BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

IN RE: DOCKET NO. 010345-TP - Petition by AT&T

Communications of the Southern States, Inc., TCG South Florida, and MediaOne Florida Telecommunications, Inc. for structural Separation of BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. into two distinct wholesale and retail

corporate subsidiaries.

BEFORE: CHAIRMAN E. LEON JACOBS, JR.

COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON COMMISSIONER LILA A. JABER COMMISSIONER BRAULIO L. BAEZ COMMISSIONER MICHAEL A. PALECKI

PROCEEDINGS: AGENDA CONFERENCE

ITEM NUMBER: 4

DATE: Tuesday, October 16, 2001

PLACE: 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 148

Tallahassee, Florida

REPORTED BY: MARY ALLEN NEEL

Registered Professional Reporter

ACCURATE STENOTYPE REPORTERS
100 SALEM COURT
TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301
7 (850)878-2221

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PARTICIPANTS:

KIMBERLY CASWELL, Verizon.
CLAUDIA DAVANT, AT&T.
JASON FUDGE and HAROLD MCLEAN, Florida PSC.
JOSEPH HATCHETT, on behalf of AT&T.
JOSEPH MCGLOTHLIN, on behalf of FCCA.
NANCY WHITE, BellSouth.

STAFF RECOMMENDATION

ISSUE 1: Should BellSouth's Motions to Dismiss, or, in the alternative, Motions to Strike AT&T's Petition and FCCA's Request be granted?

RECOMMENDATION: No. The motion regarding AT&T's Petition has been rendered moot. Staffs recommendation on BellSouth's Motion regarding FCCA's Request is subsumed in its recommendation in Issue 2 and 4.

ISSUE 2: Should BellSouth's Motion to Dismiss, filed August 28, 2001, be granted?

RECOMMENDATION: No. The Motion should be denied with the understanding that the Commission's authority to order any relief will be made when the appropriate relief, if any, is determined. This analysis is also applicable to BellSouth's Motion to Dismiss FCCA's Request filed April 17, 2001.

<u>Issue 3</u>: Should BellSouth's Motion for More Definite Statement and Motion to Strike Clarified and Amended Petition, filed August 28, 2001, be granted? <u>RECOMMENDATION</u>: No. The motions should be depreciated.

ISSUE 4: Should the Commission proceed to hear on AT&T's Amended Petition to consider structural separation of BellSouth, as well as other remedies? RECOMMENDATION: Yes. The Commission should set this docket for hearing and continue its investigation of the matters raised in AT&T's Amended Petition and FCCA's Request.

ISSUE 5: Should this docket be closed?

RECOMMENDATION: No. Based on staff's recommendation in Issues 1, 2, 3, and 4, this docket should remain open.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: We're now on Item 4.

MR. FUDGE: Commissioners, Item 4 is staff's recommendation on BellSouth's various motions to dismiss.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Very well. Ms. White.
MS. WHITE: Thank you. Thank you,

Mr. Chairman.

This vote is about whether the Commission should go forward with a hearing that may or may not determine whether structural separation, an extraordinary remedy, may or may not be within the Commission's jurisdiction to fix a problem that may or may not exist. There's certainly a knot of mays, maybes, coulds, and perhapses surrounding this issue.

Let's go back for a minute to another petition, a petition filed by competitive carriers for Commission action to support local competition in BellSouth's service territory.

This was filed in late 1998. It was Docket No. 981834. AT&T, MCI, Florida Competitive Carriers Association, and the Competitive

Telecommunications Association, among others, alleged that there were certain roadblocks to local competition in Florida and that four, four

actions were required by this Commission to spur local competition.

First they said that this Commission should establish a generic UNE pricing docket. Then they said this Commission should establish a Competitive forum to address BellSouth's operational issues. Third, the ALECs said the Commission should establish third-party testing of BellSouth's operational support systems. And fourth, they said the Commission should establish a rulemaking for expedited dispute resolution. "Only with these specific actions," said the ALECs, "will Florida see progress in the development of local competition."

You should note that structural separation was not, I repeat, was not one of the actions sought about these petitioners.

Now, in response to this petition, the Commission opened several dockets. They opened a docket, generic docket on the provisioning of collocation. They opened a generic docket on the pricing of unbundled network elements. They opened a generic docket on compensation between ILECs and ALECs for terminating local traffic. The Commission opened a docket to investigate

the establishment of permanent performance measures. This Commission established third-party testing for BellSouth's operational support systems. And these dockets were in addition to dockets previously held on number portability, resale, interconnection, and number conservation issues.

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The Commission has recently opened a docket on allegations of anticompetitive behavior, and the Commission has also established a collaborative process in an attempt to resolve various operational issues. And this doesn't even mention some of the major arbitrations at which issues common to several ALECs have been resolved by the Commission.

Now that these various dockets are either resolved or in the process of being resolved, only now do the ALECs come along and say, "Wait a minute. The actions we requested in late 1998 and that you granted, the actions that have been ongoing for the last two years, well, they're just not good enough. We want structural separation." Only when the actions that you were asked to take are coming to fruition did the FCCA and AT&T say, "We've thought of another

hurdle for BellSouth."

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Now, there will always be another hurdle, a higher standard that these parties want. By explicitly stating that the actions they asked for are not good enough, the ALECs are implicitly saying, "we don't like the answers the Commission gave us." You're being asked to prejudge that the actions that you have taken in these dockets have not and will not accomplish anything, and this you shouldn't do.

Structural separation is an enormous step into the unknown. All that AT&T and the FCCA have advanced in favor of structural separation are accusations of conduct. Now, if there's a violation of conduct, this Commission has the authority to address it without the necessity for an extraordinary remedy such as structural separation.

what will the byproducts of structural separation be? Increased costs passed on to customers in the form of higher prices; customer confusion, more regulation, not less -- even the staff recognizes this in their recommendation.

A greater burden on the resources of the Commission, not less; increased complexity; and

a pretty good argument that there's no authority, there will be no regulatory authority over the wholesale side.

Now, this Commission is being asked to take a general average statute, a statute that says the Commission should encourage and promote competition, you're being asked to take that statute and distort it to fit the Draconian action sought by the ALECs. If the Commission starts down this path, logic goes out the window. What's going to be next? Are you going to be asked to use the statute to fund financially ailing ALECs because that will encourage and promote competition? Are you going to be asked to close an ILEC's operations completely because that might encourage and promote competition?

Look at the timing of this request. This Commission is in the middle of BellSouth's 271 proceeding, a proceeding that will, in part, determine whether local competition exists in Florida. In states that have long distance authority, local competition has increased dramatically. So the 271 proceeding is also a proceeding that by other states' experience will

1 promote competition in Florida.

Consider who stands to gain by going forward with a hearing on this issue. Not the Commission; your burden will increase. Not the customer; their confusion will increase. And certainly not BellSouth. The parties who will gain are the same ones trying to prevent BellSouth from entering the long distance market.

Don't be fooled by protestations that their motive is to encourage local competition.

You've heard that before. You acted on it.

Now, only when your labors are bearing fruit do you hear the ALECs shouting for more.

I urge you to reject a hearing on this issue, and I urge you to close this docket. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Very well. Ms. Caswell.

MS. CASWELL: As Ms. White pointed out, staff's recommendation says that you may or may not have the authority to order structural separation for BellSouth, but that you should go ahead and hold a hearing anyway and decide at the end. Verizon agrees with BellSouth that you don't have jurisdiction to order structural

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separation under any scenario.

But let's leave the legal arguments aside for a moment and use some common sense. The ILECs and the CLECs may not agree on the details of how much structural separation would cost and whether it would benefit anyone. There is no dispute, however, that there will be significant costs. That's self-evident. Dividing one company into two will create inefficiency and expense.

There has also been no real challenge to the point that structural separation would chill ILECs' investments in the state. Maryland, for instance, rejected structural separation legislation because it would discourage investment in new technologies and it would suppress job creation. Here in Florida, union leadership has called structural separation a radical and ill-conceived idea and a threat to good union jobs.

Now, let's consider these concerns about investment, jobs, and increased costs in light of today's environment. Since September 11th, investors have pulled out of the stock market in droves. The country is headed into a recession.

The U.S. Congress is considering economic stimulus packages. President Bush is working on a plan to protect national security and reinvigorate the economy. The plan will address protecting critical telecommunications infrastructure and boosting broadband deployment.

Here in Florida, unemployment claims are soaring. Governor Bush is doing all he can to put the Florida economy back on track.

The FBI has put telecommunications utilities on high alert, and state law enforcement authorities have asked these companies for their crisis management plans.

Now, here's where the common sense is important. Given these conditions, do you want to entertain a radical proposal that will have unmistakably negative impacts on investment and jobs? As policy-makers around the country readjust their priorities to focus on network security and reliability, do you want to even consider the possibility of breaking up the largest telecommunications company in Florida? Do you want to consider a scheme that will undermine BellSouth's ability to respond to a

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disaster, whether it's natural or manmade?

If you need a firsthand account of what it takes to respond to a major crisis, Verizon is the expert. After the massive destruction of its facilities in Manhattan on September 11th, Verizon was told to get Wall Street back in business in less than a week, and it did. This unprecedented achievement would not have been possible if Verizon's wholesale and retail operations were in two separate companies.

Structural separation was never a good idea, but there could not be a worse time for this Commission to embark on a proceeding to consider such a drastic and expensive proposal. Aside from the cost of structural separation itself, just going to hearing will drain Commission resources to a degree you have never seen before. Again, if you need the details, you can ask Verizon. The Pennsylvania Commission and the company spent two and a half years and untold resources on a structural separation proceeding. The Commission ultimately rejected structural separation because it would be too costly, would increase the need for regulatory oversight, and would not

be in consumers' best interests. So you should be skeptical of any suggestion that there's no harm in just studying structural separation.

