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November 30, 1999



Blanca S. Bayo, Director Division of Records & Reporting Florida Public Service Commission 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850

> Re: Docket No. 950387-SU

> > Application for a rate increase for North Ft. Myers Division in Lee County by

Florida Cities Water Company – Lee County Division.

Dear Ms. Bayo:

Enclosed for filing in the above docket, on behalf of Florida Cities Water Company, is an original and fifteen copies of a Notice of Filing Transcript and an original transcript of Item 73 of the March 16, 1999, agenda conference.

Please acknowledge receipt of the foregoing by stamping the enclosed extra copy of this letter and returning same to my attention.

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

KGWC/ldv Enclosures

AG

EG LAS PC IA!

DOCUMENT NUMBER-DATE

1 4605 NOV 30 8

IN THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

Florida Cities Water Company,) a Florida Corporation, FPSC Case No. 950387-SU Applicant/Appellant, First DCA Case No. 1999-1666 v. State of Florida, Florida Public Service Commission, Appellee.

NOTICE OF FILING TRANSCRIPT

Applicant/Appellant, Florida Cities Water Company, gives notice of filing the Transcript of Item No. 73 from the March 16, 1999, commission agenda conference.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the Notice of Filing Transcript has been furnished this ___30^{Eh-} day of November 1999 by hand delivery to:

Harold McLean, Associate Office of Public Counsel c/o The Florida Legislature Claude Pepper Building, Room 812 111 W. Madison Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1400

Ralph Jaeger, Esquire Division of Legal Services Florida Public Service Commission 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850

Chris Moore Division of Appeals Florida Public Service Commission 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850

Fla. /B/ar No.: 002/9/66 KATHRYN G.W. COWDERY Fla. Bar No.: 0363995 Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A. 215 S. Monroe St., Suite 815 Tallahassee, FL 32301 (850) 681-9027

Water Company

Attorneys for Florida Cities 1714DOCUMENT NUMBER - DATE

14605 NOV 30 #

BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA

IN RE: Application for a rate increase for North Ft. Myers Division in Lee County by Florida Cities Water Company - Lee County Division.

DOCKET NO. 950387-SU



CHAIRMAN JOE GARCIA COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON COMMISSIONER SUSAN F. CLARK COMMISSIONER JULIA A. JOHNSON COMMISSIONER E. LEON JACOBS

AGENDA CONFERENCE

73

March 16, 1999

4075 Esplanade Way, Room 148 Tallahassee, Florida

PROCEEDING:

ITEM NUMBER:

DATE:

PLACE:

JANE FAUROT, RPR P.O. BOX 10751 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32302 (850) 561-5598

APPEARANCES:

KATHRYN COWDERY, Esquire, representing Florida Cities Water Company
HAROLD McLEAN, Esquire, representing OPC

PROCEEDINGS

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Item Number 73.

MR. JAEGER: Commissioners, Item Number 73 is staff's recommendation concerning the remand and reversal by the First District Court of Appeal of the Commission's final order in Florida Cities Water Company's rate case, and also the motion in Florida Cities to make rates permanent.

Staff is recommending that the Commission use annual average daily flow as the numerator of the used and useful equation and do grant in part the utility's motion to make rates permanent.

Kathryn Cowdery is here to address the Commission. Also, I think Harold McLean is here to answer any questions or respond if necessary.

One other thing, staff notes that participation is allowed only on Issue 3A and Issue 10.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay.

MS. COWDERY: Commissioners, good afternoon. I'm Kathryn Cowdery of Ruden McClosky, Tallahassee, representing Florida Cities Water Company. As to Issue 3A, Florida Cities agrees with the staff recommendation that pursuant to the holding in the Southern States case in 1998, no used and useful adjustment should be made to the reuse facilities.

However, I have some concerns, and I hope the

Commission has some concerns about the recommendation

that the issues should be proposed agency action. I

think there is some problems with this. I don't think

it's appropriate in this case. If you look at

the staff recommendation on Page 19 you will see that

the staff states in the bottom paragraph that in this

case staff believes that the utility has separated the

costs associated purely with reuse -- this is in the

initial hearing, okay -- and those figures are

available without the need or requirement for

additional evidence.

