	BEFORE THE			
FLORIDA	PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION			
In the Matter of:				
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EXAMINATION OF THE REPLACEMENT FUEL/P				
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PARTICIPATING:	COMMISSIONER EDUARDO E. BA	LBIS		
DATE:	Tuesday, April 30, 2013			
TIME:	Commenced at 10:00 a.m.			
IIME.	Concluded at 11:37 a.m.			
PLACE:	Betty Easley Conference Ce	nter		
	Room 148			
	4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida			
REPORTED BY: LIN	TINDA DOLEG CDD DDD			
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APPEARANCES:

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JOHN T. BURNETT, ESQUIRE, Progress Energy

Service Company, LLC, Post Office Box 14042, St.

Petersburg, Florida 33733-4042, and J. MICHAEL WALLS,

ESQUIRE, Carlton Fields Law Firm, Post Office Box 3239,

Tampa, Florida 33601-3239, appearing on behalf of

Progress Energy Florida, Inc.

JON C. MOYLE, JR., ESQUIRE, c/o Moyle Law Firm, The Perkins House, 118 North Gadsden Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, appearing on behalf of the Florida Industrial Power Users Group (FIPUG).

ROBERT SCHEFFEL WRIGHT, ESQUIRE, c/o Gardner Law Firm, 1300 Thomaswood Drive, Tallahassee, Florida 32308, appearing on behalf of the Florida Retail Federation.

JAMES W. BREW, ESQUIRE, Brickfield Law Firm, Eighth Floor, West Tower, 1025 Thomas Jefferson Street, NW, Washington, DC 20007, appearing on behalf of White Springs Agricultural Chemicals Inc. d/b/a PCS Phosphate.

CHARLES J. REHWINKEL, ESQUIRE, Office of
Public Counsel, c/o The Florida Legislature, 111 West
Madison Street, Room 812, Tallahassee, Florida
32399-1400, appearing on behalf of the Citizens of the
State of Florida.

APPEARANCES (Continued):

KEINO YOUNG, MICHAEL LAWSON, LEE ENG TAN, and CAROLINE KLANCKE, ESQUIRES, FPSC General Counsel's Office, 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850, appearing on behalf of the Florida Public Service Commission Staff.

CURT KISER, GENERAL COUNSEL, and MARY ANNE
HELTON, DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL, Florida Public Service
Commission, 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee,
Florida 32399-0850, Advisors to the Florida Public
Service Commission.

PROCEEDINGS

COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Good morning. I would like to thank everyone for joining me in this meeting to hear oral arguments concerning the scope of the upcoming hearings for Crystal River 3 project.

As I've stated consistently, this Commission will initiate an evidentiary hearing concerning the remaining issues of this case when the issues are ripe for hearing. We are now at that time.

I have issued revised Orders Establishing
Procedures outlining the hearing schedule, as well as
other issues. This meeting is to hear oral arguments
from the parties concerning a threshold question to
further identify the scope of those proceedings.

So with that, I'd like to call this oral argument to order. Staff, could you please read the notice.

MR. YOUNG: Good morning. By notice issued April 16th, 2013, this time and place has been set for oral arguments before Commissioner Balbis as Prehearing Officer in Docket Number 100437. The purpose of the oral argument is set out in the notice.

COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Okay. Thank you. I would like to take appearances now, starting with Progress Energy Florida.

1	MR. BURNETT: Good morning, Commissioner.
2	John Burnett and Mike Walls on behalf of Duke Energy.
3	MR. MOYLE: Jon Moyle with the Moyle Law Firm
4	on behalf of the Florida Industrial Power Users Group,
5	FIPUG.
6	MR. WRIGHT: Robert Scheffel Wright on behalf
7	of the Florida Retail Federation.
8	MR. BREW: Good morning. James Brew with the
9	firm of Brickfield, Burchette, Ritts & Stone for White
LO	Springs Agricultural Chemicals/PCS Phosphate.
L1	MR. REHWINKEL: Good morning, Commissioner.
L2	Charles Rehwinkel with the Office of Public Counsel.
L3	MR. YOUNG: Keino Young, Caroline Klancke, Lee
L4	Eng Tan, and Mike Lawson on behalf of Commission staff.
L5	MS. HELTON: And Mary Anne Helton, advisor to
L 6	the Commission. Also here advising you today is the
L7	General Counsel, Curt Kiser.
L8	COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Okay. Thank you. I
L9	just would like to go over some procedural matters. By
20	way of background, on April 5th, 2013, the parties
21	requested clarification as to the scope of the
22	proceeding in their joint motion of the parties to
23	resolve disputed case issues.
24	In this joint motion the parties requested
5	that the Commission clarify the scope of this proceeding

by answering the following question: What issues, if any, does the settlement agreement approved by the Commission vote on February 22nd, 2012, and in Order Number PSC-12-0104-FOF-EI preclude the Commission from determining in this docket?

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On April 11th of this year I issued Order

Number PSC-13-0155-PCO-EI granting in part and denying
in part the parties' joint motion and setting forth the

procedural schedule for resolution of this issue so that
the case may proceed accordingly and setting this matter
for oral argument today.

As set forth in the body of this order, oral argument today will be no longer than two hours in duration. Duke and the Office of Public Counsel shall have 30 minutes each for oral argument. PCS Phosphate, FRF, and FIPUG shall have 20 minutes each for oral argument. There shall be no sharing of minutes. I will reserve my questions until after all the parties have presented oral argument in this matter.

Following the conclusion of oral arguments, we will also discuss the schedule for this case that is reflected in the third Order Establishing Procedure that I issued late last week. So with that, we will begin oral arguments with Duke Energy.

And just a reminder, we do have the light FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

system in place. Green is your time has started -obviously I'm going to start that in a moment -- but
amber, there will be two minutes left; solid red, there
are 30 seconds left; and flashing red is your time has
been exhausted. So with that, Duke Energy.

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MR. BURNETT: Understood. Thank you. Good morning, sir.

Commissioner, there are several complex legal arguments and positions in the briefs and a lot of stuff going on in the briefs, and I'm not going to get into the legal argument. I'll let the briefs speak for themselves.

But I would, I would submit to you,

Commissioner, there are really three straightforward

questions that you have to determine to resolve the

dispute we have today.

The first one is what issue does the

Commission need to decide with respect to the prudence

of our NEIL settlement? The second one is what evidence

can the Commission consider in coming to that

determination? And then finally, how does the

settlement impact on those first two issues?

Starting with the first issue, Commissioner, there is one central issue in this case, and it is was our settlement with NEIL reasonable and prudent? I

think the Intervenors actually said it best in their initial brief on page 7 when they said that that issue is the focal point of the remaining dispute between the parties, and we agree.

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Now there are lots of positions that the Intervenors are taking and lots of arguments they want to make, but that is the central issue. And they're free to make those positions and those arguments under that issue.

So if the Commission focuses on that ultimate issue and says that's what we're deciding, it's going to avoid another issues conference. We've been to three Issue ID meetings. We've tried our best to agree on subissues, and the Intervenors want to have several subissues under that. We're going to, we're going to continue to fight over that language. We're going to continue to try to get those neutrally phrased. We don't need that argument. We can avoid this all by just saying there's a central issue on the prudence. Let the Intervenors argue what they want under that. It's efficient, it's not controversial, and it's fair.

Moving on to the second question of if you frame that central issue, what evidence does the Commission get to look at in determining that issue? The simple answer to that question is all relevant

evidence that the Commission wants to consider. In reading the reply briefs, I can tell that there is a fundamental misunderstanding between what the Intervenors think our position is or was and what our position actually is.

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I believe that the Intervenors were under the impression that Duke was trying to say, Commissioner, you and the Commission can't look at evidence beyond a certain date. Forget history existed before that time and you can only look prospectively forward at actions and evidence taken from a date forward until we sign the settlement agreement. Not our position at all.

In fact, we think the Commission should consider and should know the whole story and the big picture and get all the facts. So we're in no way trying to argue that the Intervenor should be limited in the scope of their discovery or that the Commission should be limited in the evidence that it can see.

