1	BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION	
2	DOCKET NO. 020398-EQ	
3	In the Matter of	
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5	PROPOSED REVISIONS TO RULE 25-22.082, SELECTION OF GENERATING CAPACITY.	
6	GENERATING CAPACITY.	
7	ELECTRONIC VERSIONS OF THIS TRANSCRIPT ARE	
8	ELECTRONIC VERSIONS OF THIS TRANSCRIPT ARE A CONVENIENCE COPY ONLY AND ARE NOT	
9	THE OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF THE HEARING, THE .PDF VERSION INCLUDES PREFILED TESTIMONY.	
10	VOLUME 2	
11		Pages 141 through 281
12	PROCEEDINGS:	SPECIAL AGENDA CONFERENCE
13	BEFORE:	CHAIRMAN LILA A. JABER
14	BEI ORE.	COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON COMMISSIONER BRAULIO L. BAEZ
15		COMMISSIONER MICHAEL A. PALECKI COMMISSIONER RUDOLPH "RUDY" BRADLEY
16 17	DATE:	Monday, September 30, 2002
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20		Room 148 4075 Esplanade Way
21		Tallahassee, Florida
22	REPORTED BY:	JANE FAUROT, RPR, Chief
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PROCEEDINGS

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(Transcript continues in sequence from Volume 2.)

CHAIRMAN JABER: Let's go ahead and get started. Commissioner Palecki, you were about to ask a guestion?

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Yes, I have a question for Ms. Clark. And one of the reasons I want you to answer this question is because it relates, I believe, to a situation that existed. I believe, when you were a Commissioner, it might have been before that when you were the general counsel. But I --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Ms. Clark is going, do you want me to remember that?

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I am very comfortable with the utilities in Florida being a significant provider of generation, and even the dominant provider of generation. And I understand your fear of a rule like this bidding rule because I think you believe that it threatens that position. And the question I wanted to ask, and I can't remember for sure if it was the Cypress generation case or Indiantown, but I recall very specifically that there was a deal that was negotiated, and I believe it was Florida Power and Light with one of the independent power producers. And that deal would have allowed the IPP to provide service under contract for a year or two years, and then the power plant would be turned over to the utility.

And I guess the question I have is if we do have defined criteria up front, doesn't that allow the utilities to ensure their place as a significant or dominant generator in the State of Florida, and can't they do that by just putting in a provision in a contract that would say that, oh, after seven years of providing service, payment would be made to the IPP and the power plant would then be turned over to the utility? And couldn't that be done for numerous time periods and wouldn't that give the utility quite a bit of control over their generation destiny?

MS. CLARK: First of all, Commissioner Palecki, I am not sure that what is motivating the response to the proposals on the bid rule is motivated by the notion of keeping them as the dominant provider of capacity. I think the motivation is that particularly with respect to what the IPPs are proposing, it is unwise public policy and will not lead to the most cost-effective choice.

With respect to the notion of putting in the contract a requirement that the power plant be turned over to the utility, I would suspect that you will chill a lot of proposals. It seems to me that one of the ways they will likely make money is being able to operate that plant for a long time in the future when they paid off some of their investment in that plant.

I believe there have been contracts where it does

1 provide for the utility to take over under certain 2 circumstances, but it is not a motivating factor that in the 3 end they are the sole provider of generation. It is to find 4 the most cost-effective. 5 COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Thank you. 6 CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Baez and then 7 Commissioner Deason. 8 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: You mentioned there are 9 contractual, there exists contractual terms today that allow an IOU to step in in the event of any failure by an IPP to run, 10 11 you know, I don't know what the contingencies might be, but 12 there are contingencies along those lines? 13 MS. CLARK: I want to state this positively. 14 believe that there are, and there are circumstances where if 15 the power has not come on line when it is committed or some 16 other failure of contract performance that the utility can step 17 in to operate the plant. 18 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Thank you. 19 MS. CLARK: But, you know, I would have to --20 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Off the top of your head you 21 don't know specifically, but you suspect that there are. Thank 22 you. 23 COMMISSIONER PALECKI: And let me just ask one 24

follow-up, and I promise the Chairman it would only be one question, but ${\mbox{--}}$

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CHAIRMAN JABER: It's quite all right, it's your lunch.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: You have talked about a chilling effect if there was a provision like that that would require turnover of the plant after a certain number of years of operation, but would it really be a chilling effect or would it more be a cost that would be considered by the bidding community, including if bids were required by the utility itself, including the utility itself, isn't that just another cost that would be incorporated into the bid by whoever happened to be involved in submitting a proposal?

MS. CLARK: I guess I have sort of three responses to that. The notion that I don't think -- I think one of the things you want to maintain is creativity in responding to the bids, you stated that in your rule. I would suspect if you have in there the notion that after seven years or whatever you have to turn over your plant, it will drive up the short-term costs, because they will want to get value for making that proposal on the power. I said there were three things, didn't I? And I think it will have the effect of limiting who will put in bids for that particular capacity addition.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Deason, did you have any questions?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Yes, Madam Chairman. First of

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all, let me say in light of Mr. Twomey's comments from the religious analogy that this decision may be one that requires a lot of fasting and prayer, I didn't know the fasting part was going to be so literal.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I can't help it, Commissioner Deason.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: But given the hour, I will be precise in my question. My question is to staff, and it pertains to PACE's principle number three, and the question is this: Does staff agree or disagree with that principle? If you agree with it, where is it incorporated in your proposed rule. And if you disagree with it, why do you disagree?

MR. BALLINGER: Okay. This is a discussion of having a neutral third party do the evaluation, correct?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: No. Requirement three, I am looking at PACE's letter dated September 25th, and it is a requirement that the utility submit a binding proposal at the same time and in the same manner as all other RFP participants.

MR. BALLINGER: That has been talked about before.

Your question is does staff agree with that principle or not?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Yes.

MR. BALLINGER: I would say no, we do not agree with that as a principle. And it really focuses on what is meant by the word binding. I think today utilities are in a sense bound by their bid in an RFP process. Because staff looks at that as

a benchmark come time for cost-recovery, and we look at are you at or above or below what you told us in the bid process. If you come in above that we ask for justification. And I think it is reasonable to assume that there will be changes as we go forward in the cost overruns. Things may come about that weren't contemplated and things of this nature. I think it would be unwise to be inflexible and have a binding bid for a determined length of time. Contracts are not binding as well. We have had litigation, relitigation of contracts when things go awry, so I think it goes both ways.

And I would contend right now that in a way they are binding. That utilities when they put out their RFP and they put their costs in there, that is kind of what staff focuses on from the need determination as we go forward, and cost-recovery is kind of a benchmark.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioners, can we at this point sort of sum up. Do you want to take a lunch break? I suppose I should have actually posed that question before? Okay. You're just going to make me feel bad. Can we sort of assess where we are -- hang on, Mr. Twomey -- and gauge any other questions, target any other questions to the strategy the Commission wants to undertake.

As one Commissioner, I have to tell you I have a lot of trouble accepting the stipulation for a number of reasons.

A few I have already articulated, but we will do it again. I

commend all of the stakeholders. I know just by reading all the comments and following the procedure that there was a real effort to reach compromise on a very difficult issue. I agree with Commissioner Bradley on the points he made with respect to the principles, but I would note similar to the way we could accept or reject the stipulation, we could accept or reject the principles. Just the fact that parties have articulated them, that doesn't mean those are the ones we wind up with at the end of the day.

The stipulation gives me problems for the following reasons. It is not a mutually agreed-upon stipulation with all of the stakeholders in the process. I also can't accept it because I can't explain to a customer what the stipulation does to enhance the current process. That is not to say what is not in the stipulation is a good starting point or a legitimate effort by the IOUs to reach compromise, I think it is all of that. I am just looking for a way to make the current process better so that benefits flow back to the ratepayers. And I don't think what the stipulation offers gets me there philosophically.

And then finally, I think with respect to the assumption that the stipulation goes a long way in addressing my concerns with statutory authority, it really doesn't. Once and for all let's have the statutory authority issue answered, and if that means a rule -- and, again, this is just from my

standpoint -- if it means a rule has to be proposed so that the court can address the statutory authority issue, that is okay with me. That is what courts do; this is what the PSC does. But I also think that the statutory authority issue may be minimized depending on what the rule looks like at the end of the day.

And I would like to leave it at that and see, Commissioners, where you are. My questions go to staff's strawman proposal and things I want to take out of staff's proposal, and things I want to add to staff's proposal. But all of that is for naught if you all want to accept the stipulation. Commissioner Bradley.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Yes. Thank you, Madam Chair. Just to cite your -- I wouldn't say argument, but your statement sort of gets to the heart of what I was trying to get done the last time we met on some of the preliminary matters as it relates to where we are today, and that was to ask the two parties to get together and to do some give and take on both sides. And also it gives me displeasure because that hasn't happened. And in my opinion, and it is just one opinion, I do see movement on one side but not movement on the other. And it creates a quandary because we are being put in the position of deciding for the two parties. And I just thought that it would be better if they could come up with something that they could live with. And it's just not a good situation to have, because

that means that if -- someone is going to be unhappy here. My preference would be to have two unhappy parties. But it probably is going to force me to have to choose between one or the other, and I'm prepared to do that.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Commissioner Bradley.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Chairman Jaber, I don't have a problem with most of what is contained in the primary staff recommendation, but I would like to see the addition of the three principles that have been outlined numerous times today by PACE and the other intervenors. When I was first appointed to the Florida Public Service Commission, I promised Governor Bush that I would always try to do what is best for Florida while at the same time acting within the statutory authority that has been granted to us by the legislature.

I have discussed the issue regarding our statutory authority with what I believe are some of the finest legal minds that are available to us here at the Florida Public Service Commission on numerous occasions. I have read the pleadings, I have listened carefully to the argument of counsel. I have conducted my own independent research. And at this time my conclusion is that we have adequate authority to enact a meaningful bid rule.

And I say at this time because my suggestion is that we move forward with rulemaking. And I will go into rulemaking with an open mind, and if I hear legal authority that leads me

to change my mind, I will do that. But at this time I support the three suggestions that have been made by PACE. I believe they are in the best interest of the State of Florida. I have a few reasons for that. First is we have a statutory obligation to determine what is the most cost-effective alternative available. And that is something that I don't believe we can possibly determine under the current situation. Secondly, I see that we have seen some very good benefits from the existing rule. I believe that the utilities have sharpened their pencils, and I believe that we have seen some very, very good deals for the ratepayers. And I'm talking about a change from what was occurring in the '80s when there were many cost overruns. And I think that change occurred because there were many interested parties that participated in our RFP rule and pencils were sharpened by the utilities, and they beat the best price, and they built good power plants at low cost.

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I am concerned that the process is falling apart. I am aware of at least five bidders from the past who have decided to move out of the State of Florida, who have decided no longer to participate in this process because they believe that an independent power producer does not have a chance to win a bid, and they cite to the fact that in the course of eight or nine years none of them ever have been awarded a project.

This issue is not about competition. This issue is

about ratepayers and what is the most cost-effective alternative. And I think that the process as it exists is driving the players away from the State of Florida, and we no longer have that healthy situation we have had where the utilities are forced to sharpen their pencils, where we have a lot of players coming in with a lot of creative ideas and the utilities are forced to beat the best deal. Well, when everyone decides to go home and not play the game, the utility customers are going to be the ones that suffer.

I believe that we should have a draft rule that incorporates the three suggestions that have been made by PACE. I believe that we should move forward and set a hearing to enact a rule and listen to the evidence, listen to the argument regarding our authority, keep an open mind. And I'm not saying that because I believe these three criteria should be included in the draft that we put together now that that is what we should end up with after the rulemaking. I'm saying that it sounds to me like that would result in the best deal to the ratepayer. And I am willing to listen to testimony, and evidence, and argument of the parties, and I might change my mind. But I think right now the best thing for us to do is go ahead and set this thing now for a rulemaking.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay, Commissioner Palecki. Commissioner Bradley.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Yes. And I have a very

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1 interesting communique on my desk here today, and I will tell 2 you, I don't think there is anyone on this Commission who is 3 not willing to adhere to and to stand behind free market 4 principles. However, I would like to just remind my fellow 5 Commissioners that we as a body are here to implement current 6 law and to not be an activist body by creating law. And also I 7 agree that we do have the statutory authority to change the bid 8 rule to ensure that it is fairer and more transparent, but my 9 concern is with the legislative intent. When the statute was 10 passed, no one was considering restructuring or deregulation. 11 And as I said, I have a communique here, and I want to -- I 12 think this somewhat sums up what our quandary is. It say here, 13 I am going read just three excerpts from this communique. "At 14 its hearing on Monday, the PSC must choose between three 15 courses of action. Number one, do nothing and allow IOUs to 16 continue to deny consumers the benefit of competition in power 17 Competition. Number two, make cosmetic changes to generation. 18 the existing bid rule process and further facilitate 19 anticompetitive practices. Anticompetitive practices. Or, 20 number three, create meaningful change to protect Florida's 21 consumers from artificially high utility rates which benefit 22 excessive corporate bottom-line profits." 23

And this what is my quandary is, this says competition is an issue that should be considered. The appropriate venue to consider deregulation of competition is

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not here within this environment or before the Public Service Commission, that is an issue that needs to be addressed by the Florida Legislature. We are here to implement and not to -- to implement policy and not to develop policy. And irrespective of what my personal beliefs are, I took an oath to do just that. And that is to implement the statutes of the State of Florida and to not be an activist commissioner. So I find it very difficult in order -- I find it very difficult to support these three principles that have been put forth by PACE. I think that it steps across the line. These principles force the Commission to step across the line and to get into policymaking rather than implementation of policy or existing statute.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Baez, and then I'm going to try to move this forward into a motion.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: You know, Commissioner Bradley, I agree with you. I think that competition is something that has to be discussed in the legislative arena, and as a Commission we need to wait on, or wait for, or not worry about at all whether there is competition in this state or not. The way that I have gone about -- the way that I have come at this rule is that we do have a responsibility. We have got a responsibility to ensure that the ratepayers are paying fair and reasonable rates. Part of paying fair and reasonable rates involves a function of determining that the expenditures and

that the costs of the companies are acceptable in order to be passed on through rates. To me this bid rule, first of all, I think is a misnomer. I'm sure you all have heard that before. This is not about bidding, this is about how much, and what kind, and how good information this Commission gets in order to perform its functions.

The only way for us to perform our function is to be comfortable with the quality of the information and the reliability and the integrity of the information that we are receiving. If a company, if an IOU comes in and says a plant costs this much, and here is the information we have to prove up that, part of the information or part of the processes that are used is a competitive hid process. It is a rule that has been on the books since '90 -- for over ten years, was it '94? Okay, almost ten years, forgive me. And it has been used and it has been employed. And at the time there was great participation. And at the time there wasn't -- you know, the Commission made a decision at that time, and all of that is well and good.

And I would submit that times haven't necessarily changed. But I feel less and less confident about the information that I get when need determinations come up in the speed in which I receive it, at the time in which I receive it, that I can feel confident that any number that gets thrown out there is a good one and feel confident in approving it. So

part of the purpose that I saw this opportunity here providing this Commission with is an opportunity to change the timing in which we receive the information so that I am not in the middle of a need determination where construction has to begin within a few months later saying, all right, everybody hurry up, hurry up. Is this information good, isn't it good? Well, I don't know, but we don't have time, you know, I have been trying to stop the clock here and it's not stopping. And I'm looking at three years down the line we have got a supply problem; the only reason these need determinations exist.

So if I can get information that I feel is good, that I feel is reliable, that I feel has been subject to an integral process, I feel a lot more comfortable at that need determination nine months down the line. That was one of the purposes that I saw this providing an opportunity to me.

Secondly, and I go back to an earlier point, it's not about competition, it's about the information and when we get it and how we get it. The only way for information to be reliable is if we feel that it is reliable. If it is a bid process, then let the bidders feel that it is reliable, as well. The bid process is only as good as the motivation behind the participants. And if the participants are not motivated to participate, we don't have -- you know, they might as well throw up a number. Let's pull a number out of the air as far as I'm concerned.

Lastly, as to the statutory authority and, you know, we have been up and down this at workshops and other, you know, I think one of the things that we owe the companies, the IOUs in particular is certainty. And if there is a question, an honest debate, an honest disagreement as to what this Commission's authority is, I, for one, am not going to start from the position that I don't have authority. I can't do it. As soon as someone throws up a statutory authority argument and I say, well, you know what, you might be right, let me sit back and not do it. If I'm not convinced 100 percent, and I am not, I can't start from that point because then I'm not doing my job.

There is a place and a time to have those discussions, and they are in front of a judge in challenge today a rule, in challenge to a decision that this Commission makes in a court of law. Sometimes it is great to avoid litigation. Sometimes it can't be avoided. And sometimes the sooner we get started on litigation the better, because that in the end provides certainty to the companies.

Frankly, I don't care whether I win or lose on this. I mean, if a court says that we don't have statutory authority to be even making a bid rule, and as I have heard the IOUs maintain at some point, I mean, somehow the line of origin has moved back during this debate, now all of a sudden we don't have statutory authority to even have a bid rule, much less

change it. But that said, you know, that is not for me to say, and certainly not for me to accept.

If every time someone said you don't have statutory authority we had to buy into it and feel doubtful about our authority, we are not going to get any work done. So that is a long way of saying that I think, you know, at least for me the writing is on the wall, Commissioners. I think we need to adopt a rule today, we need to set it for hearing on our own motion so that we can actually take some evidence on this. I think it was Mr. Moyle that kind of pointed up what I thought made a very good point.

There has been no evidence on this. There is, you know, so far it is just the attorneys, God bless them all, speaking their mind, you know, and telling us what we can and what we can't do, and some of them are more reassuring than others. But we haven't taken a stitch of evidence on this. And I think that it would benefit me, in particular, to hear and to have all of these facts getting thrown around as part of a record so that we can come up with the best decision that we can on the back end.