You may not recall however, in the initial hearing that information was given as part of 25-30.4415, the rule regarding improvements in the public interest. There was a lot of detailed information, it's in the MFRs and Schedule G-19, Exhibit 1 in the case.

The staff recommendation goes on further to say,

"However --" in the final order -- "despite the

facilities being designated as reuse and absent any

determination that the costs were imprudently

incurred, the Commission through its used and useful

adjustment set rates such that a portion of these

costs were not recovered in the utility's rates.

Based on all of the above, staff believes that the Commission must correct this apparent error and set rates in this remand proceeding making no used and useful adjustment to those facilities classified as reuse." That's fine, and I think that is completely on point with the Southern States 1998 court case.

Then we come to the last paragraph of the recommendation, it's almost as a postscript and it does not follow that thinking. They seem to believe that there is some question whether the parties had a fair opportunity to address whether the facilities were actually reuse and whether the costs incurred were prudent, okay.

Florida Cities put on a complete case in this regard. There was no finding of any imprudency, there was no challenge, there was no issue in that regard. It was purely a used and useful determination, okay.

If you look at the language of the Southern

States First DCA case, you will see -- and I'm going to read this to you, because I think this case is directly on point in guiding you in this matter.

On Page 1058, "We agree that in order to comply with the First DCA with the statutory mandate requiring that the entire cost of a prudently constructed reuse facility be recovered in rates, such

a reuse facility must be treated as if it were 100 percent used and useful." You go on through, they cite to some reasoning in that regard and conclude, "In the present case, there has been no suggestion that any costs incurred in constructing the reuse facilities was imprudent. We therefore, reverse the order under review to the extent it excludes a portion of the construction cost for reuse facilities from rate base."

So what we are looking at here is application for that First DCA case to the facts of this case. If you have a PAA order, what is going to happen if someone disagrees, if somebody protests? Where are you going to go with that? It's not appropriate to go back to an evidentiary hearing on it; we have already had that. We are on remand from the First DCA on, as we all know, limited issues. I don't think this was contemplated.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Staff, could you answer that?

MR. JAEGER: Commissioners, a lot of what Ms.

Cowdery says is true. What we went to was the prehearing order and the first hearing we had on this, and I don't think anybody was put on notice of the importance of whether it was classified as reuse or wastewater facilities, and so they didn't have their

clear point of entry into the process that this would be. It wasn't until the Southern States decision came out that it became all important that everybody realized, hey, now, if it is reuse, if it is prudently incurred, then they get all of it.

And so I think there was -- the customers did not have a clear point of entry that they needed to contest whether it was reuse and whether it was prudent. So, I believe that is the reason we were going with the PAA, just to give -- that they did have that now that they know of the significance.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Is that what the customers want?

MR. McLEAN: I think we had fair opportunity to question whether it was reuse and whether it was prudently constructed in the principal part of the hearing. I appreciate very much Mr. Jaeger's concern, and I think we knew that it was very likely important. Because the argument was certainly made by Florida Cities and other utilities that that reuse statute meant what the court eventually said. So the importance didn't come as a big surprise to us.

I think we had fair opportunity to protest both of those issues. So I don't think it offends us for you to issue that as a final order.

MR. JAEGER: If OPC has no objection to issuing 1 2 it as a final order, then I have no problem with that. 3 MR. McLEAN: I don't know that -- there are other 4 affected parties, but speaking on behalf of OPC, we 5 had the opportunity to contest those issues. MR. JAEGER: It could have been -- I'm sorry. 6 7 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Are you doing the PAA for yourself so you can go back and add something to the 8 record or --9 10 MR. JAEGER: No. I think what Mr. McLean said, it could have been made an issue, it was not made an 11 issue. And it was just staff was concerned that 12 13 people at that point in time it had not been decided 14 how important if it is reuse it's 100 percent. mean, we didn't know, staff didn't know that and we 15 were not operating under that principle. 16 17 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Was this issue part of the 18 remand from the court in this docket? 19 MR. JAEGER: I'm sorry, Commissioner. 20 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Was this issue part of the remand from the court in this docket? 21 22 MR. JAEGER: In Footnote 4 of the order, the court said we need not address whether 367.0817 is 23 24 applicable in this case, because the parties did not raise it. I don't understand that footnote, because 25

