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PROCEEDINGS 1 2 (Transcript continues from Volume 1.) CHAIRMAN CLARK: Call the hearing back to 3 order. Ms. McMillin. 5 MS. McMILLIN: Thank you, Madam Chairman. MCI would call Elizabeth Kistner as our witness and I 6 7 believe she's already been sworn. 8 9 ELIZABETH G. KISTNER 10 was called as a witness on behalf of MCI Telecommunications Corporation and, having been duly 11 sworn, testified as follows: 12 13 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MS. McMILLIN: 14 15 Ms. Kistner, please state your name and address for the record. 16 My name is Elizabeth G. Kistner. My address 17 A is 3 Spoede Ridge, St. Louis, Missouri 63141. 18 By whom are you employed and in what 19 capacity? 20 l I'm self-employed as a consultant in the 21 telecommunications regulatory area, and I'm appearing 22 23 here on behalf of MCI. 24 Q Have you filed direct testimony on behalf of

MCI Telecommunications Corporation and MCI Metro

Access Transmission Services, Inc. consisting of 16 2 pages? 3 Yes, I have. 4 Do you have any changes or corrections to 5 make to that testimony? 6 A No, I do not. 7 If I ask you today the same questions as are contained in your direct testimony, would your answers 8 9 be the same? 10 Yes, they would. 11 MS. McMILLIN: Chairman Clark, MCI would move that Ms. Kistner's prefiled direct testimony be 12 inserted into the record as though read. 13 CHAIRMAN CLARK: It will be inserted into 14 15 the record as though read. 16 (By Ms. McMillin) Ms. Kistner, have you also prefiled rebuttal testimony consisting of nine 17 pages? 18 19 Yes. 20 Do you have any changes or corrections to Q 21 make to that testimony? 22 A No, I do not. 23 If I ask you the same questions as are contained in your rebuttal testimony would your 24

answers today be the same?

| 1 | · |
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| 1 | A Yes, they would. |
| 2 | MS. McMILLIN: Chairman Clark, MCI would |
| 3 | move into the record Ms. Kistner's prefiled rebuttal |
| 4 | testimony as though read from the stand. |
| 5 | CHAIRMAN CLARK: It will be inserted into |
| 6 | the record as though read. |
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| 1 | | DIRECT TESTIMONY OF ELIZABETH G. KISTNER |
|----|----|--|
| 2 | | ON BEHALF OF MCI TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION |
| 3 | | DOCKET NO. 950737-TP |
| 4 | | September 23, 1996 |
| 5 | | |
| 6 | | I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u> |
| 7 | | |
| 8 | Q. | PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS. |
| 9 | A. | My name is Elizabeth G. Kistner. My business address is 3 Spoede Ridge, St. |
| 10 | | Louis, Missouri 63141. |
| 11 | | |
| 12 | Q. | PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL |
| 13 | | BACKGROUND. |
| 14 | A. | I am a consultant in private practice, specializing in analysis of |
| 15 | | telecommunications public policy issues. During the past three and a half years, |
| 16 | | I have focused on issues related to the introduction of competition in the local |
| 17 | | exchange market, and especially on interim and permanent local number |
| 18 | | portability ("LNP") implementation issues. With respect to interim LNP |
| 19 | | ("ILNP"), I have reviewed numerous Local Exchange Carrier ("LEC") ILNP |
| 20 | | tariff filings, and in Michigan, testified on behalf of MCI on appropriate costs |
| 21 | | and rates for ILNP. With respect to permanent LNP, I have been involved in all |
| 22 | | aspects of national LNP implementation on behalf of MCI, including participation |
| 23 | | in numerous state LNP workshops. |
| 24 | | |
| 25 | | Before entering private practice, I was employed for eight years by MCI |

| 1 | | Telecommunications Corporation ("MCIT"). From 1989 to 1990, I was |
|----|----|---|
| 2 | | Manager, Market and Business Analysis, in the Marketing Department, |
| 3 | | responsible for providing intrastate pricing and competitive market analysis. |
| 4 | | From 1986 to 1989, I was a Staff Analyst in the Regulatory Department |
| 5 | | Southwest Division, responsible for analyzing the impact of LEC intrastate access |
| 6 | | and toll tariffs filed in Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas, with |
| 7 | | emphasis on tariffs impacting 800 and WATS-type services. From 1982 to 1986, |
| 8 | | I worked in MCI's Litigation Support Department in Washington, D.C., |
| 9 | | providing supervisory and analytical support to MCI litigation efforts. |
| 10 | | |
| 11 | | I am a graduate of Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts, with a Bachelor of |
| 12 | | Arts in International Relations. |
| 13 | | |
| 14 | Q. | HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY TESTIFIED IN REGULATORY |
| 15 | | PROCEEDINGS? |
| 16 | A. | Yes. I have testified on behalf of MCI in the states of Oklahoma, Missouri, |
| 17 | | Texas and Michigan. |
| 18 | | |
| 19 | | |
| 20 | | II. PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY |
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| 22 | Q. | WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY? |
| 23 | A. | The purpose of my testimony is to respond to the issues identified by the Florida |
| 24 | | Public Service Commission ("PSC") regarding the appropriate cost recovery |
| 25 | | mechanisms for ILNP, including the appropriateness of the recovery mechanism |
| | | |

previously approved in Order No. PSC-95-1604-FOF-TP in Docket No. 950737-TP (the "LNP Order"). Specifically, I will explain why the LNP Order is inconsistent with the Federal Communication Commission ("FCC") First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 95-119 ("FCC Order"), and recommend that the PSC direct each LEC and Alternative Local Exchange Carrier ("ALEC") to pay for its own costs of ILNP measures. I will also recommend that the PSC require application of its decision in this case retroactively to the date of the FCC Order. Finally, I will ask the PSC to require all LECs and ALECs to adopt appropriate meet-point billing arrangements for access charges paid by Interexchange Carriers ("IXCs") terminating calls via ILNP measures.

III. CONSISTENCY OF FLORIDA LNP ORDER WITH FCC ORDER

Q. WHAT IS YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE PSC'S LNP ORDER WITH RESPECT TO ILNP COST RECOVERY?

A. The PSC's *LNP Order* identified costs associated with providing Remote Call Forwarding ("RCF"), and established rates and a cost recovery mechanism. The costs identified were: service implementation costs, central office equipment and software costs, and interoffice networking costs. (*LNP Order* at 15) The rates approved by the PSC consisted of a monthly per-line charge, a monthly additional path charge, and a non-recurring charge. (*Id.* at 16-17) These rates were to be charged to ALECs by BellSouth, GTE Florida ("GTEFL"), and Sprint, for each ALEC number ported from the incumbent LEC via RCF.

| 1 | Q. | WHAT IS YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE FCC ORDER WITH |
|----|----|---|
| 2 | | REGARD TO RECOVERY OF ILNP COSTS? |
| 3 | Α. | Fundamentally, the FCC Order requires that ILNP costs be recovered on a |
| 4 | | competitively neutral basis. Specifically, the FCC concluded that "section |
| 5 | | 251(e)(2) [of the 1996 Act] gives [us] specific authority to prescribe pricing |
| 6 | | principles that ensure that the costs of number portability are allocated on a |
| 7 | | 'competitively neutral' basis." (FCC Order at ¶ 126) The FCC rejected |
| 8 | | recovering all ILNP costs on new entrants and stated the following: |
| 9 | | Ordinarily the Commission follows cost causation principles, under |
| 10 | | which the purchaser of a service would be required to pay at least |
| 11 | | the incremental cost incurred in providing a service. (FCC Order |
| 12 | | at ¶ 131) |
| 13 | | |
| 14 | | However, the FCC properly recognized that interim portability is not a service |
| 15 | | and rejected the recovery of all the costs of interim number portability from new |
| 16 | | entrants on a cost-causative basis: |
| 17 | | number portability is a network function that is required for a |
| 18 | | carrier to compete with the carrier that is already serving a |
| 19 | | customer. Depending on the technology used, to price number |
| 20 | | portability on a cost causative basis could defeat the purpose for |
| 21 | | which it was mandated. (FCC Order at ¶ 131) [Emphasis added.] |
| 22 | | |
| 23 | | Interim number portability is a mechanism that both enables competition and is |
| 24 | | used by carriers to route calls between their networks. If one must find a cost |
| 25 | | causer, then it is competition in general, in which all local telecommunications |

carriers will participate, and all local telecommunications users will benefit. In addition, local telecommunications carriers and their customers benefit from the ability to complete calls to any other user on the network -- the value of a network is directly related to the number of users that can connect and communicate. The routing of calls should not be considered a service, but rather, as the 1996 Act recognized in Section 251(b)(2), an obligation between carriers. In this capacity, number portability helps enable competition and is a network function, not a service, and it makes no sense to recover the costs of network routing from only new entrant carriers.

Q. WHAT DID THE FCC ULTIMATELY CONCLUDE REGARDING THE RECOVERY OF INTERIM NUMBER PORTABILITY COSTS?

- A. The FCC determined that a competitively neutral cost recovery mechanism should satisfy two criteria:
 - (1) "...a 'competitively neutral' cost recovery mechanism should not give one service provider an appreciable, incremental cost advantage over another service provider, when competing for a specific subscriber. In other words, the recovery mechanism should not have a disparate effect on the incremental costs of competing carriers seeking to serve the same customer." (FCC Order at ¶ 132)

(2) "The second criterion for a 'competitively neutral' cost recovery mechanism is that it should not have a disparate effect on the ability of competing service providers to earn normal returns

| on | their | investment." | (F | 7CC | Order | at 9 | Ţ | 135) | ١ |
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Q. IS THE PSC'S LNP ORDER INCONSISTENT WITH THE FCC ORDER WITH REGARD TO THE RECOVERY OF ILNP COSTS?

A. Yes, it is. The cost recovery mechanism approved by the PSC, in which ALECs must pay incumbent LECs tariffed monthly and non-recurring rates in order to use interim number portability is equivalent to having them pay all the costs of interim number portability. This is an explicit violation of the FCC's competitively neutral cost recovery criteria. In its Order, the FCC gave the following example to explain its criteria:

When a facilities-based carrier that competes against an incumbent LEC for a customer, the incumbent LEC incurs no cost of number portability if it retains the customer. If the facilities-based carrier wins the customer, an incremental cost of number portability is generated. The share of this incremental cost borne by the new entrant that wins the customer cannot be so high as to put it at an appreciable cost disadvantage relative to the cost the incumbent LEC would incur if it retained the customer. Thus, the incremental payment by the new entrant if it wins a customer would have to be close to zero, to approximate the incremental number portability cost borne by the incumbent LEC if it retains the customer. (FCC Order at ¶ 133)

The FCC Order goes on to conclude that a cost recovery mechanism that imposes the entire incremental cost of currently available number portability on a

| 1 | | facilities-based new entrant would violate the first criterion. Such a cost recovery |
|----|----|--|
| 2 | | mechanism would impose an incremental cost on a facilities-based entrant that |
| 3 | | neither the incumbent, nor an entrant that merely resold the incumbent's service, |
| 4 | | would have to bear. |
| 5 | | |
| 6 | | IV. APPROPRIATE COST RECOVERY MECHANISMS |
| 7 | | |
| 8 | Q. | GIVEN THE FCC ORDER, WHAT IS AN APPROPRIATE COST |
| 9 | | RECOVERY MECHANISM FOR FLORIDA? |
| 10 | | |
| 11 | A. | In its order, the FCC identified several cost recovery mechanisms that it found |
| 12 | | would meet its competitively neutral recovery criteria. (FCC Order at ¶ 136) The |
| 13 | | simplest and most direct of the recommended mechanisms is one whereby each |
| 14 | | local carrier would pay for its own costs of currently available number portability |
| 15 | | measures. Such a mechanism is competitively neutral because it recognizes that |
| 16 | | both incumbent LECs and ALECs will incur costs to forward calls to another |
| 17 | | carrier's network via ILNP methods. |
| 18 | | |
| 19 | Q. | WHAT OTHER TYPES OF COMPETITIVELY NEUTRAL RECOVERY |
| 20 | | MECHANISMS DID THE FCC IDENTIFY? |
| 21 | A. | The FCC described the following three additional cost recovery mechanisms that |
| 22 | | would satisfy its competitively neutral criteria: |
| 23 | | 1) The method used by carriers in Rochester, New York where a |
| 24 | | surcharge based on each carrier's number of ported telephone numbers |
| 25 | | relative to the total number of active telephone numbers in the local |

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2) A cost recovery mechanism that allocates number portability costs based on a carrier's number of active telephone numbers (or lines) relative to the total number of active telephone numbers (or lines) in a service area.

3) A cost recovery mechanism that would assess a uniform percentage assessment on a carrier's gross revenues less charges paid to other carriers. (*Ibid.*)

Α.

Q. WHY DOES MCI PREFER THE MECHANISM WHEREBY LECS AND ALECS EACH RECOVER THEIR OWN COSTS OF ILNP?

This mechanism is superior in that it does not require special reporting between carriers of revenues, minutes of use, number of customer telephone numbers, etc. In addition, it does not require carriers to produce, or the PSC to review, cost studies to determine the appropriate incremental costs for recovery. This is especially important because interim portability measures will soon be replaced by permanent number portability. Further, industry and state commission resources are already strained implementing all of the other provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 without having to draw away resources to implement a new, temporary mechanism for the recovery of interim number portability costs. Development and monitoring of the accounting and reporting systems necessary to implement another, more complicated, competitively neutral cost recovery mechanism would be extremely inefficient given the short time frame it will be in place. The other cost recovery mechanisms specified by the FCC would have nearly the same effect on carriers as the method MCI advocates.

However, MCI recommends that the PSC select a cost recovery mechanism that comes without the additional effort and expense that would accompany other allocation-based cost recovery schemes.

A.

Q. WHY WOULD ALL THE VARIOUS COMPETITIVELY NEUTRAL COST RECOVERY MECHANISMS IDENTIFIED BY THE FCC HAVE NEARLY THE SAME EFFECT ON CARRIERS?

The recovery mechanism preferred by MCI and the other mechanisms identified by the FCC are similar in that they all result in an allocation of costs based on the size of the local carrier's market share. With the method that MCI proposes, where each carrier must pay for its own costs of number portability, the result is nearly the same, only with fewer overall costs. This is because in the beginning it is likely that the number of customers porting away from a carrier will be in proportion to the market share of that carrier. In this case, most of the customers who port their number will port away from the incumbent LEC, with a smaller number porting away from the new entrant. Thus, using any of the suggested methods requires carriers to pay interim number portability costs based on their size and related market share. However, with the proposal that MCI advocates there are no unnecessary expenses and difficulties created with the development and implementation of allocative processes.

Q. HOW SHOULD THE COSTS OF INTERIM NUMBER PORTABILITY BE DETERMINED FOR ALLOCATION AND RECOVERY?

A. If MCI's recommended cost recovery mechanism is utilized there is no need to determine the costs of interim number portability because every carrier recovers

its own costs. Further, with this method carriers have no incentive to inflate the costs of interim number portability. In fact they have an incentive to provide interim portability as efficiently as possible.

However, if the Commission adopts a different method of cost recovery that allocates the cost of interim portability to carriers based on some specific criteria it is important that only the *incremental* costs that are incurred due to the provision of interim portability be accurately identified and recovered. In its Order the FCC states that "[t]he principles we adopt should also mitigate any anti-competitive effects that may arise if a carrier falsely inflates the cost of currently available number portability." (FCC Order at ¶ 125)

While apportioning the cost of number portability by market share goes far toward discouraging the inflation of interim number portability costs it does not mitigate it as carriers paying their own costs would. Therefore, if carriers covering their own costs of number portability is rejected, and an allocation method is used, then the incumbent LECs' cost studies must still be scrutinized to determine that costs are not artificially inflated above absolute *incremental* costs. This must be done because an incentive to inflate costs might still remain since the portion of costs that the incumbent pays of its own costs may be simply a matter of "taking money out of one pocket and putting it into the other."

