**FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION**

 **Capital Circle Office Center 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard**

 **Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850**

 **M E M O R A N D U M**

 **MARCH 12, 1998**

**TO: DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF RECORDS AND REPORTING**

**FROM: DIVISION OF LEGAL SERVICES (B. KEATING)**

**DIVISION OF AUDITING AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS (WRIGHT, HACKNEY, CATER, MAILHOT)**

**DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS (AUDU)**

**RE: DOCKET NO. 970808-TL - PETITION OF BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. TO REMOVE INTERLATA ACCESS SUBSIDY RECEIVED BY ST. JOSEPH TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH COMPANY.**

**AGENDA: MARCH 24, 1998 - REGULAR AGENDA - DECISION PRIOR TO HEARING - MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF PREHEARING OFFICERS ORDER - ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED**

**CRITICAL DATES: NONE**

**SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: I:\PSC\LEG\WP\970808.RCM - ALTHOUGH THE PARTIES DID NOT REQUEST ORAL ARGUMENT, THIS IS A DECISION PRIOR TO HEARING AND ORAL ARGUMENT MAY BE GRANTED AT THE COMMISSIONS DISCRETION. STAFF BELIEVES, HOWEVER, THAT THE PLEADINGS ARE SUFFICIENT FOR A FULLY INFORMED EVALUATION OF THE ISSUES AND THAT ORAL ARGUMENT WILL NOT AID THE COMMISSION IN ITS DECISION.**

 **CASE BACKGROUND**

On July 1, 1997, BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. (BellSouth) filed a Petition to Remove InterLATA Access Subsidy received by St. Joseph Telephone and Telegraph Company (St. Joseph). On July 22, 1997, BellSouth filed a revised Petition. On August 11, 1997, St. Joseph filed an Answer in opposition to BellSouths revised Petition. This matter has been set for hearing on May 20, 1998.

On January 30, 1998, Commission staff conducted an issues identification meeting. The parties and the Office of Public Counsel attended the meeting. At that meeting, a dispute arose regarding the inclusion of certain issues suggested by St. Joseph, which is now known GTC.

On January 20, 1998, BellSouth served its First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents (PODs) on GTC. On January 30, 1998, GTC filed objections to BellSouths interrogatories and PODs. On February 5, 1998, BellSouth served GTC, Inc. with its Revised First Set of Interrogatories. On that same day, BellSouth also filed a Motion to Compel responses to its Revised Interrogatories. On February 13, 1998, GTC filed its Response to BellSouths Motion to Compel.

On February 16, 1998, the prehearing officer conducted a pre-prehearing conference at which he heard oral argument on the issues in dispute and the discovery dispute. On February 18, 1998, Order No. PSC-98-0300-PCO-TL was issued setting forth the prehearing officers rulings on these disputes.

On February 27, 1998, GTC filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Order No. PSC-98-0300-PCO-TL. Therein, GTC asks that the Commission reconsider the prehearing officers decision to partially grant BellSouths Motion to Compel. On March 6, 1998, BellSouth filed its Response to GTCs Motion.

This is staffs recommendation on GTCs Motion for Reconsideration.

 **DISCUSSION OF ISSUES**

**ISSUE 1:** Should GTCs Motion for Reconsideration of Order No. PSC-98-0300-PCO-TL be granted?

**STAFF RECOMMENDATION:** No. GTC has failed to identify any point of fact or law that the prehearing officer overlooked or failed to consider in rendering Order No. PSC-98-0300-FOF-TL. GTCs motion should, therefore, be denied.

**STAFF ANALYSIS:** The proper standard of review for a motion for reconsideration is whether the motion identifies a point of fact or law which was overlooked or which the Commission failed to consider in rendering its Order. See Stewart Bonded Warehouse, Inc. v. Bevis, 294 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1974); Diamond Cab Co. v. King, 146 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1962); and Pingree v. Quaintance, 394 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). In a motion for reconsideration, it is not appropriate to reargue matters that have already been considered. Sherwood v. State, 111 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1959); citing State ex. rel. Jaytex Realty Co. V. Green, 105 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958). Furthermore, a motion for reconsideration should not be granted based upon an arbitrary feeling that a mistake may have been made, but should be based upon specific factual matters set forth in the record and susceptible to review. Stewart Bonded Warehouse, Inc. v. Bevis, 294 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 1974).

