

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

**DIRECT TESTIMONY OF HUGH GOWER
BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
ON BEHALF OF
SOUTHERN STATES UTILITIES, INC.
DOCKET NO. 960258-WS**

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

ACK _____
AFA _____
APP _____
CAF _____
CMU _____
CTR _____
EAC _____
LEG _____
LIN _____
OPC _____
RCH _____
SEC _____
WAS _____
OTH _____

**DOCUMENT NUMBER-DATE
11195 OCT 18 88
FPSC-RECORDS/REPORTING**

1 Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, OCCUPATION AND ADDRESS.

2 A. My name is Hugh Gower, and I am self-employed. My
3 address is 195 Edgemere Way South, Naples, Florida
4 34105. I also provide consulting services to
5 utilities and others on financial and operating
6 matters. I also provide expert testimony on topics
7 related to public utility economics and rate
8 regulation in cases before public service
9 commissions and courts.

10 Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR EDUCATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL
11 BACKGROUND.

12 A. I hold a bachelor of science degree in accounting
13 and economics from the University of Florida, and I
14 am, or have been, registered as a certified public
15 accountant in Florida, Georgia, and several other
16 states. I am a member of the American Institute of
17 Certified Public Accountants and other professional
18 organizations. I engaged in the practice of public
19 accounting continuously for more than 30 years with
20 Arthur Andersen & Co. with whom I was a partner
21 prior to retirement.

22 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE FIRM OF ARTHUR ANDERSEN & CO.
23 AND YOUR PARTICULAR EXPERIENCE.

24 A. Arthur Andersen is among the largest international
25 firms of independent public accountants and serves

1 as auditors for a major share of the electric, gas
2 and telephone, as well as a large number of the
3 other utilities operating in the United States. In
4 addition to audits of financial statements, the
5 firm performs tax work and designs and installs
6 accounting systems for businesses of all types.
7 The firm also provides expert testimony in
8 connection with public utility rate applications
9 before federal and state regulatory authorities on
10 a variety of accounting, financial and rate-making
11 topics.

12 I was a partner in the Utilities and
13 Telecommunications Division of the Atlanta office
14 of Arthur Andersen & Co., which serves as the
15 concentration office for the firm's regulated
16 industries practice in the southeastern United
17 States. This area of the practice includes work
18 for electric, gas, telephone, water and sewer
19 utilities, motor carriers and airlines. I served
20 as the southeastern area director of this practice
21 for 17 years. I have had responsibility for
22 supervising the work performed for Arthur Andersen
23 & Co. clients, the training of firm personnel, and
24 administrative matters. I have also had direct
25 responsibility for the work done by the firm for

1 numerous clients in this area of the practice.

2 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE NATURE OF THE WORK YOU HAVE
3 PERFORMED WITH ARTHUR ANDERSEN & CO.

4 A. By far, the greatest portion of my work has been
5 devoted to the public utilities industries, but I
6 also have substantial experience with other
7 industries. I performed independent audits of
8 public utilities, as a result of which Arthur
9 Andersen & Co. issued reports on the financial
10 statements of such companies, and I participated in
11 and supervised work in connection with audits of
12 various statements, schedules and other data
13 required either annually or in connection with rate
14 applications before federal or state regulatory
15 authorities. I have also supervised work in
16 connection with the issuance of billions of dollars
17 of securities by public utilities. I also
18 participated in the development of accounting and
19 management information systems as well as operating
20 systems designed to promote close control over
21 utility resources, such as materials, fuel and
22 construction costs. In addition, I directed the
23 preparation of financial forecasts or projections,
24 conducted reviews of financial forecasts and
25 directed the development of financial forecasting

1 models.

