

Kimberly Caswell
Vice President and General Counsel, Southeast
Legal Department



FLTC0007
201 North Franklin Street (33602)
Post Office Box 110
Tampa, Florida 33601-0110

Phone 813 483-2606
Fax 813 204-8870
kimberly.caswell@verizon.com

June 21, 2001

Ms. Blanca S. Bayo, Director
Division of Records & Reporting
Florida Public Service Commission
2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard
Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850

Re: Docket No. 000075-TP (Phase II)
Investigation into appropriate methods to compensate carriers for exchange of
traffic subject to Section 251 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996

Dear Ms. Bayo:

Please find enclosed for filing an original and fifteen copies of Verizon Florida Inc.'s
Supplemental Posthearing Brief in the above matter. Also enclosed is a diskette with
a copy of the Supplemental Brief in Word 97 format. Service has been made as
indicated on the Certificate of Service. If there are any questions regarding this
matter, please contact me at 813-483-2617.

Sincerely,



Kimberly Caswell

KC:tas
Enclosures

APP _____
CAF _____
CMP _____
COM 5 _____
CTR _____
ECR _____
LEG 1 _____
OPC _____
PAI _____
RGO _____
SEC 1 _____
SER _____
OTH _____

RECEIVED & FILED
RXM
FPSC-BUREAU OF RECORDS

DOCUMENT NUMBER - DATE
07703 JUN 21 01
FPSC-RECORDS/REPORTING

BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In re: Investigation into appropriate methods to compensate carriers for exchange of traffic subject to Section 251 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996)
Docket No. 000075-TP)
Filed: June 21, 2001)
)
)
)
_____)

VERIZON FLORIDA INC.'S SUPPLEMENTAL POSTHEARING BRIEF

In accordance with the Commission's Order number PSC-01-1094-PCO-TP, Verizon Florida Inc. (Verizon) files its supplemental posthearing brief addressing the FCC's April 27, 2001 ruling on intercarrier compensation for Internet service provider (ISP)-bound traffic.¹

The FCC's Remand Order directly affects this first phase of this proceeding, which is intended to address the jurisdictional and policy questions associated with reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound traffic. In its original Posthearing Brief, Verizon explained that this Commission lacks the jurisdiction to adopt an intercarrier compensation mechanism for delivery of ISP-bound traffic. The Remand Order confirms that any state commission order imposing reciprocal compensation on ISP traffic is contrary to the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and is preempted by federal law. In light of the FCC's Order, the Commission should close the docket without taking any further action.

Below, Verizon discusses the effect of the Remand Order on each of the issues identified for resolution in this docket.

¹ Implementation of Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomm. Act of 1996; Intercarrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, Order on Remand and Report & Order, FCC No. 01-131 (April 27, 2001) (Remand Order).

DOCUMENT NUMBER-DATE

07703 JUN 21 01

FPSC-RECORDS/REPORTING

Issue 1(a): Does the Commission have the jurisdiction to adopt an intercarrier compensation mechanism for delivery of ISP-bound traffic?

Verizon's Position: ** No. The FCC explicitly concluded that state commissions have no authority to impose reciprocal compensation on ISP traffic. FCC rules and policies govern compensation obligations for such traffic **

In its ISP Remand Order, the FCC set forth a new, comprehensive construction of the Telecommunications Act establishing how the Act applies to ISP-bound traffic and how it governs the intercarrier compensation mechanisms that must apply to that traffic. The FCC clarified how sections 251(b)(5) and 251(g) of the Act operate together to determine the treatment of ISP-bound traffic.

The reciprocal compensation obligation is imposed by section 251(b)(5) of the Act, which requires carriers to “establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of telecommunications.” 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5). The FCC explained, however, that for ISP-bound traffic, “proper analysis hinges on section 251(g).” Remand Order ¶ 54. That section provides that each local exchange carrier “shall provide exchange access, information access, and exchange services for such access to interexchange carriers and information service providers in accordance with the same equal access and nondiscriminatory interconnection restrictions and obligations (including receipt of compensation) that apply to such carrier” at the time the Act was passed. 47 U.S.C. § 251(g). The FCC concluded that this section is a “carve-out provision,” Remand Order ¶ 34, that expressly excepts specified telecommunications services from the scope of the reciprocal compensation obligation in section 251(b)(5). Section 251(g), after all, specifies that the enumerated services should be provided under the same “obligations” *“including receipt of compensation”*

that applied when the Act was passed. 47 U.S.C. § 251(g) (emphasis added). The agency thus explained that “Congress specifically exempted the services enumerated under section 251(g) from the newly imposed reciprocal compensation requirement.” Remand Order ¶ 36.

