1	FLOR1	BEFORE THE IDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
2	In the Matter of:	
3		OWER CORPORATION'S DOCKET NO. 000824-EI
4	EARNINGS INCLUDING E	EFFECTS OF
5	PROPOSED ACQUISITION CORPORATION BY CAROL	INA POWER & LIGHT.
6	REVIEW OF FLORIDA PO COMPANY'S PROPOSED N	
7	CORPORATION. THE FOR	RMATION OF A FLORIDA
8	TRANSCO, AND THEIR E POWER & LIGHT'S RETA	AIL RATES.
9	REVIEW OF TAMPA ELEC	
10	IMPACT OF ITS PARTION GRIDFLORIDA, A FLOR COMPANY, ON TECO'S F	IDA TRANSMISSION
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15		VOLUME 1 PAGES 1 THROUGH 163
16	PROCEEDINGS:	HEARING
17	BEFORE:	CHAIRMAN E. LEON JACOBS
18		COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON COMMISSIONER LILA A. JABER COMMISSIONER PRAIL TO L. PAEZ
19		COMMISSIONER BRAULIO L. BAEZ COMMISSIONER MICHAEL A. PALECKI
20	DATE:	Wednesday, October 3, 2001
21	TIME:	Commenced at 9:30 a.m.
22	PLACE:	Betty Easley Conference Center
23		Room 148 4075 Esplanade Way
24	DEDODTED DV	Tallahassee, Florida
25	REPORTED BY:	JANE FAUROT, RPR Official FPSC Reporter
		DOCUMENT NUMBER-DATE

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FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 2630 OCT-45

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PROCEEDINGS

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Good morning. We will call this hearing to order. Counsel, read the notice.

MR. KEATING: Pursuant to notice issued August 20th, 2001, this time and place have been set for a hearing in Docket Number 000824-EI, review of Florida Power Corporation's earnings including effects of proposed acquisition of Florida Power Corporation by Carolina Power and Light; Docket Number 001148-EI, review of Florida Power and Light Company's proposed merger with Entergy Corporation, the formation of the Florida Transmission Company (Florida Transco), and their effect on FPL's rates; and Docket Number 010577-EI, review of Tampa Electric Company and impact of its participation in GridFlorida, a Florida transmission company, on TECO's ratepayers.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: We will take appearances.

MR. LONG: Harry Long appearing on behalf of Tampa Electric Company.

MR. WILLIS: I'm Lee L. Willis of the firm of Ausley and McMullen, P.O. Box 391, Tallahassee, Florida, 32302, appearing on behalf of Tampa Electric Company.

MR. CHILDS: Matthew Childs of the firm of Steel, Hector and Davis appearing on behalf of Florida Power and Light.

MR. FAMA: Jim Fama, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae,

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	appearing on behalf of Fronta rower corporation. I would also
2	like to enter the appearance of Jim McGee, in-house with
3	Florida Power Corporation.
4	CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Fama? You said Fama, correct?
5	MR. FAMA: Fama, yes. Thank you.
6	MR. McWHIRTER: John McWhirter, Jr., assisting Vicki
7	Gordon Kaufman on behalf of the Florida Industrial Power Users
8	Group.
9	MR. BRYANT: Bill Bryant of the firm of Katz, Kutter,
10	Haigler, et al, representing Enron Corporation. And I would
11	also like to enter the appearance of Ms. Natalie Futch with the
12	law firm.
13	MR. McGLOTHLIN: Joe McGlothlin of the McWhirter
14	Reeves law firm, 117 South Gadsden Street, Tallahassee. I
15	appear for Reliant Energy Power Generation, Inc.
16	MS. PAUGH: Leslie Paugh of Landers and Parsons, 310
17	West College Avenue. Appearing with me is Diane Kiesling. We
18	are appearing on behalf of Calpine Corporation, Duke Energy
19	North America, and Mirant Americas Development, Inc.
20	MR. HOWE: Commissioners, I'm Roger Howe with the
21	Public Counsel's Office appearing on behalf of the citizens of
22	the State of Florida.
23	MR. TWOMEY: Mr. Chairman, Mike Twomey appearing on
24	behalf of Thomas and Genevieve Twomey, Buddy L. Hansen,
25	Sugarmill Woods Civic Association, and as well I filed a

1	petition to intervene on behalf of Louis D. Putney, who is a
2	customer of Tampa Electric Company on September 21st. I spoke
3	to Mr. Willis this morning, they have no objection, so I assume
4	that intervention is appropriate. Thank you.
5	CHAIRMAN JACOBS: We will take that up. We have some
6	other intervenors. You can either step to the side mikes or
7	come up to the front table, either way you like.
8	MR. ANTONACCI: Commissioner Jacobs, Pete Antonacci,
9	Gray Harris & Robinson, appearing for Publix in Docket 10577.
10	MR. FRAZIER: Seann Frazier from Greenberg Traurig,
11	also appearing for Publix.
12	CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Seann I'm sorry, I didn't get
13	your last name.
14	MR. FRAZIER: Frazier.
15	CHAIRMAN JACOBS: I'm sorry?
16	MR. FRAZIER: Frazier.
17	CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Very well. Here it is, I've got
18	it.
19	MR. STRICKLAND: Wes Strickland for Foley & Lardner,
20	106 East College Avenue, Suite 900, Tallahassee, Florida,
21	32301, appearing on behalf of Seminole Electric.
22	MR. FRANK: Dan Frank of Sutherland Asbill & Breenan
23	in Washington, D.C. on behalf of Walt Disney World Company.
24	CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Very well.
25	MR. KEATING: And Cochran Keating appearing on behalf

of Commission staff, as well as Bob Elias. 1 2 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Very well. Mr. Moyle is listed. I 3 assume he is going to participate, as well? 4 MR. MOYLE: Jon Moyle, Sr. --5 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Oh, we get the first team. 6 MR. MOYLE: As my grandchildren said this morning, the real Jon Moyle. And also Cathy Sellers and Dan Doorakian 7 8 of the law firm of Moyle, Flanigan, Katz, Raymond & Sheehan. We are here on behalf of PG&E National Energy Group, and 9 10 Competitive Power Ventures Atlantic, Limited. Thank you, Mr. 11 Chairman. 12 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Very well. Thank you. Staff, I understand we have a couple of preliminary matters? 13 14 MR. KEATING: There are three motions or petitions 15 that are outstanding at this point. As Mr. Twomey mentioned his petition to intervene on behalf of Louis Putney is pending. 16 17 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Is there any opposition to that? MR. WILLIS: No opposition. 18 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Very well. Show it granted. 19 MR. KEATING: And I believe that the petition to 20 21 intervene of Publix in Docket 010577 is still pending, as well. 22 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Any opposition to that? 23 MR. LONG: No objection. 24 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Very well. Show that granted as 25 well.

MR. KEATING: Finally, on staff's list of preliminary matters is staff's motion to strike portions of the testimony of Korel M. Dubin that has been filed in this docket.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Very well.

MR. KEATING: And we are prepared to address that.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: We are going to take that up now unless Commissioners have any other preference on that. Here is what I would like to do. I would like to limit argument to -- this is -- we will go eight minutes per side, okay. And you can reserve time if you need. You may proceed.

MR. KEATING: I think that will be plenty of time.

Commissioners, staff's motion to strike is based on two orders of this Commission that we believe establish the parameters of this proceeding and we believe that Ms. Dubin's testimony concerning a cost-recovery or proposing a cost-recovery methodology for certain costs associated with GridFlorida goes beyond those parameters.

First, to step back and to see how this proceeding started, Florida Power and Light, Florida Power Corporation, and Tampa Electric requested an expedited proceeding for review of GridFlorida, and they requested that it be done in a generic docket. The Commission granted the request for an expedited proceeding, but not for a generic docket. In granting the request, the Commission found that the review should take place within the existing dockets that we are here at hearing on

today, and established a Phase I and Phase II proceeding for those dockets with the exception of the Tampa Electric docket, for which there is no Phase II rate proceeding established at this time.

In its order establishing this proceeding, the Commission stated some parameters for what would be done in Phase I and Phase II. And we believe in pertinent part the Commission stated we will not in Phase I allocate any of the costs or benefits associated with GridFlorida. And in Phase II, we will include cost-recovery.

FPL has argued in its response to our motion that it is not proposing cost-recovery, only a cost-recovery methodology. However, we believe that different cost-recovery methodologies can result in different allocations by retail rate class. As the Commission stated in its order, Phase I will not involve an allocation of costs or benefits associated with GridFlorida, so therefore even if you accept FPL's argument that it is not asking for cost-recovery, only cost-recovery methodology and therefore that it is within the parameters of the Phase I proceeding, we still believe that given the language in the order that it falls outside of Phase I.

The second order that staff has relied on is the order establishing issues in this docket. We conducted an informal issue ID with the parties and we conducted before the

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prehearing officer a formal prehearing issue identification conference to identify the issues to be addressed in testimony in this proceeding. That order does not include an issue concerning cost-recovery or concerning a cost-recovery methodology.

In fact, Florida Power and Light had proposed an issue that is very similar to what is listed as Issue 4 in the prehearing order and in the order establishing issues today which asks what the estimated costs of GridFlorida are to FPL's ratepayers. In FPL's proposed issue it included the phrase at the end of Issue 4, "And how should these costs be recovered?" That phrase was not included in the issue list that was set forth in the order establishing issues.

Now, Florida Power and Light has suggested in its response to our motion that the order establishing issues includes language suggesting that the parties could approach these issues as very broad issues. We believe that reading the order, however, to allow FPL to address cost-recovery, even if it is just a cost-recovery methodology, would be inconsistent with the order from this Commission establishing the bounds and the parameters of the Phase I review in these dockets. I think it is important to note that no reconsideration was sought of either order.

In preparing for this hearing, the staff has, I believe, reasonably relied upon these orders as defining the

scope of the proceeding. And we believe that allowing the testimony at this time to be put into the record puts not only the staff, but other parties at an unfair advantage -- or disadvantage. And we believe that allowing the testimony would be inconsistent with the order establishing this proceeding and the order establishing the issues in this proceeding.

I just want to make one final point. In the deposition of Ms. Dubin, she asserted that when asked -- and this is stated in staff's motion, the exact question and answers -- how a cost-recovery methodology was somehow subsumed in Issue 4 as it is currently worded which asks what the estimated costs are to FPL's ratepayers. She said that in order to determine the estimated cost to FPL's ratepayers you have to have a method to do that. And we believe that is simply not true.

In fact, we believe it is in the public interest to not address cost-recovery methodologies until Phase II. In Phase II we will have more concrete cost data and cost studies that will allow staff and the Commission to more fully consider the impacts of these costs on FPL's ratepayers and to establish a cost-recovery methodology which most equitably allocates those costs to ratepayers.

In summary, we believe that allowing those portions of Ms. Dubin's testimony that address a cost-recovery methodology would be inconsistent with your orders, first,

establishing this proceeding, and, second, establishing the issues in this proceeding, and would not be in the public interest. As an alternative to striking the testimony, staff has suggested in its motion that the testimony could simply be deferred to Phase II of this proceeding. And perhaps another alternative, although it's not listed in our motion, is that it simply clarified the cost-recovery methodology is not a Phase I issue. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: What would be the procedure if you were to defer the testimony to Phase II simply to be held in the docket, but not considered in your order?

MR. KEATING: Yes, I suppose that if you chose that route, FPL could choose to withdraw the testimony and refile it at Phase II, in Phase II, or it could leave it as is.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Very well. Thank you. Mr. Childs, you may proceed. I guess I should ask before you begin are there others who want to speak as proponents of the motion?

MR. TWOMEY: Mr. Chairman, I filed a joinder on behalf of my clients supporting the staff's motion, and I won't reiterate the fine points Mr. Keating said, except just to say that there is a time and place for everything, and the time for the testimony that is sought by staff to be excluded, I think, is in the second phase and not the first. And we support the Staff's motion. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Thank you. You may proceed, Mr.

Childs.

MR. CHILDS: Commissioners, having you address the testimony of Ms. Dubin in Phase I is important to Florida Power and Light Company because it addresses a methodology for cost recovery that we believe is appropriate and necessary, not just appropriate but necessary because of the cost circumstances associated with implementing GridFlorida. We were asked -- in the first order which set forth the phasing of this hearing, we were asked to tell you what we believe was necessary in order to go forward with GridFlorida to be addressed in Phase I. We were asked to tell you that, and we did. And this is one of the things that we raised.

As to what we are asking for, I want to spend a moment on that. We are not asking that you change rates, we are not asking that you allocate costs to rate classes. We are not asking that at all. What we are asking is simply that you look at a procedure that is presented to you, which incidentally is a procedure that you already have and have used for a number of years in connection with the recovery of capacity costs. And we are suggesting to you not that there are -- what we want you to set the rate at, we are not asking you to set any factor. We are saying this is a procedure and we need to have some authorization or recognition from the Commission that this is an appropriate procedure if and when.

I mean, we are not presuming that you are going to

approve or find prudent the pursuit of GridFlorida. But if you do, in order for us to be able to go forward we want some assurance that there is a method for cost-recovery. One of the reasons is, and I say it's important, is that if you did approve GridFlorida, and if the company is then confronted with the decision of what does it do, it is not going to be in a position to incur costs if it is not going to address even the methodology to recovery those costs until some later date. We believe we were asked to tell you that. We were asked to petition for that relief, and we did.

Now, as to the interpretation of the orders, I want to spend a few moments on that. First, I want to go to the order setting the issues out. All parties met, and we had several sessions with the prehearing officer who had a great deal of patience with all the parties in this docket as to their issues in several meetings and several filings by all of the parties. And at the end of that process the prehearing officer issued an order.

This order, which is Number 1485, set forth the issues which staff identifies and says that none of those issues include any specific mention of a cost-recovery methodology. They're right. There is no specific issue that covers that. We proposed an issue, we proposed an issue to the prehearing officer that we believe was appropriate to cover cost recovery. And in setting forth the issues and resolving

all of the disagreements with all of the parties about what issues were going to be addressed in Phase I, the prehearing officer said, and I am going to quote, he said -- this is right before he listed the issues -- said I believe it is in the best interest of all parties that the issues remain as broad as reasonably possible thereby allowing all parties the opportunity to address their issues in the positions taken on the broad issues. The issues as stated below -- and he lists them all -- are sufficiently broad as to encompass or subsume all of the issue statements provided by all of the parties and allow the individual utilities to present their cases consistent with the joint order.

Well, we did have an issue and it did include the method that we wanted to address how the costs should be recovered. And we took this to say just exactly what it says, that all parties will have the opportunity to address their issues in the positions taken on the broad issues. This is something the Commission does from time to time when they say that something is subsumed within an issue. But it went on beyond that and said in addition that these issues are stated sufficiently broad as to encompass all of those issues. I don't think there is any dispute or should be any dispute as to whether our issue is appropriate.

Now, I want to come back to that other order in just a minute, but I want to tell what you we did to try to

implement that. When we filed our prehearing statement we identified this issue in our position. We identified that in our prehearing statement for all parties and ultimately filed the testimony of Ms. Dubin. And if you will look to the prehearing order, you will see that we still have that position in the prehearing order. Page 56 of the prehearing order, which asks what the costs are, what are the estimated costs to the utility ratepayers of its participation in GridFlorida.

The issue that is in our prehearing order says FPL maintains that such incremental GridFlorida transmission charges are properly recoverable through the capacity cost-recovery clause. Explicit approval of the recovery of the incremental transmission costs through a recovery clause is required for FPL to proceed with RTO development. So we have a path. We have the path from the beginning where we believe we were asked to state the issue, we did. The prehearing officer attempted to resolve difficulties as to multiple issues that have been raised and he reached an accommodation and said he was going to state those broadly, but parties could address their issues and their issue statements were subsumed within the broad issues. We did that.

We filed a prehearing statement. We identified this in our prehearing statement. That's how it got in this prehearing order is it was in our prehearing statement. At no time until the motion to strike was filed had there been an

objection raised. And I want to come back to the first part which staff relies upon, which he is the argument that the original order circumscribes the proceedings such that you should not be entertaining this testimony now.

I want to read because I think it is a little

I want to read because I think it is a little different than saying that the Commission said that it wouldn't consider anything that had to do with rates. And at Page 3, I quote an order which is -- I quote a portion of the order which is not in the motion to strike, I don't believe, or that portion is. And what the Commission said is we will not change retail rates or allocate any of the costs or benefits associated with GridFlorida in Phase I.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Childs, which order are you reading from?

MR. CHILDS: I am reading on Page 5 of Order 1372.

And, you know, I understand, and I'm not trying to suggest that there is anything other than a cost-recovery methodology.

That's what it is, and the staff has acknowledged it is a proposed methodology. But we are not proposing to change rates. The argument was made earlier that the issue shouldn't be addressed and we ended up with the direction from the prehearing officer as to the scope.

The other point that I try to make in the response to staff's motion is that the Commission in this Order 1372 addressed what was going to happen three times, three separate

occasions. And I'm going to read, however, from -- first, I'm going to read from the ordering paragraph after the discussion. The ordering paragraph said, ordered that each utility FPC, FPL, and TECO shall no later than June 28th file a separate petition specifically requesting such affirmative relief with respect to its participation in GridFlorida as it believes appropriate. No later than July 30, 2001, each utility shall file direct testimony and exhibits in support of its petition. The Commission will make a decision on each petition within 90 days following the filing of the utilities' direct testimony and exhibits.

Now, we didn't file on that date because the prehearing officer granted an extension of time, but I think this sets forth the parameters. And I want to reiterate, we believe it is important, we told the Commission it was important, we petitioned for it. We were told that the issues -- our issue statement could be subsumed within the broad issues that had been listed and that is what we did. We proposed that it be subsumed to no objection. We listed that in our prehearing statement, we filed testimony, and it is now in your prehearing order.

One other comment, I guess, and that is as to the deposition questions to Ms. Dubin. Staff sets out an exchange, and I don't think that that sets the basis for a decision made. It's one point, but I think the staff is wrong. The staff says

that Ms. Dubin's comment that you need to set the methodology 1 2 is circular in order -- that you need to set the methodology in 3 order to know what the costs are that the customers will bear 4 is circular. And I say it is anything but circular, because if 5 you don't have a way to determine the costs will be borne by 6 the customers then it's really kind of an empty exercise to 7 determine what the costs are that will be borne by the 8 customers, because you don't know. And that's what she thought 9 she was doing was to present a methodology and when asked that 10 question that was her answer. And I think it's correct, but I 11 don't think it is the whole story. 12 We urge that you not defer this. We urge that you hear this and that you decide it and that you decide it 13 14

favorably so that we will be in a position to go forward with GridFlorida if you decide that doing so would be prudent.

Thank you.

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CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Mr. Childs, is it the premise -and I don't want to put you in a position of having to state opinions based on Ms. Dubin's testimony, but it would occur to me that an important condition to reach your position is that cost recovery is an important aspect of the viability of GridFlorida, is that a correct?

MR. CHILDS: I think it is. I think it is important to the viability of GridFlorida because, Commissioner, we were asked to tell you what we needed to know to go forward and that is what we are telling you.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: And here is my point. One of the fundamental elements in my mind of the discussion we are having goes to the idea that we are embarking on this brave new world and to the extent that we are asking the retail ratepayers of these companies to essentially buy into this brave new world, we want to give them some assurance that there is no undue risk, I will put it that way.

So it would occur to me that the very debate that we are having has to do with to what extent there is any extra cost recovery that would be put onto retail ratepayers as a result of going into this exercise, rather than in my mind the idea that there is an extra cost recovery and it should absolutely occur in a prescribed manner. Do you get my distinction?

MR. CHILDS: Well, I think I do. And I think I agree with most of what you said. We are not asking you to prejudge whether you think it is prudent by authorizing cost recovery. We are not asking you to do that. We are asking you that as an issue, we are asking you to determine that going forward with GridFlorida as proposed is the right thing to do and we are prudent. We are asking you to do that.

If you make that decision, then we are saying would you -- because we are going to have to take some action next.

If we are going to go forward with GridFlorida, we are going to

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have to incur expenses to do that. We are saying would you address -- after you determine it is prudent, would you address a method for us to recover costs. We are not saying don't set any cost recovery now. We are not proposing that you change -and you set anything in a clause or change rates at all, we are simply saying would you make a decision that this is an appropriate methodology to recover the costs of GridFlorida so that -- and that is one of the things the testimony goes into is to try to tell you why we think that is necessary because of the volatility of costs, because of the way the costs are going to be structured. So I'm not suggesting, and Florida Power and Light is not suggesting that you do anything to impose costs on customers, or to agree with us to impose costs on customers until and unless you find that going forward with GridFlorida is appropriate.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Very well.

MR. CHILDS: But we are trying to avoid that gap in the decision, that if you decide that it is appropriate and we don't come back until some future time and we are then confronted with having to make the argument all over again about the methodology. We are in significant doubt as to what to do in the interim.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: I understand. Commissioners, any questions? I had offered the opportunity for proponents. Are there any opponents of the motion who would like to speak, as

well? I'm sorry, you had a question?