And then let's let the process move forward. Let's let the courts say what they will, let's let the arguments be made somewhere else for a change. So I would support moving ahead with the rule and actually setting it for hearing on our own motion. I think I heard Commissioner Palecki suggest it,

1 so I would support that. 2 CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Commissioner Baez, that 3 is perfect in moving us forward. Can we go ahead and dispose of Issue 1? Is there a motion to deny staff's recommendations 4 5 plural on Issue 1? 6 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, actually I've got a 7 question as to form. I mean, there is a --8 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Madam Chair. 9 CHAIRMAN JABER: Hang on one second, Commissioner 10 Bradley. 11 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I guess the primary recommendation is denial, in essence, but if we can clarify 12 13 that even with staff's condition, if you will, I would vote it. 14 CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes. My question went to even with 15 the condition. Hang on, Commissioner Bradley might have a 16 question on that, too. 17 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Yes, I have a suggestion. 18 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. 19 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I think it might be better to vote on the alternative recommendation first, and on Issue 1 20 21 last. 22 CHAIRMAN JABER: They are both -- we can do that. We 23 can -- I was just suggesting we dispose of them together. It 24 really doesn't matter to me if you want to have a motion on the

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alternative. I have to tell you, staff, I know, Mr. McLean, I

160 1 am always appreciative of options when they are really options. 2 but you are the general counsel, and I don't want to ever make 3 you think I want an option just for the sake of letting me know 4 that I can accept the stipulation so, take that for what it is 5 worth to you. I know I have as an alternative the ability to 6 accept the stipulation, so I hope you didn't put that language 7 in there --8 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: He put it in at my request. 9 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay, good. I know I have that 10 11

option. So give me the out-of-the-box options, just for future clarification. I know that the opposite of yes is no. It is the last time I checked.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Mr. McLean was -- this was added to the process at my request, just to make that clear.

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CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay, Commissioner Bradley. My only point is that two paragraphs doesn't give me an option. I didn't find that very helpful to me, but maybe that is exactly what you asked for, I don't really know.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Well, I can explain why. Again, it goes back to a statement that I made several times today. I have seen movement on the part of the IOUs but none on the part of the IPPs. And I think it is bad public policy when one group takes a hard stand and forces the Commission to make a decision in their favor because they just out and out refuse to compromise. I think that the alternative

recommendation is excellent.

CHAIRMAN JABER: So do you have a motion on the alternative?

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Yes. I would like to make a motion that we accept the alternative recommendation.

CHAIRMAN JABER: You want to accept the stipulation?

I am probably confused by your earlier comments.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Yes. I do want to accept the stipulation by the IOUs, and I will tell you why.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I am very concerned about the legislative intent. Sure we have the ability to alter the rule and to deal with this issue, but we have to recognize the fact that when the statute was passed, when the statute was passed a few years ago, no one was considering restructuring or competition. And I think that we are teetering on this Commission making a policy decision, and that should be left to the discretion of the legislature. And I just don't feel comfortable with the road that we are traveling. If the legislature says we shall deregulate or we shall restructure, then I would be the one who would be out here leading the bandwagon, but that is not the direction that we have received from the legislature. The legislature says that we are here to implement the statute and not to create policy. So I think that the alternative recommendation is in line with that

philosophy. 1 2 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. There is a motion to accept 3 the alternative recommendation. Is there a second? Okay. 4 Motion fails for lack of a second. Commissioner Bradley. 5 Let's have a -- is there another mention on Issue 1? 6 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Madam Chair, just going back, I 7 mean, and maybe perhaps legal can -- the appropriate motion is 8 to deny staff on Issue 1, and that will be -- that is clear 9 enough? 10 MS. BROWN: Yes. Commissioner. COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I can move staff. Staff denial: 11 12 forgive me. 13 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. There is a motion to deny 14 staff on Issue 1. 15 COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Second. 16 MS. BROWN: Wait. 17 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I just want to get the form 18 right. that's all. 19 MS. BROWN: And I think you have it reversed. 20 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I'm not interested in accepting 21 the staff's recommendation because it contains partial -- some 22 receptiveness subject to a condition, and I'm not interested in 23 24 MR. BALLINGER: Perhaps this would help. You would 25 approve the primary staff recommendation, just the very first

1 || sentence.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I think, Commissioner Baez, the answer to the question is we can probably modify the recommendation to clarify that we are not accepting the stipulation in any form.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I don't want to leave a condition out there. That is really my point.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Okay. The question is should the Commission approve the proposed -- am I reading it correctly?

CHAIRMAN JABER: Uh-huh.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Should the Commission approve the proposed stipulation offered by the investor-owned utilities dated August 20th, 2002. Is that correct?

CHAIRMAN JABER: That is the issue. So my suggestion is that someone make a motion to just not accept the stipulation that is offered by the IOUs.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I am prepared to make the motion, Madam Chairman. Despite the fact that there are many things that I like about the industry stipulation, and there are many things I like with the staff's primary recommendation, I would move that both be rejected. I don't believe that either goes far enough.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Second.

CHAIRMAN JABER: There is a motion and a second. All

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those in favor say aye.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Aye.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Aye.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Aye.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Before we vote, Commissioner Bradley, I want to make an effort to give you some comfort. Because philosophically I don't disagree with you. I think we are getting to the same place differently. So in an effort -- I want a unified position because I don't think philosophically we are saying different things. Regardless of the principles that were offered by the IPPs, I do not think this proceeding should be designed to change the framework of the electric industry as it is governed today. And I wholeheartedly agree with you and Commissioner Baez that that is within the purview of the Commission.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: The legislature.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I'm sorry, the legislature. Oops. I wholeheartedly believe that changing the framework of how the electric industry is governed or whether it is deregulated is within the purview of the legislature. The reason I can't accept the stipulation is for the reasons I have already articulated. I can't explain how the stipulation makes it better for the consumer in assisting us in figuring out what the most cost-effective alternative. I offer that just for your consideration. I am prepared to support the motion.

1 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Okay. And I just need some --2 I need to make sure that I understand. By not accepting Issue 3 1's recommendation or accepting the alternate recommendation, 4 what we are doing is putting a third recommendation on the 5 table? 6 CHAIRMAN JABER: What we are doing is moving forward 7 to Issue 2 and talking about what the rule should have in it 8 and whether it should be set for hearing. What the effect of 9 the motion is, we are not accepting the stipulation, that is 10 Issue 1. Issue 1 is should you accept the stipulation or not. 11 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Well, I think I made it pretty 12 clear that I feel very strongly that the stipulation should be 13 accepted and I don't mind being a dissenter. 14 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Fair enough. All those in 15 favor of the motion say aye. Aye. 16 COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Aye. 17 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Aye. 18 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Aye. 19 CHAIRMAN JABER: Opposed to the motion? 20 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: No. 21 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. We are on Issue 2. And, 22 Commissioners, based on dialogue I think you all have gathered 23 that I do not believe repowerings and the language related to 24 150 megawatts or more belongs in a proposed rule. I really do 25 not believe that language keeps us within the purview of the

need statute.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: And I think also based upon what we have heard today, there is not really a compelling reason for any language regarding repowering. I think we have heard that there are no plans on the horizon for any repowering projects, so I'm not really certain that this is critical in any way.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Well, can we -- depending again on where the Commissioners are, can we at least dispense of that and then focus on what --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And I guess maybe staff can clear this up for me. My concern was to -- I feel that the bid rule somehow is integral to our siting responsibilities, to our need determination responsibilities. And consistent with that, I had a little bit of trouble, for instance, regarding the combustion turbines that don't need siting, that aren't subject to the Act. And I just want to make sure we are talking about the same thing. Obviously repowerings aren't' subject to the Act, as well. But is your -- are your comments directed at the whole so that we can draw a line between PPSA and non-PPSA projects?

CHAIRMAN JABER: Exactly. Just talking out loud, what I really thought would be the most efficient way of handling a hearing, Commissioner Palecki, is to get the rule as targeted as possible to the Power Plant Siting Act so that the

comments and the evidence we get is better. This isn't a wish list. And I didn't interrupt you when you were talking about the principles. I'm not going to agree with you in having all of the principles encompassed in the rule. I want to set that aside for a moment and talk about what we think we have got the statutory authority to include, and then also putting a rule out there that gets us the best evidence and the most targeted comments so that the process is the most efficient that it could be. And that may or may not be consistent with the principles that have been outlined by the IPPs. But the reason repowerings are important, Commissioner Baez, I think staff, a loot of staff's changes to the strawman proposal went toward repowerings and CTs, and it seems like we can just give them general direction to take that language out without going line-by-line. But how do you all -- just my reading of the law left me with the impression that repowerings and CTs were not part of the legislative intent.

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COMMISSIONER DEASON: Madam Chairman, let me say that I agree with you. The Power Plant Siting Act, that is where the most cost-effective standard is in place. The bidding rule, of course, is to be utilized to help us accomplish meeting that standard with some assurance that what we have in front of us and what we ultimately approve is the most cost-effective. The Power Plant Siting Act, of course, has the limitations in there and it does not address combustion

turbines, and it does not address generation below 75 megawatts, and these are exceptions which are in the Act itself.

And I was listening very carefully to Mr. Sasso in his presentation, and he indicated that this would be one of the most vulnerable aspects that would be subject to a jurisdictional challenge. And while I think that we need to go forward and assert our ability to protect customers, that we don't need to subject ourselves to areas that perhaps are more vulnerable to jurisdictional challenge when there is not a really crying need to do so.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Without judging whether it is a good thing or a bad thing, whether in the future repowerings were the subject of some kind of rulemaking, I see it, again, you know, if we are trying to stay close to our responsibilities and obligations along need determination obligations, then I see this as something entirely different. To me it is about the quality of the information and the timing of the information and not where -- how much more we are going to be looking at or what kinds of things we are going to be looking at. So I feel the same way. I think I can support striking whatever references or applications --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Commissioner Bradley and then Commissioner Palecki.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: So are you ready to entertain

la motion?

CHAIRMAN JABER: No. Commissioner Palecki has some questions.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Go ahead.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I just had a comment that I agree but for a different reason than was expressed by Commissioners Deason and Baez. I believe that we do have the statutory authority under our ratemaking authority over the repowerings. I am also concerned about cost overruns in repowering projects. However, whatever rule we come up with is not going to apply to existing repowerings, and we have already heard comments from each one of the utilities that there are no repowerings on the horizon out ten years. So I just doesn't think that this is a really critical issue that needs to be addressed, and I'm willing to not address this issue at this time.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. I'm still not ready for a motion, Commissioner Bradley. The other questions on the rule itself go to staff. I thought Ms. Clark raised some very, very good questions about the language of the rule itself that I really want you to address. The notion of -- let's see, where was it. The whole idea of the complaint process, participants can file complaints, the expedited hearings, all of that, give me an idea of procedurally how you think it will work. And I will tell you, Martha, what I am really interested in, as

Commissioner Baez says, making sure on the front end we have the data. You know, I live for the day where need cases are not controversial. To me that should be a streamlined process by the time we get to it, and that means you do more on the lfront end. But when I hear and see people can file complaints, I think PAA process, protest, hearing, is that what you are talking about?

MS. BROWN: And I think what you are saying is that it is already there, and there really doesn't need to be specific language in the rule that addresses the usual processes we use. Is that right?

CHAIRMAN JABER: No.

MS. BROWN: Well, the reason I brought that up is we have had this discussion amongst ourselves, and I would need to confer with staff, but I frankly don't have a problem taking all of that out if that would make you all feel more comfortable.

CHAIRMAN JABER: But how would the concerns be resolved. Let's say we have the pre-bid meeting as contemplated by the strawman proposal, and participants do have a complaint that they want to bring to the Commission's attention about whether the criteria were followed or not. Did you envision the resolution of that complaint being final so that it doesn't hold up the need process?

MS. BROWN: Well, it depends on when the need process

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is brought to us, also, and whether the utilities are holding us to the 90-day time frame. It is tough to do, to resolve a complaint in that time.

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MR. BALLINGER: Commissioner Jaber, the example we just went through with Florida Power and Light when they issued their first RFP. And when they came in for the need determination the units had changed. That spurred complaints from some people down the table here. It went on -- I think Mr. McGlothlin characterized it as FPL went and did a redo. They reissued their RFP, and basically it solved the complaint. if you will. The complaint went away, Reliant withdrew its complaint and the problem got solved. That one was a difficult one because the complaint was after the end of the process and then we were really in a tight time frame. A lot of this complaint is on the structure of the RFP itself. We haven't had any to date, but I would envision that we would do all we could to keep the process moving if there was a need determination. So, really, it was staff's intent with that language to put down in writing what is currently available to the parties today; nothing more, nothing less.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: This is something -- you know, this kind of process or this kind of front-loading of the process, I mean, first of all, Commissioners, I think that including this in the rule is merely -- and to borrow a word from Mr. Sasso, it is institutionalizing something that is

already there. But I also think that it has an added advantage in that it might offer us an opportunity to fix time lines so that we can keep the process moving forward. But I do want to raise one issue, a question, I mean. You know, we have to have adequate time, whether it be on an expedited basis or not, to address any problems that may crop up. Whether it is something that we see by our participation in monitoring the bid process or whether it is raised by a participant. What effect does that have -- I mean, you know, is it appropriate to have some kind of tolling that operates in order to let us do this? And I know, Martha, that you are grimacing over there, but I think in the interest of having a more streamlined approach on the need determination you are going to have to give everybody time to settle this.

MS. BROWN: Well, there are two time frames in the need determination process; one is statutory that is provided in the Siting Act.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: That is after it gets filed, correct?

MS. BROWN: After it gets filed. The others are our own time limitations in our rules that were crafted in order to accommodate the time schedules in the statutory scheme. I would have to go back and look to see how the two could be arranged. Where a utility agrees to a waiver of those time frames, then the problem is really taken care of, but we can't

count on that.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: But you are anticipating -- okay. I guess in my mind it --

MS. BROWN: The limitation that I see on it is our rule time frames could be changed, but we are still -- we still have to keep in mind the statutory time frames.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: But that is once a need determination gets filed. And a need determination doesn't get filed until the RFP process is done. And if what we are doing is creating a complaint process, for lack of a better word, I don't won't to scare anybody by the words that I'm using, but if what you are doing is creating a point of entry, almost before the need determination is what you are doing, so the timing lines you are not, you wouldn't be tolling --

MS. BROWN: You're right.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: -- you wouldn't be tolling a need determination which would be under a statutory time, what you are doing is tolling the RFP process from coming to conclusion, because you have a pending -- and, again, these complaints are subject to all the challenges of merit, on the basis of merit or what other grounds capable lawyers are able to think of, you know, just like anything else. But there does have to be some stop and let's talk about this.

MS. BROWN: I have a suggestion and it has to do with the competitive bidding process that state agencies are

required by statute to implement. I am familiar with that because I have worked on the Florida Relay Contract Request for Proposals. There is in 120, and I can't remember the number of the competitive bidding statute, that has a process by which a party who is unhappy with the proposal document itself has a limited amount of time to object to that document. And then if they don't -- it's like 15 days from the date of issuance or something -- if they don't do it within that time, they waive their rights to object thereafter. It helps streamline the process in the front end as you have been talking about.

If you want, I can go back and look at those time frames that are in there and see if we can craft some timing that would be similar to that. There is another process -- I haven't looked at this in a long time. Once that objection to the request for proposals, the document itself, time passes, then the document issues, then there is another opportunity at the back end after the selection is made to contest at DOAH the process of the selection if it is flawed, or if something was missed, or the selection didn't actually follow the request for proposals document, that sort of thing. We are very much talking about the same things. If you would like, I will go back and put some time frames in that are similar.

CHAIRMAN JABER: To the degree we get into the hearing phase, I think that could be fleshed out even more in the hearing.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I mean, Commissioners, I just threw that out as a topic for discussion. And ${\bf I}$ understand that the proper language may not even be available, but it sounds like there is an analog out there.

MS. BROWN: Yes, there is.

CHAIRMAN JABER: And to be clear, my concern was not just timing, but also finality and time for the need case. You don't want two hearings going on at the same time. There needs to be a certainty well in advance of the need case being filed.

MS. BROWN: And the certainty that you are interested in is the certainty that the document itself, the request for proposals --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Is not subject to challenge anymore.

MS. BROWN: Right. And these statutes do -- I mean, that is what they are getting at, they are getting at this two-phased thing. The first is does the document look okay. The second phase could happen in the need determination as it does now, the evaluation of the results of that document wasn't adequate or needs to be resolved, that is done in the need determination now.

CHAIRMAN JABER: The other point that Commissioner Clark -- that Ms. Clark raised related to the site-specific and whether that could be used to dictate collocation of land, I thought that the stakeholders, at least the IPP side of the

1 stakeholders gave up on that issue. So I'm wondering why 2 that --

MR. BALLINGER: Staff never envisioned a mandatory collocation, but we do envision utilities exploring all options. We just wanted to keep it open in case they decided to offer it as Florida Power did one time in their RFP. So it is not a mandate by any means, it is just to keep it open as an option.

CHAIRMAN JABER: In several of the workshops we asked that question. And as I recall, Mr. Sasso, you need to tell me if I'm wrong, you said that where the land was available to be included in the option, the RFP could so state.

MR. SASSO: That is correct. If the utility elects to make the site available, the utility could say that in the RFP.

CHAIRMAN JABER: There is a fine line. Let me tell you, I thought one of the greatest things Mr. Sasso said today was the notion of you have got to trust the IOUs to run their business. And that is true about all companies, Mr. Sasso, not just the regulated IOUs. I would expect that the IPPs can also evaluate things like that in figuring out whether they want to submit proposals to your bid or not. I don't want to micromanage their negotiations. So to the degree the site specific language could come out --

MR. BALLINGER: Well, the other reason it is in

there, as I said earlier, is everybody is building the same
plants and we are wondering why the cost difference is there.
And by getting this information up front it may tell us why the
IOU has an advantage of building on its own site. It has the
existing infrastructure. It gives us a sanity check of the
numbers.

