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Ms. Blanca S. Bayo, Director  
Division of Records and Reporting  
Florida Public Service Commission  
2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard  
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850

Re: Docket No. 000761-TP

Dear Ms. Bayo:

Enclosed for filing in the above docket are the original and fifteen (15) copies of Sprint PCS' Rebuttal Testimony of Bridger M. Mitchell, Michael R. Hunsucker, Randy G. Farrar, and Anthony Sabatino.

Please acknowledge receipt and filing of the above by stamping the duplicate copy of this letter and returning the same to this writer.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

Yours truly,

  
John P. Fons

Enclosures

cc: All parties of record

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by U.S. Mail, hand delivery(\*), or overnight delivery (\*\*) this 13<sup>th</sup> day of December, 2000, to the following:

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\_\_\_\_\_  
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1                   **BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION**

2                                   **REBUTTAL TESTIMONY**

3   **OF**

4                                   **BRIDGER M. MITCHELL**

5  
6   **I. Introduction**

7  
8   **Q. Please state your name, occupation, and business address.**

9   A. My name is Bridger M. Mitchell. I am a vice president of  
10 Charles River Associates Incorporated, an economics,  
11 finance and business consulting firm with offices in  
12 Boston, Massachusetts and several cities in the U.S. and  
13 other countries. I am the director of the Palo Alto  
14 office, which is located at 285 Hamilton Avenue, Palo  
15 Alto, California.

16  
17   **Q. Did you previously file Direct Testimony in this**  
18   **proceeding?**

19   A. Yes.

20  
21   **Q. What is the purpose of your rebuttal testimony?**

22   A. My testimony rebuts portions of the Direct Testimony of a  
23 panel of witnesses, consisting of Jamshed K. Madan,  
24 Michael D. Dirmeier, and David C. Newton (the Panel),  
25 filed on behalf of BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.

1 November 15, 2000. I begin with a brief review of the  
2 FCC's forward-looking economic cost standard for  
3 determining the additional cost of transport and  
4 termination service as detailed in the FCC's TELRIC  
5 methodology. I then discuss two related topics, first the  
6 treatment of fixed costs by the Panel, and, second, their  
7 efforts to use concepts of "coverage" and "build out" to  
8 determine the additional cost of transport and termination  
9 service.

10

11 **II. TELRIC Pricing Principles**

12

13 **Q. The Panel, at page 6, lines 5-7, states that "the results**  
14 **presented by Sprint PCS in this case cannot possibly be in**  
15 **accord with the FCC's TELRIC pricing rules, as alleged by**  
16 **Sprint PCS' witnesses". Do you agree with this assertion?**

17 **A.** No, I do not. The FCC has provided carriers and state  
18 commissions with a pricing methodology to be followed in  
19 calculating the total element long run incremental cost of  
20 network elements and transport and termination service.  
21 The Sprint PCS cost model applies that methodology to a  
22 wireless network.

23

24 **Q. Can you briefly summarize the FCC's TELRIC pricing rules**  
25 **for an incumbent local exchange carrier (ILEC)?**

1 A. Yes. The standard established by the FCC for determining  
2 the additional cost of transport and termination service  
3 is forward-looking economic cost. The FCC established a  
4 pricing methodology based on forward-looking economic cost  
5 when it laid out the principles for calculating total  
6 element long-run incremental cost (TELRIC) and instructed  
7 the state commissions to "give full and fair effect to the  
8 economic costing methodology we set forth in this Order."  
9 Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Rcd 15499, 16024-25, at  
10 619 (1996). Henceforth, Local Competition Order.

11

12 For an incumbent local exchange carrier, the TELRIC  
13 pricing methodology first estimates the costs of  
14 constructing a new local network with wire centers placed  
15 at the ILEC's current wire center locations. All inputs  
16 are assumed to be variable. The new network is assumed to  
17 use the most efficient technology that is currently  
18 deployed in the networks of incumbent local carriers and  
19 capacity is sized to meet reasonably foreseeable capacity  
20 demands. The investment in each network facility is then  
21 converted to a monthly capital cost using a forward-  
22 looking cost of capital and depreciation schedules based  
23 on the facility's economic life. Ongoing costs of  
24 operating and maintaining the facility are added to the  
25 capital cost to obtain the forward looking cost of the

1 facility. Finally, a reasonable proportion of the  
2 forward-looking common costs of the network are added to  
3 the calculated cost of the facility. (47 C.F.R. § 51.505).