1	in both their brief and
2	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Was it raised on appeal by
3	any of the parties?
4	MR. JAEGER: Yes, it was raised by the utility,
5	in both briefs that they submitted.
6	COMMISSIONER DEASON: To the court.
7	MR. JAEGER: To the court.
8	COMMISSIONER DEASON: And then the court in a
9	footnote said that we shouldn't have to determine
10	whether it is or is not reuse?
11	MR. JAEGER: I could read the footnote.
12	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I have read the footnote.
13	I think it's in your recommendation. What does it
14	mean? Don't read it to me, tell me what it means.
15	MR. JAEGER: Well, I think they just did not feel
16	like they needed to go into whether 367.0817 was
17	applicable at that point in time.
18	COMMISSIONER DEASON: So if they are not
19	concerned with it, why are we?
20	MR. JAEGER: Well, when they sent it back they
21	did not tell us to put reuse in at 100 percent at that
22	time. They didn't tell us to fix that. It was only
23	when Southern States came out six months later that
24	they made the decision
25	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Why does that have

retroactive effect on a case that was decided before then?

MS. COWDERY: Commissioner --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I'm talking to staff right now, in just a moment.

MR. JAEGER: I'm sorry, Commissioner, I'm not sure I understand your question.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: My question is how does that decision in Southern States or whatever have a retroactive effect on this decision if it was not specifically addressed by the court at the time it issued the remand to this Commission for this company in this docket?

MR. JAEGER: I think that when this comes before the Commission we have an ongoing responsibility to set fair, reasonable, and just rates, and they have now said that you must put in reuse at 100 percent and we must follow the Southern States --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: On a going-forward basis.

Why do we do it retroactively? Had there been any other case where we had interpreted this the other way we are going to go reopen the record on a case where rates have already been set a year or two and say now we have got to go in and increase your rates because the court made a decision two years later that

reversed something that we did earlier? Where do we draw the line?

MR. JAEGER: The rates that are in effect are the proposed agency action rates, and they include the facilities at 100 percent, and I believe they have never been final -- they have not been finally set, and this was an on-going issue. That's what this whole appeal was about. So the rates have never been final, and so what we are trying to do is figure out what the rates should have been when this case was first decided back in September of '96, and the court --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And it's because this docket is not closed is the reason that we go back and retroactively apply a decision that was made after we made our initial decision?

MR. JAEGER: I think the court -- well, the rates -- I think because the rates have not been finally set, yes. The court has decided that 367.0817 requires that no reuse, no used and useful adjustment be made to reuse, and that part of the section was already --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: But if that is the way the law should have been interpreted, why didn't the court interpret it then at that time if the issue was in

front of them? They declined to. They didn't want to. They said we don't even have to be concerned with it.

MR. JAEGER: They said they did not need to reach that because nobody had argued for a discreet used and useful, and they did not reach it. I don't think they determined it one way or another. They didn't reach that at all.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Ms. Cowdery.

MS. COWDERY: Thank you, Commissioner. The reason that you need to apply the Southern States case is that it is established case law in the State of Florida and elsewhere that the law as it exists at the time a case is decided is the law to be applied. So the Southern States case must be applied in this case which is still pending. If this case goes up on appeal --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Hold on just a second.

That decision was not made at the time we made our decision, and the court did not tell us we were wrong in that decision.

MS. COWDERY: That's right. Southern States had not yet been decided, and it was pending about the same time, I think. You know, we can only speculate, you know, why they decided that they wanted to address

it in one case over the other, but they did.

But the case law is clear that -- it is clear in the State of Florida that you have to apply the law, and this can be statutory changes or it can be statutory interpretations by courts to any pending case. If this case would go up on appeal, the First DCA would be required to apply any law as it existed at that time, including its own court decisions, including any brand new Supreme Court cases, because the case --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: But this case has already been on appeal and the court issued a decision.