CHAIRMAN JABER: But isn't that one of the things

CHAIRMAN JABER: But isn't that one of the things that could also come up in the pre-bid meeting or whatever it is? Yes, pre-bid meeting you called it.

MR. BALLINGER: I suppose it could. But I think from the evaluation standpoint, staff would still look at those numbers to see if the IOU won, let's say, by \$50 million, is that because of the land? If so, fine, and maybe that is an appropriate --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Why do I care why they won? Aren't I looking at the bottom-line cost?

MR. BALLINGER: It gives us the sanity of the process. If they are building the same plants, why are they so different in cost.

CHAIRMAN JABER: But remember, we are putting more on the front end in terms of the process. So if I've got a transparent, open, fair process on the front end, by the time I'm looking at it for need, I am not going to be second-guessing the cost, am I?

MR. BALLINGER: Probably not, but it is something we

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consider. Quite frankly, we haven't considered --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Something you consider now. You have got the current bidding rule, and our problem with the current bidding is by the time -- my problem with the current bidding rule is by the time I've got the need case, I am looking at a plant that needs to be constructed real soon. And to the degree I am second-guessing costs, I am put in that awkward position of asking them to rebid and having the companies incur more costs which could be subjected to the ratepayer.

What I am suggesting is in the new transparent open process those sorts of considerations have taken care of themselves by the time I get the application for need. Is my thinking flawed here?

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: See, I'm seeing -- and that is why some of my questions earlier were trying to clear up what the two -- if there is a two-fold, and I don't want to say requirement, or if there is half a requirement here and half, you know, wishful thinking, or encouragement, whatever that means. But, you know, do you have to provide the cost of land, does that have to be --

MR. BALLINGER: I don't know. And, quite frankly, we have taken a little turn from what staff was originally going with, what we thought the rule was to look like. What I'm hearing you say now is we are going to probably keep the rule

to do need determination projects only. And initial blush is I think keep the existing rule as it is. I think it covers it. I think the utilities have a fairly open process. People know what is going on. We have heard some complaints about this. Staff needs to go back and focus, all right, can we tweak process a bit more to make it more transparent. I think we have tried, but we may have missed the mark.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I'm not sure that we need to get into a debate of whether, you know, leave it as it is or not. Here is the strawman proposal. I guess my question or what I'm trying to get straight, Madam Chairman, and I don't know if it -- is your problem the same, and I will step back and get out of your way, is exactly -- is it information that is being required, is it consideration of proposals containing collocation that is being required, what is it that is being required exactly? If anything, and, you know, that might be all right, too.

MR. BALLINGER: I think the part about the cost of land is information to put out there to let others know what the utilities' value their property as. Whether they choose to open it up to others or not, that is their choice. And it is just there for staff so we have kind of a benchmark to go from when the need determination comes in to see why proposals shook out the way they did. So it is an information gathering.

MR. FUTRELL: It is also information for the bidders

so that they will know -- have a clear picture of what target they are shooting at so that they will know these are costs that they need to factor into their planning when they formulate a bid. Not just for the staff and the Commission, but for the bidders to see what it exactly is, have a clear picture of what their target is. And that is separate from this collocation argument about, well, whether or not to preclude such an arrangement. It is two separate things.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Right. And I sensed that there was a problem on the part of the IOUs, and certainly Ms. Clark expressed it that way when I asked her about it, is that some of the language in the proposed rule as it is now has the --might have the effect of actually creating a requirement that notwithstanding the fact that an IOU may not choose to make the land or the site available to the other participants, that a proposal by a participant that includes collocation would also have to be -- would be de facto meeting requirements and subject to consideration.

And I think -- I tend to agree with her that that may be an unintended consequence. If the purpose of at least some of the language is to have that information be known likewise as a reality check for the Commission as well as the company so that they can kind of see where the costs are going, I'm not adverse to that. But I don't want to create -- and I think it would be wrong to create a requirement that says, IOU, you have

1 to consider me even though I am proposing to collocate on your 2 3 collocation. 4 5 6 7 what is out there. 8 9 10 11 12 13 point. 14 15 16 17 18 19 recommendation. 20 21 22 23 24

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land, even though you are not offering the land up for MR. BALLINGER: I don't think that was the intent. I can tell you that from my perspective, it wouldn't be the intent to force that. But we do want the utilities to consider COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And that would come under the creativity portions of the rule, correct? I mean, it doesn't preclude anyone from proposing collocation, but I think it is probably more appropriately within the company's discretion to decide what it wants to do with its land, at least at this MS, BROWN: Commissioner Baez, the section in question was Section 6, which states the public utilities shall allow participants to formulate creative responses to the RFP. COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: What page is that on? MS. BROWN: I'm actually looking on Page 11 of the COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Six and 7 of the rule. MS. BROWN: It's Page 45 of the rule. The reason I'm looking at the recommendation is because the part that Ms. Clark was concerned about was the staff's explanation that follows that section. If you like that section, the part that

the utilities seem to be concerned about was how staff was

explaining it, not the --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And I took the language in the recommendation to be just an example. But at the same time, by listing that as an example I don't want the language at the end -- and I will note that the language in the rule does say shall evaluate all proposals. Now, I guess I don't understand enough to say exactly what evaluate means, because there was also another question about screening and, you know, what does it mean to you, evaluate?

MR. BALLINGER: It could be as simple as a screening. If it came in and a proposal did not meet their screening criteria, it would be gone. But at least they considered it. They didn't just out and out deny it.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I mean, I know that doesn't solve all of -- you know, that doesn't address all of your concerns on it, but it is a concern that I share. I don't want to create a requirement when there probably shouldn't be one. So at least on that point --

MS. CLARK: I would just make two points. First of all, with regard to providing that information, and staff says it is important for them to evaluate, that's appropriate. They can get that information, they will get it as part of discovery and when they look at the need coming in. By putting it in the rule, and by their recommendation they are suggesting it being used for another purpose, and that is the evaluation that it

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can be included in bids that include locating on their property and they must evaluate that bid.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: But I think we just tried to clarify that evaluation -- I mean, as Mr. Sasso said, an RFP can at the company's discretion and in the company's judgment include or not include offer of a site for use by the participants. Did I grasp it correctly?

CHAIRMAN JABER: I think they tried to clarify that, Commissioner Baez. But I have to tell you, I would rather take that language out of a proposed rule because it provides -- if anything, leaving it in the rule just creates confusion. With the understanding that if we go forward with the pre-bid idea and a pre-RFP meeting idea, that those are the kinds of things that should be discussed in identifying what the criteria are. Because you can think of land right now, what about all the other things that we can't think of. I would expect that companies that participate in the process in exercising their management positions would talk about all of these things as the possibility of identifying them as criteria.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: So when you say we should take that out, are you talking about (a)(10), 5(a)(10)?

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Could I make a suggestion that we take that out and look at Paragraph 2 of the PACE proposal, which is very simple and straightforward and replace these paragraphs with Paragraph 2 on Page 1 of the PACE proposal.

That is the one that is dated September 25th.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. What Commissioner Palecki is suggesting is that we take out -- Commissioner Palecki, on Page 43 of staff's recommendation we take out Number 10 and substitute with Paragraph 2 of PACE's proposal?

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Yes. And I'm not sure exactly how it fits in, but PACE's proposal doesn't have any laundry lists. It doesn't really contain any of the highly specific criteria, it just basically states that the utility shall file its RFP package with the Commission, that then the potential bidders will have an opportunity to address those RFP provisions and provides for a complaint procedure if there is a disagreement.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Bradley.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I have a suggestion. It seems that we are getting bogged down in a very complicated discussion. I would suggest that maybe what we do is consider changing the language when we get into the formal hearing process.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I understand the suggestion,

Commissioner Bradley, but the way the rulemaking process works here is the comments and the testimony that gets filed goes to the rule, goes to the draft rule. They are going to be prefiling their comments talking about the proposed rule that comes out of this. And I know that this is a tedious process,

but the better we make the strawman proposal, the more efficient the comments will be. But, you know, I stand to be corrected.

Commissioners, do you generally agree with that?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I guess I'm somewhere in between. I don't think we are going to perfect this rule today. We are going to get testimony filed not only on the rule proposal as whatever form it comes out of here today, but what form it should be in the eyes of everyone that is going to be participating. So I am all for it. If there are some major items in staff's proposal that we feel need to be clarified, or deleted, or whatever, I think we need to do that. But our goal should not be to try to perfect staff's proposal today.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And I don't think that would be possible, frankly.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And let me say that in terms of Item 10, which is cost information, I guess the question that I have is what is relevant about a company's booked costs? We are talking about making informed decisions and considering proposals which are based upon current market costs and what a company -- if the company bought land 30 years ago, what relevance is that now to whether who has the most cost-effective proposal in front of us? That is the difficulty I'm having. And so if we are going to get into some detail, I guess I will ask the questions. So why do we even have it in

here at all?

MR. BALLINGER: This whole thing about utility property came about when we saw a need determination that came in here with Orlando where they worked out a deal with an independent provider on their land, had a long-term lease back for the property. It got staff wondering is that an option that utilities should pursue.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, now you said lease.

Lease is based upon current market prices. You are talking about information that you probably have access to or you can just file a discovery question and say give us your book costs for all this information, to the extent it is relevant at all. I'm not so sure that we need to be hung up on this in the context of what has to be required to be filed up front in a rule.

MR. BALLINGER: I was getting there. The reason the cost is up front, we wanted to use that to compare to what the asking price was for the lease to see was it three times book, four times book and have it all in one place.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, what if it is ten times book, what relevance is that?

MR. BALLINGER: That's fine. At least we know what the market was -- or what they were asking for in market.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: It may depend on whether they bought the land six months ago or 50 years ago.

MR. BALLINGER: Yes. And what we tried to do in this 1 2 whole thing in part of it in other parts with the -- for 3 instance, the load forecasts and stuff like that is to have it 4 in one package of the most up-to-date data. Not to have to 5 pick a piece from here and a piece from there. So a lot of 6 this data, you're right, does exist, we were just trying to get 7 it all packaged together in one rule in one location. So I do 8 agree with you, you're right, the cost data is available, we 9 were just trying to get it in one package in the one rule. 10

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CHAIRMAN JABER: Ms. Brown.

MS. BROWN: Chairman Jaber. I just wanted to remind you that we are at the point of proposing a rule, which means that we publish it in the FAW. We send a copy of that to the Department of State and to the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee. And if you all are not comfortable with the rule yet, if you think it needs more work, I would prefer perhaps for us to come back to you.

CHAIRMAN JABER: You know, it's not that I mind coming back, here is what I think this industry deserves. industry deserves us to be done with this to the point where we can get to hearing. We have got to -- and I know this is a tedious process, but it has been a year and a half. And where you all were directed to be, which mind you is from a January 2000 directive to look at repowering, admittedly is not where this Commission is today. I understand that.

But I want it to be a meaningful hearing process, and I want it to be -- who knows, ever the optimist, maybe we don't get to a hearing, but Commissioner Deason's points are well taken. I don't want repowerings and CTs covered in this rule. I want to take out the collocation language. The other question I had related to Ms. Clark's point about evaluating all proposals, putting that sort of restriction on the IOUs when maybe they are -- and I don't know if this ever happens, maybe this is just completely exaggerated, I don't know. To the degree there are companies who submit proposals that are nowhere near the RFP, then why should they go through the expense of evaluating those proposals? I would ask that we think about that language, Commissioners.

The equity penalty, we haven't really talked about the equity penalty. Mr. Green, I don't know what exactly gives you heartburn about the equity penalty. Maybe you can just take a few minutes and help me understand that a little more. What is it you would like this Commission to do as it relates to the equity penalty?

MR. GREEN: Relative to the equity penalty, I think, you know, my heartburn as you referred to it, I think, was the fact that on the initial RFPs the equity penalty wasn't ever called out. We didn't know it was there. The equity penalty was not called out in the RFPs as something that was going to be considered.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I'm sorry, I didn't hear you. The 1 2 equity penalty was not set forth in the RFP? 3 MR. GREEN: There were some words in there that --4 did it call it equity penalty? I mean, there were some vague 5 words that talked about the effect on their debt/equity ratio, 6 but it wasn't real clear what the magnitude of that penalty was 7 going to be, or how important it was, or how unimportant it 8 It was one sentence. I think, in the RFP. was. 9 CHAIRMAN JABER: Was it a statement that that would 10 be a consideration that the IOU would have in exercising the 11 self-build option? 12 MR. GREEN: I think in fairness it did say this is 13 something that they may consider I think is the words they 14 used. And I will let Martha correct me if I'm wrong. 15 CHAIRMAN JABER: Well. if that is the case. staff. 16 then I think your language goes a little bit beyond that, so walk me through that. 17 18 MR. McGLOTHLIN: Madam Chairman, may I follow up on that, also? 19 20 CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes. 21 MR. McGLOTHLIN: In addition to the wording that 22 appeared in the RFP, it is our position that the risks 23 associated with buying or building capacity have a law of 24 dynamics in them, that they have been run both ways, and there

are a myriad of individual risk factors. It is our contention

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that the equity penalty singles out one of them. It only works in one direction, and for that reason is prejudicial and not an even-handed way to look at the financial risk situation, and is therefore inappropriate in an RFP package.

CHAIRMAN JABER: But if they just simply make a statement that they may consider the appropriate penalty because of certain debt situations, then haven't you -- then don't you have the information you need to make an educated decision on whether to submit a bid?

MR. McGLOTHLIN: Well, that is part of the problem, because if the IPP receives an RFP package that has criteria which are tilted, then that is disincentive to bid because it is an indication that the scoring is going to be weighted in favor of the IOU's alternative in a way that is unfair.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Would you be able to go to the pre-bid meeting and say, well, what exactly would the penalty be, and at what point would you exercise the equity penalty?

MR. McGLOTHLIN: I suppose those questions could be asked. But as long as that is part of the equation it is a tilting of the scales from our perspective.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Ms. Brown, you were about to address the language included in your strawman?

MS. BROWN: Just a minute, Chairman Jaber. I can't find it.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: While Ms. Brown is looking for

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1	that, I am looking at the PACE proposal. The entire thing is
2	three pages, and I see some very large chunks of what the
3	staff's proposal is that could be replaced by one or two
4	paragraphs. For example, with regard to the upfront criteria,
5	you have Paragraph 2, and then you have Paragraph 7, which is
6	PACE's laundry list of the various ingredients that need to be
7	included. I somehow think it would be a lot more expedient to
8	use this as kind of like maybe we could go through this and
9	see what we agree and what we disagree with on the PACE
10	proposal because it is quite more well, it is much shorter,
11	and I see it as being more straightforward and much simpler.
12	CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioners, let's talk about
13	that. That was the last question I have, Ms. Brown, so answer
14	the equity penalty question.
15	MS. BROWN: And the question is what, again?

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CHAIRMAN JABER: How is it in your strawman proposal you address the equity penalty and was the purpose of including it the same purpose articulated by PACE here?

Yes, I think it was to actually codify MS. BROWN: something that we do in need determinations anyway when the equity penalty shows up. If it is going to make a difference, there is an evaluation made of it and the utility will justify why they have done it. This was to codify that and expressly include it. And I don't think it goes much further than --

> MR. SASSO: Madam Chairman, may I address that very

briefly?

CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes.

MR. SASSO: We are concerned even getting past all the threshold issues. If the Commission is working off of this rule, we suggest this should not be placed in the rule for several reasons. First, it does substantively alter what the Commission is doing today in evaluating these cases on the merits. In our case, for example, on Hines 2 we had a discussion of imputed debt. It's not a penalty; it is simply a recognition of the impact on our cost of capital of entering into long-term power purchase agreements. It's not a penalty at all. And the Commission has recognized it is legitimate to take this into account because the world takes it into account, Wall street takes it into account, and so the Commission has taken it into account and staff recognizes that.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Is it to reconcile the perception of debt that is created when you enter into a purchased power agreement?

MR. SASSO: Yes, ma'am. What happens when you enter into a long-term purchased power agreement, you are taking on obligations that are debt like. You commit to make regular payments to the provider.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Can that be articulated just like that in an RFP so that any non -- and that is true for an IOU who submits a bid or for an IPP that is awarded the bid.

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MR. SASSO: Well, the concern isn't whether it occurs. This is a fact that is well known and well established in the Commission's decisions, but it doesn't seem to belong in an RFP. It is really quite immaterial to the bid except that it is part of the background against which all bidders participate recognizing what Wall Street does. But what place does it have in an RFP? What the staff proposal does is it actually suggests a presumption against use of this absent a showing of good cause. That really goes to the way the Commission makes its decision on the merits in reviewing the evaluation made by the utility in a particular case. It has really got nothing to do with the RFP, as such. Further, the Commission's rule on the contents of a petition, 250-22.081, for a need case requires us to address this when we file a It says, if the generation addition is the result of petition. a purchased power agreement between an investor-owned utility and a nonutility generator, the petition shall include a discussion of the potential for increases or decreases in the utility's cost of capital. So the Commission has already addressed this in an existing rule that deals with the contents of the petition, which is really where it belongs because this goes to the merits of the decision, not what we ask other people to bid on.

MS. BROWN: And, Madam Chairman, I really hate to interrupt Mr. Sasso, but this is an issue in the FPL need

determination case that is coming up before you on Wednesday.

