bidders.
•	13	Q.	You mentioned that one problem with the RFP was the preference for integrated
-	14		bids. Describe that provision.
	15	A.	The RFP stated a preference for bids that met TECo's total transportation
•	16		requirements for the river, terminal, and Gulf transport elements. The RFP stated:
-	17		Tampa Electric prefers proposals for integrated waterborne
	18		transportation services, however proposals for segmented services will
-	19		be considered Proposals should represent the entire requirements
	20		stated herein of Tampa Electric's domestic waterborne solid fuel
	21		transportation services.
•	22		In other words, TECo's RFP expressed a preference for awarding the total
•	23		requirements of TECo's waterborne coal transportation needs to one company. Not

coincidentally, this preference caters to TECo's affiliate, TECo Transport, which 1 2 provides precisely those services to TECo. 3 Would such a preference discourage companies from bidding? Q. 4 Yes. This requirement tilts the playing field excessively toward the large integrated 5 company such as TECo Transport, which provides all three legs of the service (river, 6. terminal and Gulf). In fact, few companies can meet this requirement. Smaller, 7 efficient players on one leg or another may very well decide not to bid due to this 8 integration preference, especially when they do not know how much weight this 9 "preference" will receive in the bid evaluation. 10 Q. Was the time TECo provided bidders to prepare responses reasonable? 11 A. No. Five weeks is clearly an unreasonable period of time for a bid of this complexity. 12 At a bare minimum, eight weeks should have been allowed to accommodate bids for 13 the cross-Gulf leg. This concern is heightened given TECo's preference for 14 integrating the cross-Gulf leg with the river and terminal legs. TECo knew well in 15 advance when the contract would expire. There is no reason for the truncated 16 response time. 17 Q. Are there any other indications that the RFP was designed to discourage 18 bidders? 19 A. Yes, if TECo had been interested in exploring all of its options, it would have sent the 20 RFP to the railroads. The rail provider that provided a response to TECo's RFP had 21 to request a copy from TECo. 22 Q. Was the Public Service Commission Staff concerned about the RFP? 23 A. Yes.

1	Q.	Did the Staff recommend that TECo make changes to the RFP?
2	A.	Yes. I have attached a letter from Tim Devlin of the Commission Staff to Joann
3		Wehle of TECo, (Exhibit No (HGW-2)). First, the letter expresses Staff's
4		dismay that it was not permitted to review the RFP before it was issued. The letter
5		then lists Staff's concerns with the RFP and attaches clarifications which Staff
6		believes are necessary. These concerns are self-explanatory, but it should be noted
7		that Staff stated that the problems with the RFP, unless clarified, would "limit the
8		number and type of bids that TECo receives in response to the RFP as issued." The
9		letter further indicated that TECo chose not to address Staff's concerns.
10	Q.	Are you aware of any indications that the market did not take the RFP
11		seriously?
12	A.	Yes. A major industry website, Platts, quoted industry sources as follows:
13		Industry sources, however, downplayed the [TECo] solicitation as "an
14		exercise in futility." "We went through this same process six years
15		ago," said one industry executive. "They'll take bids and then award
16		the contract to their sister company, TECo Transport. It's all a game
17	•	to keep the Public Service Commission happy."
18		(Exhibit No (HGW-3)). Perception is everything in business. Barely one week
19		after the RFP was issued, the article appeared on a major website familiar to industry
20		insiders. Such an article illustrates the industry's perception of TECo's RFP.
21		Also attached to my testimony is letter from one of the top carriers in the
22		industry, (Exhibit No (HGW-4)) did
23		not provide a response to TECo's RFP, stating in its letter:



- Q. Do you know whether TECo contacted non-bidders to inquire why they chosenot to bid?
- 8 A. There is no record to show that any additional contacts were made.
- 9 Q. Did TECo establish a dialogue with bidders?
- 10 No. I think an interactive process with bidders is appropriate as long as the process is A. 11 the same for all prospective bidders. Much can be learned through dialogue in a pre-12 bid conference. TECo carried its "no dialogue" policy throughout: there was no 13 structured pre-bid meeting or follow-up meetings. The last is the most important. This 14 is the opportunity for more improvement in bids, not just price, but in operational 15 procedures, and many other factors of importance in such a contract. To me, not 16 meeting with the 'bidders is a huge indicator of TECo's lack of "seriousness" about 17 awarding this business to anyone but its affiliate. One bidder, 18 letter that indicated its desire to meet with TECo to discuss the rejection of its 19 proposal. (Exhibit No. (HGW-5)). TECo refused to meet with
- 20 Q. Did TECo Transport submit a bid in response to the RFP?
- A. No. TECo Transport was not required to bid under the terms of its prior contract with
 TECo. Therefore, TECo Transport had no incentive to "sharpen its pencil" and
 provide a competitive bid to win the business. Under the terms of the prior contract,