2 I participated in management audits, the
3 purpose of which was to assess whether management
4 systems and procedures promote economy and
5 efficiency of operations. I have directed
6 depreciation studies which, based on the analysis
7 of utility plant investments, retirement
8 experience, salvage and cost of removal, developed
9 equitable depreciation rates with which to effect
10 capital recovery during the service lives of the
11 properties. I also developed plans which were
12 accepted by regulators as equitably assigning the
13 future costs of spent nuclear fuel disposal,
14 nuclear plant decommissioning and fossil plant
15 dismantlement costs to customers receiving service,
16 considering the effects of inflation, the time
17 value of money and other variables.

18 I have directed revenue requirement studies
19 involving the analysis of rate base, operating
20 revenues and expenses as well as the analysis of
21 specific transactions or alternative rate-making
22 treatment of various cost-of-service components. I
23 have also directed studies to determine the proper
24 assignment of cost of service between customer
25 classes, regulatory jurisdictions or between

1 regulated and unregulated operations. I
2 participated in the preparation of Arthur Andersen
3 & Co.'s position statements on utility accounting
4 and rate matters which were under consideration by
5 legislative bodies and regulatory agencies. I was
6 a representative of the American Institute of
7 Certified Public Accountants on the
8 Telecommunications Industry Advisory Group ("TIAG")
9 to the Federal Communications Commission in
10 connection with its adoption of its new Uniform
11 System of Accounts (Part 32). In this connection,
12 I chaired the Auditing and Regulatory Subcommittee
13 of TIAG which dealt with issues regarding
14 compliance with generally accepted accounting
15 principles ("GAAP") when regulatory rate-setting
16 practices are based upon methods other than GAAP.

17 **Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?**

18 A. The purpose of my testimony is to support the
19 position of Southern States Utilities, Inc. ("SSU")
20 in this rulemaking proceeding that the Commission
21 should not impute anticipated potential post-test
22 period collections of contributions-in-aid-of-
23 construction ("CIAC") as a reduction of rate base
24 in rate setting proceedings.

25 The Commission has historically made such

1 imputations as an offset to the amount of plant
2 investment designated "Margin Reserve" allowed in
3 rate base in numerous water and sewer rate cases.
4 The Commission now proposes to adopt that practice
5 as Rule 25-30.431(7). My testimony will show:

- 6 ● that utilities are entitled to a return on the
7 capital which finances margin reserve plant
8 until that capital is recovered;
- 9 ● that imputing anticipated future CIAC
10 collection against margin reserve plant denies
11 investors that opportunity;
- 12 ● that imputing anticipated future CIAC
13 collections by the Commission is inconsistent
14 with its treatment of other utilities in whose
15 cases no imputation of future capital recovery
16 is made; and
- 17 ● that assigning current customers the cost of
18 carrying the unrecovered investor-supplied
19 capital which financed the investment in
20 margin reserve plant is appropriate.

21 Q. WHY IS IT PROPER AND FAIR RATEMAKING TO INCLUDE
22 (MARGIN RESERVE) PLANT INVESTMENTS IN RATE BASE
23 WITHOUT OFFSET FOR FUTURE CIAC COLLECTIONS?

24 A. It is well-established that investors in utilities
25 are entitled to both recovery of and return on the

1 capital they provide. In the case of investments
2 in utility plant, capital recovery has historically
3 been effected through inclusion of depreciation (or
4 amortization) provisions in cost of service in a
5 rational, predictable manner over a period of
6 years. Investors' capital which requires a return
7 is measured by the amount of undepreciated plant
8 investment and inclusion of this amount -- plant,
9 less accumulated depreciation times rate of return
10 -- in cost of service provides investors the
11 opportunity to recover this as well.

12 **Q. HAVE YOU PREPARED AN EXHIBIT TO ILLUSTRATE CAPITAL**
13 **RECOVERY THROUGH DEPRECIATION?**

14 **A.** Yes, Exhibit ___ (HAG-1) shows this in Figure A.
15 This hypothetical exhibit assumes a \$10,000 plant
16 investment depreciated on a straight-line basis
17 over five years. At the beginning of the period,
18 unrecovered investor capital is \$10,000. This is
19 reduced annually by ratable provisions for
20 depreciation included in cost of service. Each
21 year, accumulated provisions for depreciation
22 ("accumulated capital recovery") reduce the
23 original capital investment until it has been fully
24 recovered.