4

5 The cost of a network element is obtained by identifying  
6 the network facilities used by the element, and  
7 attributing to that element an appropriate share of the  
8 costs of these facilities. The element cost is then  
9 expressed on a per-unit basis by dividing the cost by the  
10 entire total volume of the service, including both the  
11 amounts of the service sold to competitors and the amount  
12 that is self-supplied.

13

14 **Q. Has the FCC distinguished between traffic-sensitive and**  
15 **non-traffic sensitive costs in establishing pricing rules**  
16 **for recovering the additional cost of transport and**  
17 **termination?**

18 A. Yes. As I stated in my direct testimony, the FCC has  
19 determined that ILECs generally use two network elements  
20 in terminating a call: the end-office switch and local  
21 loop. The FCC has further determined that consistent with  
22 its definition of "additional costs," ILECs may recover in  
23 reciprocal compensation only the traffic sensitive portion  
24 of these network elements -specifically, the traffic-  
25 sensitive component of local switching. The FCC stated:

1            "We find that, once a call has been delivered  
2            to the incumbent LEC end office serving the  
3            called party, the 'additional cost' to the LEC  
4            of terminating a call that originates on a  
5            competing carrier's network primarily consists  
6            of the traffic-sensitive component of local  
7            switching ... The costs of local loops and line  
8            ports associated with local switches do not  
9            vary in proportion to the number of calls  
10           terminated over these facilities. We conclude  
11           that such non-traffic sensitive costs should  
12           not be considered 'additional costs' when a LEC  
13           terminates a call that originated on the  
14           network of a competing carrier."

15

16           Local Competition Order, at 1057. Note omitted.

17

18           The FCC therefore concluded with regard to ILECs that  
19           "[f]or the purposes of setting rates under section  
20           252(d)(2), only that portion of the forward-looking,  
21           economic cost of end-office switching that is recovered on  
22           a usage-sensitive basis constitutes an 'additional cost'  
23           to be recovered through termination charges." Id.

24

25           **Q. Is the Sprint PCS cost model consistent with these pricing**

1           **rules?**

2    A.    Yes, the Sprint PCS cost model calculates estimates of  
3           forward-looking economic costs according to the TELRIC  
4           pricing rules and obtains per-minute rates that recover  
5           the traffic-sensitive portion of those costs.

6

7    **III. Fixed Costs**

8

9    **Q.    How does the TELRIC pricing methodology account for fixed**  
10           **costs in a carrier's network?**

11   A.    In its Local Competition Order the FCC found that: "In a  
12            TELRIC methodology, the 'long run' used shall be a period  
13            long enough that *all* costs are treated as variable and  
14            avoidable. This 'long run' approach ensures that rates  
15            recover not only the operating costs that vary in the  
16            short run, but also fixed investment costs that, while not  
17            variable in the short term, are necessary inputs directly  
18            attributable to providing the element." At 692, emphasis  
19            added, note omitted.

20

21            In the TELRIC methodology, costs that, in the short run,  
22            would ordinarily be considered fixed are treated as  
23            variable and are included in calculating long run  
24            incremental cost. The FCC could not have said more  
25            clearly that costs cannot be excluded from a TELRIC



1 estimate merely because they are "fixed" in some short-run  
2 context.

3

4 **Q. Is the testimony of the Panel consistent with the FCC's**  
5 **pricing methodology with regard to fixed costs?**

6 A. No. The Panel asserts that wireline loop costs and some  
7 costs of a PCS network are fixed and then erroneously  
8 claims that, because some costs may be classified as  
9 fixed, they should be excluded when calculating the  
10 additional cost of terminating a call on a PCS network.  
11 This fundamental error permeates their flawed discussion  
12 of fixed costs, coverage, and build-out requirements.

13

14 **Q. Can you describe specific examples where the analysis of**  
15 **the Panel is inconsistent with the treatment of fixed**  
16 **costs in the FCC's TELRIC methodology?**

17 A. At page 13, lines 6-8, the Panel claims that "the reason  
18 that wireline carriers were not allowed to collect a  
19 reciprocal compensation charge for the use of the local  
20 loop was because that cost was determined to be fixed."  
21 This claim contradicts the FCC's statement, which I cited  
22 above, that investment costs cannot be excluded from a  
23 TELRIC estimate simply because they may be fixed in the  
24 short run.

