

ORIGINAL



**Florida Power**  
CORPORATION

**JAMES A. MCGEE**  
SENIOR COUNSEL

February 29, 2000

Ms. Blanca S. Bayó, Director  
Division of Records and Reporting  
Florida Public Service Commission  
2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard  
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850

Re: Docket No. 991779-EI

Dear Ms. Bayó:

Enclosed for filing in the subject docket are an original and fifteen copies of the Direct Testimony of Karl H. Wieland on behalf of Florida Power Corporation.

Please acknowledge your receipt of the above filing on the enclosed copy of this letter and return to the undersigned. Also enclosed is a 3.5 inch diskette containing the above-referenced document in WordPerfect format. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

Very truly yours,

James A. McGee

- AFA \_\_\_\_\_
- APP 1
- CAF \_\_\_\_\_
- CMU \_\_\_\_\_
- GTR \_\_\_\_\_
- EAG Anderson
- LEG \_\_\_\_\_
- MAS Stag
- OPC \_\_\_\_\_
- RRR \_\_\_\_\_
- SEC T
- WAW \_\_\_\_\_
- QTH \_\_\_\_\_

JAM/kbd  
Enclosure  
cc: Parties of record

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DOCUMENT NUMBER - DATE  
02710 MAR -18  
FPSC-RECORDS/REPORTING

**FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION**

**DOCKET NO. 991779-EI**

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the Direct Testimony of Karl H. Wieland on behalf of Florida Power Corporation has been furnished to the following individuals by regular U.S. Mail this 29th day of February, 2000:

Wm. Cochran Keating, Esquire  
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Florida Public Service Commission  
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Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850

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Tallahassee, Florida 32301

  
Attorney

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FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION  
DOCKET No. 991779-EI

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF  
KARL H. WIELAND

1 Q. Please state your name and business address.

2 A. My name is Karl H. Wieland. My business address is Post Office Box  
3 14042, St. Petersburg, Florida 33733.

4  
5 Q. By whom are you employed and in what capacity?

6 A. I am employed by Florida Power Corporation as Manager of Financial  
7 Analysis.

8  
9 Q. Please state your educational background and professional  
10 experience.

11 A. I received a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering from the  
12 University of South Florida in 1968 and a Master's Degree in Engineering  
13 Administration, also from the University of South Florida, in 1975. I have  
14 also attended the Management Development Program at Georgia State  
15 University and the Public Utility Financial Seminar sponsored by the Irving  
16 Trust Company in New York. I am a registered Professional Engineer in  
17 the state of Florida and I have been employed by Florida Power  
18 Corporation on a full time basis since 1972. During the first seven years  
19 of my career, I worked as a Transmission Planning Engineer in the System

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1 Planning Department and as an Economic Research Analyst in the  
2 Economic Research Department. I became Manager of Generation  
3 Planning in 1979, Manager of Economic Research in 1983, and Director of  
4 Business Planning in 1990. I assumed my present position in 1998.

5 My current responsibilities include financial planning and forecasting,  
6 financial analysis of projects and proposals, cost benefit analyses, fuel  
7 adjustment filings and other fuel-related regulatory activities. I have  
8 testified before this Commission on numerous occasions regarding a  
9 variety of regulatory policy issues, including the role of utility incentives as  
10 a ratemaking tool -- most recently at the fuel adjustment hearings in  
11 November 1999 which led to the establishment of this "spin-off" docket.

12

13 **Q. What is the purpose of your testimony?**

14 A. The purpose of my testimony is to urge that the Commission update its long  
15 standing practice of providing utilities with an incentive for short-term  
16 economy sales made on the Florida energy broker by applying the  
17 incentive to short-term (non-separated) off-broker sales as well, in  
18 recognition of current market conditions that have led to a drastic reduction  
19 in the use of the broker as the vehicle for conducting the beneficial sales.

20

21 **Q. Do the reasons for the Commission's initial establishment of a**  
22 **shareholder incentive in 1984 remain valid today?**

23 A. Yes. In Order No. 12923 issued January 24, 1984, the Commission  
24 acknowledged that, in moving the treatment of economy sales out of base  
25 rates where utilities retained 100% of the gain, establishment of an

1 incentive through the fuel adjustment clause was desirable to preserve the  
2 then-current level of economy sales and that such an incentive would  
3 provide a net benefit to ratepayers. Faced with the current level of  
4 competition in the wholesale power market, the case for positive incentives  
5 is stronger today than in 1984, when the Commission instituted the 80/20  
6 sharing of gains on economy sales.

7

8 **Q. Why do you believe there is a greater need for incentives today than**  
9 **there was in 1984 despite the fact that the industry has become more**  
10 **competitive?**

11 A. The need for incentives is greater today than it was 10 to 20 years ago  
12 *because of the fact that the industry has become more competitive.* During  
13 the early 1980s, wholesale markets for economy sales were simple. The  
14 Florida broker system was the market, and the participants were the Florida  
15 utilities. Each utility entered its hourly incremental and decremental  
16 production costs into a computer that matched offers, notified buyers and  
17 seller, and established transaction prices.

18 Today's markets are much more complex and take significantly more  
19 effort and resources in order to participate successfully. Transmission  
20 paths and payments must be arranged by the seller in accordance with  
21 complex FERC rules. Sales are no longer limited to hourly split-the-  
22 savings transactions, rather, the transactions can span days, weeks, or  
23 even months. Pricing is at the market and all deals are negotiated rather  
24 than determined by set formula. The seller must manage additional risks  
25 associated with transactions that take place at future times when costs are

1 not known with certainty. Finally, participants are more numerous and  
2 sophisticated. They compete for a significant share of the market value  
3 that historically has stayed within Florida, to the benefit of the retail  
4 customer.