25 Over the five year useful life, the average

1 unrecovered investor capital is \$5,000. In other
2 words, on average over the 5 year useful life,
3 investors would be entitled to a return on the
4 \$5,000 unrecovered invested capital (although, of
5 course, this amount is different each year).

6 Q. WHEN CUSTOMERS PAY CIAC CHARGES THERE IS NO
7 INVESTOR-SUPPLIED CAPITAL WHICH CARRIES A RETURN
8 REQUIREMENT, IS THERE?

9 A. Yes, there is. Before customers pay CIAC charges,
10 investors first supply the capital to construct
11 new plant capacity and continue to finance that
12 plant investment until it is recovered through CIAC
13 charges. In other words, just as with depreciation
14 provisions included in cost of service, CIAC
15 charges are the vehicle by which the recovery of
16 investors' capital is effected. Until the capital
17 previously provided by investors is recovered by
18 collection of CIAC charges, any unrecovered capital
19 investment requires a return. Neither depreciation
20 nor CIAC charges provide return on investor's
21 capital.

22 Although the pattern of capital recovery which
23 results from CIAC charges is different than when
24 capital recovery is handled through depreciation,
25 the investor capital which requires a return is

1 measured by the amount of plant investment in
2 excess of CIAC collections at any point in time, or
3 over a period of time.

4 In most cases, it takes a period of several
5 years to recover applicable plant investments
6 through CIAC charges. Until the capital financing
7 such investments is recovered by CIAC charge
8 collections, such capital is entitled to a return
9 and should be included in rate base without
10 imputation of offsetting future CIAC collections so
11 that investors will have that opportunity.

12 Q. DOES YOUR EXHIBIT _____ (HAG-1) SHOW HOW
13 UNRECOVERED INVESTOR-SUPPLIED CAPITAL WHICH
14 REQUIRES A RETURN EXISTS WHEN PLANT COSTS ARE
15 RECOVERED THROUGH CIAC (OR SERVICE AVAILABILITY
16 CHARGES) INSTEAD OF DEPRECIATION?

17 A. Yes. Figure B on Exhibit ___ (HAG-1) illustrates
18 this as well. This hypothetical assumes a \$10,000
19 investment is recovered over five years. The
20 amount recovered is not ratable and varies from
21 year to year. Based on the original \$10,000
22 invested and the assumed CIAC charges, the average
23 unrecovered investor capital is \$7,500. In other
24 words, on average over the five year period, this
25 is the amount on which investors would be entitled

1 to a return.

2 Q. WILL THE FAILURE TO IMPUTE CIAC CHARGES ANTICIPATED
3 TO BE COLLECTED OVER THE PERIOD COVERED BY THE
4 MARGIN RESERVE RESULT IN OVER-EARNING BY THE
5 UTILITY?

6 A. No, it will not. Rates will still be set on the
7 basis of a test period thoroughly examined by the
8 Commission in a rate proceeding to provide
9 assurance that revenues, expenses, capital invested
10 and all other elements of cost of service will be
11 representative of future conditions for which rates
12 will be set. A properly constructed rate base will
13 show the amount of investor-supplied capital
14 outstanding during the test period on which
15 investors are entitled to a return. Allowance of a
16 return on such a rate base provides only the
17 correct return and does not cause over-earnings.
18 In fact, in the cases I'm aware of, in periods
19 following rate cases, the actual realized returns
20 have been less than the authorized return.

21 On the other hand, the imputation of CIAC
22 charges anticipated to be collected beyond the end
23 of the test period is bound to prevent the utility
24 from realizing its required return, at least on the
25 capital which finances the margin reserve plant

1 capacity.

