FILE COPY

CERTIFIED ORIGINAL

BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. 000733-TL - Investigation to IN RE:

determine whether BellSouth

Telecommunications, Inc.'s tariff filing to restructure its late payment charge is in violation of Section 364.051, F.S.

BEFORE:

CHAIRMAN J. TERRY DEASON

COMMISSIONER SUSAN F. CLARK

COMMISSIONER E. LEON JACOBS. JR.

COMMISSIONER LILA A. JABER

PROCEEDINGS:

AGENDA CONFERENCE

ITEM NUMBER:

10**

DATE:

Tuesday, July 11, 2000

PLACE:

4075 Esplanade Way, Room 148

Tallahassee, Florida

REPORTED BY:

MARY ALLEN NEEL

Registered Professional Reporter

ACCURATE STENOTYPE REPORTERS 100 SALEM COURT TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301

(850)878-2221

DOCUMENT NUMBER-DATE

13218 OCT 185

FPSC-COMMISSION CLERK 3

DIRECTOR - REG. RELATIONS TALLAHABORE, FL

PARTICIPANTS:

STAFF RECOMMENDATION

Issue 1: Should the Commission find that BST's GST filing of July 9, 1999, to restructure its late payment penalties is in violation of Section 364.051(6)(a), Florida Statutes?

Recommendation: Yes. The Commission should find that BST's GST filing of July 9, 1999, to restructure its late payment penalties is in violation of Section 364.051(6)(a), Florida Statutes, and should therefore be canceled immediately. Also, the Commission should require BST to provide refunds to all affected customers within 90 days of issuance of the Consummating Order. Further, Staff recommends that BST should file a report with the Commission upon completion of this refund showing monies that were collected from and refunded to customers.

Issue 2: Should this docket be closed?

Recommendation: No. If no person whose substantial interests are affected files a protest within 21 days of the issuance date of the order, the order will become final upon issuance of a Consummating Order. If a timely protest is not filed, the docket should remain open pending completion by Bellsouth of the refund within 90 days of issuance of the Consummating Order. Upon notification that the refund has been completed, this docket should be closed administratively. If a timely protest is filed, the tariff should remain in effect pending the outcome of further proceedings, with any revenues collected held subject to refund.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Item 10.

MS. SIMMONS: Commissioners, Item 10 addresses whether BellSouth's tariff filing to restructure its late payment charge is a permissible increase for a price regulated local exchange company. If only the flat fee portion of the tariff is considered, then the filing would be a permissible increase. If both the flat fee and the percentage charge are considered non-basic service rates, the filing would not be a permissible increase.

I would like to give an overview of this issue before the parties make their remarks. I think it may help in trying to understand the crux of the dispute.

First, I would like to say that Staff and BellSouth appear to agree on the nature of the costs covered by the 1987 late payment filing and also the 1999 late payment filing. The '99 filing did incorporate additional cost that was not reflected in the '87 filing. These were administrative -- administrative type costs were reflected in the '87 filing, whereas in the '99 filing it went beyond administrative type costs to include the time value of money, or the

opportunity cost of these late payers. So I don't think there's any dispute between Staff and BellSouth as to the type of costs covered by the '87 and the '99 filings.

I think the crux of the dispute seems to be whether the nature of the additional cost that was reflected in the '99 filing is a relevant consideration in determining the legality of the '99 filing. Staff believes the nature of the additional cost really isn't relevant. I believe BellSouth thinks the nature of the cost is extremely relevant, and I believe it is the basis for their contention that the filing is a permissible increase.

Let me just go on just a little bit more.

In Staff's mind, the critical point is how the statute defines service. Under the statute, service is defined as something that should be construed in its broadest and most inclusive sense. So from Staff's perspective, we believe the original late payment fee was in fact a non-basic service rate. In our mind, with the '99 filing, what BellSouth has done is, they have restructured and expanded the charges applicable to late payment. Staff doesn't

believe that the nature of the costs covered by

the flat fee as compared to the nature of the
costs covered by the percentage fee really can
be used as a basis for excluding the percentage
charge from non-basic service rate monitoring.
And our conclusion really hinges on the
statutory definition of service, which we
believe makes it very difficult to exclude the
percentage charge from consideration.

But I did want to let you know, I don't really think there is a dispute over the nature of the costs covered by the '87 filing versus the '99 filing.

I know there are parties here to speak.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Mr. Criser?

MR. CRISER: Commissioners, I'm Marshall Criser appearing for BellSouth.

Commissioners, on July 6th, I filed a letter in this docket which I believe in more detail outlines BellSouth's position on this matter, as well as our response to the staff recommendation. What I would like to do this morning is briefly summarize our position, and then we're available to answer any questions that you have.

First off, I would like to talk about what

it is we did, and I think that is really the crux of this matter. First of all, Bellsouth restructured its existing late payment charge to a flat rate fee. We converted the previous interest charge -- or excuse me, the percentage charge to a flat rate of \$1.50 for residence customers and \$9 for business customers. We also created a \$6 exemption which was created in order to address Lifeline subscribers with basic services, essentially to give them a break and not charge late payment fees to Lifeline subscribers if they would otherwise have incurred a late payment charge.

we structured and implemented the late payment charge in compliance with the Commission's price regulation statute. That late payment charge restructure is in compliance with the statute.

Secondly, we created a new charge, which is created to address the loss of the use of money. That charge, which also incorporates the exemption for Lifeline customers, specifically addresses loss of use of money. And the only relevance to us of looking at the cost studies

from the original filing were to demonstrate that in the cost studies, the tariff filing, all of the supporting documentation, and this Commission's order around our original late payment charge, there was never any inclusion, mention, or discussion of the use of money. Our point in the cost study was to show that the late payment charge does not address interest charges.

At the same time --

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Mr. Criser, let me ask you a question on that. Weren't you given a working capital allowance in your rate case which compensated you for the use of money, in the sense that you would have to have money to operate, and to the extent you have collectables, and maybe even collectables that are in arrears, you were compensated for that through those rates?

MR. CRISER: Commissioner, I guess I'm looking under the regime of price regulation, which is the regime under which we filed the interest charge tariff and the late payment charge restructuring. Under that regulation, there are statutes which govern price and not

cost. Again, our backup of going back to the

cost study was to ensure that we weren't trying
to go back under the late payment charge and
capture something that was already there. So we
looked at that cost study to demonstrate that it
was not in fact a part of the late payment
charge.

I guess what I've looked at in this case is

-- for late payment charges, we've tried to look
at what is the definition of a late payment
charge. And in doing that, we looked at
BellSouth's tariff, we looked at the materials
that we submitted to this Commission, we looked
at this Commission's discussion at agenda, and
this Commission's order on that tariff, and
nowhere in there is a reference to the loss of
use of money or interest charges. We therefore
hold that the interest charge we have now
implemented is something distinct and separate
from that late payment charge.

In addition to that, the interest charge that we implemented complies with the legal definition and regulations for an interest charge. And therefore, I would respectfully submit it is in compliance with Florida law in

the context of what is an interest charge.

I also would suggest we have held that since this is a fee, it is not is a service and therefore not subject to the price regulation baskets. But in either case, whether it's a fee and not subject to the baskets or treated as a new service, our interest charge complies with the price regulation statutes.

Finally, I would also -- I think it's worth commenting that I believe that these charges are a part of a responsible business approach to late payment of bills. Most importantly, they are the most avoidable charges on a customer's bill. A customer does not pay these charges if they pay their bill on time. In fact, the customer response to these charges is that since last August when the tariffs were implemented, 8% of residence accounts which were previously paying late and 13% of business accounts that were previously paying late are now paying on time.

So this charge is not just about revenue.

It's about trying to drive positive customer

behavior in terms of the payment of their bills.

In addition to that, BellSouth works with

customers to create desired payment dates, to
establish installment billing, and other
mechanisms which will facilitate their payment
of their bills. And I would note that when we
create an installment billing plan for a
customer, we do not charge the late payment
charge or interest charge on a recurring base.
It's calculated on the balance at the time the
installments are created, and it holds at that
level. So this is not a matter of continually
going back to the customer.

And as I've noted previously, we attempted to create in these new charges an exemption for Lifeline subscribers, because we believe that if we're going to look at an area that we can target to create a break, essentially, that that's the most appropriate way to approach that.

I also think it's worth noting that in the pat year since this tariff and these charges went into effect, we have had virtually no customer complaints. Again, our main customer reaction has been the case where we have some customers who are now paying their bills on time when they previously didn't.

Commissioners, BellSouth believes that there is a legal distinction between late payment charges and interest charges. The two cannot and should not be treated as the same. We have developed, we have implemented, and we are applying these charges in compliance with the appropriate Florida Statutes and in a manner which we believe reflects responsible business practice.

We would therefore respectfully request that you deny Staff's recommendation. Again, I'm available for questions.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Criser, just two questions. You said early on that BellSouth created a new charge. I'm assuming you're referring to the 1.5% on the unpaid balance greater than \$6.

MR. CRISER: The interest charge, yes, ma'am.

COMMISSIONER JABER: All right. But you already had that percentage on unpaid balances greater than a dollar, so help me understand how increasing the amount upon which you tack on the interest is a creation of a new charge.

MR. CRISER: Again, the original tariff was

a late payment charge tariff. That tariff at

its inception was for 1-1/2% on the customer's
balance over a dollar on their bill. We
restructured the late payment charge to convert
it to a flat rate charge and created the
exemption for Lifeline subscribers.
Essentially, we restructured the late payment
charge and did that in compliance with the
appropriate guidelines from the price regulation
statutes.

In addition to that — and that may be what has created some of the confusion, but honestly, an interest charge is a percent charge. We then created a new charge, which is the interest charge, and we did that in compliance with the appropriate Florida Statutes with reference to interest charges.

COMMISSIONER JABER: You would agree with me that both charges are triggered by a late payment.

MR. CRISER: I would agree with you that both charges are triggered by a late payment. I would also observe that there are other charges, as an example, the returned check charge, that are triggered by the manner in which a customer

pays their bill, and the returned check charge

is also shown as a separate -- which is also a
fee. It's a fee controlled by other statutes as
well, and is also in the basket as a separate
item.

COMMISSIONER JABER: That's an interesting point. So in your tariff -- you have let us know what your returned check fee is. Is that approved in your tariff?

MR. CRISER: That's in our tariffs, and it's in the basket.

COMMISSIONER JABER: It is in the basket?

MR. CRISER: Yes. And if this Commission's preference is for the interest charge to be in the basket, I think there are some issues around what that may do to the basket, and we would be happy to discuss those. But if it is in the basket, then it's in the basket as a new and separate service, and we've introduced it in compliance with the price regulation.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: You would agree that we're trying to follow your costs. That was what the purpose of the original tariff was, that you were recovering the additional costs that you would have to carry these past due

accounts.

MR. CRISER: The tariff at the time it was introduced, the late payment charge tariff, was set at a time when cost of service was a driving factor in the determination of rates. And we believe in addition to that, the cost studies that were filed are relevant, because they helped to distinguish what was included. Whether it's costs or not, it's also -- to me, it's a definitional issue, did this cover certain things. And I believe we actually agree that it did not.

I believe cost is relevant from that perspective. But by the same token, under the price regulation statutes, cost is provided as supporting evidence to ensure that we cover costs, but it's not the driver for determining whether or not a charge is going to be charged.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: What would that be? What would you argue that that should be?

MR. CRISER: Well, in the case of interest charges, there are actually separate statutes which govern, you know, what the level of interest charges can be. And we have done this -- in addition to the regulations which

typically would apply to the regulated side of 1 2 . the business, we have also done this in 3 compliance with the statutes that address things like interest charges. There are other Florida 4 Statutes that are relevant to that. 5 6 CHAIRMAN DEASON: Mr. Criser, the 1.5% fee. 7 as you refer to it, for amounts in arrears beyond \$6, that's at 1.5% per month; is that 8 9 correct? 10 MR. CRISER: Yes, sir. 11 CHAIRMAN DEASON: Which equates to 18% per 12 vear? 13 MR. CRISER: That's correct. CHAIRMAN DEASON: Which is in excess of 14 15 your cost of capital? 16 MR. CRISER: I would not hold that that 17

equals our cost of capital, no. We set it at the statutory rate, not on a cost-based rate.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: So then it's more than just a cost recovery. It is a charge that would -- and I think you have indicated that it already has. It would impact the actions of customers, hopefully in a positive manner by having them pay their bills on time.

MR. CRISER: Yes, sir.

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

CHAIRMAN DEASON: So it's more than just recovery.

