

## BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

IN RE: DOCKET NO. 010650-TX - Petition for

declaratory statement by Level 3

Communications LLC, that collocation revenues reported by Level 3 should not be included as "gross operating revenues derived from

intrastate business" as contemplated by Rule 25-4.0161, F.A.C., and Sections 350.113(3)(b) and 364.336, F.S., for purposes of calculating regulatory assessment fee for calendar year

1999.

**BEFORE:** CHAIRMAN E. LEON JACOBS, JR.

> COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON COMMISSIONER LILA A. JABER COMMISSIONER BRAULIO L. BAEZ COMMISSIONER MICHAEL A. PALECKI

PROCEEDINGS: AGENDA CONFERENCE

ITEM NUMBER: 4

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Tallahassee, Florida

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KEN HOFFMAN, on behalf of Level 3
Communications.

GREG ROGERS, Level 3 Communications. DENISE VANDIVER, Commission Staff.

## STAFF RECOMMENDATION

ISSUE 1: Should the Commission issue a declaratory statement that Level 3 is not required to pay regulatory assessment fees on the revenues it receives from collocation in its Florida facilities?

RECOMMENDATION: No. The Commission should issue a declaratory statement that Level 3 is required to pay regulatory assessment fees on the revenues it receives from collocation in its Florida facilities.

ISSUE 2: Should this docket be closed?

RECOMMENDATION: Yes. If the Commission votes to dispose of the petition for declaratory statement, the docket should be closed.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Item 4.

MS. BROWN: Commissioners, Item 4 is another declaratory statement petition. Level 3 has requested that the Commission find that its collocation revenues are excluded from the Commission's regulatory assessment fee statutes. Staff has recommended otherwise. Level 3's collocation revenues are gross revenues from intrastate business pursuant to the statute and should be included in Level 3's regulatory assessment fee calculation.

This position is consistent with the language and the logic of the statute, it is consistent with the Commission's traditional standard treatment of revenues from the lease of communications facilities, and it is the more reasonable policy for the fair assessment of fees to cover the costs of the Commission's regulation.

Basically, Commissioners, there is nothing new under the sun here. The Commission has traditionally treated leasing revenues from the leasing of facilities as included in the regulatory assessment fee calculations. It would be a change of policy to change it here,

2 requires it. 3 Level 3 Communications has asked to address the Commission. 4 5 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Very well. Mr. Hoffman. 6 MR. HOFFMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My 7 name is Ken Hoffman. With me to my right is 8 Greg Rogers, who is with Level 3 Communications, 9 and Mr. Rogers will make Level 3's presentation, 10 which addresses the petition that we filed for 11 declaratory statement, as well as the staff 12 recommendation. 13 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Mr. Rogers. 14 MR. ROGERS: Good morning. I'm Greg 15 I'm here on behalf on Level 3 Rogers. 16 Communications. 17 I said to Mr. Hoffman last night at dinner 18 that I appreciated, I enjoyed the humidity, 19 coming from Colorado. 20 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Oh, there's more to 21 come. 22 MR. ROGERS: I wasn't expecting this this 23 morning. It's a little excessive, in my view, 24 and I obviously wasn't prepared. 25 But I appreciate the opportunity to address

and we don't think the statute permits it or

you this morning and feel it's important to address the Commission on this issue not only because of Level 3's concerns in this particular dispute over the regulatory assessment fees that the staff feels are due, but because of the precedential value that this would have on the ALEC industry as a whole.

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And that's really why I'm here, is because staff's recommendation runs the risk of sending the Commission down a very slippery slope and regulating all telecommunications -- excuse me, all services provided by a certificated carrier. And that is our concern, that there is not a distinction that is being made between telecommunications services and other nonregulated services that an ALEC may be providing.

Level 3 believes that its regulatory reporting and accounting practices are common to competitive carriers across the country, and in this instance, with regard to revenues that are associated with collocation services, and that is based on the fundamental understanding that collocation is not a telecommunications service. This is the first instance that Level 3 has had

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where a Commission is attempting to exert jurisdiction over a nonregulated service.

Staff's position in their analysis seems to be based primarily on the reasoning that if ILECs must pay regulatory assessment fees on collocation services, then ALECs must as well. And as was stated earlier, they see that there is no legal justification for Level 3 or ALECs to not pay them when ILECs are paying them.

We feel that the exact opposite is true, that the fundamental underpinnings of telecommunications regulatory law dictate in this instance that ILECs and ALECs be treated differently, and that is the result of the Telecommunications Act itself, that ILECs are regulated as a monopoly provider, and ALECs are regulated as competitive providers. And that exists in Florida in Section 364 in many examples. Tariffing, rate determinations, unbundling of networks, all those are examples of different treatments between how ILECs are treated and ALECs are treated.

The fact that ILECs are required to provide collocation under the '96 Act, under Section 251(c)(6) of the Act, does not mean that

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collocation is a telecommunications service. It simply means that it is a regulated service that ILECs must provide. So because ILECs must pay it does not make it telecommunications service that then triggers the regulation of ALECs.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Rogers, if it's not a telecommunications service, what is it? I understand there has been some suggestion that it's like a real estate transaction.

MR. ROGERS: Essentially. I mean, it is the leasing and renting of space within a building that Level 3 owns.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So let's draw that analogy a little bit further. Well, then BellSouth could come in and say that when they decide to construct a building, or if they lease a building from someone to install a central office, that the building, the lease is not telecommunications and therefore is not part of the cost of providing service to customers, and this Commission has no jurisdiction over that, that's a real estate transaction. Tell me how they --

MR. ROGERS: They could come in and say that that is not a telecommunications service as

telecommunications are defined. However, they nonetheless are required to provide collocation services under the Telecommunications Act. And that is the analysis --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: well, let me just for a second -- you're not required to provide any service in this state, are you?

MR. ROGERS: That's correct. We're not required to provide --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So why do we collect anything? Under that analysis, under that viewpoint, why is it that you have to pay any regulatory assessment fees in this state, because you're under no obligation to provide service in this state?

MR. ROGERS: That's right. And that was actually my very next point, is that ALECs are not required to provide any service. However, if they choose to provide services that are regulated, they should be assessed regulatory assessment fees for those services.

But there are ALECs that are providing collocation in a corporate structure such that collocation is broken out as a nonregulated entity, and there are non-ALECs who are

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providing collocation as a nonregulated service because it is not a telecommunications service, and thus, the Commission does not have the jurisdiction to regulate that service, and those providers that are not ALECs are not required to become certificated.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I mean, if someone is going to come to you and lease collocation space, it is for the precise purpose of providing telecommunications service. Would you agree with that?

MR. ROGERS: No, I do not.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So somebody is going to come to you and lease your collocation service thinking they're going to get a corner office with a nice view to put in and do something totally different than telecommunications service?

MR. ROGERS: There's a very important distinction that staff has not drawn between telecommunications services as they are defined and information services or unregulated services.

And essentially what Level 3 is providing is access to the Internet. They also are

providing interstate services in large part. And so to the extent that you are regulating intrastate revenues, there's mixed jurisdiction here. There's also nonregulated service primarily that is being offered as part of our collocation provisioning.

So the limitations in staff's analysis that says that collocation is related to telecommunications service, which is a new rule that's sort of being made up for the first time as far as I can tell, is not accurate, in that the majority of what Level 3 is providing is not telecommunications service.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: But you get your collocation space from the incumbent LEC. I guess you enter into lease agreements with the incumbent LEC for collocation space.

MR. ROGERS: No, this is a different scenario. We are providing collocation on our own entirely. This is not a function of interconnecting with the incumbent.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay.