2 Q. WHY IS THAT TRUE?

3 A. Imputation of CIAC charges anticipated to be
4 collected in future periods beyond the end of the
5 test period is the financial equivalent of assuming
6 that plant investments whose capital recovery is to
7 be effected through depreciation is already fully
8 depreciated. Obviously, rate base constructed in
9 this manner is less than the actual unrecovered
10 capital devoted to utility operations and it means
11 there is no financial basis (cost less accumulated
12 depreciation) upon which a return could be provided
13 in the cost of service calculation. In simple
14 terms, a rate of return times zero equals zero.

15 The fact that unrecovered investor-supplied
16 capital exists regardless of whether capital
17 recovery is provided through depreciation
18 provisions or collection of CIAC charges is clearly
19 illustrated on my Exhibit ___ (HAG-1). It is no
20 more appropriate to assume that plant capacity
21 investments not yet recovered through CIAC charges
22 have already been fully recovered than it is to
23 assume that accumulated depreciation accruals equal
24 to 20% of the related plant cost are instead equal
25 to 100% of the plant cost.

- 1 Q. CAN YOU DEMONSTRATE THIS WITH AN EXHIBIT?
- 2 A. Yes, Exhibit _____ (HAG-2) utilizes a condensed
3 balance sheet of a hypothetical utility over a 10-
4 year period to illustrate the financial effect of
5 imputing post-test period CIAC collections as a
6 reduction of rate base.
- 7 This exhibit clearly demonstrates that the
8 practice of imputing post-test period CIAC
9 collections as a reduction of rate base denies
10 investors the opportunity to earn a fair return on
11 invested capital.
- 12 Q. WHAT ASSUMPTIONS DID YOU MAKE IN CONSTRUCTING
13 EXHIBIT _____ (HAG-2)?
- 14 A. Lines 1 through 10 of Exhibit _____ (HAG-2) show
15 the condensed balance sheet of a hypothetical
16 utility which experiences growth in plant
17 investment similar to many utilities with service
18 areas in Florida. The utility collects CIAC from
19 its customers after making investments in plant.
- 20 Utility plant and CIAC are depreciated (or
21 amortized) over a 33-year average service life.
- 22 The hypothetical utility's capital structure
23 consists of 50% debt and 50% equity. The weighted
24 cost of capital (and the authorized return) is 10%.
- 25 Q. WHAT IS "AVERAGE CAPITAL" SHOWN ON LINE 11?

1 A. Line 11 shows the average investor-supplied capital
2 which supports the net investment in utility plant
3 and working capital for each of the years 2 through
4 9, calculated on the simple average of the
5 beginning and end of year amounts.

6 This is the amount of capital upon which
7 investors would be entitled the opportunity to earn
8 a fair return.

9 **Q. HOW WAS RATE BASE SHOWN ON LINES 12 THROUGH 18**
10 **CONSTRUCTED?**

11 A. Rate base was constructed using the balance sheet
12 method employed by the FPSC. In that connection, I
13 assumed that all accounts shown on the balance
14 sheet are utility-related.

15 In addition, line 16 shows the imputation of
16 the average increase in CIAC collections for two
17 subsequent years (the assumed margin reserve
18 period).

19 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN LINES 19 AND 29.**

20 A. Line 19 shows the required return calculated by
21 applying the 10% weighted cost of capital to the
22 average capital (line 11) for each year.

23
24 Line 20 shows the return which would be
25 provided by a Commission decision which applies the

1 authorized return to the total rate base (line 18).

2 Q. WHY IS THE RETURN PROVIDED (LINE 20) LESS THAN THE
3 RETURN REQUIRED (LINE 19)?

4 A. It is because of the erroneous construction of rate
5 base. A properly constructed rate base would equal
6 the amount of capital invested in utility
7 operations and, with the application of the cost of
8 capital, provide investors the opportunity to earn
9 the required fair return.

10 Because rate base in this example -- and many
11 actual Commission cases -- has been improperly
12 reduced by imputing post-test period CIAC
13 collections (line 16), it does not equal the amount
14 of capital invested and investors are denied the
15 opportunity to earn the required fair return.