TECo Transport was simply allowed to "meet-or-beat" the best bid to win the 1 2 contract. 3 Do "meet-or-beat" clauses discourage competitive bidding? Q. 4 Yes. Such clauses discourage a company from coming in with a really competitive A. 5 bid because bidders perceive that one company, the one with the right to "meet-or-6 beat," has an extraordinary advantage over all others;, all it needs to do is sit back and 7 wait for the other bids. 8 O. Were there problems with TECo's handling of the bids it did received? 9 A. Yes. TECO did not seriously consider the low bidders it actually had in hand, 10 and CSX. In fact, it dismissed them, out of hand, apparently due to two things: 1) a 11 flawed analysis of the CSX bid and, 2) a perceived lack of financial ability on the part 12 13 Please provide an overview of the bids that were submitted. Q. 14 A. The TECo solicitation went to a number of barge lines operating on the Ohio and 15 Mississippi rivers, terminal facilities for handling coal in the New Orleans area, and 16 marine operators'in coastal waters. Probably due to the problems with the RFP 17 discussed earlier, the number of bids received was disappointing. On the river 18 portion, only one operator, an established company operating on the 19 Mississippi River and its tributaries, responded to the RFP. On the New Orleans 20 terminal portion, only one bidder, esponded. Its bid offered little or no savings. 21 No bids were received for the cross-Gulf transportation leg.

Was a bid submitted by a party to whom TECO did not send the RFP?

22

Q.

1	A.	Yes. CSX presented a bid to TECo to haul up to all of the tonnage by rail direct to
2		TECo.
3	Q.	Please describe the CSX bid.
4	A.	CSX submitted a bid for a tonnage that was sufficient to meet the total requirements
5		of TECO with no reliance on waterborne transport. CSX also submitted a second bid
6		that would have provided up to one-half of TECO's needs by rail. CSX's bid
7		contained an offer to construct and pay for the necessary rail unloading equipment at
8	*	TECo's Big Bend and Polk plants at no cost to TECO, up to a maximum of
9		million. The company rejected both of CSX's offers.
10	Q.	Did TECo properly handle CSX's bid?
11	A.	No. I believe that the CSX bid represented an opportunity for TECo to take an
12		overall lower rate back to TECo Transport for it to "meet or beat" pursuant to the
13		terms of the contract. TECo, in looking out for its ratepayers, should have been a
14		tough negotiator with TECo Transport, not an affectionate sister.
15	Q.	Describe the bid that was received for the river portion of the transportation leg.
16	A.	was the sole bidder on the river portion of the transportation leg. Its bid was
17		quite competitive, but was for less tonnage than TECo's full requirements. It was
18	•	also rejected by TECo.
19	Q.	How should TECo have handled this bid?
20	A.	Certainly a company in bankruptcy, such as significant an ideal contractor.
.21		However was competitive for coal coming from the Green River area of West
22		Kentucky. After provided considerable savings from several origins, mostly
23		concentrated in the Green River area. It makes economic sense to me that