Q. DOES THE FCC IDENTIFY THE INCREMENTAL COSTS THAT ARE INVOLVED IN THE PROVISION OF INTERIM NUMBER PORTABILITY?

| , | A. | The I've discusses the incremental costs of interim number portability and, |
|----|----|--|
| 2 | | relying on Bell Operating Company ("BOC") claims, states the following: |
| 3 | | "The BOCs claim, for example, that there are essentially three |
| 4 | | costs incurred in the provision of RCF for an intraoffice call: |
| 5 | | (1) switching costs incurred by the original switch in |
| 6 | | determining that the number is no longer resident; |
| 7 | | (2) switching costs incurred in performing the RCF |
| 8 | | translation, which identifies the address of the receiving |
| 9 | | switch; and |
| 10 | | (3) switching costs incurred in redirecting the call from |
| 11 | | the original switch to the switch to which the number has |
| 12 | | been forwarded. |
| 13 | | The BOCs further assert that the additional costs incurred for an |
| 14 | | interoffice call include: |
| 15 | | (1) the transport costs incurred in directing the call |
| 16 | | from the tandem or end office to the office from which the |
| 17 | | number was transferred and back to the tandem or end |
| 18 | | office; and |
| 19 | | (2) remote tandem or end office switching costs." |
| 20 | | (FCC Order at ¶ 129) |
| 21 | | |
| 22 | | These are essentially the additional, or incremental, costs for the provision of |
| 23 | | interim number portability, and will be incurred by any LEC providing interim |
| 24 | | number portability, both new and incumbent. |
| 25 | | |

| 1 | Q. | ARE THESE THE ONLY COSTS THAT ARE INCLUDED IN THE RATES |
|----|----|---|
| 2 | | BELLSOUTH, GTEFL AND SPRINT CURRENTLY CHARGE FOR RCF? |
| 3 | A. | Apparently not. The PSC determined that the rates it approved in the LNP Order |
| 4 | | were above GTEFL's and Sprint's stated costs to provide RCF. The PSC found |
| 5 | | BellSouth's cost studies to be questionable, and so directed BellSouth to file new |
| 6 | | cost studies by March 31, 1997. (LNP Order at 17) |
| 7 | | |
| 8 | Q. | IS IT NECESSARY FOR THE PSC TO REQUIRE LECS TO RE-FILE |
| 9 | | COST STUDIES AND TARIFFS? |
| 10 | A. | If the cost recovery mechanism that MCI proposes is adopted, that is, if all |
| 11 | | carriers recover their own costs of interim number portability, then there will be |
| 12 | | no need for tariffs or cost reviews. In this situation carriers treat each other as |
| 13 | | part of a network instead of making customers out of each other (producing all |
| 14 | | the inherent conflicts that a situation such as this could create). Further, it will |
| 15 | | become unnecessary for carriers to produce, and PSC to evaluate, interim number |
| 16 | | portability tariff offerings. If this method is adopted it will only be necessary for |
| 17 | | the PSC to require LECs to provision number portability in a timely, |
| 18 | | non-discriminatory manner and set up safeguards to assure that these standards |
| 19 | | are met. If, however, the PSC chooses to distribute the costs of number |
| 20 | | portability based on access lines or numbers then it will be necessary to determine |
| 21 | | the incremental costs that are valid for recovery. |
| 22 | | |
| 23 | | V. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF DECISION |
| 24 | | |
| 25 | 0 | SHOULD THE DSC'S DECISION IN THIS CASE RE DETROACTIVELY |

| 1 | | APPLIED? |
|----|----|--|
| 2 | A. | Yes. It is appropriate that the PSC's decision in this case be retroactively applied |
| 3 | | to the release date of the FCC Order July 2, 1996. LECs should provide full |
| 4 | | refunds to ALECs of all amounts collected for RCF between that date and the |
| 5 | | date of the PSC's order in this proceeding. Depending on the cost recovery |
| 6 | | mechanism chosen, the cost of the RCF provided during that period can be |
| 7 | | reallocated accordingly. |
| 8 | | |
| 9 | | VI. OTHER ISSUES |
| 10 | | |
| 11 | Q. | ARE THERE OTHER REQUIREMENTS IN THE FCC ORDER |
| 12 | | REGARDING INTERIM NUMBER PORTABILITY THAT SHOULD BE |
| 13 | | ADDRESSED IN THIS PROCEEDING? |
| 14 | A. | Yes, the FCC Order included requirements for the provision of Direct Inward |
| 15 | | Dial ("DID") as an ILNP method, and the collection of terminating access |
| 16 | | charges, that should be addressed by the PSC in this proceeding. |
| 17 | | |
| 18 | Q. | WHAT DID THE FCC ORDER REQUIRE WITH REGARD TO |
| 19 | | PROVISION OF DID AS AN INTERIM NUMBER PORTABILITY |
| 20 | | METHOD? |
| 21 | A. | The FCC Order required LECs "to offer number portability through RCF, DID, |
| 22 | | and other comparable methods because they are the only methods that currently |
| 23 | | are technically feasible." (FCC Order at ¶ 110) Thus, LECs must provide DID |
| | | |

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as a number portability option, along with RCF or other available methods, upon

request from a competing carrier. The PSC should therefore make clear in this

| 1 | | proceeding that the cost allocation and recovery mechanism it adopts applies to |
|----|----|---|
| 2 | | DID as well as RCF. This means that, in the event the PSC adopts a mechanism |
| 3 | | that requires the calculation of costs for allocation purposes, then the PSC must |
| 4 | | review and approve cost studies for DID as well as for RCF. |
| 5 | | |
| 6 | Q. | WHAT DID THE FCC ORDER REQUIRE WITH REGARD TO |
| 7 | | TERMINATING ACCESS CHARGES? |
| 8 | A. | In response to questions concerning the appropriate treatment of terminating |
| 9 | | access charges in the interim number portability context, the FCC concluded that |
| 10 | | meet-point billing arrangements between neighboring incumbent LECs provides |
| 11 | | the appropriate model for the proper access arrangement for interim number |
| 12 | | portability. (FCC Order at ¶ 140) Therefore, the PSC should direct the LECs to |
| 13 | | adopt meet-point billing arrangements for access charges paid by IXCs |
| 14 | | terminating calls directed to new entrants via LEC-provided RCF or DID. The |
| 15 | | appropriate split of access charges is the following: |
| 16 | | (1) the forwarding LEC charges the IXC for transport from the |
| 17 | | IXC point of presence to the end office where the RCF/DID is |
| 18 | | provided; and |
| 19 | | (2) the terminating LEC charges the IXC for the terminating |
| 20 | | LEC's terminating switching function, common line and RIC. |
| 21 | | |
| 22 | | Any additional intermediate switching and transport costs incurred by the LEC |
| 23 | | would be recovered according to the competitively neutral mechanism adopted |
| 24 | | in this proceeding. In addition, if MCI is unable to identify the particular IXC |

carrying a call subject to forwarding, the forwarding LEC should provide MCI

with the necessary information to permit MCI to issue a bill to the IXC. This may include sharing Percentage Interstate/Intrastate Usage data.

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VII. CONCLUSION

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Q. WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDATION TO THE COMMISSION TO ELIMINATE INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE PSC'S LNP ORDER AND THE FCC ORDER?

The PSC should determine that its prior LNP Order is inconsistent with the FCC Order, in that it established rates for RCF that are not competitively neutral according to the FCC's cost recovery criteria. The PSC should determine that the costs of number portability should be borne by each carrier providing portability consistent with the competitively neutral requirements of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the FCC Order. If the PSC declines to implement MCI's recommended cost recovery proposal, the Commission should alternatively allocate the cost of number portability based on the number of active access lines or telephone numbers. The PSC should then direct BellSouth, GTEFL, and Sprint to provide cost studies that identify only the necessary incremental costs that they will incur in the provision of interim number portability, including cost studies for both RCF and DID. Further, the PSC should require retroactive application of its order in this proceeding back to the date of the FCC Order, and require refunds to ALECs as appropriate. Finally, appropriate meet-point billing arrangements should be implemented for the sharing of terminating access.

| 1 | Q. | DOES THAT CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY? |
|----|----|------------------------------------|
| 2 | A. | Yes. |
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| 1 | | REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF ELIZABETH G. KISTNER |
|------------|----|---|
| 2 | | ON BEHALF OF MCI TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION |
| 3 | | DOCKET NO. 950737-TP |
| 4 | | October 7, 1996 |
| 5 | | |
| 6 | | I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u> |
| 7 | Q. | PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME. |
| 8 | A. | My name is Elizabeth G. Kistner. |
| 9 | | |
| LO | Q. | DID YOU FILE DIRECT TESTIMONY IN THIS PROCEEDING? |
| L1 | A. | Yes, I filed direct testimony on behalf of MCI Telecommunications Corporation |
| L2 | | ("MCI") in Docket No. 950737-TP on September 23, 1996. |
| L3 | | |
| L 4 | | II. PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY |
| L5 | | |
| L6 | Q. | WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY? |
| L7 | A. | The purpose of my rebuttal testimony is to respond to the direct testimony filed in |
| 18 | | this proceeding by witnesses for BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. ("BellSouth") |
| 19 | | GTE Florida Incorporated ("GTEFL"), United Telephone Company of Florida and |
| 20 | | Central Telephone Company of Florida ("Sprint"), AT&T Communications |
| 21 | | ("AT&T"), AT&T Wireless Services of Florida, Inc. ("AT&T Wireless"), Time |
| 22 | | Warner AXS of Florida ("Time Warner"), and the Florida Cable |
| 23 | | Telecommunications Association, Inc. ("FCTA"). Specifically, I will show that |
| 24 | | nearly all parties are in agreement that the Florida Public Service Commission's |

| 1 | | ("PSC's") Order No. PSC-95-1604-FOF-TP in Docket No. 950737-TP (the "LNP |
|----|----|--|
| 2 | | Order") is inconsistent with the Federal Communication Commission ("FCC") First |
| 3 | | Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. |
| 4 | | 95-119 ("FCC Order"). I will then respond to the parties' recommendations for an |
| 5 | | appropriate cost recovery mechanism for interim local number portability ("ILNP"). |
| 6 | | |
| 7 | | III. CONSISTENCY OF FLORIDA LNP ORDER WITH FCC ORDER |
| 8 | | |
| 9 | Q. | DID THE PARTIES FILING DIRECT TESTIMONY AGREE THAT THE |
| 10 | | FLORIDA LNP ORDER IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE FCC ORDER? |
| 11 | A. | All but one of the parties filing direct testimony were in agreement with MCI that |
| 12 | | the Florida LNP Order is clearly inconsistent with the FCC Order. BellSouth (at 9), |
| 13 | | Sprint (at 2), AT&T (at 3), AT&T Wireless (at 3), Time Warner (at 4), and FCTA |
| 14 | | (at 1). The current cost recovery mechanism in Florida, where Alternative Local |
| 15 | | Exchange Carriers ("ALECs") pay nearly all of the costs of interim number |
| 16 | | portability, is an explicit violation of the FCC's competitively neutral cost recovery |
| 17 | | criteria. Only GTEFL appears to disagree. |
| 18 | | |
| 19 | Q. | DOES GTEFL MAINTAIN THAT THE CURRENT COST RECOVERY |
| 20 | | MECHANISM IN FLORIDA IS CONSISTENT WITH THE FCC ORDER? |
| 21 | A. | Yes. GTEFL offers two interpretations of the FCC Order to support its position that |
| 22 | | its current ILNP tariffs in Florida are consistent with the FCC Order. First, GTEFL |
| 23 | | isolates a single line of text from the FCC Order, where the FCC allows that states |
| 24 | | may require the filing of tariffs for the provision of ILNP measures, and concludes |

that Florida must be in compliance since ILNP is offered in Florida under tariffs. (GTEFL at 3) Yet, as GTEFL itself acknowledges, the FCC set forth explicit guidelines for competitively neutral cost recovery. No reasonable person could interpret the order to mean that the mere filing of any tariffs (no matter what is in them) satisfies those criteria. Second, GTEFL later in its testimony implies that the existing tariffs in Florida are in compliance with the FCC Order, insofar as they allow incumbent local exchange carriers ("ILECs") to charge ALECs their tariffed rates, and vice versa. GTEFL asserts that this maintains competitive neutrality by allowing each carrier to recover its own costs (GTEFL at 5). However, this is precisely the type of mechanism that the FCC determined is a violation of the competitively neutral cost recovery criteria. (Direct Testimony of Mike Guedel (AT&T) at 4-5; FCC Order at ¶133 and 138). Thus, with the exception of GTEFL's baseless interpretations, the parties agree that the Florida LNP Order is inconsistent with the FCC Order. IV. APPROPRIATE COST RECOVERY MECHANISMS Q. WHAT DID THE PARTIES RECOMMEND AS APPROPRIATE COST

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RECOVERY MECHANISMS FOR INTERIM PORTABILITY COSTS? A Several parties agreed with MCI that the simplest and most efficient of the FCCrecommended cost recovery mechanisms is one whereby each local carrier would pay for its own costs of currently available number portability ILNP methods. (AT&T at 7; AT&T Wireless at 4; Time Warner at 9; FCTA at 2-3) Currently available ILNP methods include Remote Call Forwarding ("RCF"), Direct Inward

| Dial ("DID"), and similar routing methods. As AT&T correctly points out, this |
|---|
| decision affects only interim number portability, which will begin to be phased out |
| in Florida within the next 12 months. This method does not carry with it any |
| administrative costs (Time Warner at 9) and does not require the filing and review |
| of cost support. |

A.

Q. WHAT OTHER COST RECOVERY MECHANISMS WERE

RECOMMENDED?

BellSouth did not offer an alternative cost recovery mechanism, recommending instead that the Florida PSC do nothing about the inconsistency between orders (BellSouth at 12,15). GTEFL recommended a pooling and surcharge mechanism (GTEFL at 5), and Sprint recommends a cost splitting formula (Sprint at 5).

Q. WHY DOES BELLSOUTH RECOMMEND THAT THE PSC DO NOTHING ABOUT THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE FLORIDA AND FCC ORDERS?