16 Q. WOULD DIFFERENT GROWTH ASSUMPTIONS AFFECT THE
17 CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM YOUR HYPOTHETICAL
18 ILLUSTRATION?

19 A. No, the assumption related to growth in plant
20 investment could have just easily been "no growth"
21 or "declining" plant investments and the
22 illustration would just as clearly demonstrate that
23 reducing rate base for post-test period CIAC
24 collections results in a rate base which is lower
25 than the actual amount of investor-supplied

1 capital. Any time this occurs, investors are
2 improperly denied the opportunity to earn a fair
3 return.

4 Q. WON'T POST-TEST PERIOD CIAC COLLECTIONS FROM NEW
5 CUSTOMER CONNECTIONS DECREASE THE AMOUNT OF
6 INVESTOR-SUPPLIED CAPITAL SUPPORTING UTILITY
7 OPERATIONS AND CAUSE OVER-EARNINGS IN THE FUTURE?

8 A. No, in the normal case, it won't. But, the
9 Commission's traditional (and the proposed rule's)
10 method for imputation is certain to produce under-
11 earnings by how it erroneously assumes investment
12 recovery. Several facts show this assumption is
13 invalid.

14 First, the Commission must understand post-
15 test period CIAC collections for the margin reserve
16 period do not equal the amount obtained by
17 multiplying margin reserve ERC's times the service
18 availability charges. This is due, in part, to the
19 fact that a portion of the margin reserve is needed
20 to meet increased demands of present customers,
21 which generate no CIAC collections. Second, while
22 new customer connections do result in future CIAC
23 collections, it does not follow that a reduction in
24 rate base is the consequence. Anticipation of
25 future rate base reductions assumes that the amount

1 of needed margin reserve plant decreases when new
2 customers connect to the system, but this is not
3 the case. When a portion of margin reserve plant
4 held ready to meet customers' demands is
5 "committed" to serving new customers who connect to
6 the system, it does not decrease the amount of
7 needed margin reserve plant. On the contrary, the
8 amount of margin reserve plant previously available
9 but committed to serving new customers would need
10 to be replaced, all other things being equal.

11 **Q. HOW WOULD THE MARGIN RESERVE PLANT BE REPLACED?**

12 A. An equivalent amount of plant either completed, but
13 held for future use or under construction would
14 become "used and useful" as margin reserve plant.
15 Therefore, new customer connections and related
16 CIAC collections will cause neither a reduction in
17 rate base nor over earnings in the future. As the
18 unit cost of new plant increases for a variety of
19 reasons, the investment in rate base tends to be
20 even higher.

21 **Q. ISN'T "MARGIN RESERVE" PLANT CAPACITY AVAILABLE TO**
22 **SERVE FUTURE CUSTOMERS EXCLUSIVELY?**

23 A. No. The margin reserve capacity is available to
24 serve both increases in consumption by existing
25 customers as well as for any new customers. All

1 utilities obligated to serve the public, must have
2 capacity to meet future increases in the needs of
3 both present and future customers. Present
4 customers benefit when the utility serving them has
5 capacity to meet demands from new customers without
6 overloading existing facilities and degrading the
7 service to existing customers.

8 The association of margin reserve with only
9 new customers connecting to the system appears to
10 be a common misconception probably due to the
11 margin reserve calculation being based on increased
12 consumption expressed as "Equivalent Residential
13 Connections (ERC's)".

14 Imputation of future anticipated CIAC
15 collections against margin reserve plant
16 investments as done in a number of previous cases,
17 improperly insulates present customers completely
18 from any responsibility whatsoever for return on
19 investor capital which finances that plant. This
20 treatment is vividly inconsistent with the
21 Commission's treatment of electric, gas or
22 telephone companies whose plant has the capacity to
23 serve future increases in sales.