25

1 Q. But the FCC did exclude loop costs from calculation of a  
2 wireline carrier's additional costs of transport and  
3 termination. How, then, should the FCC's exclusion of  
4 loop costs from reciprocal compensation be understood?

5 A. First, as I noted earlier, the FCC has stated: "The costs  
6 of local loops and line ports associated with local  
7 switches do not vary in proportion to the number of calls  
8 terminated over these facilities. We conclude that such  
9 non-traffic sensitive costs should not be considered  
10 'additional costs' when a LEC terminates a call that  
11 originated on the network of a competing carrier." Local  
12 Competition Order at 1057, note omitted. Non-traffic  
13 sensitive costs -- those costs that "do not vary in  
14 proportion to the number of calls" -- are not the same as  
15 fixed costs.

16  
17 Traffic sensitive costs are the long-run costs of those  
18 network facilities for which the amount of capacity  
19 required in an efficiently configured network varies with  
20 the expected volume of traffic, where volume of traffic is  
21 generally measured by both the number of calls and the  
22 number of minutes of use that occur during the peak hour.  
23 The FCC has used this approach in its cost proxy model of  
24 a wireline local network, the hybrid cost proxy model  
25 (HCPM). In that model, engineering rules use data on the

1 volume of traffic (calls and minutes of use) to ensure  
2 that the new LEC network has adequate capacity to carry  
3 the expected traffic load while providing the required  
4 quality of service. In the HCPM, traffic volumes can  
5 affect investment in several facilities, including a  
6 portion of local switching, tandem switching, interoffice  
7 transport, and signaling. The costs of these network  
8 components are expressed on a per minute basis, since they  
9 are traffic sensitive. In contrast, the costs of loops  
10 and switch ports are expressed on a per subscriber basis,  
11 because they are non-traffic sensitive – not because they  
12 are fixed.

13  
14 Second, the FCC requires “that the charges for dedicated  
15 facilities be flat-rated, including, but not limited to,  
16 charges for unbundled loops, dedicated transport,  
17 interconnection, and collocation. These charges should be  
18 assessed for fixed periods, such as a month.” Local  
19 Competition Order at 744. Since the loop is a dedicated  
20 facility whose cost is recovered through flat-rate  
21 charges, the inclusion of loop costs in the charge for  
22 transport and termination could (and typically would)  
23 result in multiple recovery. The FCC has stated that  
24 “[a]ny multiple recovery would be unreasonable and thus in  
25 violation of the statutory standard.” Local Competition

1 Order at 698.

2

3 In sum, the FCC's decision to exclude loop costs from the  
4 costs of call termination on an ILEC network is consistent  
5 with two fundamental principles: that the loop is non-  
6 traffic sensitive in the long run, and that loop costs are  
7 to be recovered entirely through flat-rated charges.  
8 Multiple recovery of loop costs would occur if loop costs  
9 were also included in usage-sensitive termination rates.  
10 The explanation offered by the Panel, that the loop is a  
11 fixed cost and therefore not an additional cost, is  
12 different from both of these justifications and violates  
13 clearly stated FCC principles. Consequently, the  
14 application of the Panel approach to either a wireline  
15 network or to the Sprint PCS network would violate the  
16 FCC's TELRIC pricing methodology.

17

18 **Q. At pages 23-24 the Panel claims to have calculated a**  
19 **measure of the additional costs in the Sprint PCS system**  
20 **over the period 2001-2002. Is this calculation consistent**  
21 **with the FCC's forward-looking economic cost methodology?**

22 A. No, the Panel's calculation is another instance of its  
23 failure to properly account for fixed costs in a TELRIC  
24 calculation. Using data from the Sprint PCS Model, they  
25 have calculated the ratio of the increment in cost between

1 2001 and 2002 to the increment in demand over the same  
2 period. But this calculation is fatally flawed and  
3 produces a hodgepodge of wrongly included and excluded  
4 costs. First, this cost estimate necessarily excludes the  
5 costs of all facilities that are used in both 2001 and  
6 2002 - the costs of facilities that have already been  
7 constructed to provide service in 2001 are implicitly  
8 treated as fixed costs, and not part of long-run  
9 incremental costs. The exclusion of these costs is  
10 inconsistent with TELRIC principles. Second, the Panel's  
11 estimate of additional costs includes the costs of any  
12 non-traffic sensitive facilities that are first installed  
13 in 2001. However, non-traffic sensitive costs are not  
14 additional costs of transport and termination service.