The FCC further concluded that when an incumbent LEC carries a call bound for an ISP from one of its customers and hands it off to a competing LEC that serves the ISP, the service it provides is a form of “information access” - one of the services identified in section 251(g). *See id.* ¶ 44. “Information access,” the FCC explained, was a term borrowed from the AT&T Consent Decree,² which defined it as “the provision of specialized exchange telecommunications services . . . in connection with the origination, termination, transmission, switching, forwarding or routing of telecommunications traffic to or from the facilities of a provider of information services.” The FCC concluded that this definition “was meant to include all access traffic that was routed by a LEC ‘to or from’ providers of information services, of which ISPs are a subset.” Remand Order ¶ 44. Thus, section 251(g), by its express terms, excluded ISP traffic from the reciprocal compensation requirement.

In focusing on section 251(g), the FCC’s Remand Order refined and modified the statutory analysis on which the agency had relied in its first order addressing ISP reciprocal compensation.³ Originally, the FCC had approached the question of

² *See United States v. AT&T*, 552 F. Supp. 131, 196, 229 (D.D.C. 1982).

³ *See In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996; In re Inter-Carrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic*, Declaratory Ruling, 14 F.C.C.R. 3689 (1999), *vacated and remanded*, *Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC*, 206 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound calls by focusing on the scope of section 251(b)(5). The FCC had concluded that section 251(b)(5) applied solely to “local” calls and determined that ISP traffic was not properly characterized as “local.” ISP Order ¶ 26 n.87. In *Bell Atlantic*, the D.C. Circuit criticized the FCC’s analysis and remanded to the agency because, in the court’s view, the FCC had failed to explain adequately why ISP traffic was not properly considered “local.” In its Remand Order, the FCC concluded that its original approach had been flawed. The agency explained that its prior reliance on the distinction between “local” and “non-local” traffic for determining the scope of section 251(b)(5) was a “mistake.” Remand Order ¶ 46. *See also id.* ¶ 45 (“We were mistaken to have characterized the issue in that manner, rather than properly (and more naturally) interpreting the scope of ‘telecommunications’ within section 251(b)(5) as being limited by section 251(g).”). Instead, the key to understanding the application of the Act to ISP-bound traffic was recognizing that section 251(g) *exempts* certain services from the terms of section 251(b)(5).

In carving out specified telecommunications services from the scope of the reciprocal compensation obligation, section 251(g) not only exempted certain services from reciprocal compensation, it also specified a *different* compensation mechanism that should apply. Specifically, the section directs that the same “obligations” should apply – “*including receipt of compensation*” - as applied when the Act was passed under “any regulation, order, or policy of the Commission.” 47 U.S.C. § 251(g) (emphasis added). The FCC explained, moreover, that it has long had policies in place that specify the compensation required for categories of traffic including ISP traffic. The

FCC “has historically dictated the pricing policies applicable to services provided by LECs to information service providers,” and in particular has determined that enhanced service providers (or “ESPs” - a category that includes ISPs) may be exempted from the payment of access charges even though they receive access services from LECs. Remand Order ¶ 39 n.70. Thus, instead of paying access charges, ESPs may simply pay a local exchange carrier the monthly service fee charged for local service, even though the ESP is receiving an access service from the carrier. In specifying that the compensation requirements in place at the time the Act was passed should continue in effect, section 251(g) dictates that any existing “regulation, order, or policy” of the FCC - including the access charge exemption - shall continue to provide the rule governing the services listed in the section. The FCC itself, in fact, made the necessary implication of its statutory construction explicit as it stated that “unless and until the Commission by regulation should determine otherwise, Congress preserved the pre-Act regulatory treatment of all the access services enumerated under section 251(g).” Remand Order ¶ 39. The agency even emphasized that “subsection (g) preserves rules and regulations that existed at the time Congress passed the 1996 Act, and thus *functions primarily as a ‘backward-looking’ provision.*” *Id.* ¶ 50 (emphasis added). Section 251(g) thus both exempts ISP-bound traffic from reciprocal compensation and at the same time explicitly directs that a different compensation mechanism - namely, the policies that the FCC had in place at the time the Act was passed - should apply for that traffic.