GTC

In its Motion, GTC asks the Commission to reconsider the prehearing officers decision to partially grant BellSouths Motion to Compel and require GTC to respond to most of the discovery propounded by BellSouth. GTC asserts that all of the discovery requests seek information regarding GTCs earned rate of return, calculated as if GTC were still a rate of return regulated company. GTC notes that BellSouth has indicated that it will use this information to determine if GTC still really needs the interLATA subsidy. In requiring GTC to respond to these discovery requests, GTC argues that the prehearing officers decision departs from the essential requirements of the law.

GTC argues that because it has elected price cap regulation, GTC is no longer obligated to report financial information regarding its rate of return. GTC adds that it is important to bear in mind that its rates are currently capped and cannot be changed unless the company is able to demonstrate changed circumstances in accordance with Section 364.051(5), Florida Statutes.[[1]](#footnote-1) GTC asserts that if rates are prescribed to be reasonable for a time certain, then the Commission has no justification to review the Companys performance to determine whether it should maintain a certain component of its rates. GTC argues, therefore, that the Commission cannot affect any component of GTCs rates while GTCs rates are frozen.

GTC also argues that Section 364.051, Florida Statutes, is clear that price cap regulation exempts a company from rate of return regulation. Thus, once a company has elected to be price regulated, the Commission cannot compel it to produce information regarding its rate of return because the Commission cannot use that information to form the basis of a decision. GTC argues, therefore, that the information sought is irrelevant and that BellSouths Motion to Compel should have been denied. In support of its arguments, GTC cites Kilgore v. Bird, 6 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1942); Toyota Motor Corporation v. Green, 483 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); and Krypton Broadcasting v. MGM‑Pathe Communications Co., 629 So.2d 852, 854, (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), which states that "[i]t is axiomatic that information sought in discovery must relate to the issues involved in the litigation. . . ."

In addition, GTC argues that the prehearing officer incorrectly applied Section 364.051(1)(c) and 364.052(2), Florida Statutes, by allowing BellSouths discovery requests. As an example, GTC refers to BellSouths first interrogatory which asks GTC to compile Surveillance Reports for 1996 and 1997. GTC argues that these reports have been used by the Commission in the past to determine a companys earnings on a rate base, rate of return regulated basis. GTC notes that only rate of return regulated LECs file Surveillance Reports, in accordance with Rule 25-4.1352, Florida Administrative Code.

Furthermore, GTC argues that while the prehearing officer conceded in Order No. PSC-98-0300-PCO-TL that GTC is not a rate of return regulated company, the prehearing officer noted that the Commission has always reviewed earnings to determine the propriety of removing the subsidy. GTC argues that if the Commission intends to review earnings as part of the case, then the Commission would be incorrectly assuming that it can review earnings, and subsequently remove the subsidy, based on rate of return earnings calculations.

Finally, GTC argues that as a matter of law and of public policy the Commission should not alter a component of its price capped rates. GTC asserts that the Legislature crafted Section 364.051, Florida Statutes, as a balance between rate of return regulation and no regulation. While GTC is now free from rate of return regulation, it is price capped for at least three years. GTC argues that in establishing the price caps, the Legislature did not contemplate that the Commission would continue to make regulatory adjustments to a companys earnings. GTC notes that while Sections 364.051 and 364.052, Florida Statutes, are very specific on some points, neither of these provisions address the interLATA subsidy. GTC adds that when it elected price regulation, the subsidy was an integral part of its rates. At the time it elected price cap regulation, GTC asserts that neither BellSouth nor the Commission mentioned the subsidy. Since GTC is now price capped, it is entitled to maintain the rates it had at the time of its election. GTC further points out that under Section 364.052, Florida Statutes, only the rates of a small LEC that elects price cap regulation after July 1, 1996, are subject to Commission review.[[2]](#footnote-2) GTC states that it elected price cap regulation before July 1, 1996. Therefore, GTC argues that any decision to review GTCs earnings under a rate base/rate of return method is contrary to the law; thus, the Commission should reconsider the prehearing officers Order No. PSC-98-0300-PCO-TL.

BellSouth

In its Response, BellSouth states that it agrees with GTC that GTC, as a price regulated company, is no longer obliged to provide the Commission with financial information in order for the Commission to set GTCs rates and rate of return. BellSouth argues, however, that BellSouth is not the Public Service Commission, therefore, the arguments that GTC raises are inapplicable. BellSouth adds that it is only seeking information that the Commission has used in the past to determine whether the subsidy should be removed.

