

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In re: Joint petition by ITC^DeltaCom Communications, Inc. d/b/a ITC^DeltaCom d/b/a Grapevine; Birch Telecom of the South, Inc. d/b/a Birch Telecom and d/b/a Birch; DIECA Communications, Inc. d/b/a Covad Communications Company; Florida Digital Network, Inc.; LecStar Telecom, Inc.; MCI Communications, Inc.; and Network Telephone Corporation ("Joint CLECs") for generic proceeding to set rates, terms, and conditions for hot cuts and batch hot cuts for UNE-P to UNE-L conversions and for retail to UNE-L conversions in BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. service area.

DOCKET NO. 041338-TP

In re: Complaint of Supra Telecommunications and Information Systems, Inc. against BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.

DOCKET NO. 040301-TP  
ORDER NO. PSC-05-0437-FOF-TP  
ISSUED: April 25, 2005

The following Commissioners participated in the disposition of this matter:

BRAULIO L. BAEZ, Chairman  
J. TERRY DEASON  
RUDOLPH "RUDY" BRADLEY  
CHARLES M. DAVIDSON  
LISA POLAK EDGAR

ORDER DENYING SUPRA TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND  
INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INC.'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

BY THE COMMISSION:

**I. Case Background**

On June 23, 2004, Supra Telecommunications and Information Systems, Inc. (Supra) filed its Amended Petition for Arbitration with BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. (BellSouth). BellSouth filed its Answer and Response on July 21, 2004. The matter was then set for a two-day hearing (December 1 - 2, 2004) and later reduced to a one-day hearing for December 2, 2004.

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On September 1, 2004, Supra filed a Motion For Partial Summary Final Order on Contractual Issues. BellSouth filed its Response on September 8, 2004. The matter was resolved at the October 5, 2004, Agenda Conference, at which we denied Supra's Motion for Partial Summary Final Order finding that "It is apparent that the current agreement lists rates that are associated with the necessary steps to effect a hot cut." See, Order No. PSC-04-0997-FOF-TP, issued October 12, 2004, at page 9.

On November 29, 2004, BellSouth filed an Emergency Motion for Continuance of the hearing in Docket No. 040301-TP. In addition to asking this Commission for a continuance, BellSouth also requested that this docket be consolidated with Docket No. 041338-TP. BellSouth's Motion was granted in part, as to the request for continuance, by Order No. PSC-04-1180-PCO-TP, issued on November 30, 2004.

On November 30, 2004, Supra filed an Emergency Motion For Reconsideration of the Prehearing Officer's Order. In addition, on December 6, 2004, Supra filed a Motion For Partial Summary Final Order on Issues 3 and 4 making the same contractual arguments put forth at the October 5, 2004, Agenda conference. On February 8, 2005, Order No. PSC-05-0157-PCO-TP, was issued. The Order granted BellSouth's Emergency Motion for Continuance and Consolidation of Docket Nos. 040301-TP and 041338-TP, denied Supra's Motion for Partial Summary Final Order, and denied Supra's Motion for Reconsideration of Order No. PSC-04-1180-PCO-TP.

On February 9, 2005, Supra filed its Motion for Reconsideration of Order No. PSC-05-0157-PCO-TP, and its Request for Oral Argument. BellSouth filed its Response on February 16, 2005. At the Agenda Conference, we denied Supra's Request for Oral Argument, because the arguments were adequately contained in its pleading thereby making oral argument unnecessary. Rule 25-22.060(1)(f), F.A.C., is clear that argument on a Motion for Reconsideration is solely at our discretion.

This Order pertains to Supra's Motion for Reconsideration of Order No. PSC-05-0157-PCO-TP.

We are vested with jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Sections 364.161 and 364.162, Florida Statutes, which authorize this Commission to arbitrate unbundling disputes, as well as disputes involving rates, terms and conditions within interconnection agreements.

## **II. Arguments**

Supra requests that we reconsider Order No. PSC-05-0157-PCO-TP, issued February 8, 2005, and grant Supra's Motion for Partial Summary Final Order with respect to Issues 3 and 4. Supra argues that we made errors of fact and law regarding the issue of whether the parties' agreement contained rates applicable to a UNE-P to UNE-L conversion. It claims that the parties' Interconnection Agreement (ICA) does not specifically set forth a rate for UNE-P to UNE-L conversions and that this Commission has found that the parties' ICA does not contain a rate for UNE-P to UNE-L conversions. Supra also argues that BellSouth has not contended that the contractual language in the parties' ICA is ambiguous or even pointed to a section in the ICA

that specifically sets forth a rate for UNE-P to UNE-L. Therefore, Supra contends that the plain and unambiguous language of the parties' ICA dictates the next step, which is for Supra to receive UNE-P to UNE-L conversions for free.

In summary, Supra argues that the ICA does not specifically state a hot cut rate as required by Section 22.1 of the parties' ICA and that the plain language of the ICA requires BellSouth to bear its own costs to transition services (UNE-P) to Supra (UNE-L).

