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August 9, 2012

VIA HAND DELIVERY

Ms. Ann Cole Director Office of Commission Clerk Florida Public Service Commission 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399

Re: Docket No. 090538-TP - Amended Complaint of Qwest Communications Company, LLC against MCImetro Access Transmission Services (d/b/a Verizon Access Transmission Services); XO Communications Services, Inc.; tw telecom of florida, l.p.; Granite Telecommunications, LLC; Broadwing Communications, LLC; Access Point, Inc.; Birch Communications, Inc.; Budget Prepay, Inc.; Bullseye Telecom, Inc.; DeltaCom, Inc.; Ernest Communications, Inc.; Flatel, Inc.; Network LLC; Navigator Lightyear Solutions, Telecommunications, LLC; Communications, Inc.; STS Telecom, LLC; US LEC of Florida, LLC; Windstream Nuvox, Inc.; and John Does 1 through 50, for unlawful discrimination.

Dear Ms. Cole:

Enclosed for filing on behalf of Broadwing Communications, LLC; Saturn Telecommunications Services, Inc. d/b/a EarthLink Business and DeltaCom, Inc. d/b/a EarthLink Business.; MCImetro Access Transmission Services LLC d/b/a Verizon Access Transmission Services; and tw telecom of florida, l.p., are an original and 15 copies of the prefiled rebuttal testimony and exhibit (Exhibit TD-1) of Mr. Terry Deason. Also enclosed is a diskette containing a PDF version of Mr. Deason's rebuttal testimony and exhibit.

Please acknowledge receipt of these documents by stamping the extra copy of this letter "filed" and returning the copy to me. Thank you for your assistance with this filing.

testimony only) AFD

Matthew Feil

GCD

APA ECO

ENG

IDM

+ Rep (testimony only)

05452 AUG-92

- 1 Q. Please state your name and business address.
- 2 A. My name is Terry Deason. My business address is 301 S. Bronough Street, Suite
- 3 200, Tallahassee, Florida 32301.
- 4 Q. By whom are you employed and in what capacity?
- 5 A. I am employed by the law firm Radey Thomas Yon and Clark as a Special
- 6 Consultant specializing in the fields of energy, telecommunications, water and
- 7 wastewater and public utilities generally.

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- 8 Q. Please describe your educational background and professional experience.
 - A. I have thirty-five years of experience in the field of public utility regulation spanning a wide range of responsibilities and roles. I served a total of seven years as a consumer advocate in the Florida Office of Public Counsel (OPC) on two separate occasions. In that role, I testified as an expert witness in numerous rate proceedings before the Florida Public Service Commission (Commission). My tenure of service at the Florida Office of Public Counsel was interrupted by six years as Chief Advisor to Florida Public Service Commissioner Gerald L. Gunter. I left OPC as its Chief Regulatory Analyst when I was first appointed to the Commission in 1991. I served as Commissioner on the Commission for sixteen years, serving as its chairman on two separate occasions. Since retiring from the Commission at the end of 2006, I have been providing consulting services and expert testimony on behalf of various clients, including public service commission advocacy staff and regulated utility companies, before commissions in Arkansas, Florida, Montana, New York and North Dakota. I have also testified before various legislative committees on