I just wanted to let you know that that is out there.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes, but it's also an issue here.

commissioner deason: Let me ask Mr. Sasso a question. I understand the point that you are making. But, I guess, there is a fundamental question. How do participants in the bidding process when they are formulating their bid and putting it in front of you hoping to win the bid, how do they know how the costs of capital or how you are going to evaluate that requirement under a long-term basis to make payments? How do they know how that is going enter into your evaluation as to whether their proposal is least cost or not? Is it a stated formula that everybody agrees to or is there some subjectivity involved in that as to how you actually incorporate it, because it does enter into your evaluation, correct?

MR. SASSO: Well, it depends. For example, on our Hines 3 project it did not. It simply was not a factor in the outcome or in the evaluation. But it can. Theoretically, it can be a factor. But this is determined by rating agencies. They have formulas. For example, Standards and Poor has an approach that they use to figure out what the impact is on a utility's cost of capital if the utility enters into a long-term contract. But it's a fair point that perhaps requires some research into the rating agency methodology to determine that, and bidders --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, no, no, how are you going to evaluate it? When you get all of these proposals in, if you are going to evaluate them, you have to make a determination first does this proposal affect my cost of capital? If it does, how much does it affect it and what cost attributes do I have to attribute to this particular proposal to make it, you know, evaluate it, apples-to-apples, to all the other proposals that you have?

MR. SASSO: We follow rating agency guidelines.

MS. CLARK: I can add a little to that. It depends on what the contract says. Is it a take or pay, is it a take and pay? How long is the contract offered for? So there are a whole host of contract terms that affect how much of a percentage of the contract will be imputed as debt or the ratings agencies will take into account when they are looking at your balance sheet. I think what you can say is, you know, and I think it was indicated, that as the rule requires when you file your petition you have to say whether or not it is going to have an impact.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: The concern I have is, is there a way -- and I don't know the answer to this, but this is a function of the market, and people out there that are participating in the market that are ingenious. Is there a way that they can structure a proposal, structure the terms of the contract, or whatever they put in front of you which has the

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effect of minimizing adverse costs on your capital costs such that they may have an upper hand in winning the proposal, and do they know how to structure that in their RFP such that it will be evaluated? And if they can come up with an ingenious plan which minimizes cost of capital, they have a fair shot at winning the proposal. That is the concern that I have.

MR. SASSO: I would think the answer to that is they would study the rating agency literature and guidelines and identify the types of contracts or the attributes that have the least impact on cost of capital which is identified in the literature. Take or pay is one feature, but you would simply review the literature, identify those attributes that are of more concern to Wall Street and try to work around them.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. McGlothlin had a response to you, Commissioner Deason.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: Yes. And I just want to sort of even the balance here, because as Ms. Brown said, this is an issue you will hear more about this week. I want to make it very clear that although Mr. Sasso describes what rating agencies do and what he has characterized as what the utility must do as a consequence of that, the appropriateness of the equity penalty as a consideration in the RFP is very much in dispute. For instance, Commissioner Deason, one premise of your question was, well, you need to find out how much it decreases your cost of capital. That very premise is in

dispute because the equity penalty looks only at the issue of equity/debt ratio and does not consider possible offsets such as the shifting of construction risk away from the utility, risk of obsolescence away from the utility. Our point is that this is focussing narrowly on a single aspect of risk that works only in one direction, and it is inappropriate to factor that into the equation and disregard everything else. And so while counsel for the IOUs have said, rather matter-of-factly, here is what the rating agencies do, that entire premise is very much in dispute.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Well, from this perspective way up here, I am not talking about the rest of this week and the case we are about to hear. In the spirit of trying to make the process more transparent, my question is simple, how do you -- and I don't care if you call it an equity penalty or an equity adjustment or whatever, my question is this: How can language be included into the current process so that the utility's treatment of the equity adjustment is transparent to the bidder, whether that bidder is another IOU or an IPP? That's all. That is my question. How do you include that into the process so that that criteria is transparent, Ms. Clark?

MS. CLARK: I think Mr. Sasso was going to answer.

MR. SASSO: I was going to simply suggest that that will be resolved by the utility and by bidders by looking to rating agency guidelines. That is as transparent as it gets.

198 But this language, the only point I wish to make, and it may 1 2 not be directly responsive to your question, is that staff's 3 proposal deals with a different issue. It says that we are not allowed to use an equity penalty. 4 5 CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes. Set aside staff's proposal. 6 Again, I am --MR. SASSO: Then I guess we would simply -- we would 7 have to refer all interested parties to the rating agency 8 quidelines. 9 10

CHAIRMAN JABER: But wouldn't you know what you are going to do in terms of your debt to equity adjustments when you put your RFP together? I guess I'm really struggling with why you just can't include that language in an RFP.

MS. BROWN: Madam Chairman, that is what Subsection F says.

> CHAIRMAN JABER: Hang on, Ms. Brown. Hang on.

MS. BROWN: I'm sorry.

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CHAIRMAN JABER: Ms. Clark.

MS. CLARK: You know, I think one of the things we offered in terms of the stipulation was to set out, you know, the evaluation criteria, and that is certainly something that could be looked at. But I think Mr. Sasso's point is correct, what this says is absent a showing of good cause you will ignore a cost. And it seems to me this cost should be on equal footing with other costs.

1 CHAIRMAN JABER: I'm trying to get you to move away 2 from staff's language. But, Commissioner Baez, you had --3 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And I understand your point about 4 creating a presumption against something that you have the 5 discretion to do. Is there --6 MS. CLARK: I don't know that it is the discretion to 7 do. I think it is a legitimate cost that needs to be taken 8 into account. 9 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I'm sorry. Well. in the end you 10 are either going to include it or not, right? I mean, God 11 forbid you should decide to just eat it and not --12 MS. CLARK: Well, it may be that even including it, 13 it just makes the -- it illustrates that the self-build is even 14 better than when you exclude that. 15 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Okay. 16 MR. SASSO: This may be something in the event that 17 we end up at a hearing that could be fleshed out at the hearing 18 in terms of how to develop that criterion. 19 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And I guess my question is one 20 more of probably form. Do you agree that there are valid 21 mitigating factors, that there can be valid mitigating factors 22 to an equity penalty? I think Mr. McGlothlin stated some 23 benefits. 24 MS. CLARK: I would say not in the way he has 25 characterized it.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Not in the way he has characterized it?

MS. CLARK: Right.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Okay.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Commissioners, I am almost thinking that we need to determine what are the major ingredients we want to see in the rule. And the reason I think that we have to decide that first is that if we decide that the RFP needs to contain evaluation criteria and a dispute resolution procedure, I think all of these issues regarding equity penalties go away, because if there is an unfair equity penalty in these evaluation criterias (sic) up front, then you would have the bidders take this to dispute resolution. Staff would write a recommendation, and we would go ahead and decide whether that is fair or not. And that seems to be like one of those pieces that is of a level of detail that we might not even have to decide right here today.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I would agree with you. I do agree with you, actually, but I think that begs a question. You seem to be putting that issue in particular and there may be others. Just as an example off onto whatever obligations the company may have in listing criteria that is going to be involved, so to me that suggests that there has to be some prior knowledge on the part of the company, on the part of the IOU that there is an equity penalty involved. And it is really

not going to be enough to say it may be involved. I mean, you know, there is noticing problems to the extent that other mitigating factors exist that can become incorporated into a You know, there has to be some fair warning to all of that. But at the end of the day, I think you have to address it from a point of view of do they have the capacity of knowing ahead of time? Is it a question of can you protest it? think going into the protest period or the protest process, can you protest on something that might be, you know? So either the companies know ahead of time and can provide adequate notice that there are debt-to-equity ratio considerations and impacts and have that known ahead of time, or then you are left with arguing against a ghost. And I don't think that -- I don't think no matter how real it is later, because I think it really shows up on the need part, arguing against a ghost is an impossible -- I mean, you're trying to catch it, it's impossible.

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COMMISSIONER PALECKI: A very good point.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I don't know what the answer is. I don't know if an IOU knows ahead of time that there are, in fact, these impacts and could somehow make them, you know, make knowledge of them or the possibility of them known to participants in a meaningful way. I don't know the answer to that. but --

CHAIRMAN JABER: I didn't know the answer to that

either, Commissioner Baez. But the language that gave me
concern was requiring them to show good cause -- saying no
adjustment is appropriate absent a showing of good cause. I
would much rather see that language say something to the effect
of if an adjustment is -- if there is going to be an

MS. BROWN: We have a suggestion for language from that section if I might.

adjustment, that it needs to be a articulated up front.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay.

MS. BROWN: The last sentence we would take out. The first parenthetical phrase, including all weighting and ranking factors we would take out. So that Subsection F on Page 45 would read: That the utility must include all criteria that will be applied to select the finalists. Such criterion may include price and nonprice considerations, but no criterion shall be employed that is not expressly identified in the RFP absent a showing of good cause. That, we think, takes care of your concern that the bidders all be aware of all the factors and criterion that are going to be considered.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Well, as long as -- and maybe this is just industry practice. Maybe it is real clear that these equity adjustments go into the evaluation of who is awarded the build. If that is the case, I'm fine with that language. If it is not clear that criteria will include in a general sense whether an equity adjustment will be made, then I would ask

1	that we be more specific.
2	MS. BROWN: I think that would be clear to the
3	utilities.
4	CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Sasso, is that real clear? I
5	understand you don't agree with it, but are you clear on what
6	we are trying to accomplish?
7	MR. SASSO: I am clear, and I think I agree with the
8	statement that with the benefit of this discussion in
9	particular that this would include imputed debt. I am not sure
10	I understood exactly the language that staff was suggesting
11	would be substituted. I think I missed something. If you
12	wouldn't mind repeating that.
13	MS. BROWN: I wouldn't mind. We weren't substituting
14	any, Mr. Sasso, we were just taking some out.
15	MR. SASSO: Okay. You were just taking off the last
16	sentence.
17	MS. BROWN: Taking off the last sentence and taking
18	off "including all weighting and ranking factors" on Line 8,
19	striking those, as well, and leaving the rest.
20	CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioners, that was my last
21	question. So whatever your pleasure is. Do we need a break?
22	We need a break. How about ten minutes? We'll come back at
23	3:30.
24	(Brief recess.)
25	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Let's go ahead and get back

on the record. Ms. Brown.

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MR. McGLOTHLIN: Chairman Jaber, during the break we huddled among ourselves and have a suggestion that we think may have the potential for a little progress on this little bit of a log jam here. And with respect to the language of the staff proposed rule that treats the equity adjustment or equity penalty, PACE would be willing to accept for today's purposes a complete removal of any indication of the equity penalty, so that the rule itself is silent on the equity penalty or equity adjustment. However, as part of that we think it would be important to continue to include reference to the RFP containing all criteria and all weightings. And the upshot of that would be that if in its discretion the IOU proposes to have an equity penalty, then that would be part of the RFP and the bidders would be put on notice of it. And under the upfront mechanism that Martha described, that would be resolved in an early point in time.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I think that is a good solution. I was confused, Ms. Brown, why you took out including all weighting and ranking factors, that confused me.

MS. BROWN: I'm going to let Mr. Ballinger respond to that.

MR. BALLINGER: I will respond to that one. We are hearing some confusion about that. Staff's intent with those words were to have possibly qualitative weighting and ranking,

if you will. Say the utility would prefer longer term contracts, they would prefer units that burn a certain fuel, let's say, things of that nature. When read literally and what I have heard the discussion say -- and by the way, I have appreciated the discussion. It has been the first meaningful discussion we have had on the merits of the rule and the language both between the Commissioners and the parties and it has helped staff a lot. Up until now we have been in kind of a vacuum.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I don't know how to take that.

MR. BALLINGER: It's positive. Trust me, it's positive. The language there, the weighting and ranking in staff's view was more of the qualitative, not to go to a numerical scoring procedure as some would like for us to have. And I sense that that comes from the other side of the table. That's why we suggested taking it out. Utilities put in qualitative ranking in how they evaluate things, what they favor and not, so we just wanted to take it out for clarity.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I just didn't read it that way.

That language is okay with me, Commissioners. I don't know how you feel about it. In any case, I have asked all of my questions, so any other questions? We have not talked about binding bids and we have not talked about third-party evaluators.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I think you can take care of one

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and not the other. Well, I don't know. I'm with Commissioner Bradley on the evaluator. I just don't see us having the kind of time and expertise and man or woman or person power available to kind of engage in or take that responsibility onto ourselves. However, I think if we can have some meaningful terms in terms of how binding bids are, and that is probably a question of degree, I don't know that I would feel uncomfortable not having an independent evaluator.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Can I ask a question on that?

Mr. Sasso, today when you evaluate bids, do you have, for lack of a better word, a split in your staff? The staff that developed the RFP, is that different from the staff that evaluates the bids?

MR. SASSO: We have to be -- I have to be careful in responding to this because I don't want to mislead the Commission. Because, for example, there may be some modelers who are involved in running numbers on the preparation of the utility's own project, but also in evaluation there may be some administrative staff and so on. But at least within Florida Power Corporation the team that evaluates the bids in this last project were not the same people who developed the Hines 3 proposal. But as I say, if you look in some areas there may be some overlap or whatever, but the company gets cost data from a team that is responsible for providing information about the self-build alternative and then there is an evaluation team

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that takes that into account and looks at the bids coming in and so on.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioners, for purposes of the rule hearing, I don't find the need to include language about an independent evaluator if it could be clear. I can't remember who proposed something. It may have been in the PACE proposal, there was some language about the personnel of the IOUs not being the same.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Madam Chair.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Bradley.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: You know, my question would be who assumes the liability for an inaccurate or a bid that is not on the mark? I think it's a stretch to say that someone else should get involved in the evaluative process and that the IOU should be held to that. I would be in favor of not including this.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioners, any other questions or comments?

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Well, just my own personal opinion. I think I have already expressed it. I believe in an independent evaluation process. I am not saying that I would be unwilling to vote out a compromise that doesn't contain one, but I guess I would have to hear what was entailed in that compromise. I certainly believe that there should be a binding proposal made by all participants, and I might be willing to

forego the independent evaluation. As I said, I believe in that. I think it would result in identification of the most cost-effective proposal. I believe it would solve a lot of the criticism that we have heard from the parties and also in the press about the beauty contestant being a judge, but I might be willing to compromise if I felt that at least two of the three ingredients being requested by PACE were being complied with. I just want to say that, you know, as far as I am concerned we want a rule that will ensure that we, one, have adequate participation so that we know that the proposals that we are seeing and the one chosen we can identify as the most cost-effective. I have already stated that I think that there is a problem with the process where a lot of people or entities that used to participate are going home and are not participating. I think we need a rule that at least will allow those who would bid to have a feeling that they have some chance, some opportunity of actually prevailing and winning one of these. And I think that is the problem with what we have now. There is a viewpoint in the community, the people, the entities that have bid on these proposals that there is not any opportunity whatsoever to prevail on one of these things. And it is kind of like the opposite of the boy who cried wolf. The boy cried wolf so many times that nobody cared anymore when he cried wolf. And I just don't want it to be one of these things where -- you know, we have had this rule for eight or nine

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years. I don't want it to go to 15 years and no independent power producer has ever even been considered for a project. I think we need something that provides the community with the view that there is a real opportunity and an opportunity that if they come in with a real low bid, they beat out the other contestants that they win, and I don't think that that feeling is in the community today.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Palecki, you keep saying IPP has ever won the contest. The last time I checked I don't think another competing IOU has won the bids. I just don't see it as an IPP versus IOU issue. I don't think we should see it that way.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I agree with you.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. We need to be real clear on what we are trying to accomplish, although I want -- you know, one of the things we have not yet talked about that we should, this is an economic development issue not just for the IOUs, not just for the IPPs, but for the ratepayers. And it is not about the IPPs getting the bid. I personally don't care who is awarded the bid at the end of the day. What I care about is the bottom line rate to the ratepayers. So, frankly, I want to set up a structure that allows other IOUs to win the bids. Commissioners, the language I was talking about comes from Alabama. It was one of the -- something we got in our comments, many, many comments ago. The language says, to

1	ensure that all proposals are evaluated fairly, personnel that
2	develop proposals submitted by the company and/or its
3	affiliates will not participate in the evaluation process. I
4	don't know that today we need to include that language in the
5	rule, but going forward for the hearing process, would you all
6	consider it?
7	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Madam Chair, who pays the
8	independent evaluator?
9	CHAIRMAN JABER: I don't know. The question is who
10	pays the independent evaluator?
11	MR. GREEN: It is paid by the utility, the
12	solicitating utility from the fees collected from the bidding
13	participates.
14	CHAIRMAN JABER: So the application fee would be
15	structured such that that would pay for the independent
16	evaluator, is that correct?
17	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: The IOU would pay the
18	evaluator?
19	MR. SASSO: Well, we haven't proposed to use one, but
20	in the event the IOU retains a consultant, the IOU would pay
21	the consultant.
22	CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Sasso, I think generally
23	speaking, in your experience in the industry, in those states
24	where an independent evaluator has been used, do you know how
25	they were compensated?

MR. SASSO: No, I don't. 1 2 CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Green, do you? 3 MR. GREEN: Yes. In states where they use an 4 independent evaluator oftentimes it is the utility that has 5 solicitated the bids, takes the collected fees and pays the 6 hired evaluator. In the cases where the PSC has hired the 7 independent evaluator or has employed it, it also is paid by 8 the PSC, but out of the fees that bidders have submitted. That 9 is my familiarity with four or five different states. 10 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: That is precisely my point. 11 That is not an independent evaluator. 12 CHAIRMAN JABER: I guess I don't see your -- well, 13 first of all, I don't have --14 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: He who pays controls. I mean, 15 if an evaluator is paid by the IOU or the solicitor, the 16 evaluator is working for the solicitor. 17 CHAIRMAN JABER: I think, Commissioner Bradley, the 18 monies that go to the independent evaluator are set aside 19 solely for that purpose, so I don't -- and you all need to 20 correct me if I am wrong. I don't think the IOUs pay. I think 21 that the application fees that come with the bids pay the 22 independent evaluator. Am I missing your point? 23 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I thought I heard Mr. Green 24 make the statement that the solicitor pays the independent 25 evaluator.