MR. ROGERS: I want to go on a little bit, if I may, about the possibility that exists in corporate structuring, in that this is -- it's

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problematic. Staff's position is problematic because it says that the corporation or the company should be regulated rather than the services that are being provided being regulated. And that creates this situation where a company could come to Florida and decide to provide and choose, as an ALEC could choose to provide basic local exchange service, and it could choose to provide collocation. And that same company could create two subsidiaries, one that provides basic local exchange service and one that provides collocation. The basic local exchange service would need to be certificated. The collocation provider would not have to be certificated, and it would not be subject to regulatory assessment fees.

The fact that an ALEC can do that means that just because Level 3 has not done that, it could be treated differently than another company that did choose to set up its corporate structure in that fashion.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Rogers --

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: That brings up a good question, because we have these CLEC hotels out there now. Are we taking the same position with

them?

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MS. BROWN: I'm sorry. I didn't hear the first part. With hotels?

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: We have these private companies out there, and as I understand what they do, they develop a site essentially for collocation. They don't do anything else.

The statute specifically MS. BROWN: addresses that in the one exception that it permits, which is -- which can be found in the -- in two places, primarily in the definitions section, where it says that a provider that provides only facilities to other telecommunications providers is not considered to be a telecommunications company under our statute.

So if there is a company out there that provides only facilities, whether it be fiber optic cable -- for instance, TECO does that in its internal network around Tampa -- or if it just provides an Internet hub, then it would not be considered a telecommunications company. Ιt wouldn't have to be certificated, and it wouldn't be subject to the fees that are based on the costs of regulating a telecommunications

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company.

COMMISSIONER JABER: But that goes right to Mr. Rogers' point, I think, that they've chosen not to set up the corporation that way, and it could be that they're being penalized for not setting up the corporation that way, that they could have established a brand new company affiliated, but it would be a brand new company that would market itself solely for the purpose of providing that sort of hub, Internet or telco services.

MS. BROWN: Well, I wouldn't consider that to be a penalty by any means.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Well, what is the purpose of our collecting regulatory assessment fees from CLECs?

MS. BROWN: From CLECs?

COMMISSIONER JABER: Uh-huh.

MS. BROWN: It's to cover the costs of regulating telecommunications companies, whether they be ILECs, ALECs. The statute doesn't at all say -- add these exclusions that Level 3 would like to add to them.

COMMISSIONER JABER: But Level 3's argument notwithstanding, what would be -- it's to

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1 compensate the agency, the State, for the cost 2 of regulation. 3 MS. BROWN: Yes, the costs of its 4 regulatory activities. 5 COMMISSIONER JABER: Right. 6 MS. BROWN: Which encompass something much 7 broader than only oversight of particular 8 services. 9 COMMISSIONER JABER: Right. And with the 10 ILECs, we definitely have a cost associated with 11 collocation, in that the ILECs are required to 12 provide collocation through the Act, and we are 13 required to make sure that that happens. And in 14 fact, it's part of every arbitration that I've 15 seen thus far. Is that correct? 16 MS. BROWN: Yes. 17 COMMISSIONER JABER: Now, with the ALECS, 18 what part of their agreement with another ALEC 19 or an Internet company for collocation do we 20 monitor, enforce, review? 21 MS. BROWN: Well, there are many things. 22 And I think, number one, collocation is simply 23 the lease of communications facilities, as any 24 telecommunications company that had a telephone

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pole would lease space on its telephone poles to

cable providers.

The regulatory fee statute contemplates assessment of fees based on gross intrastate revenues. It doesn't even say from telecommunications services or anything like that. And its designed to be broad, because the Commission's regulation of telecommunications companies, ALECs, ILECs, payphone providers --

COMMISSIONER JABER: But I'm trying to understand --

MS. BROWN: -- is broad. And if you go through the particular statutes, Commissioner, and you look at it -- and unfortunately, I left mine upstairs.

COMMISSIONER JABER: But, Martha, I'm not talking to you about the statute. I'm trying to understand our review of this agreement. And a lot of it has to do with my lack of understanding of what it is we do with ALECs.

Do we review the collocation agreements? Do we -- is there some work on our part that happens with respect to their collocation agreements?

MS. BROWN: No, there is no -- not that I can think of. But we also have general regulatory authority over service quality for

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ALECs. We have general regulatory authority to preclude anticompetitive behavior, which an ALEC as well as an ILEC can engage in. There are -- we have a lot of regulatory authority that you can't tie to a particular service over customer relations.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Okay. So is your -- MS. BROWN: And all of these things --

COMMISSIONER JABER: So then is your point that our assessing regulatory assessment fees to an ALEC for collocation services, we can justify that by saying that we have the authority to monitor their service?

MS. BROWN: Well, yes. But once again, it's -- Level 3 mentioned a slippery slope. This is a very slippery slope for the Commission to go down to try to tie the costs of regulation to specific services that telecommunications companies can offer. It hasn't been the standard policy for the Commission to do that, and the reason is that we still have the costs to cover all of these broad-based regulatory activities that you really can't tie to a particular service. We will continue to have to assess fees to cover those costs, but the base

upon which we will assess those fees narrows
considerably if you start down this path.

COMMISSIONER JABER: But I'm trying to understand, though, the purpose of collecting regulatory assessment fees. That's the nexus I'm trying to establish. And I thought the purpose of collecting regulatory assessment fees was to compensate the State for work performed.

MS. BROWN: Yes, yes.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Okay. So I'm trying to get my hands around what work we perform for Level 3's collocation agreements, regardless of who's on the other side. Do we require them to file their collocation agreements?

MS. BROWN: No.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Does our staff review any of their collocation agreements?

MS. BROWN: No.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Are they ever included in arbitration matters?

MS. BROWN: No. We don't require ILECs to file their leasing agreements with cable companies to put their cables on their telephone poles either, or fiber from a purely interstate provider in a vault or a conduit.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Right.

MS. BROWN: To me, there's nothing different.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Now, let's talk -- you were going to take me to the statutes. Let me ask you to analyze for me -- there's a statute, 364.01, that talks about the Commission -- that directs the Commission to basically provide a lesser level of regulatory oversight to new entrants. And help me reconcile that with your recommendation. How much weight should I give that statute, Ms. Brown?

MS. BROWN: In this situation?

COMMISSIONER JABER: Yes.

MS. BROWN: When you're not dealing with the substance of the quality of the regulation, I think you should give it not very much weight at all. You should instead look at the plain language of the regulatory assessment fee statute and not try to carve out further exceptions in it that are not there.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Ms. Brown, what if Level 3 rented the space to a grocery store?

MS. BROWN: I think that's arguable, although I do know that incumbent LECs following

the Uniform System of Accounts lease space in their office buildings to businesses that are totally unrelated to the provision of telecommunications service, and they include those revenues as rent revenues in the regulatory assessment fee base.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: So you believe that

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: So you believe that even for Level 3, a CLEC to lease space totally unrelated to telecommunications would still require a regulatory assessment fee?

MS. BROWN: That isn't the question presented here, number one.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I understand that, but I'm trying to --

MS. RROWN: And I wrote in the recommendation that one could argue that leasing space on the sidewalk to a hotdog vendor would not be considered. And I said one could argue that, because I think one could. But one could also argue that other telecommunications providers do include that revenue in their assessment fees, and all telecommunications companies should.

So I don't know the answer. I could argue either way.

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COMMISSIONER PALECKI: What I'm trying to focus on is, I think we would still have a legitimate question if Level 3 rented the space to, for example, a cell phone provider that was in no way interconnected with the telecommunications system at the site. I think it would still be arguable if they rented the space to a telecom company that was just using it for general office purposes. But when they're renting the space to a telecom company that uses it to interconnect with Level 3's system, perhaps it becomes more clear that this is a telecom purpose that should be subject to a regulatory assessment fee.

