BEFORE THE 1 FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 2 DOCKET NO. 060508-EI 3 In the Matter of 4 PROPOSED ADOPTION OF NEW RULE REGARDING NUCLEAR POWER PLANT COST 5 RECOVERY. 6 7 8 9 10 ELECTRONIC VERSIONS OF THIS TRANSCRIPT ARE 11 A CONVENIENCE COPY ONLY AND ARE NOT THE OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF THE HEARING, 12 THE .PDF VERSION INCLUDES PREFILED TESTIMONY. 13 14 AGENDA CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS: 15 ITEM NO. 5 16 CHAIRMAN LISA POLAK EDGAR BEFORE: 17 COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON COMMISSIONER ISILIO ARRIAGA 18 COMMISSIONER MATTHEW M. CARTER, II COMMISSIONER KATRINA J. TEW 19 20 Tuesday, December 19, 2006 DATE: 21 Betty Easley Conference Center PLACE: Room 148 22 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 23 JANE FAUROT, RPR REPORTED BY: 24 Official Commission Reporter

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1	APPEARANCES:
2	WADE LITCHFIELD, representing Florida Power & Light
3	Company.
4	ALEXANDER GLENN, representing Progress Energy
5	Florida, Inc.
6	MICHAEL J. TWOMEY, representing AARP.
7	JOHN McWHIRTER, Florida Industrial Power Users Group.
8	HAROLD MCLEAN, ESQUIRE, Office of Public Counsel,
9	representing the Citizens of the State of Florida.
LO	MICHAEL COOKE, General Counsel, LARRY HARRIS, ESQUIRE
L1	and Tim Devlin, representing the Commission Staff.
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PROCEEDINGS

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Item 5. Mr. Harris.

MR. HARRIS: Good afternoon -- I guess it's almost afternoon. Larry Harris on behalf of the Commission.

This is staff's recommendation to propose new Rule 25-6.0423, nuclear power plant cost recovery. Commissioners, we're going to be handing out a type-and-strike version of the rule that's been filed with our recommendation, and the recommendation starts on Page 11. We would request that you all basically throw away the rule that's attached in your file package and substitute this type and strike version as staff's recommendation of the rule you should propose.

Staff is here and prepared to answer any questions you have. This is a rule proposal open to public participation. I believe there are a number of parties here who wish to -- or persons here who wish to address the Commission.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Okay. Thank you. We'll go ahead and make sure everybody has the proper or most recent version in front of them that we will be beginning our discussions from.

MR. GLENN: I can begin if you'd like, Madam Chairman.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Glenn.

MR. GLENN: Alex Glenn on behalf of Progress Energy

Florida.

We appreciate the significant effort that staff has put into in developing the proposed rule. While we agree with most of the proposal, the rule as written falls short, we believe, in carrying out the Governor's and the Legislature's express intent to promote investment in new nuclear power plants. Most significantly, the rule should be revised to require an annual prudence determination by the Commission and that all costs approved as prudent by the Commission in each annual review would not be subject to later challenge. I'm going to provide copies to you of what has previously been provided to OPC and the staff, and which actually, I believe, is a red line of the red line you just received.

There are a couple of key points, I think, that we have an issue with. One is the annual prudence review. The second is language that is in the rule that would require a specifically administrative finality.

Now, our proposed changes that you are receiving now are consistent with Congress's intent under the Energy Policy Act of 2005. It's consistent with the Governor and the Legislative's intent and the express language of the statute which sought to encourage the construction of new nuclear plants through innovative and creative regulation. The legislation specifically said that the rule shall be designed to promote utility investment in nuclear power plants and allow

recovery in rates of all prudently incurred costs and shall include but not be limited to a specific subset of items. And our proposal, we believe, is sound public policy.

The Commission and all parties are in a better position to determine the prudence of a utility's actions closer in time to when the costs are actually incurred, rather than go back later in time and reconstruct facts and evidence when people, witnesses may have left, memories have faded, documents are gone. Here we could be spending potentially up to a half a billion dollars, if not more, a year in certain years on the construction of this project. Customers will benefit by more closer and more frequent review of costs in which the utility has the burden to prove that all of its costs are prudent. Utilities benefit by gaining greater certainty of which costs are allowed and those that are not on a realtime basis.

The bottom line is that the rule, as written, does not do enough, in our opinion, to encourage the development of new nuclear plants and their attendant fuel diversity and reliability benefits to customers. If the company receives its preconstruction carrying costs and preconstruction costs only to retain the significant risk that the Commission could require the refund of that money years later, that's a risk that we cannot take. It would be difficult to justify to our board of directors that a utility should take a five, six,

seven-billion-dollar risk to build a nuclear power plant and associated transmission facilities and potentially subject the company with catastrophic losses later in the process. Our proposal implements the Legislature's express intent which we believe will benefit all customers in Florida.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Glenn, that was more brief than I was expecting.

Mr. Litchfield, do you have comments at this time?

MR. LITCHFIELD: Thank you, Madam Chairman. I will try to be as brief.

By way of background, I'd like to make a couple of points. Nuclear generation has provided our customers over the years with a very reliable cost-effective source of base load generation. We do believe that nuclear generation should continue to play an important role in meeting growing customer demands as part of a diverse utility generating portfolio.

However, as Mr. Glenn has indicated, and I think as all of the parties at this table have indicated in their prefiled comments, we all recognize that constructing new nuclear generation presents a host of very difficult issues for any utility, not the least of which is the overwhelming challenge that the utility faces in having to fund billions of dollars in costs on a single project that will face obstacles and hurdles every step of the way.

We know that the experiences of the last round of nuclear construction were pretty severe. They are still very fresh in the minds of investors and not terribly encouraging to any company that is considering pursuing nuclear generation.

As a result of some very protracted and highly contentious proceedings, both administrative and judicial, many companies were forced to accept significant disallowances or significant delays in the recovery of their costs. Today, of course, these very same plants are among the most reliable and cost-effective sources of generation on a utility system, but the path to get there was extremely rocky and came at a high cost to shareholders. We think this is a very important background for the discussion that we are having today with respect to the rule.

As Mr. Glenn indicated, the Florida Legislature has acted to attempt to break through some of these residual disincentives from past experience, as has Congress attempted to do so. The rulemaking that you are considering today is an important part of that process as well. Time will tell whether these efforts to remove disincentives have been sufficient to encourage nuclear generation in the state, but what we are about to do today, I think, is an important step in that regard.

We think that the staff has done some very positive things in this regard in their recommended rule. We have had

several discussions with staff, with Public Counsel, and others relative to some of these points, but there remain, I would say, three very key issues in our mind where we don't feel that the rule goes quite far enough.

One is to remove the language that addresses administrative finality, and you'll see that in your rule on Page 17, Line 12. We think the introduction of that term, which to our knowledge does not appear in any other rule of which we are aware, adds a level of confusion as to whether and if so when, the company would ever have finality with respect to costs that it had brought before this Commission, which we have recommended, and I think at one time Public Counsel had recommended be brought to you on an annual basis for you to review both projections and actuals on an annual cycle basis in order to determine the reasonableness and the prudence of those costs for purposes of cost-recovery, and we believe consistent with the legislative intent to provide the company with some degree of assurance that it is pursuing the proper path.