MR. CRISER: Yes. If I haven't been clear about that, I think that's part of what I have tried to walk myself through, is our focus -- where we focused on the cost study in the original tariff was to demonstrate that this was not a part of that original tariff. We also looked at other -- I guess I think of it as what is the definition of a late payment charge, and what is the body of evidence that shows what defined that. The loss of use of money or interest charges are not included anywhere in that discussion.

so what we are looking at now is an interest charge, which, frankly, is a desire to -- if there's a cost issue, we frankly would prefer for customers to pay on time and not incur those costs and not earn that charge. And we have been pleased to see that we in fact have a positive trend in customers who are now paying their bills on time. The residence percentage equates to some 150,000 residence accounts, a reduction of 150,000 residence accounts in terms of paying their bills on time, or paying their

bills late. I said that backwards. I'm sorry.

COMMISSIONER JABER: If we accepted Staff's recommendation, Mr. Criser, and you had to do a refund, have you done preliminary calculations to indicate how much the amount would be?

MR. CRISER: Again, I believe that the late payment charge restructure that we implemented is in compliance with the statute, that portion of it. And then what we -- what I would reduce the debate over is whether the interest charge is in fact a new service, a fee, or the same. I believe that amount is somewhere in the neighborhood of \$25 million, but I don't have a specific calculation on that. And again, right -- I mean, we could go back. We certainly can calculate that. And in terms what the long-term impact is, it's unclear, because we're actually seeing that we have fewer customers now paying these charges.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Thank you. Mr. Beck?

MR. BECK: Thank you, Chairman Deason. My
name is Charlie Beck, with the Office of Public
Counsel. We fully support the Staff's analysis
and their recommendation.

BellSouth has had a late payment fee since

1987, and for 12 years that late payment fee was a charge of 1-1/2% per month on the balance of late payments in excess of a dollar. When we went to price regulation in 1996, the late payment fee was placed in a category consistent with the price cap regulation scheme that places limits on the increases that can be placed on categories of non-basic services.

This charge of 1-1/2% per month was a late payment fee until 1999, when Bell came in and restructured their late payment fee. I think you might find it interesting that the tariff itself, they filed this both with the late payment fee restructured as a flat amount and what they now call an interest fee as all part of the same sentence in the same tariff. I mean, there are not two separate tariffs, one calling for an interest fee and one for late payment. It's the same sentence in their tariff.

Because Bell changes the name of the 1-1/2% per month fee, which had been a late payment fee for 12 years, doesn't make it different. I mean, you can't just change the name of something and say now it's an interest fee, it's

no longer a late payment fee, to let them out of the restraints that are placed by the statutes on non-basic service categories. The tariff filing itself Bell made for both of these items is described as a revision of the late payment charge for Florida subscribers.

I think the Staff's analysis is right on point, and we urge you to adopt it.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Beck, do you agree that the flat fee change is appropriate under the statute?

MR. BECK: I think they can do that. The restraint is that the non-basic service category for miscellaneous services can't go up by more than 6%.

COMMISSIONER JABER: But you agree that they haven't gone up by more than 6%, so that portion of BellSouth's change is acceptable to you?

MR. BECK: If you looked at that in isolation, yes. It's the combination of the two charges that makes it violate the price cap restraints.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Further questions?

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Staff -- I have a

question of Staff. You argue that regardless of how described by company, that there are two issues here. One is to what extent this should be just one basket, and so you would refute the company's argument with that. But let's go for a moment with the argument they raise that this is a separate item.

Under their argument, it would appear that the interest charge would no longer be subject to the cap, the increase limits; is that correct?

MS. SIMMONS: Under BellSouth's point of view, the percentage charge, or the interest charge, as they label it, is either a fee and would never be subject to non-basic service rate monitoring, or it's a new service that would be considered on a going-forward basis for rate monitoring purposes.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Would it be subject to the 6% cap?

MS. SIMMONS: It would down the road if the company wanted to increase the rate. Say the percentage charge, if they wanted to increase it or in some way modify it, then they would be subject to the non-basic service rate caps or

rate limitations, however you want to call it.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Okay.

1.7

MR. CRISER: Commissioner Jacobs, the observation I would make is there are separate Florida Statutes which regulate the level of interest charges, and so those charges in themselves have a cap on them. Whether they're in the basket or not, there is a cap.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Do you know what those caps are for this kind of a charge?

MR. CRISER: It's 18% per year is my understanding, which would be 1-1/2% per month, which is the level of the charge we have now.

The point I would make in addition to that, I think the suggestion was that if we had somehow put these things -- and I've heard this before. If we had somehow put these things into two different filings, it wouldn't be an issue.

Frankly, if that's an error, that's an error because we tried to make it clear to a customer reading the tariff exactly what the applicable fees would be for late payment of a bill, and including the language together I think is a -- you know, it's an attempt to be as up-front and thorough in the explanation. And

I'm somewhat concerned that -- the suggestion

that by simply separating them somehow we could turn this into a different matter I think falls short.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Is that correct,
Staff? Could they have filed separately and
this would have been an appropriate --

MS. SIMMONS: No. We still would have had the same concern, because we just have difficulty trying to separate the flat fee from the percentage charge, because both of them apply in a late payment sense. And based on how the statute defines service, and since service should be construed in its broadest and most encompassing sense, Staff finds it very difficult to separate these two items.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Could you address also Mr. Criser's comments regarding returned checks, that this isn't any different than having a returned check fee in a tariff?

MS. SIMMONS: Well, the returned check fee, you know, is in the tariff. It has been mentioned that it's subject to the non-basic service rate monitoring. I'm not sure that I would really view this any differently. Perhaps

Ms. Keating -- she may have other observations.

But, you know, in both cases, there is a action taken by the customer, or non-action, some event that triggers charges. And here we're talking about late payment triggering a charge, and we've now gone from one charge being applicable to two charges being applicable. As I say, we just can't find a way to separate these two in our minds.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Let me ask a legal question. BellSouth has filed a tariff. Under telecommunications law as it exists today, those tariffs are presumptively valid.

MS. KEATING: Correct.

COMMISSIONER JABER: If all parties agree that the flat fee change is acceptable under the statute, do we have the authority to modify this tariff to split the baby, so to speak?

MS. KEATING: I believe that you could. You would probably have to do so as a proposed agency action. But there is precedent in the past where you've taken similar action. In a prior case involving rate regrouping, the Commission found that the tariff was not in compliance and required BellSouth to go back and

reset the rates for the areas that had been regrouped. But as long as you do so as proposed agency action, I believe that you can.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Do you mean we rejected the tariff filing, we found it invalid and directed them to refile?

MS. KEATING: That's correct. And that was held up on appeal.

COMMISSIONER JABER: And they would have to give the refunds for -- what would the refund amount be in that scenario?

MS. KEATING: Well, if you believe that it's appropriate to keep the late payment charge but not the interest charge, then only the interest would need to be refunded.

MS. SIMMONS: And at the time of filing, BellSouth estimated that the interest charge would bring in roughly between 23 and 24 million annually. That's shown on page 6 of the staff recommendation.

MR. CRISER: Commissioners, at the risk of making one point too many, a concern I still have is that there seems to be a logic that says that this is simply a matter of semantics. I think it's important to understand that there is

a clear distinction between interest charges,

and there are statutes, usury statutes that
regulate that. And one of the concerns we have
tried to distinguish is that if you suddenly say
late payment charges and interest charges are
synonymous, you have a whole area that you need
to look at in terms of whether or not late
payment charges are being pulled under the usury
charges.

I think I would also observe in terms of distinguishing between these charges, this Commission itself has a late payment process for regulatory assessment fees which assesses a late payment penalty of 5% per month up to a total of 25% of the balance due, a 12% cost of money or interest charge, and a charge for recovering the cost of collections. So the distinguishing between the types of charges is not something new, and it is dangerous to oversimplify this process and draw these things all into one pot.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Criser, but the Commission orders refunds with interest, for example, and those interest payments are governed by our statutes and the usury laws; right? The trouble I'm having understanding

1.3

your point is the interest charge, as you call

it, is triggered by a late payment. That's the
trouble I'm having understanding your --

MR. CRISER: I suppose -- I heard the reference earlier about taking things at their most broad and inclusive level. And not to be flip about it, but at some point, people who have telephone services incur charges, but they are not all the same thing. There are different types of charges.

Historically, we never included an interest charge or a loss of use of money type charge in our late payment fee. This is a new and distinct fee. It may — for purposes of going forward, at this Commission's discretion, may be included in the basket or not included in the basket, but it is something new and distinct. That's the point we're trying to make. And we believe the Florida Statutes, both the statutes that apply to price regulation, as well as some of the broader statutes that apply to things like interest charges, that all of those things align, that we are allowed and we are permitted to do what we are doing.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: I have a question for

Staff. The statute makes a distinction between

- 6% allowable increases for non-basic services
and then a 20% for those areas in which there is
competition. Have we made any determination as
to areas in which there is competition where the
company would be permissible to impose a 20%
increase in non-basic services?

MS. SIMMONS: We have not had a company that has requested to use the 20% flexibility; thus, there has not been a need to make a determination. In this particular case, even if the Commission felt that the 20% flexibility would be appropriate, the amount of money generated from this filing is still in excess of that limit.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: I realize it is in excess. But if there were 20% increases allowed, at least in some areas it would reduce the amount of refund. would it not?

MS. SIMMONS: Yes, it would.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Mr. Criser, have you given any thought to whether there are areas in which you would be permitted to impose a 20% increase?

MR. CRISER: Yes, we've looked at that.

Again, I would say -- and I don't mean to stick

myself out on a rock, I guess is what I'm trying
to say. I think, clearly, when we've looked at
this particular issue, you know, I guess there's
an issue and argument that says it's common
industry practice. We have companies out there
who have charges far in excess of the level that
BellSouth charges. It's an area that I think
frankly comes back to -- I'm worried about
splitting the baby, because I really believe
there is a danger in trying to combine these
things into one thing. It is --

COMMISSIONER JABER: Those companies that you cite to in your letter, are they price regulated telephone companies?

MR. CRISER: Some of them are. The ones we cite in our letter, no, I don't believe so.

They are companies that have tariffs on file with this Commission. That information was from tariffs on file with this Commission.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Commissioners, further questions?

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: The essence of the recommendation today goes to whether or not there's a violation. Is that the only avenue by

5

which we can address the legitimacy of this tariff? In other words, do we have to say it's violating? Can we just reject the tariff?

MS. KEATING: In order to reject the tariff, I believe you need to find that it is in violation, because they are filed and become presumptively valid.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Commissioners, do we have a motion?

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Well, I'll wade in.

I began on this one from the premise that the company says that's the basis of their charge.

Once you step away from the idea that you're looking at cost-based and you're looking at rate of return, you're looking at what we were anticipating would be a competitive marketplace. And in a competitive marketplace, the company surely has the right to go out and offer services and products for which it should seek the market-based price, and the company seems to be offering this as something in that order.

I differ. I do not see this as a company offering a service. I see this as an issue where the company is attempting to manage its

business. And again, it ought to have the flexibility and opportunity to do that.

The troubling aspect for me is, I see an effort here to look at an aspect of its business from a different way, and that is, to what extent it can serve as a revenue-producing vehicle. In this regard, and in particular, this circumstance troubles me. When I start thinking about the consumers who are going to incur this charge, the first thing I think about is that they're already having problems paying the bill.

So there's a divergence here. The company would say, well, this would be an incentive to make them focus and give priority to this bill and make sure they pay this on time. There's some value in that. I don't disagree with that.

My experience is that most people are robbing Peter to pay Paul. And to the extent that this would be an incentive to the consumer, I think it would be fairly limited. Most people value their telephone. They will do most anything they can to keep their telephone service on.

And the ultimate avenue that the company

has to ensure that is that they disconnect them.

When a customer refuses to pay their bill, the companies have the opportunity to disconnect them. They minimize the extent of past due balances by that ultimate act, and it's done fairly frequently. So if I were looking to manage this area of the business, I would think that you have a cap there.

Now, I've seen that there is this issue of consumers who repetitively -- who continue to have late balances. That's probably an issue here, and I would think that that's something that the company might want to look at and might want to manage through this provision.

Unfortunately, I see this provision as being quite onerous in terms of managing that number of customers who are continually late month after month. I may be wrong. I have to say the evidence is not really clear to me here as to whether or not it's appropriate to manage that body of customers though this provision.

Absent that, I see a provision that will generate a substantial, according to projections from Staff, a substantial amount of revenue from

the body of consumers that I would say would be highly taxed, if not poorly equipped to contribute that revenue.