MS. BROWN: Tagree with that. I think that's true. I'm not certain whether the Commission should ever get into the position of trying to decipher what the business of the lessee is in this circumstance. And I go back again to the poles that hold cable TV cables. It hasn't -- we haven't done that before. Whether we might want to at some point, probably.

Let me make one other point here, and that is, from my review of it, it appears that

including these fees and considering them to be similar to other rental revenues for space in telecommunications facilities, poles, vaults, conduits, is the present practice and policy of the Commission, and it has a good logical base in statutory construction as well as policy.

We are in a declaratory statement procedure here. If, as Level 3 says, this is going to have some basic broad precedential value for our regulation of all ALECs, we shouldn't be here in a declaratory statement. We should be in a rulemaking, because what staff is recommending that you do here is what you have done all along. If you're going to change that and it's going to affect the whole industry, I think we better take a different tack.

COMMISSIONER JABER: But, Ms. Brown, I don't see it as a change. I see it as a distinction. And I'm trying to keep in the back of my mind the focus of the changes in the Florida Act in '95, which was to transition this entire industry into a competitive market. So, yes, we collect regulatory assessment fees from ILECs, but we continue to transition into a competitive market by requiring ILECs to do

certain things to comply with our own statute and also with the Act.

To impose a regulatory assessment fee on an ALEC, when specifically the intent of the changes to our statute was to treat ALECs in a fashion that had lesser regulatory oversight, I can't mesh the two. To impose a regulatory assessment fee smacks of regulation, when I think the direction we've been given is to --well, I know the direction that I've been given is to deregulate.

So I have to -- and I say this really to give the Commissioners a heads-up on where I'm going. I'm not going to agree with staff's recommendation. So for the benefit of the Commissioners, I just wanted you to know where I was and why.

And the distinction -- the reason I say there's a distinction, I agreed with staff's recommendation in the Verizon item, as I recall, because it was -- I was convinced that Verizon was required to publish directories, and Verizon in fact, even though there was an affiliate, held itself out to the consumer as the directory that was backed up by -- I forgot the exact

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words, but something like GTE being the good company, and it really kind of went out of its way to support the directory. And I see that as being a distinction, plus Verizon is an ILEC and was functioning as an ILEC in that situation. So I see this as a distinction. going to support staff's recommendation. COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I would like to ask staff --CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Commissioners, before you

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Commissioners, before you go, we have a lot more questioning on this item, a lot more discussion. We had an item with a time certain at 11:30. Let me hear your pleasure, Commissioner Palecki, about --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let me just do this. Let me make a motion that we approve staff's recommendation. Is there a second? We might can dispose of it;

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Okay. Is there a second?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I tried.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Sounds like we then have some further discussion at least.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, is there a motion to deny it?

COMMISSIONER JABER: Or I can make a 1 2 motion, yes. 3 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Is there an alternate 4 motion? COMMISSIONER JABER: I can move to deny 5 staff's recommendation. 6 7 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Is there a second on that motion? 8 9 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Just for argument's sake, I would like to discuss further what this 10 11 means and the precedential value that it's going 12 to have, because I think --13 COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I would as well. 14 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Okay. So --15 COMMISSIONER JABER: Should I withdraw the motion? 16 17 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Well, you can withdraw 18 it later. 19 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: It's your motion. 20 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Well, actually, there was 21 no second, was there? So we will, I guess, 22 defer further discussion on this particular item 23 and take up out of order Item 25, and then we'll revert back to this item after that, or perhaps 24 25 after lunch, one of the two.

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CHAIRMAN JACOBS: We'll readjourn agenda, and we will now revert back to our discussion in Item 4.

Mr. Hoffman. Mr. Hoffman and Mr. Rogers, you were in the middle of your presentation.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I --

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Actually, I'm sorry. You had a question. You're right.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Questions and perhaps some thoughts beforehand. I guess the reason I wanted to continue this discussion is because, although I understand what we hope in the long run are ramifications of declaratory statements, I somehow go back to the thought that in reality, they don't always work out the way we intend them.

And my concerns, although in principle I hear where Commissioner Jaber is coming from and I think I agree with her, I'm concerned that if it goes as it seems to be lining up, that we need to pay more attention to the kind of distinction that we're going to draw here. And for that reason, I wanted to continue with the discussion. And I guess just to get clear in my

mind, I wanted to ask staff one question for starters, and we'll see how it goes.

We had discussed before about, or it was brought up in the discussion about an ILEC's responsibility to offer collocation. Is the ILEC's responsibility in the law, does that extend to situations absent interconnection with their own facilities? Maybe I'm not being clear. Would BellSouth or Verizon be required to offer collocation in its COs in an event where the company that was collocating wasn't going to interconnect with the ILEC's facilities?

MS. BROWN: It's not my understanding that that would be the case. The requirement for collocation is to interconnect for purposes of access to unbundled network elements and for resale purposes under the Act. There's no --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: With one zone. I mean, I guess what I'm trying to get at is that there is no -- there's no third entity contemplated in that.

MS. BROWN: No.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Any responsibility or obligation to collocate that exists now in the

law is related with an interconnection to one's own facilities.

MS. BROWN: Yes, that's true. I don't think the ILECs have any responsibility to offer collocation to Internet service providers who are not competitive carriers.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: All right. Having said that, if an ILEC decided to gain revenues from holding out those -- and there was a way -- and I understand they have to reserve space for real interconnections and so on. But if there was a case where the ILECs were involved in that type of activity, what would be our reaction to it? What would be our --

MS. BROWN: In typical fashion -- and maybe Denise can back me up on this. The ILECs would book that as rents revenues and pay regulatory assessment fees on it.;

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And you had mentioned before -- so that falls into the category of them renting office space, you know, in their office buildings to people that are unregulated.

MS. BROWN: Well, to me, it's more like leasing space in their poles and vaults and conduits for telecommunications-related

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facilities.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: We should stay away from that, although I think you opened the door to perhaps -- I don't know if you threw up a flag to the rest of the Commissioners, but you certainly threw it up to me. If I had a telephone pole, could I carry on that business without a certificate?

MS. BROWN: If all you did was lease your telephone pole to other telecommunications providers, you would have an exemption under the statute.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Martha, here's the problem that I'm having. I'm seeing a distinction, and I'm not seeing the logic beyond what the staff has already suggested, like let's rope everything -- you know, we're casting a wide net for some reason or another. And this kind of highlights one of those considerations. It may not be limited to collocation alone, and that concerns me for other reasons. You don't want a rain of declaratory statements coming in.

But I think I understand what Commissioner

Jaber is saying, in that this is -- you know, I

think I can buy into the whole rent, real estate

transaction notion, especially in a case where

-- and maybe I'm adding a finer point to a

distinction, but especially in a case where it

may just be a pass-through situation, where

Level 3 is not -- there is no interconnection to

their system involved, if they are just

providing space.

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And I say that because there's plenty of people that are out there -- I think the Chairman pointed it out. There's a lot of people out there that are doing this very same thing, and they're not certificated, and I don't think they should be, and therefore not subject to RAFs or any type of regulation at all. And I'm having trouble making the jump of why one and not the other.

MS. BROWN: Well, from my perspective, the guidance comes from the statute itself. And it says, notwithstanding any provisions of law to the contrary, each telecommunications company licensed or operating under this chapter shall pay a regulatory assessment fee based on gross intrastate business, gross revenues from intrastate business. And that's the standard. And if what we're doing by narrowing that

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standard is creating extra statutory exceptions to the regulatory assessment fees, that's one concern I have.