The costs that it is incurring are reasonable and prudent and then it can then engage in the next year of construction activity incurring yet again significant costs over that cycle with some degree of confidence and surety that this Commission recognizes that those costs are reasonable and prudently incurred. So we would advocate removing that clause from the rule.

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As Mr. Glenn indicated, we would advocate that the prudence review be one time and one time only, and that it be done on an annual basis. We think that the period of time within which it can be conducted is more than ample. We conduct need determinations in 135 days. We conduct full base rate cases in eight months. And this is a large item, but a single item nonetheless of rate base of a company, and you would have costs before you. I think two or three different times you would have the proposed costs, you would have auditing rights throughout that process, and we really see no reason why this could not be done on an annual basis and provide some definitive conclusion and finality with respect to those costs.

The other item that I will mention is with respect to site selection costs. What the rule does is that it draws a distinction between pre-site selection costs and pre-construction costs, and it does so on the basis of a definition in the legislation with respect to construction period. Now, the legislation doesn't define site selection costs. It doesn't define pre-construction costs, but it does define a pre-construction period.

And then with respect to pre-construction costs, the legislation is very clear in allowing clause recovery, cash clause recovery of those costs on an annual cycle. And we would urge this Commission to treat pre-site selection costs no

differently. We don't think that the legislation precludes that result. In fact, we think the legislation clearly endorses creative and innovative and alternative forms of cost-recovery.

Keep in mind that these are the very first costs that the company will incur, the very first bucket of costs. We think that, therefore, they should merit treatment as least as favorable as the second bucket of costs that the company will incur, i.e., the pre-construction costs.

One last point that I would raise, and this is more by way of clarification. In our discussions with staff, we had talked about the concept of litigation costs. Now, with all of the uncertainty that we would face in undertaking a project like this, there is one certainty and that is there will be litigation costs. And they likely will be very significant. And we would propose, and we would ask for clarification that these costs would be treated no differently than any other project costs even if they are not specifically itemized in the rule.

And the source of our concern is in staff's recommendation that refers to these costs as being treated upon the request of the utility. I think the term used is on a case-by-case basis, which gave us some pause that somehow they were going to be treated differently than other project costs. So that's one clarification as opposed to a proposed rule

modification that we would suggest, and you won't see that, obviously, in our proposed mark-up.

And with that, Commissioners, I would conclude my comments. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. McLean.

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MR. McLEAN: Good morning, Madam Chairman, Commissioners.

Background-wise it was once the case, in fact, before this statute a utility who chose to undertake capital projects of this magnitude could look to accumulate AFUDC over the term of the construction period and eventually that AFUDC would be capitalized. They would be permitted to earn a return of and a return on that AFUDC along with their actual investment in the plant. And in the case of nuclear plants, I understand that that could be deferred as much as ten years.

The Legislature made what I think was an enlightened judgment to suggest that we should do better than that, and that customers should actually advance some value to the companies to persuade them to engage in nuclear generation, which we all feel over the long haul is advantageous because of the lesser cost of fuel, the initial large investment notwithstanding.

So I am prepared to say that the legislation and the staff's version of the rule, which construe and flesh out that legislation, does an excellent job at eliminating many, if not

most, of the risks that the utility faces in this spectacularly large investment which they are going to undertake. The staff version of the rule does not hold them harmless. And I believe that the version -- the criticism of the rule that you have heard from Florida Power and Light and Florida Progress goes a long ways toward holding them harmless in contrast to what the staff version of the rule does.

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However, lest you think that we are miles apart, speaking only for the Office of Public Counsel, we are not, really. We have been negotiating for about two weeks, and I kind of think if we had two or three more days to work out our differences, we probably would have got there.

Let me tell you three concerns that we have and three differences that we have with the staff recommendation. The first is not really a difference. I initially, and on behalf of the office initially opposed the annual prudence review. I have come to revisit that. I think it's probably a good idea for you to take an annual look at this program, a pervasive look, and enter a judgment as to whether you believe the investment undertaken to that point is prudent or not prudent and make whatever adjustments you think necessary.

I don't particularly want to emphasize the annual aspect of that; however, it should certainly be more than once, like over a ten-year period, but I understand that staff has workload issues regarding the period and I do, too. I tell you

frankly if you ultimately adopt this rule, I will probably go to the legislature on behalf of my own office and ask for more resources to deal with this. Because as fellow counsel pointed out -- he didn't point out quite this way, but I will -- there is going to be a bunch of money come through this rule. A lot. Maybe more so than you have ever seen before. In the few sentences that set up this annual prudence review, you are likely to see six, maybe eight, perhaps ten billion dollars pass under the bridge. There is nothing wrong with that so long as it is given a thorough review by the Commission.

So back to the point of annual. We're not particularly wed to annual. I'm happy to work with staff to determine, and with the companies to determine what an appropriate period would be. Annual works well, you can keep up with it, but if it were every two years, no offense coming from this corner.

There are phrases which set up this annual prudence review. As I say, many billions of dollars will pass through that, but there is no analog for the notion of minimum filing requirements. Now, when I mentioned that to Progress initially, there were weak knees in the crowd because what they thought I was talking about was MFRs to initiate a rate case. That's not at all what I'm talking about. There ought to be enumerated criteria in this rule that tell the utility what to file, what kinds of things to file, just like you do in a rate

case. And it should be the case that having satisfied those modified minimum filing requirements, for want of a better term, that you could, without the participation of an intervenor, be in a position to enter your final order regarding the prudence of the investments, confident that you have competent and substantial evidence in the record. You need something more than a bare allegation of entitlement. You need details much as you require in a rate filing, because there are many billions of dollars that are going to come through here.

What we don't want to do is get into a situation where, in the very short time period we have to deal with this, we don't want a bare allegation such that we have to go discover what their case is, and then once we discover it, criticize that case. All I'm saying is that you should by means of this rule tell them what you want to hear about so that you can determine an intelligent -- you can make an intelligent determination as to whether that investment is prudent or imprudent or needs adjustments -- adjustment, as the case may be.

Now, once you enter those annual judgments, a dispute, mild dispute I might add, has arisen between my office and the companies, and staff is a party to it, about what is the finality of that decision you make. That brings to my mind what is the finality of any decision you make. And I believe

that the state of the law speaks for itself. And the notion of administrative finality arises from statutory law and from constitutional law. There are exceptions to administrative finality. They are extremely narrow. We don't run across them that much. I can hardly think of any electric or telephone case over the years where we have directly addressed administrative finality. It has been addressed a time or two in water and wastewater. But the fact is the words that staff includes, which we strongly support, in its recommendation is that these decisions that you make on a yearly or maybe every two years, whatever the period is, the decisions that you enter regarding the prudence of the expenditures will be final to the extent that administrative finality permits.

And I think my phraseology is not good, but it refers the reader, the practitioner, the affected party to the existing body of administrative case law that deals with administrative finality. I don't believe that any tighter standard is prudent on your part, and I don't think that any tighter standard is probably legal on your part, because I believe administrative finality, as I say, has both statutory and constitutional stature.