Aside from the burden on resources, going to hearing on AT&T's petition will be seen as a sign that this Commission believes structural separation has some merit. As long as the idea is alive here, it will create uncertainty, not just for BellSouth, but for other ILECs too.

Uncertainty increases risk, and risk is bad for investment. What this industry needs most now, what this state needs most now is stability, not more upheaval.

Staff says there's no need to go to hearing in the near term because several ongoing dockets may address AT&T's concerns. It's certainly true that there are many dockets to address competitive issues. These include the UNE dockets, OSS proceedings, BellSouth's 271 application, the alleged anticompetitive conduct dockets, various complaint proceedings, and the collaborative process sponsored by the Chairman. It's a good bet that you've got more dockets open to address competitive issues than any other state in the country. The existence of

these dockets is not just a reason to wait to go
to hearing; it's a reason to close this docket.

If any CLEC has legitimate concerns about
anticompetitive conduct, they will be fully
fleshed out and addressed in one or more of
these proceedings.

It makes no sense to become mired in an all-consuming debate about a structural separation remedy before even knowing what you're trying to fix. First, let's figure out what the problems are, if any, and then assess what remedy, if any, is appropriate. That's the way you've always worked, and there's no reason to change that now.

You can investigate AT&T's claims in any one of the open BellSouth dockets. Yet another proceeding to address vague allegations would do nothing but waste taxpayers dollars. You should make the common-sense conclusion that the Virginia Commission did: there's no reason for a structural separation inquiry when there are already several dockets open to address competitive issues.

Even under staff's legal analysis, you don't have jurisdiction to order structural

separation unless it's the only means to promote competition and prevent anticompetitive behavior. I don't think any of you need a hearing to know that that can't be true. If you suspect that it is, then you need to close all those dockets that I just listed because they're pointless. And you need to conclude that all of those arbitrations, UNE cases, collocation cases, OSS cases, and others you've decided over the past six years have been a big waste of time.

Of course, we know that's not true.

Florida is one of the most active states for competitive entry. It's among the top four states in lines served by CLECs and for number of competitive entrants. It's in the top three for zip codes served by multiple CLECs. The Commission should take pride in these statistics rather than admitting defeat and launching a structural separation inquiry.

If you want to encourage more competition, there's no need to try experimental methods like structural separation. Instead, try the sure-fire approach; approve BellSouth's 271 application. States with long distance approval

for the RBOCs show the greatest competitive advances. That's definitive proof that structural separation cannot be the only way to promote competition.

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AT&T's structural separation petitions around the country are widely acknowledged to be a ploy to derail the RBOCs' 271 applications. If you're taken in by the ploy, then you've also got to be prepared for AT&T to abandon it in midstream. It's no secret that AT&T is looking for a merger partner and that it's pursuing the BellSouth has been mentioned as a ILECs. leading candidate. If talks with BellSouth or any other ILEC get serious, you can be sure that the last thing AT&T will want is structural separation. So if you launch a structural separation proceeding, there's a fair chance that a year or so into it, AT&T will be here asking you to close the docket.

You don't need any hearing to dismiss

AT&T's petition for lack of jurisdiction. If

the Legislature meant for you to have the

extreme authority to break up a company, it

would have said so, and it wouldn't have

fashioned the statute in such a way that if you

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do break up the company, the wholesale entity will escape your jurisdiction. Again, that just doesn't pass the common sense test.

You've never even claimed jurisdiction to review mergers, even though the statute requires you to approve all transfers of control and acquisitions, so how can you consider the opposite scenario of taking a company apart without any statutory hint that you may. The two lines of thinking just can't be squared.

BellSouth's motion asks you to decide whether you have the jurisdiction to act on AT&T's petition to separate BellSouth. There's no reason you can't answer that question now and no reason you can't dismiss AT&T's petition for lack of jurisdiction. If you would rather avoid making the jurisdictional decision now, then you should do the next best thing and close the docket. You've got plenty of other dockets open to determine whether BellSouth has engaged in anticompetitive behavior. If it has, then you can address that behavior and impose any appropriate remedy in the context of those dockets.

Thank you.

1 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Thank you. 2 Mr. McGlothlin. MR. McGLOTHLIN: I'm Joe McGlothlin. 3 here today for the FCCA. The FCCA filed a supportive petition in 5 this docket, and as staff clarified in a revised memorandum last week, its recommendation to deny 7 BellSouth's motion to dismiss the AT&T petition 8 9 also applies to BellSouth's petition to dismiss 10 the FCCA pleading. At the out --11 COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. McGlothlin, are 12 you speaking on behalf of AT&T as well? 13 MR. McGLOTHLIN: I am not, only FCCA. 14 At the outset, I would like to commend the 15 staff for the hard work and good job on getting 16 its arms around the issues that the motions have 17 presented, and I concur and commend its 18 conclusion to you. With respect to the 19 arguments here today, I just want to respond 20 very briefly. 21 First of all, I believe counsel 22 mischaracterized the recommendation in a couple 23 of respects. Counsel said -- or summarized the 24 recommendation as saying the problem may or may 25 not exist. That's not the status of the

pleadings. The FCCA alleged in its petition that a severe problem exists, and so did AT&T, and that is the allegations before you now and is the subject of the motion to dismiss.

The pleadings were characterized and the recommendation was characterized as saying you may or may not have authority, but I read the staff recommendation very differently. I think the staff recognized that the status of the pleadings is this: you have available to you a range of alternative remedies, and the appropriate time to determine whether you have authority is when you decide what action needs to be taken. For that reason, the argument is misplaced.

There was a reference to the FCCA petition filed several years ago. The only pertinent portion of that case that's applicable here is the fact that in that case, as here, BellSouth filed a motion to dismiss. And the Commission denied the motion to dismiss and in denying it said this. "Put simply, processes designed to further open the local market to competition are entirely consistent with the purposes and procedures of the Act. If the Commission finds

1 that the requested relief is designed to achieve 2 that goal and does not undermine the procedures prescribed by the Act, then the relief is well 4 within the legal authority of the Commission." 5 One final comment. Ms. Caswell said, 6 "Let's leave legal arguments aside." Well, that is a motion to dismiss, and I'm here to tell you 7 8 you can't do that. And when you apply the 9 standards applicable to a motion to dismiss, you 10 will conclude that it should be denied. 11 Beyond that, I would simply say that many 12 of the matters that she tried to bring to you 13 today belong, if at all, in a proceeding on the 14 merits. 15 Thank you. 16 COMMISSIONER JABER: I need some 17 clarification. We're here because AT&T filed a 18 petition requesting structural separation. 19 MR. FUDGE: Among other things, in their 20 clarified petition. 21 COMMISSIONER JABER: FCCA filed a 22 subsequent petition requesting the same thing. 23 MR. McGLOTHLIN: That's correct. 24 COMMISSIONER JABER: And AT&T is not here

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to address this Commission today?

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I don't see them here. MR. FUDGE:

COMMISSIONER JABER: I just needed some clarification.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me ask a Mr. McGlothlin closed his argument by indicating that we cannot ignore the legal argument which is squarely in front of us because we're here on motions to dismiss, and I understand that. And it's staff's recommendation, and correct me if I'm wrong, that we should not grant the motions to dismiss, and that's based upon your legal analysis; is that correct?

MR. FUDGE: Yes, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Now, we've also had a great deal of discussion here, particularly by counsel for Verizon and for BellSouth, going into the merits of whether it's advisable to continue with an investigation concerning structural separation, and I don't think we can ignore that either. And I guess the hurdle that I'm at is how do we address the motions to dismiss, or are we here today to address both the motions to dismiss and what future action we take in regard to structural separation.

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here to address both?

MR. FUDGE: You certainly can address both, Commissioner. But the primary reason we're here today is to determine the motion to dismiss, only raises the question of whether you can proceed on the petitions by FCCA and AT&T.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let me say this, and let me give you a broader picture approach as to where I see where we are and where we need to be, and you tell me how we can get there, if we can. And, Commissioners, this is really at this point more for discussion. I'm not trying to make a motion, but I'm trying to get the issue in focus to try to see where we are right now and where we ultimately should be.

We have had very thoughtful and thorough analysis and presentation on the jurisdiction question. Staff's analysis is part of that.

I do not think it's necessary at this point to make a determination as to whether this Commission has the jurisdiction if it found that it was necessary to order structural separation. And the reason I say that is that I think it is ill-advised at this point to go forward with an investigation into structural

However, I'm not comfortable making a decision today saying that, yes, for sure we have the jurisdiction or that, no, that we do not. But I don't think it's necessary to address that question. And I need to put in context, how do we address the motions to dismiss if we just have the feeling, the belief that to continue an investigation into structural separation is not the appropriate action and we need to direct our attention to the dockets we already have open addressing competition within the state. That's kind of a broad question, and whatever feedback staff can have, and I would look forward to feedback from

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fellow Commissioners as to where you all think
we are and where we need to be.

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MR. FUDGE: Commissioners, if you decided not to rule on the motion to dismiss today, you would still have the outstanding petitions of FCCA and AT&T, and if you still have those petitions, you have to do something with them. And there's two basic options. You can either consolidate the docket into the other open dockets, or you can just continue this proceeding indefinitely until those other dockets are resolved.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Let me -Commissioner, you asked for some feedback. I
appreciate your concerns, and I have additional
concerns that I want to throw out here so that
we can continue to dialogue.

I think that the motion to dismiss does have a strict legal standard. And you may recall the discussions we had the first time this came to us, and I was troubled by the fact that the motions to dismiss give us a legal standard that is almost inflexible.

But the bigger picture to me is the actual remedy that was requested. And to me, to pursue

structural separation right now sends a message that we failed or the Act has failed. And I know I've got problems with the Act, but we haven't finished doing everything we need to do to comply with the Act, and this agency hasn't finished doing some of the things that it can do on its own to make sure that all of the markets are open.

