

DOCKET NO.: 010949-EI - [Request for Rate Increase by Gulf Power
Company]

WITNESS: Direct Testimony of James E. Breman,
Appearing on Behalf of Staff

DATE FILED: January 14, 2002

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DIRECT TESTIMONY OF JIM BREMAN

1
2 Q. Please state your name and business address.

3 A. My name is Jim Breman; 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida
4 32399-0850.

5 Q. By whom are you employed and in what capacity?

6 A. I am employed by the Florida Public Service Commission as a Utility
7 Systems Communications Engineer in the Division of Economic Regulation.

8 Q. Please briefly describe your educational background and professional
9 experience.

10 A. From April 1980 through December 1981 I was an engineering technician
11 with Peoples Gas System Inc., North Miami Division. I graduated from Florida
12 State University in 1986 with a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering.
13 I was also employed by the College of Engineering while pursuing my degree at
14 Florida State University.

15 I began employment with the Florida Public Service Commission in 1988
16 and have held various positions since that time. In April 2000 I was promoted
17 to my current position.

18 Q. What are your present responsibilities with the Commission?

19 A. My responsibilities include reviewing utility distribution reliability
20 reports and then preparing reports to the Commission on staff's findings. I
21 also analyze various other electric utility filings concerning the Ten-Year
22 Site Plans, underground vs. overhead distribution differentials, storm damage
23 issues, and the environmental cost recovery clause. My responsibilities also
24 include addressing customer complaints related to electric service.

25 Q. Have you previously testified before the Commission?

1 A. Yes. I testified in Docket No. 910615-EU that resulted in Rule 25-
2 6.115, F.A.C., Facility Charges For Providing Underground Facilities of Public
3 Distribution Facilities Excluding New Residential Subdivisions. I testified
4 in Docket No. 960409-EI, Prudence Review to Determine Regulatory Treatment of
5 Tampa Electric Company's Polk Unit.

6 Q. What is the purpose of your testimony?

7 A. The purpose of my testimony is to show why the Commission should
8 implement a program that provides an incentive to Gulf Power Company for
9 maintaining reliable service. I also discuss why a minimum distribution
10 reliability standard is appropriate and necessary.

11 Q. Have you prepared any exhibits to which you will refer to in your
12 testimony?

13 A. Yes. I prepared four exhibits. In JEB-1, I've reproduced the various
14 graphs of distribution reliability indices presented to the Commission in a
15 June 2001 Internal Affairs report on distribution reliability. In JEB-2, I
16 state responses provided by each of the four major utilities when questioned
17 about the costs necessary to comply with the vegetation management
18 requirements of the National Electric Safety Code. JEB-3 consists of recent
19 photographs of utility distribution facilities that are not being maintained
20 in compliance with the National Electric Safety Code. JEB-4 is a detailed
21 presentation of my proposed distribution reliability incentive program.

22 Q. Is Gulf Power Company currently providing reliable distribution service?

23 A. Overall, Gulf Power Company's distribution reliability is good. As
24 Staff's Witness Durbin's testimony indicates, the Commission has not recently
25 received many complaints. Therefore, I would agree that most of Gulf Power

1 | Company's customers receive reasonable service.

2 | Q. Why are you proposing an incentive program if Gulf Power Company's
3 | customers are not complaining about service reliability?

4 | A. Waiting for a large number of customers to complain about frequent
5 | service interruptions is reactive rather than proactive. Last year, Gulf
6 | Power Company estimated that 4 percent of its customers experience more than
7 | five service interruptions. This is approximately double the amount reported
8 | by the other Florida investor owned companies. So we already know that some
9 | of Gulf Power Company's customers do not receive highly reliable service.
10 | Also, it appears there is a potential for complaints to increase.

11 | In recent years the Commission elevated its review of distribution
12 | reliability primarily because the level of customer complaints seemed high for
13 | Florida Power & Light and Florida Power Corporation. As a result of the
14 | Commission's intervention, all the utilities began various activities to
15 | improve distribution reliability. JEB-1 contains various graphs of indices
16 | used to assess changes in distribution reliability. The graphs demonstrate
17 | general reliability improvement trends relative to 1997 for the utilities as
18 | a group. However, there is little assurance that Gulf Power Company or the
19 | other utilities will either maintain or even continue to improve distribution
20 | reliability absent continual Commission intervention.