Most of BellSouth's testimony is devoted to arguing why the FCC made the wrong decision in establishing a competitively neutral cost recovery mechanism for ILNP costs. (BellSouth at 6-7, 9-15) BellSouth witness Alphonso Varner states that "BellSouth believes that the price of such [ILNP] services should be based on the cost of providing the network elements and include a reasonable profit," and that on the basis of their disagreement with the *FCC Order*, "[t]he Florida Order should simply be maintained until such time as the solution for permanent number portability can be implemented." (BellSouth at 12-13) Mr. Varner concludes by

| 1 | | suggesting that, pending resolution of BellSouth's Petition for Reconsideration of the |
|------------|----|--|
| 2 | | FCC Order, the Florida PSC should take a "wait and see" position. (BellSouth at |
| 3 | | 15) |
| 4 | | |
| 5 | Q. | IS A PENDING PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION CAUSE FOR THE |
| 6 | | FCC'S ORDER TO BE IGNORED? |
| 7 | Α | No. BellSouth is free, of course, to disagree with the FCC Order, and it can pursue |
| 8 | | appropriate administrative and judicial remedies to have the order reversed. |
| 9 | | However, absent a stay of the order by the FCC or appropriate court, the regulations |
| LO | | adopted in the order are in effect now. The guidelines adopted by the FCC for |
| L1 | | interim number portability cost recovery can not be ignored simply because |
| L2 | | BellSouth doesn't like them. |
| L3 | | |
| L 4 | Q. | WILL YOU RESPOND TO BELLSOUTH'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE |
| 15 | | FCC ORDER? |
| 16 | A. | No. Although I strongly disagree with BellSouth's characterization of and |
| 17 | | conclusions about the FCC Order and the 1996 Telecommunications Act, as stated in |
| 18 | | Mr. Varner's testimony, I believe BellSouth's arguments are irrelevant in this |
| 19 | | proceeding. MCI has appropriately responded to all of the same BellSouth |
| 20 | | arguments in MCI's Opposition to Petitions for Reconsideration and Clarification, |
| 21 | | filed September 27, 1996 in CC Docket No. 95-116, and so I will not burden the |
| 22 | | record here with a reiteration of MCI's opposition. |
| 23 | | |
| 24 | Q. | DO YOU AGREE WITH GTEFL'S RECOMMENDATION FOR A POOLING |

AND SURCHARGE MECHANISM?

| A. | No. GTEFL recommends a highly complex and inefficient pooling and surcharge |
|----|---|
| | mechanism. GTEFL's proposal is a case of regulatory "overkill," given the limited |
| | costs and duration associated with interim number portability. Under GTEFL's |
| | proposal, the PSC would have to: 1) require all carriers to submit cost studies for |
| | RCF and DID, and determine the appropriate incremental costs; 2) review IXC, |
| | ILEC, ALEC, and commercial mobile radio service ("CMRS") traffic information, |
| | estimate the total number of local service and interexchange calls, and update data |
| | on a periodic basis; 3) determine an estimated annual cost of ILNP and compute a |
| | per-call cost; 4) manage the allocation of costs to IXCs, ILECs, ALECs, and CMRS |
| | providers, and collect funds from those carriers; 5) require and review ILEC and |
| | ALEC cost reports on a regular basis to determine the amount of RCF and DID |
| | usage for reimbursement; 6) manage periodic distribution of funds to ILECs and |
| | ALECs, including dispute resolution; 7) determine an end user surcharge and |
| | oversee customer notification and reaction; and 8) determine and manage shortfalls |
| | or excesses in the fund and reapportion as needed. GTEFL describes this system as |
| | "simple" — I would call it a nightmare. |
| | In addition to the obvious difficulties of managing such a system, pooling by nature |
| | reduces the incentives for carriers to incur costs in the most economically efficient |
| | manner, and encourages carriers to exaggerate costs in their reports to the pool. |
| | Further, the costs and time associated with establishing and managing all of the |
| | necessary reporting, tracking, end user billing, and auditing processes that are |
| | necessary with pooling, will drain carrier and Commission resources from more |
| | productive efforts to further the introduction of competition to Florida local |

| 1 | exchange | customers. |
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A.

Q. IS THERE ANY REASON TO EXPECT THAT SUCH A POOLING AND
SURCHARGE MECHANISM WILL BE ADOPTED FOR RECOVERY OF
LONG-TERM LNP COSTS?

Not at this time. Although GTEFL proposed such a pooling and surcharge system in the FCC's long-term LNP cost recovery proceeding, many commenting parties — including incumbent LECs, ALECs, and state regulators — opposed pooling recommendations as an inefficient and undesirable way to recover costs. Similarly, numerous parties oppose mandatory surcharges on end user bills as anticompetitive and anti-consumer. The FCC is not expected to make a decision for several months, but there is certainly no widespread support for them to adopt such a proposal. Thus, in reviewing GTEFL's proposal, the Florida PSC should consider that such a system may be used only for Florida, and only for recovery of interim number portability costs.

Q. DOES SPRINT'S PROPOSAL TO SET ILNP RATES AT APPROXIMATELY HALF THEIR COST SATISFY THE FCC'S COMPETITIVELY NEUTRAL

CRITERIA?

A. No. Sprint witness Ben Poag characterizes Sprint's proposal as an "approximately equal sharing of the cost of interim number portability" (Sprint at 5). However, "equal" does not translate to "competitively neutral" when one carrier's share of the market is so substantially greater than that of its competitors. A split of ILNP costs, i.e., allocating approximately half of the costs to new entrants, violates the FCC's

directive that costs be allocated on a *proportionate* basis. In fact, the FCC used the specific example that a method that divided costs equally among four carriers, including the incumbent and three new entrants, would violate its cost recovery principles because the new entrants' portion of the costs could be disproportionate to expected profits (*FCC Order* at ¶135). Thus, Sprint's proposal would not be competitively neutral unless new entrant carriers had gained 50% of the local exchange market.

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VI. CONCLUSION

Α.

Q. COULD YOU PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY?

Yes. First, I pointed out that there is near unanimous agreement among the parties filing testimony that Florida's *LNP Order* is inconsistent with the *FCC Order*. As a result, most parties made recommendations for an alternative cost recovery mechanism for ILNP costs. I supported the recommendation of AT&T, AT&T Wireless, Time Warner and FCTA that the simplest and most efficient cost recovery mechanism suggested by the FCC is one whereby each local carrier pays for its own costs of providing interim portability measures. I noted that BellSouth's disagreement with the *FCC Order* is irrelevant to this proceeding, and disagreed with their suggestion that the Florida PSC can ignore the FCC guidelines simply because BellSouth has a pending Petition for Reconsideration. I showed that GTEFL's proposal for a pooling and surcharge recovery mechanism was inefficient and overly complex given the limited costs and duration associated with interim number portability. Finally, I explained why Sprint's proposal to split the

| 1 | | incremental costs of interim number portability among ILECs and their competitor |
|----|----|--|
| 2 | | does not meet the FCC's guidelines for competitively neutral cost recovery because |
| 3 | | it is not a proportionate allocation mechanism. |
| 4 | | |
| 5 | Q. | DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY? |
| 6 | A. | Yes, it does. |
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BY MS. McMILLIN:

- Q Have you prepared a brief summary of your testimony?
 - A Yes, I have.
 - Q Please give it at this time.

A Afternoon, Chairman Clark, and members of the Commission. Thank you for the opportunity to address here today the important topic of an appropriate cost recovery mechanism for interim number portability.

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires that the cost of number portability, including both interim and long term portability methods, be borne by all telecommunications carriers on a competively neutral basis.

Competitive neutrality requires that the costs be incurred by competing carriers on an equal per customer basis. If the costs of interim local number portability are not incurred on an equal basis per customer, then one carrier will have a cost advantage over its competitor with regard to number portability, something the Act intended to prohibit.

This interpretation of the Act's competitive neutrality provision was embodied in the FCC's number probability Order, and as a result you have set forth

as the first issue in this proceeding the question of whether this Commission's order on number portability is inconsistent with the FCC's order.

There is near unanimous agreement among the parties here today that the answer is yes, the Florida Order is inconsistent with the FCC number portability order. This is not surprising given that the Florida order predates the Telecommunications Act and the FCC's order interpreting it.

The second and related issue set forth in this proceeding is what is the appropriate cost recovery mechanism for interim number portability.

MCI and many other parties --

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Ms. Kistner, slow down a little bit, okay? Go ahead.

WITNESS KISTNER: I'm sorry about that.

MCI and many other parties have recommended that the simplest and most efficient cost recovery mechanism is one in which competing local carriers pay for their own costs for interim portability measures. Requiring all carries to bear their own costs has a number of significant advantages over other cost recovery mechanisms.

First, since long term portability measures should be employed in the next 12 to 24 months in

Florida, interim number portability is relatively short lived, and, therefore, it is appropriate to adopt a cost recovery mechanism that is not complex, administratively burdensome or costly to implement for such a short period.

Second, if each carrier bears its own costs it will result in a proportionate sharing of interim portability costs among incumbent and alternative local exchange carriers. The true cost of interim number portability measures, such as remote call forwarding, include both the costs of providing interim portability measures to other carriers and the cost of receiving customers with ported numbers.

The incumbent LECs have characterized this proposal as requiring them to bear virtually all of the costs of interim number portability, since at least initially customers will be porting away from the incumbent carriers. However, alternative LECs will not only incur similar costs as customers begin to ask to be ported to other carriers, but they will also incur costs to accommodate ported customers in their networks.

For example, ALECs will spend significantly more time in the customer acquisition process and will have to develop billing and customer service systems

to track two numbers for each ported customer, the ported number and the number assigned by the ALEC.

Although incumbent LECs may incur more of the total network costs in the aggregate on a proportionate or per customer basis, the cost should be relatively equal. Thus it makes sense not to develop and administer a complex recovery mechanism when allowing each carrier to bear its own cost will achieve the same purpose.

This simple and fair proposal is in contrast to the proposals of BellSouth, GTE and Sprint.

BellSouth proposes that the Commission leave the status quo in place, which results in almost all of the costs of interim number portability falling on new entrants. This is directly contrary to the Act's requirement that costs be borne on a competitively neutral basis.

GTE similarly recommends that the Commission keep the status quo, but in the alternative implement a complicated pooling and end user surcharge mechanism just for this limited amount of cost recovery.

Sprint's proposal to split the network cost of interim number portability approximately equally between incumbent LECs and ALECs at least recognizes that the status quo is not competitively neutral but

it nevertheless misses the mark because it results in ALECs bearing a disproportionate amount of the total cost on a per customer basis. And all three of these ILEC proposals require the Commission to review cost studies to determine the appropriate incremental cost for recovery.

In summary, MCI urges the Commission to consider the relatively short duration of interim number portability methods and the relatively proportionate way in which ILECs and ALECs will incur costs absent any contrived cost recovery mechanism, and determine that requiring each carrier to bear its own cost of providing interim portability will best meet the requirements of the Act and the FCC's number portability order.

In addition, MCI urged the Commission to adopt meet-point billing arrangements as the model for the sharing of access charges from the IXC's terminating calls to ported numbers. This is consistent with the FCC's conclusions regarding access arrangements in the interim portability context.

I'd like to clarify that MCI is not recommending that ILECs create costly new systems to automate meet-point billing. Rather MCI is recommending that carriers use meet-point billing as a

model for fairly splitting access charges between the intermediate LEC and the terminating LEC.

Thank you again for the opportunity to speak to you today.

MS. McMILLIN: Thank you, Ms. Kistner.

Ms. Kistner is available for cross.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Ms. White.

MS. WHITE: Yes.

CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MS. WHITE:

Q I have just a couple of questions,
Ms. Kistner. Nancy White for BellSouth
Telecommunications.

Would you agree that the majority of the costs of interim number portability are going to be borne by the incumbent local exchange company?

A I really can't agree that the majority of costs, if you include both the cost of porting to another carrier as well as the cost to a carrier of receiving porting numbers, I don't know that I could agree that the majority of the costs would be borne by the incumbent, but I would say there's probably a good likelihood.

Q Okay. Because I thought I heard you say in your summary that in the aggregate the incumbent local

exchange companies would bear more of the cost than the alternative local exchange companies. Was I mistaken in that?

- A Well, I did say the majority of network costs, and by that I was referring to the costs of providing the porting from one carrier's network to another carrier's network.
- Q You stated also in your summary that the cost on a per customer basis will be equal, do you recall that?
- A I said they would be roughly equal or relatively equal.
- Q Have you done any studies or analyses to show that that's the case -- that the costs that MCI on a per customer basis and the costs for BellSouth on a per customer basis are going to be roughly equal?
- A No. I made that statement based on my understanding of the type of costs that would be incurred, which are relatively small. And when spread out over the full customer base, I think the amount per customer is almost impossible to even calculate, and, therefore, it was easy to say that they would be approximately equal. They would be very, very minimal.
 - Q Would you agree that the -- well let me

strike that and start over.

In the original order of this case this

Commission found that the costs involved in remote

call forwarding were service implementation, central

office equipment, software costs and interoffice

network costs; would you agree with that? That those

are the type of costs that will be involved?

A Those are the type. I'd have to look at the list. Those are some of the costs. I would not agree those are all of the costs.

Q You also stated that ALECs will have to put in place billing and tracking systems?

A Yes.

Q Has MCI or have you done any studies or analyses to show what those costs are?

A We have looked at what sort of incremental difference that makes in our costs of acquiring customers. And I don't believe anybody has put a dollar figure on it. But we've looked at, for example, that acquiring a customer that requires number portability requires approximately 30% more time in the acquisition process in order to appropriately set up that customer and determine, you know, what specific ordering of the service and the additional paths. We've looked at how much additional

| 1 | order entry time it takes to make sure that two |
|----|--|
| 2 | numbers are tracked. |
| 3 | So we have looked at percentage differences |
| 4 | as opposed to actual cost numbers. |
| 5 | Q But you don't know what that 30% equates to |
| 6 | in terms of dollars? |
| 7 | A Not offhand. |
| 8 | Q Now, are you aware of whether MCI or its |
| 9 | alternative local exchange company has ordered any |
| LO | interim number portability from BellSouth as of this |
| 11 | date? |
| L2 | A I'm not aware that we have yet. |
| L3 | Q So would you agree that as far as MCI and |
| L4 | BellSouth are concerned there would be no |
| L5 | retroactivity of this effect of this Commission's |
| L6 | order? |
| L7 | A As of today that would be true, I believe. |
| 18 | MS. WHITE: Thank you. I have nothing |
| 19 | further. |
| 20 | MS. CASWELL: I do have a few questions. |
| 21 | CROSS EXAMINATION |
| 22 | BY MS. CASWELL: |
| 23 | Q Good afternoon, Ms. Kistner. |
| 24 | A Good afternoon. |
| 25 | O I think I recall in your deposition that you |

| 1 | stated you'd certainly be interested in viewing a cost |
|----|--|
| 2 | study by BellSouth or another incumbent LEC. Do you |
| 3 | recall that statement? |
| 4 | A I'm sorry. That I would like to do a cost |
| 5 | study of ? |
| 6 | Q No. I think in your deposition I recalled a |
| 7 | statement that you made that you would certainly be |
| 8 | interested in seeing a cost study done by BellSouth or |
| 9 | another incumbent LEC. Do you recall that statement? |
| 10 | MS. McMILLIN: Do you have a page reference? |
| 11 | Q (By Ms. Caswell) Pages 21 to 22 of your |
| 12 | deposition transcript, which I think the Staff |
| 13 | introduced as an exhibit. |
| 14 | MS. McMILLIN: I believe it's Exhibit No. 7. |
| 15 | And this would be on line? |
| 16 | MS. CASWELL: It would be |
| 17 | A My answer was that I would be interested in |
| 18 | seeing a type of cost study that would identify |
| 19 | specific costs that are marginally incremental to the |
| 20 | provision of RCF for interim number portability |
| 21 | purposes. |
| 22 | Q Have you asked the LECs to see their cost |
| 23 | studies? |
| 24 | A No, I haven't. I'm not aware that there is |

25 such a cost study to ask for at this point.

| 1 | Q Haven't the LECs performed incremental cost |
|----|--|
| 2 | studies they have submitted in this docket? |
| 3 | A They have performed total service |
| 4 | incremental cost studies; long term incremental cost |
| 5 | studies. |
| 6 | Q How would you define long term incremental |
| 7 | cost? |
| 8 | A Basically a study that looked at the cost |
| 9 | over a long period of time. I don't know what number |
| 10 | of years the studies were done over. |
| 11 | They would look at many costs, including |
| 12 | shared and common costs, and allocate them to a |
| 13 | particular service. It looks at for example, it |
| 14 | looks at RCF as a service, like a retail service, and |
| 15 | allocates percentages of joint and common costs to |
| 16 | that service. |
| 17 | Q Okay. But isn't that just an assumption on |
| 18 | your part since you haven't actually seen the studies? |
| 19 | A I've seen them referred to in pleadings as |
| 20 | total service long run incremental cost, and based on |
| 21 | my understanding of what total service long run |
| 22 | incremental costs are I drew that conclusion. |
| 23 | Q What sort of cost study did MCI recommend |
| 24 | for use in the earlier stages of this proceeding? Was |

25 | it a long run incremental cost study?

| I | |
|----|--|
| 1 | A I don't have knowledge of that. I know we |
| 2 | haven't made any recommendations for a particular cost |
| 3 | study since the date of the Telecommunications Act and |
| 4 | the FCC's Order interpreting it. |
| 5 | Q I'm sorry, you say you haven't made any |
| 6 | particular recommendations? |
| 7 | A Not in a proceeding, other than my comment |
| 8 | in the deposition. |
| 9 | Q Okay. Maybe I'm confused. You don't |
| 10 | recommend long run incremental cost studies though; is |
| 11 | that right? |
| 12 | A Yes. |
| 13 | Q So what would you recommend as an |
| 14 | alternative to those? |
| 15 | A My recommendation actually is that there not |
| 16 | be any cost studies whatsoever. |
| 17 | Q Okay. Okay. And do you have an alternative |
| 18 | recommendation? |
| 19 | A An alternative to consider is one of the |
| 20 | other FCC recommended cost recovery mechanisms, such |
| 21 | as one that would apportion costs based on carriers' |
| 22 | relative number of working telephone numbers or lines. |
| 23 | Q So you believe that the would it be fair |
| 24 | to say that you believe that the ILEC's cost would be |

25 irrelevant to this Commission's decision about a

mechanism for cost recovery?

