

State of Florida



Public Service Commission

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RECORDS AND REPORTING

DATE: OCTOBER 5, 2000  
TO: DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF RECORDS AND REPORTING (BAYO)  
FROM: DIVISION OF SAFETY AND ELECTRIC RELIABILITY (HAF) *WJ*  
*Tb* BOHRMANN, HARLOW, LEE *WBM*  
DIVISION OF ECONOMIC REGULATION (LESTER, MAILHOT) *PL*  
DIVISION OF LEGAL SERVICES (C. KEATING) *WCK RVE*

RE: DOCKET NO. 000982-EI - PETITION BY FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY FOR APPROVAL OF CONDITIONAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WHICH TERMINATES STANDARD OFFER CONTRACTS ORIGINALLY ENTERED INTO BETWEEN FPL AND OKEELANTA CORPORATION AND FPL AND OSCEOLA FARMS, CO.

AGENDA: 10/17/00 - REGULAR AGENDA - PROPOSED AGENCY ACTION - INTERESTED PERSONS MAY PARTICIPATE

CRITICAL DATES: PAA ORDER REQUIRED BY OCTOBER 19, 2000 TO SATISFY CONDITION OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: THIS ITEM WAS DEFERRED FROM THE 09/26/00 AGENDA CONFERENCE. STAFF HAS REVISED THE ORIGINAL RECOMMENDATION AND ADDED ISSUE 2 TO ADDRESS QUESTIONS RAISED AT THE 09/26/00 AGENDA CONFERENCE.

ATTACHMENT IS NOT PART OF ELECTRONICALLY FILED VERSION

FILE NAME AND LOCATION: S:\PSC\SER\WP\000982.RCM

CASE BACKGROUND

On August 29, 1991, the Commission issued Order No. 24989, in Docket No. 910004-EU, which required Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) to issue a standard offer contract for up to 125 megawatts (MW) of capacity. The capacity and energy payments for the

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standard offer contract were based on FPL's next avoided unit, the 1997 stage of an Integrated Coal Gasifier Combined Cycle unit.

On September 20, 1991, Okeelanta Corporation (Okeelanta) and Osceola Farms, Co. (Osceola) (collectively, QFs) submitted signed standard offer contracts to FPL. The Okeelanta contract was to provide FPL with 70 MW of firm energy and capacity starting on January 1, 1997 and continuing through 2026. The Osceola contract was to provide 42 MW of firm energy and capacity (subsequently upgraded to 55.9 MW under a provision of the contract) to FPL from January 1, 1997 through 2026. On March 11, 1992, by Order No. PSC-92-0050-FOF-EQ issued in Docket No. 911140-EQ, both standard offer contracts were approved by the Commission for cost recovery.

A dispute arose between FPL and the QFs concerning whether the QFs accomplished commercial operation by January 1, 1997, as set forth in Section 2 of the standard offer contract, and the effect, if any, of a failure to do so on the parties' respective rights and obligations under the various provisions of the standard offer contract. FPL reviewed the output of the facilities prior to January 1, 1997, and determined that the facilities had not achieved commercial operation. Therefore, FPL chose not to exercise what it believed to be its option to extend the commercial operation deadline. The QFs disagreed with FPL's interpretation of this option. FPL initiated litigation in state circuit court to determine its rights under the standard offer contract. The QFs subsequently filed a countersuit seeking approximately \$490 million in damages for breach of contract.

The QFs filed for bankruptcy in May, 1997. However, the bankruptcy court ruled that the litigation in state circuit court could continue. Operations at both QF locations were shut down in September, 1997. The Okeelanta facility was restarted in February, 1998. FPL is currently purchasing energy from this facility on an as-available basis. The Osceola facility has not been restarted.

On July 28, 2000, FPL filed a petition for approval of a Conditional Settlement Agreement (Agreement) to buy out the QF standard offer contracts. The Agreement calls for the following:

- (1) termination of the QF standard offer contracts;
- (2) settlement of all claims by and/or against FPL; and,
- (3) settlement of the pending judicial proceedings relating to the QF contracts.

