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Docket Name and Number: Docket No. 090538-TP – Amended Complaint of Qwest Communications Company, LLC against MCImetro Access Transmission Services (d/b/a Verizon Access Transmission Services); XO Communications Services, Inc.; tw telecom of florida, l.p.; Granite Telecommunications, LLC; Broadwing Communications, LLC; Access Point, Inc.; Birch Communications, Inc.; Budget Prepay, Inc.; Bullseye Telecom, Inc.; DeltaCom, Inc.; Ernest Communications, Inc.; Flatel, Inc.; Lightyear Network Solutions, LLC; Navigator Telecommunications, LLC; PaeTec Communications, Inc.; STS Telecom, LLC; US LEC of Florida, LLC; Windstream Nuvox, Inc.; and John Does 1 through 50, for unlawful discrimination.

Filed on Behalf of:

Broadwing Communications, LLC

Total Number of Pages: 19

Description of Documents:

Broadwing's Prehearing Statement

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DOCUMENT NUMBER-DATE

06195 SEP 14 2012

9/14/2012

FPSC-COMMISSION CLERK

BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

Amended Complaint of QWEST
 COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, LLC,
 Against MCIMETRO ACCESS
 TRANSMISSION SERVICES, LLC (D/B/A
 VERIZON ACCESS TRANSMISSION
 SERVICES), et al.

Docket No. 090538-TP
 Filed: September 14, 2012

**BROADWING COMMUNICATIONS, LLC'S
 PREHEARING STATEMENT**

Broadwing Communications, LLC ("Broadwing") pursuant to Order No. PSC-12-0048-PCO-TP, hereby files its Prehearing Statement in Docket No. 090538-TP, as follows:

- (1) The name of all known witnesses whose testimony has been pre-filed or who may be called by Broadwing, along with subject matter of each such witness's testimony:

* = Contains confidential information

DIRECT:

Witness	Subject	Issues	Sponsor(s)
* Don J. Wood	Qwest Counts I, II and III	5, 6, 7, 8(a), (c), (d), (f), (g), 8(a), (c), (d), (f), (g), 9(b)	Broadwing, DeltaCom, Saturn, TWTC, PaeTec, US LEC and Windstream

REBUTTAL:

Witness	Subject	Issues	Sponsor(s)
Don J. Wood	Qwest Counts I, II and III	5, 6, 7, 8(a), (c), (d), (f), (g), 8(a), (c), (d), (f), (g), 9(b)	Broadwing, DeltaCom, Saturn and TWTC
J. Terry Deason	Qwest Counts I, II and III	5, 6, 7	Broadwing, DeltaCom, MCI metro Access, TWTC and Saturn
* Mack D. Greene	Qwest Counts I, II and III	5,6,7,8(a), 8(d)	Broadwing
* Bradley N. Collins	Qwest Counts I, II and III	9(b)(i)	Broadwing

DOCUMENT NUMBER DATE

06195 SEP 14 2012

FPSC-COMMISSION CLERK

- (2) A description of all pre-filed exhibits and other exhibits that may be used by Broadwing in presenting its direct case (including individual components of a composite exhibit) and the witness sponsoring each:

* = Contains confidential information

Witness	Proffered By	Exhibit	Title
Don J. Wood	Broadwing, DeltaCom, Saturn and TWTC	DJW-1	CV of Don J. Wood
		* DJW-2	Qwest Agreement No. 1 – Excerpt
		* DJW-3	Qwest Agreement No. 2 – Excerpt
		DJW-4	MN PUC Agenda Notice: 7-20-04
		DJW-5	AT&T Comments, August 19, 2004
J. Terry Deason	Broadwing, DeltaCom, MCImetro Access, TWTC and Saturn	TD-1	Biographical Information for Terry Deason
Mack D. Greene	Broadwing	* MDG-1	Broadwing Termination Notice
		* MDG-2	Qwest Discovery Responses
		* MDG-3	Broadwing Confidential Exhibit
		MDG-4	TR Daily Noitce
		MDG-5	FCC Daily Digest
		MDG-6	FCC Declaratory Ruling
		MDG-7	Qwest FCC Comments
		* MDG-8	Minnesota Complaint
		* MDG-9	Broadwing Confidential Exhibit
Bradley N. Collins	Broadwing	* BNC-1	Broadwing Adjustments to Qwest Damage Estimate