As a result, the ineluctable consequence of the FCC’s statutory construction is that any order of a state commission that imposes reciprocal compensation on ISP

traffic is flatly contrary to Congress' directive in the Act and is preempted by federal law. It is axiomatic that any state order that conflicts with a directive of federal law is preempted. See, e.g., *Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council*, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) ("State law is naturally preempted to the extent of any conflict with a federal statute."). Where Congress has specified in a "backward-looking provision," Remand Order ¶ 50, that one form of compensation should apply to a category of traffic until the FCC expressly establishes new rules, it is simply not open to a state commission to impose a different compensation mechanism.

In fact, the FCC made it express that it was preempting state authority over the entire subject matter: "Because we now exercise our authority under section 201 to determine the appropriate intercarrier compensation for ISP-bound traffic . . . state commissions will no longer have authority to address this issue." Remand Order ¶ 82. States thus simply have no independent authority to impose ISP reciprocal compensation in a proceeding - like this one - open as of the effective date of the Order forward. Instead, state commissions, including this one, must implement the compensation terms in accordance with the FCC's Remand Order. This docket should be closed without further action.

Issue 1(b): If so, does the Commission have the jurisdiction to adopt such an intercarrier compensation mechanism through a generic proceeding?

Verizon's Position: ** As explained in Verizon's response to Issue 1(a), the Commission lacks the jurisdiction to adopt an intercarrier compensation scheme for ISP-bound traffic, either in this generic proceeding or otherwise. **

Issue 2: Is the delivery of ISP-bound traffic subject to compensation under Section 251 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996?

Verizon's Position: ** No. As Verizon explained in its response to Issue 1(a), the FCC's Order on Remand explains that section 251(g) carves out ISP-bound traffic from the reciprocal compensation obligations of section 251(b)(5). **

Issue 3: What actions should the Commission take, if any, with respect to establishing an appropriate compensation mechanism for ISP-bound traffic in light of current decisions and activities of the courts and the FCC?

Verizon's Position: ** None. As explained in Verizon's response to Issue 1(a), this Commission cannot take any actions to establish a compensation mechanism for ISP-bound traffic, because it has no jurisdiction to do so. **

In its original Posthearing Statement, Verizon explained that the Commission lacked the legal authority to establish a reciprocal compensation mechanism for ISP traffic and cautioned the Commission against taking any action that would need to be altered in the wake of the FCC's Remand Order. Now that the Order has issued, the Commission must recognize that it has been preempted from adopting any reciprocal compensation scheme for ISP-bound traffic. Although the Remand Order has been appealed, that appeal does not alter the FCC's jurisdictional conclusion or otherwise affect the force of the Order.

Verizon does not believe any party would seriously dispute that the FCC has preempted the Commission from establishing a compensation mechanism for Internet-bound traffic. For instance, in an Illinois Commerce Commission proceeding to

consider establishment of a reciprocal compensation scheme for ISP-bound traffic, the competitive local exchange carriers, including AT&T and WorldCom, advised the Commission that its docket “must be terminated and dismissed” because the FCC had “explicitly preempted the authority of state commission to set reciprocal compensation rates for ISP-bound traffic.” (Comments of Allegiance Telecom of Ill., Inc.; Focal Communications Corp. of Illinois; McLeodUSA Telecom Services, Inc.; AT&T Communications of Illinois, Inc.; TCG Chicago; TCG Illinois; TCG St. Louis; and WorldCom, Inc. Concerning Impact of FCC Order on Intercarrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, at 1-2 (May 7, 2001).) The Illinois Commission Staff agreed the Commission had been preempted and concluded that “there is only one action the Commission can take: to dismiss this proceeding.” (Comments of Illinois Comm. Comm’n Staff, at 3 (May 7, 2001).) The Commission here should take the same action.