And a concern sometimes articulated by Commissioner

Arriaga is you must be careful not to bind future

Commissioners, Commissions, in a way that you shouldn't. It is

true that the statute and the rule are both designed to lessen

the risk that utilities face. I have some doubt as to whether the extent, the body of case law that deals with administratively finality now creates a very large gate through anyone might pass to revisit your existing decisions regarding the prudence. And I doubt, too, whether it is even legal for you to attempt to do that.

The reason we have consistently insisted on the words administrative finality is because that term precisely adopts existing case law as it is written in the state of Florida. We can all look to the cases and determine what surety that gives. Mr. Litchfield said that they are looking for some degree of confidence in the quality of your decisions. Our response in support of the Commission rule as it is written is that administrative finality gives a very, very high degree of confidence. And that if you purport to absolutely foreclose for yourselves and all future Commissioners a revisiting of any of those reasons, for any of those reasons you might well have acted unwisely and perhaps illegally.

My recommendation to you is we are close enough together on this rule, I think that our differences are reconcilable. We may be able to find a better phrase than administrative finality, although I doubt it since it happens to be a phrase I came up with, but there could be. There is room for compromise.

On the enumeration of what they should file, I think

we can work that out. My recommendation to you would be to propose staff's rule, particularly since I understand you have a deadline, propose it and I think therein are, in a practical sense, something like 30 more days before one's opportunity, and affected parties opportunity to draw it out and request a hearing is something like 30 days hence.

I firmly believe that we can work together as we have for the past few days and work out these differences, the holidays notwithstanding I think we can still do it. As a matter of fact, I think if we had had another day or two, we probably could have done it this time. But I appreciate you giving me the opportunity to address the Commission, and thank you.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you, Mr. McLean.

Mr. Twomey.

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MR. TWOMEY: Madam Chair, Commissioners, good afternoon. Mike Twomey for AARP.

AARP did not take a position on the legislation, but the legislation, in fact, passed. You have the statute. You have the necessity for this rule. We would support everything that Mr. McLean said with respect to the filing requirements to give some specificity to the companies, to the intervenors, ditto with the concept of administrative finality. And lastly, and very quickly, I want to echo Mr. McLean's notion that a whole bunch of money is going to be coming before the

Commission for examination and review to determine its prudence. And in that regard, I would suggest to you that the time constraints that are placed upon yourselves, your staff and the customer intervenors in this draft rule are unnecessarily restrictive. It requires that the companies file by May 1st of each year. That will have given the companies effectively on an annual review process up to 12 months to prepare their case. The rule goes on and requires that the Commission hold a hearing by August 15th, the following August 15th. That is three and a half months, Commissioners. Three and a half months from the date of filing of the application or the petition to holding the hearing, which, of course, as you know, doesn't count for the time you have to subtract for the prefiling of testimony, prehearing statements, prehearing conferences and the like.

We don't know how much you are going to get each year to be examined. You may have more than -- you have two companies sitting here, you may have more than one application at a time. It may be a hundred million, it may be 200 million, it may be \$300 million a year. These plants, as stated earlier by the company attorneys, are going to be very expensive. You should allow yourself -- as it is right now under the statutory clause for rate cases, which in many cases are less than those amounts, you allow -- you are allowed, and the staff is allowed and the customer intervenors are allowed upwards of eight to

nine months. The companies, I don't believe, can make any suggestion that they will be harmed by the Commission and the staff and the customer intervenors having that much time to review. What you have to do -- that is to the contrary, they may openly suggest that there being insufficient time for their customers and the staff and the Commission can only benefit them. They can't be harmed by having enough time. So I would urge you to not accept this three and a half months. You should not hamstring yourself knowingly and willingly. You should increase the time length to at least six months, and I would urge a greater month time period in terms of eight or nine months.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. McWhirter.

MR. McWHIRTER: Madam Chairman and Commissioners, I represent a group of industrial consumers, and I would like to at the first say that my group strongly endorses the idea of fuel diversity. We strongly encourage the utilities to move forward with their plans with respect to nuclear plants, because we think that's in the public interest and to go forward as fast as possible, and we will support such items as are prudent to pass along the cost of these investments without creating a feather bed operation.

The rule is good in theory, but you are passing a theory without knowledge of the real facts. All we know, as

Mr. McLean says, it's going to be a bunch of money. Currently, as I reported to you in November, we found that items that go through the cost-recovery clause now constitute more than 70 percent of the total revenue collected by the utilities.

Now, these are revenues that are collected without review of whether or not the utility has a proper rate of return on its equity, without a review of the depreciation that has occurred with respect to the facilities that are in the ground, and other aspects.

I think in spite of the fact that the Commission is concerned about base rate cases and the arduousness of them, it is beneficial to occasionally have a base rate case. And if you go forward with cost-recovery items without a base rate case, what happens is you lock in a depreciation rate on existing facilities that never gets looked at again until you have your annual depreciation studies or your quadrennial depreciation studies, and that could be a serious item. You don't look at the appropriate return on equity unless you have a base rate case. Most importantly, you don't fully recognize the growth in utility sales, although they project what the sales may be in the annual fuel clauses.

And one of the concerns that we would have with this rule is the possibility for double recovery of things that might be included in the nuclear plant costs that are already covered in the base rates that customers are charged. We saw

this happen in the storm cases where linemen whose salaries were paid for their normal operating activities were put into the storm charge. There needs to be examination to ensure that those kinds of things happen.

And so being aware of those potential problems, I have to strongly recommend what Mr. Twomey has said and what Mr. McLean has said, that you need to have time for study, you need to have intelligent study and you need to have flexibility. You don't want to adopt a rule that's chiseled into stone long-range, important policies that don't have the facts at the time that the rule is adopted. So I would encourage you to treat this rule as a working document.

I would further encourage you to give us a little more time to negotiate the details to let the concerns of consumers as well as the concerns of the utilities who are planning to go forward with nuclear plants to participate and discuss the matters openly. Secrecy is going to be a big issue in these cases. It's not addressed in this rule at all, but my guess is that when you are dealing with a nuclear plant and the concerns about security, a lot of the information that's going to come out is going to be confidential. So we need to be sure that the confidential information is clearly open to study by qualified experts.

I won't prolong the general discussion that I have given you, but only to say I would suggest to you that this

rule has got to have flexibility to be reevaluated from time to time as the facts come out. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Glenn.

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MR. GLENN: Madam Chairman, if I could respond briefly to a couple of things that a couple of the other parties have said.

Number one is the OPC statement about holding the utilities harmless. Nothing could be further from the truth. There is one thing that I think everybody here is in violent agreement on, and we want transparency, openness and review. And we are willing -- we are an open book as we are in the fuel clause docket, the ECRC, and our base rate proceeding. Everything that we do the staff has, and OPC and intervenors have access to. We want that to continue.

This is not a hold harmless agreement, anything but. We have the burden to prove prudence. That rests on us, and we will be proving it every single year. The only certainty that we get in this process is if we manage that project appropriately and prudently. That is number one.

Number two, about Mr. Twomey's comments on timing.

One thing, and we have had some good discussions with staff on this, is that it is not a three-month process here. First of all, we initially offered to do it through the fuel clause in the same time frame, which gives you an additional three months. That was rejected by OPC and others who wanted a

separate review and earlier on, so that you could then set the factors for the fuel case in September. So we have, at the request of intervenors, done that.