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MR. GREEN: I will try to restate what I said. In those states in which the process or the rule requires the solicitating utility, the investor-owned utility that is soliciting bids, when that process requires an independent evaluator. I have seen it where the investor-owned utility pays the evaluator that was hired out of the fees that were paid by the bidders that bid on the project, the \$10,000 or whatever that is. There are a few states where the Public Service Commission or the Public Utilities Commission might go find an independent evaluator. And in that case the Public Service Commission or the Public Utilities Commission would pay the evaluator, again out of the fees submitted by the bidders.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Okay. A follow-up. Well, who is liable then for a faulty bid? I mean, if the independent evaluator accepts the bid that is not feasible, then who is held liable for that inconsistency?

MR. GREEN: I'm not sure I follow you. I mean, the independent evaluator, in almost all states that I am familiar with when they use them, is subject to Public Service Commission oversight. The PSC staff would look over this and make sure it is all appropriate and makes sense, because the advantage of that on the tail end, it makes the inclusion in the rate base very, very clean and smooth, because it is kind of with the presumption that if it has gone through this bid, and independence and objectivity is used in the evaluation

criteria, and if the evaluation criteria and the weighting is very clear up front and all the issues have been raised up front, and an evaluator is chosen that meets the criteria that

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COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: My question is this, though, an independent evaluator accepts a bid, the projects begins and we later on find out that it is not feasible at the rate that the bid was accepted, who then has the liability, the Public Service Commission, or the independent evaluator, or the IOU, or the bidder? I mean, who is responsible for --

is established in the up front criteria establishment, that --

MR. GREEN: Well. I don't know of any case where an evaluator, an independent evaluator has chosen a winner, if you will, of the process and then it turned ought to be, however you said, unfeasible. I don't know of any case like that. But the way I would envision that to play out would be that the evaluator chooses the winner, it would go to the utility or the Public Service Commission who had hired them, but in most cases it would go to the utility and say. I have evaluated the bids based on the criteria established, here is my recommendation. That is usually a short list. Here is a ranking of the three or four most cost-effective alternatives to provide this capacity. It is now up to that utility to go into detailed contract negotiations with number one on the list. If that falls apart, they go to number two on the list. I mean, it is a process, but that process is laid out up front in the

evaluation criteria and how the game will be played.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Let me ask a question. If after being awarded the bid under -- let's assume that we vote that there will be binding proposals. If the winner, be it the utility or the nonutility, is unable to come in at the price that they have bid, would it not be the company that is unable to build at that price to perform under the terms of the contract? So the liability would be with the person who won the bid. They would be subject to complying with all proposals --

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: So we do have a performance bond involved here.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Bradley, I didn't hear what Commissioner Palecki was saying.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Oh. I'm kind getting ahead here. I'm sorry.

CHAIRMAN JABER: That's okay.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: You know, if there was a failure to perform, you know -- let's say you bid half a billion dollars and it costs you six -- well, let's say it cost you a billion, you would have to eat it, correct?

MR. GREEN: Absolutely. I was trying to respond to Commissioner Bradley's case of some unreasonable bidding or something like that, who takes that responsibility? Once a contract is entered into -- for example, if Mr. Sasso solicits

a bid and the Joe McGlothlin or Mike Green Power Company win that bid, and we commit to give him capacity at \$6 a kW per month, we are held to that price of capacity with whatever energy prices down the road. You know, whatever the contract says, we are held to that. If it turns out it costs us more that \$6 per kW per month to build that plant, we have to eat it. We have to eat it. It's certainly -- it's on our back.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: So we have to factor in the cost of bonding then. I mean, you would have to have insurance, wouldn't you?

MR. GREEN: Well, you know, most RFPs have criteria in there that says -- called non-performance bonds or non-performance whatever.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Non-performance bonds.

MR. GREEN: It is very important to get those conditions established up front and, you know, what the amount of that is and make sure that it is not onerous to the extent that people won't bid on it.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: But shouldn't that be included as a requirement of the -- if we are going to have a -- change the bid rule, I mean, we need to have in place a process that deals with non-performance.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I think at this point -- I was just going to say I think at this point it just becomes a part of the requirements that get listed as part of the RFP. I

mean, are there bonding qualifications or bonding requirements that are part of an RFP normally? Forget the rule or whether there is one or not. I mean, it's something that to the extent that you are going out soliciting bids, you are going to want to require from the participants. no?

MR. GREEN: If I could offer up the original RFP from Florida Power and Light, I think it had a \$50,000 per day -- I'm sorry, \$50,000 per megawatt penalty if you are one day late bringing the plant on line or whatever the contract said. I personally felt that was onerous. A lot of times if you are a week late, you know, it's replacement capacity or energy costs or something like that. But when I had a real job and I was thinking about bidding on that RFP, you know, we had a 620-megawatt plant, \$50,000 per megawatt. That is a \$31 million call right they had if I am one hour late on when my plant was available.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: But that is a little bit different from what I am discussing. That only kicks in if you get behind schedule. That is just to keep you on schedule. But if, you know, in all the jobs I have ever bid on if you didn't perform, you either ate it or you had to have insurance to ensure that that person that you had the contract with would remain whole.

MR. GREEN: Well, the contracts that you sign on a PPA have guaranteed heat rates. Regardless of what you are

going to generate at, you have fixed the price. You have fixed the heat rate, you have fixed the efficiency, you have fixed the fuel cost, you have fixed whatever your contract -- whatever you negotiate in your contract, that is fixed. And if you don't -- if the IPP, the independent does not adhere to that performance, you know, it eats the loss.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: Commissioners, we anticipate that --

CHAIRMAN JABER: May I interrupt you for just a second, Mr. McGlothlin. Ms. Clark has been sort of raising her hand here for the last half hour. Let me let her go first and you have got the last word, and then, Commissioners, we are going to close it out.

MS. CLARK: I guess I am a bit confused. I thought the Commission had indicated they did not want to go to a third-party evaluator. And your question, Madam Chairman, was the separation within the company of who put together their proposal and who evaluates the RFP, and I'm just trying to find out exactly --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes. Thank you for saying that. It was not -- I'm not convinced that a third-party evaluator is necessary, and where I was is asking the stakeholders to think about that language clarifying which staff evaluates the bids within the company in lieu of a third-party evaluator. That's not to say that I foreclosed, at least in my own mind, the possibility or the feasibility of having a third-party

evaluator. What I'm saying is I'm just not there today for purposes of including it in a strawman proposal. Does that clarify? Okay.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: I was trying to summarize our answer to Commissioner Bradley's question. We anticipate that security arrangements would be among the terms, conditions, criteria, and weighting factors that would be specified in the RFP; and that by the same token, because they are specified, would be part of the review mechanism during the up front opportunity or window of opportunity for review of anything that the responding community might think is unfeasible or onerous. Whether it is the mechanism that we described in the PACE proposal or what I believe to be a similar mechanism that Martha described based upon the other statutory mechanism, it is important to include in the rule that the RFP will include all terms, conditions, criteria, and weighting factors so that that type of issue is captured.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Right. And my original question dealt with who -- I mean, who assumes responsibility if a bid -- if a non-performance occurs. You know, we are going to be looking at all the parties who are involved and that was my original question. And if we have a third party assessing and evaluating bids rather than the IOUs --

MR. McGLOTHLIN: Well, I hope this answers the question, but as we envision it the use of the third-party

evaluator, it would be an independent and objective selection of the respondents based upon the criteria and weighting factors that the IOU has proposed subject to review. And if that results in -- if any bidder is unhappy, part of our proposal would be that any agreed participant could challenge that to the PSC. The selection would be subject to PSC review, and then the ultimate selection would enter the contract if the winner is someone other than the IOU.

MS. CLARK: Madam Chairman.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Ms. Clark.

MS. CLARK: If I could attempt to answer your question, and I think it does go to a concern about the policy on a third-party evaluator. In the final analysis, who is going to be held accountable for that contract or that self-build, who is responsible for keeping the lights on? And the person or the entity that is responsible for keeping the light on and who will be held accountable for those costs ought to be the one making the decision. That is the IOUs.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioners, let's take this forward. What is your pleasure?

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Well, I think Commissioner Clark made a very persuasive point, and based upon that position, I am willing to make a motion. And that motion is that we move forward with the requirement that the utilities submit a binding proposal at the same time and in the same

1	Illianner as all other KFP participants, and we do not make any
2	changes with regard to evaluation proposals by a neutral and
3	independent entity.
4	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I disagree with that.
5	CHAIRMAN JABER: Hang on. What did you say on the
6	last part? I heard the first part.
7	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Can we deal with one issue at
8	a time?
9	CHAIRMAN JABER: We are. Hang on one second.
10	Commissioner Palecki, you said
11	COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I was talking about the
12	binding proposal.
13	CHAIRMAN JABER: Right. And that we do what?
14	COMMISSIONER PALECKI: And that we go forward with
15	that and that we allow the utilities to continue to be the
16	evaluation entity.
17	CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Palecki, so tell me now
18	you would make that motion in addition to the deletions we have
19	made to the
20	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Well
21	CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Bradley, I really am
22	trying to understand so we can even entertain the motion,
23	because I'm really not sure
24	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: And I don't understand either.
25	CHAIRMAN JABER: Right. So let's flesh it out.

1	Commissioner Palecki, you would make that motion in
2	addition to recognizing the deletions that we have talked
3	about, the repowering and the CTs.
4	COMMISSIONER PALECKI: That is correct.
5	CHAIRMAN JABER: Does that motion include the changes
6	to Sub F, Page 45?
7	COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Yes, it would include that.
8	CHAIRMAN JABER: So really the effect of your motion
9	would also take out language related to third-party evaluators?
10	COMMISSIONER PALECKI: That is correct. What my
11	motion would entail is basically two main ingredients. One,
12	that we have early identification of defined evaluation
13	criteria; and, two, that all entities, including the utilities,
14	submit a binding proposal all at the same time.
15	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay.
16	COMMISSIONER PALECKI: And that is along with the
17	other deletions that you have already identified.
18	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Now, Commissioner Bradley,
19	you have questions about that motion?
20	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I can agree with the omission
21	of 2, and I would also like to amend that motion to include 3
22	as an omission.
23	CHAIRMAN JABER: Three as an omission. You mean the
24	binding bids?
25	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY. Yes

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Well, we need to take the underlying motion up first, I think.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, then I've got questions and concerns about the underlying motion. Fundamentally and philosophically, I think that holding the IOUs, in the case of a self-build option, holding them to the number that they awarded themselves the bid with is philosophically -- it makes logical sense. It makes sense to me. The concern that I have, however, is something that Commissioner Bradley quite appropriately pointed out. I guess it was at the one of the workshops anyway, that, you know, things happen and you have to have some -- I don't want to say flexibility, but you do have to have some manner of addressing events and --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Unforeseen circumstances.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: -- unforeseen circumstances. Thank you. I was drawing a blank on that, among many others. And so I think that establishing a binding -- you know, the whole concept of binding -- you know, the whole concept of a binding bid or certainly the binding proposal doesn't quite give me the comfort I need in order to be able to -- at a need determination or a cost-recovery proceeding, or what have you, to be able to say I have comfort in being able to address unforeseen circumstances. So I think, at least in my opinion and in my mind, the only way that I could be comfortable with actually requiring or imposing some kind of binding nature to

the IOUs would be if there is an opportunity at the appropriate time to address any unforeseen circumstances, any cost overruns that have merit and so on. An additional concern, having said that, I'm not sure that a prudency standard necessarily gets us there because I also have a little bit of heartburn about holding a cost overrun to the same kind of standard that you held the original, the original proposal to. So I would throw that out for my fellow Commissioners if they want to discuss or comment how they feel about it. But I could support some kind of binding nature if it does have some flexibility on the back end. It provides the IOUs an opportunity to make their case, albeit as I have said, on a somewhat higher -- to a somewhat higher standard to address cost overruns or inevitabilities, reasonable as they may be.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I have no objection to language of that type. The last thing I want to see is something that completely ties our hands. If there are some extraordinary circumstances that would have an effect on the economic health of our utilities, I think the economic health of our utilities comes first. Of course, everything we do is a balancing between the interests of the utilities to earn a fair return, which they have that right, and the interests of the ratepayers to get quality service at a reasonable price. And I think that your concern is very well taken, and I would not want to do anything in any rule that would tie our hands to the

detriment of our investor-owned utilities in Florida.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Well, my --

MS. CLARK: Madam Chairman --

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: -- my heartburn is with the word binding. Bidding is a science as well as an art, and I think binding discourages bidders. I don't think there are too many people who want to have a binding bid with the understanding that there is no room for renegotiations. And to say that it is binding that means that once you submit an initial bid that is the end it.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, Commissioner Bradley, I would agree with you, and I think that there has been some discussion earlier today as to what the nature, certainly, of the initial bids -- and it wouldn't be -- I don't think that any rule should change the character of how those bids come in at least on an initial basis, because I think that the process should contemplate some negotiation. But I recall asking Mr. Sasso earlier today whether there is a point in the process, and I have to imagine that there is, and I think he confirmed it about whether there is a point in the process at which even the prices of the participants is fixed, if nothing else, then, so the IOU can make a determination that their costs are -- that their self-build option is a more cost efficient one. So there is a point in time, and I am in no way suggesting that it be in the initial phases of the process,

certainly, but that there is a point in time in which these numbers go hard. That they are able to be fixed certainly enough to make a determination to say, my two beats your three. And at that point is when all of this discussion however it turns out, I guess, should kick in. I don't think there needs to be any time -- you know, there is no time tied to it. But there is definitely a point in time in which something has to be certain. Whether it be for the IOU's sake in being able to determine whether it's own self-build option is the most cost-effective, as well as for this Commission at the end of the day to be able to say, all right, this number was the most cost-effective and it is not burdened and it is not -- at least it is not an open question to us. If 400 is the number, then 400 it shall be absent extraordinary circumstances. And by extraordinary circumstances, I think that can encompass the whole gamut of things, whether they be labor strikes, or work stoppages, or acts of God. And I just think that there is plenty of flexibility to make that argument. My concern in that part is that we subject cost overruns for whatever reason to the same lower level of, you know, not inadequate, but certainly not adequate enough scrutiny. I don't think they are on the same level.

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CHAIRMAN JABER: I know there are several people out here that want to address us, but, staff, if I could ask you to direct me in your strawman proposal where the attempt is made

to discuss the binding bids.

MR. BALLINGER: There isn't one.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. So the word binding is not in here at all. This is really -- it would be asking you all to address the finality of the bids but yet keep some flexibility in the process --

MR. BALLINGER: Right.

CHAIRMAN JABER: -- to account for unforeseen circumstances.

MR. BALLINGER: I had an exchange with Commissioner Deason earlier that in staff's view the RFP out there is binding. It's kind of a benchmark that we look at come time for cost-recovery, and we look at the differences there. So, I think it is saying the same thing that you are, is that we want to leave the flexibility for things down the road that may happen and look at them and that is already there. That's why it is not --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I would agree with you that at the end of the day it is this Commission's responsibility, whether it is in a rate proceeding or a cost-recovery proceeding of some sort, that we ultimately bear the responsibility of saying, yes, these costs are acceptable for passing on to the ratepayer or not. And going back to one of the couple of concerns that I listed is the notion that cost overruns receive the same kind of treatment prudence-wise as a

number that was used for our determination that a capacity addition of a particular -- that a particular project was the most cost-effective. I don't agree with that. That I can't -- I mean, I can't make the jump of saying, you know what, we approved it based on this money; and then all this other money is just tacked on, it's okay, too, because we already approved it.

MR. BALLINGER: No, no, no. I hope I didn't give that impression. I was going to follow up with saying that even if a utility came in with the exact same price as the RFP, we would still look at the prudence review of building the unit at all. We had a case just like that with the TECO Polk unit. They came in for a need determination, they were right around the costs that they said they would be at the need determination, but we questioned the need to go forward with the unit when other means were available that looked like they could be cheaper. So just because it goes through and gets the need ticket punched does not mean it's a blank check down the road.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Yes, I know.

MR. BALLINGER: And I hope I didn't give that impression that we are only looking --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I know that, and that is what I want to believe, okay. And I have no complaints and no concerns about any of the decisions this Commission has made,

1	whether I have been sitting on them or not in the past. So,
2	that is not where my concern stems from. But I do have a
3	fundamental and perhaps this is raising another issue or a
4	finer point to be discussed, but I do have a problem with
5	you know, this is something for the lawyers with the same
6	standard being applied in a case where you have a fixed, you
7	have got a fixed number of some sort. I mean, whether it is
8	codified in a rule or not, you are telling me that that
9	information is available. Somewhere someday an IOU said, you
10	know, my two beats your three, but when it comes time to
11	approve cost-recovery for it, it is not two anymore, it's four
12	That differential can't be subject to the same prudency as to
13	the same original number that was used to say, yes. this is
14	prudent. The need is there and the price is good and this is
15	the lowest cost alternative the most cost efficient
16	alternative. I'm sorry, Madam Chairman. Do you see what I'm
17	saying?

MR. BALLINGER: I think at that time you are in a box. You are at the point where the unit is built and you have costs and what are you going to do? You can't go back and rebid or tear the thing down and start again.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Exactly.

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MR. BALLINGER: I am finally catching on.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: My point exactly.

MR. BALLINGER: But I think you do have remedies for

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that as far as the cost-recovery.

2 | COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Remedies such as?

MR. BALLINGER: Disallowing certain costs. If you felt the utility acted --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Based on what standard?