In fact, I went through the Intervenor's initial briefs and made a chart in our reply brief of all of the evidence that they said was important to them that the Commission should consider so they could put their case on. And by each one of these entries I said we agree, we agree. So I believe that there's not a dispute with respect to what evidence you could

consider; rather, just a misunderstanding of our position. So we should have no dispute there.

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That takes us to the final question of how does the settlement agreement impact on these first two issues that we've talked about? Simply put, the settlement cuts off a look back for prudence from a date certain but does not compromise the Commission's ability to consider the ultimate issue that I've framed.

work, I'll use an example, Commissioner. We think that it's important for the Commission to look at the NEIL policies, to go back and say I understand what NEIL is, I understand how these policies came to pass, I can see what these policies say. The Commission may look at the NEIL policy and say I don't understand some of these provisions. This provision to me is ambiguous. I might have written this differently. I might have, if I could have. That's fair. That's fair for the Commission to do and understand that.

What the Commission and the Intervenors can't do is go back decades and argue, hey, you were imprudent for not writing that differently. You were imprudent for entering into this contract in the first place.

That's barred by the settlement. Those facts are long behind us.

What the Commission can properly do is say given that policy and what it said, given the facts that the company had before it, did the company take those facts and act prudently to ultimately enter into a settlement agreement that was in the best interest of all the stakeholders?

So that's how it works. You're not precluded from the big picture, but you are precluded from going back and the Intervenors are precluded from going back decades to challenge whether we should have even contracted with NEIL at all.

Now let's talk about, Commissioner, what we trying to do when we came here from the settlement.

Because I think it's, it's appropriate and important to give context to what we were trying to do with the settlement and then talk about what the settlement says.

So when we came before this Commission with the settlement, we made it clear that we were trying to have a path forward to resolve the important issues that were still before us then. We needed to make the repair/retire decision. We needed to come to resolution with NEIL.

The company wanted to get closure for the issues behind it. So to use a metaphor, we didn't want to look over our shoulder anymore. The past is the past

and we didn't want prudence challenges coming from behind us. We wanted a path forward.

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In fact, you may recall some of the, some of the statements that the parties made to the Commission during that time, is we want to get the company set up so it could get a good settlement or a good resolution with NEIL. We want to make sure that the company is well positioned to make an intelligent decision about repair and retire. That was the intent of the parties.

Now, the Intervenors are arguing and would have you believe that notwithstanding the fact that the company paid hundreds of millions of dollars in refunds for that settlement and that -- and clearly with that intent of moving forward, not looking backwards, that we took care of the steam generator replacement project, we took care of the repairs that resulted from that, we took care of the repair/retire, but we left a gaping hole open behind us that would allow the Intervenors to go back as far as they wanted in time and challenge any aspect of NEIL to the beginning of our first relationship with NEIL. That just doesn't make sense.

And if you think about that, what the

Intervenors would argue is to say even if we obtained a

reasonable and prudent settlement with NEIL that they

loved, under their argument they still could go back and

say, but, you know what, you should have never contracted with NEIL -- I suppose we should have contracted with State Farm Nuclear -- and get an imprudence determination. That just doesn't make sense.

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So what did we do to manifest our intent with the settlement, Commissioner? What we did is what is commonly done and is practice to do in settlements. We used broad, sweeping language to say that anything in connection with, related to, including but not limited, those kind of terms is what we used, and we said anything in connection with the steam generator project or the repairs that arose from that are barred. The prudence determination is barred. You can't look back with that.

And then in Sections 10 and 11 of the settlement we set up the exact paradigm that we told you what we were trying to do: Prospective look forwards.

If we repaired the unit, the Intervenors got to weigh in on the NEIL decision, they had interaction, they got to provide us feedback that we would take to our management. If we retired it, there was talk about how we would allocate the NEIL funds. But everything is prospective in that settlement agreement. There's no looking back.

So a clear, sweeping language to include FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

everything that happened in the past is waived,
everything going forward we have a process. That makes
sense. The Intervenors' argument to the contrary does
not.

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The Intervenors would argue to you that the NEIL claims are not connected to the steam generator replacement project or the repairs.

Commissioner, I would say, first of all, that's absurd. We can't call NEIL and say, hey, we would like you to give us some money today for no reason. We have to say we have a steam generator project that has led to damages on the building and we will file claims. What else could our NEIL claims be about but the steam generator replacement project and the repairs?

The Intervenors will argue to you that they're not connected, despite the fact that I read in their reply brief, the Intervenors say on page 4, "The Intervenors readily agree that the NEIL claim arose only because Duke undertook certain actions that led to the accident that created the delamination." In my view, Commissioner, that's, that's game over. How can you say with a straight face that that's the case, but then argue that our NEIL claims are not related and connected with the steam generator replacement project? They

can't.

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Commissioner, we assert to you that the plain language of the settlement, the intent of the parties, and the circumstances that the settlement was brought to you show that common sense has to prevail, and there's no other reasonable way to read this settlement.

Commissioner, I don't think I'll even get to the green light or to the yellow light because, in closing, I just wanted to tell you that in our reply brief we've offered up -- to my first point, what is the real issue, we've offered up language that says this is how the issue should be framed. And my recollection from the issues conference is we don't have a lot of dispute about the framing of the central issue. We just continue to have disputes about all the subissues that the Intervenors wanted under it.

Me've offered an evidentiary ruling that you may consider to say that the Commission is not barred to consider all relevant evidence that it needs to hear.

And, in fact, the Commission should hear that evidence and get the complete picture. And we've offered a simple ruling that says, with respect to any actions that took place prior to the implementation date of the settlement agreement, we're not going to go back in time and judge the prudence of those, but we are going to

answer the ultimate question of was the company prudent in dealing with those facts in coming to a resolution. And after hearing the case, if you don't think that we were, then the Commission is free to say so.

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Commissioner, it just simply defies common sense to suggest that any aspect of NEIL going back into the 1980s, when the plant first came online, can be considered. It's not what the settlement says; it's not what the parties intended. And you have issued a new procedural order with a case schedule. We can make that happen. And if we keep the issues simplistic as to what they actually are and not go back to the 1980s, we can do this, and I'm not sure we can if we're going to go back in time to the very beginning of this case.

Thank you, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Okay. Thank you. Now we'll move on to the Office of Public Counsel.

MR. REHWINKEL: Thank you, Commissioner.

What the Commission is presented with here is the case of the billion pound elephant in the room, or the billion dollar elephant in the room, if you will.

What you've just heard from Duke, and we appreciate the statements that they made about the evidentiary concessions that they've made in their reply brief or the clarification they've given, but it doesn't

go far enough. But what you hear from Duke is that what the parties, who negotiated over a period of months one of the most comprehensive, complicated, and specific settlement agreements, did was they sat in a room with this giant elephant, which was the pursuit of the NEIL claim, and they used specific language to describe everything else that was waived or resolved and left that to the vagaries of an interpretation today is, in our opinion, beyond credibility.

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Duke has shown you that they know how to write a release, that they know how to describe what is waived by the case law they've cited, by the release that they have entered into with NEIL. And so to say that what we did -- and all the parties here at this table are baffled by this notion that we discussed and negotiated a resolution of something that we would never have known about until it actually materialized, which it did on March 28th, is not the case. We were not in that negotiation that resulted in us putting a specific waiver provision in the settlement agreement and then having this broad, all-encompassing waiver language that covered something that was extant and known to at the time.

The company cites to you cases about indemnification language that interprets this in

connection with language. This is legalese that is there to cover unknown future events. Unfortunately these cases don't apply on Duke's behalf to this case because what is at -- what they say it applies to is something that was already known. We knew that there was a delamination on October 2nd, 2009. We knew that very soon after Duke had filed a claim with NEIL, and that claim started a monolithic, continuous process that only ended on March 28th.

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We know that on December 20th, 2009, Duke and NEIL entered into a confidentiality agreement that indicated that there were aspects of the ongoing negotiation of this claim that would be covered by that but is indicia that the NEIL claim process was ongoing. We knew about this. There was no reason to put broad, all-encompassing language in there to cover a future event that had already occurred.

So the parties' simple position to you is that this elephant in the room was intentionally set aside and not covered by the stipulation. You read the issue at the, at the beginning of the day that the parties put to you by joint motion to be resolved, and it is what did the stipulation bar? And the only thing that the stipulation could have barred are those rights that were expressly waived.