- regulatory policy matters. I hold a Bachelor of Science Degree in Accounting,
- summa cum laude, and a Master of Accounting, both from Florida State University.
- 3 Q. Are you sponsoring an exhibit?
- 4 A. Yes. I am sponsoring the following rebuttal exhibit:
- Exhibit ____(TD-1), Biographical Information for Terry Deason
- 6 Q. For whom are you appearing as a rebuttal witness?
- 7 A. I am appearing as a rebuttal witness for Broadwing Communications, LLC; Saturn
- 8 Telecommunications Services, Inc. d/b/a EarthLink Business and DeltaCom, Inc.
- 9 d/b/a EarthLink Business.; MCImetro Access Transmission Services LLC d/b/a
- 10 Verizon Access Transmission Services; and tw telecom of florida, l.p. (CLEC Group
- or CLECs).
- 12 Q. What is the purpose of your rebuttal testimony?
- 13 A. The purpose of my rebuttal testimony is to respond to assertions by Qwest
- 14 Communications Company, LLC (Qwest) that there has been rate discrimination in
- 15 connection with the provisioning of intrastate switched access service by the CLEC
- 16 Group in Florida.
- 17 Q. Did you serve on the Florida Public Service Commission at the time of Qwest's
- 18 complaint?
- 19 A. Qwest's complaint was filed on December 11, 2009, and asserts discrimination as far
- back as ten years ago. Thus, I was not serving as a Commissioner when the Qwest
- complaint was filed. I did serve on the Commission for much of the time that the
- complaint covers. In fact, I was serving on the Commission when Florida enacted

1	the	1995	Telecommunications	Act,	which	first	allowed	competition	in	the
2	prov	visionir	ng of local exchange tel	ephon	e servic	e in Fl	lorida.			

- 3 Q. How was local exchange service provided in Florida prior to Florida's 1995
- 4 Telecommunications Act?
- Local exchange service was provided by a number of local exchange companies that
 each had an exclusive certificated service territory. The Public Service Commission
 closely regulated the quality and terms of service. The Commission also set the rates
 that each company could charge and required them to be filed at the Commission as
 tariffed rates. After the introduction of competition, these companies became known
 as Incumbent Local Exchange Companies or ILECs.
- Q. Were the rates set by the Commission uniform throughout Florida before July 1, 1995?
- 13 A. No. Each ILEC's rates were set on its overall cost to provide service. Each
 14 company had a regulated rate base, was allowed to recover needed and prudently
 15 incurred expenses, and was permitted an opportunity to earn a Commission set rate
 16 of return, much like the Commission currently sets rates for investor owned electric
 17 utilities.
- Q. Did the setting of telephone rates back then deviate in any significant way from the setting of rates for investor-owned electric utilities?
- A. Yes. The Commission exercised discretion to price specific types of services at levels that deviated from strict cost considerations and considered the value of the service provided. For example, business rates were higher than residential rates and rates for long distance and ancillary services generally provided a higher contribution

1	to earnings	than	basic	"dial	tone"	service.	With	changes	in	technology	and	the
2	emergence	of cor	npetiti	on, the	ese inh	erent subs	sidies v	vere not s	ust	ainable.		

- Q. Did the Commission ever address concern over these differentials between
 specific rates and costs?
- Yes, the Commission was concerned that requiring a strict adherence to tariffed rates could put the ILECs at a competitive disadvantage. The Commission feared that an inability to adjust prices could result in lost customers, lost revenues, and higher rates for the ILECs' remaining customers. This concept was known as "uneconomic bypass." As early as 1983, the Commission authorized ILECs to offer contractual rates or bulk discounts, instead of strict tariff pricing. These became known as Contract Service Arrangements or CSAs.
- Q. So the purpose of CSAs was to protect end use telephone customers from incurring potentially higher telephone rates?
- 14 A. Yes, that is correct. The ILECs were required to file information monthly (later changed to quarterly) with the Commission which justified the CSAs and identified the applicable rates and contract periods. This information was used to monitor the CSAs and ascertain whether they were indeed protecting end use customers from potential rate increases.
- 19 Q. Was the CSA information filed with the Commission afforded confidential
 20 treatment?
- A. The ILECs had the option of requesting confidentiality. Many exercised this option and the Commission routinely agreed that it constituted confidential business information and granted confidential status.

1	Q.	Did	the	Commission	require	CSA	information	to	be	filed	as	a	means	of
2		prov	iding	g public notice	e of the ty	pes, a	mounts, and	dur	atio	n of n	ego	tia	ted rate	s?

No. As I stated earlier, this information was required to ascertain whether the CSAs

- 4 were combating uneconomic bypass and protecting end use customers, not to put
- 5 customers or competitors on notice of what negotiated rates might be available.