- (3) A statement of Broadwing’s basic position in the proceeding:

Broadwing: The Legislature’s repeal of the statutes upon which Qwest relies removed the Commission’s jurisdiction to enforce those statutes. Qwest has not alleged a violation of any statute now in existence, and has never attempted to amend its Complaint to allege any such violation. Qwest’s Complaint must be denied on this basis alone.

In addition, however, Qwest has wholly failed to meet its burden of proof in this proceeding. First, Qwest failed to demonstrate that the statutes upon which it relies were ever applicable to CLEC switched access rates. When the Legislature authorized local exchange competition in 1995, it specifically directed the Commission to subject the new competitors to less regulation than was imposed on ILECs and to encourage competition through “flexible” regulatory treatment. Qwest, however, seeks to impose monopoly-era ILEC rate regulation on competitive

CLECs. The Commission has never done so, and cannot now retroactively establish and retroactively enforce such a policy.

Next, Qwest made no attempt to demonstrate that it is similarly situated to the IXCs that it asserts received discriminatorily favorable treatment from Broadwing. Instead, Qwest improperly seeks to establish a presumption that *any* rate differential is *per se* discriminatory unless justified on a cost basis. There is no basis in Florida law for this claim; CLEC switched access rates have never been cost-based and the Commission has never had ratemaking authority over such rates. Further, the two Broadwing agreements complained of by Qwest were entered into to settle then-pending federal litigation, and the terms and conditions agreed to therein did not discriminate against Qwest. Qwest has known of the existence of these agreements for at least ten years, and the Commission should reject its attempt – years after the agreements were terminated, and years after the entity that made the agreement ceased providing service in Florida – to claim damages from Broadwing.

Finally, Qwest's damages estimate is unreliable and unsupported, and its claims are excessive and inflated. Qwest improperly seeks damages for years after the agreements upon which it relies were terminated, and essentially seeks to have Broadwing re-rate over ten years of traffic according to a completely different rate structure, even though Qwest cannot demonstrate its usage during much of this time and cannot demonstrate how much it paid Broadwing for such traffic. Moreover, Qwest's damages estimate is based on demonstrably erroneous data, unwarranted assumptions, and an unsupported "black box" rate proxy. In short, Qwest's damages estimate is simply speculative and its claims should be rejected.

- (4) A statement of each question of fact, question of law, and policy question that Broadwing considers at issue, along with its position on each issue, and, where applicable, the names of the Broadwing witness(es) who will address each issue.

Issue No. 1: For conduct occurring prior to July 1, 2011, does the Florida Public Service Commission retain jurisdiction over:

- (a) Qwest's First Claim for Relief alleging violation of 364.08(1) and 364.10(1), Florida Statutes (F.S.) (2010);
- (b) Qwest's Second Claim for Relief alleging violation of 364.04(1) and (2), F.S. (2010);
- (c) Qwest's Third Claim for Relief alleging violation of 364.04(1) and (2), F.S. (2010)?

Broadwing: Broadwing adopts the CLEC Group position shown in Appendix A.

Issue No. 2: For conduct occurring on or after July 1, 2011, does the Florida Public Service Commission retain jurisdiction over:

- (a) Qwest's First Claim for Relief alleging violation of 364.08(1) and 364.10(1), F.S. (2010);
- (b) Qwest's Second Claim for Relief alleging violation of 364.04(1) and (2), F.S. (2010);
- (c) Qwest's Third Claim for Relief alleging violation of 364.04(1) and (2) F.S. (2010)?

Broadwing: Broadwing adopts the CLEC Group position shown in Appendix A.

Issue No. 3: Which party has (a) the burden to establish the Commission's subject matter jurisdiction, if any, over Qwest's First, Second, and Third Claims for Relief, as pled in Qwest's Amended Complaint, and (b) the burden to establish the factual and legal basis for each of these three claims?