You have reams of paper before you with the arguments about what was and was not waived. Duke's argument about what was waived finally kind of crystallizes in their reply brief, and they're saying that what the parties waived was this broad waiver in paragraph 7 that didn't need to be replicated in paragraph 10B, which they point you to as the real NEIL process that we agreed would go forward from here.

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Unfortunately, the language they cite in paragraph 10B is not a grant of authority or a grant of rights under the settlement agreement. It is a mutual agreement by the parties to stay out of each other's business. We stay out of Progress's or Duke's pursuit of the claim. They stay out of or don't object to the rights that we already had to challenge the prudence of the, whatever resolution they had with NEIL.

At the time we had entered the agreement, we didn't know if they would settle this case by litigation, by arbitration, or by some sort of settlement. As it turned out, they settled it. But at the time we put this language in there, we didn't know. So there was an ongoing process, and we know that NEIL would have availed itself of all the facts going back to the beginning of time, October 2nd, and even beyond, which would be the policies that they would be

interpreting.

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so what we're asking the Commission to recognize is that, yes, the facts and the discovery ought to go back as far as need be to tell the whole story. But it's also known that, that Duke amended the policies from time to time. We think it's important for us to understand and for them to be accountable for that. But the stipulation does not address, under, under Duke's theory of the case, it does not even address the NEIL policy and the formation of that NEIL policy because it is without question that the NEIL policy did not arise out of this SGR project.

They've told you today that the NEIL policy has been around for decades. They didn't enter into the NEIL policy because they were going to do an SGR project starting in the 2000s. So under their definition, the stipulation, by its own terms and their theory of how it applies, cannot act as a bar to you looking at the, the formation of the NEIL policy. That goes to their relationship with NEIL and the reason why they had certain terms in there. It's all in play.

And we have cited to you in our, in our -- the petition that we filed in this case that NEIL -- that Duke made certain statements to the public and prior to your vote on the stipulation about the NEIL policy

providing full coverage to bring the building back into service.

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And so what that says and what we relied on is that these policies were going to be there to, to pay for all of the damage at the building, or in the event of a retirement, they would, they would cover the cash value or 50% value of the total repair costs.

So these are issues that need to be resolved. There's no reason for them to be foreclosed by some decision today. We have in good faith sat down with Duke to try to narrow the issues so they could develop testimony. But ordinarily issues are allowed to be raised up until the time of the prehearing conference. We will be engaged in a formative process and a winnowing process as we go forward. So there's no reason, I would contend to you today, that we have to define issues and go with just the NEIL -- the Duke language that they want to propose. There's more time for that to be worked out in the future.

Our central position to you is that the NEIL claims process, as the Duke representative told you in response to your questions last year at the hearing approving the settlement, that was on a separate parallel track, and he told you that the settlement did not interfere with that process. He didn't say, when he

had the opportunity to, that it, that it cut off NEIL -Duke's obligation to meet its burden of proof or to
prove their activities were prudent with respect to
their pursuit of the claims prior to February 23rd,
2012. He didn't say that. He just said it does not
interfere with. And that's clear evidence that these
are two separate issues. And that elephant was set
outside of the room by the stipulation, and now it's
time for, for the Commission and all the parties to
bring the elephant back in and look at it.

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You issued an OEP or procedural order in

August before the settlement was entered into that the
settlement references. In your order you do not mention

NEIL in any way whatsoever. If Progress wanted to put
the NEIL pursuit process into the stipulation, they
could have asked us to negotiate it, and we would
perhaps have negotiated or maybe we would have left it
the way we did, which was that's for the future.

So that's where we are right now. And I would urge the Commission to look at it this way. If you rule the way Duke wants it, you will cut off perhaps an inquiry into the entire course of action and all of their actions related to their pursuit of NEIL and we will never know how that would have turned out.

On the other hand, if they are held FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

accountable for the prudence of their activities and their actions in pursuing this claim, as we say they should be because it's not barred by the stipulation, then there's no harm because they have agreed that they are responsible for showing, for demonstrating that they entered into a prudent settlement with NEIL and the number they got was the best number they could get.

Because they were getting this for the customers.

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We had no voice in how they pursued the claim and what they were going to advocate. We didn't have a voice in whether they were going to arbitrate, mediate, or settle. We had advisory opportunity, as is set out in 10B, and there was -- the only process that's in 10B is how we communicated back and forth on that. That's not the process that the parties agreed to that we would be judging the prudence of.

The prudence issue is all of Duke's activities and actions in pursuing the NEIL claim. And we would submit to you that requiring them to meet that burden and meet their burden of proof there would be no different than what they've already agreed to in their reply brief, which is that they have the obligation to demonstrate that they were, that they were prudent.

And I will refrain from responding to the discussion about how you rule affecting the schedule

because this is an enormous case whether you rule one way or the other, and I don't think setting the issues is going to influence that. I understand we're going to talk about that later, so I will not get into, into that.

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Commissioner, I would also say there's a statement in Progress's initial brief that suggests that we've been arguing that we ought to be past 2014 in having a hearing in this matter. And I don't know if that was a typo and they meant 2013, but we, we certainly don't think that's the case. And I don't think that should influence the ruling whatsoever in this case as to what the timeline ought to be. We ought to get it right upfront. The issues ought to be what the issues ought to be. And we agree that if it's barred by the settlement, it shouldn't be in the case. But we would also strongly submit to you that the pursuit of NEIL and the prudence of Progress's -- Duke's actions in the pursuit of its NEIL claims is not barred in any way.

There is an express waiver that you'll hear more about. There's an express waiver provision that you'll hear more about, and I would urge and commend to you that you take those arguments to heart.

From the, from the position of the Public FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

Counsel and other customers, this is the most important issue that we have seen in decades before this

Commission. There's no reason to insert an artificial bar on looking at Duke's prudence or lack of prudence with respect to pursuing the NEIL claim. There is nothing that you have been presented with that says that on February 23rd there's something about the NEIL process that became solidified or put to bed.

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What we do know is from reading the NEIL/Duke settlement of March 28th, 2013, is that that was the first time the whole claim had been resolved. There was no claim that was, that was resolved or partially put away. Everything was on the table as far as we understand it. There will be discovery about that, but there's no reason to assume that today.

And they have not argued to you that there's something good and magical about February 23rd, 2012, that should be the beginning point of when you look at their activities in pursuing the claim. They began pursuing the claim within hours, I'm certain, of the October 2nd delamination, and all of those actions in pursuing the claim should be the subject of the Commission's review.

What should not be the subject of the Commission's review is their actions in repairing the

building and their actions in designing and executing the steam generator replacement. We agree that's off the table. But their course of dealing with NEIL from the minute it started should be something that we can all look at. And to the extent that the policies bear on that, the policies and their actions in developing the policies should be part of what everyone gets to look at.

So with that, I would close and turn it over to the next. Thank you, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Thank you.

From PCS Phosphate.

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MR. BREW: Thank you, Commissioner. Good morning.

Let me suggest at the outset that the issue we're arguing about is less about the law and more about the context and perspective, and it's actually a context and perspective that you've already expressed.

Mr. Rehwinkel mentioned the original 2011
Order Establishing Procedure where you had talked about there were facts that we already know and there are facts that we don't. And the context of the settlement when it was negotiated and approved by the Commission was accomplished during a unique circumstance, which was you had the ongoing prudence investigation relating to

the outage and you had Progress's pursuit of its NEIL claims, both going in tandem.

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What the settling parties all knew and which was apparent throughout the discussions was that the discovery and litigation of the prudence case effectively worked to the detriment of ratepayers because there's never been any dispute that every dime of NEIL recoveries was supposed to go back to benefit consumers. This was always about reimbursement of dollars for ratepayer benefit. And to the extent that the prudence case was litigated, you had the counterproductive notion of undercutting or potentially undercutting what Progress is attempting to do with NEIL, a process that was, as Mr. Rehwinkel mentioned, was not transparent to the Commission or to the other parties at all. And so it was in that context that the settlement agreement reserved those issues.

And I would note that even the staff in its presentation to you on February 20th when talking about the CR3 repair and some of the waiver provisions specifically talked about allowing Progress time to address and resolve the NEIL issues. And so that is the context in which we've addressed all of these issues.