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- 6 Q. After the elimination of exclusive local service territories and the introduction 7 of local service competition in 1995, what became of CSAs?
- The Commission eliminated the requirements that CSAs be reported and that certain 8 A. 9 information about an ILEC's service arrangements be filed with the Commission. In 10 Docket No. 010634-TL, Order No. PSC-01-1588-PAA-TL, the Commission stated:

We find that a systemic shift from a rate base, rate-of-return regulatory environment to a competitive market paradigm obviates the threat of "bypass" for rate payers. Congress and the Florida Legislature have fashioned laws to simultaneously stimulate competition, and protect ratepayers from excessive rate increases for basic services.

17 Q. What was the Commission's primary concern with respect to CSAs?

The Commission's primary concern was the protection of end use customers, A. particularly those with a lesser ability to avail themselves of alternatives. With the advent and growth of competition, competition became the means to best provide this protection, and previously imposed regulatory requirements were lifted.

Q. Did the Commission consider whether the regulatory requirement for ILECs to file CSA information was needed to protect similarly situated end-use customers from being treated in a discriminatory manner?

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A. Yes, the Commission determined that the requirement to file CSAs was not needed for this purpose. The Commission also had doubts whether "similarly situated" could be truly ascertained and whether alleged discrimination was, in fact, discrimination or constituted a failure on the part of one entity to successfully negotiate. In Order No. PSC-01-1588-PAA-TL, dated July 31, 2001, the Commission stated:

CSA reports as filed do not provide the level of detail that would be needed to determine whether clients are "similarly situated" or victims of discrimination. Assuming an all-encompassing definition of "similarly situated" could be reached, an examination of whether similarly situated clients received discriminatory contracts would require staff to identify recipients of such contracts and submit a request for production of documents for the contracts in question, and a justification from the ILEC offering the contracts. Such an assessment would also require staff to determine whether discrimination occurred in the offering of contracts or whether one party was more adept than another in its negotiations with the ILEC.

How does this determination by the Commission relate to Qwest's contention that there has been rate discrimination in the provisioning of switched access service by certain CLECs?

- A. It goes to the heart of Qwest's contention. The Commission determined that the mere existence of a rate negotiated by a local exchange carrier does not mean there has been any undue discrimination. To find undue discrimination, there has to be a determination that different entities are "similarly situated", which is a fact-intensive endeavor, and that actual discrimination occurred and was not simply the result of a failure or inability of one customer to successfully negotiate.
- Q. Is there any similar language in a Commission order specifically addressing
 switched access service provided by CLECs?
- 9 A. No, not to my knowledge.
- 10 Q. Why is that?

A.

- The Commission never considered switched access service provided by CLECs to be a regulated service that necessitated regulatory requirements in order to protect end use telephone customers. Nor did the Commission consider switched access service provided by CLECs to be a service for which information needed to be filed at the Commission. For example, unlike in the prior era of rate of return regulation, CLECs were not required to provide cost information or otherwise justify the prices they charged for switched access service. However, the Commission did speak generally to the fact that what may have been considered rate discrimination under the standards of monopoly (rate of return) regulation would not be applicable under deregulation (competition). In Docket No. 951354-TL, Order No. PSC-97-0488-FOF-TL, the Commission stated:
 - We believe that price differences caused by the implementation of price caps for basic and protected non-basic services under the