COMMISSIONER JABER: It's to staff. I guess I have a clarifying question, too. The staff filed a motion to compel. Is there a separate staff that is going to advise us on this?

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: No, actually I was not going to ask for a recommendation from staff since they proposed the motion.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Okay. Well, my question to staff on the motion to compel, is there -- regardless of what FPL's response to the motion is, just a bigger picture, is there a way -- is it possible that the cost methodology information could help us in figuring out where the costs could be mitigated? That would be my only concern. I don't want to -- I don't want to leave an opportunity out for the Commission where it is possible that the methodology actually helps us in the cost/benefit analysis.

I have made clear from the beginning I am interested in looking at cost/benefit, you know, analyses and looking at the prudency. And I'm not, quite frankly, concerned with the arguments you make in your motion to strike, nor the response. To me it's bigger than that. Are we precluding an opportunity for the Commission to form where there might be some mitigation in this if the Commission finds that some form of RTO is appropriate?

MR. ELIAS: Well, I think that that would be a Phase II issue. When we are looking holistically at all aspects of

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the utilities' operations and we have an opportunity to look at the specific costs and various functions.

COMMISSIONER JABER: But what if you get to Phase II and you find out because there is no way to mitigate the costs it wasn't a prudent thing to do, prudent thing to participate See, something -- just to borrow a word from Mr. Childs -is this a circular argument? What if you get to the very end of the proceeding and you find out this is so cost prohibitive that it is not feasible for the state and not a good idea for the state?

MR. ELIAS: And those were the sorts of things that we had talked about when we suggested that considering it in the context of the retail rate proceeding was going to give the Commission the best information. But the Commission's decision was to break it up into two phases, so, you know, the decision was made to do it that way and we are trying to make the best we can of it.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let me ask a question and I will direct it to staff at this point. First of all, just a quick clarification. When was the motion to strike filed?

MR. ELIAS: The day after the deposition, or two days after the deposition, and the prehearing conference.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: What date was that?

MR. ELIAS: September 19th.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: September the 19th. I was

under the impression that -- and maybe I was looking at it too simplistically -- but that the way we went about this in this bifurcated approach was basically to look at the broad policy issues associated with an RTO development within the State of Florida and that we would defer consideration of the actual rate impacts. And when I say rate impacts, I'm talking about actual cost recovery, dollars recovered and how those costs are going to be allocated to customer classes. Is that basically correct?

MR. ELIAS: I think that is absolutely correct. I think that is clear from the Commission's orders and the issues that have been identified thus far.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: All right. Given that broad understanding of the nature of the bifurcation, I'm having some difficulty understanding why a question of cost-recovery methodology, not the dollars or how those dollars are allocated, but a methodology, how that falls outside the scope of the broad policy implications of an RTO development.

MR. ELIAS: I do not think that given the bifurcated nature of this proceeding, that you can draw a bright line between -- or if you are going to draw a bright line anyplace, it's going to be at costs, because when you get into methodology, then there are all kinds of other rate related considerations that are dependent upon information and issues that are not resident in this phase of the proceeding.

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COMMISSIONER DEASON: But Issue 4 is directly on costs, and we have to have an evaluation of cost and benefits at least if we are going to avoid the criticism we have levied against at FERC, we are going to have to do a cost/benefit analysis ourselves.

MR. ELIAS: And we are prepared to do that. But the question of how those costs are ultimately recovered from or allocated from customers is not dependent upon an assessment of what the dollar costs are.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Elias, I think we are talking past you. We are not -- I don't envision in this proceeding weighing the costs, looking at the costs, or any of that. The methodology may be significant to the cost/benefit analysis. It might be that one methodology is better than the other in determining whether the RTO is a good idea or a bad idea for the state.

Everyone could take us by surprise and say they are not going to seek cost-recovery. I would just be pleased as punch. And if that were the testimony, then that would weigh positively on my mind with respect to the benefit to the state. That is an example of methodology, how they intend or not intend to recover the costs might be important to whether this is good or bad for the state.

MR. ELIAS: You know, and I can't disagree that if they are not going to seek to recover the costs then obviously

1 that changes the equation in terms of cost-effectiveness. 2 as we understood the Commission's decision it was that we were going to look at costs, and costs versus benefits to the state, 3 4 and that once we had made an affirmative determination on that 5 basis, that this was -- the utilities' actions to date were 6 prudent and that this made sense for the people of the State of 7 Florida, then we were going to in the context of a full review 8 of the two larger investor-owned utilities rates decide what methodology might be appropriate for recovering and what method 9 10 for recovering those costs would be appropriate. 11 12 13

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CHAIRMAN JACOBS: That decision in and of itself, the decision in Phase I that there is prudency attached to actions, doesn't that also have attached with it some assurance of cost recovery?

MR. ELIAS: In one form or another, absolutely. We have an obligation to allow the utility an opportunity to recover prudently incurred costs in one form or another. Whether it's through base rates, whether it's through a clause, whether there are some set-offs that are appropriate or what have you. But, yes, the decisions in this phase do carry some weight as far as the prudence of the costs that will be incurred.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Mr. Elias, we have a lot on our plate in Phase I, and some really momentous decisions that need to be made both by the staff and the Commission.

of your concern that just as a pragmatic matter we already have enough and this is an additional issue that can wait until the second phase?

MR. ELIAS: In a word, yes. The timing of the costs and the recovery of the costs is -- right now I think people are talking about a start up at the earliest a year down the road, so the costs that have been incurred to date by and large are being deferred. And, you know, the benefits, it has always been our supposition that the benefits to the extent that they are would be timed to match up with the recovery of the costs.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Now, as far as cost recovery is concerned, my own opinion is I don't mind hearing the testimony. I'm not sure in this phase I want to be locked in on determining cost-recovery methodology, but I certainly don't mind hearing the testimony with the idea of making a decision in Phase II. Do you have any problem with instead of striking the testimony, just this Commission or the Chairman making a ruling that the issue will be decided in Phase II?

COMMISSIONER JABER: Well, let's be clear about the issue, because Issue 4 is already identify in Phase I. And I wouldn't be interested in deferring that Issue to Phase II because Issue 4 is critical. What are the estimated costs to the utility's ratepayers of its participation in GridFlorida, that is 50 percent of the cost/benefit analysis.

MR. ELIAS: Absolutely. And we see recovery and

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methodology for recovering those costs as being separate and distinct from the question of what the costs are.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: But let's get back, and I think Commissioner Palecki may be making a good point in the sense -and I was thinking about this, as well -- by allowing the testimony, I do not think that the Commission is making a decision that we are going to decide based upon the evidence we get over the next three days whether we should or should not allow recovery through some type of a cost-recovery mechanism. It may be that we get evidence and we feel very comfortable with that and we do want to take action, or it may be that we are not and we decide that we will not take action on that.

I don't think that by allowing the testimony we are saying that we are absolutely going to vote up or down a recovery mechanism. And as I have said all along in this whole docket, the way I look at this is that I call this the comfort seeking docket. I think the Commission is seeking a comfort level with an RTO development as to whether we have enough comfort to make a decision on it and to try to give some comfort to the utilities, because in all honesty, they are placed in an uncomfortable position between two potentially conflicting regulatory agencies when it comes to an RTO.

We are going to take evidence, and to the extent that we get enough evidence that we are comfortable giving guidance to our utilities, it may be that they are willing then to make

a decision up or down on an RTO. Maybe they are willing to battle the FERC or maybe we are willing to give them enough guidance and comfort that they are willing to go forward with an RTO. I don't want to make any decision at this preliminary stage that is just going to preclude us from making a decision to giving whatever comfort level it is. And that comfort level may be zero on the scale of from 1 to 100, or it may be 100. My guess is it is going to be somewhere between the two.

But that's the problem that I'm having. I want to hear the testimony. I may decide that there is not enough information to make a decision in this phase and it has got to be deferred. But I want the option to make the decision, and by excluding the testimony I think then we are saying we are not going to make any decision on cost-recovery methodology at this point. And so I guess having said that, I would move that we deny the motion to strike.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Before we get there --COMMISSIONER JABER: Commissioner Baez has something

to say.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I just wanted to say something. And part of it, part of my difficulty as a prehearing officer, part of my difficulty with a motion to strike and certainly with the companies' responses is that both made good points, valid points from different directions. And after hearing Mr.

Childs couching of what the reasons were that they needed it,

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and certainly having my own words thrown back to me is a sobering experience, as well, I am somewhat persuaded by his argument.

My concern is this, this is one of those issues for me where we are confronted with what we did mean at the time when we took this vote to expedite the process and now we are seeing the consequences of that. I'm not smart enough to -and certainly not at that time to have separated the cost recovery, or what will be recovered from how it will be recovered. I realize that that is entirely possible, and I see your point, Mr. Childs.

My main concern is this, although we have now proceeded with these dockets on a consolidated basis. I'm concerned that even though this motion to strike only deals with testimony that FPL has provided, and while I am perfectly comfortable hearing testimony now, and as certainly some of the Commissioners here have -- several of the Commissioners here have suggested, you know, perhaps at the end of the day we do decide that we don't have to address that particular question, but certainly hearing the testimony may help us on some broader questions. I am concerned about whatever prejudice might come to the companies that did not necessarily interpret the broadness of the issues to such an extent and we may be in fact, you know, cutting out similar testimony on the other two dockets that we have here.

Now, I think there is a way of dealing with that. I mean, certainly the companies are free to file it under a Phase II. Except, of course, for TECO, who I think is particularly prejudiced in this instance because they don't have -- you know, if we are going to be dealing with cost-recovery methodologies in the next two days, I don't believe -- and Mr. Willis can correct me if I'm wrong -- but I'm not sure that there is any testimony by the company addressing it, if they had ever any intention of addressing it.

MR. WILLIS: There is not any company testimony on that, but we do not feel prejudiced by the presentation by Florida Power and Light at all.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I guess in this case if you can address my concerns and certainly Florida Power, as well, are there any -- sorry to drag you all into this, but are there any concerns, or would you have done it any differently, or was your interpretation of the broadness of the order different such that we don't have your testimony on a cost methodology?

MR. WILLIS: No, our interpretation is not any different than Mr. Childs.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: You just chose to treat it a different way?

MR. WILLIS: That is correct.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: I echo. In fact, that was exactly the point I was going to bring out, Commission Baez. We would

have to survey the whole community of participants in the dockets on the very question you just asked. And I have a real concern that if we -- I don't have any problem at all leaving the option there as to hearing testimony, but I am absolutely concerned that if at the end of this proceeding we choose to render a decision based on the testimony in the record, that we will have put ourselves at risk of -- or actually put parties at risk of some level of prejudice because they didn't have prefiling opportunities. I would doubt that depositions other than staff's deposition of this witness would have broached this subject.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, Mr. Chairman, certainly we have heard from TECO, and I don't know what Mr. Fama is going to offer up at this point, but there is a subsequent phase to this. I think that these three dockets all along have had, you know, a little bit of a domino effect. I mean, one broad decision on one docket is certainly going to impact a similar decision on the other docket. And I don't think this is any --this particular issue might not be any different, but I am comforted -- assuming hearing from Mr. Fama, certainly -- that they probably would have an opportunity to deal with it adequately at a subsequent date.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: It is my understanding from the context of discussion we have had thus far, and I think it is anticipated by the testimony that we would take as an

affirmative issue the relevance of cost-recovery to the prudency of RTO formation and consider at least whether or not the proper and most appropriate manner of cost-recovery is as proposed by the witness of -- or by Ms. Dubin. That is the issue that concerns me. That if we are to consider that issue at the end of this testimony, that we would not have given all parties an opportunity to address that issue.

MR. CHILDS: Commissioner, it may be inappropriate for me to comment on that at this time, but --

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: We asked a lot of questions of staff, I was going to given you a chance to come back, so go ahead.

MR. CHILDS: As to your concern, let me try to make clear we raised this in our position on our prehearing statement. We filed the testimony, and this testimony of Ms. Dubin that staff seeks to strike addresses this point. All parties had an opportunity to respond to that testimony and didn't. No party except the staff to my recollection even pursued any questions on it. And if you look at their statement of position, most parties -- I mean, we have that stated, we came to the prehearing conference and addressed it, the testimony had been filed and exhibits were identified, and 'they had an opportunity to file and I don't think they did, or they didn't.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Thank you. I'm sorry, were you

done, Commissioner?

MR. FAMA: Chairman Jacobs, excuse me, could Florida Power state its position on this issue?

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Go right ahead.

MR. FAMA: Commissioner Baez asked about it. Florida Power supports the procedure being proposed by Power and Light and their witness, Ms. Dubin. And Mr. Southwick has a very brief paragraph in his testimony that indicates that we support the same pass-through mechanism for recovery of the costs.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Thank you. Commissioners, I have inquired of general counsel and been informed that while it is within the purview of the presiding officer to rule on this motion, it could come back very expeditiously under a motion for reconsideration. Because of the importance of the issue and the obvious interest of the Commissioners, I am prepared at the moment to go ahead and put it before the full Commission for several reasons.

First of all, this whole process is an attempt to expedite our delivery of some manner of decision on these issues, and so to make this decision and then have to come back on a motion for reconsideration would in my mind defeat that purpose. So I am prepared to move forward and take this at this moment in an effort -- and I would take, I would consider that to forestall any process to come back for a motion for reconsideration on this matter.

(Simultaneous conversation.)

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: I assume then there is no

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opposition to doing that. Go ahead, Mr. Bryant.

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MR. BRYANT: Bill Bryant for Enron. This Commission is wise enough to take information and then deal with it in the course of the proceeding, and eliminating the information from consideration just means that you won't have it in front of you to accept or reject. And so, I mean, I don't see -- it seems like we are in an expedited proceeding, we do want to move forward and get a decision.

And, Commissioner Jacobs, you mentioned the brave new world and you're right. There are a lot of activities right now on parallel tracks to try to get this RTO issue resolved. And if information is before you, I mean, it seems to me your only question is a logistical question. Do you have the time to take this information in Phase I and at the same time keep on your schedule. And if the answer to that is yes, there is almost nothing that Enron would be afraid of you knowing and then let you deal with it in your normal course.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Very well.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I stand corrected, sorry.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Very well. Are there other intervenors who would like to give comments briefly, hopefully?

MR. McGLOTHLIN: Reliant Energy takes no position on the motion.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Okay.

MS. PAUGH: My clients take no position on the

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motion.

MR. HOWE: Commissioners, I'm Roger Howe. I told staff they could put me down as supporting their motion. And the reason I said that was I think that looking at just the scope of what was intended, staff is correct. However, I think this is not so much of a black and white what it says in the order, it's kind of what you, the Commissioners, are open to hear. And so in that sense I support staff in its technical argument and still do, but on the other hand I see this as very much a policy decision to be made by the Commission itself.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Thank you. Any others? Very well. I'm sorry, Mr. McWhirter.

MR. McWHIRTER: Mr. Chairman, I was going to address this in the opening statement, but I wouldn't want to be precluded from doing that later if you vote to include this issue.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: We wouldn't think of preventing you from having that opportunity, Mr. McWhirter.

MR. McWHIRTER: FIPUG has a feeling of ambivalence about this issue. We see in Issue Number 4 the amount of money involved is \$188 million. If it is Florida Power and Light's intention by this proceeding in Phase I your determination of the cost methodology combined with your determination of prudency is that you give consumers a \$188 million rate increase, we would be outraged by that.

The second aspect of it -- and one of the reasons we would be outraged by it is \$136 million of the cost is start-up costs. And the question pertaining there is should you collect the \$136 million the first year or do you amortize it over the useful life of the system as you do with other expenses of this kind. So, we would want to make it very clear that by not stating the position on this motion one way or the other, we are certainly not endorsing a \$188 million increase.

The second aspect of our concern is that the types of costs that are included in Issue Number 4 are matters that are normally handled with base rates. So, if you collect the \$188 million through a cost-recovery mechanism over and above base rates, and base rates are already too high, you might have a problem. And I think that is what the Phase II aspect of this case is all about anyway.

It's possible that base rates are totally adequate at the present level or at some reduced level to fully recover all the transmission costs affiliated with setting up the RTO. So, our concern, and I was going to put it in our opening argument should you vote to consider this at this time, is that certainly no decision you make on the comfort issue, which is really what Mr. Deason has pointed out to you, you want to give the utilities a level of comfort that if they incur these costs they will be recovered and they will be recovered in an appropriate manner. And we endorse that. If the utilities

incur these costs and the costs are in the consumers' best interest, we want the utility to recover them.

However, having said that, we don't want it all to be done in the first year and we don't want it all to be done through a cost-recovery mechanism if base rates are already adequate. So, it is a complex issue, and however you vote, whether you consider it now or consider it later, I would hope that if you vote on the methodology now you would reserve the opportunity to adequately examine those costs and the amount of money that should be recovered from retail consumers.

Now I have spoken my peace, and thank you for the opportunity.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Thank you very much. I think we have a motion and a second. I'm sorry, I assume there were no others wanting to speak. We have a motion and a second. All in favor?

(Unanimous affirmative vote.)

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Opposed? Very well. I would request that at the -- a clarification, and we can do this at the end, because one of the points that Commission Palecki raised I thought was a good point, that we can all -- this testimony, I think, has been raised by the parties, this testimony is relevant to both part of these proceedings and we have discretion as to which part we choose to give it the greatest weight. Is that the essence of your comments?

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: That is correct, Mr. Chairman. And, you know, what I said about having a lot on our plates, I am very serious about there are some tremendous decisions that have to be made here. I understand that it is important that we give parties a comfort level in this docket. I appreciated Mr. McWhirter's statement that, you know, legitimately incurred costs need to be recovered and recovered in an appropriate manner. And I certainly agree with that, but I want to put all the parties as well as my fellow Commissioners on notice that I'm not certain that I will be prepared to vote on cost recovery in this phase of the proceeding. And I am very concerned that perhaps we might not want to lock ourselves in in this early stages on what the exact cost recovery methodology should be.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Very well. Any other preliminary matters, staff?

MR. KEATING: Well, I just wanted to -- with respect to the motion to strike, not to reargue it, but I will let you know we will do our best to get into the record as much information as we can concerning that methodology. We are not as prepared as we are on the other issues to address that, we have done some discovery and we will attempt to address that as thoroughly as we can.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: That is another point of clarification. Anybody can file testimony in Phase II on the

same issue, correct? I mean, it may be moot if we made a decision, but certainly if we make a final decision on that issue can parties file further clarification or further testimony?

COMMISSIONER JABER: I'm sorry, I'm confused. What issue would we be deciding other than the issues that are in Phase I? There isn't a specific cost methodology issue, so I don't think we have a huge problem. I really -- it is FPL's burden to make sure Ms. Dubin's testimony goes to Issue 4. My approval of my support of allowing that testimony in is I see the relationship to Issue 4. I also would not be prepared to make some huge cost methodology decision, but I also don't think that is an issue before us.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Let me give you the reason I bring it up. In Ms. Dubin's testimony she specifically addresses backing out certain elements of base rates, and in my mind that is something that would have been -- that parties would have been addressing in Phase II, so that when we get to the determination of base rates in Phase II, if we consider --

COMMISSIONER JABER: Then it would be the utilities' burden to file that testimony in Phase II. How can we vote on a part of her testimony that won't go to a specific issue? Do you see what I'm saying? Just because she makes some adjustments backing things out of base rates -- and I know what you're talking about, I read her testimony -- doesn't mean we

will make a specific vote on that part of her testimony. I could be wrong.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: My point was regardless of that is this will be the subject of testimony in Phase II, and so we have allowed it into the record now, some party may want to address it in the context of our decision in Phase II, and I am assuming that there will be the opportunity to file that testimony in Phase II. That is the essence of my issue, and I'm assuming that that will be consistent with how we are proceeding thus far.

MR. KEATING: And I guess I would assume that if a cost-recovery methodology is not established by order in Phase I. then --

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: No, forget about cost-recovery methodology. What I'm talking about is establishment of base rates. And I guess that is cost-recovery, but this goes to what we do with regard to these costs in base rates. And my only point was this, that some parties may want to and probably will file testimony regarding that in Phase II. This testimony will be absolutely relevant, I'm just saying rebuttal testimony to this testimony will be relevant in Phase II. Would it be?

MR. KEATING: I would expect so.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Okay. Now that we have gotten that, we are at the point of opening arguments.

MR. KEATING: I would just make one other comment as

a preliminary matter, and there may be some from the parties, but this is the last one I have on my list. With respect to the order of witnesses, I have had some questions about that and how we would go forward. They are listed starting on Page 7 of the prehearing order, and we would propose that they just go forward in that order.

We do have some witnesses whose testimony is offered in all three dockets, some that is only offered in a particular company-specific docket. Rather than bring them back and forth onto the stand and have them provide their -- have the joint witnesses provide their testimony three times, three separate times for three separate dockets, we would have them addressed all at the same time.

I guess there was one question that I still have is whether the Commission would prefer as we go through these, there are two witnesses in particular, Mr. Ashburn and Mr. Southwick who have filed joint testimony and company-specific testimony. I want to find out if it is the Commission's preference to address the joint and company-specific at the same time or to bring them back to the stand a second time to address the company-specific.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: I prefer coming to the stand once, unless there is a problem with the parties.