Now, it would trouble me even more if this were really a competitive offering, because in that instance, you have an industry where companies are seeking market share and seeking to attract customers, and who would impose an 18% charge on this customer that they value. That would trouble me. But we understand that we're transitioning to competition, and so we're here as a surrogate to make sure that — in that transition, we're trying to make sure that all players in the marketplace, and the consumers particularly, are treated with fairness and with equity.

That's how I approach this question. I have no doubt that the company has the opportunity, and should have the opportunity to manage their business, and if they want to restructure this charge, that's up to them. But we're here as a surrogate, and we're here to see that to the extent that we're transitioning to competition, consumers see as much of the benefits of competition as possible. I don't

see that in this offering. I see consumers being fairly burdened by this offering.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I have a question,
Mr. Criser. The previous late payment charge of
1.5% on the unpaid balance greater than a
dollar, was that part of the miscellaneous
non-basic service basket? Was that previously
part of it?

MR. CRISER: Yes, it was.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: So it was a graduated rate. But now you're saying the fixed rate should be only considered part of that basket, and the interest rate should not. Is that what you're saying?

MR. CRISER: Our logic -- I hate to get into this argument. I think our logic -- one part of my answer would be that that should be irrelevant, because we believe this is either a fee and not part of the basket, or this is a new item, and it is in the basket.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: It's certainly not a new service. I don't think the customers would see it as a service.

MR. CRISER: And frankly, our argument for not putting it -- part of our logic for not

putting it in the basket is that if you put

things in the basket, if there's a concern -what we've tried to be is responsible about
this. If you put things in the basket that are
capped otherwise, then you leverage the basket
to be able to increase other services by a
greater amount than you would have been able to
do if you hadn't done that, if that makes
sense. We're building the foundation in the
basket with things that have statutory controls
on them, and so we believe you potentially
create a negative public policy by throwing
things into baskets just to do so.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, it would be fair to say that previously you had considered the late payment charge or the percentage was part of the miscellaneous non-basic service basket.

MR. CRISER: Yes. Yes.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: But now you're arguing that it should only be the flat rate and not the interest charge.

MR. CRISER: Well, I mean, this Commission had -- I think I would say it differently. At the time the price regulation baskets were created, the existing late payment charge was

put in a basket. On looking at that, I believe

there is an issue, you know, whether it's in
part of or beyond this particular discussion,
which is, should fees like the returned check
charge, like interest fees, be in the basket or
not, and what's the appropriate way for those to
be administered.

We frankly have tried to look at this not just from a company trying to make money perspective, but from what is the best public policy approach. And one of the observations we have is that by just throwing things into baskets, particularly ones that are capped otherwise, you create maybe some unintended — or increases that wouldn't have been there otherwise as you apply the basket. I hope I haven't confused that totally.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Commissioners, maybe we can refocus for just a moment. I appreciate all the debate and dialogue that we've had here, but to me it's not an issue as to whether it's burdensome on the customers, or whether it is a good management policy, or whether this restructure makes management sense and it incentivizes customers to pay their bills on

1.

time. All of that, while that's important if we - were in that mode, we're not in that mode.

We're strictly looking as to whether under the statute and the interpretation of the statute, whether this is a permissible charge, and we're not here to debate the merits of this, other than can it be implemented consistent with the statute. That's the critical issue. We've got to address that issue.

And I believe that this charge is not consistent with the statute, that our Staff's interpretation is correct. The only leeway I see in it, that is, there may be areas in the state where there is sufficient competition that a 20% increase in these charges may be permissible. But as Staff has pointed out, the increase in terms of revenue for this basket is somewhere in excess of 50%. But that's my narrow viewpoint on it.

I think that's the critical issue, and that's what we've got to grasp and decide one way or the other, is it legal or is it not under our interpretation of the statute.

COMMISSIONER JABER: May I try to give a motion, Mr. Chairman, and see how far we get?

In response to Staff's response to my

- question, I think it is clear that the flat fee
change is not violative of the statute, and I
think that there's agreement from the parties
that that's correct.

With respect to the percentage changes, I completely agree with what you're saying, Mr. Chairman, and that was the nature of the questions I asked. I can't understand why now there is a difference in philosophy. To me, the percentage change, whether it was called interest or not, existed from the beginning of the baskets. I don't understand how changing the amount upon which the percentage is applied is now a new service charge.

Saying that, if we modify this tariff and it has to be PAA and BellSouth has to file a new tariff, perhaps in that new tariff they can let us know what areas might be at 20% competition. I don't know.

But my motion is to modify the tariff, or to reject the tariff and allow them to file a modified tariff that indicates only the change in the flat fee, and to give the appropriate refunds for the so-called interest charges. commissioner CLARK: The only question I

have about that is, I think we should simply
reject it and let them come back with one that
complies with the law, and then it's up to them
to decide if they can meet a 20% -- if they can
meet the requirements for doing that.

MS. SIMMONS: Commissioner Clark, then would your suggestion be that basically the tariff be cancelled and that the company would revert back to the prior version of the tariff?

COMMISSIONER CLARK: We could either do
that or give them some opportunity to file a
modified tariff. I guess my point is that I
don't know that we should direct them as to what
kind of tariff they should file. We should
reject this one and allow them to file one
that's in compliance.

COMMISSIONER JABER: I think Staff is making the clarification for us that we have to let some tariff remain in effect. Otherwise, they would have -- the company would have to refund the entire amount. I think that's the distinction.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: We would revert -- as far as I'm concerned, we would revert back to

the tariff that was in effect prior to that.

1.8

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Well, can we do this?

This -- obviously, BellSouth has the opportunity to carry this to hearing by some mechanism, I guess protesting the Commission's decision. If they are willing to guarantee that the refunds would be made, can they continue the charges as they currently exist while the matter goes to hearing?

MS. SIMMONS: That would seem to be an option.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Say that again.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Simply have the charges remain in effect as they are, if they're willing to take the burden of ultimately making the refunds if we go to hearing and some other -- if we go to hearing, will we have the latitude then to impose whatever we believe is the correct structure for a late payment charge if we go to hearing? At the conclusion of that, we can impose our own, not just rely upon them to come back with a different filing.

MS. KEATING: I believe that you do have that leeway.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I'm not sure

ACCURATE STENOTYPE REPORTERS, INC.

procedurally what -- that we would do a PAA
. rejecting the tariff?

CHAIRMAN DEASON: No. We would -- I guess my concern is this. If BellSouth takes us to hearing, which is certainly within their right, why do we want to be changing rates back and forth and back and forth? These rates have been in effect for some time. If they're going to take this to hearing and have their day in court, which they're certainly entitled to, why not just allow the same rates to continue, realizing that if they lose their case at hearing, then the refund just -- the refund continues to grow, and they will be responsible for making those refunds.

MS. KEATING: Let me just try to make sure I understand what you're saying. You would say reject the tariff as not in compliance, and then if they protest, allow them to continue operating under the tariff pending the outcome of further proceedings?

CHAIRMAN DEASON: If that can be done procedurally legally.

BellSouth, do you have a -- do you want to -- I don't know what the vote is going to be,

but at least there's some sentiment that there's
. going to be a finding that the tariff is in
violation, and there may be a necessity to take
this to hearing. What do we do in the meantime?

MR. CRISER: Chairman Deason, we committed at the beginning of this process at the time when our tariff was originally being considered that if our tariff were found to be unlawful, we would refund the appropriate amounts to customers. So I think that the hold harmless provision is already there.

I would also observe, let's just say
looking at where I think I see we are right now,
the other complexity you have, as an example, we
created an exemption for Lifeline subscribers in
this current tariff. If we suddenly went back
to the tariff that was in effect before that
time, it would effectively remove that
exemption. I think the proposal that says we go
forward with where we are till this is concluded
is probably the least complicated and probably
the least disruptive way to proceed.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Can we just take it to hearing on our own motion and the refund provisions continue while we take it to hearing?

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, it's not clear

to me that we would go to hearing. I mean, it
seems to me that BellSouth may choose to file
another tariff.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: That's certainly possible too.

commissioner clark: I guess -- why don't we issue a proposed agency action that would reject the tariff, but allow it to remain in effect for 30 days, within which time Bellsouth can either file a new tariff that would be in compliance with or consistent with our vote today, or request a hearing. If they request a hearing, then the tariff would remain in effect until the conclusion of that process, with the understanding that refunds would be due back to the time the tariff originally went into effect in 1999.

MS. KEATING: Would you actually be finding the tariff in violation, and if so --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Yes.

MS. KEATING: -- what about refunds after that 30-day period?

COMMISSIONER CLARK: They would have -- the refunds -- we would find it in violation. If

they choose to go to hearing, we would allow it to stay in effect, and at the conclusion of the hearing, the refunds would be due from the time they first filed the tariff and changed the rates. Okay? And they would have -- in the meantime, they have the option of filing a new tariff and have that go into effect, at which time the rates would change to their new tariff, because they're presumptively valid.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Let's be clear on the nature of the refunds. We're all talking about the interest charge, quote, unquote. We are not talking about the change in the flat fee being refunded.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, I think it would depend on --

CHAIRMAN DEASON: I think the refunds have to be based upon revenues and percentage increases in revenues. They are allowed a 6% increase, so we would have to calculate -- assuming we ignore the 20% -- and they may can justify some 20% increases. I'm not sure. But it would be a calculation of the revenues generated with this new structure versus the old structure, and compare those two revenues, and

to the extent that the new structure generates 1 2 more revenue than a 6% increase of the old structure, that amount of dollars has to be 3 refunded. And how you calculate that on a per 4 customer basis I'm not sure, but that would be the mechanism of the calculation. 6 COMMISSIONER CLARK: I think the Staff 8 could come back to us with a recommendation on 9 the amount of the refund. 10 MS. SIMMONS: Right. It could get a little 11 bit awkward because of different customers --12 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Sure. 13 MS. SIMMONS: -- being billed differently. 14 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Sure. You would have to come back to us after you've had a chance to 15 look at it. 16 17 MS. SIMMONS: I mean, I guess conceptually 18 or theoretically, it would seem as though you --19 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Sally, do we have to 20 figure this out now? 21 MS. SIMMONS: We don't have to. 22 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay. I would move 23 Staff. 24 CHAIRMAN DEASON: All right. Let me see if 25 I'm clear. You're just moving Staff's

recommendation without a PAA or anything else.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: No. I guess I should be clearer. I would move that we find the tariff invalid, allow it to remain in effect for 30 days, at which time BellSouth can either file a new tariff that is consistent with what we've done today, or they can ask for a hearing, in which case the tariff remains in effect, but then at the conclusion of that proceeding, appropriate refunds would be due.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Only one question, and I'll direct this toward you. Is 30 days sufficient for BellSouth to structure a new tariff or else -- it would obviously be sufficient for you to request a hearing, I would think.

MR. CRISER: Thirty days is sufficient.
CHAIRMAN DEASON: Very well.

MS. SIMMONS: Commissioners, I need to make one clarification, and that is that this filing was made in both the general services tariff as well as the private line tariffs.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, we are finding both tariffs invalid.

MS. KEATING: And let me also clarify. You

1	would be doing this as PAA?
2	 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Yes. Don't we have to
3	do it as PAA?
4	MS. KEATING: I believe so, because
5	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay.
6	CHAIRMAN DEASON: There is a motion. Is
7	there a second?
8	COMMISSIONER JABER: Second.
9	COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Second.
10	CHAIRMAN DEASON: Moved and seconded. All
11	in favor say "aye."
12	COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Aye.
13	COMMISSIONER JABER: Aye.
14	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Aye.
15	CHAIRMAN DEASON: Aye. Show the motion
16	carries unanimously. Thank you.
17	(Conclusion of consideration of Item 10.)
18	
19	<u>.</u>
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

STATE OF FLORIDA)

COUNTY OF LEON

I, MARY ALLEN NEEL, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings were taken before me at the time and place therein designated; that my shorthand notes were thereafter transcribed under my supervision; and that the foregoing pages numbered 1 through 46 are a true and correct transcription of my stenographic notes.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative. employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties. or relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or financially interested in the action.

DATED THIS 17th day of July, 2000.

19

18

20

21

22

23

24

25

100 Salem Court

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

(850) 878-2221



2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18 19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

REFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. 000733-TL - Investigation to determine whether BellSouth Telecommunications, inc.'s tariff filing to restructure its late payment charge is in violation of Section 364.051, F.S.