1		provisions of section 364.051, Florida Statutes, do not constitute
2		undue discrimination pursuant to sections 364.08, 364.09, or 364.10,
3		Florida Statutes. Circumstances that would have amounted to undue
4		discrimination in rate setting under monopoly regulation do not
5		amount to undue discrimination under deregulation.
6		***
7		The answer is the development of an effective competitive
8		marketplace.
9	Q.	Did the Commission address the issue of requiring price lists for switched
10		access?
11	A.	Yes, the Commission addressed this immediately after the 1995 Telecommunications
12		Act was enacted. At its November 21, 1995 Agenda Conference, the Commission
13		approved its staff's recommendation to adopt rules governing telephone service by
14		Alternative Local Exchange Companies (ALECs). It should be noted that the term
15		"ALEC" has now been replaced with the more generally accepted term "CLEC".
16	Q.	What did the Commission's staff recommendation say in this regard?
17	A.	In its recommendation in Docket No. 950918-TX dated November 8, 1995, the staff
18		recommended that the Commission not adopt changes suggested by LDDS
19		Worldcom that switched access rates be included in ALEC (CLEC) price lists:
20		Staff does not totally agree with LDDS Worldcom's statement that
21		switched access service will continue to be a monopoly service.
22		While it is true that IXCs will pay switched access rates to LECs and
23		ALECs, there may be alternatives for end users. An ALEC may

determine that a way to differentiate itself from the dominant LEC is to provide switched access at lower rates; thus IXCs that provide service to that ALEC's customers may charge lower toll rates to end users.

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Consideration of LDDS's request should be given in light of the statute which calls for a lesser level of regulatory oversight than local exchange companies for ALECs. The staff considered whether to require the filing of price lists at all and limited its proposal to basic services only because of the desire to be able to quickly respond to consumers' complaints or questions. If there is a need to obtain information for either large business customers or IXCs, that can be requested on an as needed basis rather than requiring the ALECs to keep that information up to date with the Commission. Therefore, we recommend that the price list be limited to basic services.

Q. Do you draw any conclusions from this language as it pertains to Qwest's complaint?

Yes, there are several. First, the Commission did not find that switched access provided by CLECs is a monopoly service. As I read Dr. Weisman's direct testimony on behalf of Qwest, his positions and ultimate opinion that discrimination against Qwest took place are premised on his contention that switched access is a monopoly "bottle neck" service. If this premise is invalid or otherwise removed, his conclusion fails. It is not the purpose of my testimony to debate whether switched

access should be considered a monopoly service. Rather the purpose of my testimony is to state that the Commission <u>has not ever</u> considered CLEC switched access to be a monopoly service. It would be bad regulatory policy to redefine the fundamental nature of a service in order to provide one company a financial benefit now based on a retroactive application of that re-definition. The time for the debate and Dr. Weisman's arguments was 1995, not 2012.

Second, CLECs were under no obligation to file or otherwise post their switched access rates. Likewise, they were under no obligation to file, post or make public any negotiated changes in those rates. And, even if such an obligation could be implied, consistent with the treatment previously afforded CSAs, the Commission most likely would have afforded any negotiated rates confidential pro tection, if requested. So, Qwest's allegation that the negotiated switched access rates were "secret" is unfounded and of no consequence based on the Commission's long-standing policies.

Third, the Commission limited CLEC price lists to containing information about basic services offered to end users. The Commission further stated that, if there is a need to obtain pricing information for either large business customers or interexchange carriers (IXCs), there could be a request for such information. So, if the Commission and its staff did not need this information to be routinely filed, it is presumptuous for Qwest to assert that this information should have been routinely provided to it.

And fourth, the Commission readily acknowledged that its decision to limit the filing of price list information to a CLEC's basic service was driven by the Florida statute that calls for a lesser level of regulatory oversight for CLECs. Specifically, Section 5 of the 1995 Act amended Section 364.01 (in part) to require the Commission to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction to:

Promote competition by encouraging new entrants into telecommunications markets and by allowing a transitional period in which new entrants are subject to a lesser level of regulatory oversight than local exchange telecommunications companies; [and]

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Eliminate any rules and/or regulations which will delay or impair the transition to competition.

Α.

So, beginning in 1995, the Commission was required to encourage new entrants and to regulate them to a lesser degree than the ILECs.