24 Q. HOW IS THE IMPUTATION OF ANTICIPATED FUTURE CIAC
25 COLLECTIONS FOR WATER AND WASTEWATER UTILITIES

1 INCONSISTENT WITH THE TREATMENT OF OTHER UTILITIES
2 BY THE COMMISSION?

3 A. As my testimony has previously shown, whether
4 capital recovery is provided through CIAC
5 collections or depreciation provisions, it occurs
6 over a period of time measured in years. In no
7 case of which I am aware has this (or any other)
8 commission imputed additional accumulated
9 depreciation to electric, gas or telephone
10 utilities because actual plant investments in
11 service had the capacity to -- and likely would in
12 the future -- serve more customers or increased
13 sales to existing customers.

14 Q. IF THE COMMISSION AGREES THAT CIAC COLLECTIONS
15 SHOULD NOT BE IMPUTED ON MARGIN RESERVE PLANT, DOES
16 THIS SHIFT THE CAPITAL RECOVERY BURDEN TO PRESENT
17 CUSTOMERS?

18 A. No. Present customers would have responsibility
19 only for return on capital which finances the
20 margin reserve plant until that capital is
21 recovered. This is perfectly appropriate since
22 having that capacity available provides benefits to
23 current customers and investors are entitled to a
24 return currently.

25 Q. WHY ARE INVESTORS ENTITLED TO A RETURN ON MARGIN

1 **RESERVE PLANT CURRENTLY?**

2 A. Aside from the obvious -- that the plant is "in-
3 service" and does benefit current customers -- is
4 the fact that the risk of capital recovery through
5 CIAC charges remains on investors. History shows
6 that not all potential new customers materialize
7 and pay CIAC charges.

8 This risk is heightened by the fact that the
9 needed return on invested capital for a period, if
10 not then recovered, cannot be recaptured in the
11 future. Fairness dictates that prudent investments
12 made to meet public service obligations have a
13 reasonable opportunity to earn a fair return. This
14 opportunity would be provided by including margin
15 reserve plant investments in rate base without
16 imputation of anticipated future CIAC collections.

17 **Q. ARE THERE ANY OTHER INAPPROPRIATE ASSUMPTIONS MADE**
18 **IN APPLYING THE ADJUSTMENT TO REDUCE RATE BASE FOR**
19 **THE IMPUTATION OF CIAC ANTICIPATED TO BE COLLECTED**
20 **AFTER THE END OF THE TEST PERIOD?**

21 A. Yes. The way this adjustment has been applied in
22 other cases carries an implicit assumption that the
23 CIAC funds collected have not been, or will not be,
24 reinvested in the utility operations.

25 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN.**

1 A. Based on data from prior cases, it appears that the
2 CIAC imputation adjustment was based upon the
3 service availability charges times the number of
4 ERC's implicit in the margin reserve plant
5 investment. These amounts -- up to the limit of
6 the net margin reserve plant -- increased
7 accumulated actual CIAC collections offset against
8 the plant component of rate base. No accounting
9 for the use of the funds which the assumed CIAC
10 collection would provide was reflected in the CIAC
11 imputation adjustment. The failure to account for
12 the use of the assumed CIAC collections implies
13 that the funds were not, or will not be, reinvested
14 in the utility operations.

15 **Q. WHY IS THIS AN INAPPROPRIATE ASSUMPTION?**

16 A. In the case of utilities with which I am familiar,
17 CIAC funds collected have been included with other
18 corporate funds and used to pay for operating
19 expenses, plant construction costs, or for other
20 normal uses in carrying on the utility business.
21 Since the Commission employs the balance sheet
22 method to construct other components of rate base,
23 fairness and consistency suggest that if a CIAC
24 imputation is made, it should account for the
25 entire transaction in a manner which correctly

1 reflects the actual practices of the utility.

2 Q. DOESN'T THE INCLUSION OF THE ALLOWANCE FOR FUNDS
3 PRUDENTLY INVESTED ("AFPI") IN COLLECTIONS FROM
4 FUTURE CUSTOMERS PROVIDE A RETURN ON UNRECOVERED
5 INVESTOR-SUPPLIED CAPITAL FINANCING MARGIN RESERVE
6 PLANT?