MR. LONG: Commissioner, I would think we would prefer, if it is at all convenient, to have the joint testimony

and the company-specific testimony separated. I think the status of these witnesses is very different in each case. In one case they are testifying on behalf of all three companies and will only be able to represent positions held by all three companies. And obviously with regard to the company-specific testimony, they will be representing positions taken by the individual companies. And I think the record would be helped if we could maintain that distinction.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Okay. That sounds like a reasonable prospect.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Yes.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: Joe McGlothlin. One caveat to the order of witnesses. Mr. Mechler is listed as last. That is fine, if time permits, but I wanted to alert you to the fact that he needs to leave by noon Friday because of the limited number of flights available. And so if -- that may not come into play, but if we get into some kind of a time crunch, I would like for you to just consider that.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: I would prefer if you work that out with the parties to see if he can be taken out of order and come back with an agreement on that.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: If it looks like it's going to be a problem, we will do that.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: That will be great. Anything else?

Okay. We are at opening arguments. And what is the process, 1 2 is it per side or each individual party? 3 MR. KEATING: The prehearing order establishes a ten minute limit for opening statements from each party. I would 4 5 suggest we start with the joint applicants and move to the 6 intervenors. 7 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Let me ask is it anticipated that 8 each applicant will make an opening statement and then each 9 intervenor will make an opening statement? 10 MR. WILLIS: We will make a joint opening statement for the three companies. 11 12 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: How about the intervenors? 13 MR. BRYANT: I will have a very brief one. MR. McGLOTHLIN: Mine will be certainly less than ten 14 15 minutes, about five minutes. 16 MS. PAUGH: Ours is brief. 17 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Very well. The reason I asked is that I didn't want to interrupt the opening statements and we 18 19 kind of want to give our court reporter a break. Why don't we go ahead and take a brief recess at this moment so we can come 20 back and do them all in order. We will come back in ten 21 22 minutes. 23 (Recess.) 24 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Thank you. We are prepared to 25 proceed with opening arguments. Mr. Willis, are you going to

do the argument for the applicants?

MR. WILLIS: Yes. I will be making an opening statement for Florida Power and Light, Florida Power Corporation, and for Tampa Electric Company, which for ease of reference I am going to refer to as the GridFlorida companies.

The GridFlorida companies have filed extensive evidence in this case which shows without a doubt that their respective decisions to, one, participate in an RTO and, two, to participate in the development of the GridFlorida RTO continue to be prudent under the facts and circumstances which have faced and are facing these companies.

A central factor in that regard has been the activities at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, or FERC, which has resulted in the issuance of Order 2000 on December 20th, 1999, which established a national policy that is in the public interest for all public utilities that own, operate, or control facilities for transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce to form and participate in reasonable transmission organizations.

In the wake of the clear statements of policy in Order 2000, the GridFlorida companies had a choice to make. They could either proactively develop an RTO proposal that was tailored to meet the needs of Florida, or in the alternative, they could face the prospect of ultimately being ordered by FERC to participate in an RTO developed by others who do not

have Florida's interests in mind.

Order Number 2000 makes it clear that the formation of RTOs is an integral part of a federal initiative to increase competition nationally in the wholesale generation market. Pursuant to the mandatory process established in FERC Order 2000 that all jurisdictional utilities were required to make a filing on October the 16th, 2000, in which they either submitted a proposal to join an RTO, or in the alternative, to describe the specific obstacles to their participation and their plans for overcoming these obstacles.

FERC did not intend for the utilities simply to decide to opt out of the RTO participation, despite FERC's adoption of a, quote, voluntary, end quote, approach to RTO formation in the first instance. This requirement was clearly intended to further FERC's policy and its goal that all transmission owners participate in an RTO. The GridFlorida proposal was not made in a vacuum. Quite to the contrary, the proposal for the formation of GridFlorida was the product of many intense and detailed discussions with a wide range of market participants. Those participants included municipal utilities, REAs, existing and potential nonutility operators, the FERC staff, and in addition, the FPSC staff members also attended and participated in many of the public meetings.

In addition, a number of workshops were held before this Commission in order to keep it fully apprised of the GridFlorida proposal as it evolved. The result was an RTO proposal with a Florida focus that meets the requirements of the FERC and creates significant benefits for Florida ratepayers. In particular, the GridFlorida proposal eliminates pancaked rates for new transactions, depancakes existing transactions over a period of ten years, and provides for congestion management leading to a more efficient allocation of transmission capacity.

These and other aspects of the GridFlorida proposal represent tangible benefits to ratepayers that will stimulate increased competition in the wholesale market. The GridFlorida companies have invested significant time and resources in developing an RTO proposal that is in compliance with Order 2000. The GridFlorida companies submit to you that the Commission should determine that the decisions to participate in and to form GridFlorida were prudent and that the GridFlorida companies' decisions with respect to the scope, form, ownership structure, and functions of GridFlorida were also prudent.

The GridFlorida companies have worked hard to design GridFlorida in a manner that meets the criteria for acceptable RTOs established by the FERC. The GridFlorida will provide a system that not only operates reliably and effectively, but also provides for an open and independent process that will give participants confidence that the transmission grid will be

operated in an equitable manner.

We now urge this Commission to ratify in a clear and unambiguous ruling that the GridFlorida companies' actions in participating in the formation of the RTO are reasonable and prudent. Such an unequivocal decision is essential to preserve GridFlorida as an option for Florida. Without such a ruling, the GridFlorida companies cannot and will not go forward with additional expenditures unless specifically ordered to do so by FERC. Thank you.

MR. McWHIRTER: Mr. Chairman, I am John McWhirter appearing on behalf of the Florida Industrial Power Users Group.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Let me make sure, Mr. Willis, you are completed and that does complete the presentation of the applicants?

MR. WILLIS: Yes, it does.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Very well. You are next in line, Mr. McWhirter.

MR. McWHIRTER: As you know, the group I represent is a consumer group, and our primary concern in this case is the Phase II aspect. However, I want to point out that the Industrial Power Users Group endorses and is encouraged by the fact that many independent power producers have intervened in this case and have shown a willingness to participate in operations in Florida if we can open the grid and it can be

managed in a fashion that is beneficial both to suppliers and end users. So we endorse Phase I of this aspect whole-heartedly.

We suggest to you that there may be an even better way to do it if you went with a larger RTO for the southeastern region, and that may be forth coming in the not too distant future. My only reason for participating in Phase I at all is to suggest that you don't want to do anything that would preclude Florida utilities from participating in the larger RTO when and if that comes into being.

And, secondly, as I pointed out earlier when given the opportunity with respect to the motion you had, you don't do anything in your feel good comfort policy decision that encourages utilities to go forward that makes a final determination or can be considered to make a final determination on serious revenue issues that may be passed along to the end users in the end of this case.

The Public Counsel has done an admirable job, and I won't seek to duplicate his presentation, but he is concerned that this Commission retain jurisdiction over the protection of retail consumers and that you take no action in Phase I that would lose that jurisdiction. And we certainly endorse that proposition along with the Public Counsel and the other consumer advocates. And thank you for listening.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. McWhirter, let me ask you a

question. Can we have our cake and eat it, too? Can we endorse an RTO and encourage or maybe even order our utilities to go forward with GridFlorida or a southeast RTO and still maintain jurisdiction?

MR. McWHIRTER: I am hopeful that that is the case, and I think you definitely can. But you need to proceed with great care and caution. As the Public Counsel pointed out in his presentation, other states unwittingly wound up with unintended results when they allowed retail competition and then they lost control over the retail rates. And that would be disheartening.

You have some very significant and important people here, former members of FERC who were in and around that important institution at the time that 888, 889, and 2000 were rendered by that entity, and they may tell you whether or not you lose your jurisdiction. I would certainly encourage you to ask them that question and that any decision you finally make you be sure that you do protect the retail consumers' interest.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Mr. Bryant.

MR. BRYANT: Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, Bill Bryant on behalf of Enron. Enron also enthusiastically supports the petition of the joint GridFlorida applicants that the participation -- their participation in an RTO is prudent. We think that an RTO of some description is inevitable and

GridFlorida is well designed. The question of whether it is GridFlorida or that evolves into a southeastern RTO is a question that can't be decided at this point, but the reality is that the IOUs do have to participate and do have to be a part of that or get left behind. And we think that that participation is essential to the development of a wholesale market and to encouraging private capital to flow into Florida to invest in energy assets.

So, we agree with their position and encourage the Commission to find that it is a prudent expenditure, both it has been and Enron has been working very closely with them on the GridFlorida plan and that going forward they need to move quickly, which means that there are going to be certain costs incurred if this Commission decides that it is a prudent thing to be a member of an RTO. And we encourage anything the Commission can do to help the IOUs in that position make the decision and move forward.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Thank you. Mr. McGlothlin.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: Joe McGlothlin for Reliant Energy. Reliant Energy believes strongly that an independent RTO such as GridFlorida is essential to the development of an efficient and fully competitive wholesale generation market.

We have heard several Commissioners state over time that they want to have a comfort level that the formation and operation of an RTO such as GridFlorida will be cost-effective to ratepayers. And we have also seen this Phase I take on the attributes of policy formulation, and our participation in Phase I focuses on these areas.

Reliant Energy in this case will sponsor the testimony of Robert Mechler who is Reliant's manager of transmission policy. In his testimony, Mr. Mechler will pull together in one place the attributes of an independent RTO that can lead to a more efficient wholesale market and that will translate into lower costs for consumers. He will show how the RTO will reduce transaction costs thereby increasing the number of transactions that are economically feasible and also simultaneously effectively enlarging the size of the geographical market.

He will show how the independent RTO will encourage new entrants thereby increasing competition and also reducing market power. He will explain how the RTO's approach to the management of congestion is superior to that which is in place now and will enhance reliability. And he will show how the integrated approach to the planning of transmission facilities that the RTO will adopt will optimize both local needs and the need to facilitate bulk power transfers.

As to the comfort level that the Commissioners are looking for that these benefits will offset the costs of forming and operating the RTO, Mr. Mechler will explain that the comfort level can be seen in the difference between the

incremental cost of forming and operating the RTO on the one hand and the cost of generation on the other, because the difference can be measured in orders of magnitude. He will testify that the costs of generation are some 18 times larger than the total cost of transmission. And what that means is that it takes only a very small reduction in the cost of generation to more than offset the identified cost of forming and operating the RTO.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Mr. McGlothlin, the argument is presented very often, and I'm wondering if your witness can address the idea of the complimentary impact. I agree that the relative impact as exactly as you have described, but in the dynamic operations of these markets it has become clear -- well, let me not state that, that is stating more of an opinion than I want to state. But there is certainly the prospect that how the transmission system operates at critical times absolutely can impact the price of generation that is delivered to the marketplace.

MR. McWHIRTER: I believe Mr. Mechler will be well equipped to respond to those types of questions, Mr. Chairman. But in terms of the overall comfort level, I would like to preview his point that given this disparity in the cost of generation on the one hand being 18 times larger than the total cost of transmission and working with some information provided by TECO and by the applicants in terms of the predicted costs

of the RTO versus what is known in terms of the cost of generation, Mr. Mechler will calculate that a reduction of 1.3 percent in the cost of generation will pay for the cost of the RTO.

And given the magnitude of the difference, either the estimates of the cost of the RTO or the quantification of the cost of generation would have to be substantially way off before the impact on this calculation of a break even point will be materially different. So there is comfort in the level of disparity is the point that he is going to make.

At the same time, Mr. Mechler will point out that some 50 percent of installed generating capacity in the State of Florida is over 20 years old. Older generators are inefficient and that means they are expensive to operate. So there is this opportunity to reduce generation costs by displacing the aging fleet that is being impaired or hampered by the inefficiencies that the RTO is designed to overcome.

And we believe there is a significant comfort level in all of those facts. So much so that we suggest that the policy of the Commission should be not only to support the formation of the RTO, the policy of the Commission should be to regard the RTO as an investment that through the disparity I mentioned a minute ago and through this enormous opportunity to lower generation costs, it is an investment with which to leverage savings. And the extent of those savings he will

testify will depend upon the depth and liquidity of the wholesale market. The greater the depth, the greater the liquidity, the more competitive the market, the farther beyond the break even point you are going to go.

So we encourage the Commission to adopt a policy of supporting the formation of the RTO and simultaneously working to maximize the savings that will result by looking for ways to increase both the liquidity and depth of the wholesale market.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Thank you. Ms. Paugh, do you have an opening statement?

MS. PAUGH: Commissioners, an appropriate independent RTO will benefit Florida and its ratepayers by remedying existing impediments to the efficient and reliable grid operations and fostering wholesale competition which will lower electricity costs and increase products and services.

Any costs associated with start up and operation of an RTO will be far outweighed by the concomitant reductions in generation transactions costs. A properly designed RTO will enhance access to and use of the transmission systems and thus facilitate the least cost supply of power. The least cost supply of power is achieved by eliminating rate pancaking, restrictive transmission policies, and market participant control of the grid. An RTO would replace these impediments with a Florida-wide optimization of supply, transparent market

signals, and independent system operation.

Florida consumers access to power supply alternatives will be further enhanced through uniform interconnection procedures, coordination of planning functions, and enhanced transmission expansion and upgrade activities. Enhanced grid reliability and more efficient power supply is readily achievable. First, since an RTO will consider all resources under its control in assuring reliability and selecting the least cost supply solutions, it will be more efficient and reliable than the existing local level of system control. Likewise, unified transmission system operation and planning will lower transmission costs through economies of scale and the elimination of duplicative parochial practices.

Second, an RTO will provide the operational independence and infrastructure necessary to facilitate a viable competitive wholesale market. In general, a competitive wholesale market will provide consumers with access to a broader array of generation supply alternatives including merchant generation where the investment risk is borne by the market participants and not ratepayers.

Clearly there are a multitude of benefits to a robust competitive wholesale power market in Florida. We can and should work together to eliminate transmission related impediments to a competitive wholesale electricity market such as pancaked transmission rates, burdensome intraFlorida

reservation and scheduling practices, absence of transparency and the continuing opportunities for undue discrimination in the operation of the grid for the good of all citizens of the state, and we should do these difficult but laudable tasks in conjunction with our efforts to establish a competitive wholesale generation market. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Mr. Howe.

MR. HOWE: Chairman Jacobs, Commissioners, I'm Roger Howe with the Public Counsel's Office. This Commission has provided effective retail regulation of electric utilities in Florida for many years. And I would suggest that if you don't have to you should not take any action in this docket that might cause or allow a loss of your total oversight of the provision of retail service.

In the past, the distinction of jurisdiction between the Public Service Commission and FERC turned on such things as wholesale versus retail, interstate transmission versus intrastate, and whenever it did turn on those types of decisions deference had to be given to FERC. If they said it was interstate transmission, it was interstate transmission.

Today, the focus of FERC has shifted and they are now construing old case law dealing with such things as wholesale versus retail and interstate versus intrastate in a new light. They are interpreting those decisions in terms of whether retail transmission service is bundled or unbundled. FERC's

consistent statements since Order Number 888 has been that it has exclusive jurisdiction over the transmission of electricity in intrastate commerce and that includes all wholesale sales as well as all unbundled retail sales.

So, FERC applies what I consider a fairly simple test, and they look and they focus on the transmission aspect. I kind of view it as being four separate boxes of information. The first being generation or purchased power, the second transmission, the third distribution, and the fourth the end use retail customer. And FERC focuses on that second box. And they ask the question, is the retail transmission providing entity providing electricity to its own end use retail customers and is it doing so for a single bundled price. In other words, is transmission not carved out separately.

And if the answer to that question, which I guess you might call two questions, is no, FERC says they do not have jurisdiction and the reason they do not have jurisdiction is because it is not transmission in interstate commerce, it is solely within the providence of this Commission or other state commissions.

So it is very important for this Commission to consider what effect its decisions might have. I think it would be reasonable, for example, to interpret FERC's recent actions to say that if, for example, this Commission thought it was wise to allow an electric utility, let's use FPL as an

example, to charge separately for transmission, to not include it in the delivered price of retail electricity. I think FERC would consider that an unbundling. And although your decision may appear fairly innocuous, there is just going to be two items on the bill instead of one, FERC would say it is now unbundled, it is now transmission in interstate commerce and it is now solely FERC's jurisdiction.

Similarly, if the question is asked is another entity providing the transmission service such that the entity providing the service is not serving its own end use retail customers, FERC says that is unbundled retail service and it is exclusively FERC's jurisdiction. It is transmission in interstate commerce.

So I think this Commission should apply the same focus as FERC does. Look at it from the perspective of the transmission provider and I think you will reach the same results. So if you look at the provision of electric retail transmission service, for example, by Florida Power and Light, and ask the question is Florida Power and Light providing retail transmission service to Florida Power and Light's own end use retail customers, the answer is yes. It looks like the state probably has jurisdiction and it looks like it's probably not in interstate commerce.

But you need to go one step further and also ask the question is the transmission, the retail transmission component

part and parcel of the delivered price of electricity FPL is charging to its end use retail customers. And if that answer is also yes, it is strictly a sale of electric energy at retail and FERC does not have jurisdiction.

However, I believe under FERC's recent interpretations any action by this or any other Commission that has the effect of unbundling retail service from that perspective -- and that perspective being from the retail transmission provider -- jurisdiction is going to transfer to FERC. And, Commissioners, I think it will be totally lost to you. In answer to your question to Mr. McWhirter, Chairman Deason, I think what you are going to find is once -- if jurisdiction is transferred it is lost to you completely.

And, Commissioner Jaber, your reference earlier to the fact that what it is going to cost is a very important issue, I would suggest that it may become irrelevant. And the reason I say that is whatever costs FERC approves, whatever increases in costs FERC demands that these utilities incur, whatever amortization period FERC allows for the start-up costs, under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution I believe you are going to have to just include those in the final rates you allow FPL as now a distribution and generation utility to charge to its customers.

So, returning to my starting point, I would suggest that if you do not believe you absolutely have to you should

not take any action in this docket which permits or causes either directly or indirectly the transfer of jurisdiction over retail transmission service from this agency to a federal agency. Thank you very much.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Howe, let me try to understand your concern regarding jurisdiction so that I keep it in my mind as we go forward. Your concern would be limited to the jurisdiction of the Florida IOUs, the retail providers only, not the merchant plants or the independent power producers, right?

MR. HOWE: Yes, except I'm not sure that you can look at it that way. And the reason is FERC's jurisdiction is over all wholesale sales of electricity and all transmission in interstate commerce. So I think the inquiry has to be directed to who is providing the retail transmission service. The merchant plants are going to take transmission service, but it is not going to be transmission service necessarily provided to the ultimate consumer. It depends on which way it goes.

FERC has addressed this somewhat. For example, if a merchant plant sells electricity to Florida Power and Light, and Florida Power and Light, as the transmission entity, provides that purchased power to Florida Power and Light's own end use retail customers, FERC considers that -- and provides it for a bundled retail rate in which transmission is not listed or charged separately -- then FERC considers that a

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retail sale of electricity and does not consider it to be under their jurisdiction.

So, whether it comes from a merchant plant or not, it depends from a jurisdictional standpoint who is providing the transmission service, the retail transmission service to the ultimate end use customers. And I think if you adopt the same perspective that FERC uses you will always get consistent results. So, for example, if you look at it from the perspective of GridFlorida and you ask the first question is GridFlorida going to be providing service to its own end use retail customers, the answer I clearly no. So you clearly are dealing with transmission in interstate commerce solely subject to FERC's jurisdiction.

COMMISSIONER JABER: See, and that's why I'm asking the question. Are your comments also separate from having a concern over the jurisdiction of the RTO, and specifically because there was early on when we were doing some workshops a concern about who would have jurisdiction of the RTO, do you share that concern?

MR. HOWE: Yes. I think the RTO in terms of rates, terms, and conditions of service will solely reside with FERC. For issues such as transmission line siting, I think it will remain with the state.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Okay. Well, as it relates to IPPs being part of whatever RTO is formed, how does that impact

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the jurisdictional question? If we ask the question you want us to ask to ourselves who is providing the retail transmission service, then clearly you can make that decision as it relates to the Florida IOUs, but as it relates to the IPPs and how they participate in an RTO, what should I be looking for?

MR. HOWE: I would suggest that if you are even thinking of it in terms of an RTO, you have already conceded jurisdiction is at FERC, because if you have an IPP, for example, selling electricity to an existing -- for example, I will stay with Florida Power and Light as the transmission entity. To the extent that FPL, for example, is transmitting the IPP power to Tampa Electric, that is under FERC's jurisdiction because you asked the question is FPL in that instance transmitting electricity to its end use customers, the answer is no. So it's clearly a FERC jurisdictional transmission activity.

Where you are dealing with an RTO, though, I think if you start from the premise that you are dealing with some power being transmitted by an RTO, by definition you are outside of the jurisdictional question. It has been ceded to FERC.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Mr. Howe, taking into consideration your argument, is there any way that this Commission can obtain the benefits of an RTO without conceding the jurisdiction to FERC, and those benefits would include the elimination of pancaking, open access to the transmission

system to competitors, and the other benefits that have been discussed this morning?