Broadwing: Broadwing adopts the CLEC Group position shown in Appendix A.

Issue No. 4: Does Qwest have standing to bring a complaint based on the claims made and remedies sought in (a) Qwest's First Claim for Relief; (b) Qwest's Second Claim for Relief; (c) Qwest's Third Claim for relief?

Broadwing: Broadwing adopts the CLEC Group position shown in Appendix A.

Issue No. 5: Has the CLEC engaged in unreasonable rate discrimination, as alleged in Qwest's First Claim for Relief, with regard to its provision of intrastate switched access?

Broadwing: Broadwing adopts the CLEC Group position shown in Appendix A.

Issue No. 6: Did the CLEC abide by its Price List in connection with its pricing of intrastate switched access service? If not, was such conduct unlawful as alleged in Qwest's Second Claim for Relief?

Broadwing: Broadwing adopts the CLEC Group position shown in Appendix A.

Issue No. 7: Did the CLEC abide by its Price List by offering the terms of off-Price List agreements to other similarly-situated customers? If not, was such conduct unlawful, as alleged in Qwest's Third Claim for Relief?

Broadwing: Broadwing adopts the CLEC Group position shown in Appendix A.

Issue No. 8: Are Qwest's claims barred or limited, in whole or in part, by:

(a) the statute of limitations;

Broadwing: Broadwing adopts the CLEC Group position shown in Appendix A.

(b) Ch. 2011-36, Laws of Florida;

Broadwing: Broadwing adopts the CLEC Group position shown in Appendix A.

(c) terms of a CLEC's price list;

Broadwing: Broadwing adopts the CLEC Group position shown in Appendix A.

(d) waiver, laches, or estoppel;

Broadwing: Broadwing adopts the CLEC Group position shown in Appendix A.

(e) the filed rate doctrine;

Broadwing: Broadwing adopts the CLEC Group position shown in Appendix A.

(f) the prohibition against retroactive ratemaking;

Broadwing: Broadwing adopts the CLEC Group position shown in Appendix A.

(g) the intent, pricing, terms or circumstances of any separate service agreements between Qwest and any CLEC;

Broadwing: Broadwing adopts the CLEC Group position shown in Appendix A.

(h) any other affirmative defenses pled or any other reasons?

Broadwing: Broadwing adopts the CLEC Group position shown in Appendix A.

Issue No. 9 (a): If the Commission finds in favor of Qwest on (a) Qwest's first Claim for Relief alleging violation of 364.08(1) and 364.10 (1), F.S. (2010); (b) Qwest's Second Claim for Relief alleging violation of 364.04(1) and (2), F.S. (2010); and/or (c) Qwest's Third Claim for Relief alleging violation of 364.04(1) and (2) F.S. (2010), what remedies, if any, does the Commission have the authority to award Qwest?

Broadwing: Broadwing adopts the CLEC Group position shown in Appendix A.

Issue No. 9(b): If the Commission finds a violation or violations of law as alleged by Qwest and has authority to award remedies to Qwest per the preceding issue, for each claim:

(i) If applicable, how should the amount of any relief be calculated and when and how should it be paid?

Broadwing: Broadwing adopts the CLEC Group position shown in Appendix A.

(i) Should the Commission award any other remedies?

Broadwing: Broadwing adopts the CLEC Group position shown in Appendix A.

(5) A statement of issues to which the parties have stipulated:

Broadwing: None at this time.

(6) A statement of all pending motions or other matters the party seeks action upon:

Broadwing: None at this time.