7 A. No, as Commission orders state, the AFPI charge is
8 designed to allow investors to recover a fair rate
9 of return on prudently constructed plant facilities
10 excluded from rate base as "not being used and
11 useful." Hence, AFPI charges -- when and if
12 collected -- provide no return on margin reserve
13 plant which is "used and useful."

14 Q. IS IT PROPER TO IMPUTE ONE-HALF OF ANTICIPATED
15 POST-TEST YEAR CIAC COLLECTIONS ON THE MARGIN
16 RESERVE AS THE COMMISSION HAS DONE IN SSU'S RATE
17 CASE (DOCKET NO. 950495-WS) AND IN PALM COAST
18 UTILITY CORPORATION'S CASE (DOCKET NO. 951056-WS)?

19
20 A. No, it is not. The assumption underlying a one-
21 half imputation provision is the same as that for
22 the imputation of all margin reserve period CIAC
23 collections as of the end of the test year. For
24 the reasons I have explained above, such an
25 assumption is erroneous and deprives the utility an

1 opportunity to earn a fair return on invested
2 capital until that capital is recovered. That
3 imputation is improper is even recognized by the
4 Commission staff as evidenced by Mr. Marshall
5 Willis' comments on the issue at the Special Agenda
6 on SSU's rate case. The averaging approach taken
7 by the Commission in the referenced cases merely
8 reduces the degree of improper capital deprivation
9 and should be rejected in this proceeding.

10 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR TESTIMONY.**

11 **A.** The inclusion of a utility's investment in margin
12 reserve plant without imputation of anticipated
13 future CIAC collections in rate base is necessary
14 and appropriate to provide investors an opportunity
15 to earn a return on their capital until it is
16 recovered.

17 It is appropriate that investors receive the
18 return on capital currently in view of the inherent
19 risks not compensated for by AFPI charges.

20 It is also appropriate that current customers
21 provide this return through rates since they
22 receive benefits from the margin reserve plant.

23 Finally, inclusion of margin reserve plant
24 without imputation of anticipated future CIAC
25 collections is necessary so that a water and sewer

1 utility's investors will be treated fairly in
2 regard to capital recovery as are investors in
3 electric, gas or telephone utilities.

4 Q. WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDATION TO THE COMMISSION
5 REGARDING ITS PROPOSED RULE?

6 A. I recommend the Commission not adopt its proposed
7 Rule 25-30.431(7) and adopt instead the Florida
8 Waterworks Associations' proposed Rule 25-
9 30.431(7), which does not authorize imputation of
10 post-test year CIAC collections on margin reserve.

11

12 Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?

13 A. Yes.

SOUTHERN STATES UTILITIES
ILLUSTRATION OF CAPITAL RECOVERY




FIGURE A




FIGURE B

SOUTHERN STATES UTILITIES, INC.
ILLUSTRATION OF RATEMAKING TREATMENT OF
MARGIN RESERVE AND CONTRIBUTIONS-IN-AID OF CONSTRUCTION