MS. COWDERY: I know, but it is still pending.

It is still pending. We don't have final rates. It is still pending. And the case law -- it's just that is the way it is in Florida.

And I have cited the two cases, a First DCA case and a -- let me see. I guess they are both First DCA cases, and they just stand for that proposition. And when you've got a court that interprets a statute or an administrative rule, and you have got a remand, you've got to apply it. The case hasn't been finalized.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Even if it wasn't an issue with the court in the original remand?

MS. COWDERY: It was at issue. We raised it as an issue and the court simply did not reach it.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, that is even more reason it seems to me that you just ignore it now.

The court ignored it, we are just doing what the court did.

MS. COWDERY: Well, the court didn't need to reach it. There is a lot of times when you get into cases that the courts decide that they are not going to reach certain issues. They just don't reach it. It wasn't decided against us. The Southern States case came out, and under the laws of the state, under the case law of the state you've got to apply it.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Mr. Vandiver.

MR. VANDIVER: I believe this is a very technical point of law, however, I would say that when the court pronounces what the law is, that is what the law has always been. In other words, that is what the law reads, and that is what the court held, and we are trying to give effect to that holding on a going-forward basis in this open docket, and I appreciate the fact --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: That is the distinction, it's an open docket. My question is what if this law had been adopted ten years ago and we interpreted it

the way we interpreted it, no one ever appealed it, and then in the tenth year someone appeals it and the court interprets, Public Service Commission, you have been wrong all of this time, it should be 100 percent used and useful. Do we have an obligation to go back and increase every utilities' rates that we denied them some used and useful on a reuse facility? I don't think so.

MR. VANDIVER: No, I don't think so, either. But I think that we have this case before us today, we have the opportunity to conform our ruling to what the court opined the law was. And I believe we are duty bound to follow that.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Ms. Jaber, you wanted to say something?

MS. JABER: No, I think Rob said it all.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: You didn't have any questions?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Not on that particular issue. I mean, all the lawyers say that is the way it has got to be, to a non-lawyer it doesn't make a lot of sense. I mean, just from a plain -- if we were wrong then the court should have told us we were wrong then. And the matter was appealed and the court said

you don't have to determine it, don't worry yourself 1 2 with it. And now we are worrying ourselves with it 3 because of a decision that was made six months later. MS. JABER: I think from a practical standpoint, 5 Commissioner Deason, what might give you some comfort is the reason the court didn't specifically address it 6 is the reuse facilities were included in the overall 7 used and useful determination. So when Florida Cities 8 went up on appeal, the court was addressing the entire 9 10 used and useful concept, and the court noted that no one appealed the reuse calculation, for lack of a 11 better way to say it. 12 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Even more reason. 13 Ιt wasn't even appealed by the person that is now saying 14 that we have got to do it. They didn't raise an issue 15 with the court. They were willing to live with it. 16 17 MS. JABER: No, actually they weren't. They did include something, as I recall, Mr. Jaeger, in the 18 brief and in the prehearing statements here, and --19 20 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Apparently the court didn't think so, they said it's not an issue, don't worry 21 22 yourself with it. MS. JABER: I don't think they said it's not an 23

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, they said don't worry

24

25

issue.

yourself with it. That's what the footnote said. 1 2 MR. JAEGER: I think they said we did not need to reach -- what they say is, "Neither party has 3 4 advocated on appeal for a discreet used and useful 5 calculation for the reuse facility or contended that 6 the reuse facilities should be considered separately 7 from the rest of the system. We do not, therefore, reach any question arising under Section 367.0817, Sub 8 9 3, Florida Statutes." 10 COMMISSIONER DEASON: No question before the 11 court, is that what they're saying? 12 MS. JABER: No specific question before the court 13 on reuse. COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Was it an issue on the case 14 15 below? MR. JAEGER: Just used and useful. It was not 16 whether reuse should be 100 percent used and useful. 17 That was not a specific issue. 18 19 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Just the issue of used and useful overall, that was it. And it wasn't whether 20 21 this facility is a reuse facility, and if it is a 22 reuse facility it has to be 100 percent used and 23 useful. That particular question was not in front of 24 the court.