A No.

Q Okay.

A I believe that if -- what I said was if the Commission were to adopt my primary recommendation, it would not be necessary to perform a specific cost study in order for carriers to bear their own costs of interim number portability, and you wouldn't need it because each carrier would provide it as efficiently as possible.

- Q Wouldn't any of the FCC's mechanisms that you talk about require this Commission to look at ILEC cost studies?
- A Yes, those would.
- Q Okay. You have no recommendation for the particular type of cost study that should be used; is that what I heard you say?
- 18 A No.
- **Q** Okay.

A In the event that some other mechanism were selected that involved apportioning specific costs among carriers, then it would be necessary for the carriers to perform cost studies. And I would recommend that the costs that would be identified for allocation be those costs that are marginally

incremental to the provision of remote call forwarding or other interim number portability mechanisms for 3 that purpose. So if you looked at a LEC cost study -- have 4 5 you ever prepared a cost study? 6 No. MCI generally has never prepared cost 7 studies. Q Not having seen LEC cost studies you think 8 they are not appropriate, correct? 9 I said I hadn't seen BellSouth's. 10 11 Have you seen GTE's? Not in Florida. I've seen Bell Operating 12 Company and GTE cost studies for interim number 13 14 portability in other jurisdictions. 15 Now, Ms. Kistner, I think you stated that Q the ALECs will also have significant portability 16 17 costs. And assuming that's true, would it be 18 important to include those costs in any cost spreading 19 mechanism? Can you think of any reason why the Commission would not include those costs? 20 21 No. So would you recommend that the Commission 22 have the ALECs do cost studies? 23 I think that's one way that the Commission

can determine the ALEC's cost.

24

Generally speaking, ALECs don't routinely do cost studies of their own costs and don't have personnel and methodologies that they are familiar with. And when looking, for example, at the ILECs' or the ALECs' costs of providing RCF to another carrier, it would be appropriate perhaps to use the ILEC's cost as a surrogate for the ALEC's cost.

- Q I think I just heard you say that the ALECs don't have methodologies that they are familiar with for coming up with cost studies. Did you mean that you are not familiar with the way a long run incremental cost study works?
- A No. As a general -- as a practical matter,

 ALECs have historically not been called on to prepare
 long run incremental costs of their own services
 because they are competitive, nonmonopoly carriers.

 ALECs have a great deal of experience, and MCI does
 and I have some -- at reviewing the total service long
 run incremental cost studies of other carriers.
- Q So because the ALECs don't have experience in doing cost studies, is it your view they shouldn't be required to produce cost studies?
- A I think the value of having an ALEC do a cost study of that nature is questionable. But if ordered to do so we would undertake to do it.

| 1 | |
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| 1 | Q What is the difference in meaning in your |
| 2 | opinion between the words "discourage" and "mitigate"? |
| 3 | A Could you give me some context? |
| 4 | Q Yeah. If you look at your direct testimony, |
| 5 | Page 10, Lines 13 through 15, you state that "While |
| 6 | apportioning the cost of number portability" |
| 7 | A Excuse me one second. I haven't found it. |
| 8 | Please give me a chance. Page 10. |
| 9 | Q It's Page 10, Lines 13 through 15. The |
| 10 | statement is "While apportioning the costs of number |
| 11 | portability by market share goes far toward |
| 12 | discouraging the inflation of interim number |
| 13 | portability costs, it does not mitigate it as carriers |
| 14 | paying their own costs would." |
| 15 | A Yes, I see that now. |
| 16 | Q What is the difference between "discourage" |
| 17 | and "mitigate"? |
| 18 | A Discourage means to make a carrier |
| 19 | disinclined to do something, and mitigate would mean |
| 20 | to eliminate as a possibility altogether. |
| 21 | Q Do you know that this Commission routinely |
| 22 | analyzes cost studies, isn't that right? |
| 23 | A Yes. |
| 24 | Q Don't you think it has the ability and |

25 experience to detect inflated costs should they occur?

- think that cost studies among most experts in this country at looking at cost studies, anyone would tell you that it's difficult to detect everything in a cost study. They have been remarkly unreliable historically for a variety of reasons. They also even at best are very time consuming. If there are ways to avoid having to deal with cost studies I urge it.
- Q Has MCI taken number portability from GTE at at this point?
 - A Not to my knowledge.

- Q So isn't retroactivity a moot issue if MCI hasn't ordered portability?
- A It depends on when an order is issued with regard to it. If an order were issued today, which it won't be, then it would be irrelevant. If it were issued six months from now and we had ordered, you know, sufficient amounts or substantial amounts of remote call forwarding by then, then it would be something to look at.
- **Q** Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: It is axiomatic that all costs must eventually be recovered from end users?
- A Pending a definition of axiomatic I could probably agree with that.

| 1 | Q Do you mean that you need a definition of |
|----|--|
| 2 | axiomatic or do you agree with that statement? |
| 3 | A Why don't you define the axiomatic for me in |
| 4 | this context. |
| 5 | Q Let's say essential, it's essential that all |
| 6 | costs must eventually be recovered from end users. |
| 7 | It's a basic principle that has got to be true. |
| 8 | A With the only caveat that there is recovery |
| 9 | from shareholders as well as of certain types of |
| 10 | costs. Most costs certainly are recovered by end |
| 11 | users. |
| 12 | Q What types of costs would be appropriate for |
| 13 | recovery from shareholders as opposed to recovery from |
| 14 | end users? |
| 15 | A I don't even want to venture into that. |
| 16 | It's not an area of my expertise. I only commented |
| 17 | that there are costs that shareholders recover. |
| 18 | Q And you said, I believe, there are certain |
| 19 | types of costs that are recovered from shareholders, |
| 20 | so there must be categories in your view that are fair |
| 21 | to recover from shareholders as opposed to recovering |
| 22 | from end users. Would that be a fair statement? |
| 23 | A Yes. |
| 24 | Q Do you agree or disagree with the following |
| 25 | statement with regard to cost recovery for interim |

number portability: The ideal public policy for 1 recover of those costs would be recovery from all 2 telephone users. 3 I don't think I could agree with that. I 4 A think that might be too broad a statement. Again, 5 it's difficult to say because it's a single statement 6 without any context. But it strikes me as being too 8 broad. 9 Do you know who Don Price is? Yes, I do. He's an MCI employee, 10 regulatory. 11 Would you be surprised to find out that he 12 Q said those things? 13 No. As I said, a single statement taken 14 without any context is very difficult for me to respond to. 16 Okay. 17 MS. McMILLIN: Do you have a specific 18 reference? 19 MS. CASWELL: I'm going to end that line of 20 questioning. I do have a reference. It's in 21 Mr. Price's direct testimony in the previous stage of 22 this proceeding. (By Ms. Caswell) Let's go back to your 24 Q

view about cost recovery. Do you think it would be

fair for the Commission to order the institution of a cost recovery mechanism in this proceeding that would force the ILECs to recover the costs of interim number portability from their shareholders?

A No. I mean I wouldn't make that recommendation.

- Q Okay. Then who are they supposed to recover the costs from if not the ALECs?
- portability costs incurred by both incumbents and alternative LECs represent network functionality costs much like SS7, or, you know, the costs of AIN in a network. These are just general routing costs. I mean those are not costs that are line item items on a bill to an end user. They are a cost of doing business. And as such those costs are recovered generally from all end users taking service from those carriers.
- Q so in this case would you recommend that the ILEC recover its cost from its end users?
- A Yes. And I recommend that ALECs recover the costs from their end users.
- Q And I think you testified that in the aggregate at least the ILECs would have most of the cost of number portability. Correct?

A No. I said most of the network costs. And on a proportionate basis that would -- both ALEC and ILEC customers would both be supporting roughly the same amount of cost associated with interim number portability.

- **Q** Okay. Your recommendation, your primary recommendation is cost absorption for each party, correct?
 - A Correct.

- **Q** And if the ILEC absorbed its own cost, is there the possibility that its service prices will go up?
- A I would find that extraordinarily hard to believe, that they would have to go up as a result of this level of cost.
- Q Where would the costs be recovered if the services couldn't go up and we couldn't charge the ALEC, where do those costs go?
- A On any given day or any given month, the multitude of costs that go into -- you know, the giant cloud of costs that make up an ILEC's cost will fluctuate to some degree. There are changes in bank loan rate and there's changes in labor cost; a flood causes a cable to be unearthed. There are costs that go up and down, and there's no attempt to try and

| 1 | separately account and recover for each one of those. |
|----|---|
| 2 | Those are simply the costs of doing business. And |
| 3 | your overall rates are designed to recover your |
| 4 | overall costs, and that's how I would expect interim |
| 5 | portability costs. |
| 6 | Q And again, the ability of the ILEC to do |
| 7 | that would depend on the level of the cost, right? |
| 8 | A I don't understand your meaning there. |
| 9 | Q If we had \$6 million in portability costs, |
| 10 | would it just disappear in that cloud you're talking |
| 11 | about? |
| 12 | A I can't tell you an actual pick a |
| 13 | specific number. |
| 14 | $oldsymbol{arrho}$ Would you expect that we would need to |
| 15 | recover a significant amount if we could identify that |
| 16 | amount? |
| 17 | A I believe if overall not based on some |
| 18 | single item, but if overall you find that an |
| 19 | incumbent LEC finds they are not recovering their cost |
| 20 | of doing business, that they have options for |
| 21 | increasing their service prices. |
| 22 | MS. CASWELL: Okay. That's all I have. |
| 23 | Thank you, Ms. Kistner. |

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Mr. Wahlen.

CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. WAHLEN:

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- Q Good afternoon, Ms. Kistner. I'm Jeff Wahlen for Sprint.
 - A Good afternoon.
- Q I think you just explained to Ms. Caswell that the incumbent LECs would be able to increase their prices and would have a lot of options to increase prices if their cost burden was more; is that correct?
 - A I did not say they had a lot of options.
- Q Well, they have some options. One of them is increasing prices to end users?
- A Again, in the instance where an ILEC is -feels necessary that -- believes that their costs are
 not being met by their overall rates, I believe there
 are options.
- Q And is one of those increasing the price to end users?
- A I'll say yes with a caveat: Depending on the regulatory scheme under which they operate, if it's a price cap scheme where they are in price caps.
- Q Let's approach this from a different angle.

 I think you testified earlier that you thought just
 generally that maybe MCI would incur a 30% greater

cost if one of its customers used remote call forwarding or one of the temporary number portability solutions. Is that true?

A I said that the acquisition process for a given customer who was selecting number portability was higher by a factor of approximately 30%.

Q Okay. And is it safe to assume that MCI will be increasing the prices to those end-user customers by about 30% when they use the interim number portability solution?

A As a competitive local carrier, our pricing is very much directed by and influenced by the price that the incumbent LEC charges their customer. So I'm not in a position to tell you that MCI any more than an incumbent LEC can or would line item increase costs by a certain amount to reflect a particular factor. So pricing is based on all of the factors that make up cost.

Q So you would agree that there are competitive pressures here that may impair the ability of a carrier to increase its prices if it can't recover costs another way?

A I'm saying that a new entrant entering the market with no market share is highly influenced by the price that the monopoly carriers are charging.

| 1 | Q And wouldn't you agree that the reverse is |
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| 2 | also true? |
| 3 | A Not anywhere to the same degree. I mean the |
| 4 | very nature of the monopoly is that they have |
| 5 | substantial ability to control and set prices, so it's |
| 6 | not a reciprocal situation. |
| 7 | Q Okay. You have been around the regulatory |
| 8 | process for some time, haven't you? |
| 9 | A Yes. |
| LO | Q And have you ever heard anyone say if you're |
| 11 | going to compare the cost burdens incurred by two |
| 12 | parties you need to make sure that the comparison is |
| 13 | apples to apples? |
| 14 | A No. |
| 15 | Q Have you ever heard an expression like that? |
| ۱6 | A No. |
| L7 | Q Have you ever heard anyone say that you have |
| 18 | to make sure when you're comparing the cost burdenss |
| 19 | between two parties that you have to make sure that |
| 20 | you're comparing the same kinds of costs? |
| 21 | A I've never heard expressions like that |
| 22 | before. |
| 23 | Q Would you agree with that as a general |
| 24 | proposition? |

I'd be concerned about agreeing because it

could be taken out of context. Because I disagree that comparing a -- you have to have a control when you're comparing. If you want to compare two items, and you make an assumption that all other things being equal, then you can maybe say something about the comparison of those two single items. But determining the costs of one carrier versus another is a fairly complex prospect.

- Q You haven't reviewed Sprint's cost study in this case, have you?
 - A No, I haven't.

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- Q So you don't know whether Sprint's cost study in this case includes administrative costs, do you?
- A My recollection of the witness's testimony I think, subject to check, was a statement or assertion that it did not include administrative costs.
- Q So you would agree with me, subject to check, that Sprint's cost study does not include administrative costs?
- A I would agree with you, subject to check, that the witness said that in their testimony.
- Q Would you agree with me that administrative costs are different than network costs?
 - A Yes.

| 1 | |
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| 1 | Q Would you agree with me that a comparison of |
| 2 | network costs and administrative costs isn't comparing |
| 3 | the same kinds of costs? |
| 4 | A Yes. |
| 5 | Q Thank you. |
| 6 | MR. WAHLEN: That's all I have. |
| 7 | MR. WIGGINS: No questions. |
| 8 | CHAIRMAN CLARK: Mr. Wiggins. |
| 9 | MR. WIGGINS: No questions. |
| 10 | CHAIRMAN CLARK: Mr. Rindler. |
| 11 | CROSS EXAMINATION |
| 12 | BY MR. RINDLER: |
| 13 | Q Good afternoon, Ms. Kistner. I have just |
| 14 | have a couple of questions. |
| 15 | A Good afternoon. |
| 16 | Q We have been talking about long run |
| 17 | incremental costs and TSLRIC. You talked about |
| 18 | something called short run incremental cost I thought |
| 19 | I heard you say. |
| 20 | A Or marginal. |
| 21 | Q What are you measuring in this case and what |
| 22 | are you proposing be measured in this case using that? |
| 23 | A Again, I'm not proposing to measure anything |
| 24 | because I think the most efficient and fair mechanism |

25 to use for this limited cost recovery purpose is that

each carrier bear their own cost, in which case you 1 don't have to measure anything. 2 If, however, a cost recovery mechanism were 3 adopted that required an identification of costs, then 4 I think in this case -- and I mean this for very 5 limited purposes -- that traditional service pricing, 6 service pricing costing not be used because of the 7 unique nature of this interim routing function that's 8 being looked at. And so for this unique circumstance, 9 that looking at isolating the short run marginal cost 10 of providing this RCF function would be appropriate. 11 MR. RINDLER: Thank you. That's all. 12 MS. WILSON: No questions. 13 MS. WEISKE: No questions. 14 MS. DUNSON: No questions. 15 CROSS EXAMINATION 16 BY MS. JACOBS: 17 Good afternoon, Ms. Kistner. Gwen Jacobs 18 with AT&T Wireless. 19 Does MCI's alternative recommendation plan 20 include wireless carriers, or apply to wireless 21

carriers?

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None of my recommendations would apply to wireless carriers unless they happen to be porting, and I'm not aware that any of them are planning to.