Q. Why was this requirement in section 364.01 enacted?

Absent such a requirement, it was believed that new entrants would be hesitant to enter a market and compete against larger existing ILECs. Lessening the new entrants' regulatory burdens was seen as one way of encouraging them to do so. It was also believed that the new entrants needed pricing flexibility to effectively compete and add value to their new customers. To have declared the new entrants' switched access services a regulated monopoly service would not have been

1	consister	nt with	these	goa	als. M	ore	over,	the	Comn	nission	under	rstood	that	the	new
2	entrants	would	have	the	ability	to	nego	tiate	rates	withou	t the	regula	atory	bur	dens

associated with CSAs that the Commission had previously imposed on the ILECs.

- 4 Q. How does Qwest's complaint of alleged discrimination mesh with these statutory goals?
- A. It does not mesh at all. It would be bad regulatory policy and perhaps even disingenuous to have encouraged new entrants to enter the Florida market with the promise of lesser regulation in 1995, and then impose new regulatory requirements (such as a duty to file contract rates and to provide cost justification) in 2012 retroactively to 1995.
- 11 Q. You previously responded that to encourage new entrants into the Florida
 12 market, the Commission allowed CLECs pricing flexibility and granted them
 13 the ability to negotiate rates. Why did the Commission believe this was needed
 14 and appropriate?
- 15 A. First, this was consistent with the 1995 Act and the requirement to encourage competition. In addition, the Commission generally encouraged negotiations and flexibility in prices as the best means of meeting customer needs. Traditional regulation was ill-suited to provide these benefits in a manner as fair and as prompt as negotiations between carriers and their customers often could.
- Q. Did the Commission encourage negotiations between telecommunications companies?
- 22 A. Yes.

- 1 Q. What is Dr. Weisman's position on the price that Qwest should pay the CLECs
- 2 for switched access service?
- 3 A. He states that there should be a default (uniform) price that all long-distance carriers
- 4 should pay the CLEC, unless a CLEC can demonstrate that its cost of providing
- 5 switched access varies between the various long-distance carriers.
- 6 Q. Does Dr. Weisman quantify what that uniform price should be?
- 7 A. No, he does not specifically quantify a uniform price. He implies that the uniform
- 8 price should be the prices that the CLECs negotiated with other IXCs. However,
- 9 there are many different negotiated prices in Florida, not a single uniform one.
- 10 Arguably the only uniform prices are the voluntarily published prices by the CLECs
- in their price lists, which are the rates I understand that Qwest was charged. In
- essence, Qwest's basic premise is inherently flawed. Under the guise of preventing
- alleged discriminatory prices via uniform prices, Qwest wants to obtain the financial
- benefit of lower negotiated prices that are not uniform. In addition, Owest is seeking
- the lower prices that it had no hand in negotiating. Then, to top it off, the give-and-
- take of those negotiations is not known to the Commission and likely encompassed a
- 17 number of considerations, including matters other than switched access prices.
- 18 Owest's request that the Commission now award it the lower prices that were
- obtained through negotiations and compromises and concessions by others is unfair
- 20 to both the Commission and the other IXCs that availed themselves of the
- 21 negotiating process and likely made concessions on other matters.
- 22 Q. You stated that Qwest is seeking the benefit of negotiated prices that it had no
- 23 hand in negotiating. If the Commission had required negotiated switched

1	access prices to be published, would there have been any negotiated prices a
2	all?

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Since the Commission did not require the negotiated switched access prices to be published, I cannot say with certainty. However, as a general rule, requiring negotiated prices to be published has a dampening effect on negotiations and efforts to resolve various issues. This is one of the reasons the Commission routinely granted confidential status to CSAs, which I earlier described. So, as a theoretical matter, requiring the prices and terms of negotiated agreements to be published so that other companies (perhaps dissimilarly situated companies) could request the same prices, terms and conditions may have resulted in no or fewer negotiated prices.

