#### BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In re: Complaint of the Florida Competitive Carriers Association Against BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. Regarding BellSouth's Practice of Refusing to Provide FastAccess Internet Service to Customers who Receive Voice Service from a Competitive Voice Provider, and Request for Expedited Relief

Docket No. 020507-TP

Filed: December 23, 2002

#### REBUTTAL TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS

**OF** 

#### JOSEPH GILLAN

ON BEHALF OF

THE FLORIDA COMPETITIVE CARRIERS ASSOCIATION

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FPSC-COMMISSION CLERK

# THE FLORIDA COMPETITIVE CARRIERS ASSOCIATION REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH GILLAN

#### BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

#### DOCKET NO. 020507-TL

#### **December 23, 2002**

1		Introduction
2		
3	Q.	Please state your name, address and business affiliation.
4		
5	<b>A</b>	My name is Joseph Gillan. My business address is P. O. Box 541038, Orlando,
6		Florida 32854. I am filing rebuttal testimony on behalf of the Florida Competitive
7		Carriers Association (FCCA). I previously filed direct testimony in this
8		proceeding on behalf of the FCCA.
9		
10	Q.	What is the purpose of your rebuttal testimony?
11		
12	A.	The purpose of my rebuttal testimony is to respond to BellSouth's "policy
13		reasons" that it claims justify its refusal to provide FastAccess DSL service to any
14		customer that has moved its voice service to an Alternative Local Exchange
15		Company (ALEC) using UNE-P or UNE-L leased from BellSouth. In addition to
16		my testimony, the FCCA is sponsoring the testimony of Mr. Jay Bradbury and
17		Ms. Sherry Lichtenberg who address the operational issues raised by BellSouth.

1	Q.	Please summarize your rebuttal testimony.
2		
3	A.	BellSouth offers three reasons why the Florida Commission should sanction its
4		refusal to provide DSL data service to those customers that choose an ALEC for
5		voice service:
6		
7		* The FCC has not ordered BellSouth to cease the practice;
8		
9		* BellSouth's federal tariff or, at least, BellSouth's
10		interpretation of that tariff requires that it refuse service;
11		and,
12		
13		* Competition - and, even more remarkably, consumers -
14		benefit from BellSouth's refusal to provide service to
15		customers that have chosen an ALEC for voice service.
16		
17		As I explain below, however, none of these explanations has merit. Although it is
18		true that FCC rules do not prohibit BellSouth's practice of restricting FastAccess
19		to its own voice customers, neither do they sanction this extreme behavior.
20		Moreover, the FCC is not the sole (nor necessarily, even the best) judge of
21		discrimination under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("Federal Act" or

1		"Telecom Act"), nor has it addressed whether such conduct is appropriate under
2		Florida law.
3		
4		The issue in this proceeding fundamentally is "when is it reasonable - if ever -
5		for BellSouth to refuse service to a customer?" BellSouth characterizes FCCA's
6		Complaint as forcing BellSouth to serve the "ALEC's customers" (Fogle, page 5),
7		but that characterization is misleading - these are <u>BellSouth's</u> customers (or, with
8		respect to new requests for FastAccess, potential customers). FCCA's Complaint
9		is that it is discriminatory and unlawful for BellSouth to refuse service to one of
10		BellSouth's data customers as punishment for the customer choosing an ALEC
11		for voice service. It is against this remarkable action that the merit of BellSouth's
12		claimed justifications - in a nutshell, "the FCC lets me do it," "my tariff makes
13		me do it," and "consumers benefit by my doing it" - must be balanced.
14		
15	Q.	Before you address BellSouth's policy arguments in detail, do you have any
16		preliminary comments?
17		
18	A.	Yes. One of the issues in this proceeding concerns the Commission's authority to
19		order the relief requested by the FCCA (Issue 1). It is frequently difficult in
20		regulatory proceedings to separate economic and policy testimony from legal
21		arguments. Although my rebuttal testimony does discuss a number of FCC
22		decisions and BellSouth's interstate tariff (these discussions are necessitated by