15  
16 The defect in the Panel's method can be readily  
17 illustrated by applying the Panel's methodology to the  
18 BellSouth network in Florida. An estimate of the  
19 additional cost of call termination that is consistent  
20 with the FCC's pricing rules can be obtained from the  
21 default output of a cost proxy model for the Bell South  
22 network. The FCC's Hybrid Cost Proxy Model (HCPM),  
23 developed to calculate TELRIC for a wireline network, is  
24 one such model. This estimate can then be compared to an  
25 estimate obtained for the same network with a higher level

1 of demand representing a year's growth in traffic, and the  
2 difference in total cost obtained by the two calculations  
3 can then be divided by the corresponding difference in  
4 demand to obtain a cost estimate consistent with the  
5 Panel's approach. Based on my experience with several  
6 cost proxy models, I would expect that the cost estimate  
7 based on the Panel's methodology will be significantly  
8 different, and likely much lower than the estimate of  
9 additional cost reported in the default output of the  
10 HCPM.

11

12 The FCC was aware that an estimate of incremental cost  
13 would depend critically on the size of the increment: "The  
14 costs that are considered incremental will vary greatly  
15 depending on the size of the increment. For example, the  
16 incremental cost of carrying an additional call from a  
17 residence that is already connected to the network to its  
18 end office is virtually zero." Local Competition Order at  
19 675. For switching costs, the FCC has similarly concluded  
20 that: "Fixed costs are the largest portion of the cost of  
21 a switch." In the Matter of Implementation of the Local  
22 Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of  
23 1996, CC Docket No. 96-98, Third Report and Order,  
24 Released: November 5, 1999, at 258. By choosing a small  
25 increment in output, the Panel's methodology implicitly

1 classifies a large proportion of the costs as fixed and  
2 excludes it from the calculation of additional cost.  
3 However, as the FCC made clear in passages cited above, an  
4 exclusion of "fixed" costs is not part of the TELRIC  
5 methodology. Indeed, the "Total" in TELRIC refers to the  
6 *total* output produced by the LEC, and the use of a smaller  
7 increment of output violates a basic TELRIC principle.

8

9 **IV. Coverage and Build-Out**

10

11 **Q. The Panel says that "coverage" is the basic investment**  
12 **that a carrier must make in order to provide seamless**  
13 **ubiquitous service to its customers in its service areas.**  
14 **Do you agree with the treatment of the costs of "coverage"**  
15 **in that testimony?**

16 **A.** No, I do not agree with that position. The Panel has  
17 invented a concept of "coverage costs" that does not  
18 appear to be grounded in FCC rules or opinions and is not  
19 consistent with basic principles of TELRIC methodology.  
20 At page 12, lines 8-9 of their testimony, the Panel states  
21 that "coverage is the basic wireless infrastructure needed  
22 to reach the boundaries of the service territory and is  
23 the counterpart to wireline subscriber access." The Panel  
24 argues that the cost of providing coverage should be  
25 excluded from the calculation of additional costs. To do

1 so would be inconsistent with the FCC's TELRIC pricing  
2 methodology, which requires including the costs of the  
3 total volume of the element in question, not just the  
4 portion of the element that remains once "coverage" is  
5 removed.

6

7 The error in the Panel's treatment can be clearly seen by  
8 applying their argument to wireline subscriber access, the  
9 claimed counterpart of wireless coverage. Excluding the  
10 costs of coverage in a wireline network would omit from  
11 the calculation of additional costs very substantial  
12 portions of the costs of switch software, initial  
13 switching capacity, land and buildings for central  
14 offices, trenches and duct and the first cable in the  
15 interoffice network, and the fixed costs of signaling  
16 systems. However, all of these items are currently  
17 included in the cost of transport and termination  
18 calculated by the FCC's hybrid cost proxy model. The  
19 calculated additional cost of end office switching (and of  
20 most other elements) would be close to zero if the Panel's  
21 methodology were adopted, as was suggested by the FCC when  
22 it recognized that the cost of terminating a call on an  
23 already built out network was minimal.