Issue 4: What policy considerations should inform the Commission’s decision in this docket?

Verizon’s Position: ** Because the Commission lacks the jurisdiction to adopt any intercarrier compensation mechanism for ISP-bound traffic, this policy issue is moot. **

As explained in Verizon’s response to Issue 1(a), the Commission has no authority to adopt a compensation mechanism for ISP-bound traffic. As such, there is no need to address any policy considerations that might have factored into the Commission’s decision about such a mechanism.

It is, nevertheless, worthwhile to observe that the FCC vindicated Verizon’s

claims that current decisions imposing reciprocal compensation on ISP traffic have distorted incentives, hindering competition and creating opportunities for “regulatory arbitrage.” (See Verizon’s Posthearing Statement, filed April 18, 2001, at 10-17.) While the FCC based its Order on a straightforward construction of the terms of the 1996 Act, it also explained that its interpretation was buttressed by the fundamental policy objectives underpinning the Act - namely, promoting competition. The FCC resoundingly confirmed that, as Verizon has explained all along, ISP reciprocal compensation provides an unwarranted “windfall” for new entrants serving ISPs. Remand Order ¶ 70. The rates that have typically been set for reciprocal compensation bear no relation to the costs that a new entrant actually incurs in carrying a call handed off from an incumbent’s facilities to the new entrant’s own ISP customer. The characteristics of ISP traffic then multiply the distortion caused by excessive rates: ISP traffic is all one way. ISPs receive hundreds of incoming calls - calls with an average duration much longer than a typical voice call - and make no outgoing calls. Imposing supposedly “reciprocal” compensation on this traffic thus generates an enormous one-way revenue flow for carriers that can sign up ISPs as their customers.

As the FCC explained:

[T]his led to classic regulatory arbitrage that had two troubling effects: (1) it created incentives for inefficient entry of LECs intent on serving ISPs exclusively and not offering viable local telephone competition, as Congress had intended to facilitate with the 1996 Act; (2) the large one-way flows of cash made it possible for LECs serving ISPs to afford to pay their own customers to use their services, potentially driving ISP rates to consumers to uneconomical levels.

Remand Order ¶ 21. The FCC was thus “convinced” that “intercarrier payments for ISP-bound traffic have created severe market distortions.” Remand Order ¶ 76.

In particular, the FCC found that the “record is replete with evidence that reciprocal compensation provides enormous incentive for CLECs to target ISP customers.” *Id.* ¶ 70. In fact, the FCC determined that ISP reciprocal compensation had so severely distorted incentives that “some ISPs even seek to become CLECs in order to share in the reciprocal compensation windfall, and, for a small number of entities, this revenue stream provided an inducement to fraudulent schemes to generate dial-up minutes.” *Id.* Even worse, the agency explained that “viable, long-term competition among efficient providers of local exchange and exchange access services cannot be sustained where the intercarrier compensation regime does not reward efficiency and may produce retail rates that do not reflect the costs of the services provided.” *Id.* ¶ 71.

Issue 5: Is the Commission required to set a cost-based mechanism for delivery of ISP-bound traffic?

Verizon’s Position: ** This issue is moot, as the FCC’s Remand Order clarifies that the Commission cannot set any compensation mechanism for delivery of ISP-bound traffic. **

Issue 6: What factors should the Commission consider in setting the compensation mechanisms for delivery of ISP-bound traffic?

Verizon's Position: ** This issue is moot, as the FCC's Remand Order clarifies that the Commission cannot set any compensation mechanism for delivery of ISP-bound traffic. **

Issue 7: Should intercarrier compensation for delivery of ISP-bound traffic be limited to carrier and ISP arrangements involving circuit-switched technologies?

Verizon's Position: ** This issue is moot, as the FCC's Remand Order clarifies that the Commission cannot set any compensation mechanism for delivery of ISP-bound traffic. **

Issue 8: Should ISP-bound traffic be separated from non-ISP bound traffic for purposes of assessing any reciprocal compensation payments? If so, how?