And then, of course, I wanted --

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Ms. Brown, after that concern, based upon the statutory provision you just read, if Level 3 had broken out a separate real estate business that was separate and apart from its telecommunications operation and it was called Level 3 Real Estate, then we would not have an issue with regard to regulatory assessment fees here, would we?

MS. BROWN: No.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: So it's because of this statutory language that specifically uses the words "each telecommunications company" and "gross operating revenues derived from intrastate business" that is the reason for the staff's recommendation here.

MS. BROWN: Yes. Yes, that's correct, and that is because Level 3 is a certificated regulated company subject to the responsibilities and benefits of Commission regulation. I don't think you can argue that this -- one can argue cogently that this is

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anything other than intrastate business. It's business from leasing communications facilities in Florida.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: So under staff's recommendation, clearly, Level 3 would need to pay the regulatory assessment fee for this past year. But if they tomorrow split out a separate corporation, a real estate company, and did the same exact thing, allowed their building to be collocated by another telecommunications company, then they would not have to pay the regulatory assessment fee next year.

MS. BROWN: Yes, probably for two reasons, one because then they would just be providing telecommunications facilities to others really on sort of a wholesale basis, although that's probably a bad word to use, to other telecommunications provider, and they would be exempt from the definition of telecommunications company, for that reason as well as for any other.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Was Level 3's operations, their actual physical plant that we're talking about in this docket, were they certificated under 364.33?

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1 MS. BROWN: Yes. They're certificated, as 2 I understand it, as an interexchange carrier and 3 an alternative local exchange company. COMMISSIONER PALECKI: And that particular 4 5 statute requires that anyone before building, 6 construction, or operation of a 7 telecommunications facility needs to go through 8 the Commission and get a certificate, and that 9 did happen in this particular instance? 10 MS. BROWN: Yes, that's my understanding. 11 COMMISSIONER PALECKI: So there would be 12 some level of regulation that has already 13 occurred just to open up their operation. 14 MS. BROWN: Yes, and there is a lot of 15 other regulation that Level 3 enjoys from the 16 Commission, not necessarily --17 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: That's a word --18 COMMISSIONER DEASON: I don't know of 19 too many folks that we'regulate that enjoy it, 20 but --21 MS. BROWN: Which was why I kind of 22 laughed. 23 Well, there are some benefits to the 24 regulation. Of course, there are some 25 responsibilities as well. But you can start at

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the beginning of 364 and go through a whole series of statutes in 364 that apply to and that require the Commission to engage in activity that costs money that affects directly the ALECs. First of all, 364.01(2) talks about the Commission's regulation of telecommunications companies, all telecommunications companies.

Promoting competition in local telecommunications markets doesn't just -- it doesn't at all, I think we all realize, mean lesser regulation of alternative local exchange companies. It might be different, but it's not -- our regulatory activity hasn't lessened any with our duties to promote competition.

There's also the question of transitioning to competition, which requires regulatory oversight, which benefits alternative local providers, which can't be tied to a particular service. Resolving disputes between companies and their customers, we do that for all telecommunications customers.

And staff has told me in the interim that while we do not now approve at the outset collocation agreements between ALECs and their customers, we do have Chapter 364.19, which says

that we can make reasonable rules to regulate contracts between telecommunications companies and their patrons. And if there were allegations of adverse effects to the development of competition in Florida or anticompetitive behavior on the part of Level 3 or another ALEC, staff informs me that they would certainly consider addressing those allegations. That's just the beginning. There's more.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Ms. Brown, can I interrupt you there just to clarify, to make sure I understand what you just said, and then I have a follow-up question. You said we would all agree that there isn't less oversight for alternative providers?

MS. BROWN: It's different. On a global basis, Commissioner, the regulatory activity that the Commission engages in now pursuant to 364, the changes in '95 and the Telecom Act, is different than rate of return regulation, rate base regulation. It's not necessarily less.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Okay. Let me --MS. BROWN: I can turn --

COMMISSIONER JABER: Then explain to me

what (4)(d) means, because (4)(d) uses exactly those words, and I can't reconcile what you're saying with this, promote competition by encouraging new entrants into telecommunications markets and by allowing a transitional period in which new entrants are subject to a lesser level of regulatory oversight than local exchange telecommunications companies.

MS. BROWN: I think where we're talking past each other, Commissioner, is that I'm considering this from the Commission's perspective, what are the Commission's regulatory costs. Those have not lessened with different regulatory oversight. And in a substantive instance where we don't rate base regulate ALECs, the oversight is lessened, but there are increased impositions on the Commission's resources ithat --

COMMISSIONER JABER: Generally speaking -MS. BROWN: -- come from implementing this
regulatory statute.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Okay. And that brings me back to my initial question in trying to act on this declaratory statement. I thought with declaratory statements, you have to answer the

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specific question that's presented to you, and that's where I'm coming from. I am not trying to set -- I'm not trying to open any doors; I'm not trying to close any doors; I'm not trying to establish policy here today.

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Level 3 has asked us a very specific question. And in trying to decide that, and the crux of my motion, which still stands, is that I can't understand from you all what costs of regulation we're trying to be compensated for in Level 3's collocation services. That's the very narrow focus. That's a very specific question that I'm trying to answer, and that's the crux of my motion. It's not to establish ILEC RAFs going forward.

MS. BROWN: Well, that's -- I'm concerned that that's what will happen if we do go forward there.

I would also tell you that I don't consider that to be the question that's being asked by this declaratory statement petition. It's are these collocation revenues gross intrastate revenues for purposes of collecting regulatory assessment fees, which are designed to cover the

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whole global costs of Commission regulation. They're not specifically directed to specific services. They are -- here is where I think we end up. I think we end up with a little nit-picking, nicking away at the scope of the base, and we end up with plain old telephone service customers paying the full costs of all of the Commission's regulation that cannot be attributed to just plain old telecommunications service.

COMMISSIONER JABER: And in a declaratory statement --

MR. BROWN: And I still have more on my list.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Ms. Brown, in a declaratory statement, it behooves the companies to be real specific in asking the question, and we will act on that. Perhaps, though, in some sort of policy-making proceeding, whatever that needs to be, in a workshop or whatever, we need to revisit or visit our policy with respect to regulatory assessment fees.

But, Mr. Rogers, what is the specific question you're asking us to address in this regulatory statement?

1 MR. ROGERS: The petition that we filed 2 requests that the Commission find that the 3 regulatory assessment fees that are being 4 applied or sought to be applied by staff to 5 collocation revenues do not constitute gross 6 operating revenues derived from intrastate 7 business according to the statute, in other 8 words, to exclude revenues from collocation in 9 the regulatory assessment. 10 COMMISSIONER DEASON: And why is that? 11 Because it's not intrastate or it's not your 12 business? 13 MR. ROGERS: It is our business --14 COMMISSIONER DEASON: As a regulated 15 entity. It's not the business of a regulated 16 entity, and it's not intrastate? 17 It is not a telecommunications MR. ROGERS: 18 service, first and foremost. 19 COMMISSIONER DEASON: No, you just read the 20 statute. It says from intrastate business. 21 MR. ROGERS: Correct. 22 COMMISSIONER DEASON: You're implying that 23 means intrastate regulated telecommunications 24 business? 25 MR. ROGERS: What we would recommend

essentially is a reading that says intrastate telecommunications business. Telecommunications companies should pay regulatory assessment fees on gross operating revenues derived from intrastate telecommunications service.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And the staff reads it a little broader than that. Is that --

MS. BROWN: Yes, yes. There's nothing in the statute that implies otherwise. And I believe that the breadth of the statute reflects the breadth of the Commission's regulation, that it covers a much broader scope, and that it's not simply telecommunications service, and it's not particular services, because you can't -- if we went down that path where we tried to say, "Okay. Which is a regulated telecommunications service? How much does it cost to regulate that service?" we're missing all of the broader things. And it is the policy, and imposing upon basic telecommunications customers the full burden of Commission regulatory costs that I foresee if we go down this path.