BEFORE:

CHAIRMAN J. TERRY DEASON COMMISSIONER SUSAN F. CLARK COMMISSIONER E. LEON JACOBS, JR. COMMISSIONER LILA A. JABER

PROCEED I NGS :

AGENDA CONFERENCE

ITEM NUMBER:

10**

DATE:

Tuesday, July 11, 2000

PLACE:

4075 Espianade Way, Room 148 Tallahassee, Fiorida

REPORTED BY:

MARY ALLEN NEEL Registered Professional Reporter

ACCURATE STENOTYPE REPORTERS 100 SALEM COURT
TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301
(850)878-2221

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Item 10.

MS. SIMMONS: Commissioners, Item 10 addresses whether BellSouth's tariff filing to restructure its late payment charge is a permissible increase for a price regulated local exchange company. If only the flat fee portion of the tariff is considered, then the filing would be a permissible increase. If both the flat fee and the percentage charge are considered non-basic service rates, the filing would not be a permissible increase.

I would like to give an overview of this issue before the parties make their remarks. I think it may help in trying to understand the crux of the dispute.

First, I would like to say that Staff and BellSouth appear to agree on the nature of the costs covered by the 1987 late payment filing and also the 1999 late payment filing. The '99 filing did incorporate additional cost that was not reflected in the '87 filing. These were administrative -- administrative type costs were reflected in the '87 filing, whereas in the '99 filing it went beyond administrative type costs to include the time value of money, or the

2

PARTICIPANTS:

CHARLES BECK, Office of Public Counsel.
MARSHALL CRISER, BellSouth Telecommunications.
BETH KEATING, Commission Staff.
SALLY SIMMONS, Commission Staff.

STAFF RECOMMENDATION

Issue 1: Should the Commission find that BST's GST filing of July 9, 1999, to restructure its late payment penalties is in violation of Section 364.051(6)(a), Florida Statutes?
Recommendation: Yes. The Commission should find that BST's GST filing of July 9, 1999, to restructure its late payment penalties is in violation of Section 364.051(6)(a), Florida Statutes, and should therefore be canceled immediately. Also, the Commission should require BST to provide refunds to all affected customers within 90 days of issuance of the Consummating Order. Further, Staff recommends that BST should file a report with the Commission upon completion of this refund showing monies that were collected from and refunded to customers.

Issue 2: Should this docket be closed?
Recommendation: No. If no person whose substantial interests are affected files a protest within 21 days of the issuance date of the order, the order will become final upon issuance of a Consummating Order. If a timely protest is not filed, the docket should remain open pending completion by BellSouth of the refund within 90 days of issuance of the Consummating Order. Upon notification that the refund has been completed, this docket should be closed administratively. If a timely protest is filed, the tariff should remain in effect pending the outcome of further proceedings, with any revenues collected held subject to refund.

opportunity cost of these late payers. So I don't think there's any dispute between Staff and BellSouth as to the type of costs covered by the '87 and the '99 filings.

I think the crux of the dispute seems to be whether the nature of the additional cost that was reflected in the '99 filing is a relevant consideration in determining the legality of the '99 filing. Staff believes the nature of the additional cost really isn't relevant. I believe BellSouth thinks the nature of the cost is extremely relevant, and I believe it is the basis for their contention that the filing is a permissible increase.

Let me just go on just a little bit more.

In Staff's mind, the critical point is how the statute defines service. Under the statute, service is defined as something that should be construed in its broadest and most inclusive sense. So from Staff's perspective, we believe the original late payment fee was in fact a non-basic service rate. In our mind, with the '99 filing, what BellSouth has done is, they have restructured and expanded the charges applicable to late payment. Staff doesn't

ACCURATE STENOTYPE REPORTERS, INC. - 850/878-2221

But I did want to let you know, I don't really think there is a dispute over the nature of the costs covered by the '87 filing versus the '99 filing.

I know there are parties here to speak. CHAIRMAN DEASON: Mr. Criser? MR. CRISER: Commissioners, I'm Marshall Criser appearing for BellSouth.

Commissioners, on July 6th, I filed a letter in this docket which I believe in more detail outlines BellSouth's position on this matter, as well as our response to the staff recommendation. What I would like to do this morning is briefly summarize our position, and then we're available to answer any questions that you have.

from the original filing were to demonstrate that in the cost studies, the tariff filing, all of the supporting documentation, and this Commission's order around our original late payment charge, there was never any inclusion, mention, or discussion of the use of money. Our point in the cost study was to show that the late payment charge does not address interest charges.

At the same time --

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Mr. Criser, let me ask you a question on that. Weren't you given a working capital allowance in your rate case which compensated you for the use of money, in the sense that you would have to have money to operate, and to the extent you have collectables, and maybe even collectables that are in arrears, you were compensated for that through those rates?

MR. CRISER: Commissioner, I guess I'm looking under the regime of price regulation, which is the regime under which we filed the interest charge tariff and the late payment charge restructuring. Under that regulation, there are statutes which govern price and not

First off, I would like to talk about what it is we did, and I think that is really the crux of this matter. First of all, BellSouth restructured its existing late payment charge to a flat rate fee. We converted the previous interest charge — or excuse me, the percentage charge to a flat rate of \$1.50 for residence customers and \$9 for business customers. We also created a \$6 exemption which was created in order to address Lifeline subscribers with basic services, essentially to give them a break and not charge late payment fees to Lifeline subscribers if they would otherwise have incurred a late payment charge.

We structured and implemented the late payment charge in compliance with the Commission's price regulation statute. That late payment charge restructure is in compliance with the statute.

Secondly, we created a new charge, which is created to address the loss of the use of money. That charge, which also incorporates the exemption for Lifeline customers, specifically addresses loss of use of money. And the only relevance to us of looking at the cost studies

cost. Again, our backup of going back to the cost study was to ensure that we weren't trying to go back under the late payment charge and capture something that was already there. So we looked at that cost study to demonstrate that it was not in fact a part of the late payment charge.

I guess what I've looked at in this case is — for late payment charges, we've tried to look at what is the definition of a late payment charge. And in doing that, we looked at BellSouth's tariff, we looked at the materials that we submitted to this Commission, we looked at this Commission's discussion at agenda, and this Commission's order on that tariff, and nowhere in there is a reference to the loss of use of money or interest charges. We therefore hold that the interest charge we have now implemented is something distinct and separate from that late payment charge.

In addition to that, the interest charge that we implemented complies with the legal definition and regulations for an interest charge. And therefore, I would respectfully submit it is in compliance with Florida law in

ACCURATE STENOTYPE REPORTERS, INC. - 850/878-2221

the context of what is an interest charge.

I also would suggest we have held that since this is a fee, it is not is a service and therefore not subject to the price regulation baskets. But in either case, whether it's a fee and not subject to the baskets or treated as a new service, our interest charge complies with the price regulation statutes.

Finally, I would also -- I think it's worth commenting that I believe that these charges are a part of a responsible business approach to late payment of bills. Most importantly, they are the most avoidable charges on a customer's bill. A customer does not pay these charges if they pay their bill on time. In fact, the customer response to these charges is that since last August when the tariffs were implemented, 8% of residence accounts which were previously paying late and 13% of business accounts that were previously paying late are now paying on time.

So this charge is not just about revenue. It's about trying to drive positive customer behavior in terms of the payment of their bills. In addition to that, BellSouth works with

Commissioners, BellSouth believes that there is a legal distinction between late payment charges and interest charges. The two cannot and should not be treated as the same. We have developed, we have implemented, and we are applying these charges in compliance with the appropriate Florida Statutes and in a manner which we believe reflects responsible business practice.

We would therefore respectfully request that you deny Staff's recommendation. Again, I'm available for questions.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Criser, just two questions. You said early on that BellSouth created a new charge. I'm assuming you're referring to the 1.5% on the unpaid balance greater than \$6.

MR. CRISER: The interest charge, yes, ma'am.

COMMISSIONER JABER: All right. But you already had that percentage on unpaid balances greater than a dollar, so help me understand how increasing the amount upon which you tack on the interest is a creation of a new charge.

MR. CRISER: Again, the original tariff was

customers to create desired payment dates, to establish installment billing, and other mechanisms which will facilitate their payment of their bills. And I would note that when we create an installment billing plan for a customer, we do not charge the late payment charge or interest charge on a recurring base. It's calculated on the balance at the time the installments are created, and it holds at that level. So this is not a matter of continually going back to the customer.

And as I've noted previously, we attempted to create in these new charges an exemption for Lifeline subscribers, because we believe that if we're going to look at an area that we can target to create a break, essentially, that that's the most appropriate way to approach that.

I also think it's worth noting that in the pat year since this tariff and these charges went into effect, we have had virtually no customer complaints. Again, our main customer reaction has been the case where we have some customers who are now paying their bills on time when they previously didn't.

a late payment charge tariff. That tariff at its inception was for 1-1/2% on the customer's balance over a dollar on their bill. We restructured the late payment charge to convert it to a flat rate charge and created the exemption for Lifeline subscribers. Essentially, we restructured the late payment charge and did that in compliance with the appropriate guidelines from the price regulation statutes.

In addition to that -- and that may be what has created some of the confusion, but honestly, an interest charge is a percent charge. We then created a new charge, which is the interest charge, and we did that in compliance with the appropriate Florida Statutes with reference to interest charges.

COMMISSIONER JABER: You would agree with me that both charges are triggered by a late payment.

MR. CRISER: I would agree with you that both charges are triggered by a late payment. I would also observe that there are other charges, as an example, the returned check charge, that are triggered by the manner in which a customer

ACCURATE STENOTYPE REPORTERS, INC. - 850/878-2221

1 2

pays their bill, and the returned check charge is also shown as a separate -- which is also a fee. It's a fee controlled by other statutes as well, and is also in the basket as a separate item.

COMMISSIONER JABER: That's an interesting point. So in your tariff -- you have let us know what your returned check fee is. Is that approved in your tariff?

MR. CRISER: That's in our tariffs, and it's in the basket.

COMMISSIONER JABER: It is in the basket?
MR. CRISER: Yes. And if this Commission's preference is for the interest charge to be in the basket, I think there are some issues around what that may do to the basket, and we would be happy to discuss those. But if it is in the basket, then it's in the basket as a new and separate service, and we've introduced it in compliance with the price regulation.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: You would agree that we're trying to follow your costs. That was what the purpose of the original tariff was, that you were recovering the additional costs that you would have to carry these past due

typically would apply to the regulated side of the business, we have also done this in compliance with the statutes that address things like interest charges. There are other Florida Statutes that are relevant to that.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Mr. Criser, the 1.5% fee, as you refer to it, for amounts in arrears beyond \$6, that's at 1.5% per month; is that correct?

MR. CRISER: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Which equates to 18% per vear?

MR. CRISER: That's correct.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Which is in excess of your cost of capital?

MR. CRISER: I would not hold that that equals our cost of capital, no. We set it at the statutory rate, not on a cost-based rate.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: So then it's more than just a cost recovery. It is a charge that would -- and I think you have indicated that it already has. It would impact the actions of customers, hopefully in a positive manner by having them pay their bills on time.

MR. CRISER: Yes, sir.

accounts.

MR. CRISER: The tariff at the time it was introduced, the late payment charge tariff, was set at a time when cost of service was a driving factor in the determination of rates. And we believe in addition to that, the cost studies that were filed are relevant, because they helped to distinguish what was included. Whether it's costs or not, it's also -- to me, it's a definitional issue, did this cover certain things. And I believe we actually agree that it did not.

I believe cost is relevant from that perspective. But by the same token, under the price regulation statutes, cost is provided as supporting evidence to ensure that we cover costs, but it's not the driver for determining whether or not a charge is going to be charged.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: What would that be? What would you argue that that should be?

MR. CRISER: Well, in the case of interest charges, there are actually separate statutes which govern, you know, what the level of interest charges can be. And we have done this — in addition to the regulations which

CHAIRMAN DEASON: So it's more than just recovery.

MR. CRISER: Yes. If I haven't been clear about that, I think that's part of what I have tried to walk myself through, is our focus -- where we focused on the cost study in the original tariff was to demonstrate that this was not a part of that original tariff. We also looked at other -- I guess I think of it as what is the definition of a late payment charge, and what is the body of evidence that shows what defined that. The loss of use of money or interest charges are not included anywhere in that discussion.

So what we are looking at now is an interest charge, which, frankly, is a desire to — if there's a cost issue, we frankly would prefer for customers to pay on time and not incur those costs and not earn that charge. And we have been pleased to see that we in fact have a positive trend in customers who are now paying their bills on time. The residence percentage equates to some 150,000 residence accounts, a reduction of 150,000 residence accounts in terms of paying their bills on time, or paying their

ACCURATE STENOTYPE REPORTERS, INC. - 850/878-2221

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

20

bills late. I said that backwards. I'm sorry.