MR. HOWE: I would suggest no. And the reason being if you have an RTO, it takes an RTO to provide those nonpancaked rates. Now, perhaps you could through some method of regulating Florida's utilities perhaps you could do something at the retail level, but the whole concept of pancaked rates itself is dealing with wholesale generation. You are almost exclusively talking about the RTO as an identified vehicle of FERC with the specific purpose of increasing generation in the wholesale generation market. So the whole concept is essentially outside the purview of this Commission.

The benefits that are alleged flow from the fact that that could theoretically lead to lower cost generation and lower cost transmission rates. Because after all, all electricity ends up eventually going to a retail end user. So that may be reflected in there, but it will be something that you will no longer be concerned with because all of those rates and charges will have been set by FERC.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Well, whether or not this Commission is concerned with them, I think all of us have an overriding concern for the ratepayers and those benefits would bring benefits to the ratepayers, as well, would they not?

MR. HOWE: I would suggest no, and let me tell you

why. Whenever you hear the discussion, for example, of lower cost generation, you usually hear the discussion of how competition will bring the market price of generation down. But keep in mind that under your current retail state regulation, these utilities as part of good utility practices have to dispatch their units on an economic basis.

The retail customers right now are getting the lowest cost units and then as the load grows the next lowest cost unit. So the market price very likely, although it might be lower, does not necessarily have to in any instance be lower than what an economic dispatch cost would be. And only if you discount economic dispatch do I think you get into that realm where you say competition necessarily reduces cost. It does in the abstract, and it certainly does where you are dealing with unregulated monopolies, but not necessarily where you are dealing with a regulated monopoly that is charged with at all times providing its lowest cost generation to its native load and use retail customers.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: But isn't the economic dispatch driven in part by the expense of transmission so that generation that is available in a portion of Florida that would require pancaked rates to be paid is not going to be economic generation so it is eliminated from the dispatch scheme. That's not part of the equation anymore.

MR. HOWE: That's correct, that can affect it. But

one of the things to keep in mind even there is even FERC's jurisdiction, utilities are not required, in fact, I think it is a jurisdictional issue with FERC, they are not allowed to take their own transmission service at their open access transmission tariffed rate. FERC has said that is only used for where these utilities, our in-state utilities are making wholesale sales. Where our in-state utilities are using their own transmission system to deliver electricity to their own customers it is not even at a FERC rate.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: I saw that argument and you say then that the companies are without authority to change that, they can't change how they are going to provide that transmission service for retail.

MR. HOWE: I'm saying they should not be allowed to change it. What is happening is FERC's position, as I understand it, and you people know that I have been dealing at the state level all of my career, so all I know is what I read in books, but FERC has turned its interpretation on what is unbundled. And so, for example, FERC isn't driving any unbundling, they have said that they take jurisdiction of what was previously bundled retail transmission service that becomes unbundled either through a state retail program, which I construe to mean a retail competition initiative, or a voluntary action by the utility.

So FERC is sitting there waiting to take jurisdiction if something happens to voluntarily on the utility's part place the retail transmission component under FERC's jurisdiction. It is my position that a utility in Florida cannot take a voluntary action in such a way as it would transfer jurisdiction away from this Commission.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Under state law they can't do that. MR. HOWE: Yes.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: And let's say that there were some event that brought about that, then you would argue that we are under some obligation to require for lack of a better term, a firm retail tariff from this RTO.

MR. HOWE: I don't believe you can participate. You can request, but the actual tariff and everything is going -- you won't be able to demand it, I don't believe, in the sense that you will have regulatory oversight over the RTO. If you can prevail upon the utilities that it would be in their best interest when they are here before you, you might be able to get that result. But essentially you are going to have to, I believe, flow RTO tariffed rates through to your retail customers to the extent that we are talking about the provision of retail transmission service.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Right, I understand that point.

Once we go to an RTO environment we are at a point of flowing through rates, but even then, isn't it a question of

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apportionment of risk and benefits such that, you know, do we have an opportunity at that point in time to say we are only willing to accept a portion of the risk of operating this RTO to be flowed through to the retail ratepayers?

MR. HOWE: I would suggest no. And the reason is I can't recall the cases specifically, but there has been some cases dealing with wholesale power purchases that I think are analogous.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: But then -- I understand your point, but the premise of your -- and I interrupted you, so excuse me, but the premise there is that everything gets declared as wholesale. What I heard you arguing initially was that that wasn't --

MR. HOWE: Let's be careful there. When we talk about wholesale versus retail generally we are talking about the sale of electricity. In other words, if the sale of electricity is from one utility to another, that is wholesale, all right. Transmission -- and this is one of the things that perhaps we will have to get sorted out here, but there is a real question of whether FERC considers this to be a wholesale/retail situation. I would suggest that they do not.

FERC's jurisdiction on the one hand is wholesale sales of electricity, all right, and there FERC has jurisdiction over the generation, the transmission, everything incident to the sale of electricity at wholesale. On

transmission their jurisdiction is just over transmission in interstate commerce. The RTO is a transmission entity. I'm not sure you can say that where GridFlorida, for example, sells transmission service to FPL that it is necessarily -- it's not a wholesale sale of electricity, it's just a transmission service. So, I think we need to be careful when we cross that line between wholesale/retail, and wholesale transmission.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me ask you this question, does it make any difference whether it is a Florida only RTO or if it is a southeastern RTO as to whether the creation of the RTO would trigger FERC's jurisdiction?

MR. HOWE: I do not think so. And I think that is clear from the testimony filed in this case. And I again go back to the way I view the simple first question, would GridFlorida as a Florida RTO, Florida only RTO, be providing transmission service to its own end use retail customers. If you get the answer no, it's FERC jurisdiction.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, how did Texas for so long avoid FERC jurisdiction?

MR. HOWE: Texas -- and, again, this is again all I have read. Texas early on established itself without any interstate connections.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So since the connections didn't exist you couldn't very well argue that there was interstate commerce.

MR. HOWE: Right. And they have successfully over the years maintained that independence. For example, there is a U.S. Supreme Court case dealing with whether FERC has jurisdiction over Florida Power and Light. And if I recall that case correctly, Florida Power and Light's position at that time was they were not subject to FERC's jurisdiction because all of FPL's transmission was within the state, all of its generation was within the state, and all of its customers were within the state, and it was not interconnected with any utility outside the state, and, therefore, FERC had no jurisdiction.

Well, FERC blew right past that argument and said but you are interconnected with Florida Power Corporation, who is interconnected with Georgia Power, and for all we know when you are selling electricity to Florida Power it's going to Georgia or vice versa. And that was good enough to determine that FERC had jurisdiction over FPL even when it was totally within the state.

Texas has avoided that because I have heard that they have basically weak direct current kind of connections where they need them but otherwise it is an allegedly isolated island outside of FERC's jurisdiction for that reason.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Howe, you have indicated that -- and I think I have this correct, is that the Florida Commission should take no action which has the effect of

transferring jurisdiction?

MR. HOWE: Yes, that is correct.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So by that I take it that we should not endorse, encourage, or allow our utilities to join an RTO, that is your position?

MR. HOWE: Well, I guess --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: First, let me back up just a second. First of all, under state law, is it your position under state law that we even have the ability to allow our utilities to join an RTO or is that something that the law has to be changed to even allow that?

MR. HOWE: I believe the law has to be changed. And it's not explicit in statutory law at all, but from the way that Florida has regulated utilities for many years I think it is implicitly understood that until there was a change in statutes that you would continue to regulate all aspects of retail service including retail transmission. So, yes, my feeling is it would have to be a change in law.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: But retail basically meant non-FERC, correct?

MR. HOWE: It used to mean non-FERC, now it means FERC if it is unbundled. And this is where it gets so very confusing. In other words, a retail transmission service that is either not provided by the transmission entity serving its own end use retail customers or by the transmission entity not

serving at a bundled rate. That retail transmission is under FERC's jurisdiction and they draw -- I can't explain it better than just kind of repeating what they do -- is where an electric -- a retail utility is providing bundled service, in other words, charging one rate for everything, FERC says that is a retail sale and it is not transmission in interstate commerce, even though it has a transmission piece, obviously.

However, FERC has said where anything happens to pull that transmission, that retail transmission piece out, either a separate provider of transmission service or a separate charge of transmission service, the language FERC has used is the jurisdictional lines change at that point and it becomes retail transmission in interstate commerce subject solely to FERC's jurisdiction.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So it is your position that if an RTO is formed, ignoring the legal issue as to whether we can allow it under state law or not, if one is formed then that means we lose jurisdiction?

MR. HOWE: Yes. And I would address it from your jurisdiction. I guess the preliminary step would be should you allow the utilities to stop providing their own retail transmission, should you allow them to transfer their assets or operational control to someone else, and should you allow them to unbundle with unbundling being defined from the same perspective FERC uses. That's how I think you would address it

at the state level. Whether or not you can allow them or not allow them to join an RTO, the RTO itself as a concept, as a construct that they can join is a matter outside your jurisdiction if they can find a way to get there. And I don't think they can get there without going through you by stopping providing and so forth.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: They cannot divest their assets unless they come through this Commission, is that your position?

MR. HOWE: That is my position, yes. And I go a step further to say and I doubt that you have -- they need your permission, but I doubt that you have the authority to grant permission because the way -- we must assume the way utilities have always been regulated in Florida, that that would continue until some pronouncement from the legislature.

Are my ten minutes up?

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: There is about 30 seconds left.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: Chairman Jacobs, I don't want to get in the way of Mr. Howe's latitude in making his opening statement or the Commissioners' ability to ask questions, but there was one point during what was primarily a discussion of jurisdictional matters where Mr. Howe started commenting on factual assertions and specifically the role of economic dispatch and whether competition can take place or not given economic dispatch. Reliant believes that there was a

misstatement of fact, and if we had some opportunity to cross his witness, we would, but he has no witness. So I hope you will use your discretion during the hearing and allow our witness, Mr. Mechler, either to have the Commissioners pose the same question to him or give me an opportunity to have him say something about that.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: I think that latitude is proper, or you can address it in your brief, either way.

MR. McWHIRTER: Thank you, sir.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Chairman, since this is on jurisdiction, can I ask one last question of Mr. Howe. This is really the only opportunity we have to talk about the legal matters.

Your position with jurisdiction is that you believe we lose jurisdiction if we allow the creation of an RTO as it relates to rates only, or is it rates and reliability?

MR. HOWE: If you mean reliability in the sense of -- COMMISSIONER JABER: Transmission.

MR. HOWE: -- transmission siting and so forth, no, you would not lose that jurisdiction. I think FERC fairly well concedes that they don't have jurisdiction over reliability issues.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Okay. So your comments just the last few minutes really were only related to our loss of jurisdiction as it relates to rates?

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MR. HOWE: Rates and otherwise as to terms and conditions of service.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I can't help -- I've got to ask this question, Mr. Howe. You seem intent that this Commission should retain this jurisdiction. I take it then that you feel like we have done a good job protecting retail customers in the State of Florida?

MR. McWHIRTER: You don't have to answer that question.

MR. HOWE: I don't mind answering it. I do believe -- and my job, of course, everybody knows is as an advocate, but as I have told the utilities, it is my job to advocate the consumers' perspective, but I think the utilities in the State of Florida have done a very good job of providing safe, efficient, reasonably priced service for many, many years under the oversight of this Commission. So both together, yes.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Thank you, Mr. Howe.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Thank you. Mr. Twomey.

MR. TWOMEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Commissioners. I'm Mike Twomey. My clients have a substantially more simplistic view of this case than the parties that have spoken thus far. Three of my four individual clients are retired. those three are elderly. You know the people from Sugarmill Woods from some of our water and sewer cases. They are mostly a retirement community, many of them elderly. In short, they

don't want to pay, Commissioners, for any unwarranted rate increases. They don't want to pay for any rate increases at all. And the bottom line of this proceeding is to ask your permission for these utilities to increase the retail rates of their customers, pure and simple.

My clients don't want to be -- don't want to see this Commission cowed or bullied into approving cost recovery as a result of this RTO as a result of undue pressures by the FERC. So, in essence you have two issues before you, Commissioner, that you need to address in the next two and a half or three days. One is -- and it is a threshold issue in this case -- is participation in an RTO and the formation and the operation of an RTO by these three utilities voluntary or indeed is it mandatory under legitimate authority of the FERC. If it is mandatory, then generally we would say that whatever dollars the utilities expend as long as they were reasonable in forming the RTO have to be recovered through retail rates and this Commission has no second chance of reexamining those costs.

If, on the other hand, participation by these utilities is voluntary, which my clients say that it is, then the Commission has the responsibility and statutory obligation to come forth and as in any other issue in a rate case is to say are the monies reasonably and prudently expended and is it cost-effective in the sense that the economic benefits will equal or exceed the costs. If the costs exceed the benefits

and they go ahead and do this, then you ought to make them eat the cost, have their shareholders do it or have somebody else pay. But the retail customers shouldn't have to pay for anything where the costs exceed the benefits to the retail customers.

Now, with respect to the first issue, is it voluntary or is it mandatory? My clients submit to you that the evidence in this case, the testimony of the ten witnesses you will hear in the next two and a half or three days shows that it is voluntary, pure and simple. Not one witness will come up, Commissioners, and tell you that the FERC has the statutory authority to make them join an RTO or indeed that the FERC possesses the statutory authority to do so.

The testimony will instead say to you it is the strong FERC policy that we join a RTO. They want us to do it. More recently in a document that you will receive in evidence through the first witness today, a memo of September 26, 2001, by the Chairman of FERC, you will see where they propose not to tell them to do it, but if they don't do it -- and I submit they can't tell them to do it because they don't have the authority -- you will see in this memo, Commissioner, where the Chairman of the FERC proposes three coercive measures to punish any utility in this country that doesn't join in an RTO voluntarily.

Take away the prospect of future mergers, eliminate

the ability to charge market-based rates for transmission services prospectively, after a fair hearing presumably. And another threat, none of these witnesses will tell you that the FERC has the authority and indeed is mandating this participation. And you need to pay attention to their testimony, and I submit you need to ask each and every one of them is it mandatory or is it merely coercive bullying threats by a federal agency that proposes abuses of its own legitimate powers in order to force participation in this RTO.

We maintain that it is voluntary. If it is voluntary, Commissioners, you have to do the test to weigh the cost versus the benefits. Again, you have ten witnesses here, not one of them in our reading of the prefiled testimony offers one credible penny savings or benefits to any customer, retail or wholesale. And I say credible because I don't buy -- my clients don't buy the merchant plant witness' testimony.

And when we get to costs, while these witnesses can't specify one penny of savings, one penny of credible savings, they have no problem listing the costs involved. Hundreds of millions of dollars in start-up costs, net increases in annual operating costs for transmission services which are being provided today with no apparent problems. The system is not obviously broken, Commissioners. So they have lots of costs, fanciful illusory, perhaps, benefits that customers will receive.

They like to use the term, you will see it repeatedly throughout the testimony the next couple of days, we will get from spending all of this money robust wholesale competition, maybe. Even if we do get robust wholesale competition who benefits, Commissioners? We think the testimony will show that even though the so-called benefits are not quantified, if, in fact, they occur, they will inure to the advantage of the other intervenors in this case who include the merchant plants, who as we all know can't fully operate in the state anyways because of the footdragging of the petitioners, but it will inure to the benefit if they occur of the merchant plants who can make sales easier and the transmission dependent utilities, whether the cooperatives or the municipalities, they will have better sales opportunities and perhaps lower cost of generation.

Even if that comes true, how does that benefit retail customers who are being asked to pay all of these costs of a vertically integrated utility that professes to this Commission, the legislature, and the 2020 Electric Study Commission that they have adequate generation reserves. We think the evidence will show that it is voluntary, that is not cost-effective, and in short you should deny them recovery of the monies being sought. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Thank you. Mr. Moyle.

MR. MOYLE: Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, my name is Jon Moyle, Sr. of the firm of Moyle,

Flanigan, Katz, Raymond & Sheehan, and I have a brief opening statement today.

First, let me apologize to the Commission, Jon Moyle, Jr., who is more frequently over here than I am and remembers to turn the button on or off better than I do has a longstanding conflict and was unable to be here. But we are here today on behalf of PG&E National Energy Group, which I will refer to as NEG, PG&E, and also Competitive Power Ventures Atlantic, Limited, which I will refer to as CPV.

I hadn't planned on mentioning this, but as a result of some points that were made in some of the opening statements and someone reminded me of a situation that I really don't know about, but I have a vague recollection about, and I would suggest that staff may want to check this out, because Commissioner Deason, I think you asked the question about Texas and the FERC jurisdiction, and I don't know this for sure, but it's worth checking out whether that lack of jurisdiction may relate to a congressional statutory exemption which occurred during the presidency of LBJ as opposed to the grid system or the interconnect system. It might be worth knowing and getting an answer to your question.

Continuing with my opening statement, on behalf of NEG and CPV we reassert the positions contained in our separately filed prehearing statements of issues and positions and our participation in this proceeding will be in support of

those positions.

An additional matter, though, that I would like to take a few minutes, and this will be brief, on behalf of NEG I would like to make a clarification statement in connection with the RTO. Apparently some confusion has arisen as to the position of NEG on a region-wide RTO for the southeast and for the GridFlorida model in particular. NEG has asked me to state in this docket that it has been a strong advocate of RTO development across the country, that it strongly supports the GridFlorida as well as the southeast regional RTO both in the development and implementation.

As a national power marketer and as a developer, owner, and operator of generating facilities in Florida and the southeast, NEG participated in the development of the proposed GridFlorida model through the stakeholder process. NEG was also an active participant in the FERC ordered mediation sessions held to determine the form of a southeast RTO. The company believes that a southeast RTO is necessary to develop the wholesale market in the southeast.

In its view, such an organization will provide cost efficient benefits that will reduce costs to consumers. Among these benefits are the appropriate size and scale for regional transmission and market operations, access to highly efficient lower cost generation to meet growing demand, optimal operation for all generation resources as a result of fair and open

transmission access and transparent market operations, removal or improvement of seams, pancake access, these types of problems as well as costs associated with the transfer of power between regions and subregions, and an opportunity to increase needed transmission investments.

NEG supports many of the market design and market structure features contained in the original GridFlorida model which were subsequently incorporated into the collaborative governance model recommended to FERC by the administrative law judge who presided over the recent mediation. The company believes that a full review, including the prudence determination by the PSC, is appropriate and needed at this time notwithstanding the absence of deregulation decisions in Florida, and that the proposed RTO will be beneficial to all parties under existing or present circumstances and will also be beneficial to a further deregulated market when that occurs.

A southeast RTO will bring benefits to the region to increase competition and commercial opportunities for needed transmission expansion. NEG hopes this statement clarifies its position for the Florida PSC and looks forward to working with the Commission and the other market participants on the ultimate implementation of the southeast RTO. And thank you on behalf of NEG for allowing the presentation of this statement.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Thank you. I believe that was the last presentation by the intervenors? Very well.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Chairman, I apologize, but I need to ask Mr. Willis a question.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Very well.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Willis, I tried to take notes, and I believe that you indicated at the conclusion of your opening statement that this Commission should ratify GridFlorida and should make an unequivocal ruling to that effect, is that correct?

MR. WILLIS: That is correct.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Now, you really didn't go into jurisdiction, but I feel compelled to ask you, what is our jurisdiction when it comes to RTO approval? First of all, under present statutory scheme do we have the ability to act on this RTO proposal, and if the divestiture of assets are required for a utility to join an RTO, is that something this Commission must approve?

MR. WILLIS: To answer the last question first, we do not believe that you have the jurisdiction to deny the company divestiture. That is not really clear, clearly spelled out in the law, but we don't believe that your current jurisdiction allows you to do that. You certainly have ample jurisdiction over each of the GridFlorida companies, though. You are exercising that jurisdiction here today, and we pay very close attention to the views of the Commission. So in a practical sense, we are very interested in your point of view, and as a

practical matter can influence it very extensively. So --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So you are saying this Commission can do the same thing FERC has done. In areas where we have clear jurisdiction we make your life miserable.

MR. WILLIS: Well, you used to call it amiable terrorism and it has been practiced for a long period of time and that is kind of a flip label to reality is that your ideas are known on various subjects and we pay very close attention to them.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Picking up on that same question, you are familiar with the grid bill, correct?

MR. WILLIS: Well, the grid bill and any number of -you have pretty wide authority over any public utility that is
providing electric utility service at retail in this state. I
mean, you have a very wide authority and sometimes persuade us
to do things with respect to one thing when you are reviewing
another thing.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: I want to go to a fairly specific question, and if you want to defer this to the witness, that is fine. But under GridFlorida it is my understanding that the RTO will have exclusive control over upkeep, maintenance, and the whole realm of operation of the transmission facilities that it takes ownership of.

MR. WILLIS: I think it would be appropriate for you to put that question to Mr. Naeve or the panel.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: That would be fine. Very well.