Now, let me just say one thing -
COMMISSIONER JABER: What does that mean?

What? We're imposing on who?

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MS. BROWN: If we go down --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: We're narrowing the base.

MS. BROWN: -- this path and we nick away at everything, we end up -- because in Level 3's petition, they make a distinction that I could never really quite figure out between required services and regulated telecommunications services. And I can envision, just as we are here today dealing with this because of one little bit of language in the Verizon declaratory statement, that we would end up with everyone saying, "Well, all you can really assess your costs on are basic local phone service. Forget all of the rest."

COMMISSIONER JABER: You know, I am really trying to stay focused on the declaratory statement, and there has to be a way to do that without making some sort of policy statement. And if it's such a policy, why aren't we assessing regulatory assessment fees -- Level 3 cannot be the only ALEC that has established internal hotels for these kinds of services. They can't be. I would be very impressed if they were, because --

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MS. BROWN: Well, those ALECs should be paying regulatory assessment fees on that intrastate business.

COMMISSIONER JABER: And have you been assessing that?

MS. BROWN: I think what you're trying to get at, I see that you're concerned about imposing costs of regulation upon ALECs in a regulatory environment that you foresee as directing you to lessen the regulatory impositions on ALECs. And if you want --

COMMISSIONER JABER: And add to that -that's absolutely right, Ms. Brown, and then add
to that regulation that is not on the service
currently, because, see, I guess I'm
interpreting it even more than you are with
respect to imposing RAFs. It's actually
imposing regulation. The collection of
regulatory assessment fees is regulation.

MS. BROWN: Well, it's the indirect costs of the broader substantive regulation, I would say. But if you like that idea, I don't think you ought to do it in this declaratory statement. If you're going to change your policy here -- and I know you don't want me to

argue this again, but I do think this is -there isn't much new with leasing of
telecommunications facilities as revenue of
telecommunications companies. And if you want
to make the distinction, I really would -- I
think the law requires you do it in a rulemaking
proceeding, because it will have tremendous
precedential effect. And it would also need the
careful analysis that a rulemaking --

COMMISSIONER JABER: In that sense, we agree with you that there is a policy, I can't find the policy. Where is it we've articulated that policy?

MS. BROWN: Well, I don't know that we have articulated it, but in our practices, that is what we have done. And the statute itself is broad enough to, I think, more logically contemplate that practice than the one urged by Level 3.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me ask you this question. First of all, let me make this observation. I think there are a lot of ramifications, potential ramifications of going down this path, and maybe they need to be explored.

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But one of those questions that I have, and I'll just raise it at this point, is, let's assume for a moment that there is a regulated entity which is providing a regulated service in the State of Florida, and they happen to lease facilities from Level 3. Now, the payment that they make to Level 3, Level 3 being another certificated company, that payment, they reduce their revenues that they then -- that reduces their base that they then turn and apply the percentage and submit regulatory assessment fees. And it seems to me that there has to be fees collected somewhere along the line.

So if we exempt Level 3, then it is no longer exempt from the company that is leasing from them, and they're going to have to pay, and they may have a dog in this fight and want to present that argument to the Commission. It seems to me that there may be incumbent companies out there that are saying, "If you exempt collocation services from regulatory assessment fees, perhaps to be" -- and that is a question that could be debated. I could see both sides. But they probably could come forward and say, "To be competitively neutral,

you should not tax or collect regulatory
assessment fees on my collocation activities."

And I think it could be expanded to the example you already gave, that perhaps telephone companies — incumbent telephone companies would say, "well, we should not have to pay regulatory assessment fees on pole attachment rentals that we get from cable TV companies." And the list could just go on and on. And maybe those are legitimate questions. I just — I'm not comfortable going down that path within the confines of what's in front of us today.

MR. HOFFMAN: Mr. Chairman, may I respond to just a few of the points that have been discussed?

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Were you done with your statement, Commissioner?

Go right ahead, Mr. Hoffman.

MR. HOFFMAN: Just very briefly. First of all, the Commission — first of all, Commissioner Jaber is right that the statute and the uniform rules require the Commission to react and respond to this petition for declaratory statement based on the facts that are alleged in this petition. Is it prudent to

look beyond the petition in terms of what the ramifications may be in the future? No question about it. But not within the framework of issuing an order on this petition. This petition should either get a yes or a no based on the allegations that are in this petition.

And Ms. Brown had mentioned before lunch that it would be inappropriate to do a declaratory statement, but perhaps the best thing, if it is appropriate, is to move to rulemaking. And I'm not sure that the Commission has agreed with that proposition.

But let me just say, many times in the past, one that comes to mind is in the electric industry, master metering, the Reddington Towers petition for declaratory statement. The Commission answers the question that is posed by the petitioner and in that case decided that it was appropriate because of the ramifications to move to rulemaking. So these are not mutually exclusive remedies by any means.

The Commission has no prior policy on the specific question that is raised in this petition, so it would not be departing from it.

As Commissioner Jaber said, it would not be a

question of revisiting. It would be a question of visiting.

And in terms of the statute itself -- and this is my last comment. In terms of the statute itself, the words in the statute are "gross operating revenues derived from intrastate business," and you've heard a lot about that. But the statute also specifically says that the fees are to be related to the cost of regulating such type of regulated company, and those fees for ALEC collocation are zero. They should be zero, because there is no work done by this Commission in terms of regulatory oversight of ALEC collocation agreements.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: What have we been doing for the last two hours if not working on this issue, Mr. Hoffman?

MS. BROWN: Thank you.

MR. HOFFMAN: Well, I can tell you this, Commissioner Deason. As you know, because you've been involved, there have been generic proceedings on collocation, and they've focused exclusively on ILEC obligations concerning collocation.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Didn't this

Commission certify the telecommunications facility in the first place? I mean, that was Commission action right there, was it not?

MR. ROGERS: I would like to comment on that, on your comment about Level 3 obtaining certification. It's not a function of obtaining certification to provide collocation specifically. Level 3 provides telecommunications services. They also provide nonregulated services under the same corporate entity.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Well, let me interrupt you for one second. The statute says "may be not begin the construction or operation of any telecommunications facility." Before you could even construct that facility, I believe you had to get certification.

MR. HOFFMAN: Commissioner, the statute with respect to ALECs says the Commission shall grant a certificate to an ALEC upon a showing that the applicant has sufficient technical, financial, and managerial capability, period. And so there are, it so happens, a number of certificated ALECs in this state that are placeholders. They don't have the first

facility out there in the State of Florida, but they have certificates.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Mr. Hoffman, that means
-- I don't think that's inconsistent with what
Commissioner Palecki has said. They couldn't
have constructed a telecommunications facility.
But I think -- and not to interrupt the
Commissioner, but my question is a little bit
more fundamental. If we stick to what
Commissioner Jaber's position is, which is to
stay focused on the question of the petition,
the question of the petition carries with it
some implication that collocation isn't a
telecommunications service. Now, I would like
that -- I mean, are we answering that question,
in essence? I would like to know. I have that
question.

COMMISSIONER JABER: That is a question, but I'll tell you that the reason I made the motion is that I'm looking at all of 364. For me, I have to. I can't pick a statute out of 364 and say it applies to this ALEC. I'm looking at 364, the purpose that I think the changes associated with 364 were, and I'm trying to answer this question.