1 could be awarded a contract for this area only in order to save substantial freight 2 costs, which might be only marginally reduced by the cost of coordinating two 3 was in bankruptcy at the time it made its bid, it offered to carriers. Although 4 meet with TECo to discuss its financial situation. Being the low bidder on the river 5 portion, I believe TECo should have met with Since TECo Transport has the 6 right of refusal, it should have at least been required to meet the lower 7 Q. Are you recommending that the Commission order TECo to reissue the RFP? 8 A. No. Our position is reflected in Mr. Majoros' recommended adjustments to Mr. 9 Dibner's price per ton for coal transportation. In the alternative, we request that the 10 Commission audit TECo Transport's actual costs. 11 III. MR. MAJOROS' TESTIMONY IS REASONABLE 12 Q. Have you reviewed Mr. Majoros' testimony filed in this docket? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. Mr. Majoros addresses backhaul in his testimony. Should TECo charge the 15 ratepayers for the round trip cost of the barge when it has backhaul traffic? No. My company, EFC, did not charge round trip costs to FPC's ratepayers when 16 A. 17 backhaul was involved. This was prior to the imposition of the market proxy. Mr. 18 Dibner's procedure of charging round trip costs is patently unfair to the ratepayer. 19 Were it not for ratepayer-financed TECo coal, these backhauls would not have 20 occurred and it is wrong for TECo ratepayers to pay the full round trip voyage costs. 21 Q. Please summarize your testimony. 22 A. I believe TECo's administration of its RFP was unreasonable and flawed. As I have 23 discussed in detail above, there were numerous problems with the RFP that TECo

1 could have avoided. At a minimum, TECo should have required TECo Transport to
2 "meet or beat" the bids TECo received. Finally, I agree with Mr. Majoros'
3 conclusion that backhaul should be considered.
4 Q. Does this conclude your testimony?

A.

5

Yes.

BY MR. VANDIVER:

Q Mr. Wells, have you prepared a summary of your testimony?

- A Yes, I have.
- Q Could you provide that at this time, please?

A Yes, sir. Thank you. Good afternoon. My name is Pat Wells. I'm appearing on behalf of the Office of Public Counsel and the Florida Industrial Power Users Group. I have testified before this Commission before, but it has been quite sometime, and I'm pleased to be back here.

For over 12 years I served as president and CEO of Electric Fuels Corporation, a subsidiary of Florida Power, now going under another name. In that capacity I was responsible for the procurement and transportation of about five and a half million tons, plus or minus, of coal a year to Florida Power Corp's facilities at Crystal River by both rail and barge, and both somewhat unsegmented and some segmented sections that you have been hearing about. I also am experienced in backhaul, which may get me more questions than I want. This transportation system is very similar, but not exactly like that of TECO. That is the summation.

The principle conclusions of my testimony are that TECO did not follow good practice in its RFP process. And I have some comments about that. The RFP stated a preference for integrated bids. Bidders were given an unreasonably short

response time. The RFP was not provided to the railroad.

Staff's suggested changes were not addressed, and there was a lack of dialogue with the bidders.

TECO then failed to be a tough negotiator and did not present any of the very few bids they received to TECO

Transport to either meet or beat. These items taken together skewed the results of the solicitation toward TECO's sister company, TECO Transport, and discouraged bidders from coming forward. Additionally, I support the concept explained in Mr. Majoros's testimony that considers backhaul in setting rates.

- Q Does that conclude your summary, Mr. Wells?
- A Yes, it does.

MR. VANDIVER: The witness is tendered for cross, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Thank you, Mr. Vandiver.

Mr. Wright, do you have questions?

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, sir, I do.

CROSS EXAMINATION

19 BY MR. WRIGHT:

- Q Good afternoon, Mr. Wells.
- A How are you, Mr. Wright?
- Q I'm doing great, and it is nice to have you back here. I have a number of questions for you that relate to how your statements regarding Tampa Electric Company's handling of the RFP and CSX's bid were informed.

Regarding your understanding of the bid, do you understand the lowest amount of coal that CSX is willing to transport pursuant to either of its bids?

A I didn't hear the very last.

Q I'm sorry. I'm having a little trouble keeping the mike and my mouth together. Do you know what the lowest annual tonnage that was available for carriage by CSX Transportation was?

A I don't remember the exact number at this time. I did know and I may have it here somewhere.

Q Is it your understanding there were two bids and one was for a smaller amount and one was for a bigger amount?

A Yes, I did.

Q Thank you. At Page 8 of your testimony you make the statement that CSX (sic) did not consider low bidders it actually had in hand, is that correct?

A That TECO?

Q Yes.

A Yes.

Q What were some of the defects in Tampa Electric Company's consideration of the CSX bid?

A In order to put that in just a little context, a successful RFP gets bids. If they don't get bids, it is not successful. And so you want to do everything you can to get as many bids as you can. You can do a very complex RFP process,

and I would say that Tampa's is somewhat, but you have to sell that RFP to the bidders. Particularly if you have been buying from the same supplier since 1950. You have got to entice people to come bid on your business. They don't think you are going to give it to them. So you have to work every step of the way to bring these guys in and bid.