MS. JACOBS: Okay. No further questions. 1 CROSS EXAMINATION 2 BY MR. COX: 3 4 Q Good afternoon, Ms. Kistner. Will Cox on 5 behalf of the Public Service Commission Staff. Good afternoon. 6 7 I just have a couple of questions. 8 Earlier in your position summary that you 9 delivered before the Commission today, you mention 10 that costly billing modifications will be required to 11 perform meet-point billing. 12 Yes, I had understood in listening to some of the witnesses earlier today there seemed to be a 13 misunderstanding that MCI was advocating development 14 of some special meet-point billing systems. And I 15 wanted to clarify that that was in no way MCI's 16 17 recommendation. That being the case, do you believe that 18 Q GTE's proposal of a surrogate to split access charges 19 is appropriate? 20 I agree that using surrogates is 21 Yes. 22 appropriate. And the point I was trying to make in my testimony was that a surrogate is fine, but then you also have to look at what elements are appropriate for

recovery by which carrier. And some carriers have

the -- the incumbent carriers have recommended that this be an item left up to negotiation. As a carrier that has been the victim at times, if you will, of negotiations, without a lot of power negotiations, that a decision by this Commission, or an indication by this Commission of which elements would be appropriate for recovery by which party might prevent, you know, future misunderstandings or difficulties in negotiations.

Q Different parties have negotiated various rates for temporary number portability in Florida. Do you believe that the cost recovery mechanism established in this proceeding would affect those negotiated rates? And I realize it's not a legal opinion, but I'm asking for your lay opinion.

A I would just certainly expect them to affect the rates that were specified, because the rates specified are -- represent a type of cost recovery that's contrary to the telecommunications statute.

And the carriers when negotiating those agreements,

MCI specifically included -- had clauses included in there that would recognize decisions by the FCC, for example, that would differ from what was in those contracts and provided that the contracts would change as a result.

That you, Ms. Kistner. That MR. COX: 1 concludes Staff's questions. 2 CHAIRMAN CLARK: Commissioners. 3 I have a question. COMMISSIONER DEASON: 4 Ms. Kistner, I think you indicated in your 5 summary that your primary recommendation would result 6 in a sharing of costs on a proportionate basis, I 7 think is it way you characterized it. 8 WITNESS KISTNER: Yes. 9 COMMISSIONER DEASON: What do you mean by 10 proportionate? 11 WITNESS KISTNER: I mean proportionate to 12 the number of end users a carrier would have. 13 that, for example, if there was a total pool of 14 \$10,000 of interim number portability costs that each 15 carrier's share of that \$10,000 would be proportionate 16 to how many customers they had, subscribers they had, 17 from whom to recover all of their costs. COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me interrupt. 19 Under your primary you're not recommending any type of 20 pooling of costs, are you? 21 WITNESS KISTNER: No I'm not. Excuse me. 22 Maybe I misunderstood. 23 My recommendation in the event that there 24

was a sharing mechanism that was, for example, in my

alternative recommendation -- in some of the alternative recommendations, that proportionality should be viewed as relative to the number of subscribers a carrier has.

and maybe I misunderstood your testimony, but I thought in relation to your primary recommendation, that is, that each carrier pay for their own cost, that under that situation one of the reasons you stated why that proposal should be adopted by the Commission is that there would be a proportionate sharing of costs, and that is -- I misunderstood; is that correct?

witness kistner: I believe that the result of allowing and directing each carrier to bear their own cost will be that costs will be recovered or accumulated by each carrier roughly proportionate to their customer share.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: To their customer share.

WITNESS KISTNER: To their number of subscribers.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: But it would be true, though, that you would expect a higher percentage of an ALEC's customers to be utilizing a call forwarding

technology of some sort as opposed to the percentage of customers of the ILEC.

witness kistner: Absolutely. But my point being that if my -- if I have only a hundred customers and the ILEC has a million customers, the amount of costs that I would incur through -- you know, relative to the incumbent, a more limited provision of interim number portability for customers leaving my network to go to another network, that that would be -- that would represent a minuscule amount of cost relative to my number of customers, just as it would represent a minuscule amount of cost relative to the ILEC's number of customers.

commissioner deason: So have you made any estimates of the number of customers you will have and the number of customers that would then be leaving your network to go to the incumbent network, or are you just saying that it's just -- a broad look at the numbers, you think that it would be proportionate?

witness kistner: I say that just based on my expectation. But also because the more customers that I have, the more customers are likely to leave. I say that in spite of the great service that we'll provide customers. But a certain number of customers are going to want to go elsewhere. And that may be

1%, 2% of my customer base. As my customer base grows, my aggregate costs are going to go up as more of those customers, more total customers end up porting away from my network.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Yes, I just want to clarify one thing. If you have trouble understanding me let me know.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Commissioner Keisling.

WITNESS KISTNER: Okay.

commissioner KIESLING: Issue 3 in the prehearing statement is "Should there be any retroactive application of the Commissions decision in this proceeding?" And MCI's position is "Yes. The PSC's decision should be retroactively applied to the release date of the FCC order." When I look at Page 13 of your direct testimony, Lines 2 through 7, you give that same answer in your testimony. But I can't find anything in your testimony that explains to me why this should be done or why it's appropriate that it be retroactive. And I'm trying to understand the reason for it.

witness kistner: The appropriateness of retroactivity -- and I offer that as a policy recommendation, not as a legal one, but that if there were -- if BellSouth or GTE or an incumbent LEC had

been collecting dollar amounts for like RCF, for example, after the date of the FCC's order, that having -- I mean the requirement that costs be recovered on a competitively neutral basis actually date back to January. The interpretation of that was not -- was not encompassed in the FCC order until July or August, perhaps, when it was published in the federal register. At that time in my opinion it would be inappropriate for incumbent LECs to be charging retail-type rates to ALECs for that service.

Also I would point that in the agreements negotiated by BellSouth with MCI, for example, there was a provision for just that. That the carriers -- if there was a change in, or an FCC order that changed a part of the agreement, that the carriers would immediately renegotiate that agreement amount and it would apply back to the date of whatever the pertinent FCC order was. And that might be -- I'd have to check -- a final FCC order; that might include actually a date up through reconsideration.

commissioner KIESLING: I guess that didn't quite satisfy me. And I'm not looking necessarily at the date back to which this decision should be retroactively applied. I'm looking at the theory behind why it should be retroactively applied at all.

And again all I heard you say there was that you think it's appropriate to do that and I don't understand why.

witness kistner: I think it's appropriate, and this is somewhat theoretical now because at least as of this point in time there doesn't appear to have been any RCF ordered by MCI or -- by MCI.

But the appropriateness to me stems from the fact that the law really -- and as I said, even going back to the date the Telecom Order became effective, established as a matter of law and public policy that it was inappropriate for one carrier to have another carrier incur all of the costs of interim number portability. It was not competitively neutral. And to me it rewards competitive unneutrality to allow those amounts to be recovered beyond the date that that public policy or law was enacted.

commissioner KIESLING: Let me ask it this way: Do you think -- when you state that this decision should be retroactive back to some date, whatever date that may be, are you saying that it must be? Is that what you mean when you use the word "should"?

A No. I'm saying it is a recommendation. It is a policy recommendation.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: So it's permissible to do it retroactively but we don't have to.

WITNESS KISTNER: Again, I'm not making any legal recommendation at all as to permissibility of retroactivity. But I make an assumption that it is certainly up to the Commission to decide that. I don't by any means mean to suggest that you are required to act in that way.

The question was put forth as an issue on which carriers were invited to comment.

to understand it. It's because every other carrier in this case, every other party in this case either said, "No, it shouldn't be retroactive," or "It's permissible for it to be retroactive." Nobody else said it should be retroactive. And I'm trying to understand --

WITNESS KISTNER: I will certainly clarify.

My word "should" was not a "must" but a --

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Thank you.

WITNESS KISTNER: -- recommendation.

commissioner KIESLING: Okay. When I looked in your testimony to try to find something to back up MCI's stated position, that's all I could find, so I was confused. Thank you.

| 1 | CHAIRMAN CLARK: Other questions, |
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| 2 | Commissioners? Redirect. |
| 3 | MS. McMILLIN: No redirect. |
| 4 | CHAIRMAN CLARK: Thank you. |
| 5 | MS. MCMILLIN: May Ms. Kistner be excused? |
| 6 | CHAIRMAN CLARK: She may be excused. And |
| 7 | it's been pointed out to me that we did not move the |
| 8 | exhibits of Mr. Varner into the record. |
| 9 | MR. CARVER: We'd like to move those in, |
| 10 | please. |
| 11 | CHAIRMAN CLARK: Without objection, Exhibits |
| 12 | 14 and 15 are admitted into the record. |
| 13 | (Exhibit 14 and 15 received in evidence.) |
| 14 | Mr. Devine. |
| 15 | |
| 16 | TIMOTHY T. DEVINE |
| 17 | was called as a witness on behalf of MFS |
| 18 | Communications Company, Inc. and, having been duly |
| 19 | sworn, testified as follows: |
| 20 | DIRECT EXAMINATION |
| 21 | BY MR. RINDLER: |
| 22 | Q Mr. Devine, could you state your name for |
| 23 | the record, please? |
| 24 | A Timothy T. Devine. |
| 25 | • Q And could you tell me by whom you're |

| 1 | employed? |
|----|---|
| 2 | A MFS Communications Company, Inc. |
| 3 | Q Have you reviewed the testimony that was |
| 4 | filed by Alex Harris on September 23rd, 21 pages in |
| 5 | length? |
| 6 | A Yes. |
| 7 | Q Do you have any changes to make to that |
| 8 | testimony? |
| 9 | A Yes, I have a couple small changes in the |
| 10 | direct and the rebuttal. |
| 11 | In the direct, on Page 1, Lines 1 through |
| 12 | 19, and Page 2, Lines 1 through 7, if you can |
| 13 | substitute what Mr. Rindler provided earlier as a |
| 14 | handout of my background instead of Mr. Harris' |
| 15 | Q With those changes to the direct testimony, |
| 16 | if I were to ask you the questions today, would your |
| 17 | answers be the same? |
| 18 | A Yes. |
| 19 | Q Thank you. |
| 20 | MR. RINDLER: Madam Chairman, I'd ask that |
| 21 | the direct testimony be put in the record as if read. |
| 22 | CHAIRMAN CLARK: The direct testimony as |
| 23 | modified will be inserted into the record as though |
| 24 | read. |

(By Mr. Rindler) Mr. Devine, have you also

| 11 | |
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| 1 | had the opportunity to review the testimony filed by |
| 2 | Mr. Harris on October 7th? |
| 3 | A Yes. |
| 4 | Q Do you have any changes to that testimony? |
| 5 | A Yes. On Page 1, Line 3, if you can change |
| 6 | Alex Harris' name to Timothy Devine's name. |
| 7 | Q Mr. Devine, with those changes would the |
| 8 | answers to the questions asked be the same today? |
| 9 | A Yes. |
| 10 | MR. RINDLER: Madam Chairman, I would move |
| 11 | that the rebuttal testimony be inserted into the |
| 12 | record as though read. |
| 13 | CHAIRMAN CLARK: The prefiled rebuttal |
| 14 | testimony as amended will be inserted in the record as |
| 15 | though read. |
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DIRECT TESTIMONY OF TIMOTHY T. DEVINE ON BEHALF OF MFS COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, INC. F.P.S.C. Docket No. 950737-TP

- O. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.
- A. My name is Timothy T. Devine. My business address is MFS Communications Company,
 Inc. ("MFS"), 6 Concourse Parkway, Atlanta, Georgia 30328.
- Q. WHAT IS YOUR POSITION WITH MFS COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, INC.?
- A. I am the Senior Director of Regulatory Affairs for the Southern Region.
- Q. WHAT ARE YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES IN THAT POSITION?
- A. I am responsible for the regulatory oversight of commission dockets and other regulatory matters and serve as MFS representative to various members of the industry. I am also responsible for coordinating co-carrier discussions with Local Exchange Carriers within the Southern Region.
- Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR PREVIOUS PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND.
- A. I have a B.S. in Political Science from Arizona State University and an M.A. in Telecommunications Policy from George Washington University. I began work in the telecommunications industry in April 1982 as a sales representative for packet switching services for Graphnet, Inc., one of the first value-added common carriers in the United States. From 1983 until 1987, I was employed at Sprint Communications Co., in sales, as a tariff analyst, as a product manager, and as Manager of Product and Market Analysis.

 During 1988, I worked at Contel Corporation, a local exchange carrier, in its telephone

operations group, as Manager, Network Marketing. I have been working for MFS

Communications Company and its affiliates since January 1989. During this time period, I have worked in product marketing and development, corporate planning, regulatory support, and regulatory affairs.

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF ALEX J. HARRIS ON BEHALF OF MFS COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, INC.

| 1 | Q. | PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS. |
|-----|----|--|
| 2 | A. | My name is Alex J. Harris. My business address is MFS Communications |
| 3 | | Company, Inc. ("MFS"), 33 Whitehall Street, 15th Floor, New York, NY |
| 4 | | 10004. |
| 5 | Q. | BY WHOM ARE YOU EMPLOYED AND WHAT ARE YOUR |
| 6 | | RESPONSIBILITIES? |
| 7 | A. | I am the Vice President of Regulatory Affairs for MFS. I am responsible for |
| 8 | | directing state regulatory activities for MFS. In this capacity, I have been |
| 9 | | responsible for overseeing interconnection negotiations with incumbent local |
| 10 | | exchange carriers ("LECs") across the country pursuant to the |
| 11 | | Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act"). At various points during my |
| 12 | | tenure with MFS, I have also had supervisory responsibilities relating to |
| 13 | | industry affairs, line cost management, and pricing. |
| 14 | Q. | PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND |
| 15 | / | PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE. |
| 16 | A, | Prior to joining MFS in 1993, I was employed by Telepart Communications |
| 17 | | Group in that company's regulatory affairs department. From 1990 to 1991, I |
| 18/ | , | served as Executive Assistant to then-Commissioner and former Chairman |
| 19 | | Ellen C. Craig of the Illinois Commerce Commission, advising her on |

telecommunications and transportation issues. From 1986 to 1989, I served as 1 2 an Analyst in the Illinois Commerce Commission's Policy Analysis and Research Division's Telecommunications Program. I was an intern with the 3 Commission staff from 1984 to 1986. I received Bachelor of Arts degrees in 4 Philosophy and Political Science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-5 6 Champaign in 1984. At present, I am a student in the Executive MBA 7 Program at New York University's Stern School of Business. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE OPERATIONS OF MFS AND ITS 8 Q. 9 SUBSIDIARIES. 10 A. MFS is a diversified telecommunications holding company with operations throughout the country, as well as in Europe. MFS Telecom, Inc., an MFS 11 subsidiary, through its operating affiliates, is the largest competitive access 12 13 provider in the United States. MFS Telecom, Inc.'s subsidiaries provide nonswitched, dedicated private line and special access services. 14 The operating subsidiaries of MFS Intelenet, Inc. ("MFSI"), an MFS 15 16 subsidiary, collectively are authorized to provide switched interexchange 17 telecommunications services in 48 states and have applications to offer such service pending in the remaining two states. Where so authorized, MFSI's 18 19 operating subsidiaries offer end users a single source for local and long 20 distance telecommunications services with quality and pricing levels

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comparable to those achieved by larger communications users. Apart from Florida, MFS subsidiaries have been authorized to provide competitive local exchange service in twelve states. Since July 1993, MFS Intelenet of New York, Inc. has offered local exchange services in competition with New York Telephone Company. MFS Intelenet of Maryland, Inc. was authorized to provide local exchange services in competition with Bell Atlantic-Maryland, Inc. in April 1994 and is offering competitive local exchange services. On June 22, 1994, MFS Intelenet of Washington, Inc. was authorized to provide local exchange services in competition with US West Communications, Inc. On July 20, 1994, MFS Intelenet of Illinois, Inc. was certificated to provide local exchange services in competition with Illinois Bell Telephone Company and Central Telephone Company of Illinois and is providing such services. MFS Intelenet of Ohio was certificated to provide competitive local exchange service in competition with Ohio Bell on August 3, 1995. MFS Intelenet of Michigan, on May 9, 1995, was certificated to provide competitive local exchange service in competition with Ameritech-Michigan. MFS Intelenet of Connecticut was certificated to provide local exchange service in competition with Southern New England Telephone Company on June 28, 1995. MFS Intelenet of Texas, Inc. was authorized to resell local exchange service in Houston and Dallas in competition with Southwestern Bell Telephone

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Company by Order signed on October 25, 1995. Subsequently, Metropolitan Fiber Systems of Dallas and Metropolitan Fiber Systems of Houston were certified to provide resale and facilities-based local exchange service. MFS Intelenet of Georgia, Inc. was authorized to provide competitive local exchange service in Georgia on October 27, 1995. MFS Intelenet of Pennsylvania, Inc. was authorized to provide local exchange service in Pennsylvania by Order entered October 4, 1995. MFS Intelenet of Oregon. Inc. was authorized to provide local exchange service in Oregon on January 12, 1996. MFS Intelenet of Massachusetts was certificated on March 9, 1994 to operate as a reseller of both interexchange and local exchange services in the Boston Metropolitan Area in competition with New England Telephone and is providing such services. MFS Intelenet of New Jersey was certificated in June 1996 to provide competitive local exchange services in that state. Metropolitan Fiber Systems of Florida, Inc. ("MFS-FL") was granted

authority by this Commission to provide switched local exchange service effective January 1, 1996.