So it's almost premature to reach the level of structural separation, but I'm sensitive to the fact that we have a motion to dismiss. I would like staff to comment on whether we could discard the motion to dismiss by not reaching the point of deciding the motion to dismiss, because on our own we find it premature to address the structural separation petition. That's one concern.

The second concern is, I want certainty in this industry. It is time for us to be able to focus on the matters that are directly prominent on our calendar. And I think all industry stakeholders deserve certainty, and I am not willing to entertain leaving this docket open. It is good to know we may have an additional tool that I would like to use, or at least be

able to use later on if it's absolutely necessary. But to leave a docket open and bring some of that uncertainty to the market I'm not interested in doing. So maybe staff could address those points as well.

MR. FUDGE: Commissioners, if you think it's premature to rule on the motions to dismiss today, then you could just defer it indefinitely until the other dockets are resolved, which may ultimately render the petition moot.

COMMISSIONER JABER: It seems like if we address the underlying request for structural separation, depending on how we address it, the motions to dismiss take care of themselves. If we find that there's no need right now to entertain a petition for structural separation, I would imagine that the motions to dismiss are rendered moot.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: We find ourselves in a rather unique situation, in that we have -this Commission took the petitions very seriously and, in fact, we scheduled two days of workshops, so -- and part of that workshop was devoted to the jurisdictional question, but part of it was devoted to the merits, so it's

difficult to divorce the two.

I am of the opinion that it is ill-advised at this point to continue with the investigation into structural separation and to even have that docket open. And we have gotten information through the workshop process, and I believe that if we -- I'm trying to find a vehicle where we do not have to rule on the strict jurisdiction question, because I think it's not necessary. So if there is a way that we can avoid having to rule on the jurisdiction and just simply close the docket, how do we get there?

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: I have a question, and it's not in opposition to what your concern was, Commissioner. This is legal. What's the nature of the remedy of structural separation?

MR. FUDGE: Can you expand on that? Do you mean what would it entail?

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Let me ask this. Isn't structural separation an equitable remedy?

MS. SIMMONS: Commissioner, or Chairman Jacobs, let me take a stab at this.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: This is purely legal.

MS. SIMMONS: Okay.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: I need an answer first.

MS. SIMMONS: Okay.

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MR. McLEAN: Well, I'm trying to remember the difference between equitable and legal remedies. This is -- the first thought that comes to my mind is that we're dealing here with a quasi-legislative agency, and strictly -- the distinction between legal and equitable remedies may not help us a whole lot. If I had to choose, I would say it was much more analogous to an equitable remedy. It is a thought that this is the right thing to do, despite the fact that it may not be specifically set forth in statute. But I'm very uncomfortable with that kind of analogy because, frankly, I think the distinction between equity, chancery and law doesn't help us a whole lot here.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Well, what I tried to do was kind of get some idea about that myself, and I went and looked it up. And according to the treatise that I found, it, while not definitive, is pretty consistent with the idea of equitable relief.

MR. MCLEAN: Yes, sir, I agree. It's closer to equity than it is to law, but it is not the same, I would say.

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CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Then my next question then becomes, if that's what the nature of this relief is, how do we -- in an administrative forum, is that where we impose equity relief?

MR. McLEAN: No, sir. The Commission doesn't have equitable powers like a court does, like a court of chancery does. And in that kind of analysis, I would suggest to you that, no, it doesn't have equitable powers. But I don't think that's what the staff recommendation to you envisions.

Equity takes you almost outside the law.

It's the conscience of the crown. It lessens
the severity of legal remedies. And I don't
think that kind of rationale applies well here.

That's not what staff is suggesting to you.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Well, absent -- in fact, I would disagree. I think it absolutely applies here. And what I -- the whole import of implementing this type of a remedy is that you come to a conclusion that there has been egregious behavior, there has been monopolization, antitrust, anticompetitive, whatever. And the whole objective, at least in the antitrust arena, the whole objective then

becomes what do you do to fix it, what do you do to make the market conditions amenable to competition again, and you then look at a range of remedies to achieve that. And structural separation has historically been implemented when the structure of the marketplace was deemed to be out of whack and you had to implement fundamental market structure modifications in order to adjust that.

But without going too far afield, I want to get back to the central question that in my mind is raised. If this looks like a duck, i.e., it looks like equity relief, how do we implement it? And in searching that through, my research says that even when governmental agencies — and let me step back for a minute. I have a lot of agreement with the analysis of implied authority. I think that implied authority is broad, particularly when you have a statute, an organic statute that's broad.

However, the essence of the legal analysis says once you come to the conclusion that you have broad implied authority, then all manner of remedies is at your disposal. And I've always understood that equity relief is a different

door to the courthouse. And, in fact, we have to go to the court, it's my understanding. Even if we demonstrate that the basis of relief is found, can we do that in an administrative order or an administrative forum, or do we have to go to a court and ask the court to implement the equity remedy that we now have supported in our analysis? That's really my question. Once we

MR. McLEAN: If you say that it's an equitable remedy, then you have decided that the Commission can't do it. In my opinion, this Commission does not have equity jurisdiction.

But what you're dealing with here is very close to equity jurisdiction. It's a good analog, I think. But, again, I'm very nervous bringing the distinctions between law and equity into this forum. I don't think they have a place here.

What the staff is saying to you is that the Legislature has directed you to encourage competition and has given you a number of tools to achieve that end. If you find that this is the only tool which is appropriate to the task, then it's one you should impose. That's

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essentially what the staff is saying to you.

COMMISSIONER JABER: And in that regard. why can't we say it is premature right now to entertain a petition like that, because it may not be the only tool. I mean, why do we even need to reach whether this is a matter of law or equity or whether we have jurisdiction? just premature.

MR. McLEAN: Well, let me point this out to you. You're here on a motion to dismiss, which has some fairly technical requirements. I've looked to give Commissioner Deason the comfort that we don't have to deal with it, but I'm afraid you have a motion to dismiss before you and that you need to deal with it. Now, you could put it off for a while, but sooner or later somebody is going to say, "Well, you've put it off long enough, so it's a decision in and of itself."

COMMISSIONER JABER: I don't think I agree with you, Harold. Why can't we dismiss the underlying petition on our motion --

> MR. MCLEAN: I think that you --

COMMISSIONER JABER: -- and find the motion to dismiss moot as a result? Is that --

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MR. MCLEAN: Because I think affected parties have a right to a point of entry into the administrative process to bring evidence before you.

COMMISSIONER JABER: An affected party that didn't bother to come today.

MR. McLEAN: Well, we have two petitioners, as I understand it. And I noticed that they didn't show up too.

But let me back up just a little bit. You may want to deal with the motion to dismiss and then deal with the petition on your own motion. But it is my opinion that you should do so by proposed agency action, because people who want to bring evidence before you have the right to do that on their petition, unless you decide on your own motion that you don't want to hear from them. Then you're going to have to propose an action, and then they can petition for formal hearing on that proposed action.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: There's a troubling aspect of where we are right now, because we're -- and I know your analysis is broad and it makes a better point than I'll make now. But the scope of this discussion is that our

jurisdiction rests on our ability to ascertain whether or not this remedy applies. Yes, there is a way to contest a cause of action which says we don't have -- that relief can't be granted. But we can't be sitting here talking about our jurisdiction and then say, "well, let's talk about whether or not structural separation applies." We have the jurisdiction to take on this manner of investigation of conduct or we don't, and I don't want us to get trapped in that box. We have the jurisdiction to undertake this investigation.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: We may have the jurisdiction, but there's also the question of should we exercise that jurisdiction.

MS. WHITE: Exactly.

MR. McLEAN: Precisely.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: That's precisely the point where we are right now.

MR. MCLEAN: That's exactly the point where we are. Yes, sir, I agree.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: And then my analogy becomes do we -- if what we're seeking to accomplish here is to impose things that look like equity relief, then perhaps we shouldn't

exercise that jurisdiction in this matter. We have other avenues to do that.

MR. McLEAN: Maybe I could clear the deck like this. If you deny -- if you grant the motion to dismiss, then the case is over.

Nothing else happens, because you decide that you don't have jurisdiction to do what the petitioner wants you to do.

on the other hand, if you deny the motion to dismiss, then the issue becomes, now that you claim that you have jurisdiction, what you're going to do with the petition. And among the things that you could do is decide that you're pursuing these matters in other dockets, and that's where you want to handle it, and you propose to either deny -- well, you propose to deny the petition on its merits, or perhaps you move this record to some other docket. You essentially consolidate it with some other docket.

But the seminal question is one of whether you have jurisdiction. And you have a motion before you, and my advice to you is that you probably need to decide that motion sometime in the foreseeable future. I don't think deferring

that motion for a long time is such a hot idea.

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One thing that you could easily do is to deny the motion to dismiss and propose not to go

forward in this docket because you believe the

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MS. WHITE: But you could also answer Issue 4, which is should the Commission proceed to hearing on the petition, say no to that, and then the motions to dismiss are moot.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I have a question while Ms. White raised Issue 4, and I have a question of staff, because I think I heard Commissioner Jaber suggest certainty. Certainly the industry deserves certainty, but I'm having trouble just finding certainty within this Commission as to what dockets are open and what they all mean and how they relate to each other. We heard mention of the anticompetitive dockets, of which I have very little knowledge to this date what the purpose of them -- I guess there's three of them -- will be. And is there any relation to the hearing that you suggest in Issue 4 with these other dockets that are already open?

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MS. SIMMONS: Commissioner Baez, I'll try

To me -- I am not directly involved with the anticompetitive dockets, but to me, those dockets are more in the way of regulatory detection and enforcement in terms of -- it's more of our status quo approach, almost a bottoms-up kind of approach, let's detect problems and figure out remedies. That's how I understand those dockets.