And if you continue to do it over, and over, and over, you may be able to just put a note in one of the coal magazines that says, we are going to buy coal next year or buy transportation next year, and here is how much, and the phone will ring. You don't even have to do any more than that as an RFP. You have to let that competitive market know that you are willing to accept bids, and then when you have a need, you are going to bring them in and listen to them. And so you do all of these things you can to make that one objective occur.

Get them to bid, get them to bid low, and then after they do that, bring them in and see if you can negotiate a better deal either on terms, conditions, or price. And anything short of that is going to be more, just drive that particular business right back into the competition. So the particular points I make are much less important than the effort that it takes to get in there and get the people in to bid, and that takes dialogue and action.

Q I wanted to ask you specifically about Tampa Electric's handling of the bids submitted by CSXT?

1 A Oh, by CSXT.

Q Yes, sir. And I can just start by asking you whether in your opinion Tampa Electric's handling of CSXT's bids submitted to it was prudent?

A No.

Q Would you please explain what that opinion is and then explain that opinion?

A I'm going to incorporate my last statement because it has to do with that, and that is that if you are going to take a bid, you have got to be realistic about it. Get them in and talk to them about it. And in this particular case I believe there was a gift horse involved where they were going to put up some capital, and they never offered that to me. And I would have -- the first thing I would do is when can you start. And so that was a mishandling right there. That would tell me that they don't want any competition.

It would be great to have both rail and water transportation. I had the highest traffic cost on the Gulf. TECO had the lowest. And I couldn't compete with them on cross-Gulf traffic. And so I had rail. And while they were good at that, the rail beat them a lot of times.

Q In your previous answer you mentioned that it would be great to have both rail and barge. What, if anything, would be the benefits of having both rail and barge capability?

A Well, you have got two competitors now. That's the

first thing.

- Q And what benefit does that provide, if I may?
- A Lower cost almost always.
 - Q Thank you.

A Then you also have access to other coal fields. TECO has done a very excellent job of picking the lowest cost coal suppliers close to the transportation system. And when you have rail, you don't send them there.

So if you do a comparison at the end of the day of delivering TECO's coal specifically selected to be a low cost on the river, it is very likely that is not the best mine for delivering rail coal. You find the rail coal mine that already loads coal on the railroad, and usually that is right at the mine instead of having a long truck haul or a long rail haul just to get to the river. They load right at the plant. And they have the capability of meeting all the criteria of railroad demurrage, and off we go. And so those are the mines that you would have a whole set of different mines for the railroad than you would for a coal, and maybe if you are lucky you may have one or two that can do both ways. But all of that is going to lead to more and more competition. So that is my answer.

- Q When you were at EFC and -- well, you actually got the barge system going at EFC, did you not?
 - A Yes. We originally contracted all of it, but we did

build one segment.

Q Thank you. When you were at EFC, what were the approximate percentages of coal that were carried by barge and by rail for Florida Power Corporation?

A It was more or less half and half for a long time, but I think it grew more on the railroad over time.

- Q Thank you. Do you know what the current percentages are?
 - A No, I don't.
- Q Did EFC, as the barge carrier, and CSXT or its predecessor at the railroad co-exist peacefully during that time?
- A Oh, yes. We had a good relationship. We had arguments, and I think you expect that.
- Q Did you have any problems with CSXT as a vendor of transportation services?
 - A Not at all.
- Q I know that you have been present for virtually all of these last two long days, Mr. Wells, and I wanted to ask you did you hear testimony given as to whether Tampa Electric ever actually negotiated with CSX Transportation?
 - A I heard some of that testimony.
- Q And what that was the nature of that testimony, had they negotiated with CSXT or not?
 - A No, they did not.