And so when Duke filed its initial brief and said on page 7 that, that all issues, including the NEIL

ones, had been resolved through the implementation date, that was clearly wrong, which is why PCS filed its reply in this matter.

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And I had found actually Duke's reply brief to be somewhat baffling. And in some respects it takes sort of a Jekyll and Hyde approach, or what I started to think of as Progress and Duke, in that, as Mr. Burnett mentioned, they did acknowledge that the NEIL insurance claims in its handling and its outcome are clearly an issue. And Duke goes to pains on page 7 to list a whole series, a page-long length of subissues that they consider to be in play. And they say on the next page that all proper evidence, however far back in time is required to go, are also a legitimate area of inquiry.

So I got to that point and I said, well, then what are we really arguing about? And then you turn the next page when it comes to the specific issues of OPC 7 and 8, and now they're back to paragraph 7 accomplishes an all-encompassing waiver. Well, the fact is you can't do it both ways.

They've acknowledged that the NEIL issues have to be addressed by the Commission. They've acknowledged that the scope of that, of that inquiry is whatever is reasonably necessary to get to the bottom of that.

Now that could be addressing questions of FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

specific interactions between Duke and NEIL. It could be NEIL's perception of the repair, all of which the subissues that are mentioned on Duke's reply brief plainly say is something to be addressed. But it could also involve the scope of the insurance policy and the coverage and how it's changed, which is what OPC's disputed issues 7 or 8 are trying to get to.

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And so the basic problem is not do we need to address the global issue that Mr. Burnett described?

It's really is there any rational basis for arbitrarily cutting off that inquiry? And the answer is no.

And so the only final issue, as Mr. Burnett mentioned, was, well, what's the impact of the settlement agreement on that? And the answer is none, because that issue has been preserved and it was preserved for a clearly stated reason that everybody in the room understood because the NEIL process was ongoing when we did the settlement agreement and no one knew how it was going to turn out and no one was plugged into that process.

And so the, the provision in the agreement,

10B, specifically talked about Duke advising the

Intervenors about its outcome. Our input was purely
advisory. Because it was purely advisory, that

provision expressly said we reserve all of our rights to

address those issues. Not some of them, all of them.

And it was because we were in a process where no one knew where NEIL was going and how it would affect either the repair or retire decision and so there was no, there were no facts to settle. There was no basis for speculating where they would turn out; whether it would be for a thousand dollars or a billion dollars. And because of that, the agreement reserved those issues, all of them, until it was time. And as you mentioned today, now is the time.

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So there's no basis to cut off the inquiry in terms of the evidence to be considered, which, for issues that are in play, Duke seems to concede. In fact, they've expressly said they agree, that you can go back as far in time as it takes for the issues that are in play. There's just no basis for their additional argument that some of the insurance issues aren't in play because they've been settled because the settlement did not resolve any of those issues by inference. In fact, as I mentioned, from the overall context and the language of the agreement, nobody was shooting in the dark. Those issues were fully reserved until such time as it was appropriate to do so, which is now. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Thank you.

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MR. WRIGHT: Good morning, Commissioner. Thank you very much for the opportunity to address you.

One thing that we all agree on, and this is genuine and from our hearts, is that this whole sequence of events beginning in October of 2009 is a terrible tragedy. It's a tragedy with far-reaching economic consequences for Florida.

The remainder of this docket is about how the ultimate economic effects and impacts of this tragedy are going to be apportioned between Duke and its Florida customers.

Duke's obligation was and is to minimize those adverse consequences on its customers. Duke's burden here in this docket is to prove that it satisfied -satisfactorily fulfilled that obligation.

We believe, frankly, just based on the numbers involved relative to the, relative to the settlement numbers involved with the NEIL settlement versus the staggering impacts of this case, we believe that there's a prima facia case that Duke did not satisfactorily fulfill its obligation and that's what we're here to litigate. So you've got basically two issues, and it looks like maybe we've only got one big issue, and that is what issues can be litigated in this docket now that

Duke has, has apparently agreed that we can look back to evidence that occurred -- that existed, came into being before February 23rd, 2012. To the extent that's true, then I'm going to let that go.

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But the issues are what can be litigated in this docket, and there's several specific disputed issues, disputed in the sense of whether they should be in here: Did they maintain adequate and appropriate insurance coverage? Did they maintain a prudent relationship? Did they govern themselves? Did they behave reasonably and prudently in their dealings with Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited? As one of the largest members of NEIL, a closely related issue, did they have a, a conflict of interest?

We're not completely sure, but it appears to us that Duke is a major member of this mutual insurance company and has exposure based on the percentage in which it participates in NEIL. This, on its face, looks like a conflict of interest and we want to litigate that issue.

And then finally there's an issue of potential double counting regarding O&M costs and rates. And, frankly, I can't see why on earth Duke would object to that issue, but apparently they do.

These are either facial prudence issues or FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

issues that relate to, quote, Duke's course of action, unquote, with respect to NEIL, which is expressly reserved as a matter that the parties are free to litigate in this docket.

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Regarding the scope of the case, paragraph two of the settlement agreement, which my colleague Mr. Burnett never mentioned in his remarks, specifically provides, "The parties reserve all rights, unless such rights are expressly waived under the terms of this agreement." It is obvious on its face that the settlement agreement contains no such express waiver of our ability to litigate any of these issues.

Mr. Burnett suggests that, that if you allow litigation of prudence issues relative to NEIL, that they somehow left a gaping hole in what they thought they were protecting themselves against. The corresponding suggestion, the implication of that argument is that without saying so, because there's no language in the settlement agreement that says so in any way expressly or implicitly, the corresponding suggestion is that the representatives of the consumers in this case, the Public Counsel's Office, PCS Phosphate, the Industrial Power Users, and the Retail Federation, left a corresponding gaping hole, which at the time we entered into the settlement agreement had a

value somewhere north of \$2.25 billion. That was just the repair cost coverage. And the fuel cost coverage was another \$490 million on top of that.

They would suggest that we left a gaping hole in our ability to protect our customers' interests in the subsequent litigation in this docket. This defies the plain language of the contract. There's no express waiver, no express limitation, no, no implicit waiver, no implicit limitation. It defies the plain language of the contract. It defies common sense. It is patently absurd. We should be allowed to litigate these issues, and we agree with the Public Counsel and PCS. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Thank you.

Mr. Moyle.

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MR. MOYLE: Thank you. And before I get into my argument, I just wanted to thank you for giving us the chance to appear before you to discuss this issue. It's a, it's a matter that we've briefed extensively. And I think oral argument hopefully you will find beneficial to you as you ponder the issue before you.

You clearly articulated the issue, you know, that was before you. I'm going to make some remarks about Progress's comments because it surprised me a little bit that they in their remarks said there are

really three issues and identified three issues. I do not see it that way. FIPUG does not see it that way.

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You know, the joint motion said there was one issue before you today. And, as you stated, that is what issues, if any, does the settlement agreement approved by the Commission in an order preclude the Commission from determining in the docket? So the question is what is off the table?

And I would suggest while you have to look at the operative document, which is the agreement, that almost from a going in standpoint that there should be a hesitancy to not look at issues as this Commission, as the entity that oversees rates, that oversees utility regulation, that serves to strike the right balance between utilities and customers, that it should almost be a presumption that you're not going to hamstring or limit yourself in looking at certain issues.

And as Mr. Wright indicates, you know, the parties did not intend to limit themselves. I mean, what the parties said, as has been pointed out a couple of times, is there is an express provision that says we're reserving all rights unless they're expressly waived. And that's in paragraph two.

So you have to construct the contract by looking at all the terms. You've got a provision that

says we're not waiving anything unless it's expressly waived under the terms of the agreement.

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So it seems to follow to me then that the next part of the analysis is to look at the agreement and to say, okay, you know, what was expressly waived? And in my reviewing of the agreement, I've identified a few areas that were expressly waived, and one is on page 6. It says, and I'm paraphrasing a little bit, but, you know, absent fraud, misconduct, or misrepresentation, quote, the intervening parties cannot and will not challenge the prudence of PEF's actions on the SGR project or PEF's repair activities from the inception date of the SGR project through implementation date in any PSC or judicial proceeding. So that's, that's one provision that, that addresses a waiver.