	BellSouth's effort to hide behind these documents), the testimony does not
	directly address the Commission's legal jurisdiction, which is an issue that will be
	addressed in post-hearing brief. Let me just note that the issue of this
	Commission's authority to take action in this case is one that has already been
	decided multiple times by the Commission.
	The FCC Has Not Sanctioned BellSouth's Policy Restricting FastAccess
Q.	BellSouth attempts to justify its FastAccess policy by claiming that the FCC
	approves of it. (Ruscilli, page 3). Is this interpretation accurate?
A.	No. A cornerstone of BellSouth's claim that its FastAccess policy is lawful is its
	assertion that the policy has been "sanctioned" by the FCC. BellSouth is so
	convinced of this view, that not only does it claim that the FCC has sanctioned the
	behavior, BellSouth claims that the FCC has preempted any other conclusion.
	(Ruscilli, page 3).
Q.	Has the FCC been as "definitive" as on these issues as BellSouth claims?
A.	No. A complete review of FCC decisions regarding FastAccess (and other
	FastAccess-like arrangements) reveals an FCC that is far more ambiguous than
	the characterization BellSouth implies. BellSouth portrays the FCC as reaching
	A. Q.

definitive findings that its behavior is not discriminatory. However, a fair reading of relevant FCC Orders shows that the FCC has generally deferred substantive consideration of the discrimination question by finding only that its rules <u>as</u> <u>written</u> do not require that BellSouth continue to offer DSL service to customers served via UNEs (and UNE-P in particular).

Finding that a rule does not compel certain behavior is far different than finding the behavior is lawful. The FCC itself made this distinction clear when it first concluded that its rules were not written to require an ILEC to provide DSL service to customers choosing voice service from another carrier (FCC Order 01-26, CC Dockets No. 98-147 and CC Docket No. 96-98, January 16, 2001, ¶ 26):

As described above, we deny AT&T's request for clarification that under the *Line Sharing Order*, incumbent LECs are not permitted to deny their xDSL services to customers who obtain voice service from a competing carrier where the competing carrier agrees to the use of its loop for that purpose. Although the *Line Sharing Order* obligates incumbent LECs to make the high frequency portion of the loop separately available to competing carriers on loops where incumbent LECs provide voice service, it does not require that they provide xDSL service when they are not longer the voice provider. We do not, however, consider in this Order whether, as

1	AT&T alleges, this situation is a violation of sections 201 and/or
2	202 of the Act.
3	
4	In effect, the FCC decided not to decide - acknowledging that existing rules did
5	not require an ILEC to offer its xDSL services to customers served via network
6	elements, while leaving for another day whether such action would be
7	unreasonable. This approach was carried forward to a series of Section 271
8	proceedings that judged compliance with existing rules. BellSouth relies heavily
9	on such Section 271 decisions, but without ever acknowledging the critical
10	context provided by the decision's reference to existing rules (FCC Order No. 02-
11	147, CC Docket No. 02-35, May 15, 2002, ¶157 (Georgia/Louisiana 271 Order),
12	emphasis added):
13	
14	We reject these claims [regarding FastAccess] because, under our
15	rules, the incumbent LEC has no obligation to provide DSL service
16	over the competitive LEC's leased facilities.
17	
18	This theme continued into the FCC's review of BellSouth's "5 State Application"
19	(FCC Order No. 02-260, WC Docket No. 02-150, September 18, 2002, ¶164,
20	emphasis added):
21	

1		As we stated in the Georgia/Louisiana Order, an incumbent LEC
2		has no obligation, under our rules, to provide DSL service over the
3		competitive LEC's lease facilities.
4		
5		There is no question that the FCC's existing rules do not require the relief sought
6		by the FCCA - obviously, if the existing rules did so, then this proceeding would
7		be unnecessary. This "admission" does not, however, change the question before
8		the Florida Commission: What resolution is appropriate for Florida consumers,
9		given the Federal Act's prohibition on discrimination and the provisions in
10		Florida law concerning anticompetitive conduct?
11		
12	Q.	Has the FCC previously indicated that it expected the states to investigate
12 13	Q.	Has the FCC previously indicated that it expected the states to investigate (and prevent) discrimination problems, such as those presented here?
	Q.	
13	Q.	
13 14		(and prevent) discrimination problems, such as those presented here?
13 14 15		(and prevent) discrimination problems, such as those presented here?  Yes. Although federal rules define a national framework and establish minimum
13 14 15 16		(and prevent) discrimination problems, such as those presented here?  Yes. Although federal rules define a national framework and establish minimum requirements, the FCC clearly expected that the states would "drill down" to
13 14 15 16 17		(and prevent) discrimination problems, such as those presented here?  Yes. Although federal rules define a national framework and establish minimum requirements, the FCC clearly expected that the states would "drill down" to adopt more detailed discrimination protections and address other issues as they
13 14 15 16 17		(and prevent) discrimination problems, such as those presented here?  Yes. Although federal rules define a national framework and establish minimum requirements, the FCC clearly expected that the states would "drill down" to adopt more detailed discrimination protections and address other issues as they arose (FCC Order 96-235, CC Docket No. 96-98, August 8, 1996, ¶ 310,
13 14 15 16 17 18		(and prevent) discrimination problems, such as those presented here?  Yes. Although federal rules define a national framework and establish minimum requirements, the FCC clearly expected that the states would "drill down" to adopt more detailed discrimination protections and address other issues as they arose (FCC Order 96-235, CC Docket No. 96-98, August 8, 1996, ¶ 310,