COMMISSIONER JABER: If we accepted Staff's recommendation, Mr. Criser, and you had to do a refund, have you done preliminary calculations to indicate how much the amount would be?

MR. CRISER: Again, I believe that the late payment charge restructure that we implemented is in compliance with the statute, that portion of it. And then what we -- what I would reduce the debate over is whether the interest charge is in fact a new service, a fee, or the same. I believe that amount is somewhere in the neighborhood of \$25 million, but I don't have a specific calculation on that. And again, right -- I mean, we could go back. We certainly can calculate that. And in terms what the long-term impact is, it's unclear, because we're actually seeing that we have fewer customers now paying these charges.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Thank you. Mr. Beck? MR. BECK: Thank you, Chairman Deason. My name is Charlie Beck, with the Office of Public Counsel. We fully support the Staff's analysis and their recommendation.

BellSouth has had a late payment fee since

no longer a late payment fee, to let them out of the restraints that are placed by the statutes on non-basic service categories. The tariff filing itself Bell made for both of these items is described as a revision of the late payment charge for Florida subscribers.

I think the Staff's analysis is right on point, and we urge you to adopt it.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Beck, do you agree that the flat fee change is appropriate under the statute?

MR. BECK: I think they can do that. The restraint is that the non-basic service category for miscellaneous services can't go up by more than 6%.

COMMISSIONER JABER: But you agree that they haven't gone up by more than 6%, so that portion of BellSouth's change is acceptable to you?

MR. BECK: If you looked at that in isolation, yes. It's the combination of the two charges that makes it violate the price cap

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Further questions? COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Staff -- I have a

1987, and for 12 years that late payment fee was a charge of 1-1/2% per month on the balance of late payments in excess of a dollar. When we went to price regulation in 1996, the late payment fee was placed in a category consistent with the price cap regulation scheme that places limits on the increases that can be placed on categories of non-basic services.

This charge of 1-1/2% per month was a late payment fee until 1999, when Bell came in and restructured their late payment fee. I think you might find it interesting that the tariff itself, they filed this both with the late payment fee restructured as a flat amount and what they now call an interest fee as all part of the same sentence in the same tariff. I mean, there are not two separate tariffs, one calling for an interest fee and one for late payment. It's the same sentence in their tariff.

Because Bell changes the name of the 1-1/2% per month fee, which had been a late payment fee for 12 years, doesn't make it different. I mean, you can't just change the name of something and say now it's an interest fee, it's

question of Staff. You argue that regardless of how described by company, that there are two issues here. One is to what extent this should be just one basket, and so you would refute the company's argument with that. But let's go for a moment with the argument they raise that this is a separate item.

Under their argument, it would appear that the interest charge would no longer be subject to the cap, the increase limits; is that correct?

MS. SIMMONS: Under BellSouth's point of view, the percentage charge, or the interest charge, as they label it, is either a fee and would never be subject to non-basic service rate monitoring, or it's a new service that would be considered on a going-forward basis for rate monitoring purposes.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Would it be subject to the 6% cap?

MS. SIMMONS: It would down the road if the company wanted to increase the rate. Say the percentage charge, if they wanted to increase it or in some way modify it, then they would be subject to the non-basic service rate caps or

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

rate limitations, however you want to call it. COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Okay.

MR. CRISER: Commissioner Jacobs, the observation I would make is there are separate Florida Statutes which regulate the level of interest charges, and so those charges in themselves have a cap on them. Whether they're in the basket or not, there is a cap.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Do you know what those caps are for this kind of a charge?

MR. CRISER: It's 18% per year is my understanding, which would be 1-1/2% per month, which is the level of the charge we have now.

The point I would make in addition to that, I think the suggestion was that if we had somehow put these things -- and I've heard this before. If we had somehow put these things into two different filings, it wouldn't be an issue.

Frankly, if that's an error, that's an error because we tried to make it clear to a customer reading the tariff exactly what the applicable fees would be for late payment of a bill, and including the language together I think is a -- you know, it's an attempt to be as up-front and thorough in the explanation. And

Ms. Keating -- she may have other observations. But, you know, in both cases, there is a action taken by the customer, or non-action, some event that triggers charges. And here we're talking about late payment triggering a charge, and we've now gone from one charge being applicable to two charges being applicable. As I say, we just can't find a way to separate these two in our minds.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Let me ask a legal question. BellSouth has filed a tariff. Under telecommunications law as it exists today, those tariffs are presumptively valid.

MS. KEATING: Correct.

COMMISSIONER JABER: If all parties agree that the flat fee change is acceptable under the statute, do we have the authority to modify this tariff to split the baby, so to speak?

MS. KEATING: I believe that you could. You would probably have to do so as a proposed agency action. But there is precedent in the past where you've taken similar action. In a prior case involving rate regrouping, the Commission found that the tariff was not in compliance and required BellSouth to go back and

22

I'm somewhat concerned that -- the suggestion that by simply separating them somehow we could turn this into a different matter I think falls short.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Is that correct, Staff? Could they have filed separately and this would have been an appropriate --

MS. SIMMONS: No. We still would have had the same concern, because we just have difficulty trying to separate the flat fee from the percentage charge, because both of them apply in a late payment sense. And based on how the statute defines service, and since service should be construed in its broadest and most encompassing sense, Staff finds it very difficult to separate these two items.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Could you address also Mr. Criser's comments regarding returned checks, that this isn't any different than having a returned check fee in a tariff?

MS. SIMMONS: Well, the returned check fee, you know, is in the tariff. It has been mentioned that it's subject to the non-basic service rate monitoring. I'm not sure that I would really view this any differently. Perhaps

reset the rates for the areas that had been regrouped. But as long as you do so as proposed agency action, I believe that you can.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Do you mean we rejected the tariff filing, we found it invalid and directed them to refile?

MS. KEATING: That's correct. And that was held up on appeal.

COMMISSIONER JABER: And they would have to give the refunds for -- what would the refund amount be in that scenario?

MS. KEATING: Well, if you believe that it's appropriate to keep the late payment charge but not the interest charge, then only the interest would need to be refunded.

MS. SIMMONS: And at the time of filing, BellSouth estimated that the interest charge would bring in roughly between 23 and 24 million annually. That's shown on page 6 of the staff recommendation.

MR. CRISER: Commissioners, at the risk of making one point too many, a concern I still have is that there seems to be a logic that says that this is simply a matter of semantics. I think it's important to understand that there is

24 25

a clear distinction between interest charges, and there are statutes, usury statutes that regulate that. And one of the concerns we have tried to distinguish is that if you suddenly say late payment charges and interest charges are synonymous, you have a whole area that you need to look at in terms of whether or not late payment charges are being pulled under the usury charges.

I think I would also observe in terms of distinguishing between these charges, this Commission itself has a late payment process for regulatory assessment fees which assesses a late payment penalty of 5% per month up to a total of 25% of the balance due, a 12% cost of money or interest charge, and a charge for recovering the cost of collections. So the distinguishing between the types of charges is not something new, and it is dangerous to oversimplify this process and draw these things all into one pot.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Criser, but the Commission orders refunds with interest, for example, and those interest payments are governed by our statutes and the usury laws; right? The trouble I'm having understanding

Staff. The statute makes a distinction between 6% allowable increases for non-basic services and then a 20% for those areas in which there is competition. Have we made any determination as to areas in which there is competition where the company would be permissible to impose a 20% increase in non-basic services?

MS. SIMMONS: We have not had a company that has requested to use the 20% flexibility; thus, there has not been a need to make a determination. In this particular case, even if the Commission felt that the 20% flexibility would be appropriate, the amount of money generated from this filing is still in excess of that limit.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: I realize it is in excess. But if there were 20% increases allowed, at least in some areas it would reduce the amount of refund, would it not?

MS. SIMMONS: Yes, it would.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Mr. Criser, have you given any thought to whether there are areas in which you would be permitted to impose a 20% increase?

MR. CRISER: Yes, we've looked at that.

your point is the interest charge, as you call it, is triggered by a late payment. That's the trouble I'm having understanding your --

MR. CRISER: I suppose -- I heard the reference earlier about taking things at their most broad and inclusive level. And not to be flip about it, but at some point, people who have telephone services incur charges, but they are not all the same thing. There are different types of charges.

Historically, we never included an interest charge or a loss of use of money type charge in our late payment fee. This is a new and distinct fee. It may — for purposes of going forward, at this Commission's discretion, may be included in the basket or not included in the basket, but it is something new and distinct. That's the point we're trying to make. And we believe the Florida Statutes, both the statutes that apply to price regulation, as well as some of the broader statutes that apply to things like interest charges, that all of those things align, that we are allowed and we are permitted to do what we are doing.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: I have a question for

Again, I would say -- and I don't mean to stick myself out on a rock, I guess is what I'm trying to say. I think, clearly, when we've looked at this particular issue, you know, I guess there's an issue and argument that says it's common industry practice. We have companies out there who have charges far in excess of the level that BellSouth charges. It's an area that I think frankly comes back to -- I'm worried about splitting the baby, because I really believe there is a danger in trying to combine these things into one thing. It is --

COMMISSIONER JABER: Those companies that you cite to in your letter, are they price regulated telephone companies?

MR. CRISER: Some of them are. The ones we cite in our letter, no, I don't believe so. They are companies that have tariffs on file with this Commission. That information was from tariffs on file with this Commission.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Commissioners, further questions?

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: The essence of the recommendation today goes to whether or not there's a violation. Is that the only avenue by

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

32

which we can address the legitimacy of this tariff? In other words, do we have to say it's violating? Can we just reject the tariff?

MS. KEATING: In order to reject the tariff, I believe you need to find that it is in violation, because they are filed and become presumptively valid.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Commissioners, do we have a motion?

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Well, I'll wade in. I began on this one from the premise that the company says that's the basis of their charge. Once you step away from the idea that you're looking at cost-based and you're looking at rate of return, you're looking at what we were anticipating would be a competitive marketplace. And in a competitive marketplace, the company surely has the right to go out and offer services and products for which it should seek the market-based price, and the company seems to be offering this as something in that order.

I differ. I do not see this as a company offering a service. I see this as an issue where the company is attempting to manage its

And the ultimate avenue that the company has to ensure that is that they disconnect them. When a customer refuses to pay their bill, the companies have the opportunity to disconnect them. They minimize the extent of past due balances by that ultimate act, and it's done fairly frequently. So if I were looking to manage this area of the business, I would think that you have a cap there.

Now, I've seen that there is this issue of consumers who repetitively -- who continue to have late balances. That's probably an issue here, and I would think that that's something that the company might want to look at and might want to manage through this provision. Unfortunately, I see this provision as being quite onerous in terms of managing that number of customers who are continually late month after month. I may be wrong. I have to say the evidence is not really clear to me here as to whether or not it's appropriate to manage that body of customers though this provision.

Absent that, I see a provision that will generate a substantial, according to projections from Staff, a substantial amount of revenue from

30

business. And again, it ought to have the flexibility and opportunity to do that.

The troubling aspect for me is, I see an effort here to look at an aspect of its business from a different way, and that is, to what extent it can serve as a revenue-producing vehicle. In this regard, and in particular, this circumstance troubles me. When I start thinking about the consumers who are going to incur this charge, the first thing I think about is that they're already having problems paying the bill.

So there's a divergence here. The company would say, well, this would be an incentive to make them focus and give priority to this bill and make sure they pay this on time. There's some value in that. I don't disagree with that.

My experience is that most people are robbing Peter to pay Paul. And to the extent that this would be an incentive to the consumer, I think it would be fairly limited. Most people value their telephone. They will do most anything they can to keep their telephone service on.

the body of consumers that I would say would be highly taxed, if not poorly equipped to contribute that revenue.

Now, it would trouble me even more if this were really a competitive offering, because in that instance, you have an industry where companies are seeking market share and seeking to attract customers, and who would impose an 18% charge on this customer that they value. That would trouble me. But we understand that we're transitioning to competition, and so we're here as a surrogate to make sure that — in that transition, we're trying to make sure that all players in the marketplace, and the consumers particularly, are treated with fairness and with equity.

That's how I approach this question. I have no doubt that the company has the opportunity, and should have the opportunity to manage their business, and if they want to restructure this charge, that's up to them. But we're here as a surrogate, and we're here to see that to the extent that we're transitioning to competition, consumers see as much of the benefits of competition as possible. I don't

ACCURATE STENOTYPE REPORTERS, INC. - 850/878-2221

 see that in this offering. I see consumers being fairly burdened by this offering.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I have a question, Mr. Criser. The previous late payment charge of 1.5% on the unpaid balance greater than a dollar, was that part of the miscellaneous non-basic service basket? Was that previously part of it?