Questions, Commissioners? Very well. Then that ends opening statements, and we are prepared to swear the witnesses, correct?

All those who are intending to testify, would you stand and raise your right hand.

(Witnesses sworn collectively.)

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Thank you very much. You may be seated.

MR. KEATING: Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Yes.

MR. KEATING: Before we start with the first witness, I would like to bring up one matter. Staff has prepared some composite exhibits that consist of several of the discovery responses that the parties have provided. At this point in time we have reached a -- Florida Power Corporation has agreed that those exhibits could be stipulated into the record. With respect to those composite exhibits for Florida Power and Light and Tampa Electric it is my understanding from the last time I talked to both of them that they have not had the chance to completely go through that list of exhibits to determine if there is anything that they felt needed to be clarified or was objectionable.

What I would like to do is I guess at this point if there is no objection to offer the Florida Power Corporation

composite exhibit. It's not something that we intend to 1 2 cross-examine their witnesses on, and it is my understanding 3 from talking to Florida Power and Light's counsel that they 4 expect before we start tomorrow they will have had the 5 opportunity to go through the list that we provided them and that we can perhaps -- it's my hope that most of what we have 6 identified could be stipulated into the record. And where 7 8 there needs to be some clarification or there is some objection, that we deal with that as it comes up, and once --9 10 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: It sounds like we can mark it now. First of all, let me ask, are their objections? 11 MR. McGLOTHLIN: Mr. Chairman, I have not had a 12 chance to review that package. It may very well be we could 13 stipulate, but I would like a chance to see it first. 14 15 16 17 a chance to further review it.

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CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Okay. We will mark it now and we will hold off a motion for admission until the parties have had

MR. KEATING: Okay. What we will do is distribute each set at this point, and what I would propose and I discussed briefly with FPL's counsel is that when they have had a chance, those parties that haven't agreed that these interrogatory responses could be made a part of the record. So when they have had a chance to do that that we would --

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: I will leave it to you to come back in the morning and tell us whether or not you have a

stipulation on its admission. If not, then we will hear the objections to it.

MR. KEATING: It's our hope, like I said, that most of this could be stipulated in. And my only concern is that there may be some witnesses that come up today that would address a question that is related to those interrogatories that may not be stipulated, and that the staff have the opportunity, once we have heard back from the parties that have not had a chance to completely look through our list, that we be able to address the question with the appropriate witness to perhaps bring that witness back up out of order if necessary.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: You can use the subject matter for cross. I don't think we need to have it as an exhibit for you to use it as cross. And if there is something -- if there was an objection as to the question on cross, we can deal with it then, so I don't think there is a problem with that. But in terms of bringing it into evidence, that I think will be deferred. But I don't think it should be a problem.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Chairman, I believe the concern is, though, if a witness takes the stand and then leaves and then something is not stipulated into the record, staff wants the ability to recall that witness to ask cross questions.

MR. KEATING: That we will have lost the opportunity. We want to avoid having lost the opportunity to have asked

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cross questions, and I don't know to what extent we will need to do that. I hope it's limited.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Okay. Over the lunch break would you just coordinate with the parties and find out what the prospect of that is, whether or not a witness that may have -it doesn't sound like there is any kind of broad objection to it in any event, but check with the parties who do have some prospective objections and coordinate with their witnesses and make sure they will be here in the event you need to do that. Very well. So we will mark that as Staff Composite Exhibit 1.

MR. KEATING: Well, we have three separate composite exhibits, one for each company. And if you would like we could distribute those now. Because I realize that there are other parties whose agreement is required in this case, and I don't want to short circuit their ability to review these. The list of interrogatories and document requests was provided to all parties, the actual exhibits have just been put together in the last 24 hours.

MR. CHILDS: Are you doing these as three separate exhibits?

MR. KEATING: Yes.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: As I'm seeing it, it looks like they are distinguished by docket, so interrogatory responses distinguished by docket.

MR. KEATING: That is correct.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Okay. So we will mark as Exhibit 1 1 2 staff's composite interrogatories responses in Docket 000824. 3 MR. KEATING: Okay. CHAIRMAN JACOBS: We will mark as Exhibit 2 responses 4 to staff's interrogatories in Docket Number 010577, composite. 5 6 And we will mark as Exhibit 3 responses to staff's 7 interrogatories in Docket Number 001148. 8 (Composite Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 marked for 9 identification.) COMMISSIONER JABER: You forgot to say the part about 10 11 no cell phones in the agenda room, didn't you? 12 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Yes, I did. Very well. MR. KEATING: Thank you. And I apologize for the 13 14 interruption. Given the expedited nature of this case, many of these requests were received just last week and many of them 15 were provided to staff even a few days early so the parties 16 17 haven't been dragging their feet on this, but it has just been a matter of running out of time prior to this hearing to get 18 this wrapped up. And it's our hope that in the long run this 19 20 will expedite the hearing and streamline it a bit. 21 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Very well. And we are prepared for the first witness. I believe, Mr. Childs, it's your witness. 22 23 MR. CHILDS: For the first witness we call Mr. Naeve. 24 CLIFFORD M. NAEVE was called as a witness on behalf of Florida Power Corporation, 25

Florida Power and Light, and Tampa Electric Company and, having 1 2 been duly sworn, testified as follows: 3 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. CHILDS: 4 5 Would you state your name and address, please? 0 6 My name is Clifford M. Naeve. I go by Mike Naeve. Α 7 My address is 1440 New York Avenue, Washington, D.C., 20005. 8 Q By whom are you employed and in what capacity? 9 I am a partner in the law firm of Skadden, Arps. Α 10 Slate, Meagher & Flom. 11 Do you have before you a document that is identified 0 as being sponsored in three dockets, that is Docket Number 12 001148, 010577, and 000824 entitled testimony of Mike Naeve? 13 14 Yes, I do. Α 15 Was that prepared by you as your testimony for this 0 16 proceeding? 17 Α Yes. it was. And I understand, Mr. Naeve, that you do not have any 18 Q 19 changes or corrections to make to this testimony? 20 Α That is correct. 21 And do you adopt it as your testimony? 0 22 Yes. I do. Α MR. CHILDS: Commissioners, we ask that the prepared 23 testimony of Mr. Naeve be inserted into the record as though 24 25 read.

1 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Without objection, show the 2 testimony is entered into the record as though read. 3 MR. CHILDS: Mr. Naeve in the prehearing order identifies an exhibit that he is sponsoring, and he talks about 4 5 that on his testimony, Pages 3 and 4. I would like to have 6 that marked for identification, please. 7 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Very well. That is Volume 1 of the GridFlorida RTO Formation Documents? 8 9 MR. CHILDS: I believe it is Volumes 1 through 6 of 10 the RTO documents. 11 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Now. there were other witnesses who are associated with those, so they are jointly sponsoring 12 13 those? 14 MR. CHILDS: There are other witnesses who speak to 15 it, but this witness is sponsoring it. 16 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Show that marked as Exhibit 4. 17 (Exhibit 4 marked for identification.) 18 MR. CHILDS: In addition, I have distributed, or I think I was successful in distributing yesterday a three-page 19 20 document dated September 26th from Pat Wood, III. I am going 21 to go through identification of that right now. 22 BY MR. CHILDS: 23 0 Mr. Naeve, do you have a document that is addressed 24 to Bill Massey and two other individuals from Pat Wood. III? 25 Α Yes. I do.

1	Q Could you tell us what that is, just describe it?						
2	CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Could you give us just a moment						
3	until we get copies of that, Mr. Childs?						
4	MR. CHILDS: I will get copies. I have copies of						
5	that for you.						
6	BY MR. CHILDS:						
7	Q Mr. Naeve, will you identify that three-page memo						
8	that I just handed out?						
9	A Yes. This is a memo from Pat Wood, who is the						
LO	Chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and it is						
L1	directed to the three existing Commissioners of the Federal						
12	Energy Regulatory Commission other than Commissioner Wood, who						
13	are Bill Massey, Linda Breathitt, and Nora Brownell. That is a						
L4	memo in which Chairman Wood expresses his views on the FERC						
15	policies pertaining to RTOs, and a memo in which he makes						
16	various suggestions to accelerate the development of RTOs. One						
17	suggestion is that						
18	Q Just identify it for just a moment.						
19	A Okay.						
20	MR. CHILDS: I would like to have that marked as an						
21	exhibit.						
22	CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Show that marked as Exhibit 5.						
23	MR. CHILDS: Okay.						
24	(Exhibit 5 marked for identification.)						

BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In re: Review of Florida Power & Light Company's proposed merger with Entergy Corporation, the formation of a Florida transmission company ("Florida transco"), and their effect on FPL's retail rates.

In re: Review of Tampa Electric Company and impact of its participation in GridFlorida, a Florida Transmission Company, on TECO's retail ratepayers.

In re: Review of Florida Power Corporation's earnings, including effects of proposed acquisition of Florida Power Corporation by Carolina Power & Light. **DOCKET NO. 001148-EI**

DOCKET NO. 010577-EI

DOCKET NO. 000824-EI

FILED: August 15, 2001

TESTIMONY OF MIKE NAEVE

- 1 Q. Please state your name and occupation.
- 2 A. My name is Mike Naeve. I am a partner in the law firm Skadden, Arps, Slate,
- 3 Meagher & Flom LLP.

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- Q. Please briefly describe your background.
- 5 A. I previously served on the staff of two Texas Governors, was Director of the
- 6 Legislative Staff of U.S. Senator Lloyd Bentson, and from 1985-1988 was a
- 7 Commissioner at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"). While at
- 8 FERC, I was deeply involved in establishing FERC's policies for enhancing
- 9 competition in the natural gas industry. These policies included open access
- transportation, relaxation of wellhead price regulations and deregulation of gas

merchant activities. I also helped to develop new approaches to the FERC's regulation of the electric power industry. Since leaving FERC, I have continued to be involved in FERC regulatory matters, most particularly with respect to the electric utility industry. I have worked on a number of electric utility merger proceedings, and I helped to develop the first market-based rate tariff and the first open access transmission tariff used by FERC as a model for its Order No. 888 pro forma Open Access Transmission Tariff. I have been involved in a number of electric utility restructurings, and I have testified before Congress on several occasions on energy policy and antitrust issues in energy markets. I represent Florida Power & Light Company ("FPL") in a number of matters, including representation at FERC with respect to FPL's participation in GridFlorida.

I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

Q. What is the purpose of your testimony in this proceeding?

A. I am presenting testimony on behalf of FPL, FPC and TECO (the "GridFlorida Companies") in support of their position that it is prudent for them to participate in the GridFlorida RTO, as they have proposed to FERC. In particular, my testimony addresses the following issues:

1. Prudence and Benefits (Issue Nos. 2, 3, 5 and 6)

When I discuss the "prudence" of the GridFlorida Companies' decisions, I am addressing this issue from the perspective of the GridFlorida Companies' ratepayers. I address the prudence issue on two levels. First I explain why, given FERC's clearly stated policy that all transmission-owning utilities should join an RTO, it was prudent for the GridFlorida Companies to proactively develop and request approval of an RTO. Second, I explain why, given the decision to

participate in some kind of RTO, the GridFlorida Companies made various choices as to scope, form, ownership and functions that led to the GridFlorida proposal, and why those choices were prudent. In order to explain why these decisions are prudent, I also address the benefits of those decisions.

2. FERC Southeastern RTO Proceeding (Issue No. 11)

Recently, FERC issued a series of orders requiring that parties attend mediation before a FERC ALJ to discuss how to form a large Southeastern RTO. Although the GridFlorida Companies were not required to attend, they were strongly encouraged by FERC to do so. As a consequence, the GridFlorida Companies and other GridFlorida stakeholders, including the Florida Public Service Commission's ("FPSC") Staff, have participated in the FERC discussions. My testimony also deals with this development.

3. Retail Unbundling (Issue Nos. 8 and 9)

Issue Numbers 8 and 9 assume that the GridFlorida Companies have proposed to unbundle their retail electric service. As I explain below, however, that is not the case. These issues therefore are not relevant to the GridFlorida proposal.

4. Chronology of Significant Events

Finally, I also am providing a brief chronology of significant events that have led the GridFlorida Companies to the current stage of GridFlorida development.

Although this testimony does not directly relate to any of the hearing issues, it provides useful background information for the FPSC.

Q. Are you sponsoring any exhibits as part of your testimony?

A. Yes. On July 30, five volumes of GridFlorida formation documents were filed as Exhibit CMN-1 to my testimony. These documents also were filed to give the

1		FPSC	C useful background regarding GridFlorida. I have included a sixth volume			
2		to Exhibit CMN-1 in the filing made today.				
3	Q.	Wha	What other witnesses are testifying on behalf of the GridFlorida Companies?			
4	A.	In addition to my testimony, the GridFlorida Companies are jointly sponsoring a				
5		numb	number of other witnesses in support of their position. In particular, the			
6		GridI	GridFlorida Companies are submitting testimony addressing the following issues:			
7		1.	FERC RTO Policy (Issue Nos. 1-3). Mr. James Hoecker, the recent			
8			Chairman at FERC who was responsible for the issuance of Order No.			
9			2000, will testify regarding FERC's RTO policy. In particular, he will			
10			explain that it is FERC's clearly expressed policy that all transmission			
11			owners join an RTO. Mr. Hoecker also will explain the benefits that			
12			FERC believes would result from RTO participation, and why those			
13			benefits should apply to Florida.			
14		2.	Governance, Planning, Operations and Market Design (Issue Nos. 2,			
15			3, 5 and 6). This testimony addresses the substance of the GridFlorida			
16			proposal and explains why the various substantive provisions are			
17			appropriate. Since the various subjects are all interrelated, this testimony			
18			is being jointly sponsored by myself, Mr. Marty Mennes of FPL, Mr. Greg			
19			Ramon of TECO and Mr. Henry Southwick of FPC. I refer to this			
20			testimony later on as the "Panel Testimony."			
21		3.	Pricing (Issue Nos. 2, 3, 5 and 6). The GridFlorida Companies have not			
22			yet filed the proposed rates for GridFlorida. However, the GridFlorida			
23			Companies have made detailed filings regarding the approach that they			
24			will follow, including a rate plan designed to mitigate cost shifts resulting			

1 from the elimination of pancaked rates as required by FERC. Mr. William 2 Ashburn of TECO is presenting testimony describing the GridFlorida rate 3 proposal and why it provides adequate mitigation of cost shifts and 4 otherwise is appropriate. 5 4. Start-Up and Operating Costs (Issue No. 4). Mr. Brad Holcombe of 6 Accenture, which has helped the GridFlorida Companies to develop a 7 blueprint and budget for GridFlorida start-up, presents testimony on the 8 proposed GridFlorida start-up and initial operating costs. Mr. Holcombe 9 explains how cost estimates were developed and shows that the 10 GridFlorida costs are reasonable when compared to start-up costs for other 11 RTOs. Mr. Holcombe's testimony relates to the total GridFlorida budget – 12 some portion of which would have been incurred by the GridFlorida 13 Companies even if GridFlorida never is implemented. Mr. Holcombe also 14 sponsors an analysis prepared by the three companies that identifies which 15 annual operating costs are incremental to GridFlorida, i.e. the portion of 16 total operating costs described by Mr. Holcombe that would not be 17 incurred by the GridFlorida Companies in the absence of GridFlorida. Mr. 18 Holcombe's testimony was filed on July 30. 19 5. GridFlorida Development Activity and Costs (Issue Nos. 4 and 6). Mr. 20 Henry Southwick presents testimony describing the interim development 21 work that the GridFlorida Companies performed in order to make

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GridFlorida. This testimony was filed on July 30.

GridFlorida operational, and also addresses the estimated total costs of

1		6.	Company Specific Testil	mony. Finally, each of the GridFlorida Compa-		
2		nies is presenting company-specific testimony dealing with issues specific				
3		to the individual companies. Those witnesses are as follows:				
4			Florida Power Corp	H. I. Southwick		
5			Florida Power and Light	C. M. Mennes		
6			Florida Power and Light	K. M. Dubin		
7			Tampa Electric Co	W. R. Ashburn		
8			Tampa Electric Co	T. L. Hernandez		
9 10 11	II. IT WAS PRUDENT FOR THE GRIDFLORIDA COMPANIES TO PROPOSE RTO PARTICIPATION (ISSUE NOS. 2, 3, 5, 6 AND 1					
12 13 14 15 16 17		A.	JOIN AN RTO, IT WAS	CY THAT ALL TRANSMISSION OWNERS S PRUDENT FOR THE GRIDFLORIDA E SUBMITTED A PROPOSAL TO FORM		
18	Q.	What was the GridFlorida Companies' view as to whether they were re-				
19		quire	d to join an RTO?			
20	A.	As Mr. Hoecker explains, it was FERC's clearly stated policy that all transmission				
21		owners join an RTO. The GridFlorida Companies read Order No. 2000 as raising				
22		the very strong likelihood that, if the GridFlorida Companies did not file their own				
23		RTO proposal, FERC eventually would force RTO participation, either through a				
24	`	direct order or through the imposition of a number of ever increasing penalties –				
25		"guid	ance and encouragement" –	as FERC put it in Order No. 2000. ¹ The		

GridFlorida Companies did not believe that RTO participation was voluntary in the long run, notwithstanding that FERC declined to make a generic finding in Order No. 2000 that every utility was required to join an RTO. In this regard, I think that the opinion of DC Court of Appeals Judge Williams is instructive in describing FERC's claim that participation in its natural gas pipeline restructuring rule was "voluntary": "[W]hen a condemned man is given the choice between the noose and a firing squad, we do not ordinarily say that he has 'volunteered' to be hanged."²

- Q. Given FERC's stated policy about RTO participation, what is your opinion as to the prudence of the GridFlorida Companies' decision to submit a proposal to form an RTO?
- A. A prudent utility would not frame the question simply as whether or not it should join an RTO, but instead as whether it is better to proactively develop and submit a proposal or to wait and run the substantial risk that it ultimately would be required by FERC to join an existing RTO. In my view, it was prudent for the GridFlorida Companies to make the decision to submit their own proposal rather than take the substantial risk that they later would be forced to join an existing RTO.

²<u>Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC</u>, 824 F.2d 981 at 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

Q. Why is that?

A.

- It is a question of controlling your own destiny. If the GridFlorida Companies later were forced to join an existing RTO, they would have to take that RTO as they found it, and would have minimal input into its essential features. By contrast, there have been considerable benefits to Florida ratepayers resulting from the GridFlorida Companies' decision to form their own RTO and to develop their own proposal, including the following:
- GridFlorida Companies' decision to form their own RTO is that they established a substantial collaborative process in which all Florida stakeholders, including representatives of the FPSC, were able to provide guidance and advice on the content of the GridFlorida Companies' RTO proposal. While the GridFlorida Companies did not accept all comments that they received (many of which were mutually exclusive with other comments received) the comments that the Florida stakeholders provided materially shaped the ultimate contents of the GridFlorida proposal. By contrast, if the GridFlorida Companies had not filed their own proposal, but later were required to join an RTO formed without the benefit of the Florida collaborative process, the Florida stakeholders (including the GridFlorida Companies) would have been completely shut out of the development process.
- 2. <u>Peninsular Florida Scope</u>: The FPSC has expressed on numerous occasions its strong preference that any RTO joined by the GridFlorida

 Companies be limited to Peninsular Florida. Because the GridFlorida Companies submitted their own proposal, they were able to achieve this goal. By contrast, if

the GridFlorida Companies had declined to develop their own proposal and later were forced to join an existing RTO, the only existing RTOs would be located outside of Florida. The benefit of a Florida RTO to Florida electric consumers was recognized by the FPSC's Staff in a September 2000 briefing paper by the Division of Policy Analysis & Intergovernmental Liaison entitled "Regional Transmission Organizations: Policy Analysis Briefing Paper: The Viability of an RTO in Florida." At page 33 of the briefing paper, the Staff noted that:

Any RTO adopted for Florida should take into account the state's unique geographical location and transmission tielines. Also, this RTO must balance the current level of the state's energy prices and electric reliability with the desire of industrial users and merchant plant owners for fair and equal access to the state's transmission grid. Each operating RTO across the country has been designed to address particular regional issues, many of which are quite different from the Florida status quo.

- 3. Florida Focus: A closely related benefit to the Peninsular Florida scope of the RTO is that such an RTO would have a Florida focus in the way that it operates after it commences operations. The RTO would be headquartered in Florida, would focus its operational and planning efforts on Florida, and would not be put in the position where it would have to balance the impacts of its actions between Florida and other regions and thereby benefit another state at the expense of Florida.
- 4. <u>Cost Shifts and Mitigation</u>: While the GridFlorida proposal, as a consequence of implementing FERC's requirement that rate pancakes be eliminated, does result in some cost shifts among various Florida customers,

participation in an out-of-state RTO might result in Florida customers being required to bear costs previously borne by out-of-state customers. Furthermore, the GridFlorida Companies developed, through the Florida collaborative process, a cost-shift mitigation plan designed to mitigate the impacts of any such cost shifts. The GridFlorida Companies would be required, of course, to accept whatever cost shift mitigation plan, if any, is established by an existing RTO if they were forced to join such an RTO in the future.