Verizon's Position: ** The FCC has established a rebuttable presumption that traffic exchanged under a particular contract between local exchange carriers that exceeds a 3:1 ratio of terminating to originating traffic is ISP-bound traffic subject to the FCC's compensation regime. Remand Order paras. 8 & 79. A carrier may seek to rebut this presumption before the state commission. If it demonstrates that traffic above the 3:1 ratio is, in fact, local traffic, and not ISP-bound traffic, then the state commission may provide for payment of the state-approved reciprocal compensation rates for such local traffic. If, conversely, a carrier demonstrates to the state commission that the traffic it delivers to another carrier is ISP-bound, even though it is below the 3:1 ratio, reciprocal compensation does not apply for that traffic, which is instead subject to the regime

established in the Remand Order. Remand Order para. 79.

Issue 9: Should the Commission establish compensation mechanisms for delivery of ISP-bound traffic to be used in the absence of the parties reaching an agreement or negotiating a compensation mechanism? If so, what should be the mechanism?

Verizon's Position: ** No. As explained, the Commission has no jurisdiction to establish compensation mechanisms for ISP-bound traffic under any scenario. The FCC has established the compensation regime that applies to such traffic. **

As Verizon explained in response to Issue 1(a), this Commission has no authority to establish a reciprocal compensation scheme for ISP-bound traffic. That traffic is, instead, subject to FCC rules and policies.

The Remand Order sets forth the specific, interim compensation mechanism that will apply until the FCC can determine the permanent mechanism. This mechanism is based on a series of declining rate caps for compensation of ISP-bound traffic. For six months from the effective date of the Order (June 14, 2001), intercarrier compensation for ISP-bound traffic will be capped at a rate of \$.0015 per minute-of-use (mou). From the seventh month and continuing for eighteen months, the rate will be capped at \$.0010/mou. From the twenty-fifth month through the thirty-sixth month, or until further Commission action (whichever is later), the rate will be capped at \$.0007/mou.

Because these transitional rates are caps, they do not affect any lower compensation rates for this traffic ordered by this Commission under particular local interconnection agreements. (That is, if a carrier is paying a rate lower than the cap

today, that lower rate will continue to apply.) Remand Order paras. 8 & 79.

In addition to the rate caps, the FCC has capped the total ISP-bound minutes for which a carrier may receive the prescribed compensation. For 2001, the carrier may receive compensation under a particular interconnection agreement for ISP-bound minutes not to exceed the number of such minutes for which the carrier was entitled to compensation during the first quarter of 2001, plus a 10% growth factor. For 2002, the ceiling on compensation will equal the ISP-bound minutes for which it was entitled to compensation in 2001, plus another 10% growth factor. For 2003, the carrier may receive compensation for ISP-bound minutes up to the ceiling established for 2002. Remand Order para. 28.


In addition, where carriers are not exchanging traffic pursuant to interconnection agreements prior to adoption of the Remand Order - that is, where "a new carrier enters the market or an existing carrier expands into a market it previously had not served" - the FCC determined that bill-and-keep should apply immediately. Remand Order ¶ 82.

As to the longer-term compensation structure for ISP-bound traffic, the FCC has tentatively concluded that a bill-and-keep approach is the preferable cost recovery regime for ISP-bound traffic, but intends to develop a more complete record on bill-and-keep issues. Remand Order para. 6. The FCC will consider the ultimate compensation scheme for ISP traffic in the context of its rulemaking to develop a unified intercarrier compensation scheme, opened the same day the Remand Order

was released.⁴ While that rulemaking should not directly affect any issues in this first phase of this docket, it affects the issues in the second phase, as the Commission there is considering reciprocal compensation schemes for non-ISP traffic (including traffic subject to section 251(b)(5)). As such, Verizon has urged the Commission to hold in abeyance any decision in that proceeding until unified compensation issues have been further developed at the FCC level. (See Verizon's Prehearing Statement in Phase II, filed May 31, 2001).

Respectfully submitted on June 21, 2001.

By:




Kimberly Caswell
P. O. Box 110, FLTC0007
Tampa, FL 33601
Telephone: (813) 483-2617

Attorney for Verizon Florida Inc.