MR. CRISER: Yes, it was.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: So it was a graduated rate. But now you're saying the fixed rate should be only considered part of that basket, and the interest rate should not. Is that what you're saying?

MR. CRISER: Our logic -- I hate to get into this argument. I think our logic -- one part of my answer would be that that should be irrelevant, because we believe this is either a fee and not part of the basket, or this is a new item, and it is in the basket.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: It's certainly not a new service. I don't think the customers would see it as a service.

MR. CRISER: And frankly, our argument for not putting it -- part of our logic for not

put in a basket. On looking at that, I believe there is an issue, you know, whether it's in part of or beyond this particular discussion, which is, should fees like the returned check charge, like interest fees, be in the basket or not, and what's the appropriate way for those to be administered.

We frankly have tried to look at this not just from a company trying to make money perspective, but from what is the best public policy approach. And one of the observations we have is that by just throwing things into baskets, particularly ones that are capped otherwise, you create maybe some unintended — or increases that wouldn't have been there otherwise as you apply the basket. I hope I haven't confused that totally.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Commissioners, maybe we can refocus for just a moment. I appreciate all the debate and dialogue that we've had here, but to me it's not an issue as to whether it's burdensome on the customers, or whether it is a good management policy, or whether this restructure makes management sense and it incentivizes customers to pay their bills on

putting it in the basket is that if you put things in the basket, if there's a concern—what we've tried to be is responsible about this. If you put things in the basket that are capped otherwise, then you leverage the basket to be able to increase other services by a greater amount than you would have been able to do if you hadn't done that, if that makes sense. We're building the foundation in the basket with things that have statutory controls on them, and so we believe you potentially create a negative public policy by throwing things into baskets just to do so.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, it would be fair to say that previously you had considered the late payment charge or the percentage was part of the miscellaneous non-basic service basket.

MR. CRISER: Yes. Yes.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: But now you're arguing that it should only be the flat rate and not the interest charge.

MR. CRISER: Well, I mean, this Commission had — I think I would say it differently. At the time the price regulation baskets were created, the existing late payment charge was

time. All of that, while that's important if we were in that mode, we're not in that mode.

We're strictly looking as to whether under the statute and the interpretation of the statute, whether this is a permissible charge, and we're not here to debate the merits of this, other than can it be implemented consistent with the statute. That's the critical issue. We've got to address that issue.

And I believe that this charge is not consistent with the statute, that our Staff's interpretation is correct. The only leeway I see in it, that is, there may be areas in the state where there is sufficient competition that a 20% increase in these charges may be permissible. But as Staff has pointed out, the increase in terms of revenue for this basket is somewhere in excess of 50%. But that's my narrow viewpoint on it.

I think that's the critical issue, and that's what we've got to grasp and decide one way or the other, is it legal or is it not under our interpretation of the statute.

COMMISSIONER JABER: May I try to give a motion, Mr. Chairman, and see how far we get?

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 9

10

11

12

13

14

15 16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

40

In response to Staff's response to my question, I think it is clear that the flat fee change is not violative of the statute, and I think that there's agreement from the parties that that's correct.

With respect to the percentage changes, I completely agree with what you're saying, Mr. Chairman, and that was the nature of the questions I asked. I can't understand why now there is a difference in philosophy. To me, the percentage change, whether it was called interest or not, existed from the beginning of the baskets. I don't understand how changing the amount upon which the percentage is applied is now a new service charge.

Saying that, if we modify this tariff and it has to be PAA and BellSouth has to file a new tariff, perhaps in that new tariff they can let us know what areas might be at 20% competition. I don't know.

But my motion is to modify the tariff, or to reject the tariff and allow them to file a modified tariff that indicates only the change in the flat fee, and to give the appropriate refunds for the so-called interest charges.

the tariff that was in effect prior to that.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Well, can we do this? This -- obviously, BellSouth has the opportunity to carry this to hearing by some mechanism, I quess protesting the Commission's decision. If they are willing to quarantee that the refunds would be made, can they continue the charges as they currently exist while the matter goes to hearing?

MS. SIMMONS: That would seem to be an option.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Say that again. CHAIRMAN DEASON: Simply have the charges remain in effect as they are, if they're willing to take the burden of ultimately making the refunds if we go to hearing and some other -- if we go to hearing, will we have the latitude then to impose whatever we believe is the correct structure for a late payment charge if we go to hearing? At the conclusion of that, we can impose our own, not just rely upon them to come back with a different filing.

MS. KEATING: I believe that you do have that leeway.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I'm not sure

38

COMMISSIONER CLARK: The only question I have about that is, I think we should simply reject it and let them come back with one that complies with the law, and then it's up to them to decide if they can meet a 20% -- if they can meet the requirements for doing that.

MS. SIMMONS: Commissioner Clark, then would your suggestion be that basically the tariff be cancelled and that the company would revert back to the prior version of the tariff?

COMMISSIONER CLARK: We could either do that or give them some opportunity to file a modified tariff. I guess my point is that I don't know that we should direct them as to what kind of tariff they should file. We should reject this one and allow them to file one that's in compliance.

COMMISSIONER JABER: I think Staff is making the clarification for us that we have to let some tariff remain in effect. Otherwise, they would have -- the company would have to refund the entire amount. I think that's the distinction.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: We would revert -- as far as I'm concerned, we would revert back to

procedurally what -- that we would do a PAA rejecting the tariff?

CHAIRMAN DEASON: No. We would -- I quess my concern is this. If BellSouth takes us to hearing, which is certainly within their right, why do we want to be changing rates back and forth and back and forth? These rates have been in effect for some time. If they're going to take this to hearing and have their day in court, which they're certainly entitled to, why not just allow the same rates to continue, realizing that if they lose their case at hearing, then the refund just -- the refund continues to grow, and they will be responsible for making those refunds.

MS. KEATING: Let me just try to make sure I understand what you're saying. You would say reject the tariff as not in compliance, and then if they protest, allow them to continue operating under the tariff pending the outcome of further proceedings?

CHAIRMAN DEASON: If that can be done procedurally legally.

BellSouth, do you have a -- do you want to - I don't know what the vote is going to be,

but at least there's some sentiment that there's going to be a finding that the tariff is in violation, and there may be a necessity to take this to hearing. What do we do in the meantime?

MR. CRISER: Qhairman Deason, we committed at the beginning of this process at the time when our tariff was originally being considered that if our tariff were found to be unlawful, we would refund the appropriate amounts to customers. So I think that the hold harmless provision is already there.

I would also observe, let's just say looking at where I think I see we are right now, the other complexity you have, as an example, we created an exemption for Lifeline subscribers in this current tariff. If we suddenly went back to the tariff that was in effect before that time, it would effectively remove that exemption. I think the proposal that says we go forward with where we are till this is concluded is probably the least complicated and probably the least disruptive way to proceed.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Can we just take it to hearing on our own motion and the refund provisions continue while we take it to hearing?

they choose to go to hearing, we would allow it to stay in effect, and at the conclusion of the hearing, the refunds would be due from the time they first filed the tariff and changed the rates. Okay? And they would have -- in the meantime, they have the option of filing a new tariff and have that go into effect, at which time the rates would change to their new tariff, because they're presumptively valid.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Let's be clear on the nature of the refunds. We're all talking about the interest charge, quote, unquote. We are not talking about the change in the flat fee being refunded.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, I think it would depend on --

CHAIRMAN DEASON: I think the refunds have to be based upon revenues and percentage increases in revenues. They are allowed a 6% increase, so we would have to calculate -- assuming we ignore the 20% -- and they may can justify some 20% increases. I'm not sure. But it would be a calculation of the revenues generated with this new structure versus the old structure, and compare those two revenues, and

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, it's not clear to me that we would go to hearing. I mean, it seems to me that BellSouth may choose to file another tariff.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: That's certainly possible too.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I guess -- why don't we issue a proposed agency action that would reject the tariff, but allow it to remain in effect for 30 days, within which time BellSouth can either file a new tariff that would be in compliance with or consistent with our vote today, or request a hearing. If they request a hearing, then the tariff would remain in effect until the conclusion of that process, with the understanding that refunds would be due back to the time the tariff originally went into effect in 1999.

MS. KEATING: Would you actually be finding the tariff in violation, and if so --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Yes.

MS. KEATING: -- what about refunds after that 30-day period?

COMMISSIONER CLARK: They would have -- the refunds -- we would find it in violation. If

to the extent that the new structure generates more revenue than a 6% increase of the old structure, that amount of dollars has to be refunded. And how you calculate that on a per customer basis I'm not sure, but that would be the mechanism of the calculation.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I think the Staff could come back to us with a recommendation on the amount of the refund.

MS. SIMMONS: Right. It could get a little bit awkward because of different customers -- COMMISSIONER CLARK: Sure.

MS. SIMMONS: -- being billed differently.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Sure. You would have to come back to us after you've had a chance to look at it.

MS. SIMMONS: I mean, I guess conceptually or theoretically, it would seem as though you --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Sally, do we have to figure this out now?

MS. SIMMONS: We don't have to.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay. I would move Staff.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: All right. Let me see if I'm clear. You're just moving Staff's

45 recommendation without a PAA or anything else. 1 COMMISSIONER CLARK: No. I quess I should 2 3 be clearer. I would move that we find the tariff invalid, allow it to remain in effect for 5 30 days, at which time BellSouth can either file 6 a new tariff that is consistent with what we've 7 done today, or they can ask for a hearing, in which case the tariff remains in effect, but 8 then at the conclusion of that proceeding. 9 10 appropriate refunds would be due. CHAIRMAN DEASON: Only one question, and 11 I'll direct this toward you. Is 30 days 12 sufficient for BellSouth to structure a new 13 14 tariff or else -- it would obviously be sufficient for you to request a hearing, I would 15 think. 16 17 MR. CRISER: Thirty days is sufficient. CHAIRMAN DEASON: Very well. 18 MS. SIMMONS: Commissioners, I need to make 19 one clarification, and that is that this filing 20 21 was made in both the general services tariff as 22 well as the private line tariffs. 23 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, we are finding 24 both tariffs invalid. 25 MS. KEATING: And let me also darify. You

```
2
                      CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
 3
 4
      STATE OF FLORIDA)
 5
      COUNTY OF LEON )
             I, MARY ALLEN NEEL, do hereby certify that the
 7
 8
      foregoing proceedings were taken before me at the time
 9
      and place therein designated; that my shorthand notes
10
            thereafter transcribed under my supervision; and
11
      that the foregoing pages numbered 1 through 46 are a
12
      true and correct transcription of my stenographic
13
      notes.
14
             I FURTHER CERTIFY that i am not a relative,
15
      employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties,
16
           elative or employee of such attorney or counsel,
17
      or financially interested in the action.
18
             DATED THIS 17th day of July, 2000.
19
20
21
22
                                   MARY ALLEN NEEL, RPR
                                   100 Salem Court
Tailahassee, Florida 32301
(850) 878-2221
23
24
```

46 would be doing this as PAA? 1 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Yes. Don't we have to 2 3 do it as PAA? 4 MS. KEATING: I believe so, because --5 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay. CHAIRMAN DEASON: There is a motion. Is 6 7 there a second? COMMISSIONER JABER: Second. 8 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Second. 9 CHAIRMAN DEASON: Moved and seconded. All 10 in favor say "aye." 11 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Aye. 12 COMMISSIONER JABER: Aye. 13 14 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Aye. 15 CHAIRMAN DEASON: Aye. Show the motion carries unanimously. Thank you. 16 (Conclusion of consideration of Item 10.) 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

ACCURATE STENOTYPE REPORTERS, INC. - 850/878-2221

• . • .