MR. BALLINGER: If they acted imprudently of going forward with the project when they saw costs were escalating, they are under --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: At that point you can't -- I mean, you are subject to the same realities of having to put the brakes on something and, you know, it's the same box that I feel this Commission is in oftentimes in a need determination when you don't have up front -- when you don't have up-front information or you don't have criteria analyzed up front, and you are dealing with all of this, you know, an RFP that took place months ago now at the point where they are breaking ground on a facility. You know, you are -- at least I am, I confess, feeling a little bit rushed and a little bit inadequately -- so then it is the same box. How can I say after I said, you know, X amount of dollars wrapped into the whole of the proposal merited approval and then later on I'm going to say, you know what, whatever cost overruns is just not bad because they were unforeseen.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: Commissioner, may I speak to your point?

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I would like to say something before you speak to his point, though. Binding, let's think about that word. That creates inflexibility. That means that, in my opinion, cost overruns cannot be considered. It really creates finality, okay. Well, now, do you know what that means in the real world? That means that then a contractor starts to do what? Take short cuts. Short cuts mean what? Shoddy work. What happens when you have a shoddy project that is built? You have major problems later on. And it most certainly is not going to be there for its entire economic life the same as one that is built and constructed at a high quality, at a higher quality.

CHAIRMAN JABER: No, what protects companies -- what protects the ratepayers from companies doing that is the possibility of litigation.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Who bears the responsibility for shoddy work?

CHAIRMAN JABER: Exactly. The way I look at this, the term binding, if we structure the rule correctly at the end of the day, binding means certainty. And the one thing all of this table has in common is that they want certainty. They want this Commission to take leadership and say, here is the way it is going be. This is going to be a better process. It is going to be open and transparent for the benefit of the ratepayer. And it means that if you outline the criteria at

the front end, if you apply the factors to those criteria and you award the bids in the most fair way, it all takes care of itself. And you know what, and it may be at the end of this tortured process the IOUs still get to self-build. And I am okay with that. I am completely okay with that, because I have forced the companies to put the most efficient process up front for the benefit of the ratepayers.

And I see that you want to talk, Ms. Clark. I have been waiting for the opportunity to remind you you started all of this.

I think that IPPs and IOUs will not hire construction companies that will do shoddy work because the other companies will turn around and sue them.

Ms. Clark, Mr. Garcia, and then Commissioners, I am ready to entertain Commissioner Palecki's motion.

MS. CLARK: I want to make one small point. You talk about cost overruns. In the September 6th letter to you we pointed out that there also is the potential for savings, and there have been significant savings as a result of some of these self-builds. And I guess my question is by saying binding, are you going to prevent it from going both ways?

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I am perfectly willing to consider throwing some love your way. If you guys come under budget, you know, I think that is fair. You know, I think that it should be a two-way street.

CHAIRMAN JABER: To that point, though -- to that point, Ms. Clark, what is wrong with an economic incentive approach where -- because, again, not caring who gets the bid at the end of the day, we don't want cost overruns, right? Because we don't want you to be put in the position of applying for cost-recovery and showing that costs that were unanticipated are prudent. But by the same token, I want to send you a direct signal that you be the most efficient you can be in your construction costs and have that money go back to the ratepayers in some sort of sharing fashion. You know, maybe it's 80/20 or whatever. It should be both. I have no problem with you all pursuing through the hearing process some economic incentive approach.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And I will tell you why I don't have a problem with that kind of approach is because at the end of the day I felt comfortable with your original number, you know.

CHAIRMAN JABER: That's right.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And so I definitely think that if there are some benefits flowing back, they should flow back to everyone and in a considerable way. I mean, I am not ready to discuss numbers. I suspect Mr. Shreve may have something to say about that in the end, but I think that the mechanism is entirely appropriate. But, again, I would reiterate my concern over having the -- I call it -- it is the all-stuck-together

philosophy.

MS. CLARK: I just didn't want the other side of the equation not mentioned. The other thing --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Thank you for doing it.

MS. CLARK: -- that I would remind you of is at the end of the day you have regulatory authority and control over the utility. You can tell the utility, you know, we approved that, but we just don't think -- the way things are turning out, we don't think you should go forward with it. It's not the same thing when you go to a contract.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, I understand. I recognize the point.

MS. CLARK: I do recall the TECO case when it looked like maybe it didn't need to come on line when they were projecting it, and we were able to push it back. I'm not sure you could do that with a contract.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Okay.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Bradley.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Yes. Before we vote on Commissioner Palecki's motion, I would just like to remind you that I did offer an amendment to his motion, so I think we need to vote that up or down and then get to his original motion.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. I have forgotten already what the amendment was. I will ask you to remind me in just a minute, Commissioner Bradley. Hang on.

Mr. Garcia, this is it.

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MR. GARCIA: Yes. I think Commissioner Baez addressed it a little bit later on, but part of what we're doing, and I think you came all the way back around. I think you were expressing some of your thoughts all the way through, and just to close the loop because I think Susan did that also. I think what we're talking about is who bears the risk? And if we are putting this out there, if you are making the IPPs bear the risk -- and, again, to us, to FIPUG, we are neutral here. We don't necessarily want or need someone else to do it. But the whole point is if you are taking the risk away from the ratepayers, it has got to be to some degree. Maybe there is a better word than binding. And there has to be some standard that holds them, because if not, you play a regulatory game, which is you lowball it and then you use the regulatory process to get to where you need. That process has to be the same for all players, whether it is Duke Power, or Reliant, or Constellation, or whichever company you can think of that won the bid, or FPL. The parties have to be situated and treated exactly the same. And I believe that that also gives them the advantage that if there is some incentive way for the investor-owned utility to derive benefit from lowballing it, we are going to be -- Florida ratepayers and my customers are going to be, or my clients are going to be benefitted just like the system has benefitted. But if we don't treat them the

235 1 same, and if we are worried about a project going bad for an 2 IOU, we have to be worried in the same way for an IPP. And I 3 know there is a different regulatory standard, that's why we 4 are putting it out there. Because we are all taking -- we are taking the risk away from the ratepayers to some degree and 5 6 going for a number. COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Right, Commissioner Garcia, 7 8 and that is precisely what -- I understand that. My argument 9 is to protect the consumer, the same as yours is, and if all of 10 this goes south instead of north, then that means that

ultimately the consumer is the one who has to assume the

responsibility for a project that went south.

MR. GARCIA: Well, I think that if it goes south, you are talking about a process within another process. In other words, you know, when you talk about shoddy labor or other things like that, we still have regulatory oversight. There still is a control over the system and the need in that system that the companies have to meet that, and our responsibility --I'm sorry, your responsibility remains the same.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: That's okay. Once one always one.

MR. GARCIA: Thank you.

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CHAIRMAN JABER: Don't tell him that.

MR. GARCIA: I will take advantage of that,

Commissioner. But I think -- you make a very good point, but I

think in the long-term process this participation in this 1 2 process, the profit is in the long-term gain. It is not a 3 necessary -- what I worry about, and I think Commissioner Baez 4 in his sort of walking through it is both sides. I agree that 5 if FPL can beat every bid out there, FPL should be building the 6 generation. We have all, all Floridians have benefitted, the 7 business community as well as individual consumers. And they, 8 FPL's shareholders, should benefit from their efficiency. 9 There is no question about that. On the other side, we are 10 bearing a risk. When we give you a number, Commissioners, from 11 the outside and that be either the competitive players, the 12 IPPs or IOUs, we have got to have something to hold onto and 13 there has to be a standard to overtake that. Because if not, 14 you end up in a regulatory game and, you know what, you become the independent determiner of this issue that you don't want to 15 16 Because then everybody will come in, you know, everybody 17 will bid a dollar for generation and then we will work 18 regulatorily up from there and see how well we can do. I thank 19 you for the opportunity.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Mr. Garcia. Okay.

Commissioner Bradley, you had an amendment. Please remind me what it is.

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COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Correct me if I'm wrong,
Commissioner Palecki. I think that Commission Palecki agreed
to -- his motion was to eliminate 2 and keep 1 and 3, and my

1 amendment was to eliminate 3 as well as 2. 2 CHAIRMAN JABER: Are you talking about the 3 principles? When you refer to 1, 2, and 3, you all are talking 4 about --5 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: The principles. 6 COMMISSIONER PALECKI: And I think you are talking about the cover sheet on the September 25th, 2002, because they 7 8 seem to me to be numbered. I would put 3 where 2 is and 2 9 where 3 is. COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Okay. Well, I will read the 10 11 language, then. 12 COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I understand what your 13 amendment is. 14 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Okay. Help me then understand 15 what you are proposing. 16 COMMISSIONER PALECKI: What my proposal is, is that we go with defined criteria with an opportunity for a dispute 17 18 resolution procedure up front and that we have --19 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Which would be Number 1. 20 right? 21 COMMISSIONER PALECKI: That's Number 1. And that we have that everyone submits a bit at the same time, sealed bids. 22 23 All applicants, whether they be a utility or a nonutility generator will bid in the same manner. And just to further 24 25 clarify the motion, I was not going to include evaluation by a

neutral -- or I would not require evaluation by a neutral and 1 2 independent entity. So three requests of PACE, I would grant 3 two of the three. The independent and neutral evaluator would 4 be not part of the proposed rule for purposes of our strawman. 5 And I think we still have to clarify here that we are talking about setting this for hearing. And any of us might be 6 7 persuaded that we want to go with the third requirement or we 8 might decide something different altogether, but we would have 9 a hearing scheduled and move forward with a hearing on these 10 issues. 11 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: And my substitute motion was 12 to eliminate a requirement that the utilities submit a binding 13 proposal at the same time and in the same manner as all RFP 14 participants. CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Let's vote the amendment by 15 Commissioner Bradley. 16 17 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I need a second. 18 CHAIRMAN JABER: Is there a second? 19

The motion on the amendment, Commissioner Bradley, fails for lack of a second. Commissioner Bradley, may I ask you a question to engage in perhaps another motion?

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Uh-huh.

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CHAIRMAN JABER: What would you suggest as an alternative, what is currently in the strawman proposal, or you iust wouldn't --

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I just wouldn't have a binding proposal requirement.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. I think what is troubling me
-- I may not be that far from where you are. What is troubling
me is we have sort of moved away from the word binding, which I
could be okay with that.

And, Commissioner Baez, correct me if I'm wrong, it seems to me the discussion went to the award should go to the bid that falls in line with the criteria outlined at the front end reserving flexibility with the IOUs due to unforeseen circumstances.

any vested interest in the word binding, as long as the notion that the proposed costs that an IOU uses in order to award a bid, that its own proposed costs that it uses in order to award a bid, to the extent that it is determined to be the most cost-effective, that that number have meaning. That that number not be subject to the same standard of review when it counts -- that any deviation, rather -- I misspeak. That any deviation from that number not be subject to the same standard of review at the time that cost-recovery is considered. I don't -- you know, it has to mean something at the need determination stage going forward, otherwise we are signing a blank check. And I have trouble doing that and I'm not comfortable with the same -- I am not comfortable with the

current standard.

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2 CHAIRMAN JABER: Right.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: My main concern --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Palecki, that is where I can support your motion with those clarifications on there. I think what I am struggling with is trying to say that they are on equal footing. I'm not there yet. I don't think they are on equal footing. I don't think I want them to be on equal footing.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I guess my main concern is that we don't have -- is that we move off of the old rule policy where we had, after all of the bids are over, the utility gets to look at all of the bids, and then play what I think one of the parties, it may have been Mr. Twomey, called the extra card, and say I can beat everybody else, and that they have that last opportunity. I kind of like what is set forth in Paragraph 4 of the PACE proposal, because there you have everyone bids together, and disregarding the fact that under this paragraph it would be a neutral evaluator, just let's ignore that part. I like the part of a two-phased bid where the public utility would provide to each participant on the short list its analysis of transmission integration cost. et cetera, and then each participant on the short list, including the public utility, if applicable, would thereafter submit a final sealed and binding bid for evaluation. And I

think the word binding is used in terms of we are talking about a bid and it is binding in that you can't come back and then bid again after you have already done that. That is your bid, and you can't change your bid. And so I have no problem whatsoever with Commissioner Baez's proposal as long as we are talking about, you know, a process where everyone is bidding together, and that once you make that bid you can't go and say, oh. I changed my mind. I want to make another bid, because I didn't make the right bid. Well, no, that's not the way bids work.

CHAIRMAN JABER: But I don't think that is what we are talking about. Where I continue -- where I still can't support you is on the notion that the extra card will be played. If on the front end the criteria are established and vetted through this pre-bid meeting, then there will not be an extra card. The flexibility comes in, at least -- and I don't want to put words in your mouth, Commissioner Baez, as it relates to my point, just unforeseen circumstances. Something that -- some technology that is developed. And that language, Sub 4 doesn't get me there.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Well, I think that this Commission, as well as the courts, always have a certain amount of flexibility inherent where you have acts of God, where you have -- you have mentioned new technologies, where you have world changing events. I'm not sure it needs to be expressed.

But as I stated earlier I don't want to tie our hands to the extent that if something horrible happens, let's say we are in a war and a bomb is dropped and it hits a power plant. Well, I mean, what are we going to do? I mean, there are extraordinary circumstances there, and I think we can always consider those kind of extraordinary circumstances.

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COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, but here is -- and here is my approach to it, and I may be totally wrong, but the way I look at it is this: I have more -- I have more trouble accepting the notion that the IOUs and the IPPs in this are on equal -- are peers okay, and lumping them all together. Because I think the way the law is now you have to recognize that the IOU doesn't stand in the same -- you know, that they are not at the same level. However, my -- so you can either lump them all together and force them to bid contemporaneously and all of those things, or you can write it so that at the end of the day whatever number, whatever number an IOU awards itself a project with, is pretty much set. And that the only way to change that for unforeseen circumstances, you know, it better have a note from Doctor Spock and not Doctor Seuss. You see what I'm saying? I mean, you have got to have a really good -- really, really good, and that's why I'm trying to concentrate more on --

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: You mean a note from Mr. Spock, don't you?

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COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Mr. Spock would do, yeah. But you see, I mean, there has to be some consequence attached to That it is not easy assuming -- and I'm not saying that it it. ever happened, but assuming it would be possible, you know, all the disadvantages to this Commission in trying make a decision on the cost-recovery side with saying, hey, you know, you are already in for 400, and you are faced with that decision as a Commissioner saying, well, they have already spent 400 million on it, you know, 100 million in cost overruns seems reasonable by comparison because look at how far in. Besides the fact that you are already at a point where you can't turn back. okay. So I don't think that all of those circumstances timing-wise bode well for our ability to say, you know what, company, you were wrong, you were imprudent, you were all of these negative things, and you are going to have to, you know, you are going have to bear some responsibility over it. that in an effort to set out as much as we can up front and still be cognizant of the fact that there are unforeseen circumstances out there, which eventually may merit that kind of treatment, you know, that the standard be a little higher. That you say, you know what, you gave us a number, you put us on a 90-day time clock at X dollars. We took that 90-day time clock, did the best we could and approved it based on that number. That number has to have meaning come time to pay. Ιt has to have meaning.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Yes. But, you know, this is assuming that this whole discussion has been built around the premise that the low bid is the best bid.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: No, I disagree.

CHAIRMAN JABER: No. That's why I have been clarifying that it is the most cost-effective alternative as opposed to the least cost. The IOUs in their argument kept saying least cost. That's precisely why I wanted to clarify it, at least from this Commissioner's standpoint.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And I remember reading as well, Commissioner Bradley, that at least the strawman proposal also has flexibility and discretion on the part of the IOUs considering the project or considering the bids, however and whoever is considering it, in order to take in nonprice attributes and also system considerations. So that if you need fuel diversity or that if you need, you know, certain aspects addressed, that you can address them throughout that process and that there is still some flexibility built in for them to address it. You know, I don't think that their hands are tied in that respect in any way.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Baez, how would you accomplish what you're saying with respect to the flexibility -- can that be reconciled with Commissioner Palecki's motion? That's really where I'm stuck.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, I think we have been cut up

on the word binding, you know. And to me that is really -- I don't know how to get around that because I had jotted down something, you know, kind of culling together language that we found in the different comments and so on and certainly from PACE. But, you know, to have the public utilities propose costs be binding. And, again, we can discuss that word later on it in the future, in future surveillance and ratemaking proceedings. Absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances, now, I don't know -- I would like to hear from the lawyers if that is -- you know, if that is an appropriate standard. And keep in mind that my concern is having a higher standard than just prudence. You know, that's really where I'm coming from whatever the --

MS. BROWN: I think we are going to have to go play with the language, Commissioner. We are going to have to go back and read the transcripts and see what it is you all wanted to do so we are clear on that. But I would remind Commissioner Palecki that he worked on the negotiated cogeneration rules, and one of the matters that was of considerable significance to the utilities at that point was whether they would be assured of cost-recovery or not. And there was language, I think, in the order that talked about absent, mistake, fraud, extraordinary circumstances, that those contracts would be honored. It seems to me we might be able to flip that around the other way and say the costs will be presumed reasonable

absent some extraordinary, fraud, or act of God, or something. But I think I would like to look at it if that is all right and play with some wording.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: If I recall correctly, the Commission argued about that for about four hours.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, we are well past that now.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Palecki, for me it hinges on whether I'm going to support your motion. If we could have a general understanding that by your motion -- and maybe philosophically you're not there, you just need to tell me. If we could have a general agreement by your motion that you don't mean to preclude the flexibility on whether there are unforeseen circumstances that have created a deviation from the award, for lack of a better --

commissioner Palecki: No, I don't have any problem with that. As I have stated earlier, my main concern is to have all of the bids submitted at the same time in the same manner. I understand that in some circumstances there may be extraordinary circumstances and, also, that there is an obligation to serve on the part of the utility, and we have to make sure that we recognize that. We need to make sure that we take action to maintain an adequate power supply, and there can be any number of, you know, contingencies or events that could require some change. And so I don't have any problem with that sort of language at all.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I don't have a problem with that language, either, but I do have a problem with how it is being described and how we would establish the intent of what we are seeking to accomplish here. Because, I mean, we have said all afternoon that IOUs and bidders are not equal because of the fact that -- because of what Florida law is. And I think that to have that requirement that everybody bids at the same time, I mean, makes them equal. And correct me if I'm wrong, but I think the intent is to establish the fact that IOUs and bidders are not equal.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Again, from one Commissioner's standpoint, and I would invite everyone to chime in here, because I think Commissioner Bradley raises a very good point. Here is how I reconcile it, Commissioner Bradley. If on the front end all of the criteria and the weighting and the ranking factors are established through a pre-bid meeting by the IOU and with the collaboration and feedback of the potential participants and the Commission staff, there is that transparency, right? The openness, the fairness, and the transparency. Why not allow all of the companies to submit proposals at the same time? The advantage you want to give to the load serving entity is to respect their identification of need pursuant to what they have identified they need in the ten-year site plan. That means they are in the best posture of identifying the criteria up front, establishing the procedure

to be followed for the evaluations and the ranking, and then what is left? Why is it they would need to submit their bids later on in the process? What they really need, we have given them at the front end.