Q. Why did the CLECs in this proceeding agree to negotiated switched access prices?

- That would be for each CLEC to explain. However, as a matter of general policy, I would assume there were compromises or concessions made by the negotiating entities to reach an agreeable outcome. It defies logic to assume the CLECs were not acting in their own interests, or that they agreed to lower switched access rates without obtaining concessions or other benefits in return.
- Q. What would have been the result had Qwest negotiated its own switched access agreements with the CLECs?
- A. We simply do not know. Nor do we know what Qwest would have been able to offer in return for lower switched access prices. I have not evaluated whether Qwest was similarly situated to other IXCs that did successfully negotiate switched access

agreements. What we do know is that Qwest is asking the Commission to grant it now the economic equivalent of lower prices, without it being required to make any concessions, provide any other forms of consideration included in those agreements or undertake any obligations that those agreements might have required. Qwest argues only that it has an entitlement to these prices because it believes the prices should be uniform. As I have explained, that view is not in line with the regulatory policy in this state, nor is it consistent with commercial norms in a competitive environment.

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- Dr. Weisman states a caveat that there could be a deviation from uniform prices if the provider's cost of providing service varies between customers. Do you agree?
 - If you were to assume that the service in question is truly a monopoly one, I do not disagree from a purely theoretical standpoint. However, from a practical standpoint, it should have no bearing in this case. First, as I earlier explained, the Commission has never considered CLEC switched access to be a monopoly service. And second, there is no cost information available to demonstrate that costs may vary. Because CLECs have never been cost regulated by the Commission, as the ILECs were at an earlier time, there are no CLEC cost studies or other experience on which the Commission could rely to conduct such an examination. Today, even the ILECs are no longer cost regulated. Thus, creating new cost justification requirements for competitive carriers at this stage in the evolution of regulatory policy would be a huge step backwards and would be contrary to the express provisions of the 1995

1	Act designed	to	encourage	new	entrants	by	subjecting	them	to	a	lesser	level	of
2	regulation.												

- Q. Did the 1995 Act address the appropriate cost standard to be used in order to detect cross-subsidization or other similar anti-competitive pricing?
- Yes, it did. In the context of detecting cross-subsidization between basic and non-basic service, the Act specified that total long-run incremental cost was the appropriate standard for the ILECs. CLECs were specifically exempted from this standard and no other cost standard or requirement was imposed upon the CLECs. Therefore, there is no cost-based standard applicable to the provisioning of switched access service by CLECs. In any event, there has been no allegation that the CLECs negotiated switched access prices that were below total long-run incremental costs.

12 Q. Did the 1995 Act address nondiscriminatory pricing?

13 A. Yes, to a limited extent. The term "nondiscriminatory" appears in only three 14 sections of the 1995 Act, but none of these references are applicable to CLEC 15 switched access service.

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The first reference to "nondiscriminatory" is in Section 5 amending Section 364.01, setting forth the powers of the Commission and legislative intent. In this section, flexible regulatory treatment is premised on monopoly services being available to competitors on a nondiscriminatory basis. This section further clarifies that the applicable monopoly services are those provided by ILECs. Nowhere in this section and nowhere in the entire Act is it envisioned that CLECs would be providing monopoly services.

The second reference to "nondiscriminatory" is in Section 14, amending Section 364.16 concerning local interconnection and number portability. This section of the Act requires CLECs to provide nondiscriminatory access to and interconnection with other providers of <u>local</u> exchange telecommunications service. However, it contains <u>no</u> such requirement for access to and interconnection with interexchange carriers, such as Qwest. In addition, this section specifies that the first attempt to obtain such nondiscriminatory access and interconnection should be through negotiation. Only if the negotiations fail could the carriers ask the Commission to make a determination about the terms of interconnection. This is in stark contrast to Qwest's criticisms of the negotiations that took place between the CLECs and other IXCs. Qwest is asking the Commission to become involved because others successfully negotiated and it did not.