Finally (1) 9:9 financially (1) 47:17 find 18:12 23:8 29:5 42:25 finding (3) 41:2 42:19 45:23 finds (1) 22:15 First 5 3:16 6:1,3 30:10 43:4 fixed (1) 33:11 flat [14] 3:6,9 5:2 6:5,7 12:5 18: 14 19:10 22:10 23:16 34:20 37: 2.24 43:13 flexibility [3] 27:9,12 30:2 flip (1) 26:7 Florida @ 8:25 11:7 12:16 15:4 19:6 21:5 26:19 47:4 focus (2) 16:5 30:15 focused (1) 16:6 follow (1) 13:22 foregoing [2] 47:8,11 forth 2 40:7,7 forward [2] 26:15 41:20 found [3] 23:24 24:5 41:8 foundation (1) 34:9 frankly [6] 16:16.17 21:19 28:9 33:24 35:8 frequently (1) 31:7 fully (1) 17:23 Further (4) 19:24 28:21 40:21 47:14

G

general (1) 45:21 generate [1] 31:24 generated [2] 27:14 43:24 generates (1) 44:1 give (7) 3:12 6:11 24:10 30:15 36:24 37:24 38:12 given [2] 7:12 27:22 going-forward (1) 20:17 got 2 36:9.21 govern [2] 7:25 14:23 governed @ 25:24 graduated (1) 33:10 grasp [1] 36:21 greater (4) 11:17,22 33:5 34:7 grow (1) 40:14 guarantee (1) 39:6 guess [11] 7:20 8:8 16:9 28:2.4 38:13 39:5 40:3 42:7 44:17 45: guidelines (1) 12:9

H

happy [1] 13:17 harmless [1] 41:10 hate (1) 33:15 heard [2] 21:16 26:4 hearing [18] 39:4,9,16,17,20 40: 5,9,13 41:4,24,25 42:2,13,14 43: 1.3 45:7,15 held [2] 9:2 24:8 help (2) 3:14 11:22 helped [1] 14:8 hereby (1) 47:7 highly (1) 32:2 hinges (1) 5:6 Historically @ 26:11 hold [3] 8:18 15:16 41:10 holds (1) 10:9

honestly 1912:12 hope 1935:16 hopefully 1915:23 however 1921:1

idea (1) 29:13 ignore (1) 43:21 impact [2] 15:22 17:17 implemented [7] 6:15 8:19,22 9:17 11:5 17:7 36:7 important [2] 24:25 36:1 importantly #19:12 impose (5) 27:6,23 32:8 39:18, incentive [2] 30:14.21 incentivizes (1) 35:25 inception 🖽 12:2 include (1) 3:25 included (5) 14:8 16:13 26:11. 16.16 including (1) 21:23 inclusion (1) 7:5 inclusive [2] 4:19 26:6 incorporate (1) 3:20 incorporates (1) 6:22 increase (14) 3:5,8,11 4:14 20: 10,22,23 27:7,24 34:6 36:15,17 43:20 44:2 increases [6] 18:7 27:2,17 35: 15 43:19.22 increasing (1) 11:23 incur 13 16:19 26:8 30:10 incurred [1] 6:14 indicate [1] 17:5 indicated (1) 15:21 indicates @ 37:23 industry (2) 28:6 32:6 information [1] 28:19 installment [2] 10:2.5 installments (1) 10:9 instance (1) 32:6 interest [46] 6:6 7:8,23 8:17,18, 21.23 9:1.7 10:7 11:3,18,24 12: 13,14,17 13:14 14:21,24 15:4 16: 13,16 17:10 18:15,18,25 20:9,13 21:6 24:14,15,17 25:1,5,16,22,23 26:1,11,22 33:13 34:21 35:5 37: 12.25 43:12 interested (1) 47:17 interesting [2] 13:6 18:12 interpretation 🛭 36:4,12,23 introduced [2] 13:19 14:3 invalid গ্র 24:5 45:4,24 involving 1123:23 irrelevant (1) 33:18 isn't [2] 4:10 22:19 isolation (1) 19:21 issue [15] 3:13 14:10 16:17 21: 18 28:4,5 29:24 31:10,12 35:2. 21 36:8.9.20 42:8 issues [2] 13:15 20:3 Item 6 3:1,2 13:5 20:7 33:20 46:17 items (2) 19:4 22:16

itself 13 18:13 19:4 25:12

JABER [20] 11:13,20 12:18 13:6.

12 17:2 19:9,16 22:5,17 23:10, 15 24:9 25:21 28:13 36:24 38: 18 43:10 46:8,13 JACOBS [11] 13:21 14:19 19:25 20:19 21:2,3,9 28:23 29:10 46:9, 12 July [2] 5:18 47:18 justify [1] 43:22

K

Keating (12) 23:1,14,19 24:7,12 29:4 39:23 40:16 42:19,22 45: 25 46:4 keep (2) 24:13 30:24 kind (2) 21:10 38:15

L

label [1] 20:14 ianguage (1) 21:23 last (1) 9:17 late [60] 3:4,18,19 4:1,21,25 6:4, 12,14,15,18 7:4,8,23 8:3,6,9,10. 20 9:12,19,20 10:6 11:2 12:1,4,7, 19,22 14:3 16:10 17:1,6,25 18:1, 3,4,9,11,13,18,22 19:1,5 21:22 22:12 23:5 24:13 25:5,7,12,13 26:2,13 31:12,18 33:4 34:16,25 39:19 latitude [1] 39:17 law [3] 8:25 23:12 38:4 laws 19 25:24 least (4) 27:18 41:1,21,22 leeway [2] 36:12 39:24 legal (4) 8:22 11:2 23:10 36:22 legality (1) 4:8 legally (1) 40:23 legitimacy (1) 29:1 LEON (1) 47:5 letter [3] 5:19 28:14,17 level @ 10:10 14:23 21:5,13 26: 6 28:7 leverage (1) 34:5 Lifeline 6 6:10,12,23 10:14 12: 6 41:15 limit @ 27:15 limitations (1) 21:1 limited (1) 30:22 limits [2] 18:7 20:10 line (1) 45:22 little [2] 4:15 44:10 local (113:5 logic (4) 24:23 33:15.16.25 long (1) 24:2 long-term (1) 17:16 longer [2] 19:1 20:9 look [7] 8:9 10:15 25:7 30:4 31: 14 35:8 44:16 looked 1918:5,8,11,12,13 16:9 19:20 27:25 28:3 looking 11916:25 7:21 16:15 29: 14,14,15 31:7 35:1 36:3 41:13 lose (1) 40:12

loss 15 6:21,24 8:16 16:12 26:12 M

ma'am (9 11:19 made (4) 19:4 27:4 39:7 45;21 main (9 10:22 manage (5) 29:25 31:8,15,21 32:

management [2] 35:23,24 managing (1) 31:17 manner (3 11:7 12:25 15:23 many (1) 24:22 market (1) 32:7 market-based (1) 29:20 marketplace @ 29:17,17 32:14 Marshall (1) 5:16 MARY (1) 47:7 materials (1) 8:12 matter @ 5:21 6:3 10:10 22:3 24:24 39:8 mean 🙉 17:15 18:17,24 24:4 28:1 34:22 42:2 44:17 meantime 🖾 41:4 43:6 mechanism [2] 39:4 44:6 mechanisms (1) 10:3 meet [2] 38:5.6 mention (1) 7:6 mentioned (1) 22:23 merits (436:6 might (4) 18:12 31:14,14 37:19 million (2) 17:13 24:18 mind [2] 4:16,22 minds (1) 23:9 minimize (1) 31:5 miscellaneous গে 19:14 33:6 34:17 mode (2) 36:2.2 modified [2] 37:23 38:13 modify (4) 20:24 23:17 37:16,21 moment 🖾 20:6 35:19 money [12] 3:25 6:21,24 7:6,14. 15 8:17 16:12 25:15 26:12 27: 13 35:9 monitoring (4) 5:5 20:16,18 22: month ।। 15:8 18:2,9,22 21:12 25:14 31:18,19

morning (1) 5:23 most (2) 4:19 9:12,13 10:17 22: 14 26:6 30:19,22,23 motion (6) 29:9 36:25 37:21 41: 24 46:6,15 move (2) 44:22 45:3

Moved (1) 46:10 moving (1) 44:25 MS (27) 3:2 20:12,21 22:8,21 23: 1,14,19 24:7,12,16 27:8,20 29:4 38:7 39:10,23 40:16 42:19,22 44:10,13,17,21 45:19,25 46:4

much [2] 17:5 32:24 myself [2] 16:5 28:2

N

name [3] 17:22 18:21,24 narrow [1] 36:19 nature [9] 3:17 4:6,9,11 5:1,2,11 37:8 43:11 necessity [1] 41:3 need [5] 24:15 25:6 27:10 29:5 45:19 NEEL [1] 47:7 negative [1] 34:12 neighborhood [1] 17:13 never [3] 7:5 20:15 26:11 new [24] 6:20 9:7 10:13 11:15,24 12:14 13:18 17:11 20:16 25:19 26:13,17 33:19,22 37:15,17,18

ACCURATE STENOTYPE REPORTERS, INC. 850/878-2221

42:11 43:6,8,24 44:1 45:6,13 non-action (1) 23:3 non-basic [13] 3:10 4:22 5:5 18: 8 19:3,13 20:15,25 22:23 27:2,7 33:7 34:17 note (1) 10:4 noted (1) 10:12 notes [2] 47:9.13 noting [1] 10:19 nowhere (1) 8:18 number (1) 31:17 numbered #147:11

observation [1] 21:4 observations [2] 23:1 35:11 observe [3] 12:23 25:10 41:12 obviously [2] 39:3 45:14 offer (1) 29:19 offering (5) 29:21,24 32:5 33:1, Office [1] 17:22 Okay (4) 21:2 43:5 44:22 46:5 old [2] 43:24 44:2 Once (1) 29:13 one (18) 18:17,18 20:3,4 23:6 24: 22 25:3,20 28:12 29:11 33:16 35:11 36:21 38:3,16,16 45:11,20 onerous (1) 31:17 ones [2] 28:16 35:13 only [10] 3:6 6:24 24:14 28:25 33:12 34:20 36:12 37:23 38:1 45:11 operate (1) 7:16 operating (1) 40:20 opportunity [7] 4:1 30:2 31:4 32:19,19 38:12 39:3 option [2] 39:11 43:6 order (5) 6:10 7:4 8:15 29:4,22 orders (1) 25:22 original (7) 4:21 7:1,4 11:25 13: 23 16:7,8 originally [2] 41:7 42:17 other (12) 10:2 12:23 13:3 15:4 16:9 23:1 29:2 34:6 36:7,22 39: 16 41:14 otherwise [5] 6:13 34:5 35:14. 16 38:20 ought (1) 30:1 out 6 19:1 28:2,6 29:18 36:16 outcome [1] 40:20 outlines (45:20 over (3) 5:11 12:3 17:10 oversimplify (1) 25:19 overview [1] 3:12 own (2) 39:21 41:24

PAA (5) 37:17 40:1 45:1 46:1.3 page [1] 24:19 pages [1] 47:11 part [13] 8:6 9:11 16:4.8 18:15 33:6,8,12,17,19,25 34:16 35:3 particular (4) 27:11 28:4 30:7 particularly [2] 32:15 35:13 parties (93:135:1423:1537:4 47:15

past (3) 13:25 23:22 31:5 pat (1) 10:20 Paul (1) 30:20 pay [8] 9:14,15 15:24 16:18 30: 16,20 31:3 35:25 payers [1] 4:1 paying (9) 9:19,20,20 10:24 16: 21,25,25 17:18 30:11 payment [56] 3:4,18,19 4:21,25 6:4,12,14,16,18 7:5,8,23 8:3,6,9, 10,20 9:12,24 10:1,3,6 11:3 12:1, 4,7,20,22 14:3 16:10 17:7,25 18: 1,5,10,11,14,19,22 19:1,5 21:22 22:12 23:5 24:13 25:5.8.12.14 26:2,13 33:4 34:16,25 39:19 payments [2] 18:3 25:23 pays (1) 13:1 penalty [1] 25:14 pending (1) 40:20 people [3] 26:7 30:19,22 per @ 15:8,11 18:2,9,22 21:11, 12 25:14 44:4 percent (1) 12:13 percentage (15) 3:9 5:3,4,9 6:6 11:21 16:22 20:13,23 22:11 34: 16 37:6,11,14 43:18 Perhaps [2] 22:25 37:18 period (1) 42:23 permissible [7] 3:5,8,11 4:14 27:6 36:5.16 permitted [2] 26:23 27:23 perspective (3) 4:20 14:14 35: Peter [1] 30:20 philosophy (1) 37:10 place [1] 47:9 placed [3] 18:5,7 19:2 places (1) 18:6 plan [1] 10:5 players #132:14 pleased [1] 16:20 point [11] 4:16 7:7 13:7 19:8 20: 12 21:14 24:22 26:1,7,18 38:13 pointed (1) 36:16 policy 134:12 35:11.23 poorly [1] 32:2 portion [3] 3:6 17:8 19:18 position [2] 5:20,23 positive 199:23 15:23 16:21 possible [2] 32:25 42:5 pot [1] 25:20 potentially (1) 34:11 practice (2) 11:9 28:6 precedent (1) 23:21 prefer [1] 16:18 preference III 13:14 preliminary [1] 17:4 premise (1) 29:11 presumptively (3) 23:13 29:7 43:9 previous (2) 6:5 33:4 previously (6) 9:18,20 10:12,25 33:7 34:15 price [16] 3:5 6:17 7:21,25 9:4.8 12:9 13:20 14:15 18:4,6 19:22 26:20 28:14 29:20 34:24 prior (3) 23:23 38:10 39:1

priority (1) 30:15

private [1] 45:22 probably (4) 23:20 31:12 41:21, problems (1) 30:11 procedurally [2] 40:1,23 proceed (1) 41:22 proceeding (1) 45:9 proceedings [2] 40:21 47:8 process (4) 25:12,20 41:6 42:15 products [1] 29:19 projections (1)31:24 proposal (1) 41:19 proposed [3] 23:20 24:2 42:8 protest (1) 40:19 protesting (1) 39:5 provided [1] 14:15 provision (931:15,16,22,2341: provisions (1) 41:25 Public @ 17:22 34:12 35:10 pulled (1) 25:8 purpose (1) 13:23 purposes [2] 20:18 26:14 put (5) 21:16,17 34:1,4 35:1 putting [2] 33:25 34:1 O

question 1917:12 20:1 23:11 26: 25 32:17 33:3 37:2 38:1 45:11 questions @ 5:24 11:12,14 19:

24 28:22 37:9 quite (1) 31:17 quote (1) 43:12

raise [1] 20:6 rate (20) 4:22 5:5 6:5.7 7:13 12:5 15:18,18 20:15,17,22,25 21:1 22: 24 23:23 29:14 33:11,11,13 34: rates 191 3:10 7:19 14:5 24:1 40: 6,7,11 43:5,8 reaction (1) 10:23 reading (1) 21:21 realize [1] 27:16 realizing (1) 40:12 really 1914:10 5:3,6,11 6:2 22:25 28:10 31:20 32:5 recommendation (8) 5:22 11: 11 17:3,24 24:20 28:24 44:8 45: recovering [2] 13:24 25:16 recovery 🖾 15:20 16:2 recurring (1) 10:7

reduce 🕮 17:9 27:18 reduction [1] 16:24 refer (1) 15:7 reference 의 8:16 12:16 26:5 referring (1) 11:16 refile (1) 24:6 reflected [3] 3:21,23 4:7 reflects (1) 11:8 refocus (1) 35:19 refund (9) 17:4 24:10 27:19 38: 22 40:13,13 41:9,24 44:9 refunded (3) 24:15 43:14 44:4 refunds (13) 24:10 25:22 37:25

roughly [1] 24:18 Salem 11 47:23

remarks [1] 3:13 remove [1] 41:18 repetitively (1) 31:11 RÉPORTER (1)47:2 request (4) 11:10 42:13,13 45: requested (1) 27:9 required (1) 23:25 requirements [1] 38:6 reset [1] 24:1 residence [5] 6:7 9:18 16:22.23. respect [1] 37:6 respectfully [2] 8:24 11:10 response (4) 5:21 9:16 37:1,1 responsible (4) 9:11 11:8 34:3 40:14 restraint (1) 19:13 restraints [2] 19:2.23 restructure 🗐 3:4 6:18 17:7 32:21 35:24 restructured [6] 4:24 6:4 12:4. 7 18:11.14 restructuring (1)7:24 return (1) 29:15 returned [7] 12:24 13:1,8 22:18, 20,21 35:4 revenue 🗐 9:22 31:25 32:3 36: 17 44:2 revenue-producing (1) 30:6 revenues [4] 43:18,19,23,25 revert [3] 38:10,24,25 revision (1) 19:5 risk [1] 24:21 road (1) 20:21 robbing [1] 30:20 rock (1) 28:2 39:6,16 40:15 42:16,22,25 43:3,

refuses [1] 31:3

refute (1) 20:4

regard (430:7

34:24

15:5

45:4

40:18 42:9

rely (1) 39:21

remains (1) 45:8

rejected (1) 24:5

rejecting (1) 40:2

relative [2] 47:14,16

relevance (1) 6:25

regarding (1) 22:18

regardless (1) 20:1

regrouped (1) 24:2

regrouping (1) 23:23

regulate (2) 21:5 25:3

regulated এ 3:5 15:1 28:15

regulations [2] 8:23 14:25

reject @ 29:3,4 37:22 38:3,16

relevant [6] 4:7,10,12 14:7,13

remain 5 38:20 39:14 42:9,14

regulatory (1) 25:13

regulation [12] 6:17 7:21,24 9:4,

8 12:9 13:20 14:15 18:4,6 26:20

regime (2) 7:21,22

Sally (1) 44:19

11,17 45:10

same [10] 7:10 11:4 14:14 17:11 18:16,16,19 22:9 26:9 40:11 saying (5) 33:11,14 37:7,16 40: says (4) 24:23 28:5 29:12 41:19 scenario (1) 24:11 scheme (1) 18:6 second @ 46:7.8.9 seconded (1) 46:10 Secondly (1) 6:20 see [15] 16:20 29:23,24 30:3 31: 16.23 32:22.24 33:1.1.23 36:13. 25 41:13 44:24 seeing [1] 17:18 seek (1) 29:20 seeking [2] 32:7.7 seem [2] 39:10 44:18 seems [4] 4:5 24:23 29:21 42:3 seen [1] 31:10 semantics (1) 24:24 sense [6] 4:20 7:15 22:12,15 34: 9 35:24 sentence [2] 18:16.19 sentiment (1) 41:1 separate [11] 8:19 13:2.4.19 14: 22 18:17 20:7 21:4 22:10,16 23: separately [1] 22:6 separating (1) 22:2 serve [1] 30:6 service [26] 3:10 4:17,18,22 5:5. 7 9:3,7 13:19 14:4 17:11 19:3, 13 20:15,16,25 22:13,13,24 29: 24 30:25 33:7,22,23 34:17 37:15 services (9) 6:11 18:8 19:14 26: 8 27:2,7 29:19 34:6 45:21 set [2] 14:4 15:17 share (1) 32:7 short (1) 22:4 shorthand (1) 47:9 show [2] 7:7 46:15 shown [2] 13:2 24:19 shows (1) 16:11 side (1) 15:1 similar (1) 23:22 SIMMONS (15) 3:2 20:12.21 22: 8,21 24:16 27:8,20 38:7 39:10 44:10,13,17,21 45:19 simply (4) 22:2 24:24 38:2 39: since 59:3,16 10:20 17:25 22: sir [2] 15:10,25 so-called @ 37:25 somehow [3] 21:16,17 22:2 somewhat (1) 22:1 somewhere [2] 17:12 36:18 sorry [1] 17:1 specific (1) 17:14 specifically (1) 6:23 split (1) 23:18 splitting [1] 28:10 Staff [16] 3:16 4:2,9,25 5:21 19: 25 20:1 22:6,15 24:19 27:1 31: 25 36:16 38:18 44:7,23 Staff's 1914:16,20 11:11 17:2,23 19:7 36:11 37:1 44:25 start [1] 30:8

state [2] 36:14 47:4 statute [15] 4:17,17 6:17,19 17:8 19:11 22:13 23:17 27:1 36:4,5,8, 11.23 37:3 statutes [18] 7:25 9:8 11:7 12: 10.16 13:3 14:15.22 15:3.5 19:2 21:5 25:2,2,24 26:19,19,21 statutory [3] 5:7 15:18 34:10 stay (1) 43:2 stenographic [1] 47:12 step (1) 29:13 stick [1] 28:1 still 13 22:8 24:22 27:14 strictly (1) 36:3 structure [6] 39:19 43:24.25 44: 1.3 45:13 structured [1] 6:15 studies [3] 6:25 7:2 14:6 study [4] 7:7 8:2.5 16:6 subject [7] 9:4,6 20:9,15,19,25 22:23 submit [1] 8:25 submitted (1) 8:13 subscribers (6) 6:10.13 10:14 12:6 19:6 41:15 substantial (2) 31:24.25 suddenly [2] 25:4 41:16 sufficient (4) 36:14 45:13,15,17 suggest [1] 9:2 suggestion @ 21:15 22:1 38:8 summarize (1) 5:23 supervision (1) 47:10 support [1] 17:23 supporting [2] 7:3 14:16 suppose (1) 26:4 surely [1] 29:18 surrogate [2] 32:12.22 synonymous [1] 25:6

tack [1] 11:23 target (1) 10:16 tariff (65) 3:3,7 7:2,23 8:12,15 10: 20 11:25 12:1.1 13:7.9.23 14:2.3 16:7,8 18:12,16,20 19:3 21:21 22:20,22 23:11,18,24 24:5 29:2, 3,5 37:16,18,18,21,22,23 38:9,10, 13.15.20 39:1 40:2,18,20 41:2,7, 8,16,17 42:4,9,11,14,17,20 43:4, 7,8 45:4,6,8,14,21 tariffs [8] 9:17 13:10 18:17 23: 13 28:18.20 45:22.24 taxed (1) 32:2 telecommunications @23: telephone (4) 26:8 28:15 30:23, terms [7] 9:24 16:24 17:16 25:7, 10 31:17 36:17 themselves [1] 21:7 theoretically (1) 44:18 there's [10] 4:2 16:17 28:4,25 30:13,16 34:2 37:4 41:1,1 thereafter (1) 47:10 therefore [4] 8:17,24 9:4 11:10 therein (1) 47:9 thinking 19 30:9 thinks (1)4:11 Thirty (1) 45:17

thorough (1) 21:25 though (2) 31:22 44:18 throwing [2] 34:12 35:12 till (1) 41:20 today (4) 23:12 28:24 42:13 45; together (1) 21:23 token [1] 14:14 total (1) 25:14 totally (1) 35:17 toward (1) 45:12 transcribed (1) 47:10 transcription [1] 47:12 transition (1) 32:13 transitioning (2) 32:11.23 treated [3] 9:6 11:4 32:15 trend (1) 16:21 tried @ 8:9 16:5 21:20 25:4 34: 3 35:8 triggered [4] 12:19,22,25 26:2 triggering (1) 23:5 triggers @23:4 trouble (4) 25:25 26:3 32:4,10 troubles (930:8 troubling (1) 30:3 true [1] 47:12 try [2] 36:24 40:16 trying [10] 3:14 8:2 9:23 13:22 22:10 26:18 28:2,11 32:13 35:9 turn (1) 22:3 two [10] 11:3,13 18:17 19:21 20: 2 21:18 22:16 23:7,8 43:25 type [4] 3:22,24 4:3 26:12 types [2] 25:18 26:10 typically (1) 15:1

ultimate [2] 31:1,6 ultimately 1939:15 unanimously [1] 46:16 unclear (1) 17:17 Under [16] 4:17 7:21,22,24 8:3 14:14 19:10 20:8,12 23:11,16 25:8 36:3.22 40:20 47:10 understand (7) 3:14 11:22 24: 25 32:10 37:9,13 40:17 understanding (4) 21:12 25:25 26:3 42:16 Unfortunately (1) 31:16 unintended (1) 35:14 uniawful (1) 41:8 unpaid 의 11:16,21 33:5 unquote [1] 43:12 until 🖾 18:10 42:15 up [6] 19:14,17 24:8 25:14 32:21 38:4 up-front (1) 21:25 urge (1) 19:8 usury [3] 25:2,8,24

valid (3) 23:13 29:7 43:9 value (4) 3:25 30:17,23 32:9 vehicle (1) 30:7 version (1) 38:10 versus (2) 5:12 43:24 view (2) 20:13 22:25 viewpoint (1) 36:19 violate (1) 19:22 violating (1) 29:3 violation (5) 28:25 29:6 41:3 42 20,25 violative (1) 37:3 virtually (1) 10:21 vote (2) 40:25 42:12

W

wade (1) 29:10 walk (1) 16:5 wanted (2) 20:22,23 way [7] 10:17 20:24 23:8 30:5 35:6 36:22 41:22 whatever (1) 39:18 whereas (1) 3:23 whether [18] 3:3 4:6 9:5 14:9,18 17:10 21:7 25:7 27:22 28:24 31: 21 35:2.21.22.23 36:3.5 37:11 whole (1) 25:6 will 10:3 30:23 31:23 39:17 40:14 willing [2] 39:6,14 within [2] 40:5 42:10 without (1) 45:1 words [1] 29:2 working (1) 7:13 works 🗓 9:25 worried [1] 28:9

year । व 10:20 15:12 21:11 years । 18:1,23

worth [2] 9:9 10:19