On page 10 the parties said we're not going to challenge the repair, if it was executed and undertaken before December 31, 2012. It was essentially a term that said, look, we want you to go forward and repair. If you do that -- we're not going to, we're not going to challenge your execution of repair if you, if you begin to do it before December 31. That was a, that was a waiver.

We, on page 15, waived expressly the right to challenge the decision to retire or repair. That was

expressly waived. So, you know, I point these out because in construing and constructing a contract it has to be looked at in toto.

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We think it's clear that the waivers were very limited. I mean, that was the intent of the parties. If it is unclear, we cited in our brief a case, the Gladfelter case at 160 So.2d 740, that suggests that if uncertainty exists as to whether rights were waived or not, then the matter should be decided in favor of one whose rights might be extinguished.

And I would couple that case law with sort of the general policy of this Commission being set up to, you know, to look at issues and make decisions that would suggest that the contract be interpreted in accordance with its plain terms, and that this broad waiver that PEF -- excuse me -- that Duke is suggesting not be adhered to.

I have some notes, and we, in our brief, I think made a point about how awkward it would be to try to put a hard cutoff date of February 22nd in. And at one point in some of the discussions it was suggested that anything that occurred before that date from any standpoint, whether it was a piece of evidence or not, would not be something that could be inquired into. I think Progress has conceded that point early on. So I'm

not going to spend much time on that, other than to say it would be really awkward if you were taking a deposition of someone and you were asking them the question, "Did your company ever look at the relationship with NEIL and recognize that there might be a conflict of interest because Duke, the acquiring company, has a bunch of nuclear power plants, NEIL is a mutual company, and there might be a conflict of interest as you negotiate with them?"

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If the deponent was then having to try to remember, well, I had that conversation, but was it before February 22nd, 2012, or not? I mean, how would, how would he answer that question? It would be very cumbersome, very awkward. And we don't -- we think discovery should be broader than that. I think, I think Progress has recognized that and conceded that position, but I did just want to take a minute and make that point. To try to impose a, you know, a blackout date with such rigor and rigidity would not, would not work very well and probably lead to an absurd result, and there's case law that says you don't construe a contract in a way that would lead to an absurd result.

I want to spend a minute, if I could, and relate that -- I may have misunderstood, but what I thought I heard Duke suggest was really this case should

be decided as one issue; it's ripe for a one-issue decision. And we, we reject that for a whole host of reasons.

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First of all, Florida Statute 120.57 and 120.569 govern this proceeding. There are disputed issues of fact. Parties have raised disputed issues of fact. The Florida Retail Federation and OPC has filed a pleading where they have put a bunch of issues in play. And parties, pursuant to statute, have the right to have disputed issues of fact, provided they're relevant and material, decided by the trier of fact -- in this case, the Commission.

So existing statutory law says we can't all roll this up into one issue, which is, you know, was the NEIL settlement reasonable and prudent? That's what Duke is suggesting, if I heard them, saying there's really one issue.

But as Mr. Rehwinkel says, you know, he classifies this and characterizes it as a billion dollar elephant in the room. Maybe, you know, maybe his math is off, because if you take the property insurance damage policy, that was 2.25 billion, each of the replacement power policies was 490, I'll call it 500 for rounding purposes. There were two events. Were both events covered? Was only one event covered? You know,

if you add those two policies together for another billion, you know, you're at, you're at 3.25 billion.

And, you know, Progress accepted a significant reduction from that number; I think less than 25% of it. So, you know, I think they will say, well, that's a lot of money, 800 million is a lot of money. But you have to step back and judge in what context is that?

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If a homeowner had an insurance policy for \$325,000 on their house and it got hit by a hurricane and the insurance company paid them \$800,000, I'm not sure they would think that they got a real fair, reasonable, good, prudent deal in that context.

So I think the temptation to say this should all be one issue should be rejected. And I would point out the magnitude of the case. OPC calls it one of the biggest ones this Commission has ever considered.

I was thinking about rate cases. And, you know, to take what they suggest to say we could just have one issue; was the NEIL amount that you settled for reasonable? Well, we could do the same thing in a rate case and say is the request for X amount of money reasonable? But that's not how the Commission does it. I mean, rate cases typically have over a hundred issues that are broken out into subsets. And I think that's a good practice because it has discovery on select issues,

it has a rigid, rigorous inquiry.

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And I counted the issues that have been identified to date in this case, it's attached to the brief that Progress filed, and there's 39. That's not an unmanageable or unwieldy amount of issues for a case of this magnitude.

So I would, on behalf of FIPUG, encourage you to not accept the proposition that this law can be decided, you know, as, as one issue.

And, furthermore, we're still in discovery. I mean, we are serving interrogatories. Depositions will be taken. To the extent that there are issues that are discovered, as is the Commission's practice, typically you have until the prehearing conference to identify issues that will be resolved, and that should not be changed in this context.

If I could just have one minute to review my notes.

(Pause.)

To sum up, we think that the agreement is clear. To the extent that it's not clear, any uncertainty should be resolved in accordance with case law in a way that preserves rights, does not have them forfeited.

To the extent that parol evidence would ever FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

need to be taken about what the parties intended, you know, then that would necessitate a separate evidentiary hearing. But if there was so much uncertainty, which I don't think there is because we think the agreement is clear on its face, then the next proper course of action would probably be to take some evidence about, about what was intended when the parties sat down. You've heard some of the people say here's, here's the argument. But that would be, you know, a step.

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So we would encourage you to answer the question that is presently before you and answer only that question: What issues were waived? And by going through the agreement and identifying those that were waived, not by implication but as the agreement recognizes, by express terms, I think you would come up with an answer that would allow the parties to move forward, you know, to litigate a number of issues.

And I did want to make just one clarification for the, you know, for the record. We've had a number of issue identifications. In, I think, the reply brief, Duke suggested that the question of whether it was prudent to conduct business with an insurance company that's not properly registered or licensed in the state of Florida was somehow waived. And, again, we're back to a waiver argument. But just to make clear, that

issue has not, has not been waived. We think that's a 1 2 bona fide question and should not, you know, fall within -- you know, it's not expressly waived in the 3 4 agreement and should be one that the Commission 5 considers when they ultimately make a decision in this 6 case. So thank you for the, for the time and the 7 8 opportunity to express arguments. We appreciate it. 9 **COMMISSIONER BALBIS:** Okay. Thank you. 10 And I want to thank all of the parties for 11 staying within your time constraints. I was a little 12 bit generous with that, but I wanted to make sure that 13 everyone had the opportunity to speak their mind on this 14 important issue. 15 We're going to move on to the question phase. 16 I believe staff has some questions of the parties. 17 not, I know I have some clarifying questions that I 18 would like to ask. 19 MR. YOUNG: Commissioner, staff had some 20 questions, but based upon the parties' comments here 21 today, all of staff's questions as relates to the joint 2.2 motion and the parties' briefs have been answered. 2.3 Thus, staff has no questions. 24 COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Okay. Thank you.

And I have a few questions. And, again, I

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agree with staff; the majority of my questions have been clarified with the comments from, from Duke and also with the reply briefs.

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But I want to make sure there still isn't confusion in what Duke is agreeing to is an appropriate scope to discuss during the hearing process. So I'd like to kind of flesh that out to make sure that everyone is clear.

So for Duke, on page 7 of your reply brief you had a table that issued 14 assertions that you agree with the Intervenors on that are appropriate to be discussed during the, the hearing process. However, a lot of those activities occurred between the SGR inception date and the implementation date, which is counter to some of your arguments that that time period should be excluded. So I just want to clarify that you are conceding that activities within that period are appropriate to be reviewed and discussed and ruled upon.

MR. BURNETT: Thank you, Commissioner.

We certainly agree that if the, if those issues are important to the Intervenors, they want to put it before the Commission and have the Commission consider it, they can do so. Considered, yes, we agree. Brought to light and discussed, absolutely.

Ruled upon as to any independent issue in FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

there, no, if it was prior to the implementation date. And Mr. Moyle makes the, makes the perfect point. He wants to go back and challenge was it prudent to even contract with NEIL at all? So that's an example of something that you could consider how NEIL was formed, how the relationship came to be, and look at that big picture as going forward. But we argue that the Commission and the Intervenors are precluded from challenging the initiation of that relationship in the first instance.