In return, FPL would make a one-time payment of \$222.5 million to the QFs. FPL stated in its petition that, "Approval of the Agreement will not only resolve the pending disputes and claims, it will eliminate the risk and uncertainty of litigation, and will enable FPL to reduce the cost exposure of FPL customers under the Okeelanta and Osceola Standard Offer Contracts." To date, FPL has spent approximately \$7.6 million on attorney's fees and court costs related to the contract litigation. Approximately \$6.9 million of these fees and costs have been approved for recovery from FPL's ratepayers through the Energy Conservation Cost Recovery Clause.

FPL's petition further requests approval for recovery of the \$222.5 million settlement payment through FPL's Capacity Cost Recovery Clause (capacity clause) and/or Fuel and Purchased Power Cost Recovery Clause (fuel adjustment clause). ~~FPL's petition does not specify a cost recovery methodology; rather, FPL plans to raise this issue in the upcoming fuel adjustment clause proceedings scheduled for November, 2000.~~

FPL also requests expedited approval of its petition in order to meet timing requirements of the Agreement. These timing requirements were established in order to resolve this matter prior to the scheduled April 9, 2001 hearing in state circuit court. The Agreement provides that all conditions precedent to its effectiveness, including the Commission's approval, should be completed four months prior to this trial date. Thus, a final Commission order, with all appeals exhausted, is required by December 9, 2000, for the agreement to become effective. Allowing 21 days for potential protests and 30 days for potential appeals if the Agreement is approved, the Commission's proposed agency action (PAA) order would be required by October 19, 2000, to satisfy the conditions of the Agreement.

On August 24, 2000, staff filed a recommendation concerning this petition for the Commission's consideration at the September 26, 2000 Agenda Conference. At the September 26, 2000 Agenda Conference, there was a discussion regarding what the savings from the Agreement would be from the year 2001 forward rather than over the life of the contract, which would have begun in 1997. Further, a significant amount of discussion surrounded the testimony filed by FPL on September 21, 2000 in Docket No. 000001-EI which proposed a specific cost-recovery method for the settlement payment. Ultimately, the Commission deferred this matter to the October 17, 2000 Agenda Conference.

Since FPL has now made a formal proposal for cost recovery, staff has added Issue No. 2 to this recommendation to address the

overall savings and cost-recovery proposal at this time as part of the overall approval of the Agreement.

The Commission is vested with jurisdiction over this matter through several provisions of Chapter 366, Florida Statutes, including Sections 366.04, 366.05, 366.051, 366.06, and 366.80-.82, Florida Statutes.

**DISCUSSION OF ISSUES**

**ISSUE 1:** Should the Commission approve Florida Power & Light Company's Petition for Approval of Agreement to Buy Out the Okeelanta Corporation and Osceola Farms Standard Offer Contracts?

**RECOMMENDATION:** Yes. The Agreement appears to be cost-effective and in the best interest of FPL's ratepayers. The Agreement will enable the Okeelanta and Osceola facilities to become merchant plants on the electric grid, thus mitigating potential price spikes in the wholesale electricity market. If the Agreement is approved, FPL should adjust the capital structure in its earnings surveillance reports to comply with the equity ratio cap contained in the stipulation approved by the Commission in Order No. PSC-99-0519-AS-EI.

**STAFF ANALYSIS:** As a condition of the Agreement, FPL proposes to make a one-time payment of \$222.5 million to the QFs in return for termination of FPL's responsibilities under its standard offer contracts and settlement of all claims arising from its litigation with the QFs. Even after accounting for the lump-sum payment, FPL expects that the termination of these contracts will save its ratepayers approximately \$412 million on a net present value (NPV) basis. The \$412 million savings is the net result of comparing the total cost of capacity and energy payments that would have been paid under the contracts (\$1.1092 billion) to the sum of the settlement payment (\$222.5 million) and the replacement capacity and energy cost (\$474.7 million). See Attachment A.