- (7) A statement identifying the party's pending requests or claims for confidentiality:

Broadwing: Broadwing has filed the following documents under confidential cover:

Claim/Request	Date Filed	Document No.	Description	Party Claiming Confidentiality
Claim	06/14/2012	03884-12	Pages 56-59 of Direct Testimony of Don J. Wood and Confidential Exhibits DJW-2 and DJW-3	Qwest
Claim	07/02/2012	04361-12	Broadwing's Interrogatory No. 42 to Qwest and Broadwing Document Request No. 50 to Qwest	Qwest
Claim	08/09/2012	04566-12	Confidential rebuttal testimony (complete) of Bradley N. Collins and confidential Exhibit BNC-1; and Confidential rebuttal testimony (complete) of Mack D. Greene and confidential Exhibits MDG-1,2,3, 8 and 9	Broadwing Qwest

In addition, Qwest may have filed documents belonging to or obtained from a Respondent that are not included in any of Qwest's Requests for Confidential Classification filed to date. Broadwing requests that Qwest provide a list of such documents so the parties may determine who should file a Request for Confidential Classification for same.

- (8) Any objections to a witness's qualifications as an expert. Failure to identify such objection will result in restriction of a party's ability to conduct voir dire absent a showing of good cause at the time the witness is offered for cross-examination at hearing:

Broadwing: None.

- (9) A statement as to any requirement set forth in this order that cannot be complied with, and the reasons therefore:

Broadwing: None.

Respectfully submitted on this 14th day of September, 2012.

/s/ Marsha E. Rule

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify the foregoing has been served by U. S. mail or email to the following persons on this 14th day of September, 2012:

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/s/ Marsha E. Rule

Marsha E. Rule

CLEC Group List of Issues and Positions

Issue No. 1: For conduct occurring prior to July 1, 2011, does the Florida Public Service Commission retain jurisdiction over:

- (d) Qwest's First Claim for Relief alleging violation of 364.08(1) and 364.10(1), Florida Statutes (F.S.) (2010);
- (e) Qwest's Second Claim for Relief alleging violation of 364.04(1) and (2), F.S. (2010);
- (f) Qwest's Third Claim for Relief alleging violation of 364.04(1) and (2), F.S. (2010)?

CLEC Group Position: No, as to all subparts. Even if sections 364.08(1), 364.10(1) and 364.04, F.S. (2010) did apply as Qwest alleges (which CLECs dispute), Chapter 2011-36, Laws of Florida ("the Regulatory Reform Act"), repealed and did not replace 364.08(1) and 364.10(1), which are the basis for Qwest's First Claim. The Regulatory Reform Act also modified 364.04 to clarify the conduct at issue in Qwest's Second and Third Claims (*i.e.*, providing service by contract) is entirely permissible. The Regulatory Reform Act did not include a savings clause to preserve Commission jurisdiction over pending cases, as had been done for prior legislative changes to chapter 364. The Commission only has the powers granted to it by the Legislature. Thus, Florida courts have long held for administrative cases that "[w]hen a law conferring jurisdiction is repealed without any reservation as to pending cases, all cases fall with the law." Reliance on a "vested right" theory cannot be used to avoid this rule. Regulatory statutes do not create absolute obligations or rights, and a litigant to an administrative proceeding has no constitutionally protected right in pursuing a non-final (pending) administrative hearing claim. Therefore, the Commission has no jurisdiction to hear Qwest's claims made for conduct prior to July 1, 2011 under statutes repealed by the Regulatory Reform Act.

Issue No. 2: For conduct occurring on or after July 1, 2011, does the Florida Public Service Commission retain jurisdiction over:

- (a) Qwest's First Claim for Relief alleging violation of 364.08(1) and 364.10(1), F.S. (2010);
- (b) Qwest's Second Claim for Relief alleging violation of 364.04(1) and (2), F.S. (2010);
- (c) Qwest's Third Claim for Relief alleging violation of 364.04(1) and (2) F.S. (2010)?

CLEC Group Position: No, as to all subparts. The Regulatory Reform Act repealed and did not replace 364.08(1) and 364.10(1), on which the First Claim is based, and modified 364.04 to

clarify that the conduct at issue in Qwest's Second and Third Claims (*i.e.*, providing service by contract) is entirely permissible. Therefore, the Commission has no jurisdiction to address any portion of Qwest's Claims for conduct occurring on or after July 1, 2011.