BellSouth also argues that GTCs obligation to comply with discovery requests is not abated simply because GTCs basic rates are currently frozen. BellSouth adds that the prehearing officer specifically included issues in this proceeding relating to the effects of GTCs frozen rates and the effect of removal of the subsidy.

Finally, BellSouth argues that GTC has not presented any new arguments that would merit overturning the prehearing officers order. BellSouth asserts that GTC is merely restating its prior arguments. Furthermore, BellSouth argues that GTC simply wants the best of both worlds -- to be able to be price regulated, but to continue to be subsidized by BellSouth. BellSouth argues that this is improper. BellSouth argues, therefore, that GTC has not presented any mistake of fact or law that would warrant granting GTCs motion for reconsideration. BellSouth states that the motion should be denied. In addition, BellSouth notes that it pared down its discovery requests as directed by the prehearing officer. BellSouth attached its revised, reduced discovery requests as Exhibit A to its Response.

Staff Analysis

The arguments that GTC raises in its Motion for Reconsideration are the same arguments presented by GTC at the February 16, 1998, pre-prehearing conference and addressed in the prehearing officers Order on Disputed Issues and Discovery Dispute. See Order No. PSC-98-0300-PCO-TL at p. 4. GTCs only argument is that the prehearing officer misinterpreted the statutory provisions regarding price cap regulation and rate of return regulation for small LECs, Sections 364.051 and 364.052, Florida Statutes, and, as a result, improperly allowed BellSouth to obtain information that is irrelevant to the matter at issue in this docket.

Section 364.051(1)(c), Florida Statutes, states:

Each company subject to this section shall be exempt from rate base, rate of return regulation and the requirements of ss. 364.03, 364.035, 364.037, 364.05, 364.055, 364.14, 364.17, and 364.18.

Section 364.052(2) states, in pertinent part:

. . . After July 1, 1996, a company subject to this section, electing to be regulated pursuant to s. 364.051, will have any overearnings attributable to a period prior to the date on which the company makes the election subject to refund or other disposition by the commission. Small local exchange telecommunications companies not electing the price regulation provided for under s. 364.051 shall also be regulated pursuant to ss. 364.03, 364.035(1) and (2), 364.05, and 364.055 and other provisions necessary for rate base, rate of return regulation. . . .

As set forth on page 6 of Order No. PSC-98-0300-PCO-TL, the prehearing officer addressed GTCs argument that earnings is not a factor that the Commission can review to determine the propriety of removing the interLATA subsidy. The prehearing officer stated:

The Commission is not prohibited from reviewing evidence that may indicate what impact removal of the subsidy will have on GTC simply because GTC has elected to become price regulated.

Order No. PSC-98-0300-PCO-TL at p. 6. The prehearing officer further noted that GTC itself had brought up the issue of the impact that removing the subsidy would have on the Company. Reviewing earnings is one means of investigating that impact. The prehearing officer then found that the discovery sought by BellSouth was likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. GTC has not identified any mistake of fact or law in that finding. GTC simply disagrees with the prehearing officers interpretation of the statutory provisions in question and the discovery rules. While reasonable minds may differ, a difference of opinion does not amount to a mistake of law.

Essentially, GTC asserts that, once a company has elected price cap regulation, not only can the Commission not regulate the Companys rates, the Commission cannot review any information relating to the companys rates or revenues for any purpose. GTC argues that since the Commission cannot review the information, the information is not discoverable, at least for any Commission purposes. Furthermore, since the companys rates cannot be altered under price regulation, GTC argues that all components of those rates are also protected from regulatory meddling.

Staff believes that GTCs argument contradicts the Rules of Civil Procedure on discovery. Under those Rules, which have been adopted by the Commission by Rule 25-22.034, Florida Administrative Code, the scope of discovery is broad. This is clearly indicated by Rule 1.280(b)(1), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:

Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action. . . . It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

The Commission has broad discretion in resolving discovery disputes. The Commission should, however, balance the competing interests to be served when discovery disputes arise. See Dade County Medical Association v. Hlis, 372 So.2d 117, 121 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1979).

In Eyster v. Eyster, 503 So.2d 340, 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), rev. den. 513 So.2d 1061 (Fla. 1987), the court stated:

[T]he trial court possesses broad discretion in granting or refusing discovery motions and also in protecting the parties against possible abuse of discovery procedures, and only an abuse of this discretion will constitute fatal error. Orlowitz v. Orlowitz, 199 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1967).