21 | Q. Why do you believe the utility provides little assurance that it will
22 | maintain or improve distribution reliability?

23 | A. The utilities have been relying on self-set goals. These internal goals
24 | are typically tied to financial performance. The desire to meet such
25 | financial goals creates a disincentive to make expenditures that would

1 increase distribution reliability. Consequently, as in 1997, it is sometimes
2 necessary for the Commission to intervene on behalf of the retail customers.
3 The utilities do not have what I would call a minimum standard for
4 distribution reliability because their current practice has not proven to be
5 effective. Unless there is a change in the process, history is likely to be
6 repeated.

7 Q. Do you have a specific example that demonstrates how your concerns apply
8 to this rate case?

9 A. Yes. The test year budget includes a projection of all costs for
10 planned activities including those affecting distribution reliability. There
11 are certain causes of service interruptions that a utility has more ability
12 to mitigate than others. Tree trimming or vegetation management is one of
13 these. One would think that a utility would have a natural incentive to
14 therefore promote vegetation management activities. The utility should also
15 be motivated to promote vegetation management because Part 2, Section 21.218
16 of the National Electric Safety Code requires the utilities to maintain
17 clearances between vegetation and utility distribution facilities. Yet, as
18 you can see in JEB-1, vegetation continues to be a significant cause of
19 service interruptions. Last year, staff asked the utilities to estimate the
20 annual cost to be in continuous compliance with the National Electric Safety
21 Code. Their responses are in JEB-2. Please note that some of the utilities
22 characterized the tree trimming budget as the amount to most cost effectively
23 comply with the National Electric Safety Code in 2001 while others simply
24 stated the budgeted amount. Gulf Power Company responded with a budgeted 2001
25 amount of \$2,599,198. Gulf Power Company's 2001 budget is at least \$1.5

1 million less than the 2003 test year vegetation budget of \$4.1 million.

2 Q. Did Gulf Power Company comply with the vegetation clearance requirements
3 of the National Electric Safety Code during 2001?

4 A. No. JEB-3 is a catalog of recent photographs taken by Jerry Woodall,
5 a PSC Safety Engineer. The pictures are of various locations where Gulf Power
6 Company was not in compliance with the National Electric Safety Code.

7 Q. Gulf Power Company's test year budget is higher than the 2001 budget.
8 If the vegetation management budget were doubled would your concern be
9 addressed?

10 A. No. It is important to realize that vegetation management and other
11 distribution reliability programs are expensive. However, I don't believe the
12 Commission should be picking and choosing between distribution reliability
13 activities. As I said earlier, vegetation management is just an example.
14 Vegetation management is just one of many activities affecting distribution
15 reliability. The vegetation management example highlights the incentives and
16 dis-incentives a utility has to minimize the many causes of service
17 interruptions shown in JEB-1. The example highlights current utility and
18 Commission practices. The existing scheme relies primarily on customer
19 complaints and is not proactive. A better approach would be one that ensures
20 reliable distribution service.

21 Q. You appear to suggest a change from historical rate case reviews. What
22 is wrong with performing a test year distribution budget review similar to
23 what was done in prior rate cases?

24 A. In the past, a common method has been to review the previous five years
25 and compare the test year budget levels to the five-year averages. However,

1 | the five-year period of distribution expenses includes the effects of direct
2 | Commission intervention. Consequently, I don't know what level of expense
3 | would have occurred under "normal" or "average" conditions. In addition,
4 | there are no minimum distribution reliability standards. Neither the
5 | Commission nor the utility can tell the customer what average service is or
6 | that next year the same level of service will be considered average.
7 | Consequently, I don't know what normal or average distribution expense levels
8 | are because I don't know what normal or average service means.

9 | Q. How should the Commission address the situation?