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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY

Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?

A. My testimony is designed to address MFS's position on cost recovery issues associated with currently available number portability (which I simply refer to as "portability" throughout this testimony). The Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC") Portability Order in CC Docket No. 95-116, 1/2 which is binding on the states, requires the Commission to reevaluate its resolution of portability issues in Order No. PSC-95-1604-FOF-TP (released December 28, 1995). Specifically, the Commission must revisit such issues as what recurring portability costs are properly recoverable under federal law, from which carriers and in what manner. I begin my testimony proposing that the Commission require parties to absorb their own costs of providing portability. Alternatively, if the Commission desires to create a formal cost recovery mechanism, my testimony sets forth the proper method for calculating incremental costs of providing portability and for spreading these costs among contributing carriers. I first explain that the Commission should permit carriers to recover only the total element long run incremental costs

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1 ("TELRIC") of portability. Next, I deal with the need to create a 2 competitively-neutral mechanism for recovering portability costs to comply 3 with the Portability Order and the 1996 Act. I argue that the Commission 4 should require all telecommunications carriers within the State of Florida to 5 contribute to a portability fund in direct proportion to their total revenues from 6 intrastate telecommunications operations (though with an offset for payments 7 to other carriers for intermediate telecommunications services employed in the 8 delivery of revenue-generating retail services). 9 HOW SHOULD THE COSTS OF PROVIDING PORTABILITY BE Q. 10 RECOVERED CONSISTENT WITH THE 1996 ACT AND THE **ORDER?** 11 12 MFS believes that carriers should absorb their own costs of providing A. 13 portability arrangements. The FCC has explicitly endorsed this approach as 14 meeting its standard for competitive neutrality. Portability Order, at ¶ 136 15 ("we believe that a mechanism that requires each carrier to pay for its own 16 costs of currently available number portability measures would also be 17 permissible"). MFS supports the concept because it would considerably ease 18 the burden of administering the portability cost recovery mechanism and alleviate the need for most regulatory oversight. If, however, the Commission 19

is not inclined to accept this proposal, it should consider MFS's alternative

| 1 | | proposal presented below. The next two sections discuss how the incremental |
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| 2 | | costs of providing portability should be measured and recovered in a |
| 3 | | competitively neutral manner. |
| 4 | MEA | SURING PORTABILITY COSTS |
| 5 | Q. | WHAT ARE THE COSTS OF PROVIDING PORTABILITY? |
| 6 | A. | When a telephone user switches LECs, but retains its telephone number, calls |
| 7 | | are forwarded to the customer through the new LEC's network via Remote |
| 8 | | Call Forwarding ("RCF"), Direct Inward Dial ("DID") or other similar |
| 9 | | arrangements. ^{2/} The original LEC incurs the recurring costs of forwarding |
| 10 | | these calls. |
| 11 | Q. | HOW DO YOU MEASURE PORTABILITY COSTS? |
| 12 | Α. | In the Portability Order, the FCC declared that: |
| 13 14 15 16 17 | | The costs of currently available number portability are the <i>incremental costs</i> incurred by a LEC to transfer numbers initially and subsequently forward calls to new service providers using existing RCF, DID, or other comparable measures. |
| | | |

The Commission approved a stipulation of the parties in Docket No. 950737-TP to use RCF as a "temporary number portability mechanism." Order No. PSC-95-1604-FOF-TP, at Attachment A. The FCC ruled that LECs must provide portability through DID as well. Portability Order, at ¶ 121. MFS therefore requests that the Commission clarify that DID arrangements must be made available for portability purposes.

1 Id., at ¶ 129 (emphasis added). Incremental cost is the benchmark for 2 measuring portability costs. 3 One month after issuing the Portability Order, the FCC elaborated upon the definition of "incremental cost" in its Interconnection Order.³ The 4 5 FCC stated that the incremental cost of interconnection, unbundled network 6 elements, and collocation should be calculated according to the TELRIC 7 methodology. DID THE FCC EXPLICITLY APPLY TELRIC TO PORTABILITY Q. 8 9 COSTS? 10 No, not in so many words. The Portability Order, however, preceded the A. 11 Interconnection Order by approximately six weeks. Although the FCC simply used the term "incremental costs" in the Portability Order, TELRIC is the 12 13 incremental costing methodology that the FCC has adopted for establishing the rates for interconnection and network elements. Section 153(29) of the 14 15 1996 Act defines network element to include "features, functions, and 16 capabilities that are provided by means of such facility or equipment,

In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Interconnection between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, CC Docket Nos. 96-98 & 95-185, First Report and Order (released August 8, 1996) (hereinafter "Interconnection Order").

1 including subscriber numbers " (Emphasis added). Thus, portability falls 2 squarely within the definition of a network element under the 1996 Act. 3 Given that the FCC selected TELRIC as the proper methodology for calculating the incremental costs" of network elements, the Commission 4 5 should apply TELRIC to determine the level of portability costs that are 6 subject to recovery. 7 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE HOW THE TELRIC METHODOLOGY 8 WORKS. 9 TELRIC are the forward-looking costs over the long run of the facilities and A. 10 functions that are directly attributable to providing a particular element — in this case, portability. TELRIC has three major components: operating 11 expenses, depreciation cost and the appropriate risk-adjusted cost of capital 12 13 associated with the assets used to provide portability. 4/ In addition, the FCC specified several aspects of TELRIC, including: 14 Efficient Network Configuration. TELRIC is properly estimated 15 16 assuming a reconstructed network using the most efficient 17 telecommunications technology available and the least-cost network

Interconnection Order, at ¶703.

| 1 | | configuration, given the existing location of the incumbent LEC's wire |
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| 2 | | centers. ^{5/} |
| 3 | • | Forward-Looking Cost of Capital. TELRIC is calculated using a |
| 4 | | forward-looking cost of capital that presumably projects market |
| 5 | | growth, increased competition and other factors that affect risk and |
| 6 | | return. The cost of capital in TELRIC is what investors must be paid |
| 7 | | to induce them to invest in the assets used to provide the unbundled |
| 8 | | network element. In a sense, it is the profit or return associated with |
| 9 | | the unbundled network element.69 |
| 10 | > | Depreciation. TELRIC is calculated using forward-looking economic |
| 11 | | depreciation rates. Depreciation in a TELRIC study is economic |
| 12 | | depreciation which measures the expected change in the economic |
| 13 | | value of assets used to provide the unbundled network element. $^{\underline{7}}$ |
| 14 | • | Directly Attributable Costs. TELRIC would include all costs and only |
| 15 | | those costs that are directly attributable to or caused by portability. |
| 16 | | Retailing costs, marketing expenses, billing and collection costs, and |
| 17 | | all other costs associated with retail offerings cannot be included in the |

Interconnection Order, at ¶682.

⁶ Interconnection Order, at ¶¶699-700.

Interconnection Order, at ¶703.

| 1 | | directly attributable costs of an unbundled network element. The FCC |
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| 2 | | also requires that an incumbent LEC's cost study must explain why or |
| 3 | | how a specific function included in a TELRIC estimate is necessary to |
| 4 | | provide a particular element.8/ |
| 5 | | No Embedded Costs, Universal Service Support or Opportunity |
| 6 | | Costs. The FCC expressly prohibits the use of embedded costs or |
| 7 | | costs incurred by the incumbent carrier in the past as the basis for |
| 8 | | TELRIC. ^{9/} The FCC also prohibits the inclusion of universal service |
| 9 | | subsidies or opportunity costs (i.e., the revenues the incumbent carrier |
| 10 | | expected to earn but for offering a particular unbundled network |
| 11 | | element). 10/ |
| 12 | Q. | WHAT ARE THE ADVANTAGES OF MEASURING PORTABILITY |
| 13 | | COSTS ACCORDING TO TELRIC? |
| 14 | A. | Portability costs are most likely to be competitively neutral if they are based |
| 15 | | on TELRIC. Because TELRIC estimates incremental costs using a |
| 16 | | reconstructed, hypothetical network (constrained only by existing locations of |
| 17 | | the incumbent LEC's wire centers), TELRIC portability costs should not vary |
| | | |

^{8/} Interconnection Order, at ¶¶682, 691 and 47 C.F.R. §51.505(d).

Interconnection Order, at $\P\P$ 704-707.

Interconnection Order, at \P 708-711, 713.

1 with the identity of the carrier forwarding calls to the customer's new service 2 provider. TELRIC provides a competitively neutral assessment of portability costs that could not be achieved by a cost study of portability functions within 3 4 the incumbent LEC's existing network. Under a TELRIC framework, new 5 entrants would not be disadvantaged by having to contribute to portability 6 costs inflated because of inefficiencies inherent in the incumbent LEC's 7 existing network. 8 9 COMPETITIVELY NEUTRAL COST RECOVERY MECHANISMS 10 Q. WHAT PRINCIPLE SHOULD UNDERLIE ANY COST RECOVERY 11 MECHANISM FOR PORTABILITY? 12 A. Clearly, that principle is competitive neutrality. The 1996 Act expressly 13 provides that the costs of portability must be shared by all telecommunications 14 carriers. Specifically, Section 252(e) states that: 15 The costs of establishing . . . number portability shall be borne by all telecommunications carriers on a 16 17 competitively neutral basis as determined by the 18 [FCC]. 19 20 (Emphasis added).

| 1 | Q. | IS IT PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE 1996 ACT AND FCC RULES TO |
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| 2 | | REQUIRE ONLY CARRIERS SUBSCRIBING TO PORTABILITY TO |
| 3 | | PAY THE COSTS OF PROVIDING IT? |
| 4 | A. | No. The FCC has concluded that Section 251(e)(2) of the 1996 Act mandates |
| 5 | | a departure from general cost causation principles, pursuant to which the |
| 6 | | purchaser of a service would be required to pay the cost of providing the |
| 7 | | service. Portability Order, at ¶ 131. Moreover, the FCC ruled that any cost |
| 8 | | recovery mechanism that requires new entrants to bear all of the costs of |
| 9 | | portability does not comply with Section 252(e) of the 1996 Act. Portability |
| 10 | | Order, at ¶ 138 ("imposing the full incremental cost of number portability |
| 11 | | solely on new entrants would contravene the statutory mandate that all carriers |
| 12 | | share the cost of number portability"). The tariffed charges currently imposed |
| 13 | | by incumbent LECs on purchasers of portability are inconsistent with the Act |
| 14 | | and must be suspended immediately. |
| 15 | Q. | HAS THE FCC PLACED THIS POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF |
| 16 | | TRADITIONAL COST CAUSATION PRINCIPLES? |
| 17 | A. | Yes, the FCC expressly declared that a competitively-neutral recovery |
| 18 | | mechanism for portability costs represents a departure from traditional cost |
| 19 | | causation principles: |

| 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | | With respect to number portability, Congress has directed that we depart from cost causation principles if necessary in order to adopt a "competitively neutral" standard, because number portability is a network function that is required for a carrier to compete with the carrier that is already serving a customer. Depending on the technology used, to price number portability on a cost causative basis could defeat the purpose for which it was mandated. |
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| 9 | | Portability Order, at ¶ 131. |
| 10 | Q. | WHAT CARRIERS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO CONTRIBUTE TO |
| 11 | | THE COSTS OF PORTABILITY? |
| 12 | A. | Consistent with Section 251(e) of the 1996 Act, all carriers providing |
| 13 | | intrastate telecommunications services in Florida shall contribute to the costs |
| 14 | | of portability. This would include incumbent LECs, new LECs, Commercial |
| 15 | | Mobile Radio Service providers and interexchange carriers. |
| 16 | Q. | DID THE FCC ENUNCIATE ANY CRITERIA FOR APPLYING THE |
| 17 | | COMPETITIVELY-NEUTRAL STANDARD? |
| 18 | A. | Yes, the FCC's Order establishes two criteria that shall govern state |
| 19 | | commission determinations of whether or not recovery mechanisms for |
| 20 | | portability costs are competitively neutral. First, recovery mechanisms |
| 21 | | "should not give one service provider an appreciable, incremental cost |
| 22 | | advantage over another service provider, when competing for a specific |
| 23 | | subscriber." Order, at ¶ 132. In other words, new entrants cannot be saddled |

| 1 | | with the full costs of portability. Spreading TELRIC portability costs among |
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| 2 | | all telecommunications carriers would meet this criteria. |
| 3 | | Second, recovery mechanisms must be proportional so that portability |
| 4 | | is affordable for all carriers, large and small. The Commission cannot |
| 5 | | implement a recovery mechanism that would grant large carriers a competitive |
| 6 | | advantage over small carriers. The following type of recovery mechanism |
| 7 | | would be proscribed under the Portability Order: |
| 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | | If, for example, the total costs of currently available number portability are to be divided equally among four competing local exchange carriers, including both the incumbent LEC and three new entrants, within a specific service area, the new entrant's share of the costs may be so large, relative to its expected profits, that the entrant would decide not to enter the market. |
| 15 | | Portability Order, at ¶ 135. Proper recovery mechanisms should assess |
| 16 | | contributing carriers proportional shares of the total portability cost fund |
| 17 | | based on some competitively neutral allocator that is related to the size of each |
| 18 | | contributor. |
| 19 | Q. | PLEASE DESCRIBE MFS'S PROPOSAL FOR RECOVERING THE |
| 20 | | COSTS OF PORTABILITY IN A COMPETITIVELY NEUTRAL |
| 21 | | MANNER. |
| 22 | A. | MFS proposes recovering portability costs from all telecommunications |
| 23 | | carriers in Florida, in direct proportion to each company's total revenues from |

intrastate telecommunications operations, but with an offset for payments made to other carriers for intermediate telecommunications services that are used in the delivery of revenue-generating retail services.^{11/} I will call MFS's proposed cost recovery mechanism the "net revenue approach."

Q. HOW WOULD THE COMMISSION IMPLEMENT THE NET REVENUE APPROACH?

A. The Commission would begin by determining, on a forward-looking basis, the amount of funds necessary to pay for portability costs throughout the state of Florida. This task would involve multiplying the incremental cost of portability arrangements (i.e. TELRIC portability costs) by a prediction of the demand for portability among LECs in Florida. In assessing demand for portability, the Commission should use its own expertise in local competition as well as consultations with representatives of the industry.

Once the Commission has ascertained the size of the portability cost fund, next it should calculate a uniform contribution factor to be applied to all carriers providing intrastate telecommunications services. The contribution factor should be derived by dividing the portability cost fund by the total gross intrastate revenues of all carriers providing service in Florida net of payments

Such payments include those for switched access, interconnection, unbundled network elements, reciprocal compensation, and resold bundled services.