1	Q Was it prudent for them not to negotiate with CSXT?		
2	A No, it was not.		
3	MR. BEASLEY: Objection, I think that is outside the		
4	scope of Mr. Wells' direct testimony.		
5	CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Mr. Wright, can you point to Mr.		
6	Wells' testimony for the basis of your question?		
7	MR. WRIGHT: I'm asking him yes, he refers to		
[^] 8	their rejection of the handling of the bids. I think he has		
9	testified, and now I'm asking him would it have been		
10	appropriate for them to negotiate in the context of having		
11	received bids.		
12	CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Overruled. Go ahead.		
13	THE WITNESS: Please ask the question again.		
14	BY MR. WRIGHT:		
15	Q My question for you is was it prudent for Tampa		
16	Electric not to negotiate with CSXT having received the bids		
17	that it received?		
18	A No, it was not.		
19	Q Thank you. Mr. Wells, in an effort to hurry some		
20	things along here, before you took the stand, I handed you a		
21	copy of what has been introduced as interrogatory number		
22	Tampa Electric's response to the staff's Interrogatory 93?		
23	A Yes.		
24	Q Did you have a chance to review that?		

A Yes, I glanced through it.

- Q What do you interpret that interrogatory to be saying as to why Tampa Electric didn't do more with the CSX bids?
 - A Frankly it sounds like they were too busy.
- Q Is that a reasonable explanation for not engaging in negotiations?
 - A No, it is not.

- Q This is a question like several that have been posed by Commissioners during the day, particularly today. If you were a utility fuel procurement manager or director and you got an offer like this, what would you do?
 - A I would call them in.
 - Q And then what?
- A We would sit down and we would discuss the terms, conditions, and the ramifications of it, the impact on what I'm already doing. If I didn't have railroad, I would discuss a long time about the timing, because I know that my coal mines are not all strategically located, and I've got contracts and a lot of other problems. You have got to solve a lot of things. So it would not be a don't call us, we'll call you. I would call them in immediately.
- Q You made a reference to timing in your remarks just now and your answer just now. Can you explain what you were referring to there, please?
- A Well, we know that in this case Tampa or the railroad jointly someway would build a facility. They couldn't take the

coal immediately. And so that would be part of the timing.

And it could be that their coal arrangements, and I'm not an expert on this, but they may have everything tied up for the next year already. I understand, and I heard just awhile ago that the contracts are all signed with TECO Transport and that may make that moot now, but that certainly wouldn't have been at the time, I don't think. I think there was time to work something out that would work beneficially to both companies.

Q Well, if it were you, and assuming that there were some constraints due to existing contracts, would you talk to the railroad company about some appropriate starting time in the future?

A Oh, yes.

Q In previous answers you referred to the benefits from intermodal, i.e., rail versus barge competition. Is that competition more effective when you have both facilities in place?

A Oh, yes.

MR. BEASLEY: Mr. Chairman, I would like to object. There weren't any previous questions. Mr. Wright is the only questioner, and Mr. Wells' testimony regarding the railroad is Lines 1 through 18 on Page 9 of his testimony, and that is pretty much it. And we have spent probably four or five times that much in Mr. Wright's questioning of the witness.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Show me the numbers again. Mr

Wright, how much more do you have on this line?

MR. WRIGHT: On this line very, very little. I do have a couple more questions about Mr. Wells' exhibits.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Pick the two best and move on, please.

MR. WRIGHT: Well, I like the question that I just asked, and then I was going to go to the exhibits.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Answer the question, Mr. Wells.

THE WITNESS: All right. And the question was? A brief of your question.

BY MR. WRIGHT:

2.4

- Q The question was, in a previous answer to my questions relating to the benefits that would be obtainable through intermodal competition, you said it is great to have both rail and barge. I believe those were your words. Is that about right?
 - A That is exactly right.
- Q And my question for you is is it better to have both of them available to deliver coal with facilities on the ground?
 - A Yes.
- Q Thank you. I would like to ask you to look at your Exhibit 10. Excuse me, what is Exhibit 10, which I believe is your Exhibit 3.
 - A What is the --

- Q It is the trade press article from Platt's. I believe it is nonconfidential.
 - A Oh, the trade press. All right.
 - Q Yes, sir.

- A Okay. I have that.
- Q What does this tell you about the quality of Tampa Electric's RFP?
- A This is admitting that the market thinks they are not going to warrant anything. Confirming it I would say.
- Q And I wanted to ask you a couple of questions about barge companies. Are you familiar with major United States barge companies?
 - A Yes, some of them.
- Q Would you expect there to be more than one bid submitted in response to a good RFP by such barge companies?
- A That requires more than one answer. There would be more than one on the cross-Gulf portion, but not a lot. There would be very few, but there would be more than one. And I think I refer to that in my testimony. And on the river portion, there would probably be a lot more, although there are diminished numbers. I understand there are fewer barge lines operating on the river now than when I had the pleasure of doing this. There still are quite a few that are capable of doing at least a part and some that could do the whole thing.