On February 16, 2005, BellSouth filed its Opposition to Supra's Motion arguing that the Motion is procedurally deficient because it requests reconsideration of an Order addressing a prior request for reconsideration. BellSouth effectively adopts its January 11, 2005, pleading in opposition which states that Supra's Motion is based on a previous argument that was rejected by this Commission. Further, BellSouth claims that the Motion for Reconsideration has been rendered moot by intervening events. First, the consolidation of Docket Nos. 040301-TP and 041338-TP has created a proceeding whereby the parties to the dockets will agree on a rate structure, but that Supra is seeking a determination as a matter of law as to the structure of a rate without the input of the other named CLECs. Second, Supra has agreed to pay the rates in its contract on a going-forward basis with a true-up, if necessary. This agreement renders the Motion moot, unless Supra is now backing out of the aforementioned agreement. Last, BellSouth argues that the Motion should be denied because Supra fails to identify anything that contradicts our finding that "an issue of fact exists as to whether an appropriate rate for a UNE-P to UNE-L conversion is contained in the parties' ICA." (BellSouth's Opposition, p. 3)

### **III. Standard of Review**

The standard of review for a motion for reconsideration is whether the motion identifies a point of fact or law which was overlooked or which this Commission failed to consider in rendering its Order. See Stewart Bonded Warehouse, Inc. v. Bevis, 294 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1974); Diamond Cab Co. v. King, 146 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1962); and Pingree v. Quaintance, 394 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 1<sup>st</sup> DCA 1981). In a motion for reconsideration, it is not appropriate to reargue matters that have already been considered. Sherwood v. State, 111 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 3<sup>rd</sup> DCA 1959), citing State ex.rel. Jaytex Realty Co. v. Green, 105 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1<sup>st</sup> DCA 1958). Furthermore, a motion for reconsideration should not be granted "based upon an arbitrary feeling that a mistake may have been made, but should be based upon specific factual matters set forth in the record and susceptible to review." Stewart Bonded Warehouse, Inc., 294 So. 2d at 317. Last, it is well-established that it is inappropriate to raise new arguments in a motion for reconsideration. In re: Established Nondiscriminatory Rates, Terms and Conditions, Docket 950984-TP, Order No. PSC-96-1024-FOF-TP, August 7, 1996.

### **IV. Decision**

We hereby deny Supra's Motion for Reconsideration, because Supra has failed to identify an error of fact or law in Order No. PSC-05-0157-PCO-TP, issued February 8, 2005. It is our

finding that Supra's analysis is flawed due to misinterpreting the issues set forth in the underlying Order and the Order Establishing Procedure.<sup>1</sup>

As stated above, Supra claims that the parties' Interconnection Agreement (ICA) does not specifically contain a rate for a UNE-P to UNE-L conversion, and therefore the company should receive hot cuts for free. However, the issue in these dockets is not whether the parties' ICA "contains" a rate for UNE-P to UNE-L conversion, but rather, "Should a new nonrecurring rate be created that applies for a hot-cut from UNE-P to UNE-L . . . ." We have already considered Supra's argument and found that there is an issue of fact as to whether there are rates in the parties' ICA that "apply" to a UNE-P to UNE-L conversion. Supra's argument was put forth at the October 5, 2005, Agenda Conference for Issues 1 and 2, and was rejected by this Commission.<sup>2</sup>

In its Motion for Reconsideration, Supra puts forth the exact same argument for Issues 3 and 4.<sup>3</sup> We find that this is not a proper basis for a Motion for Reconsideration, and therefore deny the Motion. Supra's question regarding the parties ICA has been preserved for hearing and will be addressed at that time.

Therefore, in the spirit of consistency, and applying the applicable standard of review stated above, we deny Supra's Motion for Reconsideration of Order No. PSC-05-0157-PCO-TP, issued February 8, 2005.

These dockets shall remain open pending the resolution of the issues set for hearing.

Based on the foregoing, it is

ORDERED by the Florida Public Service Commission that Supra Telecommunications and Information Systems, Inc.'s Motion for Reconsideration is denied. It is further

ORDERED that these dockets remain open.


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<sup>1</sup> See, Order Establishing Procedure, Order No. PSC-04-0809-PCO-TP, issued August 19, 2004.

<sup>2</sup> "In short, we find that although the agreement does not explicitly list a rate for a UNE-P to UNE-L "hot cut," the agreement may contain rates associated with the necessary steps to effectuate such a "hot cut." In other words, an issue of fact exists as to whether this rate covers a UNE-P to UNE-L conversion. Therefore, we deny Supra's Motion for Partial Final Summary Order because there is an issue of fact as to whether the current rates in place include the necessary steps to effectuate a hot cut from a UNE-P arrangement to a UNE-L arrangement." Order No. PSC-04-0997-PCO-TP, issued October 12, 2004, page 9.

<sup>3</sup> Id., "Should a new nonrecurring rate be created that applies for a hot-cut from UNE-P to UNE-L . . . ."

By ORDER of the Florida Public Service Commission this 25th day of April, 2005.

  
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BLANCA S. BAYO, Director  
Division of the Commission Clerk  
and Administrative Services

( S E A L )

JLS/FRB

NOTICE OF FURTHER PROCEEDINGS OR JUDICIAL REVIEW

The Florida Public Service Commission is required by Section 120.569(1), Florida Statutes, to notify parties of any administrative hearing or judicial review of Commission orders that is available under Sections 120.57 or 120.68, Florida Statutes, as well as the procedures and time limits that apply. This notice should not be construed to mean all requests for an administrative hearing or judicial review will be granted or result in the relief sought.

Any party adversely affected by the Commission's final action in this matter may request:

- 1) reconsideration of the decision by filing a motion for reconsideration with the Director, Division of the Commission Clerk and Administrative Services, 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850, within fifteen (15) days of the issuance of this order in the form prescribed by Rule 25-22.060, Florida Administrative Code; or
- 2) judicial review by the Florida Supreme Court in the case of an electric, gas or telephone utility or the First District Court of Appeal in the case of a water and/or wastewater utility by filing a notice of appeal with the Director, Division of the Commission Clerk and Administrative Services and filing a copy of the notice of appeal and the filing fee with the appropriate court. This filing must be completed within thirty (30) days after the issuance of this order, pursuant to Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. The notice of appeal must be in the form specified in Rule 9.900(a), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.