The structural separations docket, on the other hand, to me is more redesigning the system. And I use that term very loosely, our system of regulation. BellSouth, the way they have themselves organized, it would almost be a change in the whole regulatory modus operandi that would be under consideration. And to me, it's more of a tops-down pervasive kind of approach to the alleged anticompetitive issues.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: So then if I hear you correctly, would structural separation -- and I'm trying to get away from the jurisdictional argument, which I have problems with as well. But besides that, structural separation as a remedy is not something that could be considered

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under these generic or these more general
anticompetitive dockets?

MS. SIMMONS: I guess it's possible, if you wanted to do that, to consolidate this docket with, for instance, the anticompetitive docket that was set up to deal with Bellsouth issues. That could be done. I wouldn't necessarily recommend that, because I think the approaches in the two dockets are quite different, but it's something you could consider. As I say, I wouldn't necessarily recommend it.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And here's some of the concerns I'm having. (a), I don't believe our jurisdictional analysis in -- I guess it's Issue 1 in this recommendation. I'm not comfortable with the federal analysis. I'm not comfortable with how all this plays out in terms of the Act, whether we have authority under the Act, the federal Act, or not. So I'm not comfortable with saying we have or haven't jurisdiction on those grounds. I don't believe that issue has been fleshed out, at least not for my purposes anyway.

Secondly -- and I think it may have been

Commissioner Deason or Commissioner Jaber. And

1 I go back to something I said, I guess it was a 2 couple of weeks ago. I'm trying to wade through 3 this mass of open dockets that all seem to bleed into each other and trying to make some sense 4 5 out of all of them. But certainly there appear -- some dockets have the implication that if you 7 decide to move forward with one of them, you're 8 in fact -- you know, you're canning whatever progress or whatever results you would possibly 9 10 make with pursuing the rest of them. And I have 11 a problem with that, because -- I'll say it 12 We've been at this for over two years on again. 13 some of them, and to change -- you know, to switch onto another track midstream just doesn't 14 15 make sense to me. 16 And I would like to understand how

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And I would like to understand how proceeding with this docket and accepting your recommendation doesn't constitute changing for forsaking all the progress or whatever decisions we've made up to now in other dockets, be it OSS, be it the pending 271 docket, even the anticompetitive dockets, which at this point I don't think we've made much progress on, but there they are. So I want to know how this — you know, adding one other docket and one other

1 investigation and one other consideration of 2 remedies doesn't mean to me that I have to 3 ignore whatever work we've already done and 4 whatever resources we've already expended on the other dockets. 5 MS. SIMMONS: I guess I would comment that 6 7 I think there is a question in terms of how many paths you want to go down simultaneously. Let 8 9 me make clear that I understand your concerns. 10 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I'm running out of 11 fingers. 12 COMMISSIONER JABER: Ten davs of the week. 13 MS. SIMMONS: I think that's --14

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COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And toes, ten days of the week, yes.

MS. SIMMONS: -- a very legitimate question. You know, based on the legal analysis before you, the legal, I think, recommendation is to -- basically that we should proceed as far as the legal analysis. I do think -- if you take that just as a given for sake of discussion, I do think there remains a question of timing, timing and also venue, you know, where do you want to deal with this and when.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let me say

this. And maybe this is a poor analogy, and if it is, staff, correct me. But, Commissioner, I see that -- I don't see that this structural separation potential remedy is necessary. I don't think that it can be combined in with some of our other dockets. I think it is a totally different remedy. And the analogy I would use is that, you know, we've got an automobile, and perhaps it's not running exactly as it should. Do we fix it, or do we scrap it and build a new one? And I don't think you do both of those at the same time. And I think that structural separation is more akin to scrapping what you're doing now and building a new one.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: No, I agree with you.

It's an extreme -- it's perhaps the most extreme of remedies. But the trouble that I'm having understanding parallel paths is that, again, as an example, an anticompetitive -- first of all, this docket -- and I'm not clear if the hearing again that you're suggesting in Issue 4 constitutes having a hearing on finding -- having a finding of anticompetitive behavior, because that to me -- and I could be wrong, but that to me becomes some kind of threshold issue

as to whether you should even get into a discussion of remedies. You know, you have to have a basis for it. And I think to some extent, we're backing into it.

Is what we're saying here, yeah, we've got jurisdiction to do it, and we can do it if we want to, and let's go find out if we should do it? Isn't that what we're doing to some extent on the other dockets? Understanding, Commissioner Deason, what you're saying is one probably has nothing to do with the other. But, you know, to say that I have jurisdiction or not to do it, well, that serves me -- great, but it doesn't solve it.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I'm not comfortable saying we do have jurisdiction. I'm not comfortable saying that we do not.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And I said that up front. Absolutely.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: You know, at some point -- and I don't know what the future holds. At some point, we may feel compelled that we need to exercise our jurisdiction in a way which would result in structural séparation. We're not there yet.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Commissioner, that's a very troubling argument, and I hope I was -- I was trying to say we don't do. We don't say that we do an investigation in order to impose structural separation. We do an investigation to root out and discover anticompetitive conduct, and then we have an arsenal of tools before us to deal with that. We can't get -- in my mind, we would do ourselves a disservice to say, "Let's embark upon this path to get to structural separation." It's a nonstarter. We are dealing with a market issue and conduct in that marketplace.

And I keep saying this, that to say that this magical thing is it is, first of all, limiting ourselves. I agree with what Commissioner Jaber said earlier. There are a hole host of tools to deal with whatever you discover in an investigation.

I think, if I may, Commissioners, that the issues are covered in other dockets. We're doing the investigation essentially that would -- that is necessary to derive whatever records you would need to derive to reach whatever conclusions you need to reach regarding conduct

in the marketplace in other dockets. The purpose of this petition was to seek a specific relief. And it challenges me in many respects because it's just on that specified course to arrive at some specified result.

That is not what we're here for. We're not here to derive a specified result for the parties. We're here to determine what's happening in the marketplace, whether or not it's conducive to competition, and what we may have to do to facilitate competition.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Commissioner -- I'm sorry.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: And then I still go back to my other argument, which was, I admit, one of those nice little lawyers' discussions, but I think it's a relevant discussion here. You know, I don't want to get into the history and all that of the law, but it's pretty clear that when you order structural separation, what you have essentially done is enjoined a parent company from exercising further control over a subsidiary. That's injunctive relief. That's equity relief. And I'm of the opinion that we as an administrative body, if we wanted that, we

would have to go to the court or to the Attorney
General to ask for them to go to court to get
that relief.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Commissioners, there's something that I would like to accomplish either in this docket or in one of the many other dockets that we have open right now.

I see that we do have a problem in this industry. I see that we've had constant litigation between the ALECs and the ILECs since the 1996 Act was passed. In 90 percent of these cases, it seems that the ALECs believe that they're being treated unfairly because they are being treated in a manner that's different from the retail side of the ILEC. They feel that they are being discriminated against. They feel that they are not at parity. And there's no end in sight. From the information I've received, there's no let-up in this litigation in the states where 271 approval has been granted.

I don't want to dictate to the ILECs how this should be done. I don't want to use the word "separation" at all, let alone structural or functional. But I would like to ask the

ILECs to evaluate their processes and let the ILECs tell us how they could be reorganized so that their retail side would use the same processes as the ALECs, and I would like staff to make this a matter of discovery. I don't feel that I need to do that in this docket, but I think it's something that I would like to hear from the ILEC community as to what they think the best manner that this could be accomplished in.

And I would like to ask the ILEC community to please keep an open mind. Don't just give us a knee-jerk reaction against this. Look at the amount of your litigation expense since 1996, and let's try to do something to give the ALEC community the perception that they're in this together with the retail side of the ILECs, that you're all going through the same processes, that you're all lined up at the same ticket window, and let's try to eliminate some of this litigation.

I don't think it needs to be done in this docket. I think there are many other vehicles that we have available to us. But this is an area that I think the Commission should explore.

COMMISSIONER JABER: I have a question for Harold. It seems to me that the motion to dismiss, the standard, if I understand it correctly, Legal, the moving party in this case, FCCA and AT&T, have to demonstrate that -- no, the moving party was BellSouth. BellSouth has to demonstrate that the allegations in the FCCA and AT&T petitions -- we have to assume that those are facially correct and that they've shown that there's a cause of action for which relief can be had here. That's the standard.

MR. McLEAN: That's correct, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER JABER: I think we may be able to accomplish what the Commissioners are suggesting by finding that the relief requested is premature. I'm really trying to avoid reaching the issue of jurisdiction. But at the same time, I hear what you're saying with respect to the motion to dismiss. I understand we have to rule on the motion to dismiss. And why can't we say that we can't grant the relief requested because it's premature, we are not done with processing the very important dockets that we have open?

MS. CASWELL: Commissioner Jaber, can I

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COMMISSIONER JABER: Hang on. I --

MS. CASWELL: Okay.

COMMISSIONER JABER: -- need our staff to answer this question for me.

MR. McLEAN: The notion that the -- I'm a little confused. Are you suggesting that the docket not go forward because the remedy suggested is premature? I think that you can do that, but does that mean that you close the docket?

COMMISSIONER JABER: I would like to close this docket because --

MR. MCLEAN: I have a concern, and that is, a party has filed a petition before you seeking relief. You can't just blow that petition off on the merits because you think it's premature. I think that you can propose to do that because it's premature, but I still think that you have to afford a party a clear and effective point of entry into the administrative process. And to my mind, that means an opportunity to present evidence to you to persuade you what you ought to do if they have stated a claim upon which relief could be based. So it --

1 COMMISSIONER JABER: I thought the motion 2 to dismiss standard actually doesn't take you into the merits, that you're supposed to kind of take a prima facie look, and if there's a cause 4 of action for which relief may be had, fine. If 5 there isn't, you're supposed to grant the motion to dismiss. 7 8 MR. MCLEAN: I agree. 9 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: I thought that's what the whole doctrine of ripeness was about, that you 10 blow people off because it's not time yet. 11 12 MR. McLEAN: Well, are you prepared to 13 decide to deny the petition on its merits here 14 and now as a final appealable order? CHAIRMAN JACOBS: I thought I heard 15 Commissioner Jaber say it's not ripe yet. 16 17 COMMISSIONER JABER: Yes. I think you're turning it around on us, Harold. You said we've 18

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got to decide the motion to dismiss.