The third and final reference to "nondiscriminatory" is found in Section 16, creating Section 364.162 regarding negotiated prices for interconnection and for the resale of ILEC services and facilities. This section is applicable to CLECs, but only when CLECs are seeking interconnection with an ILEC. It has no bearing on CLEC switched access service provided to IXCs. Nevertheless, as with Section 14, the Act makes clear that negotiations are the first step to obtaining nondiscriminatory interconnection arrangements. The Act makes it abundantly clear that negotiating rates, terms and conditions is essential and congruent with obtaining access on a nondiscriminatory basis. Qwest's claim in this case is based on exactly the opposite,

1		i.e., that the mere existence of a negotiated rated shows the existence of
2		discrimination, even though the Act does not require that switched access be
3		provided on a nondiscriminatory basis in the first place.
4	Q.	So there is nothing in the 1995 Act requiring CLEC switched access to be
5		provided on a nondiscriminatory basis?
6	A.	Yes, that is correct. In addition, negotiations to set prices and terms between
7		carriers, which Qwest finds objectionable for switched access, was generally allowed
8		for competitive carriers and was actually required for many types of services by the
9		1995 Act.
10	Q.	Was there any preexisting relevant language in the Florida Statutes at the time
11		the 1995 amendments were enacted that addressed potential discriminatory
12		practices?
13	A.	Sections 364.08, 364.09 and 364.10 generally prohibited the giving of undue or
14		unreasonable preferences to persons under like circumstances. But, these sections
15		were not relevant to the question of discrimination in the provisioning of switched
16		access services by CLECs.
17	Q.	Why were these sections not relevant to the provisioning of switched access
18		services by CLECs?
19	A.	These sections had their genesis when there were no CLECs, only rate base regulated
20		monopoly telephone companies. These sections were designed to protect end use
21		customers from discrimination and to protect the general body of end use customers
22		from higher rates.

- 1 Q. Why was this protection needed for customers of a rate base regulated
- 2 monopoly?
- 3 A. Similar to the situation with CSAs that I earlier described, any unjustified reduction
- 4 in revenues could lead to rate increases for all other customers. This is a function of
- a regulated monopoly having a "revenue requirement" determined by the
- 6 Commission to provide a reasonable opportunity for the regulated monopoly to earn
- 7 its authorized rate of return. Any unjustified reductions in rates charged or any
- 8 reduction in the number of customers paying the tariffed rates, would mean that the
- 9 resulting revenue deficiency would have to be made up by all other customers
- through higher rates.
- 11 Q. If these sections had no relevancy to CLECs, why did they remain in Chapter
- 12 **364, Florida Statutes?**
- 13 A. These sections were necessary to enable the Commission to protect customers of the
- ILECs. While the 1995 Act introduced competition, the ILECs were not initially
- subject to the level of competition which now exists. So these provisions were
- applied to ILECs during the transition to a more competitive market. In recognition
- of the transition to a more competitive market, Section 364.09 was repealed in 2009
- and Sections 364.08 and 364.10 were repealed in 2011.
- 19 Q. How did the Commission apply these sections to ILECs during the transition
- 20 period to greater competition?
- 21 A. The Commission applied these sections on a case-by-case basis to protect ILEC end
- 22 use customers. As competition increased and statutory provisions changed, so did
- the Commission's need for regulation. In Order No. PSC-97-0488-FOF-TL, which I

earlier cited, the Commission expressly noted that circumstances that would amount to undue discrimination in a monopoly environment do not necessarily constitute discrimination in a competitive one.

4 Q. Did the Commission ever apply these sections to CLECs?

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5 A. No, not to my knowledge. CLECs were subject to a lesser level of regulation by
6 statute. In addition, the protections afforded ILEC end use customers were not
7 necessary for CLEC end use customers. CLEC customers were exercising their
8 option to shop for the best prices and service offerings and to negotiate with CLECs
9 to maximize these benefits.

Does the nonexistence of a nondiscrimination standard in the Act for switched access service mean that the Commission should be unconcerned with switched access rate levels?