24

25 Cost proxy models of wireline networks, including the



1 FCC's hybrid cost proxy model, do not, in fact, define the  
2 investment required to provide coverage or subscriber  
3 access, and do not exclude any costs from the additional  
4 costs of call termination on the grounds that they are  
5 incurred to provide coverage. In the FCC's methodology  
6 the only costs that are excluded from additional costs are  
7 the non-traffic sensitive costs associated with dedicated  
8 facilities. To exclude "coverage costs" from the  
9 additional cost of termination on a wireless network would  
10 result in a greater exclusion than is consistent with the  
11 FCC's basic TELRIC principles, and therefore in  
12 unreasonably low estimates of the additional cost of  
13 transport and termination. Just as wireline cost proxy  
14 models include the traffic sensitive portions of all  
15 switches and transport elements in an ILEC's service  
16 territory regardless of "coverage" requirements, the  
17 Sprint PCS model includes the traffic sensitive portion of  
18 all cell sites, BTSs, BSCs and other network components  
19 required in both densely and sparsely populated areas.

20

21 **Q. At pages 17-18, the Panel states that investments made to**  
22 **satisfy a wireless licensee's "build out requirements" are**  
23 **not additional costs. Do you agree with this position?**

24 **A.** No, I do not. The Panel states that these costs are not  
25 additional costs of termination because they are "initial

1 fixed cost(s).” I have explained earlier that a  
2 distinction between fixed costs and variable costs plays  
3 no role in the FCC’s long run analysis of additional  
4 costs. The conclusion reached by the Panel is therefore  
5 inconsistent with the FCC’s basic TELRIC principles.  
6 Furthermore, ILECs are required to offer service to all  
7 subscribers in their service areas, including subscribers  
8 for whom the incremental cost of providing service exceeds  
9 the revenue generated. This requirement is analogous to  
10 (and, in fact, stricter than) the build out requirements  
11 placed on Sprint PCS. Yet, when calculating additional  
12 costs for wireline LECs, the FCC’s HCPM does not exclude  
13 the facilities required to serve these subscribers, even  
14 if some of these facilities might have very low  
15 utilization.

16  
17 For example, the default output for the HCPM for Bell  
18 South shows that for one wire center in Florida, MNSNFLMA,  
19 the calculated fill for the distribution plant is only  
20 53%. In wire centers served by other local exchange  
21 carriers the calculated fill factor in this model is even  
22 lower. Nevertheless, these wire centers are included in  
23 the HCPM when transport and termination costs are  
24 calculated for the serving local exchange carrier.  
25 Similarly, the model does not exclude other facilities,

1 such as switches serving remote rural areas, merely  
2 because the actual fill factors reported by the model for  
3 these facilities are low.

4

5 The Panel suggests that build out requirements and low  
6 fill factors should be used to exclude some network  
7 facilities when calculating additional cost.  
8 Specifically, at page 11, lines 22-25, they claim that:  
9 "For those cell sites with only one or two channels [sic],  
10 clearly they have considerably more capacity than is  
11 actually needed at present and the cell site itself must  
12 have been established to meet coverage requirements." The  
13 Panel thus asserts that the actual fill factor for these  
14 cell sites, as measured the ratio of by current peak  
15 demand to currently available capacity, is low. They  
16 offer no evidence that the actual fill at cell sites with  
17 one or two carriers is lower than the actual fill achieved  
18 in cell sites with three carriers. In any event, the  
19 FCC's cost proxy model of a wireline network does not  
20 exclude facilities with low actual fill factors and to do  
21 so in a wireless network would be inconsistent with the  
22 FCC's pricing methodology.

23

24 **Q. At page 13, lines 6 to 17, the Panel argues that cell**  
25 **sites on the margins of a service area will never be used**

1 to capacity, and are therefore fixed cost facilities that  
2 are "exactly like the wireline customer's local loop."  
3 They conclude that such cell sites should be eliminated  
4 from Sprint's cost study. Do you agree with their  
5 analysis?

6 A. No, I do not agree with that analysis. The FCC has  
7 clearly stated that costs are not to be excluded because  
8 they are fixed, and coverage or build-out requirements are  
9 not relevant cost concepts in the FCC's TELRIC  
10 methodology. Furthermore, the local loop is a non-traffic  
11 sensitive, dedicated facility, while a cell site's  
12 capacity is shared by all mobile customers served by the  
13 site and both the equipment in individual cell sites and  
14 the number of cell sites are traffic sensitive. The  
15 Panel's suggestion that these cell sites be excluded from  
16 the calculation of additional costs has no basis in the  
17 FCC's TELRIC methodology, which only provides for the  
18 exclusion of the costs of dedicated, non-traffic sensitive  
19 facilities when calculating the additional cost of  
20 transport and termination services.

21

22 Q. Does this conclude your testimony?

23 A. Yes.

24

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