At the September 26, 2000 Agenda Conference, there was a discussion regarding what the cost of the QF contracts would be from the year 2001 forward rather than over the life of the contract, which would have begun in 1997. FPL stated that another possible outcome of the civil court case would be for the jury to order that the QF contracts continue as originally intended but ignore the first four years of payments. The resultant cost of the QF contracts, as presented by counsel for FPL, is approximately \$900 million rather than \$1.1092 billion. This revised cost was not confirmed by staff at the Agenda Conference. After reviewing the calculations, staff believes that the revised \$900 million cost is correct if payments for the first four years of the contracts are excluded. This treatment results in savings of approximately \$300 million rather than \$412 million.

There appear to be four possible outcomes to the pending litigation between FPL and the QFs. These four outcomes, and their potential cost to FPL's ratepayers, are summarized below:

OUTCOME OF LITIGATION	COST TO FPL'S RATEPAYERS
FPL prevails in litigation	FPL's attorney's fees and court costs (approx. \$7.6 million)
Agreement APPROVED, litigation ends	Settlement payment (\$222.5 million)
QFs prevail in litigation	Breach of contract award to QFs (\$490 million)
Court orders performance of QF contracts	Value of QF contract payments (\$1.1092 billion NPV)

~~FPL has not requested a Commission decision on the mechanism (e.g., fuel adjustment clause, capacity clause, or combination of the two) for recovering the Agreement's costs from FPL's ratepayers. FPL plans to raise this issue in the upcoming fuel adjustment clause and capacity clause proceedings. However, assuming a worst-case scenario in which the entire \$222.5 million is recovered over a one-year period through the fuel adjustment clause, the fuel adjustment charge would increase over that year by approximately 0.25 cents/kWh, or 12%. This translates into a \$2.50 monthly bill increase for a typical residential customer using 1,000 kWh per month.~~

If a lump-sum payment is assumed, the Agreement has a four-year payback because the high-cost standard offer contract capacity is replaced with cheaper electricity from FPL's own system. Even though the combined capacity of the QF contracts is about 126 MW, removal of the units from FPL's expansion plan does not cause much change. FPL's base-case generation expansion plan, which for the last three years has not included the QFs, is substantially the same as an expansion plan which incorporates the QFs. Both expansion plans are identical until 2006.

Both QF facilities burn biomass as a generator fuel. Approval of the Agreement by the Commission and the courts will free up these facilities from their standard offer contracts, thus making them the first renewable merchant plants in the state. The facilities could then operate to mitigate potential price spikes in the wholesale electricity market.

The Agreement differs from past buyout settlements of cogeneration contracts which the Commission has considered, such as those between FPC and Lake Cogen, Pasco Cogen, and Orlando Cogen. In those three cases, there was a dispute over which baseline to use to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the buyout. In this case, FPL's dispute with the QFS is over contract performance.

From a financial perspective, the Agreement will reduce FPL's off balance sheet liabilities, which, in turn, will increase its adjusted equity ratio. The adjusted equity ratio for FPL was capped at 55.83% in the stipulation approved by Order No. PSC-99-0519-AS-EI, issued March 17, 1999. The off balance sheet liability associated with the QF facilities is \$61,721,894 as of June 30, 2000. Removal of the off balance sheet liability, in accordance with the Agreement, will increase FPL's adjusted equity ratio from 56.40% to 56.81% as of June 30, 2000. Staff believes that FPL should adjust the capital structure in its earnings surveillance reports to comply with the equity ratio cap in the Agreement.

~~If approved, the \$222.5 million lump-sum payment will create a regulatory asset. FPL intends to address the recovery of this regulatory asset, including a return on the unrecovered balance (carrying costs), at the upcoming fuel adjustment clause and capacity clause proceedings. Specifically, FPL's financing of the lump-sum payment and the immediate tax deductibility of the payment will affect the appropriate return on the unrecovered balance.~~

Based on staff's review of the Agreement and of data provided by FPL, the Agreement appears cost-effective and in the best interests of FPL's ratepayers. Therefore, staff recommends that the Commission approve FPL's petition.