The second thing is this is an open book all year.

It is like a tax audit of the PSC. The PSC has staff at our corporate headquarters all year reviewing documents. This is the same thing. We discussed that with staff here, and I agree with Mr. McLean that I think we need some more meat on the bones of what actually is going into a petition. I think that is a good thing. I don't think it is appropriate for this rulemaking, but we can have audits that occur and that will be ongoing throughout this process, so that everybody is going to see on a realtime basis what contracts are we executing, how are we managing those contracts, what work order changes have been done. We want transparency.

As to Mr. McLean's argument, I don't believe that we need that in the rule, per se. I think we need to sit down with the parties all involved and say what is that MFR suggestion. But that can be done outside of the rulemaking process. Because I do agree with Mr. Twomey, we need some flexibility because we are going to have lessons learned from year one to year two to year three on what actually needs to be done.

Those are the key points. I don't have anything else.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you.

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Commissioners, before I open it up for questions, let's look to our staff. Mr. Harris, Mr. Devlin, Mr. Cooke, Doctor Bane, are you in a position that you can speak to some of the points that have been questioned and also maybe some of the red line suggested language that was passed out?

MR. DEVLIN: Madam Chair, I think if it is okay with the Chair, we will do a little tag team on this.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: That's fine.

MR. DEVLIN: The issue or one of the issues I think that seems to be most important to the parties is the prudency review, so let's speak to that first. And, we understand, although this is an issue that sort of was brought to our attention sort of late in the process, but we understand the need and agree with the annual prudency review. And we understand it would reduce uncertainty for the company; and, therefore, reduce financial risks for the companies.

At the same time we think it is real important to balance that against the need to ensure only prudent costs are being asked to be recovered by ratepayers. So there is -- the time line proposed by the company, we feel, is unreasonable, and I'll give you three reasons for that.

First of all, and I think it was articulated somewhat by Mr. Twomey and Mr. McLean, that we would have a very short time frame to get an audit review done in time for a hearing in

August. If you look at our August 15th hearing date and back out with the testimonial deadlines and rebuttal testimony deadlines, et cetera, that would leave an audit report due date around May. And, remember, the filing as we have articulated in the rule for construction costs would be April, and it is unreasonable.

And it is true, Mr. Glenn is right, there is a lot of preliminary work that can be done during the year, but that's preliminary work. You really need to have the construction costs, actual or finished, for the year before you can really finish your audit work. That's number one.

Number two, this isn't like a normal audit, and

Ms. Vandiver is back here, and she can back me up on this, I

think. Normally when we audit, we verify that what they spent
is what they spent, and they booked it properly, et cetera. We

are talking about prudency review, and I think that's a step up

from the normal verification accounting type of auditing that

we do.

Somebody asked me, could you define what prudency means, and that is difficult, but I would say it goes beyond just verification. It means that you ensure that the costs are being expended in the most efficient and prudent way, the most efficient way for the benefit of the ratepayer. That's an extra burden, if you will, a responsibility in the audit; and, therefore, it takes more time and resources.

The third point is we will be dealing with it on an annual basis, and, again, we agree that there is great benefit in doing this, but we will be dealing with big dollars, and we'll be dealing with mainly contract or project type costs. In many instances they won't be complete, and that just adds to the complexity. An example that we kicked around that we would see is the site clearing contract. There may be a site clearing contract that we review after the site is chosen. And it may be that in reviewing the actual costs that the site clearing may only be half done, and it just would be difficult, not impossible, but more difficult to evaluate the prudency of contracts that are half executed.

Anyway, with those points in mind, again, we attempted to craft an annual prudency review process that appears to be unacceptable to the companies. I think as the parties mentioned, there is a lot of room for negotiation here. I don't think we are very far apart. I think we can maybe move up the deadline for filing. Right now it's April 1st. We know that the companies close their books in January. Maybe they would be amenable to an earlier filing. And at the same time, at the back end maybe we could have a hearing later than August 15th on the prudency. I think the other issues we can handle in that time frame, but we are talking about, I think, around \$500 million or so a year in construction costs per company. And I think we just need to give adequate time and

effort to ensure that only prudent costs are recovered by customers.

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MR. HARRIS: And building on than point, the annual prudence review is something that is very unusual, you know, as Mr. McLean mentioned. Generally a company books it. At the end of the project they come in and say, here is what we did, and it's prudent, and we want to put it in base rates. This annual prudence review is something that the Commission hasn't done before. And we see that as a very strong incentive to the companies removing disincentives to nuclear plants. But with that, given the fact that it's going to be annual and could be spread out, we do see some merit to the administrative finality concept being on the end.

And I'll give you the example that Mr. Devlin used with site selection. You have an ongoing process. Let's say it takes three years. You have year one, year two, and year three. In any one year the company might come in and demonstrate that it is prudent in that year and do that for three years. But at the end of the project there might be something, you know, that fell through the cracks, for lack of a better word, that ends up to be not prudent. If each year they had a signed off nonreviewable final prudency determination, there would be no way to fix that.

Now, we're not saying that that language necessarily has to be in the rule. I think that the law is what it is, and

you all might have the chance to go back and open it up. But it at least removes the argument that someone could make that you all thought about this, that you knew about the concept of administrative finality, and by leaving it out of the rule this Commission made a decision that that concept would not apply to these types of costs. So for that reason, we are sort of comfortable leaving that concept in, at least at this point.

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Another point that the companies made, moving on, was this idea with the site selection costs being treated differently. We are not opposed to substituting the word "separate" proceeding for "limited" proceeding, that doesn't bother us. What does concern us is that they would try to lock us into -- automatically through the clause. Staff sees part of this rule as giving future Commissions as much flexibility as possible. We prefer our language, which is the method of recovery. We believe that means you all could do it through a clause, but there might be some other method, a surcharge, a base rate, something like that that makes more sense for those particular costs. And we would like you to have the opportunity, the flexibility to consider those options. We are worried that if we lock you in through the rule to only clause recovery for site selection costs, we have taken away a little bit of flexibility from you all, and that is not something we want to recommend that you do.

You heard Mr. Devlin mention that we might have some

room to negotiate on the time, and I think that we do. All of the parties indicated that with a little bit more time we could probably get together, and I believe that to be true. As I see this process, we are recommending that you propose a rule today. We haven't published a notice of that rule proposal in the Florida Administrative Weekly. That will take -- if our Clerk's Office could get it done today, it would be published a week from Friday. That's ten days from now. Then there is the statutory period of 21 days for parties to look at that notice of proposal, any person who gets the FAW to look at that and either file written comments or request a hearing. That's another 21 days. So realistically it's about 31 days from now before we could actually get a rule adopted.

That's time for us to sit down with the companies, sit down with the intervenors, sit down with the customer representatives and try to figure out if there is a way we can come together and come up with a consensus that we could recommend to you all that you adopt. And one way I would see this perhaps happening is the written comments during that 21-day period could be a joint written comment. We all have sat down, we have agreed to this, we would suggest you adopt the rule with the following changes.