- been responsible for developing the GridFlorida proposal, they have been able to shape that proposal in ways intended to limit cost incurrence. For example, as explained in Mr. Holcombe's testimony, the GridFlorida Companies have decided to use the existing FPL control center initially on an interim basis, which will allow significant cost savings when compared to the construction of an entirely new control center. FERC has required the GridFlorida Companies to wait until the Independent Board is formed before making certain implementation decisions affecting market design, but the GridFlorida Companies are permitted to make other development decisions that can impact the overall costs of GridFlorida. The cost issue is addressed in more detail in the testimony of Mr. Holcombe and Mr. Southwick.
- Q. What is your conclusion about the prudence of the GridFlorida Companies' decision to develop and file an RTO proposal?
- A. First of all, notwithstanding FERC's decision to follow a "voluntary approach", it was FERC's clearly stated policy that <u>all</u> transmission owners join an RTO, as Mr.

Hoecker explains in his testimony. I do not believe that the GridFlorida Companies should be found to be imprudent for following a clearly articulated federal policy.

A.

Furthermore, given FERC's stated policy, it was prudent for the GridFlorida Companies to proactively develop and file an RTO proposal rather than wait and take the significant risk that they ultimately would be forced to join an existing RTO that would have been developed without their input. This decision has resulted in benefits to the GridFlorida Companies and their Florida ratepayers when compared to the results if the GridFlorida Companies later were forced to join an existing RTO.

Q. How are your conclusions impacted by the FERC's recent order initiating mediation to establish a larger Southeastern RTO?

As of the filing date of this testimony, the parties are still involved in the FERC mediation, so I do not know what proposal may arise out of that mediation, how FERC will react to any such proposal, or whether the GridFlorida Companies would agree to join the larger RTO. However, the GridFlorida Companies are participating in the FERC mediation for the same reason that they believed that it was prudent to develop the GridFlorida proposal in the first place. They are concerned that someday they may be ordered by FERC to become part of the Southeastern RTO and, even if that is not the case, a Southeastern RTO will have a significant impact on the Florida market. By participating actively in the Southeastern RTO discussion, the GridFlorida Companies already have been able

to influence the process, and it appears that the parties are likely to agree to many of the same features that are in the GridFlorida proposal. The GridFlorida Companies hope that by participating they can make the proposed RTO as efficient and effective as possible, and otherwise protect Florida ratepayers. Of course, the GridFlorida Companies would consult with the FPSC prior to making any decisions about Southeastern RTO participation.

A.

Q. Will the GridFlorida Companies be required by FERC to participate in the Southeastern RTO?

At this point, it is too early to tell. I believe that it is possible that FERC will not require the GridFlorida Companies' participation in a Southeastern RTO initially, given that FERC did not require the GridFlorida Companies to participate in the mediation. However, I believe in the long run that it is likely that GridFlorida will be required to join the Southeastern RTO if the GridFlorida Companies do not agree to join initially. The GridFlorida Companies therefore likely will be faced with a similar situation to the one that they faced with Order No. 2000 – they can participate actively and shape the RTO to benefit Florida to the extent possible or they can refuse to join initially and ultimately be required to participate in an RTO that was formed without their involvement and with no Florida focus whatsoever.

B. OTHER BENEFITS OF RTO PARTICIPATION

Q. Are there other benefits to the GridFlorida Companies' decision to form an RTO?

A. Yes. Mr. Hoecker addresses the general benefits that FERC believes would result from RTO participation. My testimony focuses on some of the specific benefits to

1 Florida that would result. Many of these benefits are difficult if not impossible to 2 quantify. 3 O. What benefits result from the GridFlorida proposal? As discussed by Mr. Hoecker, one of the benefits of RTO participation is the 4 A. elimination of pancaked rates. FERC stated that this should allow more efficient 5 6 transactions to occur. As Mr. Ashburn explains in detail, the GridFlorida proposal 7 eliminates pancaked rates for new transactions and depancakes existing 8 transactions over a period of 10 years. 9 10 A second benefit is a congestion management proposal that leads to more efficient 11 allocation of transmission capacity. The GridFlorida proposal includes a Physical 12 Transmission Rights ("PTR") model of congestion management that FERC 13 approved. This approach is discussed in more detail in the Panel Testimony. 14 15 A third benefit is the creation of a real-time balancing market and ancillary 16 services markets that are market based as is described in more detail in the Panel 17 Testimony. Again, this should permit a more efficient wholesale market. The 18 GridFlorida Companies included a revised market design in their May 29 19 Compliance Filing at FERC, and FERC's order on that filing is pending. Q. 20 These benefits all relate to creating a more efficient wholesale market. Can 21 such benefits be obtained in Florida given the Florida Supreme Court's 22 ruling interpreting the application of the Florida Electrical Power Plant 23 Siting Act ("Siting Act") to merchant plants?

Mr. Hoecker explains that there can be benefits from increased competition in Florida even if merchant plants cannot be built. Furthermore, as I understand it, the Supreme Court's ruling does not prevent non-utility generation owners from building plants in Florida. For example, a nonutility generation owner can execute a contract with a load-serving entity to supply all or a significant portion of its entire output. In addition, plants with a steam cycle below 75 MW in size and any plant that does not have a steam cycle, such as a simple cycle peaking plant, are exempt from the Siting Act and therefore do not need to be owned by or dedicated to a load serving entity. Such plants provide competition for existing wholesale sellers of power to load-serving entities. Changes that eliminate rate pancaking and ensure nondiscriminatory open access will benefit these plants and increase wholesale competition.

A.

The argument that non-utility generation facilities can still be developed in Florida is not just a theoretical argument. As described in the Panel Testimony, the GridFlorida Companies currently have pending requests for interconnection of over 50 plants representing over 26,000 MW of non-utility owned generation to be placed in service in the next five years. While not all of these plants will be placed into service (and indeed some of the requests have been filed in anticipation of a revision to the Siting Act), the magnitude of the requests shows that a significant amount of non-utility plants likely will be built in Florida notwithstanding the Florida Supreme Court's ruling.

Furthermore, I would note that the Governor has appointed a Committee to study steps that can be taken to foster increased wholesale competition in Florida. Whatever form any restructuring of the Florida utility industry might ultimately take, having an RTO in place is an important predicate for wholesale competition. It is appropriate to establish GridFlorida soon so that the infrastructure will be in place at such time as the Florida legislature acts. This conclusion is consistent with the FPSC Staff's opinion as expressed at page 34 of the briefing paper I described above. "An effective RTO is a necessary . . . condition toward the development of a competitive wholesale generation market."

A.

Finally, there are many merchant plants and other generation facilities located outside of Florida. Improving wholesale competition should at the very least have a positive impact on the availability and price of power imported into Florida.

Q. Are there other benefits from having an RTO?

Yes. Another significant benefit is in having the planning function discharged by a single entity, particularly with respect to interconnection planning. As noted above, there are a large number of interconnection and transmission service requests pending before the GridFlorida Companies. Many of these requests impact the systems of more than one of the GridFlorida Companies, and therefore have to be studied by more than one of the GridFlorida Companies, or have to be organized into a joint study among the GridFlorida Companies. The use of separate queues has had the effect of complicating new supplier access to the Florida grid, as explained in more detail in the Panel Testimony regarding the

1 GridFlorida proposal. When separate queues are combined into a single 2 GridFlorida queue and the planning function is performed on a regional basis by 3 GridFlorida (or by a larger RTO), the impacts of a particular interconnection 4 and/or transmission request can be analyzed in one study performed on a regional 5 basis. This should facilitate access to the grid and encourage new generation. 6 Q. What other benefits result from the GridFlorida Companies's decision to 7 form an RTO? 8 A. As Mr. Hoecker testifies, FERC has indicated that it will be much more open to 9 innovation in transmission service from RTOs than it has been to deviations from 10 the Order No. 888 pro forma tariff by individual transmission owners. This 11 should be the case for GridFlorida as well. It is difficult to foresee exactly what 12 innovations will arise in the future, but the ability to adjust to a rapidly changing 13 industry is an important benefit that should permit the GridFlorida Companies to

Q. Do these benefits justify the GridFlorida Companies' decision to incur the costs of GridFlorida?

access power to serve their customers at a lower overall cost.

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As I stated above, the choice faced by the GridFlorida Companies was whether to proactively propose to join an RTO or run the strong risk that they would be forced to join an existing RTO in the future. The prudence of this decision cannot be judged simply by comparing the costs of GridFlorida with a quantification of the benefits, because such a calculation ignores the substantial likelihood that the GridFlorida Companies would be forced to join an RTO eventually. The proper way to evaluate the prudence of the GridFlorida Companies' decision is to

1 compare the outcome of the GridFlorida Companies' decision to proactively 2 propose GridFlorida with the outcome that would result if the GridFlorida 3 Companies were forced to join an RTO at some point in the future. As I showed 4 above, it is clear that it was prudent and in the best interests of the GridFlorida 5 Companies' ratepayers for the GridFlorida Companies to have developed their 6 own proposal rather than be forced to join an RTO designed by someone else out 7 of state. 8 9 Having said that, the benefits to joining an RTO described above are significant, 10 particularly in the long run as competitive wholesale markets evolve and mature. 11 However, some of these benefits are very difficult to quantify. The significant 12 benefits of RTO formation reinforce the prudence of the decision to go forward 13 rather than attempt to resist RTO participation to the bitter end. The FPSC should 14 not let the fact that many of these benefits are difficult to quantify color its view of 15 the soundness of the GridFlorida Companies' decision to go forward with GridFlorida. 16 17 III. THE GRIDFLORIDA COMPANIES' DECISIONS REGARDING THE 18 SPECIFIC GRIDFLORIDA PROPOSAL WERE PRUDENT (ISSUE NOS. 19 2, 3, 5 AND 6) 20 21 Q. So far, you have addressed the prudence of submitting an RTO proposal to 22 FERC, and have concluded that the GridFlorida Companies' decision to do 23 so was prudent. Would you now please address specific decisions regarding

the structure of GridFlorida that were made by the GridFlorida Companies.

What were the key alternatives considered by the GridFlorida Companies?

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1 A. In my view, there were four key strategic alternatives considered by the 2 GridFlorida Companies. These alternatives were as follows: (1) Whether to 3 propose a scope larger than Peninsular Florida; (2) Whether to propose a for-4 profit Transco or a non-profit ISO; (3) Whether the GridFlorida Companies would 5 transfer ownership of their transmission facilities to GridFlorida or retain 6 ownership and only transfer operational control over the transmission facilities; 7 and (4) Whether to propose an Independent Board or a Stakeholder Board. 8 9 In reviewing the GridFlorida Companies' choices with respect to these strategic 10 alternatives, it is important to recognize that the GridFlorida Companies were not 11 completely free to advance whatever alternative they wanted. Order No. 2000 had 12 some very specific guidelines as to characteristics and functions an acceptable 13 RTO proposal would have to include. To the extent that an alternative is 14 inconsistent with Order No. 2000, it could never be approved by FERC and 15 therefore was not selected by the GridFlorida Companies even if they otherwise 16 might have believed that the alternative had merit. 17 18 Below, I will discuss the most important strategic consideration for each of the 19 alternatives and will evaluate the GridFlorida Companies' decisions. 20 **REGIONAL SCOPE** Α. 21 Q. What alternatives did the GridFlorida Companies consider with respect to 22 the regional scope of their RTO?

A.	The GridFlorida Companies knew that FERC likely would not consider an RTO
	smaller than Peninsular Florida, and the FERC would prefer a larger size if
	possible.

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- Q. What factors did the GridFlorida Companies consider in deciding on the appropriate scope?
- The GridFlorida Companies knew that the FPSC strongly preferred a scope A. limited to Peninsular Florida for many reasons, including the fact that peninsular Florida has unique geography, being surrounded by water on three sides, the FRCC region encompasses peninsular Florida, transmission facilities in Florida are already subject to regional coordination for reliability purposes, and peninsular Florida is already a large energy market unto itself. A Peninsular Florida scope would allow the RTO to be headquartered in Florida and to focus on reliability and operations in Florida. In addition, Florida had become a separate reliability region in 1996, underscoring the reasonableness of using peninsular Florida as the proper regional scope for an RTO. Finally, the GridFlorida Companies knew that it would be more difficult to reach agreement with entities outside of Florida, which would make it more difficult to meet FERC's October 15, 2000 deadline for filing RTO proposals, if indeed any agreement at all could be reached with entities outside of Florida. Based on these factors, the GridFlorida Companies decided to limit their RTO proposal to Peninsular Florida.

Q. Was this a prudent decision?

1	A.	Yes it was. While there was some risk that FERC might reject a Florida-only
2		RTO, the GridFlorida Companies were able to convince FERC that this was an
3		appropriate scope.
4	Q.	What is the GridFlorida Companies' position with respect to participation in
5		the Southeastern RTO that FERC is attempting to form?
6	A.	As I stated previously, GridFlorida was invited but not required to participate.
7		Nevertheless, the GridFlorida Companies are attending these meetings. They
8		believe that it is prudent to at least participate in the meetings to protect the
9		interests of Florida. The GridFlorida Companies will evaluate whether it is
10		appropriate to participate after the Southeastern RTO proposal is developed and
11		FERC provides further guidance on its expectations for participation in such an
12		RTO. As I noted above, any decision will be made after consultation with the
13		FPSC.
14		B. FOR PROFIT TRANSCO OR NON-PROFIT ISO
15	Q.	What alternatives did the GridFlorida Companies consider with respect to
16		the corporate nature of their proposed RTO?
17	A.	There were two basic alternatives considered. The first was forming a for-profit
18		transmission company ("Transco"). The second was forming a non-profit
19		independent system operator ("ISO").
20	Q.	What concerns about Transcos did the GridFlorida Companies consider in
21		evaluating these alternatives?
22	A.	The GridFlorida Companies were aware that some concerns had been raised
23		nationally that Transcos would not be the neutral system operators that FERC

1 requires. However, FERC specifically addressed this issue in Order No. 2000 and 2 found that a properly structured Transco would be independent from market 3 participants, if the proposal limited market participant ownership to "passive" 4 ownership without any rights to control the decisions or operations of the Transco. 5 Q. What concerns did the GridFlorida Companies have about ISOs? 6 A. The GridFlorida Companies were concerned that the existing ISOs did not appear 7 to have the proper incentives to operate efficiently or to attempt to reduce costs. 8 For example, the California ISO built a redundant and expensive control center 9 and hired a large staff. The problem is that a non-profit ISO is not directly 10 accountable to anyone or to any entity that has an interest in ensuring that costs 11 are incurred efficiently. So long as the ISO is able to recover its costs in its rates 12 and at the same sees no benefit from reducing those costs, it has no real incentive 13 to keep costs down. 14 15 By contrast, a for-profit Transco is accountable to its owners for the way that it 16 incurs costs, which adds an additional incentive for efficiency. The GridFlorida 17 Companies recognize that there are significant start-up and staffing costs that will 18 be incurred in forming an RTO under either a Transco or an ISO proposal. 19 However, they believe that these costs could be kept under better control with a 20 Transco. 21 Q. Are there other concerns about the accountability of an ISO? 22 A. Another problem with the fact that an ISO Board of Directors does not have to 23 answer to shareholders is that it can become entrenched and less responsive to the

needs of customers and other stakeholders. It is very difficult for any outside party to remove an Independent Director of an ISO without compromising the ISO's independence, even when the ISO is not performing satisfactorily. By contrast, the Directors of a Transco are responsible to their shareholders. If the Transco is not operating efficiently and providing good service, then the Directors can be replaced.

Q. What is another concern about ISOs?

A non-profit ISO generally owns relatively few assets. This means that the ISO is not financially strong, and as a consequence must be extremely risk-averse. When faced with a decision that could require it to take on some risk, an ISO must avoid such risk, and instead must shift the risk to others even at the expense of not providing better service or failing to improve the workings of the market. There is no incentive for an ISO to propose more efficient tariff structures or services if those tariffs or services expose the ISO to both greater risk and greater opportunity when the upside of the opportunity will not be retained.

A.

I do not mean to suggest that a Transco would or should be willing to take on risk unnecessarily. However, as an entity with considerably greater financial strength, a Transco will be able to weigh the benefits and consequences of risk, and to take on an acceptable amount of risk if that will result in improved service or efficiency, and if the risks are balanced with a potential for reward. As a forprofit entity, the Transco will have the incentives to do so in order to increase its profits. I want to emphasize here that I am referring here to business risk, such as

a decision to install equipment that allows service to be provided more efficiently in the expectation that the resulting cost savings will offset the cost of equipment.

I do not believe that a Transco is more likely to take operational risks that could threaten the reliability of the grid, nor do I believe that taking such risks would be appropriate.

Q. Are there other advantages to the Transco structure?

A. Yes. Another advantage to a Transco that owns assets is that it has greater financial strength and access to capital necessary to fund construction and maintenance at a lower cost. The GridFlorida Companies also believed that a Transco that owns its own assets is more likely to focus more carefully on prudent asset operation and maintenance policies. These prudent policies will be applied not only to the assets owned by the Transco, but to all other assets under its long-term control.

Q. What decision did the GridFlorida Companies make with respect to the Transco?

A. FPL decided early on that a Transco was more desirable. Although TECO initially had proposed an ISO, after TECO discussed the relative benefits of a Transco, TECO became convinced that the Transco approach was superior. FPC also initially contemplated an ISO, but was willing to go forward with a Transco approach since that was what was preferred by the other GridFlorida Companies.

Q. Do you believe that this was a prudent decision?

1	A.	Yes. In my view, the aspects of a Transco that made it attractive to the
2		GridFlorida Companies, i.e. efficiency, economy, accountability, innovation and
3		financial strength, all also work to the benefit of Florida ratepayers.
4	Q.	Have other RTOs proposed a Transco structure?
5	A.	Yes. In the Southeast, GridSouth has proposed that a Transco be the RTO. The
6		Alliance RTO also is structured to eventually be a Transco.
7		C. OWNERSHIP OF TRANSMISSION FACILITIES
8	Q.	What alternatives did the GridFlorida Companies face with respect to the
9		ownership of their transmission facilities?
10	A.	Even after the GridFlorida Companies decided to form a Transco, they still had to
11		decide whether or not to transfer ownership of their transmission facilities to the
12		Transco or simply to transfer operational control while retaining ownership.
13	Q.	What considerations applied to this decision?
14	A.	Some of the considerations are similar to the considerations regarding the choice
15		between a Transco and a non-profit ISO. As I discussed above, if the Transco
16		owns considerable assets, it will have greater financial strength and more
17		incentives to innovate, and will be able to assume an acceptable amount of risk in
18		order to provide improved service.
19	Q.	What other benefits are there to transferring ownership of transmission
20		facilities to GridFlorida?
21	A.	There is a benefit to aligning the ownership of the transmission facilities with the
22		responsibility for operating and maintaining those facilities. This alignment also
23		results in the entity that is responsible for decisions regarding expansion and other

1		capital expenditures also being an owner of facilities with the responsibility for
2		obtaining the necessary financing.
3	Q.	What are the benefits of retaining ownership of transmission facilities?
4	A.	Given the current uncertainties regarding the ultimate shape of the restructured
5		electric industry, there is a benefit in retaining ownership of transmission facilities
6		in order to increase flexibility to respond to changes that may occur in the future.
7	Q.	Does the decision to transfer ownership of transmission facilities affect the
8		treatment of the GridFlorida Companies' transmission assets for retail rate
9		purposes?
10	A.	No. As I explain further below, FERC has required entities that retain ownership
11		of their transmission facilities to nevertheless take transmission service for retail
12		load from the RTO. Therefore, <u>all</u> transmission facilities of the GridFlorida
13		Companies must be included in GridFlorida's rates, whether those facilities have
14		been divested to GridFlorida or ownership of the facilities is retained by the
15		GridFlorida Companies. While there may be a number of ways to reflect this fact
16		in the GridFlorida Companies' retail rates, the transfer of ownership of
17		transmission facilities to GridFlorida should make no difference in how retail
18		rates are determined.
19	Q.	What decisions did the GridFlorida Companies make regarding the transfer
20		of ownership of transmission facilities to GridFlorida?
21	A.	FPL and TECO decided to transfer ownership of their transmission facilities to
22		GridFlorida while FPC decided to retain ownership and transfer operational
23		control only.