10 | A. The Commission should establish a program that allows the utility and
11 | retail customer interests to be reasonably balanced between rate cases. The
12 | program should be based on two fundamental concepts.

13 | The first concept is that distribution reliability should not decline
14 | between rate cases. At a minimum, the retail customer should not be expected
15 | to endure less reliable service once the rate case is concluded. Making such
16 | a commitment is consistent with setting base rates for average service.

17 | The second concept is simply that the company will be held accountable
18 | for declines in service in a timely manner. Timely accountability will
19 | provide an incentive for the company to consistently ensure that distribution
20 | reliability is appropriately maintained.

21 | Q. Can you be more detailed in how the new program would be implemented?

22 | A. Yes. In JEB-4 I've prepared a schedule reflecting the implementation
23 | of the new program for Gulf Power Company. Simply stated, the utility is
24 | required to make an annual refund to its retail customers when the number of
25 | retail customers experiencing more than five service interruptions exceeds an

1 | established standard in any consecutive 12 month period.

2 | Q. Should there be a cap on the annual refund amount?

3 | A. Yes. The total refund amount should be capped at the equivalent amount
4 | of 10 basis points of equity.

5 | Q. Why do you recommend a cap of 10 basis points?

6 | A. The intent of the refund is simply to provide sufficient incentive to
7 | cause the utility to manage distribution systems pro-actively between rate
8 | cases. It is not intended to be punitive.

9 | Q. Why did you select the number of customers experiencing more than five
10 | interruptions as the index for the incentive program?

11 | A. The number of Customers Experiencing More Interruptions than Five
12 | (CEMI5) is perhaps the best indicator of reliable service because CEMI5 is the
13 | number of customers who did not receive reliable service. By definition,
14 | CEMI5 provides the number of customers that have experienced six or more
15 | service interruptions. A prudent company should seek to minimize CEMI5. As
16 | seen in JEB-3, problems are likely to exist in areas where customers are
17 | experiencing many interruptions. In addition, as seen in JEB-1, CEMI5 is
18 | already used by the utilities and the Commission. Finally, the number of
19 | customers experiencing more than five interruptions is a measure that is
20 | easily understood.

21 | Q. Do all utilities have similar abilities to report CEMI5?

22 | A. Not as of June 2001. Gulf Power Company and Tampa Electric Company were
23 | implementing system changes that are expected to enable them to begin
24 | computerized reporting of CEMI5 in the near future. I believe the four
25 | largest companies will have similar abilities by the end of 2002 or sooner.

1 | Therefore, Gulf Power Company should be able to begin implementing the program
2 | in 2003.

3 | Q. How do you respond to the lack of computerized and historical data for
4 | Gulf Power Company?

5 | A. Gulf Power Company estimated a CEMI5 of 4 percent for year 2000. Mr.
6 | Fisher's testimony highlights various service reliability improvement
7 | activities that are either new activities or expansions of year 2000
8 | activities. Therefore, on a going forward basis, distribution reliability
9 | should improve. Consequently setting CEMI5 to 4 percent is not appropriate.
10 | I believe a CEMI5 of 2 percent is a reasonable standard primarily based on the
11 | expectation that Gulf Power Company's projected cost levels for activities are
12 | typical of future years. Continuation of similar budget levels should
13 | continue to improve retail service. In which case, at some future date, the
14 | Commission may need to adjust the incentive program.

15 | Q. How do you propose Gulf Power Company implement the incentive program?

16 | A. In 2003, they should include the necessary documentation in their final
17 | true-up testimony filed in an appropriate cost recovery clause where the
18 | refund amount can be allocated on a demand basis. The total refund amount,
19 | if any, would be a line item adjustment to the final true-up amount that Gulf
20 | Power Company would normally report for 2003. This way, a measure of the
21 | level of distribution reliability achieved during 2003 is used to set Gulf
22 | Power Company's retail cost recovery factors for 2004.

23 | Q. Does this conclude your testimony?

24 | A. Yes.