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So, again -- and I agree with the Intervenors, it's superficial to suggest that the Commission can't understand how we got to where we got. The operative question is after February, the year that we spent with NEIL after February 2012 up until the date we signed the settlement, that is the question to say knowing all the facts of how we got here, did you take those facts and did you negotiate a reasonable settlement?

COMMISSIONER BALBIS: My question is specifically not just from the implementation date to the time the settlement with NEIL was, was executed, but from the SGR inception date to the implementation date. So as soon as the claims process started with NEIL after the first delamination in October 2009 to the settlement with NEIL, that period of time, you're conceding, is

appropriate for the Commission to review?

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MR. BURNETT: Absolutely, sir, as part of the determination. But, again, we take issue with going back and nit-picking to any particular act of, well, you should have been, for instance, more aggressive with NEIL on this meeting on Thursday. Had you, had you pushed that out for two more hours, the Intervenors might argue, NEIL would have folded. That's a particular factual issue that they say that was imprudent. That's what we say is barred. But you can consider the interaction, just not judge any particular microaction there.

And, really, I mean, to take it back, I'm not sure what case to put on if we don't have a bright line there. Under the Intervenors' argument I think they may say, hey, I want to know whether it was prudent to build CR3 in the first instance. Under their argument they say that's not barred under the settlement, it's not specifically listed.

So that's what I'm saying, Commissioner.

You're fully entitled to know the big picture, but there has to be some credibility given to the settlement and focus on the what real question is you're trying to decide.

COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Okay. Let me change FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

gears a little bit.

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I issued a second Order Establishing

Procedures that listed 12 items that at a minimum

Progress at the time, now Duke, should provide testimony
in covering the information on those 12 topics. Duke

did not challenge that order. So is it your

understanding and your belief that the specific
information requested in that order be proper and
considered?

MR. BURNETT: Yes, Commissioner. And I may have been misunderstood by Mr. Moyle as well. When I say the central issue, I'm talking about NEIL. All these briefs are about NEIL. There are a whole host of issues, the ones that you issued in your order included, that we've, I believe, agreed upon, and they are set aside at this point to say we don't have any problem with these coming in as factual issues, maybe even stipulated issues. So all those are included and will be addressed in our case or will be before the Commission in some manner.

But I just wanted to say here I think we're really just talking about the NEIL issue today.

COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Okay. And, again, on page 8 of your reply brief, and you've alluded to this, you stated that Progress or Duke is in no way suggesting

that the Commission cannot consider all proper evidence put before it going back to well before the implementation date. Is that a -- I mean, it's a quote from your reply brief, but you stand behind that statement.

MR. BURNETT: I do, sir.

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COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Okay. Because what, what I need to determine is, again, the question that's before me, and what issues is the Commission precluded from considering? So I think that that statement is very clear.

Did you find or put in any language in the settlement agreement that precludes the Commission from taking any action?

MR. BURNETT: I'm sorry. Could you ask that one more time, Commissioner?

COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Sure. Is there any language in the settlement agreement that binds the Commission?

MR. BURNETT: Yes, sir, there is. To the extent that the Commission has ruled that actions from the -- well, since the Commission has ruled that actions from the beginning of the SGR to the implementation date are covered by the settlement and the Commission has taken action consistent with that ruling in dismissing

Phase 1, the Commission and everyone else has that 1 2 behind them now. The Commission certainly is not bound to judge the prudence of our actions after the 3 4 implementation date, nor is the Commission bound to 5 challenge and review the repair/retire decision. 6 Certainly the Commission is not barred from judging the 7 ultimate resolution of our prudence with the -- the 8 prudence of our ultimate resolution with NEIL. But the 9 issues implementation that date back are, by your order 10 and approval of the settlement, barred.

COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Okay. And then I think this is my last question. But this Commission has a procedure with dealing with privileged or confidential information. Do you feel that the standard procedures that we have to deal with those would be appropriate for this process or this hearing?

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MR. BURNETT: Certainly with respect to confidential information, yes, Commissioner.

Absolutely. Privileged information is a different sorry. Privileged information, if it is, in fact, privileged, never comes to the Commission. But certainly your procedure for dealing with confidential information is appropriate.

COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Isn't there a procedure to determine what is privileged and what is not?

MR. BURNETT: Yes, sir, there is. I don't, I 1 2 don't think we're there yet. I don't know that any of 3 the Intervenors have raised a motion to compel or 4 challenged any of our objections, but we may be there at 5 some point. 6 COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Okay. And then just a 7 few questions for the Intervenor parties. 8 And I have a question for the Office of Public 9 Counsel, and it concerns the disputed issues that were 10 copied in, I believe, Progress's initial brief, and you 11 touched upon it in a reply brief and in your statements 12 today. 13 If Progress or Duke settled for less than the 14 full coverage amount of the NEIL policy, then why is the 15 policy amount important --16 MR. REHWINKEL: Just --17 **COMMISSIONER BALBIS:** -- or appropriate for 18 this proceeding? 19 MR. REHWINKEL: Just so I understand your 20 question, you're saying if they settled for less than 21 the policy limits, why is the -- are you asking about 2.2 the policy or the, is the policy limit amount relevant? I apologize. 2.3 24 COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Well, one of the

disputed issues -- and I don't want to get into arguing

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the issues of whether or not they're appropriate -- but this one kind of confused me, and that is the disputed issue associated with did Duke have the appropriate policy amount for the NEIL coverage.

MR. REHWINKEL: Yes.

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COMMISSIONER BALBIS: And we have a situation where Duke accepted less than the policy amount. So why would the total policy amount be appropriate?

MR. REHWINKEL: Okay. Commissioner, the, the reason that that issue is, is raised is there are 12 policies that were at issue between Duke and NEIL. And the settlement that they entered into on March 28th covered -- it resolved all claims against all 12 of those policies.

Now what we're asking about is did -- because there were public statements made by the CEO and the Chief Financial Officer of, of Progress I think before the merger had been consummated, and perhaps even by Duke -- yes -- by Duke after the merger had been consummated, that they believed that they had adequate coverage under the policies to pay for repairs to bring the plant back into service. That's an issue of fact because \$2.44 billion is the -- was kind of the high end of one of the two middle-of-the-road repair estimates, and those bear on how much the policy pays.

So if they said they had enough to cover it and they made these public statements -- and they made one of these statements prior to the Commission voting on the settlement -- that says that they were under the impression that they had in place prior to the accident occurring enough coverage to protect them and to ultimately protect the customers and the people of the

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state that they serve.

If that turned out not to be true, that's an issue I think that the Commission needs to have some ability to take a look at. So that's why that issue is there.

They also made some changes to the policy in the, in the recent years, including where and how they arbitrate; what evidence they reply upon in resolving issues about coverage under the policy. So this is, this issue may need some wordsmithing, it may need some shaping, and we're willing to work on that. But the policy itself has a central role because they're the ones that entered into the policy and they're the ones that said this policy is good to go and it'll cover us for what has happened. And if they settle for less than that, it may have a bearing upon whether the provisions of the policy did not actually provide the type of coverage that Progress or Duke thought it did at the

time they entered into it or they made these statements.

So that's the reason why we have that in there.

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Question. We have two referenced issues or documents here. We have the settlement agreement that part of that agreement required within five days a motion filed with the Commission to dismiss Phase 1 of the docket and put a stay on Phases 2 and 3. Well, Phase 1 of the docket dealt with all of Progress's activities leading up to the first delamination event. Wouldn't that dismiss the decades-old insurance issues associated with NEIL prior to that?

MR. REHWINKEL: I'm glad you asked that question, Commissioner, because that really relates to a point that, that Duke tries to make on page 10 of their reply brief in footnote 3. They say there the Intervenors never asserted the right to challenge the prudence of this insurance decision in the first place or the terms and conditions of the NEIL policies in the settlement agreement.

At the time that you entered your order and that Phase 1 was established, there was no point of entry or there was no reason for any of the parties to take a position to challenge that. It was not ripe for decision. It was not an issue that had come up.