MR. MCLEAN: I think that you do.

COMMISSIONER JABER: All right. In deciding the motion to dismiss, if we grant the motion to dismiss, that disposes of the petition for structural separation.

MR. MCLEAN: I think it's a little -- the

1 petition is broader than that. And I misspoke 2 earlier, because I said if you granted the motion to dismiss, you would shut down the docket. It is also true that the amended petition does deal with lesser remedies. suggests that there's a whole realm or continuum

of remedies that you might consider.

So it's in a peculiar posture, to put it mildly. You have -- the initial petition was construed by the defendant or by Bell to say that it addressed only that specific remedy and no other, and they filed a motion to dismiss on that basis. The petition was then amended to be a much broader petition, and the motion I think is renewed I think to the extent to address all those other things.

COMMISSIONER JABER: My frustration is that it's like -- what is the saying? The cart before the horse? We are talking about the remedy before we finish the docket where we're looking at the violations. So that's why I keep saying it seems premature.

But, you know, the parties should be commended. It is good to know we've got additional tools in our basket that we are not

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1 shy about exercising. I just don't want to 2 decide the remedy before I look at the bigger 3 picture. So how do we get there? 4 MR. MCLEAN: Well, I have a suggestion that 5 might work. I don't know what the parties would think of it. But it is simply to propose to 6 7 dismiss -- strike that. Propose to deny the 8 petition on its merits and hold the motion to 9 dismiss to be moot in the same process. 10 But I believe that you have to do that as a 11 proposal, because otherwise you will deny 12 parties, namely, AT&T and the other ALECs, an 13 opportunity, a point of entry into the 14 administrative process. 15 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Commissioners, 16 Ms. DeLoach is here, but before she speaks, we 17 need to take about a ten-minute break to take 18 care of some matters real quick, and then we'll 19 come back in about ten minutes and we'll have 20 Ms. DeLoach speak. 21 Thank you. 22 (Short recess.) 23 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Mr. McGlothlin. 24 MR. McGLOTHLIN: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

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of all, I wish to sponsor the appearance of

Claudia Davant-DeLoach, the attorney for AT&T, who in addition to being the petitioner also participates in the FCCA. And secondly, if I may, I would like to respond very quickly to some of the comments I've heard.

I want to make the point very clear that in its separate petition, the FCCA asked the Commission to initiate an investigation of structural incentives. So from the beginning, with respect to the FCCA pleading, a range of alternative remedies has been before you, and that has been true with respect to AT&T since its amended petition.

And specifically in the FCCA petition we asked this. FCCA recommends that the Florida Commission immediately convene a proceeding to address the possible forms and very real benefits of a structural incentive approach.

Now, the other point I want to make is this. In her argument Ms. Caswell told that you in the Pennsylvania case the Commission did not order structural separation. Well, that is because even though that remedy was available to the Commission, the Commission and parties reached a result short of that. It involved

some incentives and some changes, but fell short of the most straightforward form of structural separation. That outcome is one of the possible outcomes available to the Commission in this case.

Secondly, I've heard the Commissioners say that the Commission should consider perhaps denying the motion to dismiss, but ruling that the remedy we seek is premature. Well, my point is that the appropriate point in time for the Commission to reach that decision is after you've allowed the parties to give you evidence on that point.

Now, FCCA recognizes that structural separation or some variation on that theme in the form of structural incentives is an extreme type of remedy. But we've also alleged that the situation is so severe that extreme remedies are called for. And so we would make the point too that we're entitled, should you find that you have authority to hear this, we're entitled to make our case before you decide we're premature.

Now I would ask that you allow me to present Ms. DeLoach to address you.

MS. DAVANT: Mr. Chairman and

Commissioners, I apologize for being late today.

I had a personal emergency occur this morning,
and I have counsel who is on a train stuck
between there and Washington, and I have outside
counsel who's apparently missing in action. So
I do apologize for us not being represented
earlier than this very moment.

Obviously, I missed the earlier discussion, but, Commissioner Jaber, I did hear the last question that you asked, which is why are we putting the cart before the horse. And I think that's exactly why we brought this petition to the Commission's attention. We've tried all kinds of horses, and we've tried all kinds of carts. I think the remedy that is suggested by this petition is far different than any other process that you're considering right now could address.

I think you can fix a lot of problem with a third-party test. I think you can through OSS and other measures look at a lot of reasons why competition is having problems in this state. But you cannot get rid of the inherent conflict that we have between an incumbent and a competitive carrier whereby the incumbent still

controls the monopoly or the majority percentage of volume in the state. I think it was born out of frustration and absolutely the desire to participate in one of the biggest markets in the country that we brought this petition to your attention.

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I was not prepared to argue the jurisdictional issue, but I can tell you that if vou rule on the motion to dismiss without even giving us the opportunity to prove the evidence that we've already alleged in the petition, I would argue that you're not meeting that Even your staff recommendation says that if facially, on its face, everything we allege in this petition is correct, then you're under the obligation to at least hear the evidence of what we've brought before you. you dismiss this case before we even have the opportunity to bring that to you, then I would suggest that the Commission has lost an opportunity to hear evidence that wouldn't necessarily be admitted in any other process you've got underway at the moment.

I guess I would leave it at that and urge this Commission to adopt staff's recommendation

and move forward in a time frame that you think is appropriate under the circumstances and give the CLEC community an opportunity to come to you and demonstrate what we've already put forth in this petition.

MS. CASWELL: Mr. Chairman, may I respond to that?

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Ms. Caswell, briefly.

MS. CASWELL: First of all, legally you're under no obligation to hear any evidence on any of the allegations that are brought forward in the petition. There are other forums that will give them an effective point of entry into administrative proceedings. We've mentioned all of those forums, all of those dockets. I vehemently disagree that any of the evidence that might be heard here would not necessarily be admitted there.

we've heard about the same alleged problems at the workshops that we've had in the other dockets, OSS problems, discrimination, lack of parity, that sort of thing. We didn't hear any specifics, and we certainly heard nothing to the extent that would justify structural separation. And don't you think they would have come forward

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with something like that in the workshops if it existed? It doesn't.

So you don't have an obligation to hear every petition that comes before you. Parties can file petitions over and over and over again on the same thing, and you don't have to go to hearing on those. You can decide that there are other effective places that those allegations can be heard, and that's the case here.

MS. WHITE: Nancy White for BellSouth Telecommunications.

I would wholeheartedly agree with Ms. Caswell. I think that Mr. McGlothlin's statement that FCCA was not really looking for structural separation, but something called structural incentives, is just playing word games. It's the same thing.

Everything that they've complained about and that staff lists on page 16 of the rec are things that are being dealt with in other dockets. ALECs using BellSouth's OSS must wait much longer than BellSouth's retail arm, heck, that's what third-party testing is looking at. BellSouth has not devoted sufficient technical and related resources necessary to develop OSS

and provide parity to ALECs. Again, third-party testing.

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It just seems to me that we're reinventing the wheel over and over again and that it's time for it to stop. Thank you.

MR. MCGLOTHLIN: The distinction is that in those other dockets, the parties have not asked. nor is the Commission looking for the type of remedy that will get at the root cause of the problems. And by looking at structural incentives, the Commission has the opportunity to do that in a separate investigation.

MS. DAVANT: And with all due respect to other counsel at this table, and with all due respect to this Commission, my understanding of the question before the Commission is whether you're going to move to dismiss the petition. The burden that's being discussed is not whether you should order such a separation at this point. I think, obviously, that decision comes after you have a full hearing on the issue. The issue before you is a motion to dismiss and whether this petition meets the burden of dismissal, which I would argue strenuously that it does not.

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Now, I don't think any of us are prepared to argue the actual case before you today. I didn't understand that's why we were here. My understanding is we're arguing whether or not this Commission is going to move to dismiss a petition that on its face alleges facts that I think you should consider.

MS. WHITE: And with all due respect to AT&T, I would show the Commission Issue 4, which is should the Commission proceed to hearing on AT&T and FCCA's petitions to consider structural separation of BellSouth, as well as other remedies. That's an issue.

COMMISSIONER JABER: We need to back up. We need to back all the way up.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Very well. Any other questions?

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Yes, Mr. Chairman. I have a question for Mr. McLean. Does either denial or -- would denial of the motion to dismiss imply -- it would be an answer in the positive as to jurisdiction necessarily? I know that if we dismiss -- I know that if we grant the motion to dismiss, it's necessarily on the grounds that the movants have made; correct?

MR. MCLEAN: If you deny the motion to dismiss, then I believe you've decided as a matter of law that a claim has been stated which, if proven up, deserves the relief, and you have the jurisdiction to provide the remedy.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: So we are -- well, yeah, I think we've had some discussion. At least a couple of us have said that there is a fair amount of concern as to whether the jurisdictional question should be answered now at all. And I guess I'm trying to understand what the implication of either -- the implication is clear if you grant the motion. But if you deny the motion, is the same -- is it the same implication as to jurisdiction? And you're saying yes.

MR. MCLEAN: If I understand the question, yes. You have decided that there has been a claim stated upon which you have the authority to base relief. I think that's what would be necessarily held if you deny the motion to dismiss. That's the issue that's truly before you today, is whether there has been a claim stated upon which you have the authority to base

relief.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Okay. Let me ask the same question a different way. If we grant the motion to dismiss, will that prohibit the parties or the Commission at a later date from entertaining a remedy like structural separation?