1	Q.	Do you believe that the GridFlorida Companies' decisions with respect to
2		transmission facility ownership were prudent?
3	A.	I think that it is very important that GridFlorida own significant assets of its own,
4		for the reasons described above. As a result, I think that it was prudent for FPL
5		and TECO to have decided to transfer ownership of their transmission facilities to
6		GridFlorida. At the same time, I think it is prudent for FPC to continue to own its
7		transmission facilities.
8		D. INDEPENDENT OR STAKEHOLDER BOARD
9	Q.	What alternatives were available with respect to Board composition?
10	A.	In Order No. 2000, FERC discussed two types of Boards for RTOs. One type is
11		an "Independent Board" which consists of persons without any connections to any
12		market participant. The second type is a "Stakeholder Board," which consists of
13		representatives of the various groups of market participants.
14	Q.	What factors did the GridFlorida Companies consider in evaluating these
15		alternatives?
16	A.	There was some attraction to the GridFlorida Companies in being able to have
17		representation on the Board through the use of a Stakeholder Board. However,
18		the problem with such boards is that the directors tend to represent their
19		stakeholder groups more than the interests of the RTO itself. This can cause real
20		management problems given that no stakeholder group is permitted under Order
21		No. 2000 to have a controlling interest in the Board, and therefore the Board tends

stakeholders differently. Indeed, the problem got to be so bad in California that

to deadlock when forced to make difficult decisions that impact different

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FERC ordered the Stakeholder Board to be dissolved and replaced by an Independent Board. The GridFlorida Companies want to have a Board acting in the best interests of the RTO and that is able to make decisive decisions when faced with difficult issues.

Q. Are there other advantages of an Independent Board?

A. Yes. While the stakeholders know a great deal about the electric industry in Florida, they are not necessarily knowledgeable about the corporate governance issues that would typically be expected of a Board of Directors of a company the size involved here. By using an Independent Board, the GridFlorida Companies opened for consideration a much bigger pool of qualified candidates from across the nation with a number of useful skills and experiences that simply would not be available to a Stakeholder Board. The GridFlorida Companies believe that such a Board ultimately should do a much better job in directing the affairs of GridFlorida.

Q. Do you believe that the GridFlorida Companies' decision to employ an Independent Board is prudent?

A. Yes, I believe that an Independent Board is much better than a Stakeholder Board.

Furthermore, notwithstanding that FERC stated in Order No. 2000 that it would not prevent Stakeholder Boards, I believe that it would be difficult to obtain FERC approval of a Stakeholder Board in light of its ruling described above in which it required the California ISO to dissolve its Stakeholder Board and to form an Independent Board. I also would note that the GridFlorida Companies have

1		provided for a Stakeholder Advisory Committee that will give all stakeholders the
2		opportunity to provide input to the Board.
3	IV.	TREATMENT OF BUNDLED RETAIL LOAD (ISSUE NOS. 8-9)
4	Q.	What does Order No. 2000 require with respect to transmission service for
5		bundled retail load?
6	A.	Under Order No. 888, utilities were permitted to provide transmission service to
7		their own bundled retail load "off the tariff," i.e. they were not required to charge
8		a separate transmission rate for the service provided to their bundled retail
9		customers. Order No. 2000, as written, was somewhat ambiguous as to whether
10		utilities now would have to obtain transmission service for their bundled retail
11		customers from the RTO or whether they could continue to provide that service to
12		themselves without using the RTO tariff. Subsequently, however, FERC issued
13		rulings on this issue with respect to both the GridSouth and Southern Companies'
14		RTO ("SETrans") proposals. In each case, FERC made it clear that bundled retail
15		load would have to be served by the RTO, even if the utility retained ownership of
16		its transmission facilities. These decisions eliminated any possibility that FERC
17		would have permitted the GridFlorida Companies to continue serving their
18		bundled retail loads off of the GridFlorida tariff.
19	Q.	Will this result in the GridFlorida Companies' retail electric service being
20		unbundled or Florida retail customers becoming transmission customers of
21		GridFlorida?
22	A.	No. The GridFlorida Companies will be the customers of GridFlorida under the
23		RTO tariff, and the rate established by FERC will be the rate paid by the

GridFlorida Companies, not the rate paid by retail customers. The GridFlorida Companies then will use the transmission service that they purchase from GridFlorida to continue to provide bundled retail service to their retail customers. Conceptually, this will be no different than when the GridFlorida Companies purchase power for resale to retail customers at wholesale at rates established by FERC. In both instances, the GridFlorida Companies are the purchasers at wholesale and these purchases constitute elements of the bundled service that the GridFlorida Companies provide to their retail customers.

In my view, Issue Nos. 8 and 9 therefore do not come into play with respect to the GridFlorida proposal. The GridFlorida Companies will continue to provided bundled retail electric service, including the retail transmission portion of that bundled retail service, and therefore need not address the issue of seeking Commission approval to unbundle.

- Q. Will FERC assume jurisdiction over the rates paid by retail customers for transmission service provided by GridFlorida?
- A. Again, the wholesale power purchase example is instructive. The fact that FERC regulates wholesale power purchases by the GridFlorida Companies does not prevent the FPSC from regulating the GridFlorida Companies' bundled retail rates. Although the GridFlorida Companies must, as a matter of law, be permitted to recover in retail rates prudently incurred charges resulting from FERC approved rates, the FPSC determines how these and other prudently incurred costs will be reflected in retail rates.

1 Similarly, the fact that FERC will have jurisdiction over GridFlorida rates will not 2 prevent the FPSC from reviewing and approving the manner in which these costs 3 are recovered through bundled rates charged by the GridFlorida Companies to 4 their retail customers. However, once the FPSC determines that it is prudent for 5 the GridFlorida Companies to participate in GridFlorida, the GridFlorida 6 Companies must be allowed to pass through to retail customers the costs of the 7 transmission rates charged by GridFlorida and approved by FERC, just as they are 8 permitted to pass through prudently incurred wholesale power purchase costs 9 approved by FERC. 10 V. **CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN GRIDFLORIDA** 11 **PROCESS** 12 Q. Would you please describe the significant events in the process of the 13 development of GridFlorida? 14 A. Yes. The chronology can logically be broken into four time periods: (1) From the issuance of Order No. 2000 on December 20, 1999 to the initial GridFlorida filing 15 16 on October 16, 2000; (2) From October 16 to the issuance of FERC's Order 17 provisionally approving the GridFlorida proposal on March 28, 2001; (3) From 18 the issuance of FERC's Order on March 28 to the meeting of the FPSC on May 19 29,2001 at which the FPSC decided to investigate the prudence of the GridFlorida

Q. What significant events occurred from the issuance of Order No. 2000 on December 20, 1999 to the initial GridFlorida filing on October 16, 2000?

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forward.

Companies' decision to participate in GridFlorida; and (4) From May 29, 2001

In response to Order No. 2000, the GridFlorida Companies sponsored a number of stakeholder meetings in 2001 to discuss the various aspects of an RTO proposal.

Initially, there were four stakeholder groups that held meetings: (1) the Steering Committee, which was assigned the task of overseeing the collaborative process; (2) the Governance Working Group; (3) the Pricing Working Group; and (4) the Planning and Operations Working Group. Later, a fifth working group, the Market Design Working Group, was established and commenced to address market design issues. Each of these groups met on numerous occasions in Tampa, which the stakeholders agreed was a convenient central location. A website was established to provide notice of meetings and on which drafts could be obtained of the various documents being developed in the working group meetings. There were numerous stakeholders who participated, including a number of members of the FPSC's Staff. The list of participants on the website shows 248 persons who participated at one or more meetings.

A.

After several months of stakeholder meetings, the GridFlorida Companies agreed to pursue a joint filing that ultimately became the GridFlorida proposal. The GridFlorida Companies continued to work their proposal through the stakeholder process, and distributed drafts of the various documents to the stakeholders for their comments. This proposal was filed at FERC on October 16, 2000, as required by Order No. 2000. There were, however, additional details required to make the proposal complete, especially with respect to the proposed market design. The GridFlorida Companies therefore requested that FERC give them

until December 15, 2000 to make a supplemental filing that would supply the additional details. However, the GridFlorida Companies had filed a complete governance proposal, and they requested that FERC provide an expedited review and ruling on the provisions regarding board selection. The GridFlorida Companies wanted an early FERC ruling on this issue so that they could commence the board selection process in time to have the board in place prior to the December 15, 2001 deadline in Order No. 2000 for the commencement of RTO operations.

Q. What significant events occurred from October 16 to the issuance of FERC's Order provisionally approving the GridFlorida proposal on March 28, 2001?

Immediately after making their October 16 filing, the GridFlorida Companies initiated a collaborative process for developing their supplemental December 15 filing. Given the relatively short period of time available, the GridFlorida Companies decided that the process of having separate working groups meeting on an ad hoc basis would not work. Instead, they developed a process with professional facilitators who had been hired to assist in the collaborative process. Under this process, the GridFlorida Companies held a series of meetings with the stakeholders in a single group to discuss the supplemental filing. A draft filing was distributed prior to the last meeting, which was devoted to discussing the proposed filing. The GridFlorida Companies then made their supplemental filing on December 15, 2000.

A.

1 On January 10, 2001, FERC issued its order addressing the governance issues that 2 the GridFlorida Companies had requested to be addressed on an expedited basis. 3 FERC approved the proposed structure, subject to requiring a few minor 4 modifications. The governance structure is addressed in more detail in the Panel 5 Testimony. 6 7 FERC's order approving the governance structure triggered the time period in 8 which parties were required to provide a notice stating that they intended to divest 9 their facilities and transfer ownership to GridFlorida. FPL issued its Divestiture 10 Notice on February 1, 2001 and TECO issued its Divestiture Notice on February 11 9. As I discussed previously, FPC has decided not to divest its transmission 12 facilities, at least not initially. 13 14 Another consequence of the issuance of FERC's order on governance is that the 15 board selection process then could commence. As a result, the GridFlorida 16 Companies initiated the process for forming the stakeholder Board Selection 17 Committee. Once the Committee was formed, they commenced meeting and 18 selected the search firm of Hiedrick & Struggles to assist in the search. 19 20 The GridFlorida Companies also recognized that development work needed to 21 commence quickly if they were to meet the deadline in Order No. 2000 of 22 December 15, 2001 for the commencement of operations. As a result, they 23 formed GridFlorida and assumed its management on an interim basis. The first

steps that they were required to take were to establish a bank account in which to keep the membership fees for the Board Selection Committee and to initiate the process of selecting a consultant to assist with the development work. In order to fund the initial development work, the GridFlorida Companies each entered into an agreement to lend \$1 million to GridFlorida, with the loans to be repaid out of the proceeds of whatever financing arrangements GridFlorida entered into for its initial operations.

On March 28, 2001, FERC issued an order provisionally approving the GridFlorida proposal. FERC required a number of modifications to be made to the proposal, including the refiling of the market design proposal, but in general FERC found that the GridFlorida proposal was consistent with Order No. 2000 and included appropriate provisions. In its Order, FERC required the GridFlorida Companies to make a compliance filing with the required changes by May 29. The GridFlorida Companies also were required to conduct meetings with other entities in the Southeast regarding seams issues and to report back to FERC regarding these meetings by May 14.

- Q. What significant events occurred from the issuance of FERC's Order on March 28 to the meeting of the FPSC on May 29, 2001 at which the FPSC decided to investigate the prudence of the GridFlorida Companies' decision to participate in GridFlorida?
- A. After FERC's Order, the GridFlorida Companies again had to gear up to make the next filing required by FERC. Since among other things FERC's order had

approved the proposed stakeholder Advisory Committee, the GridFlorida

Companies took the steps necessary to establish the Advisory Committee, which
could then take over the stakeholder collaborative process. A draft of the filing
was distributed to all stakeholders and presented by the GridFlorida Companies to
the Advisory Committee. The GridFlorida Companies also had meetings with
Southern Companies and JEA to discuss seams issues, as directed by FERC and
scheduled a June meeting with GridSouth.

At the same time, the GridFlorida Companies selected Accenture to perform a "Phase I study," in which necessary development activities could be identified and a time line and budget for GridFlorida development activities prepared. The selection of Accenture and the work that was performed is addressed in more detail in the testimony of Mr. Southwick.

In the meantime, on May 3, the FPSC's Staff issued its recommendation that the FPSC investigate the GridFlorida Companies' prudence in pursuing the GridFlorida proposal. When this recommendation was accepted by the FPSC, the GridFlorida Companies issued a statement saying that they did not believe that it was appropriate to continue expending substantial sums on GridFlorida development until the prudence issue was resolved. The GridFlorida Companies stated that they therefore would continue preparing their FERC compliance filing but otherwise were suspending development activities pending resolution of the instant proceedings.

On May 29, the GridFlorida Companies filed their compliance filing, which included all of the changes and additional detail required by FERC. On the same day, the FPSC considered at its meeting the GridFlorida Companies' petition to have the prudence issues severed from the general rate case issues in FPL's and FPC's rate cases and considered instead in a generic proceeding on a consolidated basis in an expedited proceeding. The FPSC decided not to sever the prudence issues or consolidate them, but did determine to address the prudence issues first in an expedited proceeding.

Q. What significant events occurred from May 29 forward?

As they had stated, the GridFlorida Companies for the most part suspended their development activities after making their compliance filing. However, the GridFlorida Companies listened to the complaints raised by the FPSC's Staff that the rate impacts of the GridFlorida proposal were difficult to quantify because no rate filings had yet been made. As a consequence, FPL and TECO went forward with the filing of their rate plans, which had been close to being finished at the time that development activities were suspended. FPL and TECO believed that their filings would assist the FPSC in their evaluation in these proceedings. The exact nature of the rate filings is addressed in more detail in the testimony of Mr. Ashburn.

A.

Comments on the May 29 GridFlorida compliance filing were due on July 2. The GridFlorida Companies believed that their commitment to make the compliance filing included a commitment to defend that filing against any attacks. Therefore

1 they prepared and filed an answer to the comments on their Compliance Filing on 2 July 17. Since that time, no GridFlorida development activities have occurred. 3 Finally, on July 12, 2001, FERC issued its notice announcing the commencement 4 5 of FERC-directed mediation intended to lead to the formation of a single 6 Southeastern RTO. The GridFlorida Companies were invited, but not required to 7 participate. The GridFlorida Companies have been attending the mediation 8 sessions, which started on July 17. Because the GridFlorida proposal is one of the 9 most well-developed proposals submitted to FERC, many of the features of that 10 proposal have been endorsed by the parties. The GridFlorida Companies have 11 been asked by the FERC ALJ to submit, along with other parties including 12 Entergy and the GridSouth applicants, a strawman proposal for the Southeastern 13 RTO. Competing proposals also will be submitted, however, and the GridFlorida 14 Companies do not know what proposal will ultimately result from the process. In 15 any event, the GridFlorida Companies have not made any commitments to join a 16 Southeastern RTO, pending the outcome of this proceeding and further direction 17 from the FPSC. 18 VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 19 Q. Would you please summarize your conclusions? 20 A. Yes. There are two main points that I would like for the FPSC to take away from 21 my testimony.

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First, Order No. 2000 established a federal policy that all transmission owners join an RTO. Although Order No. 2000 stops short of mandating that every electric utility join an RTO, the GridFlorida Companies faced the substantial likelihood that, if they refused to affirmatively propose an RTO, they ultimately would be forced to do so by FERC, either directly or through ever increasing penalties. Thus, the choice faced by the GridFlorida Companies was not whether to join an RTO, but whether to affirmatively propose an RTO or else run the risk of being forced to do so later. Given the significant benefits of affirmatively developing and proposing their own RTO rather than being forced to join an RTO designed by out-of-state entities, it was appropriate and prudent for the GridFlorida Companies to have decided to develop their own GridFlorida proposal. Second, Order No. 2000 left a number of alternatives available to the GridFlorida Companies. Their decision to propose a for-profit Transco that would own the transmission assets of FPL and TECO will result in an RTO that is independent but accountable, financially strong, and with sufficient incentives to provide reliable, efficient, innovative service. Again, I believe that the decisions made by the GridFlorida Companies are appropriate and prudent.

- Q. Does that end your testimony?
- A. Yes it does.

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BY MR. CHILDS:

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2 Now, at this point, Mr. Naeve, would you please 3 summarize your testimony. And I am going to ask, 4

Commissioners, that he also comment on what has been marked for identification as Exhibit 5.

In my testimony I make two basic points. First, I conclude that the GridFlorida companies were prudent in concluding that in the long run they had no option but to join an RTO and that in the long run FERC would require them to participate in an RTO. And if they chose not to participate in an RTO at this stage, they would ultimately be forced to participate in one in which they had no opportunity to be involved in the structure and formation and policies of the RTO.

I know Mr. Twomey said that you should carefully listen to what the witnesses say, that they will all say that in the long run FERC will require it and so forth. He said that no witness will say that FERC has the power to do that. Ι will say that right now. I am convinced that FERC has the authority under the Federal Power Act to compel utilities to participate in RTOs.

So the question would be if they have the power to compel it, why didn't they? First, I would say that at the time they did Order 2000 the Commission clearly stated that it was their policy, it was the national policy that companies,

all transmission owners participate in RTOs. They went on to say that they felt the most efficient way to implement that policy was through a voluntary approach. And there are a variety of reasons they felt that may be more efficient. I think they felt that there would be more opportunity for local input if there was a voluntary approach. If they issued a mandatory approach they would have to be very specific as to what each RTO filing would have to be, and this gave them more opportunity for local input. And I'm sure there are a variety of other measures.

But the Commission went on to say that if the voluntary approach were not successful, they would look at other measures for achieving compliance, because that was their policy that everybody comply. And one of those other measures would be the possibility of compelling compliance with the RTO.

The memorandum that was distributed today that is Exhibit 2 to my testimony reinforces this initial conclusion that the companies had made, that sooner or later if they didn't voluntarily comply they would be forced to do so. Commissioner Wood expressed a concern to his colleagues in this memo, and this memo was discussed at the last FERC Commission meeting and there was no dissent among his colleagues as to the course of action that he is suggesting.

But Commissioner Wood, in effect, said that, first, he believes that they will have to narrow the flexibility the

companies have in joining RTOs, which is what one has to do if you are going to compel participation and, secondly, he suggested that they impose increasingly severe penalties on companies that do not participate. And he also suggested that they do additional cost/benefit analysis to persuade those who

have not been persuaded yet that this is a beneficial thing.

I guess another logical question is if they have the power to compel compliance with Order 2000 and compel joining an RTO, why is Commissioner Wood suggesting increasing penalties on companies instead of compelling it right now. And I think the simple answer to that is it is easier to do and faster to do. If the Commission were to compel compliance with Order 2000, they would have to amend Order 2000. They would have to go back and institute a new rulemaking, have public comment, and that could take quite a bit of time. Their desire, as expressed by Chairman Wood, is to move as fast as possible. And the fastest way to achieve compliance is simply to make it unbearable for the companies not to participate. They don't have to amend Order 2000 to do that.

As an aside, I would also say that I think we now are in a position where we may have our last chance to preserve GridFlorida as an option for Florida. The Commissioners at FERC increasingly are talking about a four RTO solution, having four giant RTOs that span the United States. They have approved GridFlorida, and I think we have an opportunity to

preserve GridFlorida as an option for Florida if this Commission provides its approval and backing for GridFlorida. If this Commission does not provide its approval and backing for GridFlorida, I think we could very well lose it as a possible option for Florida, and the only other option would be to join the southeast RTO.

The second point I made in my prefiled testimony is that the Florida utilities were prudent in the various choices they made in forming GridFlorida. And in particular I mean they were prudent in selecting Peninsular Florida as the scope for the RTO, they were prudent in choosing to have an independent board of directors as opposed to a stakeholder board. And in particular they were prudent in choosing the for-profit transco model as opposed to an independent system operator.

The transco model provides the best incentives for efficient operation, and importantly it aligns the responsibility for investing capital and recovery of the capital investment with the responsibility for rate design, it aligns ownership of assets with the operation of those assets and the maintenance of those assets, and it aligns responsibility of planning for expansion with the responsibility for investing in that expansion. That summarizes my testimony.

MR. CHILDS: We tender Mr. Naeve for cross.

1 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Very well. Mr. Willis, any cross? 2 MR. LONG: We have no cross examination. 3 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Very well. MR. CHILDS: Just to clarify, Mr. Naeve is appearing 4 5 on behalf of the three of us. 6 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Right. I understand, but I always like to make sure there is no cross from the aligned parties, 7 8 as well. 9 Mr. McWhirter. 10 MR. McWHIRTER: I have no questions, Mr. Chairman. 11 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Thank you. Mr. McGlothlin. 12 MR. McGLOTHLIN: No questions. 13 MS. PAUGH: I have just a couple of questions, Mr. 14 Chairman. 15 CROSS EXAMINATION 16 BY MS. PAUGH: 17 Mr. Naeve, if you would turn to Page 25 of your prefiled testimony, please. The question starting at Line 7, 18 19 does the decision to transfer ownership of transmission 20 facilities affect the treatment of the GridFlorida companies' transmission assets for retail rate purposes. Will you please 21 22 explain your answer to that question? 23 Yes. And this goes to this question of unbundling Α and what does unbundling mean and not mean. And I heard a 24 25 portion of the discussion earlier about unbundling, but I

didn't hear all of it, so I'm not sure I could address specifically the way it was previously discussed. I will say this, the term unbundling, I think, is used sometimes with a lack of precision. It can mean more than one thing. And one thing unbundling means is unbundling of charges and rates, so that a utility may offer a bundled service but they simply separately state the different costs of different components of that service, and that is an unbundling of rates.