There are no other Claims for Relief in the Qwest Amended Complaint, and no other provisions of the statute are encompassed within this issue or properly before the Commission for adjudication. Qwest has not alleged a violation of any other statute, either before or after July 2011, and has never attempted to amend its Complaint to allege any such violation.

Issue No. 3: Which party has (a) the burden to establish the Commission's subject matter jurisdiction, if any, over Qwest's First, Second, and Third Claims for Relief, as pled in Qwest's Amended Complaint, and (b) the burden to establish the factual and legal basis for each of these three claims?

CLEC Group Position: The burden of proof to demonstrate subject matter jurisdiction is placed on the party asserting jurisdiction, and remains on that party throughout the entire proceeding. Qwest thus bears the burden of proof on this issue because it is the party invoking the Commission's jurisdiction by the filing of its complaint. This burden requires Qwest to demonstrate the existence of jurisdiction "beyond a reasonable doubt." As the Florida Supreme Court has held, "[a]ny reasonable doubt as to the lawful existence of a particular power that is being exercised by the Commission must be resolved against the exercise thereof, and the further exercise of the power should be arrested."

Further, in the absence of statutory authority to the contrary, the party asserting the affirmative of an issue before an administrative tribunal bears the burden of proving both the factual and legal basis for its claims. The burden remains with that party in the absence of a burden-shifting legal presumption. The Legislature has not created any such presumption that applies here, and administrative agencies have no authority to create or apply legal presumptions in the absence of specific statutory or constitutional authority. Accordingly, the burden of establishing the factual and legal basis for its claims remains with Qwest throughout the proceeding.

Issue No. 4: Does Qwest have standing to bring a complaint based on the claims made and remedies sought in (a) Qwest's First Claim for Relief; (b) Qwest's Second Claim for Relief; (c) Qwest's Third Claim for relief?

CLEC Group Position: No. In order to have standing, Qwest must demonstrate that it suffered an injury in fact of a type which the proceeding is designed to protect. Qwest has not shown, and cannot show, that its alleged injuries were within the "zone of interest" that the now-repealed statutes upon which it relies (sections 364.08(1), 364.10 (1) and 364.04(1) and (2), F.S. (2010)) were designed to protect. Further, even if Qwest, in the past, would have had standing to bring a complaint based on the claims in its First, Second and Third Claims for Relief under §§ 364.08(1), 364.10(1) and 364.04(1) and (2), F.S. (2010), which CLECs dispute, it certainly lacks standing to raise or maintain such claims after the Legislature enacted The Regulatory Reform

Act, which repealed and did not replace 364.08(1) and 364.10(1), on which the First Claim is based, and modified 364.04 to clarify that the conduct at issue in Qwest's Second and Third Claims (*i.e.*, providing service by contract) is entirely permissible. Qwest has not alleged a violation of any current statute, and has never attempted to amend its Complaint to allege any such violation.

Issue No. 5: Has the CLEC engaged in unreasonable rate discrimination, as alleged in Qwest's First Claim for Relief, with regard to its provision of intrastate switched access?

CLEC Group Position: No. Qwest's First Claim alleges that each Respondent CLEC independently violated former Sections 364.08(1) and 364.10(1), Florida Statutes (2010). Even if the Commission were to apply these repealed statutes to the CLECs, Qwest cannot demonstrate that any Respondent CLEC violated the repealed statutes by failing to "extend to any person any advantage of contract or agreement . . . to persons **under like circumstances** for like or substantially similar service" or by giving "**undue or unreasonable** preference or advantage" to any person for the following independent reasons:

1. The Commission never applied the repealed statutes to CLECs. CLECs have always been subject to a lesser level of regulation and have been allowed to operate as other businesses in a free market that negotiate prices with their customers. As with any business negotiation, rates may vary based on the particular circumstances of the provider and the customer. Such deals are reasonable and permitted under Florida law and Commission rules.
2. Qwest mistakenly asserts that variations in switched access prices negotiated with customers must be based on cost differences. No Florida statute or Commission rule imposes such a requirement. To the contrary, the Commission has never (1) required CLECs to charge cost-based switched access rates or (2) required CLECs to justify price differences based on cost. The circumstances of each transaction may vary for any number of reasons, such as the volume and type of services being provided, the expected volume of switched access traffic, the term length, pending disputes between the parties, and the parties' respective bargaining skills. Because Qwest ignores such factors, it fails to demonstrate any "unreasonable discrimination."
3. The Commission has never required CLECs to charge only a uniform switched access rate to all IXCs and has never required CLECs to disclose, file and offer any non-uniform contract prices for switched access to all IXCs.