MR. MCLEAN: If I were arguing that you don't have authority, I would most assuredly argue that you had decided before that you didn't. So --

COMMISSIONER JABER: That's not what I asked.

MR. McLEAN: I understand, but you're going to hear the argument. Does it control? I don't know. Somebody will have to make that decision. Certainly it's very close to controlling. If you decide today — this petition is cast to suggest that you have the authority to go all the way to structural separation. If you decide that you don't have the jurisdiction to do that today, you'll certainly be faced with that argument should you try to do it later. And I think a very —

COMMISSIONER JABER: And what would staff's

recommendation be in that regard?

MR. MCLEAN: My personal recommendation would be that indeed you have already decided

that issue adversely. So my view of it is that

it would foreclose a later consideration.

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One thing that I believe Verizon brought up was perhaps you can decide that you have -- that affected parties have an effective point of entry into the administrative process in these other dockets. I have mixed feelings about that. It's certainly one thing that you could do today. It is probably the legal equivalent of deciding that the petition and the remedy suggested is premature. You can say perhaps that the motion to dismiss is moot. With respect to the petition on its merits, you believe that the parties have an effective point

COMMISSIONER JABER: Now I want to switch focus a little bit and talk to Ms. Davant about the difficulty I find myself in just as one Commissioner. I hear everything the ALECs are saying. And we've worked -- at the sake of

of entry in the other dockets. I think that's

the legal statement that the petition is

premature at this time.

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tooting our staff's horn and this Commission's horn, we have worked diligently in addressing these issues, and you know it and I know it.

And it's not over. We're not done. We are by no means done. And the ultimate, ultimate remedy for all of these violations is the threat to Bellsouth that they will not get 271. That is the ultimate, in my opinion, drastic remedy. Now, whether we get there or not, I don't know. I don't want to prejudge anything.

But the situation I find myself in is appreciative of the fact that you all have found an additional tool that perhaps we could take advantage of. The awkwardness is, to go there today, regardless of all these procedural, legal vehicles, I can't get past the recognition that to go there today would be a sign that we have failed already, and we're not even done.

So you help me get there. I don't want to say we don't have jurisdiction to entertain the relief of structural separation, but I also don't want to say yet that we have it. It's almost like a hip pocket kind of relief that I would like to save, but I don't want to get there today. So if you were in my position and

you knew exactly what I was trying to accomplish, how would you get me there? Would you consider withdrawing your petition? It seems to me strategically that's your best option.

MS. DAVANT: Commissioner, I do understand your concerns. I would disagree with you on one point, and that is that structural separation is a different remedy than any other that you will consider in the 271 process.

I would also question whether or not 271 is as big a hammer as everyone would have us believe. I would agree with --

COMMISSIONER JABER: I can buy that,
Ms. Davant, but you're in an awkward position
too, because you take the risk of this
Commission finding today that we don't have
jurisdiction for structural separation.

So let me go back to my question, my last question of you. As a matter of strategy, would you consider withdrawing your petition for structural separation?

MS. DAVANT: Well, I would consider just about anything that this Commission puts forward in that light. But I would also suggest, you

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know, you can deny the motion to dismiss with the understanding, as your staff's recommendation clearly indicates, that there's no hurry to get to a hearing yet because of all the other processes. So if you deny the motion to dismiss, but ultimately hold that there's no reason, there's no impending crisis that would require an immediate hearing on this issue, maybe you determine that, well, we'll get through the 271 process and ultimately determine whether or not we need to move forward on the hearing. You can deny a motion to dismiss and yet not move forward on the hearing anytime I would suggest that strategically, that gives you the hip pocket alternative you're asking for.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Ms. White, how do we get out of this morass?

MS. WHITE: I would say that you vote no on Issue 4, you --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Is that denying somebody due process if we vote no on Issue 4?

MS. WHITE: No, I don't believe it is, because you will issue an order that says we believe this matter should not be set for

hearing and that investigation should not go forward because of several reasons, one, we think it's premature because we have all these other dockets going on; the parties have a point of entry into all those other proceedings; and three, if they don't like that, you're putting this out as an order, and it can be appealed. If you vote no on Issue 4, then the motions to dismiss are moot, and you don't have to reach the issue of jurisdiction.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So if we -- under your scenario, if we vote no on Issue 4 for the reasons you just expressed, then the question of the motions to dismiss become moot, and there would be no vote taken on that?

MS. WHITE: That's correct. That would be my position.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. McLean, you disagree with that?

MR. McLEAN: No, I agree with most of it.

I think it has potential weakness, and that is whether a court, if asked to review that order, would agree with you that those other dockets afforded an effective point of entry. And given the merits of what you're considering there, I

think we could make a very persuasive argument that indeed it does, because, to kind of summarize what several of you have said, you've got -- Commissioner Baez is running out of fingers, and I am too. There's quite a few dockets that address the very same alleged issues by the ILECs. So I think we could make you a persuasive case that those other dockets do afford an effective point of entry for this consideration.

But I also have to say that a petitioner ought to be able to come forward on their vehicle and get their case heard too. So there would be two sides to that argument.

Strategically, again, Commissioner Jaber, perhaps AT&T would wait until they saw at least what the directions of the other dockets were. But the only problem I see with what Ms. White just said is that a court is going to have to agree with you, if asked to agree, that that effective point of entry arose in the other dockets.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: May I respond?

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: We're getting into another round-robin there.

1 well, let me ask this. Commissioners, do 2 we want to have more -- do you want more 3 questions, or do you want to ask more questions 4 of the parties? 5 COMMISSIONER JABER: I want to know if Ms. Davant wants to take a five- or ten-minute break and talk to the parties about -- I want to 8 know if we need a break so that you can think about what the Commissioners' discussion has 9 10 been. 11 MS. DAVANT: May I request a ten-minute 12 break, Commissioner? 13 COMMISSIONER JABER: I would be in support 14 of giving the parties a ten-minute break. 15 COMMISSIONER DEASON: We'll temporarily 16 pass this out and come back to it in about 15 17 minutes. 18 19 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: We'll go back to item 4 20 now. 21 MS. DAVANT: Commissioner, we have 22 strategized with our team as well as some of the 23 other petitioners. And as luck would have it, 24 the judge arrived and wanted to have a few 25 words, if he might.

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MR. HATCHETT: Thank you. Joseph Hatchett, Akerman Senterfitt, for AT&T. Along with me are counsel also associated in this case in this proceeding.

It's my understanding that at the time of the recess, the question was whether AT&T would choose to withdraw its petition. We would urge the Commission, since nothing is before the Commission at this time except jurisdiction, that the Commission would follow the staff recommendation and deny the motion to dismiss, in that way not really setting any great precedent, and then perhaps to continue any further consideration until some appropriate That is, while you go forward with some time. of these other proceedings, if at any time it appears appropriate for you to consider a remedy such as that that has been suggested by AT&T. that at that time you would go forward with the petition, but at this time to simply rule on the motion to dismiss that is pending this morning. And, of course, we urge that you deny that motion and continue all further proceedings in this matter.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Questions, Commissioners?

2 from BellSouth? 3 MS. WHITE: Just a short one. I mean, this 4 is -- we've talked about this for at least two 5 hours now. I believe I can speak for Verizon 6 when I say that our position remains the same. 7 It was my understanding when we first started 8 this discussion from questions from the Commissioners that the Commission did not really 9 10 want to -- thought it was premature to reach the 11 issue of jurisdiction at this point. And if you 12 follow Judge Hatchett's suggestion, then you are 13 making that decision. 14 So again, I would urge that the way to 15 decide this is on your own motion decide that 16 it's premature to go forward, that there are 17 other points of entry, and that -- decide it in 18 that way, and the motions to dismiss would be 19 moot. 20 Thank you. 21 MR. HATCHETT: May I --22 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me make one 23 observation at this point. I'm sorry. 24 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Brief response. 25 MR. HATCHETT: May I respond? As I

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Is there a response

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understand the comment that has just been made,

it said why not hold that the proceedings are

premature. If you do that, then I think you are

setting a precedent, because that will be

interpreted as meaning that you do not have the

jurisdiction to go forward on the remedy that we

have suggested.

If you simply deny the motion and postpone all further proceedings, it is not forever in stone that you will ever reach the remedy that we have suggested. It simply means that the other side has not sufficiently convinced you that our allegations were untrue. And that is all the Commission would be ruling on at this point, the strength of the allegations in the complaint or in the petition that AT&T filed.

That's all the Commission would be holding, that those allegations are sufficient, because on the motion to dismiss, all of the allegation are taken -- or in our petition, all of the allegations are taken as true, and you're simply ruling on the four corners of the petition that AT&T filed. But we believe that it would be interpreted as this Commission holding that it will never have jurisdiction to even entertain

the remedy that AT&T has suggested.

MS. CASWELL: Could I just respond briefly to that?

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Briefly.

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MS. CASWELL: If you take the approach that BellSouth and Verizon have suggested, then you won't even need to rule on the motion to dismiss. It will become moot once you decide that you don't want to go to hearing on the petition. So there's no way — there's not even the merest implication that you've decided you don't have jurisdiction to order structural separation. And if at the end of all those other proceedings you feel it's the appropriate remedy, then we can discuss it again.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me ask Mr. McLean a quick question. If we were to grant the motion to dismiss on the grounds that we lack adequate jurisdiction, is that an appealable decision?