By my quick calculations it looks like the 21-day period, if we could get the FAW notice done today and out, would be sometime around January 19th. We have an agenda

January 23rd. It's possible if all the parties are able to sit down in the near future and work this out that as quickly as January 23rd we could have a recommendation to you all to adopt with certain changes that everybody agrees to. I'm not committing to that, but I'm saying that's one way I see that this process could unfold.

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CHAIRMAN EDGAR: To our staff, do you have other comments on the red line, red marked, red lettering, whatever, that was distributed by Mr. Glenn and Mr. Litchfield?

MR. HARRIS: Yes. There are some other red lines in here that have not been addressed by the parties. We could address those if you all are inclined to hear our rationale for not taking them up. We have seen there are changes on Page 13, on Page 14. I don't think that they are big points. And if we are going to sit down and negotiate, these are things that we can talk about and see if we can come to some resolution that everyone agrees whether those particular words should be included or stricken.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you.

MR. HARRIS: We would advise that you not make those changes today and propose the rule as staff has handed it out.

MR. LITCHFIELD: Madam Chairman, may I address those particular strike-throughs on our part briefly?

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Sure.

MR. LITCHFIELD: I think they really underscore the

heart of our concern that if that language remains, the clause in that proceeding, effectively we get no comfort other than they won't be reviewed subject even to administrative finality in that proceeding, but they can be reviewed in any other proceeding.

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MR. COOKE: Commissioners, can I just touch base on the administrative finality question for a second? In this point in particular, the intent of that phrase was to make sure since we were going to have the intent of the phrase in that proceeding in those places, was to make sure that if we do have a hearing in August on the carrying costs and the pre-construction costs, that when those numbers get folded in later in the year into the clause recovery, that they not be revisited at that time.

I think that's separate and apart from the issue of administrative finality, which I can address briefly because it is a complicated or a very complex issue, and it's hard to articulate. But in my mind, the whole concept is that at some point administrative agencies' decisions are final. However, courts have recognized over time that because of the ongoing oversight and the need to protect the public interest, there are certain exceptions to that.

And some of the exceptions that courts have articulated are if there has been intentional misrepresentation, something along the lines of fraud, or they

have even used phrases such as if there are significant changed circumstances that necessitate protection of the public interest, an agency can have some chance to go back and look at a prior decision it has made.

This concept of administrative finality is a judicially created one. I think we were comfortable having the language in the statute because we think it's there, and we think it is restating what the case law says. And I think this may be a first time for us in terms of writing a rule that says we are going to do prudence review, and at the end of that review we won't revisit it. And that raised some concerns about whether we were somehow perhaps going to be perceived as waiving the concept of administratively finality.

I'm not so sure that it's necessary to include the term administrative finality in the rule because it's a judicial concept. And I think Mr. McLean was even alluding to this, I'm not so sure we could waive that. We may not be able to. It's there. It's not something we created. So I'm sort of on the fence with regard to that phrase. It was preferable to have it in there because we believe it is a concept that applies to administrative decision-making. But I also think that if we do have a little more chance to discuss it with the parties, we may be able to resolve that issue.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you.

Mr. Glenn, in your opening comments I believe you

said that the rule does not go far enough to encourage investment in nuclear generation in this state. Can you show me where in the statute you think -- what in the statute do you think this rule does not do that the statute directs?

MR. GLENN: Well, I think the statute is explicit in that what the Commission should be doing in its rulemaking is promoting the development of nuclear power plants by --

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: So you don't think this rule does that?

MR. GLENN: I don't think it does as written. With the uncertainties that exist with this administrative finality issue, with a review that may be reopened at some later date, that is a disincentive for utilities to invest that kind of significant capital dollars only with a very real possibility of somebody much later in the game coming back and challenging the prudence of those costs. So that's the disincentive that I am referring to. With respect to administrative --

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Is that the same thing as this rule does not promote renewable generation in the state?

MR. GLENN: I'm not sure what this rule does. It provides some incentives as it is currently written, and those incentives are --

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Well, I thought what the rule did is provide some incentives per the direction of the statute and lay out a process for review of costs and cost-recovery

mechanisms.

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MR. GLENN: It does outline what the statute says.

The statute gives you flexibility and the legislature gives you flexibility to determine what that process is. The process that is being proposed is a process that's similar to what we have today. And what we have today does not work for a nuclear power plant. We cannot commit the sins of the 1970s and '80s where companies were bankrupted financially because they would expend years of dollars only to have --

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Glenn, are you saying that this rule takes us back to the 1970s in this state, because I don't agree with that.

MR. GLENN: I think it does more than what we have. But the risk that we have with reopening proceedings later in time is a real substantial risk that we have to weigh as a company to determine whether to proceed with a project like that.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Okay. I would like to look to our staff for a minute. And, Mr. McLean, if you can give me just a minute, I will come back to you.

MR. McLEAN: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: I believe I just heard Mr. Glenn basically say that the rule, as our staff has proposed, is basically business as usual as we always have.

MR. HARRIS: We disagree with that.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: And that is not my understanding, and so I would like to ask our staff to speak to that.

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MR. DEVLIN: I will take first shot at it and then they can chime in, because there is at least two huge differences between what we are looking at here in this rulemaking and how we regulated back in the 1970s. One is a substantial early recovery of costs which is prescribed by statute. But based on Progress's own estimates, we are talking about in excess of a billion dollars of pre-construction costs, and AFUDC, or carrying charges and construction that would be recovered before commercial operation. And back in the '70s that would not have been the case, those costs would have been recovered from commercial operation forward. So that was a tremendous benefit and a tremendous incentive, I think, for nuclear.

And the other big difference -- at least I perceive it as a big difference -- never before in the history of the Commission, the best I can tell, we will be pre-approving the prudency of this nuclear power plant before commercial operation. Now, there is some debate on how soon can we do that. We are debating that point right now. But the fact of the matter is there will be 100 percent, or close to 100 percent, pre-approval of all costs before commercial operation, which significantly reduces the risk, and I would think would be a significant incentive.

MR. HARRIS: And two more points. They are in the statute, but the company is recovering their carrying costs and the construction balances on a yearly basis. We are talking probably hundreds of millions to a billion dollars worth of construction balances. The interest on that will be fairly significant. They are recovering that every year.

And, finally, the statute provides, and the rule makes it clear, that if something happens and the plant doesn't get completed, they get to recover those costs. That's in the statute. But that could be a fairly significant amount of investment that they are being, by statute and rule, allowed recovery of. So I strongly disagree that this rule does not promote investment in nuclear power plants. It is head and shoulders above anything the Commission has ever done before. Some of it is mandated by statute, but some of it is creative thinking outside of the box solutions to problems to promote investment in nuclear power plants.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Alternative cost-recovery mechanisms.

MR. HARRIS: Yes, ma'am.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. McLean.

MR. McLEAN: Yes, ma'am. The notion that this either returns us to the conditions of the '70s or nearly does so, to quote a friend of mine, nothing could be further from the truth. This is a quantum leap away from what we would have had

before this statute had there been a proposal before you to build a nuclear plant.