Issue No. 6: Did the CLEC abide by its Price List in connection with its pricing of intrastate switched access service? If not, was such conduct unlawful as alleged in Qwest's Second Claim for Relief?

CLEC Group Position: Each CLEC *did* abide by its Price List in connection with its pricing of intrastate switched access service to Qwest, because each CLEC charged Qwest the switched access rates in their respective Price Lists.

Moreover, a CLEC's entry into an agreement for switched access service with one IXC, but not another, does not constitute a violation of law or a failure to abide by a Price List. In fact, Qwest's complaint admits that Florida law permits – and has always permitted – CLECs to enter customer-specific agreements for switched access service.

Issue No. 7: Did the CLEC abide by its Price List by offering the terms of off-Price List agreements to other similarly-situated customers? If not, was such conduct unlawful, as alleged in Qwest's Third Claim for Relief?

CLEC Group Position: This claim only applies to Budget, BullsEye and Saturn. Each of these CLECs *did* abide by its Price List. While Qwest's Third Claim alleges that certain CLECs did not abide by Price List provisions specifying that agreements will be made available to "similarly situated customers in substantially similar circumstances," this claim obviously hinges on a demonstration by Qwest that Qwest is in fact an IXC "similarly situated and in substantially similar circumstances" to each IXC that has an agreement for switched access.

Qwest has failed to make the requisite demonstration. Instead, Qwest relies solely on an assertion that all IXCs are presumptively "similarly situated" unless there is a cost-based reason as to why they are not. However, such assertion is untenable under Florida law, because the Commission has never (1) required CLECs to charge cost-based switched access rates, (2) required CLECs to justify price differences based on cost, (3) required CLECs to charge only a uniform switched access rate to all IXCs or (4) required CLECs to disclose, file and offer any non-uniform contract prices for switched access to all IXCs contemporaneous to the effective date of such contracts. Qwest's case thus fails to account for the variety of legitimate reasons reflecting why Qwest is not "similarly situated and in substantially similar circumstances" to the contracting IXCs, and consequently fails to demonstrate that the Price List provisions somehow obligated any CLEC to extend an IXC's customer-specific agreement to Qwest.

Issue No. 8: Are Qwest's claims barred or limited, in whole or in part, by:

(a) the statute of limitations;

CLEC Group Position: Yes. The Florida Statute of Limitations, in Chapter 95, Florida Statutes, applies because Qwest has filed and pursued, and the Commission has processed, this case as a private right of action in the manner of a civil lawsuit. Specifically, either §§ 95.11(3)(f) or (3)(p) serve as an absolute bar to any portion of Qwest claims against a given CLEC that pre-dates by more than four years Qwest's naming that CLEC as a respondent. Specifically, the statute of limitations bars claims before December 11, 2005 for Respondents named in Qwest's original complaint; October 22, 2006 for Respondents first named in Qwest's Amended Complaint; and June 14, 2008 for the Respondent named in Qwest's Second Amended Complaint. In addition, under Florida law the delayed discovery doctrine does not apply, no conditions exist which would toll the limitation period, and filing a "John Doe" complaint does not toll the limitations period. Even if, contrary to Florida law, the delayed discovery doctrine were considered, Qwest has failed to meet its burden to prove any fact that would support its application here. In fact, Qwest knew of the alleged violation of its legal rights no later than June 2005, more than 4 years before Qwest chose to file its original complaint in Florida in late December 2009. Qwest inexcusably took more than 4 years to file a complaint and has neither pled nor proven any other basis for the Statute of Limitations to not apply.