 Now, at the terminal, that probably wouldn't change.

Q I have a question for you about your Exhibit 4, which has been marked for identification as Exhibit 11. I think the name of the company is confidential.

A Yes.

Q But do you view that as confirming the same thing that the trade press article said?

A This is one from -- I won't give the name, but it is probably the largest and certainly the most innovative operator in the Gulf. I don't think anybody can match him for innovation. They made me an offer I sometimes wish I had taken. But that certainly does confirm it.

Q I have one more follow-up question on an earlier answer that you gave to my questioning. You mentioned that there appeared to be a gift horse in the CSX bid where CSX was willing to pay so much money for the installation of facilities. Do you recall that question?

A Yes. I do.

Q And I think your answer to that was to ask them could they start tomorrow or something like that?

A Well, I would ask them when they could start.

Q When they could start. That's what you said. And my question for you is do you have an opinion as to -- you know, obviously they can't start tomorrow, but would you invite them in and talk about what was really going to get built and how much it was going to cost and who was going to pay for what?

A Well, I have had experience building just a facility almost like that, and you do need a better part of a year to do it, and maybe more now because of the environmental restrictions keep getting more and more difficult. But it will take a big period of time. And I don't think it is a whole lot different than the time it would take for TECO to start trying to phase this other option in and get a real competitor in this business. And you wouldn't have to worry about these hearings over whether these rates are right or not. The market is going to determine it as soon as you get some of them in here. And that is my answer to that question.

Q Thank you. I was really trying to ask you on the point of working out the capital expenditures required when in this case the railroad made the offer to pay for it. Would you invite them in and sit down and say, look, guys, how much is it really going to cost, what would you do?

A Absolutely. We would go through all of your bid, everything about it in detail, and we would determine not only when we could start it, but what mines you have, have you got suggestions for us if we start looking for coal on your railroad, because you are the only guy serving us on the rail, you would be the guy with no competition on the railroad. And so we would be looking at you as hard as I'm sure this Commission would like to look at TECO right now.

MR. WRIGHT: Thank you very much, Mr. Wells. Thank

you, Mr. Chairman. 1 2 CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Mr. Twomey, from your absence from the table --3 4 MR. TWOMEY: No questions, sir. 5 CHAIRMAN BAEZ: That was my bet. Staff? 6 MR. KEATING: No questions. 7 CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Mr. Beasley? MR. BEASLEY: Just a few, sir. 8 9 CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. BEASLEY: 10 11 Good evening, Mr. Wells. Q 12 Α Good evening. Mr. Fons, is that it? 13 No, it's Mr. Beasley. Jim Beasley. Q 14 Α Oh, I'm sorry, I know you. Thank you. 15 Mr. Wells, based on your considerable experience, 0 16 would you agree that from the perspective of a waterborne 17 transportation carrier that there are significant risks 18 involved in attempting to line-up and secure backhaul of bulk 19 commodities on a waterborne carrier basis? 20 Very much so. Being the high cost bidder -- carrier 21 I know really how tough that is. 22 Q I'm sorry? 23 Α Yes. 24 Your testimony indicates that you credited earnings on backhaul activity to reduce coal transportation costs when 25

you were the president of Electric Fuel Corporation back in the 1980s, is that correct?

A Yes. And the '70s.

- Q Is it true that the Commission required that because your transportation rates for backhaul or waterborne coal transportation were regulated on a cost-of-service type basis as opposed to a market-related type basis?
- A I wouldn't call what we were doing was a cost of service. There was no cost-of-service type ratemaking on Electric Fuels.
- Q It was cost-based charges to Florida Power
 Corporation, wasn't it? Wasn't what they were allowed to
 recover based on what your costs were?
 - A That's correct.
- Q Okay. And when you were asked that, you said in your testimony, yes, that is the case. The Commission had not moved to a market proxy form of regulation. Is that correct?
 - A That is correct.
- Q Why in your view did the Commission not require that backhaul earnings to be credited after it moved to a market-based form of regulation?
- A They did. They did require that I credit a portion of the backhaul revenue to reduce Florida Power's cost.
- Q That was when it was cost-based cost recovery, is that correct?