And on the narrow issue of administrative finality, every affected party who appears before this agency or any other administrative agency of the State of Florida, faces administrative finality in the decisions of that agency. As Mr. Cooke, I think, eloquently explained, administrative finality has built in exceptions, none of which we would expect to see in this process. That's the law of the land. That is the lay of the land.

The use of administrative finality, in my view, captures exactly the judicially established case law without expansion, and I submit that they are looking for an expansion, the companies, without expansion and without subtraction. It takes, adopts, puts affected parties on notice, as rules should, that the decisions of this agency are always subject to the notion of administrative finality. It does not, in my view, create this huge exception such that it returns us to the '70s. It simply isn't so.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioners, any questions?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: A question for staff.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commission Deason.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Harris, it is your recommendation that we propose the rule, the version that you

distributed to us this morning, correct?

MR. HARRIS: Yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: But I think in your presentation you also indicated that there was not a problem in your mind of changing the term "limited," when modifying the term proceeding, to change that to "separate." In other words, change language from "limited proceeding" to "separate proceeding."

MR. HARRIS: That's correct.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Can you explain why that is not a problem? And if it is not a problem, should we go ahead and incorporate that change in the rule that we propose or do you still think we just need to propose the version that you distributed this morning?

MR. HARRIS: We have no problem with changing the words on Lines 19 and 20 of Page 12 from limited to separate. We had initially -- you know, the idea we were trying to capture here is that site selection costs should be -- we wanted to allow the recovery up front, you know, prior to the plant going into commercial service. But there is a confusion in the statute about whether they could be recovered in the exact same manner as pre-construction costs, which is through the clause on an annual proceeding.

And so what we tried to do is come up with sort of a compromise where the company would be able to come in at a

determining time, which we have defined as the filing of a need determination, and say, okay, these were our site selection costs, and we would like to recover them now. And we thought the way to do that would be through a separate proceeding of some type.

We used the idea of a limited proceeding simply because that is a term that I have heard here at the Commission in my time, and I thought I sort of understood what it meant. The companies were concerned with that. And in their minds the term of art limited proceeding can have some negative implications. It can lead to expansion, to more of a base rate type of proceeding, and so they were uncomfortable with that phrase. That is fine with me and I believe with the technical staff. We are not concerned about the term "limited proceeding" versus "separate proceeding." What we were concerned with is the concept that these site selection costs would be treated in a manner separately from pre-construction costs, but that the company would still be allowed to recover those prior to being booked and when the plant goes into commercial service down the road.

It's the part on Line 22, the period of clause that we have a concern with striking. And as I mentioned earlier, we believe method for recovery allows the Commission some discretion to determine the best way to do it, and it could be through a clause, and that would be appropriate for the

Commission to determine if they made that decision. But it could be something else. And we don't want to lock the Commission into requiring the clause when the separate proceeding might point to a better or a different method.

So to answer your question, Commissioner, if you

So to answer your question, Commissioner, if you would like to change "limited" to "separate" we don't object to that, and we could to that today.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Harris, just so I'm clear, on behalf of staff, you are expressing no concern with the suggested language change to Page 12, Lines 19 and 20?

MR. HARRIS: Correct.

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CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Lines 19 and 20, but some concern and not recommending the suggested change to Page 12, Line 22.

MR. HARRIS: Correct.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Okay.

Commissioner Deason, did you have any further questions or comments on that point?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: No.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Okay.

Commissioner Arriaga.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: I think I heard all the parties say that they are close to additional negotiations and possibly some kind of agreement. And I am understanding that staff is proposing that we approve this as just modified and allow you more time to go back to the drawing table and come

back in the future with a potentially negotiated rule. Am I understanding correctly?

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MR. HARRIS: Roughly, yes, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: If that were to be the case, I just want to make sure that there is a commitment that you are going to come back with something and this is not going to be the final document.

MR. HARRIS: This would be the initial document that you propose. Any party can, within that 21-day period after publication, request a hearing or file written comments. You have heard some fairly strong concerns by the other people at this table. I would anticipate that were there to be no negotiations prior to that 21 days expiring, someone would file a request for hearing or written comments on it.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: And may I continue, please?

Did you want to say something?

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Go ahead.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: Well, fine. I've got two or three questions, so if you want to intervene now, that's fine.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: I'm sorry, we will work through it together, Commissioner Arriaga.

I guess I just had a little bit of a concern, and maybe I didn't hear exactly right as I was trying to re-read for the 150th time the rule at the same time I was trying to listen. But I would have a little concern with requiring our

staff to make a commitment of changing language. I have no problem at all if, indeed, that if that is the direction the body wants to go, asking them to work with the parties and think through and do additional analysis and good thought and work together and see if changes are something that with all of that they could or would recommend, so just a fine point.

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I have -- well, let me just make a comment,

Commissioner Arriaga, and then I look forward to hearing your questions.

Mr. McLean, I appreciate very much your statements earlier on about being close on some language and being willing to work even though it is the end of the year, and all of that. We all still work very hard, and I appreciate you being willing to do that and dive in and continue to work. Getting the language right to the best of our ability with the knowledge that we have at this point in time is very, very, very important, and it is very important to me. And if we need to take some additional time to get it more right, then, you know, it's good to know that we maybe have the option to do that.

So, Mr. McLean, I appreciate your commitment to do that. I know we have the commitment of our staff to do the same and look at it very closely after our discussion here if indeed that is what we want to do. And I certainly would hope that we would have the same commitment from the industry and also from the other interested parties.

I do have some frustration, though, that I feel compelled to express, and that is that this statutory language was passed, I believe, in May. We knew that we were going to be sitting here this fall having these discussions. We requested comments back in, I think, August. We received comments, and I'm very appreciative, and I'm appreciative of receiving the red line version as well. We have asked before if parties or interested persons have some concerns about language. It is always very helpful for us to see in writing other suggested language, so I thank you for that.

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But even so, I have some frustration. The statute passed in May. We requested comments back in August. We had an item much, much, much earlier in a little rougher version initially put out for agenda back in October. A number of concerns were expressed. We pulled it, asked for additional work and review from all parties. We agendaed it in November, and in November I was told we need two more weeks. We need two more weeks. And so I said, okay, take three and get it right to the best of our ability. And here I am at the end of December hearing we need more time. I always need more time.

So it is very, very important that we get it right. If, indeed, we need some more time and we can make real constructive progress, then I am very, very open to that. But, yet, I just put out that we have been working on this for over six months, and I would hope that we would really, really,

really be able to get everybody to get serious about looking and working on the potential areas of difference.

And also, Commissioner Arriaga, I would say if indeed we want -- and, again, I'm open to it, but if we want to ask -- you know, pass something out today, which I think -- or propose something out today, which I think is a procedural step that we need to take, with changes, with one change, with three, whatever is the will of the collective body, that we recognize that this is a multi-year process that we are still looking at, and that we have taken really some huge and significant steps.

I also think that if we are going to direct or request our staff and parties to continue to work on the language to get it closer to perhaps full consensus that we are -- they and we are all in a better position if it is after some discussion and we are able to hear one another on some of these points and the staff is able to hear from us, as well.