Line No.	DESCRIPTION	YEAR 1	YEAR 2	YEAR 3	YEAR 4	YEAR 5	YEAR 6	YEAR 7	YEAR 8	YEAR 9	YEAR 10
<u>BALANCE SHEET</u>											
1	UTILITY PLANT	\$ 100,000	\$ 120,000	\$ 140,000	\$ 160,000	\$ 180,000	\$ 200,000	\$ 220,000	\$ 240,000	\$ 260,000	\$ 280,000
2	ACCUMULATED DEPRECIATION	(30,000)	(33,300)	(37,200)	(41,700)	(46,800)	(52,500)	(58,800)	(65,700)	(73,200)	(81,300)
3	CURRENT ASSETS	10,000	12,000	14,000	16,000	18,000	20,000	22,000	24,000	26,000	28,000
4	CONTRIBUTIONS-IN-AID	(30,000)	(36,000)	(42,000)	(48,000)	(54,000)	(60,000)	(66,000)	(72,000)	(78,000)	(84,000)
5	ACCUMULATED AMORTIZATION	10,000	10,990	12,160	13,510	15,040	16,750	18,640	20,710	22,960	25,390
6		<u>\$ 60,000</u>	<u>\$ 73,690</u>	<u>\$ 86,960</u>	<u>\$ 99,810</u>	<u>\$ 112,240</u>	<u>\$ 124,250</u>	<u>\$ 135,840</u>	<u>\$ 147,010</u>	<u>\$ 157,760</u>	<u>\$ 168,090</u>
7	CURRENT LIABILITIES	\$ 4,000	\$ 4,800	\$ 5,600	\$ 6,400	\$ 7,200	\$ 8,000	\$ 8,800	\$ 9,600	\$ 10,400	\$ 11,200
8	DEBT CAPITAL	28,000	34,445	40,680	46,705	52,520	58,125	63,520	68,705	73,680	78,445
9	EQUITY CAPITAL	28,000	34,445	40,680	46,705	52,520	58,125	63,520	68,705	73,680	78,445
10		<u>\$ 60,000</u>	<u>\$ 73,690</u>	<u>\$ 86,960</u>	<u>\$ 99,810</u>	<u>\$ 112,240</u>	<u>\$ 124,250</u>	<u>\$ 135,840</u>	<u>\$ 147,010</u>	<u>\$ 157,760</u>	<u>\$ 168,090</u>
11	AVERAGE CAPITAL		<u>62,445</u>	<u>75,125</u>	<u>87,385</u>	<u>99,225</u>	<u>110,645</u>	<u>121,645</u>	<u>132,235</u>	<u>142,385</u>	<u>152,125</u>
<u>AVERAGE RATE BASE</u>											
12	UTILITY PLANT		\$ 110,000	\$ 130,000	\$ 150,000	\$ 170,000	\$ 190,000	\$ 210,000	\$ 230,000	\$ 250,000	\$ 270,000
13	ACCUMULATED DEPRECIATION		(31,650)	(35,250)	(39,450)	(44,250)	(49,650)	(55,650)	(62,250)	(69,450)	(77,250)
14	CONTRIBUTIONS-IN-AID		(33,000)	(39,000)	(45,000)	(51,000)	(57,000)	(63,000)	(69,000)	(75,000)	(81,000)
15	ACCUMULATED AMORTIZATION		10,495	11,575	12,835	14,275	15,895	17,695	19,675	21,835	24,175
16	IMPUTED CONTRIBUTIONS-IN-AID		(6,000)	(6,000)	(6,000)	(6,000)	(6,000)	(6,000)	(6,000)	(6,000)	(6,000)
17	WORKING CAPITAL		6,600	7,800	9,000	10,200	11,400	12,600	13,800	15,000	16,200
18			<u>\$ 56,445</u>	<u>\$ 69,125</u>	<u>\$ 81,385</u>	<u>\$ 93,225</u>	<u>\$ 104,645</u>	<u>\$ 115,645</u>	<u>\$ 126,225</u>	<u>\$ 136,385</u>	<u>\$ 146,125</u>
19	RETURN REQUIRED		<u>\$ 6,245</u>	<u>\$ 7,513</u>	<u>\$ 8,739</u>	<u>\$ 9,923</u>	<u>\$ 11,065</u>	<u>\$ 12,165</u>	<u>\$ 13,224</u>	<u>\$ 14,239</u>	<u>\$ 15,213</u>
20	RETURN PROVIDED		<u>\$ 5,645</u>	<u>\$ 6,913</u>	<u>\$ 8,139</u>	<u>\$ 9,323</u>	<u>\$ 10,465</u>	<u>\$ 11,565</u>	<u>\$ 12,623</u>	<u>\$ 13,639</u>	<u>\$ 14,613</u>