(b) Ch. 2011-36, Laws of Florida;

CLEC Group Position: Yes. Qwest's claims are completely barred by the Regulatory Reform Act. See CLEC Group positions on Issues Nos. 1 and 2 (jurisdiction) and 4 (standing).

(c) terms of a CLEC's price list;

CLEC Group Position: Yes. Qwest's claims are barred for two reasons:

(i) The CLECs' price lists require that any disputes be submitted within a set time period. For years prior to filing its complaint in this case, Qwest knew it had a dispute with CLECs, but failed to submit disputes based on its claims in this case and continued to pay the price list rates.

(ii) The price lists of Budget, BullsEye, DeltaCom, Saturn and TWTC also provide that contract rates are available to all IXCs. While Qwest acknowledges both the right of

CLECs to provide services by contract and its own right to negotiate such contracts with the CLECs and has in fact exercised that right with some CLECs, Qwest simply failed to negotiate a contract pursuant to the price lists, but claims entitlement to benefits of negotiations it consciously chose not to pursue. Qwest is not entitled to any benefit of what amounts to an imputed contract, and, in particular, is not entitled to imputation, on a retroactive basis, of one finite aspect (rates) of a contract between a CLEC and another IXC.

(d) waiver, laches, or estoppel;

CLEC Group Position: Yes, Qwest's claims should be barred in whole. Qwest knowingly waived its rights and should not otherwise be allowed to assert those rights because Qwest: (i) knew of the alleged violation of its legal rights, yet inexcusably took more than 4 years to assert them; and (ii) knew that it had the duty to submit billing disputes to, and seek contract negotiations with, the CLECs but refused to do so, even though, all the while, Qwest sought and received contract rates for switched access from CLECs with whom Qwest had other dealings. Therefore, Qwest cannot be heard to complain now when Qwest failed to timely pursue rights it knew it had.

(e) the filed rate doctrine;

CLEC Group Position: Yes. The CLECs in this case filed price lists with the Commission that were approved by the staff pursuant to authority delegated to the staff by the Commission in accordance with section 2.07 C.5.a(16) of the Administrative Procedures Manual. Those price lists provide a rate or rates that apply in the absence of a negotiated rate, require that billing disputes be timely submitted, and in some cases prescribe negotiation for contract rates. Unless an IXC negotiates a different rate, it is obligated to pay the rates in the CLEC's switched access price list when it originates or terminates interexchange traffic from or to the CLEC. Qwest may not "cherry pick" parts of the filed price lists that CLECs are required to honor and at the same time ignore other portions of the price list that impose obligations on Qwest, as a customer that obtained service pursuant to the price list. Qwest has asserted in other venues that the filed rate doctrine applies to CLEC switched access service in Florida. Qwest therefore should not be heard to take a conflicting position in this case.

(f) the prohibition against retroactive ratemaking;

CLEC Group Position: Yes. Qwest's claims for monetary relief should be barred entirely. Qwest seeks to have the Commission establish a rate different than that in a CLEC's price list and different than the rate Qwest paid, and to apply that rate retroactively to the date when Qwest alleges its claim began. More specifically, Qwest

asks the Commission to permit it to retroactively dispute CLEC bills (going back many years) and pay a different amount based on a contract rate that Qwest never negotiated. Because Qwest did not negotiate switched access rates with any of the CLECs, it was obligated to pay the “default” rates in the CLECs’ price lists. Establishing a new rate and applying it to Qwest’s bills in this proceeding would violate the well-established principle against retroactive ratemaking. Qwest’s complaint is also designed to have the Commission assert cost-based ratemaking authority over CLEC switched access charges on a retroactive basis when the Commission does not have rate-setting authority over any CLEC services. This, too, would constitute prohibited retroactive ratemaking.

(g) the intent, pricing, terms or circumstances of any separate service agreements between Qwest and any CLEC;

CLEC Group Position: Yes. Qwest’s claims should be barred in whole. Throughout the alleged damages period, Qwest sought and received contract rates for switched access from CLECs with whom Qwest had other dealings. Qwest cannot have it both ways: Qwest cannot be both a beneficiary of contract rates and an opponent of contract rates. Additionally, Qwest’s Complaint in this case asks the Commission to reverse Qwest’s own choice not to pursue contract rates with Respondent CLECs. This the Commission cannot and should not do.