MR. MCLEAN: Yes, sir, I believe it is, but let me add something. A motion to dismiss on the basis of subject matter jurisdiction lies at any time, so it could also be renewed later. I don't think necessarily responsive, but it is a

1 thought that crosses my mind. If you decide to deny the motion, if the motion is renewed at 2 3 some later point in time after --COMMISSIONER DEASON: But I'm saying grant the motion to dismiss on the grounds that we 5 lack adequate jurisdiction. 6 7 MR. MCLEAN: I believe that's an appealable 8 order, yes, sir. COMMISSIONER DEASON: But then a court of competent jurisdiction could define our 10 11 jurisdiction for us. MR. McLEAN: Yes, sir, if they chose to do 12 13 SO. COMMISSIONER DEASON: Or the Legislature 14 15 could give some guidance in this area as well. MR. McLEAN: They've been known to do that, 16 17 yes, sir. COMMISSIONER BAEZ: So it's an appealable 18 19 -- it's appealable either way; right? 20 MR. MCLEAN: If you issue a final order today that says we grant the motion to dismiss, 21 that's an appealable order. In my opinion, that 22 23 can be taken to the court. COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And if you deny the 24 25 motion to dismiss, same posture?

MR. MCLEAN: Probably so. It is also true that that motion can be renewed if denied. So if you're contemplating continuing this action, it is safe to say that if AT wished to do so down the line somewhere, they could renew the motion to dismiss.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I have a question for Judge Hatchett and Ms. Davant. What -- and maybe I'm hammering a square peg here. What evidence would you produce, what different evidence would this Commission hear in a hearing as you request in your petition that we would not hear as a result of the investigations that the staff established?

MR. HATCHETT: I hate to admit it, but I simply don't know the answer to that question.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I'm going to ask staff later, but I just thought I would let you take a crack at it.

MR. HATCHETT: I really don't know the answer to that question.

MS. DAVANT: Commissioner, if I might respond, I think obviously that's why we requested the hearing, was to allow you to listen to witnesses who on a day-to-day basis

1 may have different evidence to present. 2 counsel down the table disagrees with that. I think the key issue before this Commission is. 4 even if we don't bring new evidence to the table, the petition, the reason for the petition 5 6 was the remedy. The remedy that you have before 7 you now may or may not prohibit or prevent the 8 activities and the evidence that have been 9 presented in these other cases. 10 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And is a discussion of 11 the remedies that we may or may not have 12 available to us not an appropriate subject for 13 consideration in the context of these dockets 14 that already exist? 15 MS. DAVANT: Not this particular remedy, 16

Commissioner, as your general counsel mentioned to you earlier.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Did he mention that earlier?

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MS. DAVANT: I didn't mean to speak for Mr. McLean.

MR. McLEAN: I'm not sure what the question is.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, Harold, what I want to know is if this remedy that we're -- you know, has been requested or suggested that we're considering the appropriateness of, is that not subject to proper -- it's subject to an original decision or a preliminary decision that we have on jurisdiction, but assuming that, would it not be a proper remedy to consider under an investigation docket that we've already got open?

MR. MCLEAN: Yes, sir, I think so. I think that's consistent with the staff recommendation before you, which is, upon a showing of a number of facts, alleged but not proven before you, but alleged, that you have jurisdiction to proceed with structural separation.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: If that's the case, if that's the case, then why are -- you know, why Issue 4? If you've already got a docket that's open -- I mean, I think we've already answered that question. And secondly, if you're correct and whatever remedies we have, again subject to some kind of statement or some kind of determination of jurisdiction at the appropriate time, I don't think you can separate the two, would that not be appropriate in a docket that we've already got open? Why are we considering

-- why do we have twin tracks here? And I know that Ms. Simmons tried to explain it to me, because one is top-down and the other one is top-up, and I can only assume -- bottom-up. Excuse me. I don't know if I'm up or down anymore. And that may be true about the approach. But I guess the bottom line is, if you're looking for a remedy and you're looking for something that might be available to you and you want to consider it, the opportunity is there, isn't it, at the appropriate time?

You know, again, I don't want to reach this jurisdiction today. I don't think it has been played out.

MS. SIMMONS: Commissioner Baez, we believe you could do that.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: Commissioner Baez, you've anticipated the comment I was going to add, and that is -- let me back up for a moment. The FCCA's petition alleges that the situation is urgent, and the FCCA represents -- just to make it very clear, the FCCA represents a very broad cross-section of the ALEC community, so the problem being addressed is not limited to AT&T's petition.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I understand.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: And reference has been made by opposing counsel to points of entry, and I was very concerned listening to the argument that we might find ourselves directed to another docket, but with no ability to bring to you the type of evidence and the type of remedies that are here.

But that is something within the Commission's control, and if the Commission would allow the parties to develop not only the evidence, but the remedies that are being sought in here, then I think as long as we have the opportunity in either this forum or the other to make that case with the same end objective, that would allay some of the concerns I've had about finding my clients in a position of being told to wait, because we've alleged very sincerely that we think time is of the essence with respect to consideration of these issues.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, while I have some comfort by what you said, I'm not sure that I have complete comfort, because as I've said all along, I think that everybody here has recognized the existence of other dockets, and

certainly the end purpose of those dockets is to facilitate competition.

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Now, what you're still suggesting is that we've got to take up something before we come to some conclusion on OSS, on 271. I mean, all of these things are going to have some — they're going to create some critical mass, I suspect, and we're going to see some results that would then lead us to say, "Well, maybe this isn't working, and maybe we need to be looking at more drastic measures."

And I think that's where this remedy of structural separation comes in. I'm not ready to discount it as an alternative, but it's an alternative that comes with certain -- that comes under certain circumstances. And I'm not sure that we do justice to the processes that we've already got in place or underway to consider now this other track absent some lack of results from the ones that are already underway.

And that's a concern that I have, and I've stated it before. It's not -- we've got to have some level of faith that the dockets that we've got, that the processes that we've got are going

to be handled and resolved in a manner that's fairer and that shows results to everyone. And until we can make a determination that that is not precisely the case, to engage in yet another -- you know, go down yet another road is, in effect, to discard all this work that we've been doing and continue to do.

And I know that that sounds somehow unfair if, as you say, the conditions are urgent. But I don't think they're any less urgent than they were yesterday when we had those other processes. I don't think anyone up here, or certainly anyone that was up here during those votes said, "Well, this is something that we're going to do to address those problems, but we can take our time about it, because, you know, time is not of the essence." I don't think that implication has ever come through. I don't think that implication or that statement has ever been made.

So I agree with you, the situation is urgent. I urge you to let us see some kind of result. Let us see a little bit of a result so that we can say, you know, it's not going to work. That day hasn't been reached.

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COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Let me ask Ms. White a question. Ms. White, you're aware of my concerns and of the information and analysis that I would like to receive from the ILECs. Do the other dockets afford us an opportunity to get that information that I mentioned earlier?

MS. WHITE: I think, yes, some more than others probably. The collaborative I think is probably the one that would go furthest towards what you're looking at. That's not a -- I don't know whether that has a docket number or not. I guess it doesn't, but it's the colloborative that Chairman Jacobs put together that's meeting I think two or three times a month on various issues. It has a huge topic list of issues. But I think that is probably, of all the dockets, the one that's coming the closest to what you're looking at.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Well, I very much appreciate a collaborative process over a formal docket, but my concern is that this is something that I would like to ask the company for in a more formal discovery situation. You know, as I stated earlier, I would like the ILECs to tell us how they can use their own processes, the

same processes that the ALECs go through, and make some sort of reorganization so that their retail side can use the same processes, because I have a real problem in my -- I have a very strong instinctive belief that 90% of these dockets that we're hearing arise because the ALEC community feels they're being treated unfairly because they go through completely different processes -- excuse me, I meant ALEC community -- than the ILEC retail side. And I would like to see that information provided to us by the ILECs themselves.

I don't want to dictate what the ILECs do, but I want to explore what are the possibilities out there so we can make this more fair and so we can make the perception that it's a more fair process so that the ALEC community doesn't constantly feel that they're being treated differently and unfairly.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Commissioner Palecki, certainly it is within your prerogative to ask for whatever you want to ask for, so I don't want to -- don't misunderstand my comments to not be appreciative of that fact. But just to offer a different viewpoint, some of what you're

requesting is exactly what the OSS test results will show and some of these other dockets.

That's the first observation.

The second observation, every time we ask BellSouth to do something in addition to what we're already doing creates delay. And I'm not sure that that's legitimate delay, but nevertheless, it takes their focus from where it needs to be to something else, and it takes their resources away from the OSS testing to something else.

And that's not to say that what you're asking for is not necessary, but it's just another viewpoint, something else to think about. And every additional requirement that we put on any telecom industry stakeholder creates a cost for the consumer. And that's something, to the degree we can avoid, I'm very interested in avoiding.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Ms. White, did you just say that the collaborative process was a docketed matter?

MS. WHITE: No, it's not. I'm sorry. I wasn't sure whether it was or not.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Okay. I misunderstood.

MS. WHITE: And it's not.

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MR. McLEAN: Mr. Chairman, I'll take just a second to correct something I told Commissioners Deason and Baez. I led you to believe, I think, that if the motion to dismiss was granted, that's an appealable order, and that's true. I also, I believe, that if the motions to dismiss were denied, that would be an appealable order. And indeed it is, but courts don't like to hear that kind of appeal. It's an interlocutory appeal and would very likely be rejected. I just want to --

appreciation for the matter of, you know, acting on the -- it still proves the point. I mean, acting or not acting -- let me back up. Acting on the motion to dismiss today makes a statement on jurisdiction. I'm convinced of that. And whether it's appealable or not -- I think you said in both instances, whichever way it goes, it's appealable. That just means that someone else is going to decide whether we have jurisdiction or not.

MR. McLEAN: Probably so.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: At least with the level

of comfort that I have in deciding this today.

MR. MCLEAN: The only reason I brought that up was because in interlocutory kind of appeals, courts like to say, "You administrative folks finish your business, and then we'll hear from you."