A.

made to other carriers. For example, if the portability cost fund is \$1000 and the total net intrastate revenues of all carriers in Florida is \$10 million, the contribution factor would be 0.0001 or 0.01%. 12/

The Commission should compute the exact amount that individual carriers will contribute to the fund by multiplying the contribution factor (in the example, 0.01%) by the net revenues of a particular carrier. Thus, if a certain carrier has \$100,000 in net intrastate revenue and the contribution factor is 0.01%, it will have to contribute \$10 to the portability cost fund.

As carriers provide portability to other requesting carriers, they would draw from the fund an amount equal to the number of portability arrangements they provide times the incremental cost the Commission deems appropriate for recovery.

Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW THE NET REVENUE APPROACH MEETS FCC CRITERIA FOR COST RECOVERY MECHANISMS.

The net revenue approach is competitively neutral within the parameters set

forth by the FCC. It does not saddle new entrants — or incumbent LECs for

that matter — with the entire burden of funding portability and provides

 $^{^{12/}}$ These numbers do not reflect any attempt on MFS's part to estimate the actual costs of providing portability in Florida and have been provided for illustrative purposes only.

| 1 | | neither with a competitive advantage. The net revenue approach also ensures |
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| 2 | | that all carriers will make a proportionate contribution to the costs of |
| 3 | | providing portability to end users. |
| 4 | Q. | WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO BASE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE |
| 5 | | PORTABILITY FUND ON NET REVENUE, RATHER THAN GROSS |
| 6 | | REVENUE, OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIERS? |
| 7 | A. | An offset for payments to intermediate telecommunications service providers |
| 8 | | is necessary to avoid multiple assessments on services that are components of |
| 9 | | final end user services or services that are resold one or more times. Pursuant |
| 10 | | to MFS's proposal, each carrier's contribution to the portability cost fund will |
| 11 | | be based proportionately on the added value it brings to the |
| 12 | | telecommunications marketplace, as measured by the net revenue it derives. |
| 13 | | Economists have long favored value-added assessment mechanisms because |
| 14 | | they ensure maximum neutrality and impose minimal distortions on |
| 15 | | competitive market dynamics. |
| 16 | Q. | HAS THE FCC ENDORSED MFS'S NET REVENUE APPROACH? |
| 17 | A. | Yes, it has. In the Portability Order, the FCC approvingly cited MFS's |
| 18 | | revenue-based cost recovery proposal. Id., at ¶ 136. |
| 19 | Q. | WOULD THE NET REVENUE APPROACH BE BURDENSOME FOR |
| 20 | | FLORIDA TELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIERS? |

1 A. No. Telecommunications carriers are thoroughly familiar with revenue 2 reporting requirements. On the federal level, the FCC itself adopted a net revenue approach for recovering regulatory fees¹³/ and cited it favorably in the 3 4 Portability Order (at ¶ 136, n. 384). In Florida, the law requires interexchange 5 carriers to report gross revenues less payments for access charges under 6 Sections 350.113, 364.336, and 364.337, Florida Statutes. WHAT RULES SHOULD GOVERN HOW CARRIERS RECOVER 7 Q. FROM THEIR CUSTOMERS THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE 8 9 PORTABILITY COST FUND? 10 The Commission should not regulate how new entrants and other non-A. dominant carriers gather their contribution to the portability cost fund. 11 The Commission could allow incumbent LECs to treat their 12 13 share of portability costs as exogenous for purposes of adjusting price 14 caps. To the extent that portability costs are allocated to general end user services, such allocations should not be considered "avoided" 15 16 costs when wholesale rates are set pursuant to Sections 251(c)(4) and 17 252(d)(3) of the 1996 Act.

Assessment and Collection of Regulatory Fees for Fiscal Year 1995, Price Cap Treatment of Regulatory Fees Imposed by Section 9 of the Act, Report and Order, 10 FCC Rcd 13512, 13558-59 (1995).

1 The Commission should not permit incumbent LECs to collect 2 their contribution to the portability cost fund from customers through a discrete line item or surcharge on customers' bills. Nor should the 3 4 Commission tolerate the inclusion of an incumbent LEC's share of 5 portability costs in the prices for interconnection and unbundled network elements. 6 7 SHOULD THE PRINCIPLES FOR RECOVERING INTERIM Q. 8 PORTABILITY COSTS THAT MFS ADVOCATES HERE APPLY TO 9 THE RECOVERY OF PERMANENT NUMBER PORTABILITY 10 COSTS? Most certainly. MFS's proposal is designed to satisfy the overall requirement, 11 A. contained in both the 1996 Act and the Portability Order, for competitively 12 13 neutral recovery of costs associated with all forms of portability. Thus, when 14 permanent number portability becomes a reality, the Commission should implement MFS's proposal in the context of recovering costs incurred for 15 16 developing and maintaining the industry-wide portability database. I note, 17 however, that carriers should be responsible for the costs of their own internal updates and adjustments to software and other equipment necessary to use the 18 portability database. 19

| 1 | Q. | SHOULD THE COMMISSION TAKE ANY ACTION ON |
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| 2 | | PORTABILITY COST RECOVERY ISSUES IMMEDIATELY? |
| 3 | A. | Yes, it should suspend current tariffs that establish charges for portability |
| 4 | | arrangements. Carriers providing portability should book their costs to a |
| 5 | | deferred account. Once the Commission determines the level of costs |
| 6 | | permitted to be recovered and implements an appropriate cost recovery |
| 7 | | mechanism, carriers may recover any costs booked to the deferred account in |
| 8 | | accordance with the Commission's ruling in this proceeding. |
| 9 | Q. | DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY? |
| 10 | A. | Yes. |

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF ALEX J. HARRIS ON BEHALF OF MFS COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, INC.

| 1 | Ι. | INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY |
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| 2 | Q. | PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME. |
| 3 | A. | Alex J. Harris TIMOTHY DEVINE |
| 4 | Q. | HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY FILED TESTIMONY IN THIS |
| 5 | | PROCEEDING |
| 6 | A. | Yes. I filed direct testimony. |
| 7 | Q. | WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY? |
| 8 | A. | My rebuttal testimony seeks to address issues raised in the direct testimony of |
| 9 | | various parties filed before the Commission on the appropriate cost recovery |
| 10 | | mechanism for currently available number portability. As I discussed in my |
| 11 | | direct testimony the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC") Portability |
| 12 | | Order in CC Docket No. 95-116,1/2 requires that the recovery method selected |
| 13 | | must be competitively neutral. |
| 14 | Q. | WHAT MECHANISM IS MOST WIDELY RECOMMENDED? |
| 15 | A. | Almost all of the parties who filed direct testimony in this proceeding proposed |
| 16 | | as their first choice the same approach proposed by MFS namely that the |
| 17 | | Commission should require all parties to absorb their own costs of providing |

In the Matter of Telephone Number Portability, First Report and Order, CC Docket No. 95-116 (released July 2, 1996) (hereinafter "Portability Order").

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portability. This approach not only fully complies with the "competitive neutrality" requirement of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the Portability Order, but is by far the easiest method to administer and most efficient and cost-effective alternative. The widespread recommendation of this approach by other parties strongly supports the adoption of this approach, as the one most consistent with the Portability Order and the Telecommunication Act.

Q. IF THE COMMISSION DOES NOT ADOPT THIS APPROACH WHAT DOES MFS RECOMMEND?

If the Commission decides to adopt an alternate cost recovery mechanism for portability, MFS urges the adoption of the "net revenue" approach as described more fully in my Direct Testimony. The other cost recovery mechanisms suggested by the witnesses -- i.e., allocating costs on the basis of "working numbers" or "active lines" -- simply do not comply with the Telecommunications Act and the Portability Order. MFS believes that the only appropriate cost recovery mechanism for portability, other than each carrier bearing its own costs, is an approach whereby the Commission allocates portability costs on the basis of the net revenues of all carriers operating in Florida. Under this approach, the Commission would require all telecommunications carriers within the State of Florida to contribute to a portability fund in direct proportion to their total revenues from intrastate telecommunications operations (though with an offset

| 1 | | for payments to other carriers for intermediate telecommunications services |
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| 2 | | employed in the delivery of revenue-generating retail services). This mechanism |
| 3 | | is the only one which fully complies with the Telecommunications Act because |
| 4 | | it applies equally to all telecommunications carriers, is competitively neutral, and |
| 5 | | other than each carrier bearing their own cost, is the most simple and efficient to |
| 6 | | implement. |
| 7 | II. | COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY IS THE FUNDAMENTAL |
| 8 | | CONSIDERATION IN SELECTING A PORTABILITY COST |
| 9 | | RECOVERY MECHANISM |
| 10 | Q. | WHAT PRINCIPLE SHOULD GUIDE THE SELECTION OF ANY COST |
| 11 | | RECOVERY MECHANISM FOR PORTABILITY? |
| 12 | A. | Both the Telecommunications Act and the Portability Order establish competitive |
| 13 | | neutrality as the fundamental principle in the selection of the appropriate cost |
| 14 | | recovery mechanism. The Telecommunications Act expressly provides that the |

| 1 | | costs of portability calculated using TELRIC2 must be shared by all |
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| 2 | | telecommunications carriers. Specifically, Section 252(e) states that: |
| 3 | | The costs of establishing number portability <i>shall be</i> |
| 4 | | borne by all telecommunications carriers on a |
| 5 | | competitively neutral basis as determined by the [FCC]. |
| 6 | | (Emphasis added). Thus, consistent with the Act, all carriers providing intrastate |
| 7 | | telecommunications services in Florida should contribute to the costs of |
| 8 | | portability. This would include incumbent LECs, new LECs, Commercial |
| 9 | | Mobile Radio Service providers and Interexchange Carriers. |
| 10 | Q. | IS IT PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE 1996 ACT AND FCC RULES TO |
| 11 | | REQUIRE ONLY CARRIERS SUBSCRIBING TO PORTABILITY TO |
| 12 | | PAY THE COSTS OF PROVIDING IT? |

TELRIC ensures that portability costs are competitively neutral. TELRIC portability costs do not vary with the identity of the carrier forwarding calls to the customer's new service provider because TELRIC estimates incremental costs using a reconstructed, hypothetical network (constrained only by existing locations of the incumbent LEC's wire centers). Such a competitively neutral assessment of portability costs cannot be achieved by a cost study of portability functions within the incumbent LEC's existing network. With TELRIC, new entrants are not disadvantaged by having to contribute to portability costs inflated because of inefficiencies inherent in the incumbent LEC's existing network.

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carriers.

1 No. The FCC has concluded that Section 251(e)(2) of the 1996 Act mandates a A. 2 departure from general cost causation principles, pursuant to which the purchaser 3 of a service would be required to pay the cost of providing the service. Portability Order ¶ 131. Moreover, the FCC ruled that any cost recovery 4 5 mechanism that requires new entrants to bear all of the costs of portability does not comply with Section 252(e) of the 1996 Act. Portability Order ¶ 138 6 7 ("imposing the full incremental cost of number portability solely on new entrants would contravene the statutory mandate that all carriers share the cost of number 8 9 portability"). The tariffed charges currently imposed in Florida by incumbent 10 LECs on purchasers of portability are inconsistent with the Act and must be suspended immediately. 11 WHAT WOULD BE ANOTHER COMPETITIVELY NEUTRAL BASIS 12 Q. 13 **UPON WHICH TO ALLOCATE PORTABILITY COSTS?** A competitively neutral cost recovery mechanism cannot "give one service 14 A. 15 provider an appreciable, incremental cost advantage over another service provider, when competing for a specific subscriber." Portability Order ¶ 132. 16 17 New entrants, therefore, cannot be saddled with the full costs of portability. 18 Rather, portability costs must be allocated among all telecommunications

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Consequently, MFS submits that competitive neutrality cannot be achieved unless portability costs are recovered from all telecommunications carriers in Florida, in direct proportion to each company's total revenues from intrastate telecommunications operations, but with an offset for payments made to other carriers for intermediate telecommunications services that are used in the delivery of revenue-generating retail services.³ The way in which this "net revenue "approach would be implemented is explained in detail in my Direct Testimony. As described, this approach is competitively neutral because it does not saddle new entrants — or incumbent LECs for that matter — with the entire burden of funding portability and provides neither with a competitive advantage. The net revenue approach also ensures that <u>all</u> carriers will make a proportionate contribution to the costs of providing portability to end users. This approach is approvingly cited in the FCC's Portability Order. Portability Order ¶ 136. THE ALTERNATE RECOVERY MECHANISMS SUGGESTED

Such payments include those for switched access, interconnection, unbundled network elements, reciprocal compensation, and resold bundled services.

WITH APPLICABLE LAW

ARE NEITHER COMPETITIVELY NEUTRAL NOR COMPLIANT

| 1 | Q. | WHILE MOST PARTIES FAVOR THE APPROACH OF EACH |
|----|----|---|
| 2 | | CARRIER BEARING ITS OWN COSTS, ARE THE ALTERNATE COST |
| 3 | | RECOVERY APPROACHES SUGGESTED BY OTHER PARTIES TO |
| 4 | | THIS PROCEEDING COMPETITIVELY NEUTRAL? |
| 5 | A. | No. Each of the portability cost recovery methods proposed as alternatives |
| 6 | | i.e., allocating costs on the basis of "working numbers" or "active lines" in the |
| 7 | | event the Commission does not adopt their preferred approach, simply do not |
| 8 | | comply with the Telecommunications Act and the Portability Order. Each of |
| 9 | | these methods would operate to exclude certain carriers from the obligation to |
| 10 | | contribute to the cost of portability. The Act unambiguously mandates that all |
| 11 | | carriers must contribute to such costs. The net revenue approach advocated by |
| 12 | | MFS is the only method which insures contribution by all carriers on a |
| 13 | | competitively neutral basis. While the alternate approach advocated by GTE is |
| 14 | | consistent with that of MFS, it is far too complicated to offer a viable alternative. |
| 15 | | Of all alternate recovery methods proposed, the net revenue approach is certainly |
| 16 | | the most efficient and simple to administer. |
| 17 | Q. | CAN YOU BE MORE SPECIFIC? |
| 18 | A. | Yes. The allocation of costs on the basis of the numbers each carrier has would |
| 19 | | operate to exclude IXCs and CMRSs from the obligation to contribute to the |
| 20 | | costs of portability as numbers are assigned only to local carriers. A similar |

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result is obtained if the basis of allocation is a carrier's number of active lines. In either case, certain carriers are impermissibly excused from participating in the costs of portability. Thus, while Time Warner's first choice is for each company to bear its own costs, its alternate approach would exclude CMRSs and IXCs. ATT Wireless, which also recommends that each carrier bears its own costs, proposes an alternate that would improperly exclude CMRSs. ATT, while also favoring the approach of each carrier bearing its own costs, proposes as an alternate the model adopted prior to the Portability Order in New York that would conveniently excuse ATT from the obligation to share portability costs. MCI metre, which also supports each carrier bearing its own costs, proposes an alternate which would limit cost recovery to CLECs and LECs, a result inconsistent with the requirement that all carriers bear the costs of portability. These alternate cost recovery mechanisms fail to satisfy the competitive neutrality requirement, and, in fact, are inconsistent with the explicit language of the Act. The Commission must reject any cost recovery method that fails to impose contribution obligations equally on all carriers. Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH SPRINT'S PROPOSED METHOD OF COST **RECOVERY?** A. No. Sprint's proposal is cumbersome requiring that the Commission at this time

undertake a TELRIC study of the costs of number portability. Sprint's proposal

A.

is apparently based on TSLRIC and not TELRIC. Because TELRIC costs are based on the costs of a forward-looking network and not Sprint's, Sprint's cost studies cannot be used. Moreover, Sprint's proposal would exclude Sprint's long distance company from any obligation to bear a proportionate share of the number portability costs. An approach which does not include all carriers is not competitively neutral and fails to recognize that all carriers and all end users benefit from the availability of number portability as a part of the network.