No, that is not my position. The Commission does have a continuing obligation to see that competition in the telecommunications market continues to serve customers with quality service at reasonable prices. Just as the Commission was concerned with protecting end use customers prior to passage of the 1995 Act, the Commission has a continuing responsibility to see that customers are treated fairly. The means available to accomplish that now is by assuring a competitive market. However, assuring a competitive market does not mean that one or more competitors are assured success. A competitor's success should be based on its own efforts.

Qwest's complaint loses sight of this. Qwest is seeking the protection of historical regulation that no longer exists for its own benefit. Qwest has not shown that there has been a failure of the competitive market or that end use customers have

- been harmed as a result. Qwest is asking the Commission to intervene in an
- 2 otherwise competitive market to protect itself from either its unwillingness or failure
- 3 to negotiate within the established confine of Florida's competitive market.
- 4 Q. Does this conclude your testimony?
- 5 A. Yes, it does.

BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In re: Complaint of Qwest Communications Company, LLC against MCImetro Access Transmission Services (d/b/a Verizon Access Transmission Services); XO Communications Services, Inc.; tw telecom of florida, l.p.; Granite Telecommunications, LLC; Cox Florida Telcom, L.P.; Broadwing Communications, LLC; Access Point, Inc.; Birch Communications, Inc.; Budget Prepay, Inc.; Bullseye Telecom, Inc.; DeltaCom, Inc.; Ernest Communications, Inc.; Flatel, Inc.; Navigator Telecommunications, LLC; PaeTec Communications, Inc.; STS Telecom, LLC; US LEC of Florida, LLC; Windstream Nuvox, Inc.; and John Does 1 through 50, for unlawful discrimination.

Docket No. 090538-TP

Exhibit ____ (TD-1)

Biographical Information for Terry Deason

Rebuttal Exhibit of Terry Deason Filed August 9, 2012

Terry Deason*



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• Energy, Telecommunications, Water and Wastewater and Public Utilities

Education:

- United States Military Academy at West Point, 1972
- Florida State University, B.S., 1975, Accounting, summa cum laude
- Florida State University, Master of Accounting, 1989

Professional Experiences:

- Radey Thomas Yon & Clark, P.A., Special Consultant, 2007 Present
- Florida Public Service Commission, Commissioner, 1991 2007
- Florida Public Service Commission, Chairman, 1993 1995, 2000 2001
- Office of the Public Counsel, Chief Regulatory Analyst, 1987 1991
- Florida Public Service Commission, Executive Assistant to the Commissioner, 1981 – 1987
- Office of the Public Counsel, Legislative Analyst II and III, 1979 1981
- Ben Johnson Associates, Inc., Research Analyst, 1978 1979
- Office of the Public Counsel, Legislative Analyst I, 1977 1978
- Quincy State Bank Trust Department, Staff Accountant and Trust Assistant, 1976 - 1977

Professional Associations and Memberships:

- National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), 1993 1998,
 Member, Executive Committee
- National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), 1999 2006, Board of Directors

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- National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), 2005-2006, Member, Committee on Electricity
- National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), 2004 2005,
 Member, Committee on Telecommunications
- National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), 1991 2004,
 Member, Committee on Finance and Technology
- National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), 1995 1998,
 Member, Committee on Utility Association Oversight
- National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) 2002 Member, Rights-of-Way Study
- Nuclear Waste Strategy Coalition, 2000 2006, Board Member
- Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) South Joint Board on Security Constrained Economic Dispatch, 2005 – 2006, Member
- Southeastern Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, 1991 2006, Member
- Florida Energy 20/20 Study Commission, 2000 2001, Member
- FCC Federal/State Joint Conference on Accounting, 2003 2005, Member
- Joint NARUC/Department of Energy Study Commission on Tax and Rate Treatment of Renewable Energy Projects, 1993, Member
- Bonbright Utilities Center at the University of Georgia, 2001, Bonbright Distinguished Service Award Recipient
- Eastern NARUC Utility Rate School Faculty Member

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served upon the following by email, and/or U.S. Mail this 9th day of August, 2012.

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By:

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