5 For all these reasons, today's marketing operations have grown from  
6 a part-time activity for dispatchers to departments staffed with experienced  
7 traders, risk managers, and sophisticated computer equipment. Current  
8 marketing operations take significantly more effort and resources in order  
9 to participate successfully. Incentives provide the Commission with the  
10 most effective and efficient tool for ensuring that utilities extract the  
11 maximum value from the market for the benefit of the customer.

12  
13 **Q. Florida Power has significantly reduced the level of sales made**  
14 **through the Florida broker, for which a shareholder incentive is**  
15 **provided, and instead makes most of its non-separated sales through**  
16 **tariffs that do not provide an incentive. Doesn't that indicate that**  
17 **incentives are no longer needed to encourage these sales?**

18 **A. No.** One reason that Florida Power participates in the non-broker market  
19 is to help reduce rates to its customers. That clearly is the obligation of  
20 any utility. It is also true, however, that while 100% of the generation-  
21 related gains on sales have been returned to customers through the fuel  
22 or Capacity Cost Recovery (CCR) clauses, Florida Power has been  
23 retaining 100% of transmission revenues from such sales. Except for sales  
24 made through the broker, a separate transmission charge based on the  
25 Company's open access tariff is added to the sales transaction. For the

1 current year, Florida Power projects \$2.7 million in additional transmission  
2 revenues for non-separated sales. By comparison, 20% of projected  
3 generation-related gains would yield an additional \$2.1 million. Prior to  
4 January 2000, transmission revenues were credited to other operating  
5 revenues in surveillance reports, thus benefiting customers in the long  
6 term, but providing a strong shareholder incentive to increase sales in the  
7 short term. At the November 1999 fuel adjustment hearings, however, the  
8 Commission ordered 100% of these revenues to be flowed back to  
9 customers via the CCR clause, thereby eliminating this incentive.  
10 Therefore, like the situation in 1984 when the Commission eliminated the  
11 base rate incentive for economy sales, a replacement incentive is needed  
12 to encourage these sales for the benefit of ratepayers.

13  
14 **Q. If the Commission approves an incentive, how should it be**  
15 **structured?**

16 A. I recommend that the Commission apply the existing 80/20 sharing to all  
17 non-separated economy transactions. Doing so would continue to apply  
18 the incentive provision in the manner intended by Order 12923 which  
19 stated "...economy energy sales profits are to be divided between  
20 ratepayers and the shareholders on a 80% - 20% basis, respectively."

21  
22 **Q. How you would define economy sales for purposes of applying an**  
23 **incentive?**

24 A. In order to qualify for an incentive, a sale should meet three simple tests:

- 1 1. The sale is not separated, *i.e.*, less than one year in duration.
- 2 2. The sale is profitable (revenues exceed incremental fuel costs), *i.e.*,
- 3 provides a net benefit to ratepayers.
- 4 3. The seller must be able to influence whether or not the sale takes
- 5 place and the transaction price.

6

7 **Q. How would your proposed incentive mechanism treat "unprofitable"**  
8 **sales?**

9 A. An unprofitable sale, *i.e.*, when incremental fuel costs exceed revenues,  
10 can arise in many ways. A sale during the peak or off-peak hours of a day  
11 could show a loss for an hour or two, or a sale for a week could contain one  
12 or more unprofitable days. The risk of a sale turning out to be unprofitable  
13 is inherent in any transaction whose profitability is based on estimates of  
14 future costs.

15 Florida Power proposes a symmetrical treatment for both profitable  
16 and unprofitable sales. In the same way that shareholders receive 20% of  
17 the gain when sales are profitable, they would absorb 20% of the loss when  
18 sales are unprofitable. For example, if incremental fuel costs exceed  
19 revenues by \$10 per MWH during 2 hours of an 8-hour sale for 50 MWs,  
20 the loss over this two-hour period would be \$1,000 and result in  
21 recoverable fuel costs being reduced by \$200. In this manner, utilities  
22 would be encouraged to aggressively seek out sales that produce the  
23 greatest benefit to ratepayers by providing shareholders with a reward  
24 commensurate with a sale's profit and a penalty commensurate with a  
25 sale's loss.

1 **Q. Which of Florida Power's interchange schedules would qualify under**  
2 **your definition of economy sales?**

3 A. With the exception of Schedule A (emergency), and Schedule B (short-term  
4 firm), all sales reported on Fuel Adjustment Schedule A-6 should qualify.  
5 Schedules A and B meet criteria 1 and 2 above, but are made upon request  
6 by a buyer, not marketed by the seller.

7

8 **Q. Could your definition include firm sales?**

9 A. Yes, it could. The vast majority of non-separated sales Florida Power  
10 makes are as-available or recallable. By including all sales, the  
11 Commission eliminates having to define exactly what a firm sale is or risk  
12 inconsistent interpretation and application. As long as a utility expects to  
13 have adequate reserves over the period of the sale and the criteria  
14 advocated above are met, there is no reason to exclude a sale from an  
15 incentive provision simply because it is firm. Since firm sales generally  
16 have more value and thus a higher price than non-firm sales, excluding  
17 such sales would encourage a utility to engage in transactions that brings  
18 less value to customers only because they qualify for an incentive.

19

20 **Q. How should the shareholder incentive be treated for regulatory**  
21 **accounting purposes?**

22 A. The incentive should continue to be recorded below-the-line for ratemaking  
23 and surveillance purposes, as it is today.

1 Q. Does this conclude your direct testimony?

2 A. Yes.