MR. SASSO: May I make a very brief comment? CHAIRMAN JABER: Hang on, Mr. Sasso.

Commissioners, is that -- well, Commissioner Palecki, let me pose it to you. Is that why you think the company should submit the proposals at the same time?

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Absolutely. I agree with you 100 percent.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Sasso.

MR. SASSO: Yes, ma'am. This is exactly the issue that was fully debated on the Gulf bid rule waiver docket. And if you recall, the reason there is an issue is because the company is required in the RFP to publish its costs.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Right.

MR. SASSO: And that puts us in a different position right off the bat from the other participants. And if the IPPs are then able to submit their bids, and we are bound by the costs we put in, they are going to beat our published costs by a cent, which is why staff and the Commission strongly recommended that to discipline the bidders they recognize that the utility has the ability to sharpen its pencil at the end, so they don't just cluster around those published numbers. So

1	you can't assume that they are all in an equal situation
2	submitting bids at the same time. That's not the way the
3	rules
4	CHAIRMAN JABER: But, Mr. Sasso, I don't disagree
5	with you. I thought we have already discussed, and I think I
6	directed staff and recognized that the IPPs moved away from
7	that. I don't think you should publish your costs ahead of
8	time. I thought we went through that. I do not mean to imply
9	that you should publish your costs.
10	MR. McGLOTHLIN: PACE's proposal was
11	CHAIRMAN JABER: Does that satisfy your concern,
12	Mr. Sasso, or am I missing the point?
13	MR. SASSO: It is still in the rule. I don't believe
14	there is a suggestion to delete that from the existing rule.
15	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Show me exactly, because it
16	was my intent to delete that from the rule.
17	MR. SASSO: It is in the existing bid rule.
18	MR. BALLINGER: Page 43.
19	CHAIRMAN JABER: Now, PACE, correct me if I'm wrong,
20	you have that is where you made movement. You are
21	completely leaving that issue outside the scope of the
22	discussion. You don't think the IOUs should publish their
23	costs.
24	MR. GREEN: Yes, ma'am. In our proposed rule they
25	suggested that I think our original discussion we had that

in it, but in our subsequent discussion we have pulled back 1 2 from that. We felt truly if there is going to be a fair and 3 open bid process, they shouldn't show their prices early just 4 like they shouldn't see our prices early. 5 6

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CHAIRMAN JABER: Now, Mr. Sasso, on my copy I have written here delete, so I thought we talked about that.

MR. SASSO: Again, you may recall that when this issue was addressed in the Gulf docket, staff explained that without the published costs they were saying bids coming in were just too high. It was not an efficacious process. So they wanted the utility to publish some costs to start the bidding at a lower, more realistic level.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. You're telling me what staff I'm telling you that, at least as it relates to what wants. this Commissioner wants, and what I thought we got Commissioner Palecki to agree to include in his motion, was the deletion of that. okay?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: What language specifically are you talking about deleting?

CHAIRMAN JABER: I'm talking about Sub 10, which would have required the company to include the cost of the common facilities, land improvements, transmission facilities, cooling water facilities.

> COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: What page is that on? CHAIRMAN JABER: Page 43.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I think if you look at the top 1 2 of the page, there are costs that are associated with the major 3 capacity addition. In paragraph -- what is it, 5A? I think 4 that is the concern if I am understanding correctly. 5 MR. SASSO: That is correct. 6 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. That's fine, but didn't we also say that anything associated with repowerings would be 7 taken out? And I'm reading -- and this is good clarification, 8 staff. I thought anything related to the words major capacity 9 10 addition really went to the repowerings and the CTs. 11 MR. BALLINGER: Yes, they did, but still the cost of a power plant site act unit, the current rule and what we still 12 13 have proposed, they would have to put out in their RFP the 14 costs, the direct costs of that unit. You did tell us to take 15 out the cost of common facilities. 16 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. 17 COMMISSIONER DEASON: I'm looking at Lines 5 and 6 of 18 Page 43. 19 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: And those are underlined, not 20 deleted. MR. BALLINGER: No, those are in the existing rule. 21 22 MR. SASSO: That is an important feature of the existing rule. 23

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suggested be deleted from the rule.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: Those are the costs that PACE

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MR. SASSO: And a lot of that information is in the ten-year site plans, which was part of the rationale in requiring the utilities to provide it to begin with and denying Gulf's request for a waiver. But, again, we are concerned that we are revisiting, from a policy point of view, judgments that were made by the staff and the Commission, appropriately so, at the time the rule was initially fashioned weighing all of these considerations.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioners. Commissioner
Palecki, you were clarifying the motion. I think it would be helpful also to walk through what you were accepting and what you were rejecting in the changes we talked about earlier. I heard the IPPs give up on the identification of costs.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I thought I did, as well, and I didn't mean to include that as being included in my motion. My motion was a very general one. And with regard to the actual deletions from the existing staff strawman, you will have to help walk me through that because I didn't record all of these deletions. But I think we all agreed or at least I didn't have any objections to any of those that we discussed.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Staff, are you real clear on what we are proposing?

MR. BALLINGER: I will tell you what I have, and you tell me if I have missed something. The first thing, there are two types of plants; there is a Power Plant Site Act plant and

non-PPSA plants. We want to stick with PPSA plants only. That is what the rule is going to go to. Okay, that is the first choice. The second thing, then, you wanted to take out was the cost of common facilities, which was Section 5A, Sub 10. And that is coming out. You wanted to take out some language about forcing collocation. I think we can work on the wording of that. And we understand that concept. You don't want to force that, that has to be an option.

CHAIRMAN JABER: No. I don't want you work on the

CHAIRMAN JABER: No, I don't want you work on the wording. I think there was consensus that it should just be deleted.

MR. BALLINGER: Right. And it is probably just deleting that section where we mention it, but that section may need other tweaking to make it clear what it is doing. Exploring alternatives, but don't force collocation to have to be one of them. And I think I understand that. You don't want to force the utility to have to do it if they don't want to, I think. Am I correct so far?

CHAIRMAN JABER: Uh-huh.

MR. BALLINGER: Okay. And then the third one was the removal of the equity penalty. I think Martha talked about that, or removing that sentence back on Page 45 in Sub F there at that last sentence. Those are the deletions, if you will. And then also the change we do up front about the major capacity additions, that would be changed also related to the

Power Plant Site Act. And now we are down to where we have defined criteria with dispute resolution. There would be no independent evaluator, which isn't in the proposed rule, anyway, so there is nothing that we have to do there. And then whether or not to have binding proposals or sealed bids, and that is where we are kind of stuck at right now. That's what I have.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Is there any unintended consequence of not seeking costs of some of those things? Even though the IPPs are willing to give up on that issue, if we accept that notion, are there unintended consequences that you need to tell us about now?

MR. BALLINGER: I think they are linked, that the giving up of the IOU of displaying its cost is linked with a binding bid. And I mean binding, that you are stuck with it. And what I have heard is you don't want to have binding stuck with it, you want to allow for some flexibility at the back end. So that is what you have to consider with not forcing the IOU to display it's costs. The other unintended consequence, as Mr. Sasso pointed out, is a lot of this information comes from the ten-year site plans, the costs of units. It's already public information, so putting it in the RFP doesn't do a whole lot. It's not a big burden for the utilities to display it out there.

MR. SASSO: Ma'am, there is one more consideration,

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and that is the flexibility of all parties to negotiate after the bids are submitted and reduce their bids.

CHAIRMAN JABER: That there should be?

MR. SASSO: There should be. And I guess the proposal that the chair has suggested, while I understand the IPPs have talked about this issue in the past, and the context of their's is sort of taking me by surprise, but there are a number of issues that we would have to think through and be prepared to discuss at hearing. And one of them might be the whole set of unintended consequences that might arise from freezing all the bids at the inception, when our habit and practice has been to try to get everybody lower after that first round comes in.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And I don't want to put words in your mouth, but you seem to be suggesting that somehow a two-phased, something that actually contemplates further negotiation or at least a second round of bids, is that more or less what you are suggesting? And I don't want to nail you down on anything, but that seems to me -- that's what I'm hearing.

MR. SASSO: Yes, I -- see, the premise of this idea that we all submit sealed bids is wrong because it presumes that what we are trying to do is win the bid. And so it is our incentive to outbid everybody else and put in a more favorable bid, and so we want them to be high so we can win the bid.

1	That premise is wrong. We don't want to win the bid. We want
2	the best project for the customer. So when they all submit
3	bids, we tell them do better, we want to negotiate and so on.
4	And we have published our costs and then there is an effort
5	made to get the best project. So the premise is flawed that
6	this is just an auction where we are on an equal playing with
7	the other bidders. That is not our role, and that is not our
8	responsibility.
9	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And I'm not trying to suggest
10	that you are. I think we have discussed that enough this
11	afternoon anyway. But what I'm trying to ascertain is when you
12	talk about preserving some ability to say, hey, do better, are
13	you including yourself in that pool?
14	MR. SASSO: Well, traditionally we have tried to do
15	better.
16	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I know you do. I know you do,
17	but
18	MR. SASSO: The answer is yes.
19	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: So that whole second run would
20	mean everybody everybody submit, for instance, a second
21	sealed bid? I mean, is that
22	MR. SASSO: Well, I'm not talking about that model
23	where we have an auction, and we keep going back and forth.
24	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: What are you talking about?
25	MR SASSO: I'm talking about the status guo where we

publish some numbers with the understanding that all bidders are at risk that we can lower those numbers. So they have to give us their best shot. Then once they submit those numbers, we still try to get them lower. And we retain the ability and the obligation to try to sharpen our pencils and get even lower still. But it's not an auction. It is not a competition.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I hear you.

MS. CLARK: It's a negotiation, and they are given that opportunity to give a better price. And I think what you are suggesting is at the end of the day when the utility says, this is it; we still think the self-build is right. And they come in to you and say -- for the determination of need they say, this is our number. This is the number we said we could do it and this is the reason we chose ourselves. And you want to say, when you come back in again, we are going to hold you to that number. So at that point you want to say that what they present in the determination of need is the firm number. I think to describe it as binding bid is probably confusing it. It seems to me what you are saying is I want to hold you to that number because if you had chosen the --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: The number better be the same.

MS. CLARK: -- contract, they would be held to that.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: But the number theoretically should be the same as the number you used.

MS. CLARK: I agree.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I'm not talking -- you know, I'm not expecting to see a whole different number when the need determination comes in than the one that was used --

MS. CLARK: To evaluate.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: -- to evaluate. I guess that's really --

MR. SASSO: And those numbers do have reality, Commissioner Baez. The numbers that we use and provide to the Commission, we take very seriously. They do have reality now.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Why is that not in the nature of a binding -- I mean, just for argument sake.

MR. SASSO: It's binding in the sense that
Mr. Ballinger has described. We understand the Commission uses
that as a benchmark. We understand the Commission relies on
that number and takes it as a serious number. Whether it is
the one that we used to evaluate it, the one that we bring to
the need case, ideally they are the same number, but we
recognize that the Commission has relied on that number. And
it is a real number, and we are expected to do at least that
well when we do the project. And currently the Commission does
review any overruns for prudence, but prudence gives you all
the enforcement authority you need because it is reasonableness
under the circumstances. And part of the circumstances when we
come back to you and talk about an overrun is we gave you
another number. And now we are higher and now we have some

explaining some to do. And we do have to show you that any overrun is justified. That's part of the circumstances that you take into account in deciding whether that overcharge is prudent. So you have a set of tools now in place, and we have a track record, I believe, that suggests that those tools have been effective, and we have honored the numbers we have given and we have taken them very, very seriously. I don't believe that there has been any demonstration of a situation where a utility gamed the system has been suggested. That is just not it.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Mr. McGlothlin, why isn't knowledge of that number at the award moment, I guess, for lack of a better term, at the moment the project is awarded, albeit to a self-build option, what is not binding about that exactly?

MR. McGLOTHLIN: Commissioner Baez, I would approach it this way.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And, I'm sorry, you know, listening to what Mr. Sasso said and how he presented that.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: Well, what he presented was this, as I understand it, he wants the requirement to present costs in the RFP to stay in the rule because that is justification in large measure for the utility's claim to have a need to look at the bids that come in and have the discretion and opportunity to lower its bid when the others don't have a similar opportunity. You know, the motion that is now pending is not

to include an independent evaluator. And, of course, we reserve our opportunity to try to persuade -- if the motion goes forward, we reserve our ability to try to persuade you to the merits of that. But, for the sake of argument, if the motion is to not include an independent evaluator, then the requirement of simultaneous bids, binding in nature, and we can define binding, becomes even more important. Because what we think the objective is here is a fair comparison and an opportunity for all participants in the bid process, IPPs, other IOUs, and the soliciting utility to be on somewhat even terms. When we discussed in our most recent proposal this concept of binding, and this goes to your search for a standard that is different than what is now in place, what we suggested was that if the IOU's proposal is selected as the most cost-effective, the public utility's proposed costs shall be binding on it in future earnings surveillance reports and ratemaking proceedings to the same extent the pricing proposals of participants would be binding on them in a purchased power contract.

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COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I don't like the tail end of that language, and I will tell you why. Because that extent, that is subject to a whole other system. That is subject to litigation in a courtroom and may not be here, so I don't see that as the same thing. You know, what happens in a courtroom under a contract interpretation case is a little bit different

than what we are doing here at the time we are taking into account the numbers that the utility used. So I am uncomfortable with that comparison. I just don't think it exists.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: It was our effort to recognize that the term sheet, if you want to call it that, or the terms and conditions, puts some degree of risk on the participants, and that it is fair to require the IOU to be aware of the fact that it is going to be --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Is at risk, too. For its decisions.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: And it would take that into account in fashioning its proposal. But if the concern is or the sensitivity is that as presently structured the staff's strawman contemplates one binding bid, and there is no opportunity to sharpen pencils, then let me offer to you our suggestion that there be a short list and a second round of bids that would include everyone bidding simultaneously and would not include the IOU playing what Mr. Twomey called an extra card in that process.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Mr. Sasso, what is wrong with the utility being afraid to be undercut? What is wrong with that fear on your part?

MR. SASSO: We are not afraid of being undercut. We want to be undercut.

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COMMISSIONER BAEZ: What is wrong with using -- what is wrong with using that desire and at the same time in the context of, for instance a second round of bidding, what is it that is not -- what is it that is keeping your from your best price?

MR. SASSO: Well, currently there aren't rounds of bidding because this isn't run as an auction.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I understand.

MR. SASSO: There are continuing discussions and in our last project we made an effort to encourage the participants to lower their costs. And, in fact, we gave them our -- we lowered our costs in the process. We got better information, and we told them what that was. I think each utility operates differently, but the point is they still didn't do it. They didn't even respond to the information about our lower cost. But this can't be treated like an auction. Again, in an auction we would be rooting for other people to be high. You know, if Mr. Green was working for one of these companies and he submitted a bid, and I am the self-build auctioneer, as opposed to a regulated utility, I want him to be high. I don't want to go to him and tell him take your bid low. That's not what it is about. I'm not rooting for him to be high; I'm rooting for him to be low, and so I am encouraging him to reduce his price. And he knows he has to do it because he is at risk that I can lower my price.

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That disciplines him and the other bidders in the process, and I think that is a good system.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I wouldn't exactly --

MR. SASSO: And there is another unintended consequence that my client just told me about here. Another. maybe, embedded assumption in this idea that we have to submit bids simultaneously is that we are submitting the same kind of bids. But remember the bidders are submitting their price, not their costs. We are matching that up against our costs. If you really wanted to make it apples to apples, then we bid a price and nobody looks at our costs either. The Commission doesn't look at our costs, they don't look at our costs, nobody looks at our costs. And if it is a good deal, the shareholders get the benefit, and we are no longer a cost-based regulated utility. But we are. And it is not apples to apples. We are not bidding price to price. We are showing our costs to you and to them, and they are showing us price. They are two fundamentally different animals, and we can't be talking about submitting bids on the same plane. We need a different model, a different paradigm than we have in Florida today.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Why do your costs get lower later in the process?

MR. SASSO: Well, because this is a moving target.