1		specific rules determining the timing in which incumbent LECs
2		must provision certain elements, and any other specific conditions
3		they deem necessary to provide new entrants, including small
4		competitors, with a meaningful opportunity to compete in local
5		exchange markets.
6		
7		The FCC thus recognized that the states would be addressing specific problems as
8		they arose.
9		
10	Q.	Is it appropriate for the Florida Commission to exercise its authority to
11		prevent discrimination in this case?
12		
13	A.	Yes. Although the detailed discussion of the Commission's legal authority is best
14		left to the post-hearing brief, the focus of this case is the discriminatory impact of
15		BellSouth's policy on the Florida voice market, over which the Commission
16		unquestionably has jurisdiction.
17		
18	Q.	Does BellSouth acknowledge the interrelationship between its FastAccess
19		service and its unique position as the incumbent voice provider?
20		
21	A.	Yes. Even BellSouth acknowledges that its FastAccess position is a direct result
22		of its inherited voice monopoly (Smith, page 5, emphasis added):
21	A.	·

1		
2		By only investing in areas where BellSouth believed that it could
3		successfully market DSL service as a compliment to its existing
4		voice service and thereby realize a favorable return on its
5		investment, BellSouth was able to increase deployment and
6		investment in later years as its DSL offerings became more
7		popular.
8		
9		BellSouth used its voice monopoly to create its DSL service and is now using its
10		DSL service to further entrench its voice monopoly. This cycle must be broken.
11		
12		BellSouth's Federal Tariff Does Not Excuse its Behavior
13		
14	Q.	BellSouth claims that continuing to offer xDSL services to customers that
15		obtain voice service from another carrier using UNEs would "violate" its
16		federal tariff. (Ruscilli, page 11). Assuming the statement is true, should the
17		Commission defer to BellSouth's federal tariff?
18		
19	A.	No. Assuming that BellSouth's interpretation of its federal tariff is plausible - an
20		issue I will return to in a moment - tariffs are intended to reflect policy, not create
21		it. BellSouth's tariff (at least with respect to the issue here) was drafted and filed
22		by BellSouth and thus is entirely within BellSouth's discretion. Using the tariff as

	an excuse for its behavior is no different than simply saying that BellSouth
	refuses service "because it wants to." The Commission should decide what is
	appropriate for Florida and if that requires that BellSouth modify its tariff to
	comply with Florida law, then BellSouth is free to do so.
Q.	Is BellSouth's interpretation of its federal tariff reasonable?
A.	No. First, the most important point is the one above - BellSouth should not be
	able to "justify" anticompetitive and discriminatory conduct by claiming that its
	federal tariff permits or requires it. But even if it were reasonable to use a tariff in
	such a manner, there is nothing in BellSouth's federal tariff that could reasonably
	be read as compelling its behavior.
	BellSouth claims that FCC Tariff No. 1, Section 7.2.17(A) requires that it refuse
	service to any customer served by a UNE arrangement because that section of the
	tariff indicates that DSL service will be provided to an "in-service, Telephone
	Company provided exchange line facility." (Ruscilli, page 11). But the tariff goes
	on to define an "in-service exchange line facility" in the following manner (FCC
	Tariff No. 1, 6 <sup>th</sup> Revised Page 7-58.12, Section 7.2.17(A)):
	An in-service exchange line facility, as referred to in association
	with BellSouth ADSL service, is the serving Central Office line