Those issues that were addressed in Phase 1, it is our understanding, dealt with the repair and construction activities that were, that were part of the SGR project. The engineering that designed the method of entry into the building, the cutting into the building, the de-tensioning the building, the movement of the steam generators, the old ones out and the new ones in, those are the activities that were addressed there. Insurance was not an issue prior to October 2nd, 2009. So that, in our view, that could not have touched those issues because it was not a justiciable issue at

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COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Okay. And then the other question I had is the cost associated with the NEIL insurance policy. I mean, that has been recovered through rates for decades.

MR. REHWINKEL: Yes.

that time for Phase 1.

COMMISSIONER BALBIS: And rate cases have been administered by this Commission and ruled upon by this Commission that included those and deemed those costs prudent. When does administrative finality attach itself to those decisions and those costs?

MR. REHWINKEL: Well, I think a review of those decisions, if to the extent that NEIL policies were ever an issue in this case, would have been the

payment of the premiums, who was responsible for the premium payment, but not whether they had the right type of insurance in place to cover the, to cover the, the losses that they could have experienced from accidents at that plant. That's a different issue in our view.

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And so administrative finality with respect to going back and adjusting rates because of the premiums, yes, that, that ship has sailed a long time ago.

But they, they amend this policy every year.

And the issue about whether the policy provisions or the endorsements in the policy have, have never, in our view, been, been raised as an issue and, thus, are not foreclosed. And these amendments occurred even after the last rate case, which would have been a 2009 hearing.

So I don't think there's anything that, that is in the policy. The specific policy here that went into effect April 1, 2009, that was not raised as an issue in the last rate case. And so any changes or any interpretation of that policy certainly is not, not put to bed by even the most adventurous interpretation of administrative finality.

MR. WRIGHT: Commissioner?

COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Yes.

MR. WRIGHT: Just very briefly to respond to

your question.

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I think the way I would say it is this:

Administrative finality attaches to the Commission's orders as to those issues which were decided. In any rate case in which the Commission approved the prudency of premium payments to NEIL, that issue is decided. The issue of coverage, the issue of the terms and conditions of the policy was, to the best of my knowledge, never, ever addressed and, therefore, was not subject to a final order of the Commission.

COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Okay. And then one final wrap up question. And I believe -- I forget if it was Mr. Brew or Mr. Wright made the statement where you're not sure what we're arguing about. But I guess the question for Mr. Rehwinkel, if Progress or Duke agrees to the 14 assertions, that those are appropriate issues to be decided and ruled upon, what is left?

MR. REHWINKEL: Well, I, I think not much. It the, if the true scope of those issues is that to the extent they are heard and can be considered in the total, the overall picture, I would agree with Mr. Burnett to a degree that, that challenging specific standalone actions are not what we're after. We're after the big picture. But the big picture is, is just that. It's not, you know, something that happened in

this month or that month or before February or after February. As long as the Commission can make determinations based on the overall evidence that's made up of these issues, I think we go a long ways towards getting what the customers want.

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There are issues that may arise in discovery that we would not want to commit that they'll foreclose because they're not on this issue list even though they might come up in discovery and are not otherwise barred by the stipulation or some other provision of administrative finality or relevance or whatever. So I wouldn't give you a categorical "this is it." But this is the lion's share of it. And as long as you have a true look at it, the customers have a fair opportunity to present evidence on it and to test Duke's evidence, and Duke does put evidence on and meet their burden of proof, I think you have the essential elements for the right type of hearing that you want to hold.

COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Okay. Thank you. And, you know, I agree with you. I think that there's not much left and I think that all the parties are coming relatively close together and have the same goal that I do, and that is to have a transparent process that the Commission has as much information as possible to make an informed decision.

So with that, I will take --

MR. MOYLE: I'm sorry. Can I -- I had made notes on the questions that you had asked, and you gave Mr. Wright a chance. Can I just make three brief comments on three points that you've raised?

COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Sure. That's fine.

MR. MOYLE: Okay.

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COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Just one; you can have one comment.

MR. MOYLE: That's like a budget negotiation process: What's your, what's your top priority?

No. You had asked the question, what do you think that the Commission is precluded from considering, and Mr. Burnett answered. I would also point out that I think there's an issue that the Commission is precluded from considering that is found on page 13 of the agreement, and it relates to how the NEIL proceeds would be allocated.

And the agreement says, "If PEF determines to decommission rather than repair CR3 and return the unit to commercial operation, all NEIL insurance proceeds will, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be applied first to offset the consumers' share of replacement fuel costs incurred after December 31, 2002, with any remaining proceeds to be applied to any

unrecovered CR3 investments; i.e., the remaining unamortized rate base balance for CR3."

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So that -- we can agree, the way I understand this is we can agree to a different allocation, but that's what we agreed to in the agreement, and the Commission considered the agreement and approved the agreement. So that issue has been addressed. Anyway, I just wanted to bring that, that point to your attention.

The point that you had asked Mr. Rehwinkel about to say, well, wait, you know, if you guys said all of the insurance stuff is -- you know, the repair related activity and insurance stuff is off the table, it seems to me that Mr. Wright made the correct point, which is if the issue was live and litigated. I mean, you could have a situation in discovery where if we're saying let's see the premiums that you paid for NEIL, and let's say for every year it was \$9 million a year, but one year before the settlement date it was 90 million and they paid ten times more and it was a mistake, that issue had never been raised, would never be brought up. But if we discovered it -- you know, it's not my understanding that there's, like, a statute of limitations that would say, well, wait a minute, you can't raise the, you know, the prudence of paying 90 million and you didn't catch it, nobody caught it

when the premium statement only said pay 9 million. So I wanted to just amplify that point.

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And then the third point, on your question about the 14 issues, the attachment has 34. And, you know, I think as we go through, you know, whatever your ruling is, it will probably prompt some further conversations between parties and staff that I would just urge that — no hard line, here are the 14 at this point in the proceeding because you still have discovery outstanding and other things. And I'm not sure anyone's made an effort to reconcile the 14 issues that they put in their brief with the 34 that have been, you know, identified by the parties. So I would just urge that you not, you know, come down and say here are the 14 we're going to, we're going to litigate at this point in the proceeding. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Thank you, Mr. Moyle.

And the point I was making with the 14 is that that covered a bulk of the arguments that, that were made by both parties, and it seemed to me they were coming to a nexus on those. And that was an example on how we're really only dealing with a few issues that, that I'll rule upon.

Okay. So with that, that would conclude the oral arguments phase of this meeting, and I'd like to go

into a discussion about the schedule. In --

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MR. REHWINKEL: Commissioner, I was assuming that we would discuss issues of privilege in the schedule portion that you're now going into. But to the extent you had a concern about it in the initial phase, we, the Public Counsel did have a point we wanted to raise. But we can deal with it --

COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Concerning the question

I asked Duke on dealing with privileged and confidential information?

MR. REHWINKEL: Yes. Yes.

COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Yeah. That's fine. Now would be appropriate.

MR. REHWINKEL: Okay. I think Mr. Burnett was correct when he said that you may be seeing issues about privilege brought up. Our goal is to have something, our initial motion to compel with respect to privilege filed sometime this week, and, and that would be followed shortly by a second. We intend to file at least two at this stage. And I think that would followed, Mr. Brew can correct me, by one from White Springs. So I believe that we are on the cusp of having privilege issues teed up.

There, there may be a need to have further discussion about the process about privilege. I believe

in a BellSouth case back in the '90s, I believe, when I was working for Chairman Deason at the time, I believe there were some in camera inspections by at least one Commissioner in that process that was undertaken. So there is precedent, we believe, for the Commission to look at privileged information to make an in camera determination. However, we do believe a process needs to be developed because this is a significant issue in the case. And while there is precedent, we, we'd certainly be willing to provide input on, on the right way to do it.

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MR. BREW: Commissioner, I can confirm that PCS will be filing a motion to compel shortly thereafter, too.

COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Okay. Thank you. And my office will respond to the motions appropriately.

Okay. So moving on to the schedule portion of this. In response to concerns by the parties during the issue identification meetings with staff, especially concerning time constraints, I issued a third and final OEP extending the hearing date from April of this year, which was originally requested by Progress, to the end of October of this year. This provides an additional six months of time for the parties to prepare. I also adjusted some of the other controlling dates prior to

the hearing to give parties additional time.