COMMISSIONER JABER: I want to take the simplest approach, which is not reach the question of jurisdiction, but say some parties have exercised their discretion to petition this agency for a hearing, and we want to exercise our discretion to deny that request. That -- to take that approach would be to move to deny staff on Issue 4?

MR. MCLEAN: I believe so, yes, ma'am.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Commissioners, it

seems to me that would be the simplest approach.

Jaber, I'm sorry. I didn't mean to interrupt, but I think Mr. McLean did suggest some form or some kind of statement that has to get made.

And if I'm reading the comments correctly, there's some belief at least -- and I may only be speaking for myself -- that there are dockets available, that there are avenues or points of

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entry into the administrative process that are already up and running to entertain these kinds or issues. And if we identify them, then we will have in fact -- not just identified them, but certainly provided a clear point of entry by our words.

I just wanted to say I don't think the -- I just wanted to say for the record, I don't know that the collaborative process necessarily works here. I'm not persuaded that that's where we should park issues. But I am persuaded that as long as the staff has gone ahead and opened, you know, investigations on anticompetitive issues, that's where certainly this type of proof and this type of evidence that FCCA and AT&T are proposing to provide, that I would consider that's where it more properly lies.

So, Commissioner, Jaber, I guess with at least some of the clarification that Mr. McLean had offered us, let's be clear on why we don't think we need to approve this issue.

COMMISSIONER JABER: And I don't have certainly any problem making sure we're clear on why we're voting.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Please, some certainty.

COMMISSIONER JABER: But I think -- my hesitancy is I'm not sure I agree with you that those dockets necessarily encompass the issue. That's my hesitancy.

But since we're on those dockets, let me just tell you all that I realize that -- I'm the prehearing officer on those three dockets, sally, and I want a briefing on those three dockets ASAP. I want to know why those dockets were opened, what they were designed to encompass. And I want -- to the degree you all have issues, I want to see those issues. And that's when I'm ready to entertain what remedies might be appropriate. That's my hesitancy, Commissioner. I don't even know what those dockets were designed to do.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And again, a lot of what I've said -- this is a very delicate situation, because a lot of the opinion that I've formed is based on some assurances that that's a proper venue or a proper forum for those issues. I don't want to -- you know, if they need to go back and consider it, maybe we need to give this some time, but that would be the basis of my -- the opinion that I'm

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formulating here is that there is some avenue available.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let me muddy this water a little bit more. When we started this whole discussion. I raised the idea of how do we avoid the question of ruling on our jurisdiction and basically not engage in an investigation of structural separation at this time because I felt it was premature. that was the easiest, most direct way to handle this. And after an hour and a half of discussion, I think I'm convinced that usually what I consider the easy is probably not the easy way.

Commissioners, I'm almost at the point where I'm convinced that we should just grant the motions to dismiss and be done with it. I'm forced to make a decision on jurisdiction, that's where I come down. We do not have the jurisdiction. And once we make that decision, that can be taken to a court, and the court can define our jurisdiction for us. And If that's not sufficient, then the Legislature can define our jurisdiction for us.

So to move this along, I make a motion we

1 grant the motions to dismiss. 2 COMMISSIONER JABER: So that's Issue 2 --COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, we have 4 motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 5 think they apply to both the AT&T petition as 6 well as the FCCA. And I think that if we grant 7 the motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 8 it would apply equally. It would apply to both at the same time. And if I'm mistaken on that, 9 10 staff, please correct me. 11 MR. FUDGE: You are correct. Commissioner. 12 That would only apply to Issue 2. Issue 1 is 13 whether the first motion to dismiss would be 14 rendered moot, and staff recommends that it 15 would be rendered moot. 16 COMMISSIONER DEASON: So it would be moot 17 for Issue 1, and we would be granting the motion 18 for Issue 2; is that correct? 19 MR. FUDGE: We approve Issue 1 and --20 SPEAKER G: Which becomes moot? 21 MR. FUDGE: In Issue 2, you would deny 22 staff. 23 COMMISSIONER DEASON: That's my motion, 24 then. 25 COMMISSIONER JABER: Second.

1 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: We have a motion to 2 approve staff --3 COMMISSIONER DEASON: No. no. Deny. CHAIRMAN JACOBS: I'm sorry. If I 5 understand, we're approving Issue 1. COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. You're 7 correct. 8 MR. FUDGE: You're approving Issue 1, and 9 when you're granting the motion to dismiss on 10 Issue 2, that would only apply to the remedy of structural separation. There are other live 11 12 issues that AT&T has alleged in its petition. 13 COMMISSIONER JABER: And that motion to 14 dismiss is to dismiss FCCA and AT&T's request in 15 its entirety; correct. 16 MR. FUDGE: That is correct, Commissioner, 17 but their allegations only go to that we do not 18 have the authority for full structural 19 separation. 20 COMMISSIONER JABER: We're not dismissing 21 the allegations. We would be dismissing the 22 entire petition. And I think the motion is to 23 deny staff's recommendation and to approve -- or 24 to grant BellSouth's motion to dismiss in its

entirety. Is that correct, Commissioner

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1 Deason?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: That's my desire if we can accomplish that.

MR. HATCHETT: May I be heard?

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: We have a motion. Very briefly. Go ahead.

MR. HATCHETT: If it's improper, I -CHAIRMAN JACOBS: I think probably we want
to go ahead and resolve the motion.

Are we clear now?

COMMISSIONER JABER: Harold, are you all clear, because don't let us -- because what we're trying to accomplish is granting Bellsouth's motion in its entirety and close this docket. That's what we're trying to accomplish.

MR. MCLEAN: Does BellSouth's motion in its entirety address all of AT&T's petition? I have not read it with that focus. My concern is that you will -- the original motion to dismiss was somewhat aimed at the rifle approach that structural separation was the only remedy suggested. Now, in the two amended versions, the amended petition and the amended motion to dismiss, I believe that the motion to dismiss

directs itself to the petition in its entirety,
but I have not read it with --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Why can't we dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction and lack of clarity as to exactly what they're requesting and, give them the ability to refile, leaving out all reference to structural separation, and they can refile it with a more definite statement as to exactly what they're requesting.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Here's the thing. The amended petition added the idea that we would pursue our investigation, focus on structural separation, but at the end, whatever conclusion we arrived at, we would then attach the appropriate remedy to that.

MR. McLEAN: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Regardless of whether it be structural separation.

MR. McLEAN: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: The response to that was that it really was still maintaining a petition for a specific remedy, and the other added was nothing, in essence, it was puffery.

MR. MCLEAN: I believe that's correct, Mr. Chairman.

1 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: And in my mind then, the 2 very important question, Commissioner, is, if we accept the amended portion of that petition which says do your investigation and attach 5 whatever remedy goes along with that, in my mind, that's the more rational approach, either 6 that or we strike the whole thing and refile it, 8 whatever, however you want to do it, but --. 9 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I would grant --I would move that we grant the motions to 10 11 dismiss in their entirety, dismiss the petitions 12 and allow the parties to refile, expressing what 13 they want us to accomplish and why what they're 14 requesting cannot be done in existing dockets 1.5 which are already open. 16 MR. McLEAN: Mr. Commissioner, we can draw 17 that order and defend it. 18 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: There's a motion. 19 COMMISSIONER JABER: Second. 20 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: And a second. 21 resolve it. All in favor. 22 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Aye. 23 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: 24 COMMISSIONER JABER: Aye. 25 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: I'm going to vote in

favor; however, it will granting in part and denying in part.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I would dissent and vote --

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: I will record then the yea vote.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I would dissent and vote for the staff recommendation.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Let me express -- I've stated my theory on this earlier. I believe that we have a petition for a specific remedy, which in my mind is equitable remedy, which in my mind -- we probably could get there, but it was a stretch, and without specific authority, I wouldn't.

I clearly think we have jurisdiction to entertain the subject matter, and I think we have jurisdiction to look at this investigation and to do so in an existing docket.

Having said that, are there any other issues in this docket that we need to address?

MR. FUDGE: There's also Issue 3, but I think that has been rendered moot by the previous motion on Issue 2. Issue 3 was the motion for a more definite statement and motion

1	to strike clarified and amended petition be
2	granted. And with your motion on Issue 2, I
3	think Issue 3 has been rendered moot.
4	CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Okay. So that takes care
5	of 1, 3, and 4.
6	MR. FUDGE: Four I guess is rendered moot
7	too because of the motion on Issue 2.
8	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Very well.
9	MR. FUDGE: And 5
10	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Close the docket;
11	correct?
12	MR. FUDGE: Yes, sir.
13	CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Okay. All in favor?
14	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Aye.
15	COMMISSIONER JABER: Aye.
16	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Aye.
17	CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Opposed? Show it
18	passes.
19	MR. MCGLOTHLIN: May I ask for a brief
20	clarification? Do I understand correctly that
21	with this ruling, the parties have the option or
22	opportunity either to refile or to raise related
23	issues in existing dockets?
24	COMMISSIONER DEASON: That was part of the
25	motion, yes.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: All right. COMMISSIONER DEASON: But with the understanding that structural separation would not be a remedy that we would consider, because we've made the determination we don't have the jurisdiction to consider that. That's my understanding. MR. McGLOTHLIN: And by structural separation you mean the complete physical separation, as I understand it. COMMISSIONER DEASON: That's correct. MR. McGLOTHLIN: Thank you. CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Anything else? Any other clarification? Thank you, parties. (Conclusion of consideration of Item 4.)

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

4 STATE OF FLORIDA)

5 | COUNTY OF LEON)

I, MARY ALLEN NEEL, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings were taken before me at the time and place therein designated; that my shorthand notes were thereafter transcribed under my supervision; and that the foregoing pages numbered 1 through 95 are a true and correct transcription of my stenographic notes.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, or relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or financially interested in the action.

DATED THIS 17th day of October, 2001.

MARY ALLEN NEEL, RPR

100 Salem Court

Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (850) 878-2221