1		equipment and all the plant facilities up to and including the
2		Telephone Company-provided Network Interface Device.
3		
4		Although BellSouth continuously states that UNEs are not an "in-service
5		exchange line facility" (see Ruscilli, page 11), there is nothing in the above
6		definition that supports the claim - UNE loops include the Central Office line
7		equipment and all the plant facilities "up to and including" a BellSouth-provided
8		Network Interface Device. These conditions are satisfied as much by UNEs as by
9		a resold line, or line used to support a BellSouth retail service.
10		
11 12		The Effect of BellSouth's Policy on Local Competition and Florida Consumers
13		
14	Q.	In addition to its "legal" (i.e., jurisdictional and tariff-based) arguments,
15		does BellSouth offer any other explanations for its behavior?
16		
17	A.	Yes. BellSouth also argues that it should be allowed to refuse service to
18		customers. BellSouth claims that this policy does not adversely affect customers
19		because:
20		
21		(a) The policy can be rectified by ALECs reselling BellSouth voice
21 22		service or building their own DSL network (Ruscilli, page 13);

1		(b) The Florida market is already competitive (Ruscilli, page 15); and
2		
3		(c) Broadband competition is promoted by BellSouth's refusal to serve
4		some customers (Ruscilli, page 19).
5		
6	Q.	Can ALECs "simply" resell BellSouth's voice service or establish their own
7		DSL networks?
8		
9	A.	No. Before addressing what options are plausibly available to an ALEC,
10		however, it is useful to again point out that the fundamental issue here is whether
11		it is reasonable for BellSouth to refuse to provide service to its own customers,
12		not whether ALECs have other options. Even if ALECs had other options (a
13		claim I dispute below), that would not justify BellSouth's actions, it would only
14		lessen the potential impact of those actions on the ALEC.
15		
16		As to the ALEC's ability to "resell" BellSouth's services, that proposition ignores
17		one of the first lessons of the post-Telecom Act environment - resale is not
18		viable. Among other failings, resale does not enable competitors to introduce
19		innovative new services such as MCI's Neighborhood offering, which require that
20		MCI become the access provider to its customers in order to offer unlimited toll
21		services. BellSouth's Form 477 local competition reports to the FCC show that

1		resale lines in Florida declined by more than 50% in just the first six months of
2		2002, hardly evidence that the option is viable.
3		
4		Equally problematic is the idea that any company is in a position to duplicate
5		BellSouth's DSL footprint. As I noted earlier, BellSouth admits that its DSL
6		footprint is the result of its starting position as the incumbent voice provider.
7		(Smith, page 5). That advantage is not available to any other provider. Moreover,
8		even if an ALEC could establish a DSL footprint equal to that of BellSouth, that
9		would not justify forcing customers to change DSL service so as to change their
10		voice provider. Difficulties in establishing a working DSL arrangement are
11		legendary. Why should a customer be forced to risk a problem with its DSL
12		service just because it wants to subscribe to a better voice product?
13		
14	Q.	Is there any useful conclusion that can be drawn from BellSouth's testimony
15		that it is willing to offer FastAccess on a resold line?
16		
17	A.	Yes. The testimony directly contradicts BellSouth's assertion that it is costly and
18		difficult to arrange for FastAccess provision on UNEs because BellSouth would
19		need to "negotiate" rates, terms and conditions for provisioning with each ALEC
20		There is no reason that the "UNE-negotiations" needed to implement a
21		Commission order would be any more difficult than the "resale-negotiations" that
22		its current policy accommodates.

1 2 Q. BellSouth points to penetration statistics for Florida to support its claim that 3 competition in the local market is flourishing. (Ruscilli, page 16). Does this 4 respond to the argument that its policy is anticompetitive? 5 6 A. No. Overall penetration statistics say nothing about discrimination in particular 7 market segments, nor about BellSouth's attempt to retain voice customers by 8 threatening to disconnect DSL service. 9 10 Q. Why is it so important that BellSouth be prohibited from discriminating 11 against UNEs (and UNE-P in particular) by refusing to provide FastAccess to 12 customers being served under such arrangements? 13 14 A. Evidence continues to demonstrate that the only practical hope for mass market 15 competition for residential and smaller business customers is UNE-P. 16 following table (based on BellSouth's Form 477 Local Competition Reports filed 17 with the FCC) demonstrates the importance of UNE-P to local competition.