MS. JABER: Right. But what you are articulating

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is precisely why we recommend it should be at least PAA, because what did not get addressed fully in our opinion is which facilities were reuse facilities, and which were prudently incurred expenses I would imagine is the next step.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: It wasn't an issue in the original case before the Commission and the parties didn't raise it on appeal. This essentially is a fallout of the admonition from the court, because we have got to look at all used and useful. Is that what I'm hearing you say?

MS. JABER: That's one way of looking at it.

That is not what we have said. What we have said is

we recognize that there is an opinion that came out

after Florida Cities was heard, that should be

applicable here.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: My point is this, my point is this, the fact that it wasn't among the issues that went up on appeal, in fact, argues I think to the contrary, because if we are going to make a pronouncement on that issue, I think it supports the rationale that staff has given us. The court didn't reach it because it wasn't raised by the parties, but the fact is in order to resolve everything that is before us we have to reach that issue.

I think it argues for making it PAA, because only then will we give the parties full rights. They expressly did not get a hearing on it on the last appeal, and it sounds like they didn't get it in the last case that was before us. If we want to resolve that issue now, the only real way to do it is PAA. MR. JAEGER: That was our original reason we did

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to make it.

it as PAA.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: (Inaudible, microphone not on.) Well, I think what that boils down MR. McLEAN: to is to give us the opportunity to come in and suggest that the facilities were not reuse facilities, or that they were not prudent, or both. And it's unlikely we are going to make that case, and I think it can be argued that we already had the opportunity

There is one thing you all haven't talked about. One of the witnesses in this case before the Commission attempted to address this whole issue in testimony, and you all struck that issue on staff's motion for it being irrelevant. My sense is that if the court looks at this specific issue --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: We struck it as being irrelevant?

MR. McLEAN: Yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: The question of whether a reuse facility is 100 percent used and useful?

MR. McLEAN: No, sir. The question -- yes, the question of whether if it is reuse then it is 100 percent used and useful if it was prudently incurred. The reuse itself was prudently incurred. Mike Acosta attempted to reach that issue in the case. He filed a couple of lines of testimony about it and staff moved to strike that, and the Commission granted that as it being irrelevant. That is my recollection. My sense is that --

MR. McLEAN: Yes, sir, the remand hearing?

MR. McLEAN: Yes, sir, the remand hearing in Fort

Myers, I think it was. My sense is that if we -- if

this case goes back to the court with that issue in

it, the court knows what the law of the land is today,

the court is going to note that a witness tried to

raise that issue, tried to bring that issue to the

Commission's attention and that we might be faced with

adverse action of the court. I think ultimately that

issue is now a winner and that's where it boils down

to for me, and why I don't mind putting it in the

final order.

If you all want to hold off and put it in PAA, that's fine with me. But the chances of our coming

forward and putting on a case that it's not reuse or that it wasn't prudent is very remote. And I do appreciate the staff affording us a point of entry there. There are sometimes when we have had to argue really vehemently for that, but in this instance I don't think we are going to avail ourselves of it.

And it doesn't offend me if you want to put it in the final order.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: He's not going to avail himself? Wait a minute. These are the customers of Florida sitting here. I mean, who are we preserving a right for?

MR. JAEGER: As you remember, Sheryl Longa (phonetic) and eleven other customers are the ones that protested, and they have been quite active. Sheryl Longa at the second remand hearing did back away and did not file any prehearing statements and so she just participated as a customer only in the second remand, so --

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: She gave up her standing as a party completely.

MR. JAEGER: Yes.

MS. COWDERY: Chairman Garcia, could I have a few just concluding -- I'm sorry.

MR. JAEGER: One other thing. In the prehearing,

we did not -- again, the utility did not come forward. This was the issue of whether reuse should be 100 percent. That was not made an issue in the prehearing order, and so when Michael Acosta filed his testimony and had that law required, I think the presiding officer determined that that could be a legal question and we didn't need testimony, you know, that was not what we reopened the record for.