Furthermore, in the case of Cazares v. Calderbank, 435 So.2d 377 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), the court found that if a logical connection between the information sought and the issues is not readily apparent, the questioner should point out to the court how the information sought is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

As set forth in Order No. PSC-98-0300-PCO-TL, the prehearing officer considered the arguments of both parties. The prehearing officers decision balanced the competing interests of both parties by requiring GTC to provide the earnings information requested by BellSouth, but limiting the scope of particular interrogatories. In addition, the prehearing officer encouraged the companies to work together to further reduce the amount of information sought to that which is necessary to proceed with the case. Nevertheless, the prehearing officer found that the earnings information was reasonably likely to lead to admissible evidence based upon BellSouths arguments that the Commission had used such information in similar cases and that BellSouth was not proposing to alter GTCs rates in any way.

Staff notes that in allowing BellSouth to discover GTCs earnings information, the prehearing officer did not make any determination as to whether or not the Commission could or should grant BellSouths Petition to remove the interLATA subsidy. That is an issue to be addressed at hearing, not within the context of a discovery dispute or a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of that discovery dispute. Regarding GTCs particular reference to BellSouths request for Surveillance Reports for 1996 and 1997, staff also notes that we agree with GTC that it is no longer required to provide such reports to the Commission in accordance with Rule 25-4.1352, Florida Administrative Code, for ratemaking purposes. The earnings information within a Surveillance Report is, however, the type of information that the Commission has relied upon in the past in determining whether or not to remove the interLATA subsidy. The information requested is, therefore, likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Staff believes that the legal and factual arguments presented by GTC are arguments that will be fully explored at hearing. As indicated by the approved issues, which are set forth in Attachment A to this Recommendation, GTC will have ample opportunity to argue the purpose and intent of the subsidy, the application of Sections 364.051 and 364.052, Florida Statutes, and the propriety of removing the subsidy. As stated before, the prehearing officer made no determination on these issues in ruling upon the discovery dispute. The prehearing officer simply applied the appropriate legal test to determine whether the discovery was proper. GTC has not shown any mistake in the application of that test.

Based on the foregoing, staff recommends that the Commission deny GTCs Motion for Reconsideration of Order No. PSC-98-0300-PCO-TL. GTC has not identified a point of fact that the prehearing officer overlooked or a mistake in the prehearing officers application of the law.

**ISSUE 2:** Should this Docket be closed?

**STAFF RECOMMENDATION:** No. This Docket should remain open pending the outcome of the hearing.

**STAFF ANALYSIS:** This Docket should remain open pending the outcome of the hearing.

 **ATTACHMENT A**

 APPROVED ISSUES

1. What is the interLATA access subsidy and why was the interLATA access subsidy established?

1b. What is the history of the interLATA access subsidy and how has Commission policy regarding the subsidy evolved since the subsidy was established?

2. Was the interLATA access subsidy pool intended to be a permanent subsidy? If not, what criteria should be used for ending the interLATA access subsidy pool?

3. What is the legal authority for the BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.s proposal to eliminate the interLATA access subsidy of GTC, Inc.?

4. Considering that the rates of a small LEC electing price cap regulation may not be altered during the period rates are frozen, except as provided for in Section 364.051(5), Florida Statutes, may the subsidy in effect at the time price cap regulation was elected be discontinued during the period rates are frozen?

5. Should the interLATA access subsidy received by GTC, Inc. be removed?

6. If the access subsidy being paid to GTC, Inc. is eliminated, should BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. be directed to cease collection of the access subsidy funds? If the access subsidy being paid to GTC, Inc. is eliminated, and collection of the access subsidy funds is not terminated, what disposition should be made of the funds?

7. If the subsidy should be removed, should it be removed entirely at one time, or should the subsidy be phased out over a certain time period?

8. If the subsidy should be removed entirely at one time, on what date should the removal be effective?

9. If the subsidy should be phased out, over what time period should the phase out take place and how much should the reduction of the subsidy be in each period?

1. In accordance with Section 364.051(2), Florida Statutes, when a LEC elects price regulation, its rates for basic local telecommunications service are capped. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Staff notes that under Section 364.052(2), Florida Statutes, any prior period overearnings of a company electing price regulation after July 1, 1996, become subject to refund or other disposition by the Commission. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)