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But I'll tell you, Mr. Hoffman has said something that -- and I think Ms. Brown was going down this road anyway. What's wrong with acting on this declaratory statement and initiating some sort of proceeding to look at this issue in a bigger forum? Ms. Brown, isn't the Verizon item on appeal?

MS. BROWN: Yes.

COMMISSIONER JABER: And if what you're saying is correct, this could start a whole new flood of petitions and --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Call it a rash.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Yes, a rash. There you go. Then perhaps we should go ahead and establish some proceeding that would accommodate that kind of input.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: A RAF rash.

COMMISSIONER JABER: But the reason I made the motion, Commissioner Baez, was because I see it as a unique situation that this ALEC fits into, in that they're not required to provide this collocation service, number one, and number two, there isn't anything that we do as a state to monitor their provision of collocation service. We don't look at these agreements. We

don't review the agreements.

And with respect to the company getting a certificate, they have to have a certificate to provide telecommunications service in Florida. The issuance of the certificate to me has no impact on the regulatory assessment fee issue we have before us.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And I don't disagree with the way that you've framed the question. My concern is that our basis or our determinations in answering that question in a favorable manner to the company, given their circumstances, still leaves us a little wide, because we're in effect saying that collocation is not a telecommunications service.

Now, I can argue that that's true under some circumstances, and in particular, in situations where, as I; had mentioned before, there is a pass-through relationship, that all that's being provided to the equation is collocation service. But, for instance, in a situation where the collocation is being provided part and parcel of interconnection to the company's own system, then I think that would militate more to the posture that the

1 ILECs are in. I mean, they're providing collocation as a result of their providing interconnection. And I think that for me. that's an important distinction. And I fear -- and my concern over the question that we would have to answer under this

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petition isn't narrow enough to capture, you know, what your purposes are. That's my concern, and I'm not sure that I'm comfortable with agreeing with the basis for Level 3's assertion that collocation is not a telecommunications service under every circumstance. And I --

MS. BROWN: Commissioner, if I may --

COMMISSIONER JABER: I'm confused as to why we even have to reach that point. Why do we have to define it?

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: If we can make it clear that that's not what we're defining, then --

COMMISSIONER JABER: I don't know that we can do that at the end of the day. But it was not --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, it's clear as mud.

ACCURATE STENOTYPE REPORTERS, INC.

COMMISSIONER JABER: It was not my intent

to define anything but to say that 364 does provide the Commission with direction to encourage competition through lesser regulatory oversight. And in fact, I think the words are, encourage competition through flexible regulatory treatment among providers, to encourage new entrants into the markets by allowing a transitional period through the use of lesser oversight, and to encourage all providers of telecommunications services to introduce new telecommunications services free of regulatory impediments. And that really is where I'm coming from.

And I would add to that that it's not an imposition on our part or the statute's part that this ALEC provide collocation services.

Now, whether tomorrow we get a company that requires us -- a decision requires us to define whether that service is a telecommunications service, I don't know. But the purpose of my motion and the rationale behind it is not to define what the telecommunications service is, but to recognize that the State of Florida hasn't done any work, regulatory work associated with what this ALEC is proposing to do.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And I don't think you've said anything that I disagree with. I think what I'm having trouble with is, you know, when you declare -- you're saying that based on these circumstances, this is how we view things, and this is the result that we get, and these circumstances -- and maybe the company can address it, but it seems to me that these circumstances are stretched into an area that we may not want to be associated with in terms of a determination for these circumstances.

You know, I don't hear -- I didn't hear the company making the distinction on a specific basis that whatever they're providing as a pass-through, I keep calling it, but where they're not involved in interconnection necessarily, where they're only providing pure collocation services, that that's the situation or the circumstances that we're looking at. We're looking at all collocation services, and that can offer a set of circumstances that serves as the basis for another company to provide those same circumstances and for us to have to be consistent, and I am not -- I guess that's where my discomfort is.

And I don't know what authority or what ability we have to -- I mean, I think we've gone a long way in just discussing it, which really was my original intent. But I don't know to what extent we can limit those circumstances now in a way that I'm comfortable with.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: So we can perhaps bring this back around -- you had a question?

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I keep going back to Section 350.113, and that is the provision that requires that fees shall, to the extent practicable, be related to the cost of regulating such type of regulated company. And we have no data in front of us regarding the amount of fees that we're talking about, and not just with Level 3, but on a statewide basis, and we have no data in front of us on what the cost of regulating is. And; I find it very difficult to make a decision under that section of the statute without some sort of data in front of me.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let me make an observation or maybe raise a question, or maybe both. That particular section of the statute, I've always interpreted that that was to try to

bring some parity or equity between the various industries that we regulate, not necessarily companies within an industry and that's why we have different regulatory assessment fee percentages.

I notice that apparently it's -- 15/100 of 1% is what is applied in this situation. And we do have evidence for this company. And if we look just at what's in front of us, Mr. Hoffman, we're arguing about \$572. So I think the issue is much broader than that. I don't think you all would -- I mean, your hourly rates have probably already exceeded \$572.

MR. HOFFMAN: But, Commissioner, we are enjoying this regulation. We're enjoying it.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: But I thought that that statute was to try to bring some equality or parity to the various industries. And if you'll notice, water and wastewater has a much higher rate because of the fact that we expend maybe not more hours, but more hours per revenue generated by that industry.

Now, I would agree in a perfect world, a cost causer would pay what he or she causes for the system. And if we go down that road a long

distance, we may end up -- for example, when we send an auditor to a company to audit their books, we would send them a bill for the number of hours that the auditor was there. I don't think we want to get to that. I mean, what we have here is a surrogate that says a percentage applied to intrastate revenue is a good surrogate for what that company is causing in terms of costs.

Back in the days when we didn't have competitors and we just had certificated regulated companies, in the year that BellSouth came in for a rate case, I'll bet you they caused more costs in that year than what they paid in regulatory assessment fees. But hopefully they stayed out for two or three years, and then the next year maybe what's Verizon now, GTE would come in, and during that year we processed their rate case, they didn't pay their own way, but it all evened out over the years.

And I would submit that the bottom line of all of this is that we're still going to recover the costs of our operations, and if we change the base for one company, it's going to be made

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up by another company, so it's taking from one and giving to another. And maybe that's the right thing to do. I'm not saying that it's not. But it's a much broader question, I think, than what's in front of us today.

MR. HOFFMAN: Commissioner, just very briefly, I think that the passage you're looking at in Chapter 350 and that Commissioner Palecki cited is a general statement of the Legislature that applies across the board to every industry regulated by the Commission, and if you apply that -- and there's sort of, I think, an agreement amongst everyone here that the general purpose of these regulatory assessment fees are to pay for the costs of regulation. And I think that there's also consensus that when you're talking about the cost of regulation of Level 3's collocation arrangements, that cost is So you get to where I think you think we should get when you calculate a regulatory assessment fee by Level 3 by taking the piece that has no regulatory cost associated with it and excluding it.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Commissioner Deason raises an interesting point, because ultimately,

if we do this in a vacuum or we do this in a piecemeal fashion, we're reconfiguring a formula that we don't know how it will work out, and we may wind up where your primary certificated RAF may cause you some impact that you aren't asking for today if you get this relatively minor impact. So that's something that needs to be given some thought and perhaps further discussion before we embark on that journey.

Were there other thoughts or discussions, Commissioners?

MR. HOFFMAN: Mr. Chairman, I would just say that, again, focusing in on that criteria in Section 350.113(3) that applies across the board to all industries, that the Commission does not even need to reach what appears to be the more difficult issue of whether collocation is a telecommunications service, but for purposes of this petition, can focus on that sentence, where there is agreement that there is no cost of regulation associated with Level 3's collocation arrangements.