We reopened the record for very limited annual average daily flow versus max month. And so we didn't need testimony on that issue. If it was an issue it was a legal issue.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay. Thirty seconds.

MS. COWDERY: And to that extent, since it's a legal issue, all you have to determine is does

Southern States apply to this case. And I would say it does, and I do want to say that very issue of 367.0817(3), reuse being 100 percent used and useful is a specific set out issue in our brief and we specifically argued it. I don't know why the court did what it did, but it was issued, okay. It was an issue.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Just one question, and you might have said this, Public Counsel. It's pretty late. Did you say that you believe that Southern

1	States does apply to this case with respect to this
2	issue?
3	MR. McLEAN: Yes, ma'am, I believe it does. I
4	have done a whole bunch of research in that specific
5	area thanks to an excellent brief filed by Ms. Roddy
6	(phonetic) just recently. And I think it does because
7	the distinction in my mind is that this is a pending
8	case. And that makes all the difference in the world.
9	If this case shut down and the Southern States case
10	came out the day after this case shut down, then I
11	don't think it would touch this case.
12	COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Okay.
13	CHAIRMAN GARCIA: If you don't have a motion then
14	Leon does.
15	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I have
16	COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: (Inaudible, microphone not
17	on.)
18	CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Do you want to is there
19	anything else?
20	COMMISSION STAFF: I have nothing else.
21	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I have a question on Issues
22	8 and 9.
23	CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay.
24	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I'm trying to understand
25	what staff's recommendation is concerning the

1	additional rate case expense and when the recovery
2	begins. In a nutshell, the way I understand it, and I
3	may be totally off base, but the way I understand it
4	is that staff is recommending that it basically begin
5	recovery back while the interim rates are being
6	collected, for lack of a better term, calling them
7	interim rates. I guess they were the PAA rates.
8	MR. JAEGER: The implemented rates.
9	COMMISSIONER DEASON: The implemented rates. So
10	that the recovery of that begins sooner and that the
11	four-year period would end sooner and that rates would
12	be reduced sooner as a result.
13	COMMISSION STAFF: That is correct.
14	COMMISSIONER DEASON: In a nutshell, that is the
15	concept that you are arguing here, correct?
16	COMMISSION STAFF: Right.
17	COMMISSIONER DEASON: And that it would reduce
18	the refund amount, but then it would also hasten the
19	recovery during the four-year amortization period?
20	COMMISSION STAFF: Exactly.
21	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. I move do you
22	have anything?
23	COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I don't have any other
24	questions. I was going to move it.
25	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Staff on all issues?

1	COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Uh-huh.
2	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Second.
3	CHAIRMAN GARCIA: We have a motion and a second.
4	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I'm sorry, are you
5	recommending that we also do the PAA, because there
6	are other parties? The PAA on Issue 3A?
7	COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: 3A and 10.
8	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Because there are other
9	parties?
10	COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Yes. I don't think it's
11	going to matter, but
12	MR. JAEGER: PAA is just for 3A, I think 10 was a
13	legal
14	COMMISSIONER DEASON: 10 was parties could
15	participate. 3A was PAA.
16	MR. JAEGER: 3A was the PAA.
17	CHAIRMAN GARCIA: We have a motion and a second.
18	All those in favor signify by saying aye.
19	(Unanimous affirmative vote.)
20	CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Opposed? Okay.
21	* * * * * * * * * * *
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5	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
6	STATE OF FLORIDA)
7	COUNTY OF LEON)
8	I, JANE FAUROT, RPR, do hereby certify that the
9	foregoing proceeding was transcribed from cassette tape,
10	and the foregoing pages number 1 through 24 are a true and
11	correct record of the proceedings.
12	I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee,
13	attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor relative or
14	employee of such attorney or counsel, or financially
15	interested in the foregoing action.
16	DATED THIS 29 day of March, 1999.
17	
18	
19	finesayo
20	JANE FAUROT, RPR P. O. Box 10751
21	Tallahassee, Florida 32302
22	
23	
24	
25	