25 |

Source : 2001 Internal Affairs Report on Distribution Reliability

Figure 1





Figure 2



Source : 2001 Internal Affairs Report on Distribution Reliability

Figure 3





Figure 4



Source : 2001 Internal Affairs Report on Distribution Reliability

Figure 5





Figure 6



Source : 2001 Internal Affairs Report on Distribution Reliability

Figure 7





Figure 8



Source : 2001 Internal Affairs Report on Distribution Reliability

Figure 9





Figure 10



Source : 2001 Internal Affairs Report on Distribution Reliability

Figure 11





Figure 12



Source: Responses to question 5 of an April 2, 2001 staff data request.

Question 5:

Please identify the estimated annual cost to maintain clearances between vegetation and utility distribution facilities such that the facilities are maintained in continuous compliance with the National Electric Safety Code.

Responses:

Florida Power & Light

"FPL has budgeted 31.5 million dollars in 2001 to most cost effectively comply with the NESC."

Florida Power Corporation


"FPC's estimated cost to effectively comply with the National Electric Safety Code is \$8.2 million for 2001."

Tampa Electric Company

"\$5.8 million for 2001"

Gulf Power Company


"Gulf Power's budgeted amount for 2001 is \$2,599,198"







GULF POWER CO. 12/21/01
PANAMA CITY, FL.

2508 13th Street





GULF POWER CO. 12/21/01
PANAMA CITY, FL
SW corner of 14th St and Bay View Ave



GULF POWER CO. 12/21/01
PANAMA CITY, FL
NW corner of 14th St and Hickory

Example of Distribution Reliability Incentive Program Calculations										
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	CEMI5 % of Customers		Variance from Standard				Refund Calculation			
Month	Actual	Standard	Amount	%	Weighted	Points	1/12 Basis Point \$	Monthly	Cum. \$	Period Total \$
Jan	7.00%	2.00%	0.0500	250.0%	1.3	10.0	3.261	32.610	32.610	
Feb	6.00%	2.00%	0.0400	200.0%	1.0	10.0	3.263	32.630	65.240	
Mar	4.50%	2.00%	0.0250	125.0%	0.6	6.0	3.291	19.746	84.986	
Apr	2.97%	2.00%	0.0097	48.5%	0.2	2.0	3.298	6.596	91.582	
May	2.84%	2.00%	0.0084	42.0%	0.2	2.0	3.301	6.602	98.184	
June	2.68%	2.00%	0.0068	34.0%	0.2	2.0	3.320	6.640	104.824	
July	2.53%	2.00%	0.0053	26.5%	0.1	1.0	3.325	3.325	108.149	
Aug	2.25%	2.00%	0.0025	12.5%	0.1	1.0	3.353	3.353	111.502	
Sept	2.06%	2.00%	0.0006	3.0%	0.0	0.0	3.378	0	111.502	
Oct	2.08%	2.00%	0.0008	4.0%	0.0	0.0	3.384	0	111.502	
Nov	2.03%	2.00%	0.0003	1.5%	0.0	0.0	3.386	0	111.502	
Dec	2.01%	2.00%	0.0001	0.5%	0.0	0.0	3.394	0	111.502	111.502

Notes:

- Column(1)-Actual CEMI5 for the same 12 month period as Column(7).
Percent of customers experiencing more than 5 outages.
- Column(2)-CEMI5 Standard is 2% of customers experience more than 5 outages in a consecutive 12 month period.
- Column(3)-The amount by which CEMI5 Standard is exceeded.
- Column(4)-Percent Variance. Exceeded Amount divided by the CEMI5 Standard and rounded to the nearest tenth.
- Column(5)-Weighted Variance. Percent Variance times a weight of 0.5 and rounded to nearest tenth.
- Column(6)-Variance Points. Weighted Variance times 10 but not exceeding 10.
- Column(7)-1/12 Basis point of jurisdictional equity as reported on PSC monthly surveillance reports.
- Column(8)-Monthly Refund Amounts. Variance Points times Basis Points.
- Column(9)-Accumulated Monthly Refund Amounts.
- Column(10)-Sum of all refund amounts for the period.