MS. BROWN: Commissioners, I would just like to remind everyone that that's not the standard. The standard in the regulatory

assessment fee is the cost of regulation of the telecommunications company.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: It's not a per service thing. It's revenue for a company. If a company is certificated to do business in Florida, they're regulated, and we have -- as a surrogate of the cost they impose, we just say we're going to impose a percentage to your intrastate business revenue.

MS. BROWN: Yes, Commissioner, I agree with that assessment.

COMMISSIONER JABER: How are we able to determine for this company what's interstate and what's intrastate? How do you make that calculation for the basis of assessing the regulatory assessment fee?

MS. VANDIVER: In a lot of companies they have very good records, and they keep track of that themselves. I don't believe Level 3 keeps track of it except on a gross basis. A lot of companies do it that way. And as long as they can provide us with a reasonable allocation methodology and show us how they came up with it, we'll allow that. But they have to have an allocation methodology --

COMMISSIONER JABER: So it's an honor system. You're going to take their word for it.

MS. VANDIVER: No. We'll usually look at their reasoning for it. Usually they have to have a reason for it. They can show us based on some sort of history of what other companies do or something else. And in some sense it's an honor system that it applies to that particular system. But we're seeing more and more companies keeping specific intrastate records.

MS. BROWN: And that's for their intrastate business and interstate business, not the interstate business of another customer of theirs.

road, it could go down the other way too, which is, if you disagree with their numbers, we're going to send auditors; and we're going to look at their records, aren't we? We might be in a position of doing that with all of the ALECs that provide different, unique services to penetrate the telecommunications market.

MS. VANDIVER: We're already --

MS. BROWN: It would increase the cost of regulation.

COMMISSIONER JABER: And it would be self-imposed to some degree, wouldn't it?

MS. BROWN: I'm not sure I understand.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Well, if we start collecting regulatory assessment fees for revenues associated with new services, new arrangements between telecommunications companies, and they submit to us what their guesstimate for the revenues is, and staff disagrees with any of those amounts, you might be in an awkward position of having to send auditors to look at their books and records to verify that information; right? And that increases the costs. That's an increased cost to the agency.

MS. VANDIVER: Right. We're already periodically -- we're already doing a sample every year of all the regulatory assessment fee returns, and so we're auditing all the large companies on a periodic basis, as well as a sample of the small.

COMMISSIONER JABER: You do a random sample for the small ALECs?

MS. VANDIVER: Of all the telecommunication companies.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Oh, okay. It's random?

MS. VANDIVER: Random. Except -- yes,

right. We do the very large IXCs and ILECs, all

of those every three years, but we're doing a

random sample of everybody else.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Let me ask staff, if the statutory scheme is that new entrants should be subject to lesser regulation, and very clearly it is, why is the regulatory assessment fee the same for new entrants as well as for the existing companies?

MS. BROWN: Well, I think it's because of the statute that directs us -- directs the way we impose regulatory assessment fees. If the statute -- the regulatory assessment fee statute said "and impose lesser regulatory assessment fees on certain telecommunications companies," then we would do that.; But it --

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Let me tell you what my difficulty is. I see a statute that says that we should lighten up on our regulation, and I think if we're going the lighten up on our regulation, we should probably charge less. At the same time, I see very clear language in 364.336 that says that each licensed

regulatory assessment fee on its gross operating revenues derived from intrastate business. And to me, renting out a portion of your facility, whether it's for a grocery store or to collocate another telecom company, is part of gross operating revenues derived from intrastate business. It doesn't appear that the statutes give us very much discretion there.

MS. BROWN: I agree with you, Commissioner. And I would also point out that the beginning of 364.336 is, notwithstanding any provisions of the law to the contrary, each telecommunications company must pay the fees based on that.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: But I have a hard time when another statute, another section tells us to lighten up on regulation, that at the same time we can't lighten up on the costs we impose on those new entrants as well.

MR. HOFFMAN: Commissioner Palecki --

MS. BROWN: That is -- to me, that is a big policy, rulemaking issue. And if you want to go down that road where you consider the costs, as you were saying before, you don't have numbers before you to be able to make that kind of

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determination today. That's the kind of thing really I think the APA requires that we do in a rulemaking as well, because it has such direct effect on all participants and substantially affected companies. And as Commissioner Deason was saying, incumbent companies might want to participate in that and put their perspective and point of view. I don't think there's anything to preclude you from rulemaking on that, but I wouldn't make that kind of decision in this declaratory statement petition. I would deny it first and then --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I've got a solution to this whole problem. We just don't collect regulatory assessment fees, and when somebody files something in front of us, we just tabulate all the hours we spend on it. If there's an arbitration, we calculate all the hours, and we split the bill between the two parties that brought it to us, and maybe that would be an incentive for them to settle their disputes and not bring them in front of us. I'm being facetious. I'm not --

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: What if we just charged admission to the agenda conference?

COMMISSIONER JABER: You know, Commissioner Deason, don't some state commissions get compensated for their --

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: That got a howl from the back.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Commissioner Deason,

I think some state commissions are compensated

directly by the companies for the attorneys they

have to hire, I think in Louisiana. So you

might think you're being facetious, but it ain't

a bad idea.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, statutorily, we've got to do what our statute says, and I think staff is recommending we do that according to their interpretation of the statute, and there are different interpretations.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Well, we had a motion.

But before that, Mr. Hoffman, you had a point.

MR. HOFFMAN: I had one comment I wanted to make, Mr. Chairman, and I think Mr. Rogers has some conclusory comments.

Only in response to Commissioner Palecki's issue, I would just point out that the language in the regulatory assessment fee statutes in Chapter 350 was passed in 1980. The language in

the regulatory assessment fee statute in Chapter 364 was passed in 1990. And the more comprehensive and expansive language that Commissioner Jaber has been reciting throughout this item where the Legislature decided to open up the local markets was passed in 1995. And I think it would be an appropriate exercise of statutory interpretation to interpret these regulatory assessment fee statutes mindful of the more recent acts of the Legislature to open up the market --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Hoffman, though, wouldn't it be just as reasonable to assume that if the Legislature wanted us to change the way that we collect regulatory assessment fees depending upon the type company that falls within that industry, they would have rewritten that section of the statute as well?

MR. HOFFMAN: That is also -- I don't know if it's more reasonable or less reasonable, Commissioner, but it's certainly an argument that one could make.

MR. ROGERS: I simply wanted to say that it strikes me that we've made it more complicated than it needs to be, that at its very basic

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level, the regulatory assessment fee needs to be associated with the costs of regulating services. And to the extent that a service is not regulated, there should be no fee associated with it. And that's really the critical consideration when you're talking about the hotdog stand vendor on the sidewalk. If vou're talking about a subsidiary or a regulated company having a hotdog stand, that should not be assessed, because that is not a regulated service. And that is really the critical situation. And there's really no getting around it, in my estimation. You cannot make a decision without looking at the nature of the service.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: well, let me -MR. ROGERS: As much as you would like to.

COMMISSIONER PALEGKI: Let me ask you a question about that argument. I don't see anywhere in Section 364.366 the language you're referring to regarding regulated services. I keep seeing "gross operating revenues derived from intrastate business." And renting out a portion of your plant seems to me to be gross operating revenues derived from intrastate

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business.

MR. ROGERS: But I would -- I guess I would focus more on the telecommunications company language, which presumes that the telecommunications company offers telecommunications services. Telecommunications services has a very finite legal definition that has been set out, and those are the only things that should be assessed. To the extent a certificated carrier is offering unregulated services, it is not acting as a telecommunications company. And so the term "telecommunications" is critical and I think is the determinative factor.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Thank you.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Staff, I'm sorry. Are there any unregulated services, any example at all that are not included in the regulatory assessment fee calculation?