So, thank you, Commissioner Arriaga, for allowing me to say that, and I look forward to your questions.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: Well, I think I share with you the same frustration. And one of the reasons I do share that frustration, and I will share this with all of you, is that I just went through a nomination and appointment process, and it just happened that this year the co-chair of that oversight committee that the Legislature has set up to review and overview the PSC is Representative Atkinson. And he happens to

be the sponsor of this nuclear bill at the Legislature. And if you look at the record of that public meeting of the oversight committee where they nominated us for appointment,

Representative Littlefield and myself, Atkinson asked every one of us, every one of the candidates if we understood the purpose of the nuclear bill. If we understood that we had to go above and beyond normal business to promote nuclear energy. And each one us, including me, told him we were very clear on what the intention of the Legislature was.

So I am as frustrated as you are because we need to pass this. We need to get it done. But I'm listening, I'm hearing that there is a possibility of negotiation, there is a possibility of coming to an agreement. And if that were the case, I just don't want to hang a rule on somebody's head that would not allow them to negotiate in good faith. That's what I said, and maybe it was a very difficult word, Madam Chairman, a commitment from staff. And you're right, maybe we cannot ask staff to commit today. But at the same time, I may not want to commit myself to the current rule. So I have to find a balance here of what do we do.

If we allow you to negotiate, we pass this under at least the good faith understanding that you are going to go back to the drawing table, see all the written arguments and briefs that are going to come in, and come back to us in the future. And if there is no agreement, well, you are going to

hear some comments from us. You should be able to understand where the Commission is coming from. We are going to give you enough hints for you to take it into consideration to come up with something that will probably meet all of our expectations.

Let me make one final comment. The basic problem I have here is that -- and Mr. Cooke, our General Counsel, just said, and I think OPC has stated, it isn't easy, especially for me, a humble engineer, to understand what administrative finality is. It's not easy to explain. It's not easy to understand. It is a very difficult concept. And said in layman's terms, it is like a sword on somebody's head that is going to be hanging there for the next 10, 15, 20 years, and that I'm going to pass it through your throat if I feel like I need to investigate what you did ten years ago.

I do understand the concept of administrative finality as the right that future generations, future Commissioners have to come in and review what was done. I understand that. But at the same time I am responsible for my acts today. And if I make a determination of prudency review, I am assuming that responsibility, and I am thinking that my staff was capable enough to give me the proper numbers for me to make that decision.

I'm trusting you, I'm trusting your professional capacity, and you are at the same time trusting the judgment that I have to make. To make a judgment today thinking that I

am going to leave the door open for somebody in the future to come in and say, oh, I forgot that I needed to look at File Number ABC that should have been filed, but maybe it isn't, because ten years have passed. That kind of issue on a company does not promote nuclear energy.

So we have to balance administrative finality with regulatory certainty, which is my concern here. How do we provide regulatory certainty to these companies if we have the sword of administrative finality stuck into a rule? The rule does a lot, and I share with the Chairman that the rule does a lot. It is a very forward-looking rule, and I think it meets the expectation of Representative Atkinson.

But my question would be does it do enough? Are we leaving doors open in the middle so that the companies may not avail themselves of the rules? I think the purpose here is to make sure that nukes are built, because we need that energy. We said it over and over and over, we need nuclear energy. Ten years from now if we don't have it, we are going to look back and say we did not do our job as Commissioners. And to get hung up on terminology and placing constraints on companies that have to invest five billion dollars because we may have forgotten to review what we had to review, that's a problem. I have that big problem. I just wanted to share that with you.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you. I am looking for that

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lightning rod.

Commissioner Carter.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Thank you, Madam Chair.

Just briefly, we have a deadline here not established by us, but established by our bosses, the Florida Legislature. We have a product in front of us that is not a perfect product, but it's certainly a product that was arisen to with quality research, good sound legal reasoning, a plain reading of the statute, and negotiations in good faith by all the parties.

I think, Madam Chairman, what we need to do today is we need to go ahead on and approve this with the adjustments that have been recommended by staff, and allow the parties since they are that close together, you have got 31 days to get it all taken care of, and then they can come back with a unanimous recommendation.

But because of what the Legislature, our bosses, have asked us to do, I would want us to say, well, we are just taking it as a recommendation. But when the Legislature put a specific date on it, that means that they want us to do something by that date. It is not perfect, but it's significantly better than what we had before. So I would move this staff recommendation with the corrections presented by staff.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you, Commissioner Carter. And I think Commissioner Tew wanted to make a comment or a

question.

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COMMISSIONER TEW: It actually was a question. I'm sorry I didn't get in there sooner. I have a little bit of cold symptoms over here, so bear with me. I was going to ask earlier, but I think Mr. McLean did a good job explaining what he intended by the phrase administrative finality. But I thought while we are all here, I will try to follow up on some of that. It is just based on some recent experience with that terminology and the body of case law that surrounds it. It's definitely not a model of clarity for me, and so I do want to understand it better. And I think staff already said that they think whether we include it or not that it's still a concept that applies. And I wanted to hear from each of the parties on whether or not they think that that is the case.

And I should also say, before I turn it over for an answer to that question, that I am encouraged by the parties' comments. It does seem to me -- and I asked staff a lot about this yesterday, whether or not if we give everyone time to get together that we are actually going to get somewhere. And I think from the comments we have heard from everyone that it would be worth some period of time to do that.

But, again, I was just wondering, again while we are here, if everyone agrees that that concept of administrative finality applies whether or not there is language in the rule that suggests that terminology?

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioner Tew, who were you posing your question to?

COMMISSIONER TEW: Actually, I would assume all the parties except for staff, because I think Larry already answered that question earlier.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Okay. Mr. Twomey, you look like you want to start.

MR. TWOMEY: Yes, ma'am. Briefly, I think the answer, Commissioner Tew, is that as Mr. McLean suggested, you can't take it away. You can't take it away no matter how much you want to. If you have it in the rule, however, a draft rule now and take it out, that would -- if I was the company later, I would make the argument to a later Commission that you tried to take it out and, therefore, misrepresentation, fraud, mistake, and that kind of thing. The things Mr. Cooke told you about were not applicable here, which is what we are trying to capture is misrepresentation, fraud, mistake and that kind of -- a very narrow list of things that you want to keep your eye on. But to answer your question, if you take it out, you can't take it out.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. McLean.

MR. McLEAN: Yes. My notion is that it was judicially, and I think Mr. Cooke shares this with me, it's judicially established. There is a body of case law that describes administrative finality. Let me try this one with

Mr. Arriaga's observation that it is like a sword hanging over a throat. The sword of Damocles is hung by a thread. This sword hangs by a carbon steel cable the size of a Buick. This is not something that we can simply come up and say, you know, back in the last decade we forgot to look at this particular thing. That doesn't get a case reopened in terms of administrative finality.

There are fairly well-enumerated criteria, fraud and material mistake. Mistake doesn't mean you forgot to do something. It means you multiplied two times two and got five or something like that. I think, and I haven't researched this question and don't want to represent that I have, but that's the case law we're stuck with. I think that's what administrative finality means, and that is exactly the concept that we are trying to seize by the term administrative finality.

I think in the course of our negotiations to come, which I hope you will permit to happen, I think we can come up with language that neither expands nor contracts existing case law and that none of us will be offended with. And I can get even more flexible on that point if we have some articulated MFRs, pardon the expression, or some enumerated criteria that they must satisfy for a prima facie showing of relief that we can criticize should we choose to do so.