IV. CURRENT TARIFFS CANNOT BE PRESERVED UNDER THE

TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT AND PORTABILITY ORDER

Q. SHOULD THE COMMISSION TAKE ANY ACTION ON PORTABILITY COST RECOVERY ISSUES IMMEDIATELY?

Yes, it should suspend current tariffs that establish charges for portability arrangements. Indeed, the FCC has explicitly ruled that any cost recovery mechanism that requires new entrants to bear all of the costs of portability does not comply with Section 252(e) of the 1996 Act. *Portability Order* ¶ 138. Thus, maintaining the current tariffed charges imposed by incumbent LECs on purchasers of portability violates the Act. The current tariffs must be suspended, and the Commission must adopt a cost recovery mechanism as mandated by the Act and the Portability Order. BellSouth's suggestion that the current tariff's should be maintained is an approach that would have the Commission disregard

| 1 | | the applicable law, and, as such, must be dismissed out of hand. The fact that |
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| 2 | | BellSouth has sought reconsideration of the Portability Order does not change the |
| 3 | | fact that it is a currently effective order which this Commission may not ignore. |
| 4 | V. | RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF COST RECOVERY IS |
| 5 | | PERMISSIBLE |
| 6 | Q. | DOES THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OR THE PORTABILITY |
| 7 | | ORDER PRECLUDE THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE |
| 8 | | COMMISSION'S DECISION? |
| 9 | A. | MFS believes that under the Portability Order and the Telecommunications Act |
| 10 | | it is permissible for the Commission to apply its decision retroactively. Nothing |
| 11 | | in either the Telecommunications Act or the Portability Order precludes such an |
| 12 | | application. Indeed, none of the testimony filed with the Commission in this |
| 13 | | matter argues the contrary. The Commission will need to resolve the effect of |
| 14 | | such action under Florida law. To the extent it may not retroactively change the |
| 15 | | number portability rates, as BellSouth argues, it clearly undermines BellSouth's |
| 16 | | proposal that the Commission leave the tariffs in place when they clearly violate |
| 17 | | the Portability Order. |
| 18 | Q. | DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY? |

Yes.

A.

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BY MR. RINDLER:

- Q Mr. Devine, have you prepared a summary of your testimony?
 - A Yes.
 - Q Could you give it at this time?

A Yes. Good afternoon. The issue before this Commission is fairly straightforward: Should the Commission revise its temporary number portability cost allocation decision so that it is consistent with the FCC's decision on the same issue.

The FCC's decision came out after the Commission had made its decision in December. While it is my understanding that motions to reconsider the FCC's order have been filed, the FCC's order is in effect.

The FCC in providing guidance on acceptable methods of cost recovery emphasized the importance of temporary number portability as new entrants begin operations in the local exchange market. Competition will benefit all consumers since all consumers will be able to continue dialing the same telephone number.

Number portability and any resultant cost are simply part of the cost of doing business in the new regulatory environment. As such the FCC was particularly concerned that temporary number

portability, an inadequate substitute for true number portability, not impose additional burdens on new entrants.

As such the FCC was particularly concerned that any cost recovery for temporary number portability not result in a burden solely on the new entrants.

Since this Commission's earlier decision imposes most costs associated with temporary number portability on new entrants, it is inconsistent with the FCC order and should be changed.

In determining which method of cost recovery to use, the Commission should keep several facts in mind. First, temporary number portability is intended to be just that, temporary. Second, given the time frame in which temporary number portability is to become effective, it is highly unlikely that there will be any significant demand for ported numbers.

The carrier's experience since the Commission's order should provide a factual context to consider the likely demand.

Third, the methods used for temporary number portability are in use today. No changes to or different equipment is required. Accordingly, the incremental cost of such calls is minimal.

Fourth, the least cost method of cost
recovery given these circumstances is for each carrier
to simply provide number portability in return for the
right to obtain number portability from other

5 carriers.

Absent this approach, MFS believes that the Act and the FCC's order are quite clear: All telecommunications providers are required to contribute to any costs.

Long distance carriers are

telecommunications carriers under the Act, as are CMRS

and other wireless carriers. All telecommunications

carriers should be included in any cost recovery

approach the Commission deems necessary. There is no

legitimate basis to exclude such carriers.

In calculating each carrier's share the method which best meets the requirement for competitive neutrality among telecommunications providers is to base any assessment on net revenues.

Let me simply underscore that MFS strongly supports the position esspoused by most other carriers; that is, that each carrier bear its own cost.

Given the temporary nature of the issue the apparent and likely scope of the demand, this approach

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| 1 | is the least cost, most efficient approach and is |
| 2 | specifically included by the FCC in its description of |
| 3 | acceptable cost recovery methodologies. Thank you. |
| 4 | MR. RINDLER: Madam Chairman, Mr. Devine is |
| 5 | available for cross. |
| 6 | CHAIRMAN CLARK: Thank you. Ms. White. |
| 7 | MS. WHITE: BellSouth has no questions. |
| 8 | CHAIRMAN CLARK: Ms. Caswell. |
| 9 | MS. CASWELL: GTE has no questions. |
| 10 | CHAIRMAN CLARK: Mr. Wahlen. |
| 11 | CROSS EXAMINATION |
| 12 | BY MR. WAHLEN: |
| 13 | Q Mr. Devine, this is Jeff Wahlen for Sprint. |
| 14 | You haven't reviewed Sprint's cost study in this |
| 15 | docket, have you? |
| 16 | A No, I haven't, but as I understand it, it |
| 17 | was just filed a few days ago. |
| 18 | Q And what is your basis for that |
| 19 | understanding? |
| 20 | A My counsel informed me of that. I have been |
| 21 | out of the office the last few days. |
| 22 | Q Would you be surprised to find that FCTA got |
| 23 | a copy of that cost study right after Mr. Poag's |
| 24 | testimony was filed because they asked for it in |
| 25 | discovery? |
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| 1 | A Well, which cost study? Was it a new cost |
| 2 | study in this case or was it a previous |
| 3 | Q The one that was prepared to support his |
| 4 | Exhibit FBP-1? |
| 5 | A Okay. I guess I don't know. |
| 6 | Q So you wouldn't be surprised to find that |
| 7 | MFS could have reviewed it shortly after it was filed |
| 8 | just like FCTA did, would you? |
| 9 | A Assuming that's correct, yes, you're |
| 10 | correct. I did see a cost study based on our |
| 11 | negotiations with Sprint on interim number portability |
| 12 | back a few months ago. I don't know if it was the |
| 13 | same study or not. |
| 14 | Q You don't have any reason to disagree with |
| 15 | what is contained in Sprint's cost study, do you, |
| 16 | based on a review of that cost study? |
| 17 | A Well, the cost study that you mentioned, if |
| 18 | it's the one FCTA saw, of course, if I haven't seen it |
| 19 | I don't. Although based on the prices that are |
| 20 | proposed in the testimony I just can't understand how |
| 21 | any of that makes a lot of sense. |
| 22 | Q But you haven't reviewed the study. |
| 23 | A That's correct. |
| 24 | MR. WAHLEN: Thank you, no questions. |

MS. McMILLIN: MCI has no questions.

| 1 | MS. WILSON: No questions. |
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| 2 | MS. WEISKE: No questions. |
| 3 | MS. DUNSON: No questions. |
| 4 | CROSS EXAMINATION |
| 5 | BY MS. JACOBS: |
| 6 | Q Mr. Devine, Gwen Jacobs with AT&T Wireless. |
| 7 | Would your alternative proposal allocate |
| 8 | interim number portability cost recovery to wireless |
| 9 | carriers? |
| 10 | A Yes. For all telecommunications providers, |
| 11 | yes. |
| 12 | Q And is it your belief that wireless carriers |
| 13 | will be requesting interim number portability |
| 14 | associated with the cost recovery at issue in this |
| 15 | proceeding? |
| 16 | A No. They probably wouldn't be purchasing it |
| 17 | to use to provide local service unless they are |
| 18 | actually providing local service. But they do benefit |
| 19 | from that capability because their subscribers can |
| 20 | continue to dial the same telephone numbers. |
| 21 | MS. JACOBS: Okay. AT&T has no further |
| 22 | questions. |
| 23 | CHAIRMAN CLARK: Staff. |
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CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. COX:

- Q Good afternoon, Mr. Devine.
- A Good afternoon.
- Q I'm Will Cox appearing on behalf of the Commission Staff.

Staff has several questions regarding the direct testimony you have adopted today. First question refers to Page 5 of the direct testimony, Line 17. On Line 17 on Page 5, direct testimony filed in this docket, you use TELRIC as the cost methodology.

- A Yes.
 - Why do you use TELRIC as a cost methodology?
- A It was our interpretation of the FCC's number portability order that it expressly, you know, talks about incremental costs and that the FCC a month or so later went with the TELRIC pricing principles and, you know, we thought that that seemed to be consistent with what they ordered in the number portability order.
- **Q** From your lay perspective would you agree it is still appropriate to use this methodology since the pricing in the FCC order has been stayed?
- A Yes. There have been several commissions

that have -- despite the stay of the FCC's interconnection order have continued to apply TELRIC pricing principles for pricing of unbundled elements.

Why do you believe it's appropriate?

A Well, in Georgia, for instance, the Georgia Commission applied TELRIC pricing methodology for the pricing of unbundled loops. They thought that it was, you know, a prudent way to develop prices for loops. Several other commissions have gone with TELRIC pricing, and it seems, you know, to be a good mechanism to use. There's no reason why the Florida Commission cannot use it.

Q Mr. Devine, we're not asking for the Georgia Commission's ruling on this. We're asking for your opinion on whether or not this is appropriate for this proceeding and why.

A We feel it's appropriate because it would, you know, recover the appropriate costs used for that function. So if the actual function that's being used for interim number portability is incremental switching and incremental transport, since that's really what is happening on top of regular RCF, that if you apply the TELRIC pricing methodology to the incremental cost of switching and transport, that that would be, you know, the best way to appropriately

gauge the costs to make sure they are recovered and not over- or underallocated.

Q What's your understanding of TELRIC,
Mr. Devine?

A That it recovers, you know, forward-thinking based technology. Forward-thinking cost of capital; that it recovers the direct cost for that function, and any other, you know, common costs related to that direct cost of that function. So it would be just the specific incremental costs of switching and transport for the function of interim number portability.

Q What is your understanding of the difference between TELRIC and TSLRIC?

A I'm not an economist and I don't, you know, try to pretend to be an economist. But for TELRIC you actually would be using forward-looking costs, forward-looking technology and forward-looking costs of money. Whereas if you're looking just as TSLRIC, you could be looking just at the existing costs, let's say, of a LEC rather than what their costs would look like in a new environment using new technology and new cost of capital and things like that.

Q For purposes of temporary number portability, which carriers do you believe should be included? 2

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Just as the FCC Act and the order states, all telecommunications carriers, which would be local, long distance and wireless carriers.

That being the case, why should all carriers Q pay since not all will benefit from the implementation of temporary number portability, such as rural LECs and commercial mobile radio service providers?

All carrier and consumers do benefit just as A when we had this docket open last year I testified to the same thing. All carriers, all customers benefit.

When you're a consumer, and if you're in Siesta Key and you're trying to call a customer in Tampa, or call somebody in downtown Miami, and if there's competition in those areas, you can continue to dial the same phone number. That's a significant benefit to consumers.

Also what it does is it brings competition to the marketplace, which lowers prices for consumers. It's -- historically I mean you can look at the long distance market, you can look at the competitive access market for pricing of special access of private line.

When MFS introduced service in California 24 || for private line and special access back about six years ago, Pacific Bell lowered their T-1 prices from \$800 to \$200 a month. Well, since they priced those rates on statewide basis, those rates went down for everybody in the state overnight just because of competition in downtown San Francisco and Los Angeles.

So I think it's a big misnomer if people assume that competition, while you might only see

assume that competition, while you might only see multiple carriers initially in the urban markets, it's not true that there won't be lower prices in other markets and choices.

Q So would you agree that the FCC order allows states to exempt categories of carriers from temporary cost recovery?

A To exempt -- ?

- Q To exempt certain carriers from the cost recovery involved in temporary number portability?
 - A What do you mean by that?
- Q Would you agree basically, subject to check, that the FCC order allows states to essentially not include certain categories of carriers from the cost recovery involved with temporary number portability?
- A Do you mean like Tier 2 LECs and things like that.
- Q Any type of carrier, ILEC, ALEC, resale providers.
 - A As I said earlier, certainly there's no

language anywhere in the Act or in the FCC Order that excludes carriers from contributing towards the cost of number portability. Certainly Tier 2 LECs, that that could be -- I don't know, I mean that could be a situation. I'm not sure.

Q I'd like to refer you to Page 8 of your testimony, Line 2; Page 8, Line 2 you state that "The incremental cost is the benchmark for measuring portability costs."

Would you agree, subject to check, that

Paragraph 123 of the FCC number portability order

states that these rates are not required to be set at

LRIC or TSLRIC?

- Q Excuse me. Which paragraph number?
- Q Paragraph 123 of the FCC number portability order?
- A If you'd like, I could just read it really briefly.
 - Q Sure.

- A Object. Thanks. (Pause) I've read it.
- Q I'll restate the question. Would you agree that Paragraph 123 of the FCC number portability order states that these rates are not required to be set at LRIC or TSLRIC?
 - A Yes, it does say that in that particular

paragraph. It talks a lot about single cost up to Paragraph 140, 117 through 140.

Q The net revenue approach which is advocated in the direct testimony that you offer in this proceeding, would you agree that the net revenue approach for cost recovery in this proceeding is better than the recovery mechanism using telephone numbers?

A Yes. Because if you just use telephone numbers you're not having all telecommunications carriers contribute to the cost of number portability. As I said earlier, the net revenue, if you take the -- all revenue from all carriers, that would be a more correct interpretation of the Order and the Act. Anything other than something like net revenue or revenue does not include all telecommunications carriers.

MR. COX: That concludes Staff's questions.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I have a question.

It's your position that all customers everywhere

benefit from interim number portability?

WITNESS DEVINE: Yes.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: A customer of a rural incumbent LEC, how do they benefit by a customer in Miami having their number ported?

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witness DEVINE: Really in two regards. One is if they were to dial somebody who is in an area where they have competition and number portability is being used, they could continue to dial that customer at the same telephone number.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Whoa, just a second.

You're assuming then that there's some type of ongoing relationship between the customer in the rural and the customer in Miami so they know what their number is without looking into directory.

will be making calls outside of their local area, so yes, some customers won't benefit in that regard in terms of calling the same number.

commissioner deason: In other words, they don't have a local directory so that if they wanted to call someone -- for example, if somebody in Bristol, Florida wanted to call Joe Garcia in Miami and complain about their telephone rates, they wouldn't have a Miami directory to call Joe Garcia in Miami anyway, would they?

witness DEVINE: No. If they didn't already know the customer's phone number, or it hadn't changed in a directory or something like that, then they wouldn't --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: How did that customer benefit from the customer in Miami being able to have their number ported?

wouldn't benefit but they would benefit in terms of competion coming to the state and a precedent being set. And we all know in long distance, I mean the first competition was on a private line basis between St. Louis and Chicago. And now clearly all of the major long distance carriers offer long distance service in every LATA in the country. There's also numerous resellers and regional carriers throughout the U.S. And those rates for long distance, Sprint talks about 10 cents a minute all over the place and that's not restricted just to major urban areas.

I think it's something, Day One, some customers in some small rural areas, sure, they might not see the benefit they want. But we have to get this thing jump-started. And I think it seems the Order and the Act are pretty clear about all telecommunications carriers being involved in it.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Any questions. Redirect?

MR. RINDLER: I have none, Madam Chairman.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: No redirect.

MR. RINDLER: No, ma'am.

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| 1 | | | CHAIRMAN CLARK: Thank you very much, |
| 2 | Mr. | Devine | . |
| 3 | | | MR. RINDLER: May he be excused? |
| 4 | | | CHAIRMAN CLARK: He may be excused. |
| 5 | Mr. | Poag. | |
| 6 | | | (Transcript continues in sequence in Volume 3? |
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