It is a separate matter to have an unbundling of services. And in an unbundling of services, customers are allowed to choose services so they can buy generation from one party, transmission from another, distribution from another, and so forth. Unbundling of services typically is associated with retail access. Order --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Excuse me, I'm trying to understand. Even in a situation where there is total retail choice for customers, are you indicating to me that they have the ability to choose which transmission company will transmit their energy to them?

THE WITNESS: No, they don't, but they would buy transmission service from one entity and distribution service from a second. They may not have a choice, but it would be unbundled as to service provider.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. So they don't have a choice, but it is a separate entity which provides the service?

THE WITNESS: That's right. They would have choice as to generation, but you would be -- but the distribution company in that situation would not be providing bundled generation, distribution, and transmission service. They would be providing distribution service, a transmission company would be providing transmission service, and a generation company or companies would provide generation service.

What I'm saying in this testimony is by joining an RTO that does not cause an unbundling of retail services with respect to services or actually with respect to rates. The rate charges that a distribution company incurs for generation, and in this case they will incur charges for transmission from the RTO and then they will have their own costs for distribution, the Florida Commission is still free to -- they will be provided on a bundled basis to the retail customer by the distribution company, and it's up to the Florida Commission as to whether they unbundle the rates or do not unbundle the rate charges.

BY MS. PAUGH:

Q Is it safe to say, then, that the Florida Commission's jurisdiction is intact with respect to these rates as you have described it?

A The Florida Commission still will have full jurisdiction over the bundled services and rates of the distribution companies.

MS. PAUGH: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Question. I won't hold you to the long history of proceedings that we have had with regard to earnings of the companies, but let me pose a generic question. In Phase II of this docket we are going to explore a whole range of issues that have been outstanding for some period of time. If we determine in this proceeding in Phase I that GridFlorida poses and presents benefits and, therefore, is an option that should be explored, do we have the option or flexibility at all to determine how retail payers are exposed to risk of that, and/or how, if at all, that asset should be amortized or recovered by this retail company?

THE WITNESS: I think the question is this, if GridFlorida is formed and the companies transfer control of their assets, either ownership of their assets or control of their assets to GridFlorida, does that change your ability to make decisions that not all of these costs should be passed through, that sort of thing, and I think the answer is yes, it does change your ability to some extent.

Certainly as to the allocation of those costs among customers you retain that jurisdiction. I do think, though, that if GridFlorida were to be formed and FERC were to approve a transmission rate for GridFlorida, and that those costs were to incurred by the distribution companies, I don't think you would be able to second guess the prudence of those costs and

deny pass-through of those costs on that basis.

a process in Florida where we encourage the companies to become involved in the wholesale marketplace. And it is a sharing mechanism that says to the extent that you can demonstrate that there are benefits that accrue to the greater operation of your plants by being in the wholesale market then you can share those benefits with your shareholders and with retail ratepayers. Given that we don't have the flexibility to say, well, those costs that were used to do the transmission function, we can't control those, can we say to what extent retail ratepayers can share in the benefits of that?

THE WITNESS: Can share in the benefits of --CHAIRMAN JACOBS: The projection is that there should

be cost reductions.

THE WITNESS: Yes. I think the cost reductions will

occur in different ways, and one way in which cost reductions will occur hopefully will be in the long-term through lower transmission rates because of grid-wide planning and more efficient investments in transmission in the future because of grid-wide planning. And in a variety of other ways there may well be lower transmission rates. Those lower transmission charges then will be incurred by the distribution companies and then automatically shared with the customers because the distribution companies will have lower charges to pass through

to customers.

I think a number of parties have suggested that the larger savings may come from more efficient dispatch of generation. And, again, I think those savings will -- at least under your current system would be largely passed through automatically to retail customers through lower fuel costs and lower purchased power costs.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Would we have the ability to hold some level of accountability -- and let me just give you this scenario. You would expect there are going to be up front start-up costs and so forth and so on. In your mind do we have the ability to kind of leverage the recovery of those costs against what we expect to be savings that come in the future?

THE WITNESS: I think that the start-up costs for GridFlorida will largely be incorporated in the state into FERC filed rates. The GridFlorida will file a rate tariff at FERC, GridFlorida will attempt to recover in its rates at FERC its daily operating costs and its start-up costs. And if FERC approves those costs as being just and reasonable and prudently incurred, I think in that situation this Commission would not be in a position to come to a different conclusion as to those start-up costs.

Also FERC will -- I know one of the concerns raised this morning was will it be recovered all in one year or spread out over a number of years. And FERC has policies with respect

to what types of costs are recovered immediately and what types of costs are amortized and spread out. I don't think -- I can't speak to your policies as an expert, but I think the FERC policies are probably very similar to your own on those issues.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Thank you.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: With regard to the savings, Mr. Naeve, I am Mike Palecki, you have mentioned several areas where there might be savings that would incur as a result of GridFlorida. In parts of the country where RTOs have been in place for some time, have those savings occurred and could you give some examples?

THE WITNESS: Well, first, I would say that there are no RTOs operating yet. There are some ISOs, independent system operators, and independent system operators can be deemed by FERC to be RTOs, but none have as yet been found to be RTOs and have started operation as an RTO yet. These independent system operators were established and began commercial operation before Order 2000. Order 2000 imposed some additional requirements on them that were not part of ISOs at the time, so each of them had to make compliance filings to come into compliance with Order 2000, and those in are the works now. So in the not too distant future I expect FERC will approve some of the existing ISOs with changes to be functioning RTOs.

The question is have there been savings with respect to the operation of these institutions, and even though they

are not precisely RTOs, I think many of them like PJM and others function very close to the way that an RTO would function. And I'm not aware of any studies that have attempted to quantify what the savings are, if there are savings. I think a variety of people believe that there have been operational benefits by the creation of the RTO, but I have not seen any quantification of what those savings are.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Are you familiar with the study that Commissioner Wood has referred to in the memorandum that you distributed?

THE WITNESS: The Mirant study?

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: The Mirant study?

THE WITNESS: No. I actually have never seen the study. I have heard others discuss it, but I have not seen the study.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Thank you.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I have a question. I'm trying to understand the actual -- if we find ourselves in a situation where there is a functioning GridFlorida, will a distribution company sign some type of a contract with the RTO to have power delivered to it at certain points, or will that distribution company go to a generation company and say I want power delivered to these points, you deal with the transmission. I just want a rate from you for power. And I want to negotiate these terms and conditions, and I don't really care what the

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RTO does with FERC and what the tariff says, I just want power under these terms and conditions at these locations. How will it work?

THE WITNESS: It could work either way under today's tariffs. Most RTOs have a tariff that is based on the Order 888 tariff, but changed in significant ways. The Order 888 tariff had a physical allocation of capacity rights, RTOs are supposed to develop tariffs that have a financial allocation of capacity rights, or a market oriented allocation of capacity rights for congestion management. So there are a few differences, but for the most part the tariffs are based on Order 888.

Order 888 has two basic types of service. One type is called network service, and network service was designed for companies that have a lot of delivery points and a lot of network type uses for the system. And it is mainly designed for distribution companies and for large munies and co-ops, and in this case, distribution companies, the utilities. And under network service, the cost to the distribution company is based on a pro rata allocation of the total cost of the transmission network. And in this case the RTO would have an annual revenue requirement and if the distribution company -- if their load amounts to 12 percent of the total load on the RTO, they pay 12 percent of the total revenue requirement of the RTO. That is a very rough way of describing what happens.

There is a second type of service known as point-to-point service, and it could be either firm or nonfirm. And in point-to-point service you don't have multiple receipt points and you don't have the flexibility to move generation from multiple sources to multiple -- with a network service you can designate multiple generation sources all over the network and you can designate multiple receipt points and you don't have to say this unit goes to this receipt point, this unit goes to this receipt point, this unit

With point-to-point service you have to say here is my point of receipt, here is my point of delivery, it's firm service. If you pay for the -- if you are a network customer and you pay this pro rata share of total transmission cost, then transmission -- you don't pay any additional costs for transmission, and you can designate any generator to serve any party or load and there is no additional charge other than line losses.

If you have point-to-point service, on the other hand, it is a specific payment for that particular service. So normally a customer that is taking network service, they would choose themselves to pay for the transmission service because it is prepaid in a way.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: It is allocated based upon the loads which that distribution company places upon the transmission system?

right.

THE WITNESS: Relative to all other loads, that's

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So, for example, Florida Power and Light distribution company, I assume that they would require network service, and they -- what the percentage would be just for, say it's 60 percent. If they are 60 percent of the load they would be responsible for 60 percent of total RTO cost as approved by FERC?

THE WITNESS: That is correct.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Is that reviewed on a yearly basis, or is it trued up, is RTO then guaranteed a certain revenue stream, or is there a requirement for them to operate efficiently such that they have rates and they have -- our utilities we regulate, we don't guarantee them, we set rates and they have the ability to earn within a rate of return based upon their own efficiencies. How would it work for the RTO?

THE WITNESS: It is very similar. FERC generally requires transmission companies to file a rate and that rate remains in effect until they file a rate change. And while that rate remains in effect they have the incentive to operate more efficiently to try to increase earnings, and if events occur so that they need a rate increase, they can file for a rate increase. If the customers think that they are earning too much, they have rights under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act to file a petition to initiate a rate case

themselves, or the FERC itself could initiate a rate case. So it is, I think, probably very similar to the way you operate here.

FERC, as I expect you do, has the flexibility to develop other forms of ratemaking, incentive ratemaking and so forth, and hae suggested possibly with RTOs they may do that but there is no specific proposal as to how that would work.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Now, point-to-point service and the revenues that are derived from that by the RTO, does that go into their overall earnings review?

THE WITNESS: It does. And the revenues from point-to-point service, those revenues are credited against the total revenue requirement so when you calculate the rates for the network customers they get credit for the point-to-point revenues.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So to the extent that a market develops and there is more point-to-point transactions, that would tend to mitigate or lessen the amount of total cost which has to be allocated to network service customers?

THE WITNESS: That's right. That is generally the way it works today.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Mr. Naeve, I have a couple of other questions I would like to ask you about the Pat Wood memorandum.

THE WITNESS: Okay.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: And specifically turning to Page 2, I call it the second paragraph, it is actually the first full paragraph.

THE WITNESS: Uh-huh.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Where Pat Wood outlines what actions he will take by utilities that do not elect to join an approved RTO. The first option was to have all market-based rate privileges by any corporate affiliate be prospectively revoked. I'm trying to figure out what these factors, what effect they would have on the Florida utilities and their ratepayers. Do you have any -- could you give me any insight on what would happen to one of our utilities if that occurred?

THE WITNESS: It could effect the utilities in a couple of ways, and I think it could effect the ratepayers in one way. The way in which it would affect the ratepayers, as I understand it today, when Florida Power and Light, for example, makes sales at market-based rates outside of Florida, that a portion of those revenues that are earned from the sale at market-based rates out of Florida are shared with ratepayers of Florida Power and Light. And to the extent they are limited in their ability to make sales outside of Florida at market-based rates then there would be a reduction, a corresponding reduction in revenues that would be shared. And I can't claim to be an expert on how that mechanism works, but that is an understanding that I have.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: So basically their sales then would have to be made as cost-based rates as far as the transmission component is concerned?

THE WITNESS: Well, the transmission component in either case would be cost-based. This would be the generation component, could they get a market-based --

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: The entire sale.

THE WITNESS: And currently Florida Power and Light has no authorization to sell at market-based rates inside Florida, but outside Florida the utility can make sales at market-based rates because they have demonstrated to FERC that outside of Florida they don't have market power. And there have been in the recent future (sic) situations where prices outside of Florida became rather high and they were able to sell at market-based rates and earn revenues that were higher than they could have earned if they sold at cost-based rates, so this would limit the revenues they would earn on those off-system sales.

The other way that it would -- I said there were two ways it affects the utilities and that is one of the two. The other way it would affect the utilities is that the utilities, I suspect, all have operations outside of Florida through subsidiaries. They own generating plants that are EWGs that sell at market-based rates in various markets throughout the United States. They probably also have affiliates that are

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power marketers that operate outside of Florida at market-based rates, and if they were denied the ability to engage in sales at market-based rates, if they were a power marketer I think that would, in effect, put them out of business. If they were a generation company, it could cause them to incur a substantial loss in revenue.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Going further down on that second paragraph, he talks about recommendation that no mergers be approved. I don't really need you to go into that one. final sentence, he says he would take a hard look at the transmission rates they are permitted to charge to ensure that they are just and reasonable and recognize the interdependence of the power grid. What is he saying there? Is he going to move those rates up or down?

THE WITNESS: I think that is a code for we ought to really cut their transmission rates, and the net effect of that would be today jurisdictional utilities provide wholesale transmission service, they earn revenues from that, and if I understand your state ratemaking revenues that are earned off of those assets are credited towards the revenue requirement for setting retail rates. So you would have fewer revenues from wholesale service that would be available to credit against retail rates in the next rate proceeding, and in between the rate proceedings I think it would mean that the Florida utilities simply earn less money.

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COMMISSIONER DEASON: You indicated that there are FERC approved transmission rates which help offset retail rates?

THE WITNESS: I just assume. That is the way it works in many states. I'm not an expert on Florida ratemaking, but in many states in establishing the revenue requirement for transmission assets in retail rates, to the extent those assets are also being used for wholesale service and they earn revenues for wholesale service, frequently the revenues that are earned from wholesale service are credited against the revenue requirement for purposes of setting retail rates. And I don't --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I thought we used a jurisdictional allocation factor, but I may be mistaken. It. has been a long time since we have had a rate case.

THE WITNESS: And I'm not an expert on Florida ratemaking, so you may do it with a jurisdictional allocation factor in Florida.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Well, let me ask you this. When the Office of Public Counsel in the State of Florida looks at this paragraph, should they have reason to cheer that retail rates are actually going to go down as a result of the FERC's activities which are outlined in this paragraph?

THE WITNESS: No, I don't think this would have any effect on retail rates. It would have the effect, potentially,

of having fewer wholesale transmission revenues to the extent that there is any sharing of those with retail customers. I'm not so sure this would have any effect on retail rates.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Well, wouldn't that last sentence about taking a long hard look -- actually I thought you had answered that it might result in a reduction in transmission rates that could result in --

THE WITNESS: Well, it depends. Keep in mind, this is what would happen to companies that do not participate in RTOs. If a company does not participate in an RTO then it is not required to take transmission service from the RTO. It doesn't take transmission service from the RTO, that portion of its transmission assets that are used for retail service will not be affected by FERC and wouldn't be affected by this paragraph.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Well, I think what I am hearing, though, overall is that these factors would definitely have a negative effect on both the Florida utilities and perhaps on the retail ratepayers if this Commission did not move forward with GridFlorida.

THE WITNESS: That is correct. And I would just add that this is a familiar pattern to me, because the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission on a number of occasions has announced major policies that upon announcement are voluntary but with strong incentives to participate, and then over time

they make them -- they increase the incentives and then finally they make them mandatory. And that's what FERC did with Order 436, which was transmission service to interstate pipelines, open access transmission service. Initially it was described as a voluntary program, within no time they issued Order 500 and Order 636 and it was mandatory.

Likewise with open access transmission service.

Initially it was a voluntary thing. If you wanted to get a merger approved you had to offer it up, but it was voluntary in a sense. There was some compulsion there, but before long they issued Order 888 and it was mandatory. The D.C. Circuit -- Order 888 was appealed to the D.C. Circuit, parties alleged that FERC didn't have the authority to compel transmission. This is at about the same time they issued Order 2000.

The D.C. Circuit decided its appeal of Order 888 within a month or two after FERC had already issued Order 2000, but in that opinion the D.C. Circuit said that when the Commission makes findings of undue discrimination their power is at its zenith and that they clearly had the power to compel transmission service in 888. And for that reason I also believe they have clearly the power to compel compliance with RTOs.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: In any of those circumstances that you have outlined have you seen FERC impose punitive measures on a utility company such as those outlined in this

Il memorandum?

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2 THE WITNESS: Yes. For example, when FERC wanted 3 utilities to provide open access transmission service, they would not approve mergers unless they agreed to provide open 4 access transmission service. In addition to that, a utility 5 6 that wanted market-based rates for itself or for its affiliates, the Commission refused to grant market-based rate 7 8 authority unless they provided open access transmission 9 service. This is a very familiar story. 10 COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Thank you. 11 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Ms. Paugh, were you --

MS. PAUGH: No further questions. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Mr. Howe, do you have a time?

MR. HOWE: I would say ten minutes.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Okay. I may break in if we get much longer than that.

MR. HOWE: All right, Chairman Jacobs.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Go right ahead.

CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. HOWE:

Q Hello, Mr. Naeve. I'm Roger Howe with the Public Counsel's Office. Did I understand you correctly when you were giving your summary that when you referred to how the Commission should view bundling versus unbundling it was from a perspective of a distribution company?

A Yes. I mean electric distribution company. Well, I'm not sure I know what you mean "by from the perspective of."

Q Well, you used the phrase distribution.

A You can bundle or unbundle at any level, at the wholesale level, the retail level, and so forth. I was speaking to the retail level at that point, because that is the focus of this Commission.

Q Would you agree that FERC's view when it determines bundling versus unbundling is looking at the transmission provided?

A Not exclusively. I think FERC has looked at bundling and unbundling over the years with respect to a lot of issues, transmission, generation, and so forth.

Q Would you agree that FERC, though, doesn't have any jurisdiction over distribution, does it?

A That is correct.

Q And it doesn't have any direct jurisdiction over generation, does it?

A Well, I think they do have jurisdiction over generation. The Federal Power Act says FERC does not have jurisdiction over generation under certain sections, but I must tell you if, for example, a generating plant sells electricity, FERC has jurisdiction over it if they sell at wholesale. If they have a rate schedule on file and they make those sales, if they want to sell the assets, they are now a public utility,

they have to get FERC approval for that. 1 2 It's not a simple matter. But as a general rule. I 3 would say they have extensive jurisdiction over generation. 4 Well, let's perhaps address it this way. Let's take 0 5 Florida Power and Light as the example I was using. Would you 6 agree that FERC currently does not have any jurisdiction over 7 Florida Power and Light's provision of retail energy? You mean the sale to retail customers of energy? 8 Α 9 Q Yes. 10 They do not have jurisdiction over that. Α 11 I'm sorry, what was your answer? 0 12 They do not have jurisdiction over that. Α 13 Q If Florida Power and Light were to start charging separately for transmission service to their retail customers, 14 15 would FERC have jurisdiction over the retail component? 16 If they merely separately unbundled the rate Α No. charges, that would not give FERC jurisdiction. 17 18 All right. And then the next step. If FPL had some 0 19 other entity provide the transmission service, would that 20 effect an unbundling in FERC's view? 21 You mean if there were retail wheeling, is that your 22 question? 23 No, I mean if, for example, FPL -- I mean, exclusive Q of the RTO proposal, but if FPL just, for example, transferred 24 25 all of its transmission assets to Tampa Electric, for example,

and purchased transmission service from them such that another entity was providing the transmission service that was --

A Well, FERC would have jurisdiction over the sale of transmission service to FPL, but FERC would not have jurisdiction over FPL's service to its retail customers including, you know, its bundled rates.

Q I understand. Now from FERC's perspective and FERC's perspective only, would FERC consider that sale in which Tampa Electric provided the transmission service to be an unbundled retail sale?

A No.

Q Would they consider it to be an unbundled transmission service?

A Yes, I think so. An unbundled wholesale transmission service.

Q Does FERC currently have jurisdiction over the transmission component of electric energy sold at retail? That may be the same question I had asked you earlier.

A Well, this is a -- the answer is in FERC's view if at the state level the state unbundles service to retail customers so that retail customers do not buy generation directly from their utility supplier, but instead buy generation from multiple generators, multiple sources, in that world in which the state itself has chosen to unbundle, FERC has taken the position that their jurisdiction over transmission service

extends down to the retail customer.

In a situation in which the state has chosen not to unbundle, FERC takes the position that their jurisdiction extends only to the provision of transmission service to the distribution company. So, FERC has taken the position that their jurisdiction kind of depends on what the state chooses to do.

Q And would that necessarily imply that an action by this Commission could place matters under FERC's jurisdiction which are currently not -- currently not under FERC's jurisdiction?

A Well, if this Commission or this -- I don't know if this Commission has the authority to do it, but if this Commission were to institute retail access, FERC's view is that that would change its jurisdiction so that it would have jurisdiction over the wire service down to the retail customer.

Q Mr. Naeve, are you familiar with any pending legislation, in particular, I don't have much information, but apparently the U.S. Senate Energy Chair Jeff Bingaman (phonetic) has filed some legislation entitled the Electric Restructuring Act of 2001?

A I am familiar that he has filed it. He has filed several bills over the years, and there are hundreds of bills that have been filed, but I know he came out with a new bill recently.

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Q Do you know whether that bill would specifically amend the Federal Power Act to put jurisdiction of the transmission component of electric energy sold at retail under FERC?

A I do not know that.

MR. HOWE: I have no further questions. Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Very well. We will take time now to break for lunch. We will come back at 2:00 p.m. Thank you all.

(Lunch recess.)