So I think that we're spending a great deal more time

on administrative finality than it probably merits, but I understand the companies' concern. I don't think that we can -- I don't think that you can constitutionally limit the opportunity of a party to challenge your decisions according to the case law of the state. I have not researched it, but that is my impression.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Glenn, did you want to join in this discussion?

MR. GLENN: Sure. One thing on administrative finality to the carbon steel analogy, I may have believed that before OPC filed its petition to seek a refund of \$143 million, which we'll be arguing in a few moments, so looking back ten years is very fresh in my mind. So I think that is a really reasonable concern that we do have. It's not in any statute. It's not in any regulation that this Commission has. Why is it being put in now?

MR. LITCHFIELD: And if I might add to that, Madam Chairman, I think the concern is that the doctrine of administrative finality is not absolutely crystal clear in the law, and it is subject to various interpretations, similar to the interpretation that Mr. Glenn alluded to earlier as to what will be argued here before you this morning. And I think that is essentially what the company is concerned about, is that Mr. McLean, as well intentioned as he is, will not be Public Counsel, perhaps, ten years from now when this plant is still

being constructed, and we don't know how it will be applied.

What we are looking for -- what we are looking for is certainty and assuredness with respect to the costs that we incur during a given year, that those are checked off, they are signed off on, they are reviewed, they are evaluated and then we all move on to that next year of the construction cycle with some certainty and assuredness that what we are doing is accurate, correct, appropriate and that we are not subject to being second-guessed down the road.

I think the concern is as occasionally has been applied or has occasionally may be argued to be applied the doctrine administrative finality, which suggests that somehow if it wasn't an issue explicitly spelled out in the case, if it wasn't specifically raised in testimony, if it wasn't specifically in the order, administrative finality couldn't possibly have attached to that. Those are the kinds of concerns that we have, the kinds of arguments that are likely to be raised. We need certainty on an annual basis.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioner Tew, did you -- okay.

Commissioners, any other questions at this time?

Okay.

Commissioners, I do believe we have a motion that has been made. We have had some discussion. We can have some more if we need to. Is there discussion, other questions, or, actually, Commissioner Carter, perhaps you could restate the

motion so that we are all fresh.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Thank you, Madam Chair, for your courtesy.

The motion is that we would accept staff's recommendations with the changes that Mr. --

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Harris.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Mr. Harris said -- thank you -- were insignificant and make that to be our recommendation, and the parties -- we would ask that all parties would negotiate in good faith. We shouldn't have to say that, but we will ask that, and allow the time to run its course. And at that point in time whatever recommendations or negotiations they could arrive at, they will have plenty and ample time to do that.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you, Commissioner Carter. So, again, for clarity, my understanding of the motion that you have made to us is that we would propose the language that was initially passed out by our staff as a substitute for the language that had been in the original item with the one slight change in Lines 19 and 20 on Page 12.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Yes, ma'am.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you.

Commissioners, is there a second?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Madam Chairman, I'm going to second the motion. But I do have a question that I probably should have asked earlier, but if you will indulge me.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: You may.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And this is a question to staff, and it concerns the concept of administrative finality. And this is the situation. If a proceeding is noticed, and if we are going to -- just for the sake for this question, assume we are going to have annual prudency proceedings. And if a proceeding is noticed as a prudency proceeding and that there are costs identified for there to be a determination of the prudency of the incurrence of those costs and a number of issues are raised, and those issues are litigated in that proceeding, and there is a determination by the Commission on those issues, either the costs were prudent, or there were some imprudent costs, and there would be a determination of that and those would be addressed.

At the end of that, and parties participated, is that party or even future parties as far as that goes, under the concept of administrative finality are they precluded from, say, a year or two or ten years later saying, oh, there was a seventh or eighth issue that we didn't identify that we should have identified. And it is not because of mistake or fraud or misrepresentation, it is just that there was an issue there that we overlooked, we didn't raise it; we want to raise it now. Would that be permitted under administrative finality?

be that it would be precluded. That unless there is some

MR. COOKE: Commissioner, my reaction to that would

revisiting from the public interest standpoint, in other words, something out there beyond the prudency review that occurred in that proceeding, or if there were allegations of self-dealing or fraud or misrepresentation. I think the concept of administrative finality doesn't let you go back and revisit decisions that were made looking at the record and doing the normal course of things. I think it is narrower than that.

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The problem with it is it is a judicial concept, and it is laid out in various cases. And when we start looking at it on a case-by-case basis, a good arguer can start arguing that something is unusual and should be looked at again. But I think -- and that is the concern the companies have, they want as much certainty as possible. I would like to hear them say that they are not trying to, by writing this rule without that language, eliminate the applicability of administrative finality on our prudency review.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Do you think that's something you could explore in further negotiations?

MR. COOKE: That is what I intend to do if that is the direction you head us in.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. My second stands, Madam Chairman.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you, Commissioner Deason.

Commissioners, we have a motion and a second. Is

there any further discussion?

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COMMISSIONER CARTER: Madam Chairman.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioner Carter.

appreciate Commissioner Deason for fleshing out that issue, because really, what we are trying -- my major concern is following the dictates of the Legislature, but by the same token is that if we can make this better, and I think that all the parties have listened to the dialogue and the discourse heard from our General Counsel, and the parties understand exactly what we are talking about, I think that, you know, we can move forward on that. I don't think there is anybody that is a party or an intervenor to this action can go away and say this is not an issue that we want you to deal with when you come back to us. That is just a comment, but I do appreciate Commissioner Deason being able to flesh that issue out so it's on the table so all parties can understand it.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you.

I appreciate everybody's participation in this discussion. It has been good discussion, good questions, good answers. I appreciate everybody's work on this, and I think we are going to ask you to keep working. And, personally, I would appreciate if we all work real hard these next few days and see if we can get the words to where we all have some comfort. I think it's precedent setting. It is a proprietary to me, and

we want it to be the best that it can be to give clarity to the consumers, to the interested parties, and to the industry. So, with that, all in favor of the motion say aye. (Unanimous affirmative vote.) CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Opposed? Show the motion adopted. It is about 1:15, and I think I could use a short stretch. So how about we come back at 1:30, at which point we will be on Item 8. (Recess.)

1 STATE OF FLORIDA 2 CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER 3 COUNTY OF LEON 4 5 I, JANE FAUROT, RPR, Chief, Office of Hearing Reporter Services, FPSC Division of Commission Clerk and 6 Administrative Services, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceeding was heard at the time and place herein stated. 7 8 IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that I stenographically reported the said proceedings; that the same has been 9 transcribed under my direct supervision; and that this transcript constitutes a true transcription of my notes of said proceedings. 10 I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee, 11 attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor am I a relative or employee of any of the parties' attorney or counsel 12 connected with the action, nor am I financially interested in the action. 13 DATED THIS 26th DAY OF DECEMBER, 2006. 14 15 16 JANE) FAUROT, RPR Official FPSC Hearings Reporter 17 FPSC Division of Commission Clerk and Administrative Services 18 (850) 413-6732 19 20 21 2.2 23 24

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