18

19

Table 1: Local Market Conditions in Florida

Entry Strategy	December 2001	June 2002	Change
Resale	277,335	132,630	(144,705)
UNE-P (loops with switching)	135,719	428,326	292,607
UNE-L (loops without switching)	167,048	167,027	(21)
	580,102	727,983	

20

Contrary to BellSouth's theory, the growth in UNE-P does not mean that voice competition is unharmed by its discriminatory refusal to provide FastAccess on such lines – it is only evidence that voice competition cannot be precluded by the policy (which, given the relatively low penetration rates of DSL service should not be a surprise). The relative growth of UNE-P and resale does demonstrate, however, why BellSouth insists on punishing customers migrating to a successful entry strategy, while "offering" to provide FastAccess to customers migrating to a strategy in total decay.

Q. BellSouth (for reasons that are, quite frankly, not clear) also claims that a favorable ruling on the FCCA Complaint would not promote local voice competition in rural Florida. (Ruscilli, page 18). Do you agree?

A.

No. Although I do not understand how it would make discriminating against urban and suburban customers acceptable assuming ALECs were not serving rural areas, the data supplied by BellSouth demonstrates that ALECs are using UNE-P to compete for rural customers. BellSouth's testimony indicates that "only" 2% of the UNE-P lines are in (the presumably rural) Zone 3. However, only 3.5% of the switched lines are in Zone 3. Although these statistics suggest that competition is proportionally higher in the non-rural areas, the difference would not seem to warrant the point that BellSouth is attempting to make (whatever it is). Perhaps even more telling, on December 18 2002, BellSouth filed

information with the FCC's Wireline Competition Bureau indicating that it had discovered an error in a comparable federal filing and provided updated (and corrected) information to the FCC (BellSouth's Ex Parte Letter is attached as Exhibit No. \_\_\_\_, JPG-1). This corrected data reveals a UNE-P distribution for Florida quite different than that claimed by Mr. Ruscilli.

Table 2: BellSouth's Corrected UNE-P Data (UNE-P Lines as of September 30, 2002)

	Corrected BellS	Ruscilli	
	UNE-P Lines	Percent	Testimony
Zone 1	136,004	29%	64%
Zone 2	304,545	64%	34%
Zone 3	34,955	7%	2%
	475,504		

I would note that the above statistics continue to demonstrate the power of UNE-P to bring competitive choice to residential and smaller business customers throughout Florida, with nearly 50,000 new UNE-P lines being added in the third quarter of 2002 (comparing Table 2 to Table 1).

Q. Do you believe that prohibiting BellSouth from refusing to offer FastAccess service will promote broadband competition?

A. Yes. The policy enhances customer choice and, therefore, enhances competition.

BellSouth adopts the counter-intuitive position that allowing it to refuse service

1	promotes competition. Moreover, BellSouth argues that requiring it to cease the
2	practice would harm broadband competition in three ways (Ruscilli, page 19):
3	
4	i) By "saddling economic burdens" on BellSouth that could
5	adversely impact BellSouth's DSL deployment;
6	
7	ii) By discouraging ALECs to deploy DSL networks of their
8	own; and
9	
10	iii) By discouraging ALECs to offer competing DSL services
11	through line splitting.
12	
13	None are these claims are true. First, as discussed by Mr. Bradbury and Ms.
14	Lichtenberg, BellSouth's claimed "economic burdens" are never quantified, much
15	less shown to be significant. In fact, BellSouth has "mistakenly" provided DSL
16	service on UNE-P lines in the past, a circumstance that directly challenges the
17	claim that it is difficult or costly to accommodate. (A copy of BellSouth's letter
18	to ALECs demanding that the lines be shifted to resale or the service will be
19	disconnected is attached as Exhibit No, JPG-2).
20	
21	Second, ALECs would have the same incentive to offer DSL in the future as they
22	have today - to be able to win the customer as a DSL customer. The FCCA is not