(h) any other affirmative defenses pled or any other reasons?

CLEC Group Position: Yes. Qwest’s claims should be barred in whole. Contrary to the Legislature’s direction and the Commission’s own history of minimal regulation for CLECs, Qwest asks the Commission, for the first time in this case, to comprehensively regulate CLEC access rates, and to do so in a manner inconsistent with and more restrictive than utility rates the Commission actually does have authority to regulate and set. Further, most if not all of the positions Qwest asks the Commission to adopt would constitute agency rules. For the Commission to adopt such positions in this case outside a proper rulemaking proceeding and then to apply such rules retroactively would be unlawful under Chapter 120 and violate the CLECs’ rights.

Additionally, any relief to Qwest should be barred as a matter of policy given that (a) Qwest filed a civil complaint in 2007 against AT&T, claiming that AT&T’s agreements with CLECs were “illegal” and should be canceled in several States (including Florida) and seeking damages for harm allegedly resulting from such agreements; (b) Qwest obtained a settlement from AT&T under those claims; and (c) Qwest now seeks to benefit from the very agreements Qwest previously claimed were void and unenforceable. The Commission should thus deny any relief to Qwest to prevent Qwest from obtaining double recovery by asserting diametrically opposite positions in different forums.

Issue No. 9 (a): If the Commission finds in favor of Qwest on (a) Qwest’s first Claim for Relief alleging violation of 364.08(1) and 364.10 (1), F.S. (2010); (b) Qwest’s Second Claim for Relief alleging violation of 364.04(1)and (2), F.S. (2010); and/or (c) Qwest’s Third Claim for Relief alleging violation of 364.04(1) and (2) F.S. (2010), what remedies, if any, does the Commission have the authority to award Qwest’?

CLEC Group Position: The Commission has no current authority to award a remedy for violation of statutes that have been repealed. Qwest has not alleged a violation of any other statute, either before or after July 2011, and has never attempted to amend its Complaint to allege any such violation.

Qwest’s claim for “reparations” is, in fact, a request for compensation due to alleged discrimination. In other words, this claim is for damages, which are beyond the Commission’s authority to award. Further, the Commission lacks specific statutory authority to award or calculate prejudgment interest.

In addition to monetary damages, Qwest asks the Commission to order Respondents to lower their intrastate switched access rates to Qwest prospectively to reflect any contract rate offered to any IXC and to file their contract service agreements with the Commission. Even if the Commission had such authority before July 1, 2012, it clearly lacks authority to do so thereafter.

Issue No. 9(b): If the Commission finds a violation or violations of law as alleged by Qwest and has authority to award remedies to Qwest per the preceding issue, for each claim:

(i) If applicable, how should the amount of any relief be calculated and when and how should it be paid?

CLEC Group Position: Qwest is not entitled to any relief, even if the Commission were to find a violation of law within the four-year statute of limitations period (beginning December 11, 2005 for Respondents named in Qwest’s original complaint; October 22, 2006 for Respondents first named in Qwest’s Amended Complaint; and June 14, 2008 for the Respondent named in Qwest’s Second Amended Complaint), and even if Respondents’ Affirmative Defenses are denied.

According to Qwest’s witness, Dr. Weisman, the only arguable harm occurred, if at all, in the “downstream” retail market, but Qwest provided no evidence that any such harm actually occurred, nor has it attempted to quantify any such harm. Qwest provided no evidence that it was unable to recover intrastate switched access charges from its customers or that it lost customers or market share. Instead, Qwest claims as the measure of its damages the estimated difference between Respondents’ price list rates and the amounts Respondents charged certain other IXCs. The monetary relief Qwest seeks is therefore entirely improper.

(ii) Should the Commission award any other remedies?

CLEC Group Position: No. See CLEC Group position on Issue No. 9(a). No other remedies are appropriate.