MR. ROGERS: Internet.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Not necessarily Level 3, but anybody else in this room.

MS. BROWN: Yes.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Was that a yes?

MS. BULECZA-BANKS: Could you please repeat

that for me?

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Are there -- I keep seeing, you know, arguments on both sides of this, and one of the tacks that the staff and even some of the Commissioners have expressed is, you know, it's to the company, all right, and the statute says -- is a very general -- it states that in a very general sense. It says intrastate business. It doesn't say intrastate telecommunications business. And I'm just curious if the staff knows of any instances in which an intrastate business performed by a regulated company is not included in the calculation of RAFs.

MS. BULECZA-BANKS: If you're talking generically about regulated utilities, it is -- I mean, there are entities where they may sell or lease water heaters; or appliances or do some other business on the side.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: These are separate entities, separate corporate subsidiaries or --

MS. BULECZA-BANKS: They have it set up both ways. They have some that were actually part of the actual --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Regulated --

MS. BULECZA-BANKS: -- entity, and it would be below the line. Those revenues and expenses associated with that would be below the line.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: So there's a practice

MS. BROWN: I'm not familiar with any of that in telecommunications, though, that I can think of.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, even though we're in the telecommunications -- you know, this may be a declaratory statement, but I can't get off the notion that this goes a little bit farther than that.

COMMISSIONER JABER: See, Commissioner
Baez, if we ask the company that question, they
might be afraid to tell us, because we'll assess
regulatory assessment fees.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, you know, it cuts both ways.

MR. ROGERS: Well, I would -- I think I wanted to respond initially to your question that, you know, we've sort of assumed that collocation is associated with telecommunications services, and it really is not to a large extent. And to the extent that

they are data center providers who are providing only Internet related services, that is the reason in part that they are not regulated entities.

Level 3 does offer certain regulated telecommunications services, but their collocation services are associated much more heavily with unregulated services. And so to the -- I just want to make that clarification, that there has been, it seems to me, some sense that you want to say that collocation is directly related to and go down that slippery slope, related to telecommunications services. That is not in fact the case. It's more directly related to Internet services, interstate services, and the provision by other carriers, so it's not even Level 3 providing the telecom services.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And I think you reminded me of something that struck me as part of -- I don't know if it was in the petition. I don't remember, but that you can't distinguish one from the other. And I think for my purposes and certainly the trouble that I'm having with this, that's a very meaningful fact, because I'm

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not interested -- I guess I wouldn't be interested in casting a net over all of it. I believe that there are distinctions that can be made, and you just raised a very good one. And I think that that may be the case with some other companies.

And what I hear Ms. Banks saying is that, you know the Commission does have at least a history, if not a practice of -- that there are examples, whether they be in the telecommunications industry or others, where intrastate business and operating revenues from intrastate business are not included for RAF purposes. And so again, I mean, to me, that says that there is some leeway as to how to interpret the language in the statute, because the presumptions or the assumptions that the company is making don't seem all that unreasonable. There are some things that they may be involved with that don't constitute telecommunications service, and really, that's the reason that we regulate them. If thev weren't providing telecommunications service, we would have no business with them, or they would have no business with us, rather.

But again, that goes back to my original concern, which is that, you know, saying that collocation is not a telecommunications service absent some clear distinction that we're making, I'm just not comfortable with. And I hate to say it, because I've been battling with this even as we've been sitting up here, but I don't know that I can support answering the question that the company has posed in this case in the affirmative because there isn't that much of a —— because there isn't that deep a distinction.

MR. ROGERS: But a broader -- maybe the Commission is more comfortable saying that ALEC collocation is not a regulated service, and thus --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: That's not the question you asked us, though, is it?

MR. ROGERS: Well; I think it is in -- I think it is. We've stated that regulatory assessment fees should not be imposed on collocation because it is not a regulated service.

MR. D'HAESEELER: Commissioners, I'm told that with at least one large ILEC, nonregulated intrastate revenues are counted. They're not

excluded. Say, for example, like inside wire, 1 2 yellow page advertising. 3 COMMISSIONER JABER: That's an ILEC. That's --4 MR. D'HAESEELER: Pardon me? 5 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: That's an ILEC. 6 7 MR. D'HAESEELER: An ILEC; right. 8 MR. ROGERS: Which is the Verizon 9 declaratory statement instance. I mean, that's 10 exactly the fact scenario in that case, which we 11 think is instructive and should be applied here. 12 That same rationale really should be followed by this Commission in this declaratory statement as 13 14 well. 15 COMMISSIONER DEASON: I'm sorry. I'm sorry. You said that they are included or 16 17 are not included for regulatory assessment fee 18 purposes? 19 MR. D'HAESEELER: They are included. 20 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Are included. 21 MR. ROGERS: They are included, because 22 they are required to be provided. Because they 23 are required to be provided, they are a 24 regulated service. 25 MS. BROWN: No, Commissioner --

MR. ROGERS: Yellow pages is the example that --

MS. BROWN: It wasn't just yellow pages.

MR. D'HAESEELER: The other one was inside wire, and if they offered CP. And I'm sure there are other examples.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: My guess is that if they provided -- as an example, years and years ago -- and I'm showing my age now. Gulf Power was in the appliance business. I think it was below the line. I doubt that we collected a regulatory assessment fee. But in retrospect, we probably should have, because in every rate case we spent hours and auditors' time going in and making sure there was not a subsidy from the general body of ratepayers subsidizing their appliance sales business, and we had to allocate the square footage that they utilized in their buildings for it. And they were imposing a cost that probably should have been recovered.

So, I mean, there may be exceptions both ways.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: So let's figure out how to bring this in for a landing. I wish it were that easy.

1 We did have a motion. We did not have a 2 second for that motion. 3 COMMISSIONER JABER: We took a break. 4 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Yes, we did. 5 Is there a second? 6 Very well. Do we have an alternative 7 motion? 8 COMMISSIONER DEASON: I made one motion, 9 and it did not get a second. I don't know if I 10 can make it again or not. I don't know what the 11 procedure is, parliamentary procedure, but --12 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: I think you can restate a 13 motion. 14 COMMISSIONER DEASON: I can try to float 15 the motion again? 16 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Yes. 17 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Or maybe somebody 18 else should make a motion. 19 COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I can make the 20 motion. 21 I keep hearing the question posed by the 22 company as to whether this is regulatory charge 23 or a regulatory function, and I want to ask 24 myself that question, but the statute is pretty 25 specific, and the statute uses the term "gross

operating revenues derived from intrastate 1 business." I view this dollar amount as being 2 gross operating revenues derived from intrastate 3 business. Based upon the language of the 5 statute, I would move the staff's 6 recommendation. 7 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Second. 8 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: It has been moved and 9 seconded. All in favor, aye. 10 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Aye. 11 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Aye. 12 COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Aye. 13 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Aye. Opposed? 14 COMMISSIONER JABER: For the reasons stated 15 earlier, I dissent. 16 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Very well. Show that it 17 passes on a four-one vote. 18 MR. HOFFMAN: Thank you, Commissioners. 19 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Thank you. 20 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Hoffman, we'll be 21 sending you a bill. 22 (Conclusion of consideration of Item 4.) 23 24 25

## CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

4 STATE OF FLORIDA)

5 COUNTY OF LEON )

I, MARY ALLEN NEEL, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings were taken before me at the time and place therein designated; that my shorthand notes were thereafter transcribed under my supervision; and that the foregoing pages numbered 1 through 77 are a true and correct transcription of my stenographic notes.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, or relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or financially interested in the action.

DATED THIS 26th day of july, 2001.

MARY ALLEN NEEL, RPR

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