	asking that ALECs replace BellSouth as the DSL provider using BellSouth
	equipment - BellSouth would continue to serve its customers as before (albeit
	without retaining the customer's voice service). ALECs would still have an
	incentive to become a DSL provider in order to win DSL customers.
	Finally, ALECs would still have an opportunity to partner with competing DSL
	providers where that strategy made sense. The only difference is that in the
	meantime, for those customers that want the ALEC's voice service, BellSouth
	would not be permitted to refuse to provide it merely because the customer no
	longer wanted BellSouth's voice service as well.
Q.	BellSouth also claims that the relief FCCA seeks would harm its competitive
Q.	BellSouth also claims that the relief FCCA seeks would harm its competitive position. Does this make sense?
Q.	
Q.	
	position. Does this make sense?
	position. Does this make sense?  No. BellSouth's testimony on "competitive harm" borders on the bizarre. For
	position. Does this make sense?  No. BellSouth's testimony on "competitive harm" borders on the bizarre. For instance, BellSouth implies that the FCCA is weakening its ability to offer
	position. Does this make sense?  No. BellSouth's testimony on "competitive harm" borders on the bizarre. For instance, BellSouth implies that the FCCA is weakening its ability to offer
	position. Does this make sense?  No. BellSouth's testimony on "competitive harm" borders on the bizarre. For instance, BellSouth implies that the FCCA is weakening its ability to offer packages (Smith, page 5):

1		telecommunications products and services, including local service,
2		long distance and Internet access.
3		
4		Leaving aside the fact that there are precious few cable providers offering full
5		suites of local, long distance and Internet access in Florida, there is nothing about
6		the FCCA Complaint that would stop BellSouth from continuing to offer DSL
7		services alongside its local (and long distance, now that it has approval) services.
8		The FCCA Complaint addresses BellSouth's refusal to sell FastAccess when
9		customers decide to obtain voice service elsewhere, the Complaint does not
10		prevent BellSouth from continuing to offer FastAccess to customers that it retains.
11		It is simply implausible that BellSouth's DSL competitive position is harmed
12		because it would no longer be permitted to refuse to sell the service, although
13		such an order would (as it should) diminish its voice dominance.
14		
15	Q.	Finally, BellSouth claims that it cannot offer FastAccess on a "stand alone"
16		basis. (Smith, page 6). Is this accurate?
17		
18	A.	No. BellSouth points to other DSL efforts (such as Covad and Rhythms),
19		claiming that these companies prove that DSL service cannot be offered on a
20		"stand alone" basis. Importantly, BellSouth would never be providing DSL on a
21		stand-alone basis in the manner these companies attempted. First, BellSouth
22		would only be required to sell DSL service in situations where it is also providing

1		UNEs. Consequently, the DSL service would never be provided on a stand-alone
2		basis from a technology point-of-view. In addition, the service would remain a
3		part of the overall family of BellSouth services that collectively produced \$ 4.7
4		billion in revenue in Florida last year (ARMIS 43-01 2001 - Total Florida
5		Operating Revenues). Any comparison of this type of "joint-provisioning" to the
6		"stand-alone" efforts of other providers is simply misleading.
7		
8	Q.	Does this conclude your rebuttal testimony?
9		
10	A.	Yes.

Docket No. 020507-TP
Witness Joseph Gillan
Exhibit \_\_\_\_\_ (JPG-1, p. 1 of 2)

## **BELLSOUTH**

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December 18, 2002

Ex Parte

Ms. Marlene H. Dortch Secretary Federal Communications Commission 44512<sup>th</sup> St. S.W. Washington, D.C. 20554

Re: CC Docket No. 01-338

Dear Ms. Dortch:

On November 19, 2002, BellSouth, in response to a request from the Competition Policy Division of the Wireline Competition Bureau, submitted its residential and business UNE-P demand by state and by zone within a state, as of September 30, 2002 (see November 19, 2002 letter from W.W. (Whit) Jordan to Ms. Marlene H. Dortch, Re: CC Docket No. 01-338). Subsequent to the filing of that letter, an error in the mapping of BellSouth wire centers to UNE zones used to develop the UNE-P demand report was discovered. BellSouth now files a corrected report. While the aggregate state-specific and regional quantities of business, residence and total in-service UNE-P remain unchanged, most of the zone-specific quantities have changed.

This letter and attachment are being electronically filed. Please call me if you have any questions.