**ISSUE 2:** Should the Commission approve the cost-recovery method for the settlement payment as proposed by Florida Power & Light Company in Docket Number 000001-EI at this time?

**RECOMMENDATION:** Yes. Pursuant to testimony filed in Docket No. 000001-EI and as discussed at the September 26, 2000 Agenda Conference, FPL has proposed deferring collection of the settlement payment until January 1, 2002. Beginning on January 1, 2002, FPL has also proposed to amortize the settlement payment over a period of five years with the unamortized portion accruing interest at the commercial paper rate. FPL's proposal results in approximately \$29 million dollars less in charges through the adjustment clauses.

**STAFF ANALYSIS:** In order to mitigate the impact on customer bills in 2001, FPL proposes to reflect the \$222.5 million settlement payment as a base rate regulatory asset from January 1, 2001 until December 31, 2001. On January 1, 2002, FPL proposes to begin collection of the settlement payment over a term of five years as follows: 79% through the capacity clause; and 21% through the fuel adjustment clause. Any unamortized amounts during the five-year term would earn interest at the commercial paper rate rather than a higher overall rate of return.

Treating the \$222.5 million settlement payment as a base rate regulatory asset in 2001 will reduce FPL's achieved return on equity by approximately 26 basis points. In other words, FPL is foregoing approximately \$23.6 million in revenues for the year 2001. Recovering the settlement payment through both the capacity and fuel adjustment clauses at the proposed percentages reflects how the costs for the original QF contracts would have been recovered. The five-year recovery term is also an appropriate way to mitigate any rate impact associated with the settlement payment.

In 2002, charging interest at the commercial paper rate rather than FPL's overall rate of return on the unrecovered portion of the \$222.5 million results in a direct savings of approximately \$5.4 million to FPL's customers. The amount of savings declines each year as the unrecovered portion of the settlement payment decreases.

At the September 26, 2000 Agenda Conference, a significant amount of discussion surrounded the recent testimony filed by FPL in Docket No. 000001-EI which proposed the cost recovery method discussed above. This testimony was filed on September 21, 2000, a mere five days before the Agenda Conference. Since FPL has now made a formal cost recovery proposal, albeit in another docket, staff recommends that the Commission accept FPL's proposal at this time as part of the overall approval of the Agreement.



**ISSUE 2 3:** Should this docket be closed?

**RECOMMENDATION:** Yes. If no person whose substantial interests are affected by the proposed agency action files a protest within 21 days of the issuance of the order, this docket should be closed upon the issuance of a consummating order.

**STAFF ANALYSIS:** At the conclusion of the protest period, if no protest is filed, this docket should be closed upon the issuance of a consummating order.

08/22/2000

Okeelanta/Osceola Settlement

Savings to Customers Based on Proposed Settlement

	<u>DISCOUNTED \$</u>	<u>NOMINAL \$</u>
Net Present Value (1/1/2001 \$) of Contract Payments to Okeelanta/Osceola	\$1,109,222,959 (a)+(b)	\$2,900,557,014 (a)+(b)
Net present Value of Capacity and Energy Avoided by Okeelanta/Osceola	(474,692,979)	(1,110,917,058)
Settlement Payment to Okeelanta/Osceola	(222,500,000)	(222,500,000)
<b>Net Savings to Customers from Settlement</b>	<u>\$412,029,980</u>	<u>\$1,567,139,956</u>
	<u>\$620,624,263 (a)</u>	<u>\$1,615,750,986 (a)</u>
Okeelanta	(b)	(b)
Osceola	<u>\$488,598,696 (b)</u>	<u>1,284,806,028 (b)</u>
	<u>\$1,109,222,959</u>	<u>\$2,900,557,014</u>

**Comments:**  
 Discount rate is 8.4%  
 Contract Payments assumed to start 1/1/2001  
 All \$ are year 2001 (or 12/31/2000)

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