⁴ *Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime*, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC No. 01-132 (April 27, 2001).

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that copies of Verizon Florida Inc.'s Supplemental Posthearing Brief in Docket No. 000075-TP were sent via U.S. mail on June 21, 2001 to the parties on the attached list.



Kimberly Caswell

Staff Counsel
Florida Public Service Commission
2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard
Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850

Nancy White c/o Nancy Sims
BellSouth Telecomm. Inc.
150 S. Monroe Street, Suite 400
Tallahassee, FL 32301-1556

Marsha Rule
AT&T
101 N. Monroe Street
Suite 700
Tallahassee, FL 32301-1549

Michael Gross
Florida Cable Telecomm. Assn.
246 East 6th Avenue
Tallahassee, FL 32303

Charles Rehwinkel
Sprint-Florida
1313 Blairstone Road
MC FLTLHO0107
Tallahassee, FL 32301

Kenneth Hoffman
Martin McDonnell
Rutledge Law Firm
P. O. Box 551
Tallahassee, FL 32302

Peter Dunbar
Karen Camechis
Pennington Law Firm
P. O. Box 10095
Tallahassee, FL 32302

Mark Buechele
Supra Telecom
1311 Executive Center Drive
Suite 200
Tallahassee, FL 32301

Wanda Montano
US LEC of Florida Inc.
6801 Morrison Blvd.
Charlotte, NC 28211

Charles J. Pellegrini
Patrick Wiggins
Katz Kutter Law Firm
106 E. College Avenue
12th Floor
Tallahassee, FL 32301

Jon C. Moyle, Jr.
Cathy M. Sellers
Moyle Flanigan et al.
The Perkins House
118 N. Gadsden Street
Tallahassee, FL 32301

Norman H. Horton Jr.
Messer Law Firm
215 S. Monroe Street
Suite 701
Tallahassee, FL 32301-1876

Donna Canzano McNulty
MCI WorldCom, Inc.
325 John Knox Road
The Atrium, Suite 105
Tallahassee, FL 32303

Brian Sulmonetti
MCI WorldCom, Inc.
Concourse Corp. Center Six
Six Concourse Parkway
Suite 3200
Atlanta, GA 30328

Scott A. Sapperstein
Intermedia Communications Inc.
One Intermedia Way
MC FLT-HQ3
Tampa, FL 33647-1752

Paul Rebey
Focal Communications Corp.
200 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 1100
Chicago, IL 60601-1914

Robert Scheffel Wright
Landers & Parsons P.A.
310 West College Avenue
Tallahassee, FL 32302

Jill N. Butler
Cox Communications
4585 Village Avenue
Norfolk, VA 23502

Joseph A. McGlothlin
Vicki Gordon Kaufman
McWhirter Law Firm
117 S. Gadsden Street
Tallahassee, FL 32301

Michael R. Romano
Level 3 Communications LLC
1025 Eldorado Boulevard
Broomfield, CO 80021-8869

Dana Shaffer, Vice President
XO Florida, Inc.
105 Molly Street, Suite 300
Nashville, TN 37201-2315

Elizabeth Howland
Allegiance Telecom Inc.
1950 Stemmons Freeway
Suite 3026
Dallas, TX 75207

Jeffry Wahlen
Ausley Law Firm
P. O. Box 391
Tallahassee, FL 32302

Global NAPS, Inc.
10 Merrymount Road
Quincy, MA 02169

Genevieve Morelli
Kelley Law Firm
1200 19th Street N.W.
Suite 500
Washington, DC 20036

John McLaughlin
KMC Telecom, Inc.
1755 North Brown Road
Lawrenceville, GA 33096

Richard D. Melson
Hopping Law Firm
P. O. Box 6526
Tallahassee, FL 32314

Herb Bornack
Orlando Telephone Co.
4558 S.W. 35th Street
Suite 100
Orlando, FL 32811-6541

Carolyn Marek
Time Warner Telecom of Florida
233 Bramerton Court
Franklin, TN 37069

Morton Posner
Allegiance Telecom, Inc.
1150 Connecticut Ave. N.W.
Suite 205
Washington, DC 20036