A	Ye	s.	
	A	A Ye	A Yes.

- Q But were you there at Electric Fuels Corporation when the Commission moved to a market proxy form of regulation?
 - A No.
- Q Okay. So you don't know then whether that continued after that point?
- A Well, I wasn't around when they went to the market proxy.
- Q You didn't perform a detailed side-by-side analysis of the rates in the CSXT bid versus the rates that have been incorporated in the new contract between Tampa Electric and TECO Transport, did you?
 - A Yes, I have, but it was not part of my testimony.
 - Q What did you compare in that detailed analysis?
- A Well, I wasn't totally complete with it, but I compared the coal at the mine, cost to the river in its current contract, which I understand is included in the cost of coal in some cases, and I was able to find how much that was in certain cases and who the carrier was in certain cases.
- Q You didn't review Tampa Electric's current contract with TECO Transport, did you?
 - A The contract itself?
- O Yes.
- A I believe I read it, but I didn't make a thorough look at the contract itself, no.

1	Q Did you	analyze the capital costs specific to Big
2	Bend Station that	would be required in order to put in rail
3	facilities?	
4	A No, sir	
5	MR. BEA	SLEY: That's all I have. Thank you, sir.
6	CHAIRMA	N BAEZ: Redirect?
7	MR. VAN	DIVER: No redirect.
8	CHAIRMA:	N BAEZ: Commissioners, did you have any
9	questions?	
10	Commiss	ioner Deason, did you have questions?
11	Exhibit	s.
12	MR. VAN	DIVER: Yes, sir. I would move for admission
13	of Exhibits 8 through 12.	
14	CHAIRMA	N BAEZ: Without objection, show Exhibits 8
15	through 12 admitted.	
16	(Exhibi	ts 8 through 12 previously admitted into the
17	record.)	
18	CHAIRMA	N BAEZ: And I think that does it for the
19	exhibits, right?	I'm not holding any for anyone else. All
20	right. Mr. Wells, thank you.	
21	THE WIT	NESS: Thank you.
22	CHAIRMA	N BAEZ: I appreciate you holding out.
23	THE WIT	NESS: I'm sorry?
24	CHAIRMA	N BAEZ: We appreciate you waiting so
25	patiently for us	

1 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: All right. That is our last witness today. Is there anything we need to discuss before we recess?

MR. BEASLEY: Did you mention a start time for the next session?

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: 9:30, June 10th. And, Mr. Keating, what I need you to do is figure out what the impact -- we may need to slide some briefing dates, obviously.

MR. KEATING: We definitely will, and that is something that I have on my list is we will look back at the calendar. I have got some preliminary dates, but I don't think we need to go through them now. I have a couple of other housekeeping tips I think are important. One, there are a lot of red folders sitting around here.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: There are a lot of red folders.

MR. KEATING: Everybody needs to gather their confidential documents they handed out, and I need to gather the staff documents that were handed out.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Very well.

MR. KEATING: Two, I would just like some clarification, if I could get it, that over the next 10 to 12 days we are not going to be extending any opportunity for discovery in this case.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Oh, boy. If we weren't shut down before, ladies and gentlemen, we are shut down now, okay. So

whatever we have got, whatever we have to deal with that is still floating around we will deal with, but there will be no new requests for discovery or anything else. I think that's it. Have a safe weekend, everyone. And safe trips home, those of you that are traveling. (The hearing adjourned at 6:15 p.m.)

1	STATE OF FLORIDA)		
2	: CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER		
3	COUNTY OF LEON)		
4			
5	I, JANE FAUROT, RPR, Chief, Office of Hearing Reporter Services, FPSC Division of Commission Clerk and Administrative Services, do hereby certify that the foregoin proceeding was heard at the time and place herein stated.		
6			
7	IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that I stenographically reported the said proceedings; that the same has been transcribed under my direct supervision; and that this transcript constitutes a true transcription of my notes of sa proceedings.		
8 ^			
9			
10	I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee,		
11	attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor am I a relativ or employee of any of the parties' attorney or counsel connected with the action, nor am I financially interested in the action.		
12			
13	DATED THIS 2nd day of June, 2004.		
14			
15	JANE FAUROT, RPR		
16	Chief, Office of Hearing Reporter Services FPSC Division of Commission Clerk and		
17	Administrative Services		
18	(850) 413-6732		
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