Yours truly,

W.W. Jordan

cc: Michelle Carey Rob Tanner Tom Navin Jeremy Miller

UNE-P Se	ptember 30,	2002 (12/05/0 UNE-P	2 Corrected i	Report)
		Bus in-	Res In-	Total In-
04-4-				
State	UNE Zone	Svc Qty	Svc Qty	Svc Qty
AL	Unknown	253	33	286
AL.	1	42,408	22,255	64,658
AL	2	16,222	4,446	20,668
AL	3	4,772	886	5,658
AL	Total	63,650	27,620	91,270
FL	Unknown	579	80	659
FL.	1	42,769	93,235	136,004
FL	2	86,053	218,492	304,545
FL	3	16,408	18,547	34,955
FL	Total	145,809	330,354	476,163
GA	Unknown	979	174	1,153
GA	1	57,251	205,086	262,337
GA	2	21,601	33,376	54,977
GA	3	25,766	7,074	32,840
GA	Total	105,597	245,710	351,307
KY	Unknown	97	4	101
KY	1	9,321	7,314	16,635
KY	2	10,901	8,731	19,632
KY	3	4,876	2,602	7,478
KY	Total	25,195	18,651	43,846
LA	Unknown	214	176	390
LA	1	29,107	41,036	70,143
LA	2	6,923	2,213	9,136
LA	3	839	409	1,248
LA	Total	37,083	43,834	80,917
	1000	07,000	10,00 .	55,517
MS	Unknown	100	180	280
MS	1	10,811	11,950	22,761
MS	2	8,653	10,292	18,945
MS	3	8,544	6,436	14,980
MS	4	3,500	4,398	7,898
MS	Total	31,608	33,256	64,864
IVIO	TOTAL	01,000	00,200	04,004
NC	Unknown	310	24	334
NC NC	Onknown 1	38,235		64,020
	- ·	10,698	25,785 2,319	
NC NC	3	3,337	1934	13,017 5,271
NC NC	Total	52,580	30,062	82,642
INC.	TOTAL	32,300	30,002	92,042
60	1 lakeasses	107	11	118
SC SC	Unknown			
SC SC	1	28,397	7,967	36,364
<u>sc</u>	2	5,956	932	6,888
SC_	3	3,376	783	4,159
sc	Total	37,836	9,693	47,529
<u></u>	11-1			27-
TN	Unknown	233	14	247
TN	1 1	42,365	20,726	63,091
TN	2	21,729	7,141	28,870
TN	3	6,244	2,529	8,773
TN	Total	70,571	30,410	100,981
	<ul> <li>4 4 - 4</li></ul>	2,872	696	3,568
BST	Unknown			
BST BST	1	300,659	435,354	736,013
			435,354 287,942	736,013 476,678
BST	1	300,659		
BST BST	1 2	300,659 188,736	287,942	476,678

Docket No. 020507-TP
Witness Joseph Gillan
Exhibit \_\_\_\_ (JPG-2, p. 1 of 1)

RE: <u>BellSouth Tariffed Digital Subscriber Line ("DSL") Service on Unbundled</u> Network Element – Platform ("UNE-P") Loops

Dear

BellSouth has recently discovered that, as a result of a recent failure of a systems edit, BellSouth is currently providing its tariffed Asymmetrical Digital Subscriber Line ("ADSL") service to certain Internet Service Provider ("ISP") customers on one or more UNE-P loops purchased by your company. (A list of the affected telephone numbers is attached hereto.)

Since your company owns all features and functionalities of unbundled loops purchased from BellSouth, BellSouth does not have access to the high frequency spectrum on those loops for purposes of providing tariffed ADSL to its ISP customers. BellSouth thus intends to notify the affected ISPs, within twenty (20) days of the date of this letter, that it will be discontinuing tariffed DSL service on the affected lines. (The affected ISPs include BellSouth® Internet Services.)

To the extent your company desires to have ISPs continue to provide tariffed DSL on the affected lines, those lines could be converted to resold lines. On a resold line, BellSouth would continue to have access to the high frequency spectrum, as your company is only purchasing the low frequency spectrum in a resold situation. Unless we hear to the contrary within twenty (20) days of the date of this letter, the DSL will be disconnected.

Very truly yours,

Gregory R. Follensbee

Attachment

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Rebuttal Testimony and Exhibits of Joseph Gillan on behalf of the Florida Competitive Carriers Association has been furnished by (\*) hand delivery, (\*\*) electronic mail or by U. S. Mail this 23rd day of December, 2002, to the following:

(\*) (\*\*) Patricia Christensen Florida Public Service Commission 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399

(\*) (\*\*)Nancy White (\*\*) Meredith Mays c/o Nancy Sims BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. 150 South Monroe Street Suite 400 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1556

(\*\*) Floyd R. Self 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 701 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

(\*\*) Nanette Edwards Director-Regulatory ITC^DeltaCom 4092 S. Memorial Parkway Huntsville, AL 35802

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