Once we identify a need, identify the best alternative to meet that need, we start developing cost information. We want to be

1 as close to the in-service date as possible to have the most 2 current reliable efficacious information, and that is a moving 3 target. As we are moving through the process, we are getting 4 information as we did in this last project. And we had good 5 information when we went out to bid, but as we are going 6 through the process getting closer to the real date, the 7 in-service date, we got better information. We got better cost 8 information. And once that became available to us, we made it 9 available to the people who were viable participants at that 10 time. So this is a dynamic process. The timing is important, 11 which is why we are concerned about further litigation or 12 points of entry or so on that would extend that. That means we 13 have to back up the commencement of this process maybe how many 14 months earlier than we do now, which makes the data that much 15 more distant from the in-service date which compromises the 16 whole project. We want to wait and get as close to the in-service date as we can. We build in the regulatory process 17 18 time. We build in the construction time. We have all these 19 time lines, but you want it to be as close to the in-service 20 date as possible and not back it up another six months for 21 additional regulatory process or litigation and so on. 22 MR. McGLOTHLIN: Mr. Sasso said -- he made a 23 24

comparison between our price and his costs. As I understand it the utility evaluates proposals on the basis of impact on revenue requirements, which as I understand it, includes a

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return on investment. So I think there is something amiss there.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioners, if we could just close this down now. I think, you know, Commissioner Baez, where I am on the costs, to the degree there are unintended consequences, that is yet another advantage of getting the evidence at the hearing. Because, frankly, I hear what you are saying, I agreed with some; I disagreed with some of the other points you made. But, I don't know enough today to know whether it is the right thing to do or not to include the requirement of the IOUs including their costs. Either way, I see it being discussed in the hearing, so I'm leaning toward just leaving it in and let it get discussed in the hearing.

But with respect to Commissioner Palecki's motion, the same -- you know, I have come full circle there, too, Commissioner Palecki. The definition of binding and the flexibility can be fleshed out at the hearing, too. So for the purposes of moving this forward, I can support your motion, recognizing that there is a long way to go through the hearing process. I have lost my optimism. Can you tell?

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And just so that I can be clear, the language -- exactly what language are we inserting in terms -- or are you proposing to -- forgive me.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Well, you had talked about some extraordinary circumstances, and I think that Martha Brown

had said that there is some language that had been debated at a lengthy Commission proceeding back about eight or ten years ago that might be applicable. And if I recall, it talked about acts of God and extraordinary circumstances, war, just a laundry list of about six or seven different things. And, you know, I don't have any objection to that additional language, and I guess maybe I'm perfectly willing to flesh out and debate the exact language we need when we get to the hearing. But I know that for now we need a strawman, so whatever kind of extraordinary circumstances language --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: You know, I think as well that for purposes of moving the rule forward, I'm okay voting it out. I just want to understand the form of it. The form of the motion doesn't include specific language, and I guess you're telling me that it doesn't at this point.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Well, I don't know how in a rulemaking -- and perhaps I could ask Ms. Brown this. Do we have to be so specific at this time that we give you that exact language or can we just refer to the -- I can't even remember the docket number that that language is in, to be honest with you.

MS. BROWN: Well, the point we are in the process right now is that when you all decide, this rule would be proposed. I think I mentioned that earlier. And that means that it is published in the FAW, that it is sent to the Joint

Administrative Procedures Committee, and it really needs to be 1 2 fairly complete. So what Tom and I were talking about doing was going back over what you said and then trying -- where your 3 4 idea was more a vision rather than specifics, we would try to 5 fill in the details and then publish that. If that works for 6 you. If not --7 CHAIRMAN JABER: Let me ask you this, procedurally. 8 We have got an agenda tomorrow. We know that we have heard 9 from all of the stakeholders, we have given every opportunity 10 for people to be heard. What is wrong with you all staying up 11 all night to come up with some language, Martha, Tom, Mark, to 12 bring to us tomorrow at the end of agenda? Can I announce from 13 the bench that there will be an item tomorrow for the sole 14 purpose of having just the Commissioners take a look at the 15 language that staff has come up with consistent with our

MS. BROWN: It will be hard for me to do that because I was up all last night, and I have a hearing that starts on Wednesday.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I guess Harold has been on vacation for awhile.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Did Mr. McLean get a good night's sleep last night?

MS. BROWN: Excuse me?

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direction today?

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Nothing. Never mind.

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CHAIRMAN JABER: And maybe it doesn't have to be tomorrow, but is there a clock that has started already?

MS. BROWN: No. No clock has started yet.

CHAIRMAN JABER: And really I am responding to your concern that is has to be specific language.

MS. BROWN: I tell you what I would be most comfortable doing and that would be getting together and coming back at the next agenda to bring you what we have done.

CHAIRMAN JABER: What that does, though, Ms. Brown, is effect the availability of hearing dates.

MS. BROWN: Okay.

MR. GARCIA: Madam Chairman, if I might propose something. I mean, you know, maybe we are only going to build a two-lane highway, but it might benefit us to talk about -- as strong a rule as we want, you're all talking about scaling back. I understand Commissioner Baez's point about binding, but I think everyone will be on notice. You say we are going to hearing and you put out a strong rule and we can always work back from that. So I think --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Garcia, we are not scaling back. We are not scaling back. I also believe in not wasting peoples' time. I also believe in, you know, minimizing the expense to folks. And I know where I believe today my limits are, and I'm not going to waste anybody's time. I want a realistic rule and something that is going to generate a

targeted comment cycle. Is there any other language we can look at, Ms. Brown, in anyone else's proposal that we may want to just substitute to accommodate what Commissioners Palecki

and Baez are talking about, and myself?

MR. BALLINGER: I think I have found the language that came about, Commissioner Palecki, that we used in the cogen thing. It's on Page 47, and it's down at the bottom where costs would be assumed recoverable absent evidence of fraud, mistake, or similar grounds sufficient to disturb the finality of the decision.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: That's it.

MR. BALLINGER: Okay. My hesitancy with this is the direction to assume that the costs that come forward in a need determination assumed -- if approved, assumed prudent, and then anything over you would have to have unforeseen circumstances. Personally, I think that takes away some Commission power now where we have argued in the past that even though you have a need determination, prudency is a different animal. And all dollars are subject to that, and I want you to be aware of that before you give them that. And we haven't had that dialogue.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And maybe this is a fine point to make, but at no point have I suggested -- albeit knowingly, have I knowingly suggested that because I have asked to look at differences in numbers on the back end, look at the differential at a higher standard means that there is any

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presumption of prudence as to the bid number or the -- do you see what I'm saying?

MR. BALLINGER: I think so. I think it's getting clear.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I don't mean to be looking at one with a closer eye, with a higher standard to the exclusion of looking at the other. I just don't think they deserve the same treatment.

MR. BALLINGER: I take a simplistic view, I guess, or one could approach it this way, is that they are two separate entities. A need is a need determination; a prudence review is a prudence review, and you look at all dollars. And granted, if it is shown that it is roughly the same as the need, that helps the case. That helps you get there. But I still think when you go to prudence review all dollars are subject to disallowance. Because it could be cost overruns, it could be a load went away, the wholesale load, and they have excess capacity now. And did they manage their other resources prudently? A variety of things when they come in for cost recovery, and that's why I see the two as independent.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And I think that's where we get off of what Mr. Sasso had represented. That, you know, prudence is under the circumstances at the time, and it would be very difficult to say the load went away on day, you know, whatever, day 360. But, you guys, you know, at the time that

we incurred it, it was prudent, it was needed.

MR. BALLINGER: I understand. And I think you have to have the opportunity to justify why the difference, justify why the dollars spent were prudently incurred for a variety of reasons. You know, whatever happened in that interim time period. But I don't want to send a signal that if a need determination ticket is punched, that management's on-going duty to prudently manage its resources is done. And that's why I want to be real careful in crafting this language. And I heard some of that that was giving me pause, that is was like the number you gave here is binding and you only get the increment if it is unforeseen circumstances.

CHAIRMAN JABER: No.

MR. BALLINGER: Okay.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: No. What I meant to suggest is that there shouldn't be equal treatment for the two. I think something over and above the number upon which the award of a project was based has to have some meaning. And in order for that to have some meaning it has to be closely associated, if not identical, to the number that is proposed for cost recovery absent, you know --

MR. BALLINGER: I agree. And I think we are saying the same thing. And this is what staff would look at in a cost recovery --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: But there isn't a presumption of

1 prudence --2 MR. BALLINGER: How to put that in words, I'm having 3 trouble with. 4 CHAIRMAN JABER: You know what. Commissioners. I am 5 completely comfortable with all the direction that we have 6 given to staff to let them have the flexibility to come up with 7 some language and throw it out there for purposes of hearing. 8 Just as one Commissioner. I don't feel like I need to see that 9 language in some sort of formal fashion, recognizing we are 10 going to hearing. 11 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, is there proxy language 12 that we have to serve up with the proposed rule, because that 13 is what I hear legal suggesting? 14 CHAIRMAN JABER: I think Mr. Ballinger is pointing to the language on Page 47 as proxy language. 15 16 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: That still needs some work. MR. BALLINGER: Yes, because what is your threshold? 17 18 What are you approving absent evidence of fraud or mistake? 19 Are you giving a --20 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And I don't think that the notion 21 of approval should apply. I think it is the notion of shall 22 not be recoverable. That is really --23 MR. BALLINGER: Any overruns should not be

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recoverable absent that.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Any difference between a -- I

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don't even know what to call it anymore. I don't want to call it a winning bid necessarily, but --

CHAIRMAN JABER: But, you know, Commissioner Baez, you don't want to inadvertently take out the possible incentives that we could create through this process. If the IOU self-builds and those costs come way below the original anticipated costs, from a policy standpoint, a public policy standpoint, you would want that.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: No, and I agree, but I think that is a question of just added language, just clarifying.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Right. But my caution is not to tighten this so much to preclude what I was talking about.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I think we need the utility that wins the bid to have the same incentives that a nonutility to build that plant as efficiently as they possibly can. And if their costs -- and it's kind of like the price-to-price analogy that Mr. Sasso made earlier. I think the nonutility or the utility should both be able to -- since they both have the same risk, they should both be able to reap those rewards. And that is the entire incentive that is in place with this type of a procedure, because the utility should be rewarded for its efficiency and should be able to -- it's shareholders should be able to reap a profit from those efficiencies.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Staff and Commissioners, if we take a few minutes of a break, do you think language could be

1	developed to that subsection to accommodate what we are talking
2	about?
3	MR. BALLINGER: We will give it our best shot.
4	CHAIRMAN JABER: We are going to take our final
5	ten-minute break, and we are going to come back and vote out
6	Commissioner Palecki's motion.
7	MS. BROWN: Chairman Jaber, could well, when we
8	come back I have one other thing I would like to ask you.
9	There is one section I wanted to bring to your attention that
10	looks like it might need to come out.
11	(Off the record.)
12	CHAIRMAN JABER: Let's get back on the record. I
13	asked staff to think about specific language for Sub 14.
14	MS. BROWN: We have done that. Here is our proposal:
15	If the public utility selects the self-build option, any costs
16	in addition to those identified in the RFP shall not be
17	recovered unless the utility can demonstrate that such costs
18	were unforeseen and beyond its control. Do you want me to read
19	it again?
20	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: The cost identified in the RFP?
21	Is that
22	MS. BROWN: Yes.
23	MR. BALLINGER: Yes, because we still have the
24	provision that the utility has to put its costs forward in the
25	DED the costs of its unit. That is kind of its hid if you

will, okay?

2 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Okay.

MR. BALLINGER: And from what I was hearing, is that what you wanted was anything above and beyond that they would have to come in and demonstrate it was, you know, unforeseen at the time, things of that nature.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Martha, are you comfortable that that establishes a different legal standard?

MS. BROWN: Yes.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Yes. she shook her head.

MS. BROWN: Yes. You know, it is just the circumstances. It's hard to really focus, but this would be sufficient to propose the rule.

CHAIRMAN JABER: It gives you the specifics that you need to publish it in the Florida Administrative Weekly, which I think is all we can accomplish.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And I'm -- for one, I am comfortable with that for those purposes.

MS. CLARK: Madam Chairman.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I can live with that language. I might be able to be talked out of that language at a subsequent hearing, but I think for purposes of a strawman at this time to move forward. And who knows, it might be that that is the language we end up with. There is nothing apparent to me that is objectionable about it.

1	CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Clark, I will let you
2	comment in just one minute. Martha, before we broke you said
3	there was one other thing you wanted to tell us?
4	MS. BROWN: Yes, Chairman Jaber. On Page 48
5	actually Ms. Clark mentioned this to me. Subsection 15 at the
6	top there, that whole subsection really applies to non-PPSA
7	plants. We think that should come out.
8	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay.
9	MS. BROWN: And that was all I had.
10	CHAIRMAN JABER: Martha and Tom and Mark, to the
11	degree you find anything else like that, to stay consistent
12	with the spirit of our direction today, I would ask that you go
13	ahead and delete it.
14	MS. BROWN: All right. Thank you.
15	CHAIRMAN JABER: Ms. Clark.
16	MS. CLARK: Martha used the language identified in
17	the RFP, and I thought the objective was if they self-select it
18	is that number.
19	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Right.
20	MS. CLARK: And not what is in the RFP.
21	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I mean, is that the same thing,
22	Tom?
23	MR. BALLINGER: We could change I understand now,
24	yes.
25	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Do you see where

MR. BALLINGER: How about identify it at the need 1 2 determination proceeding, because now we have structured this whole rule to only PPSA plants. We no longer have the two 3 types of plants, we just have -- okay. I understand now. 4 5 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Hold on. Identified at a need 6 determination proceeding? 7 MR. BALLINGER: Yes. 8 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Okay. MR. BALLINGER: Because that is the only time an RFP 9 10 would be issued now is prior to a need determination proceeding. 11 12 CHAIRMAN JABER: Read it one more time with the 13 revision. 14 MR. BALLINGER: Okay. If the public utility selects a self-build option, any costs in addition to those identified 15 in the need determination proceeding shall not be recovered 16 unless the utility can demonstrate that such costs were 17 18 unforeseen and beyond its control. 19 CHAIRMAN JABER: That is enough to start with. Okay. 20 Commissioner Palecki, you have got a motion. I think it is time to call for a second. Is there a second to Commissioner 21 22 Palecki's motion? 23 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well. I can second it just clarifying that, you know, whatever needs to be out, if that is 24 something that Commissioner Palecki is accepting, based on the 25

1	Chairman's last instructions that there may be something out
2	there that hasn't been discussed, but that is consistent with
3	our direction. I can second it, Madam Chairman.
4	CHAIRMAN JABER: And, Commissioner Palecki, you said
5	earlier, so I am assuming this was part of your motion, that we
6	vote a rule out and then also set it for hearing. That is
7	still the case?
8	COMMISSIONER PALECKI: That is still the case.
9	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. So that was part of the
10	motion, Commissioner Baez, that you've seconded.
11	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Yes, absolutely.
12	CHAIRMAN JABER: All those in favor say aye. Aye.
13	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Aye.
14	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Aye.
15	COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Aye.
16	CHAIRMAN JABER: Opposed, nay.
17	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Nay.
18	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. The motion passes 4-1.
19	Commissioner Baez, I would note that you are the prehearing
20	officer in this case. I will
21	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Golly.
22	CHAIRMAN JABER: have our office look for a
23	hearing date and work with legal on a hearing date and the
24	procedure to be followed. With respect to the repowerings and
25	the CT issue, Commissioners, with your permission I would like

1	to go ahead and ask our legislative team to bring to the
2	attention of our oversight Senate and House committees to let
3	them know that that is an issue that did come up in this
4	proceeding, that to the degree the legislature is interested in
5	taking a look at this, I think and Mary is not here right
6	now, but we had been informed that at least on the Senate side
7	there was going to be some review of rules. And I think
8	consistent with that invitation and that review, we should
9	bring to their attention the concern related to repowerings and
10	CTs. And, staff, that would really be in conjunction with what
11	you articulated the policy reasons for looking at repowerings
12	and CTs. That to the degree there should be certainty as it
13	relates to the costs, that is worthy of the Legislature's
14	consideration.
15	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Would the staff also be
16	considering what the best way of communicating that is going to
17	be?
18	CHAIRMAN JABER: I didn't hear you.
19	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: The method of communication, do
20	you have a preference?
21	CHAIRMAN JABER: I think, you know, in terms of just
22	asking Mr. Neal (phonetic) to give
23	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Just a recommendation.
24	CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Emhoff and Ms. Caldwell a

call, and certainly whatever -- whatever they need.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Okay. All right.

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CHAIRMAN JABER: You know, I think letting them know first and formally and then to the degree they want our staff to provide some analysis, that is certainly within their discretion. And then there is an Issue 3. isn't there? Do I take by silence that is okay with all the Commissioners?

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Yes. And I think Issue 3 may have already been answered, because that is whether the docket should remain open, and I think we have already said it is going to be set down for hearing.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Right. Before we conclude. Ms. Clark, Mr. Green, Mr. McWhirter, Mr. Twomey, we have established a hearing date. We have tried our best to put a rule out there that people can clearly get the direction from the Commission what in our humble opinion the rule should do and what it shouldn't do. I would ask that all of you take a look at the rule, give yourselves distance, recognize what we did not include in the rule, recognize what we said that the rule does and what we think the rule does not do. And continue the dialogue. Ever the optimist. I'm not sure this is going to get to the hearing stage. I hope that this actually facilitates more discussion. With that the agenda is over.

(The special agenda concluded at 5:40 p.m.)

1	STATE OF FLORIDA)
2	: CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
3	COUNTY OF LEON)
4	T JANE SAUDOT DDD OL C OCCC C.H. C D
5	I, JANE FAUROT, RPR, Chief, Office of Hearing Reporter Services, FPSC Division of Commission Clerk and Administrative
6	Services, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceeding was heard at the time and place herein stated.
7	IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that I stenographically reported the said proceedings; that the same has been
8	transcribed under my direct supervision; and that this transcript constitutes a true transcription of my notes of said
9	proceedings.
10	I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee,
11	I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor am I a relative or employee of any of the parties' attorney or counsel connected with the action, nor am I financially interested in
12	the action.
13	DATED THIS 3RD DAY OF OCTOBER, 2002.
14	
15	JANE FAUROT, RPR
16	Chief, Office of Hearling Reporter Services FPSC Division of Commission Clerk and
17	Administrative Services (850) 413-6732
18	(000) 120 0/02
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