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Please let me know if you have concerns about the controlling dates leading up to and with exception to the hearing. So with that, I'll start with Progress Energy.

MR. BURNETT: Thank you, Commissioner.

As long as we get a ruling that -- and resolution on what issues I actually have to address in the testimony, we can, we can certainly do the June date, but I just need to figuratively know what I'm shooting at first to get the testimony done. But we can comply with your schedule.

COMMISSIONER BALBIS: And by the June date, you're referencing the June 17th where your testimony and exhibits would be due?

MR. BURNETT: Yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Okay. Thank you.

Office of Public Counsel.

MR. REHWINKEL: Yes. Commissioner, it's with a great deal of trepidation that I state to you that these dates are completely unworkable for the Public Counsel. The passage of about two and a half months between seeing for the first time what Progress or Duke says is their basis for settling would be really our opportunity to decide what we need in terms of an expert

witness.

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We have, we have one of the best civil engineering witnesses in the world from MIT, but I'm not sure that those issues will really play a major role in this case. They may play a smaller role and we may need his services.

We have two nuclear engineering -- nuclear engineers who may, we may need their expertise in understanding what was undertaken with respect to preparing the, the repair estimates that led to the insurance payouts.

But with respect to the insurance policies themselves, we need to, we need to engage an engineering -- an insurance expert that will -- and up until whenever we get a ruling on the scope of this docket and our ability to actually go forward and take a deposition of the appropriate people at, at Duke, we really have not jumped out to try to engage a witness.

There are millions of pages of documents conceivably, or at least hundreds of thousands that we expect we will need to look at between now and preparing our case and to bring an expert up to speed.

Just, you know, a matter of 70 days just to put on a case once we know what Duke's case is going to be is, is just not enough time for an issue that we've

never seen before. This is not like a rate case where -- I mean, when we know a test year letter is coming or is filed, we, we know, because we've had 30, 40 years of experience in the office, about what we need to get and who we need to get and where they are and who's going to do depreciation and who's going to do accounting and finance and engineering.

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But this issue is a novel one, it's a first of its kind, and we really don't know. And I can tell you right now we're not ready to go to hearing that fast.

But that's kind of the little big problem that we have, because the biggest problem is, is once we file our case, Progress would then have the opportunity -- or Duke would have the opportunity to file rebuttal on October 1st, and then we would have 13 calendar days to do discovery on what our experience has been is just the nature of the business that we're in, I'm not saying there's anything nefarious about it, is that you find a lot of meaty information and sometimes the real nuts and bolts of the case filed on rebuttal. Having that amount of time to, to schedule depositions and conduct discovery on what could be significant testimony in a case that has no time clock on it is, is of concern to us. And I, you know, feel like we just need to be up-front and tell you that it is a big problem for us.

And, you know, not knowing what they're going to file on direct and not knowing what they would file on rebuttal, I can't say for absolute certainty that it's, that it's unreasonable. But my experience and my knowledge of this docket tells me that it is just not workable because this insurance issue is, is a new one and it's a novel one and we're just not ready to go on that.

COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Thank you.

Mr. Brew?

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would fully support what OPC has just said, and note in that regard it's been somewhat of my lot to be dragged into quite a number of prudence cases. And I've found that, as Mr. Rehwinkel said, universally on rebuttal a lot comes up. That's the nature of the beast in terms of the utility's response to the testimony that it saw, and it's absolutely critical for a Commission decision that there be adequate time for discovery and depositions. And so at a minimum, we need a substantial adjustment there between whenever rebuttal is filed to allow adequate time for discovery before we move to hearing. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Wright?

MR. WRIGHT: I would just add that I agree with Mr. Rehwinkel and Mr. Brew. Thank you, Commissioner.

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MR. MOYLE: And FIPUG would support the comments of OPC. They have been doing cases before this Commission for years and years and years and will have a significant laboring oar in this effort. So we would support them in terms of taking the amount of time that they feel necessary to have the case ready to go to trial. Thank you.

MR. REHWINKEL: Commissioner, I apologize.

Because I did the privilege stuff in the prior phase I kind of took it out of my thoughts about here. But I think until the privilege issue is resolved and we know fully the scope of what's going to be looked at, we're also a bit at a disadvantage.

Progress has -- Duke has lodged objections to providing discovery, and those will be resolved. But until we get those resolved and we know where they're going to go and if we're going to get additional information, or we're going to know kind of the posture of their burden vis-a-vis the assertion of a privilege. In other words, there's a principle in law that you can't use the privilege as a sword and a shield. Sometimes you've got to live with the consequences of

the privilege you assert. We don't know how that's going to shake out. Until we do, we won't really fully know the scope of what the testimony is going to be about. Thank you.

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COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Okay. Thank you.

And I just want to give you my comments on this matter and my mind-set, where I am with this. And this is a unique case, and we all understand that. But one of the unique aspects of this case, which is, I think, a good thing, is that the settlement agreement established a procedure for all of the parties to have an unprecedented coordination and free flow of information once that settlement agreement was agreed to on certain issues.

At each of the status conferences I asked each one of the parties as to how that process was working, how the information was flowing, and if it was a good process. Each time I asked that, each party indicated that it was working very well. And I'd anticipated as the status conferences were going on that it would make the hearing process easier.

It is clear from the proposed issues, the briefs, the reply briefs, the oral arguments here today, and, in fact, even, Mr. Rehwinkel, your comments, there's not much left.

In contrast, recent billion dollar rate cases

had up to 192 issues, ranging from liability insurance

all the way up to return on equity. Those are issues

this Commission is used to dealing with, those are

complex issues that we're used to dealing with, and all

6 the parties here today are used to dealing with.

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But maybe a more important and appropriate comparison is the settlement agreement that this Commission approved. That was a very complex settlement dealing with multiple dockets, dealing with new nuclear units, dealing with a rate case, dealing with CR3 and other issues that were very complicated that we were able to review and approve because it was in the best interest of all the parties. In fact, one of the justifications to review and approve that settlement expeditiously was, and I'll quote, the speedy approval — the parties recognize that the continued uncertainty related to the issues addressed in this agreement adversely affects the utility and the customers.

The most important consideration that I need to make is that Progress Energy no longer exists. In fact, we have interchanged the Duke Energy and Progress Energy, but Progress Energy does not exist. It has been merged with Duke Energy to become the largest electric

company in the United States. With that merger comes expected and unexpected personnel changes.

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Unfortunately, key personnel associated with the decision-making process of this important case have changed and will continue to change: Bill Johnson, former CEO of Progress Energy, also for a short period of time CEO of Duke, and he was even on the board of NEIL, is no longer with Duke Energy; Vinny Dolan, former president of Progress Energy Florida, has retired; Jeff Lyash, a key witness in many of our proceedings, has announced his retirement; and even Jim Rogers, current CEO of Duke, who was CEO when the final decision was made to retire CR3, who was CEO when the final settlement from NEIL was, was approved, may not be in that position by the end of this year.

Information can become stale, memories can become short, and, more importantly, people can retire and move on. These issues are ripe for hearing. The customers and investors cannot afford for this uncertainty to continue any more than it has.

I believe that the additional six months will afford all of the parties the time needed to prepare, and will allow the Commission to make an informed decision. There's not much left, and I think we can have a thorough hearing process. Because, quite

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frankly, the ratepayers have waited long enough.
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               So I'll take all of your comments into
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     consideration and will issue an appropriate ruling.
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     Thank you for your time this morning.
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                (Proceeding concluded at 11:37 a.m.)
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                  FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
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1	STATE OF FLORIDA)
2	: CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER COUNTY OF LEON)
3	
4	I, LINDA BOLES, CRR, RPR, Official Commission
5	Reporter, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceeding was heard at the time and place herein stated.
6	IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that I
7	stenographically reported the said proceedings; that the same has been transcribed under my direct supervision;
8	and that this transcript constitutes a true transcription of my notes of said proceedings.
9	I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative,
10	employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor am I a relative or employee of any of the parties'
11	attorney or counsel connected with the action, nor am I financially interested in the action.
12	DATED THIS 2013 day of May,
13	2013.
14	4: 11
15	Junda Boles
16	LINDA BOLES, CRR, RPR FPSC Official Commission Reporters
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