



April 20, 2001

Ms. Blanca S. Bayó, Director Division of Records and Reporting Florida Public Service Commission 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850

Re: Docket No. 010283-EI

Dear Ms. Bayó:

Enclosed for filing in the subject docket on behalf of Florida Power Corporation are an original and fifteen copies of the Direct Testimony of Javier Portuondo.

Please acknowledge your receipt of the above filing on the enclosed copy of this letter and return to the undersigned. Also enclosed is a 3.5 inch diskette containing the above-referenced document in WordPerfect format. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

Very truly yours,

James A. McGee

JAM/scc Enclosure

cc: Parties of record

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION DOCKET NO. 010283-EI

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the Direct Testimony of Javier Portuondo has been furnished to the following individuals by regular U.S. Mail this 20th day of April, 2001.

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Attorney

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION DOCKET NO. 010283-EI

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF JAVIER PORTUONDO

Q. Please state your name and business address.

A. My name is Javier Portuondo. My business address is Post Office Box 14042, St. Petersburg, Florida 33733.

Q. By whom are you employed and in what capacity?

- A. I am employed by Florida Power Corporation (Florida Power or the Company) in the capacity of Manager, Regulatory Services.
- Q. Please provide a brief outline of your educational background and business experience.
- A. I graduated from the University of South Florida in 1992 with a Bachelor's Degree in Business Administration, majoring in Accounting. I began my employment with Florida Power in 1985. During my 16 years I have held various staff accounting positions within Financial Services in such areas as-General Accounting, Tax Accounting, Property Plant & Depreciation Accounting and Regulatory Accounting. In 1996 I became Manager, Regulatory Services. My present responsibilities include the areas of fuel and purchase power cost recovery filings, capacity cost recovery filings, energy conservation cost recovery issues, earnings surveillance reporting, and rate design and cost of service issues.

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TROC-RECORDS/ALFORTING

Q. What is the purpose of your direct testimony?

A. The purpose of my testimony is to address the issues raised by Item 1 in Part III of Order No. PSC-00-1744-PAA-EI in Docket No. 991779-EI (the Order), which concerns the treatment of incremental costs in calculating the gain on non-separated wholesale sales, and, in particular, the modification of Item 1 proposed by the Florida Industrial Power Users Group (FIPUG) in its protest of Part III of the Order.

Q. What is Florida Power's position on the modification of Item 1 proposed by FIPUG?

A. Florida Power believes Item 1 is sufficiently clear and produces the proper result without the need for significant modification, particularly the confusing and unsound modification proposed by FIPUG. Item 1 states simply that:

"Each IOU shall credit its fuel and purchased power cost recovery clause for an amount equal to the incremental fuel cost of generating the energy for each such sale."

As long as Item 1's reference to "the incremental fuel cost of generating the energy" is understood in a broad sense to encompass the incremental cost of energy generated either by the utility or by another and then purchased by the utility, as I believe was intended, Item 1 succinctly accomplishes any legitimate purpose that may be intended by FIPUG's proposed modification. Moreover, it does so without the baggage of FIPUG's perplexing language or its inappropriate inclusion of buy-through purchases.

If, however, the Commission should have a concern that the quoted phrase may not be understood to include both utility generation and utility purchases (whichever is at the increment), a simple clarification to that effect is all that would be required. (Such as "... the incremental energy cost of generating or purchasing the energy ...") Such a concern certainly should not be the basis for adopting a problematic modification that would only serve to exacerbate the potential for reaching an improper result, as FIPUG's proposal would do.

- Q. You have described FIPUG's proposed modification of Item 1 as confusing and unsound. Please explain this characterization.
- A. FIPUG proposes to modify Item 1 by adding the following highlighted language:

"Each IOU shall credit its fuel and purchased power cost recovery clause for an amount equal to the incremental fuel cost of generating the energy for each such sale or in the event wholesale power is purchased to replace the power sold, when the incremental cost of replacement purchased power is more than the applicable fuel cost factor, the clause or the buy through customer for whom the replacement power is purchased shall be credited with the price difference."

As mentioned above, it may be that one of FIPUG's objectives for this modification (putting aside for the moment its proposed credit to buy-through customers) is to ensure that the incremental cost of a sale used in calculating the gain encompasses a utility's purchased power, as well

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as its own generation. If so, that objective can be realized by Item 1, as is, or with only minor clarification. FIPUG's approach, on the other hand, is so convoluted that it is actually counterproductive to the objective of properly recognizing the incremental cost associated with purchased power.

This can be seen immediately in the first phrase of FIPUG's modification, which inexplicably attempts to limit the recognition of purchased power to situations where the "power is purchased to replace the power sold." For purposes of calculating the gain on a sale, it is totally irrelevant when or why a purchase commitment was made, so long as the cost of the purchase was incremental at the time of the sale. To illustrate the problem with FIPUG's qualifier, suppose a purchase of several weeks' duration had been arranged long before and independent of a previously unexpected sale that was made possible by several days of unseasonably mild weather during this purchase. Suppose further that this pre-existing purchase happened to represent the utility's incremental cost at the time of the sale. Under FIPUG's proposed modification, this purchase would not be eligible for consideration in calculating the gain on the sale because it had not been "purchased to replace the power sold." Such an obviously wrong result is a telling commentary on the unsoundness of FIPUG's proposal.

Another perplexing limitation on the recognition of incremental costs associated with purchased power is found in the next phrase in FIPUG's proposed modification. Instead of simply crediting the fuel clause with the incremental cost of a sale as Item 1 provides, FIPUG's language states

that "when the incremental cost of replacement purchased power is more than the applicable fuel cost factor, the clause . . . shall be credited with the price difference." By this language, FIPUG apparently seeks to create a new, two-step approach to the recognition of incremental costs associated with purchased power. To begin with, the incremental cost must exceed a threshold ("the applicable fuel cost factor") before it can be considered at all; then, if the incremental cost satisfies the first step, only the differential above the threshold can be recognized in the fuel clause. I have no idea how this bizarre exercise relates to the proper calculation of the gain on a non-separated sale. Moreover, even if the use of a threshold was somehow considered to be appropriate, I am at a loss to understand FIPUG's selection of fuel cost factors, which are based on average costs, as the yardstick for judging the proper level of incremental costs to be included in the fuel clause.

For all of these reasons, FIPUG's incredible proposal should be summarily rejected.

- Q. Earlier in your testimony you indicated that it was inappropriate for FIPUG to include incremental cost credits for buy-through customers in it's proposed modification of Item 1. Why is that?
- A. Item 1 concerns the treatment of incremental costs in calculating the gain on non-separated wholesale sales. As such, it has nothing to do with buythrough purchases made on behalf of interruptible customers because these purchases cannot represent the incremental cost of a non-separated wholesale sale.

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used to provide the energy for a sale to a wholesale customer. Likewise, the *cost* of such a purchase cannot possibly represent the incremental cost of the sale. Stated from a computational perspective in the fuel clause, it would amount to double counting if the cost of a buy-through purchase that is already fully recoverable from buy-through customers was also netted against the revenue from a non-separated sale to determine the gain credited to all customers.

FIPUG's interest in attempting to minimizing its members' buy-through

Unlike other system purchases, buy-through purchases are made for

the benefit of a specific class of retail customers, with the associated costs

recovered from this customer class only. A buy-through purchase that is

made solely to serve specific retail customers obviously cannot also be

costs is well understood, but its current attempt to inveigle this extraneous

issue into a basically straight forward gain-on-sale calculation is clearly

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Q. Does this conclude your direct testimony?

inappropriate and should be rejected.

A. Yes, it does.

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