

BEFORE THE
FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. 030851-TP

In the Matter of

IMPLEMENTATION OF REQUIREMENTS
ARISING FROM FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION'S TRIENNIAL UNE REVIEW:
LOCAL CIRCUIT SWITCHING FOR MASS
MARKET CUSTOMERS.



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VOLUME 4

Pages 599 through 805

PROCEEDINGS: HEARING

BEFORE: CHAIRMAN BRAULIO L. BAEZ
COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON
COMMISSIONER LILA A. JABER
COMMISSIONER RUDOLPH "RUDY" BRADLEY
COMMISSIONER CHARLES M. DAVIDSON

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3 APPEARANCES: (As heretofore noted.)

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I N D E X

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P R O C E E D I N G S

(Transcript follows in sequence from Volume 3.)

MS. MAYS: Thank you, Mr. Chair. The next witness for BellSouth would be Mr. John A. Ruscilli. He has direct, rebuttal and surrebuttal testimony, and he has an errata. We would ask that those be admitted into the record and that his exhibits be identified as Composite 67.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Show the testimony of Witness Ruscilli, direct, rebuttal and surrebuttal entered into the record as though read without objection. That includes the errata. And his accompanying exhibits shall be marked Composite 67.

(Exhibit 67 marked for identification.)

1 BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.
2 DIRECT TESTIMONY OF JOHN A. RUSCILLI
3 BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
4 DOCKET NO. 030851-TP
5 DECEMBER 4, 2003
6

7 Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, YOUR POSITION WITH BELLSOUTH
8 TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. ("BELLSOUTH") AND YOUR
9 BUSINESS ADDRESS.

10

11 A. My name is John A. Ruscilli. I am employed by BellSouth as Senior Director
12 – Policy Implementation and Regulatory Compliance for the nine-state
13 BellSouth region. My business address is 675 West Peachtree Street, Atlanta,
14 Georgia 30375.

15

16 Q. PLEASE PROVIDE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF YOUR BACKGROUND
17 AND EXPERIENCE.

18

19 A. I attended the University of Alabama in Birmingham where I earned a
20 Bachelor of Science Degree in 1979, and a Master of Business Administration
21 in 1982. After graduation I began employment with South Central Bell as an
22 Account Executive in Marketing, transferring to AT&T in 1983. I joined
23 Southern Bell in late 1984 as an analyst in Market Research, and in late 1985,
24 moved into the Pricing and Economics organization with various
25 responsibilities for business case analysis, tariffing, demand analysis and price

1 regulation. In July 1997, I became Director of Regulatory and Legislative
2 Affairs for BellSouth Long Distance, Inc., with responsibilities that included
3 obtaining the necessary certificates of public convenience and necessity,
4 testifying, Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) and state regulatory
5 support, federal, and state compliance reporting and tariffing for all 50 states
6 and the FCC. I assumed my current position in July 2000.

7

8 Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?

9

10 A. The purpose of my testimony is to provide an overview of BellSouth’s position
11 on the issues that the Florida Public Service Commission (“Commission”) will
12 address in determining the geographic markets in Florida where competitive
13 local exchange carriers (“CLECs”) are not “impaired” without unbundled local
14 switching – a finding that I will refer to as “impairment” in this testimony. I
15 begin by outlining the delegation that the FCC has made to the state
16 commissions. After discussing what the FCC has directed the state
17 commissions to do, I introduce BellSouth’s witnesses. These witnesses will
18 explain in detail the evidence that addresses the issues that the FCC has asked
19 the state commissions to examine, including demonstrating that CLECs are not
20 impaired within the meaning of the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996
21 (“the Act”) in specific geographic areas in Florida. I provide information
22 regarding certain interpretive decisions that BellSouth has made with respect to
23 the FCC’s Triennial Review Order, such as using the FCC’s default
24 demarcation point for differentiating between “mass market” customers and
25 “enterprise” customers. I also discuss the appropriate rate for batch hot cuts

1 and address the availability of collocation in BellSouth's central offices.

2 Finally, I address BellSouth's provisioning of co-carrier cross connects and
3 show that these operational factors do not cause CLECs to be impaired.

4

5 Q. WHAT HAS THE FCC CHARGED THIS COMMISSION WITH DOING IN
6 THIS PROCEEDING?

7

8 A. On August 21, 2003, the FCC issued its long-awaited written order in its
9 triennial review of unbundled network elements ("UNEs"). In its written
10 order, which I will refer to as the "TRO," the FCC determined that "[a]lthough
11 we find competitors to be impaired without access to the incumbent LEC's
12 switch on a national level when serving the mass market, we authorize state
13 commissions to play a fact-finding role – as set forth below – to identify where
14 competing carriers are not impaired without access to unbundled local circuit
15 switching." (*TRO* ¶ 493). As a result of the TRO, the Commission established
16 this proceeding to identify the geographic markets in Florida where CLECs are
17 not impaired in their ability to serve mass market customers without the
18 availability of circuit switching as an unbundled network element. In defining
19 these markets, state commissions must "evaluate impairment by determining
20 the relevant geographic area to include in each market." (C.F.R. §
21 51.319(d)(2)(i)). My testimony uses the terms "geographic market area",
22 "geographic area", and "geographic market" interchangeably.

23

24 In making its determination of whether CLECs are impaired in a given
25 geographic area, the FCC has required state commissions to make several

1 interrelated decisions. A state commission must first define the appropriate
2 geographic market to which it will apply the impairment analysis outlined in
3 the TRO. Next, state commissions must determine the definition for the class
4 of customers that the FCC identified as “mass market”. In the TRO, the FCC
5 divides customers into two classes, “mass market” customers and “enterprise”
6 customers (see TRO ¶419). The FCC created a presumption that CLECs
7 serving “enterprise” customers are not impaired even if the CLECs lack access
8 to unbundled switching. Conversely, CLECs serving “mass market”
9 customers are presumed to be impaired, unless a state commission determines
10 otherwise. However, the FCC did not specify which customers comprise the
11 “mass market” and directed state commissions to make that determination.

12
13 Once appropriate definitions of the relevant geographic areas and “mass
14 market” customers are determined, the FCC requires state commissions to
15 apply two “triggers” tests to see whether CLECs are impaired with respect to
16 serving mass market customers in each defined geographic market. Both of
17 the triggers tests are straightforward. If there are three CLECs with self-
18 provisioned switches serving mass market customers in a given geographic
19 market, the state commissions are required to find that CLECs are not impaired
20 in that geographic market. Alternatively, if there are two CLECs providing
21 wholesale switching services to other CLECs who are providing retail service
22 to mass market customers in a geographic market, the state commissions are
23 required to find that CLECs are not impaired in that geographic area. To
24 summarize, if either of these bright line tests are met in a given geographic

1 market, the switching inquiry is complete in that area and a finding of “no
2 impairment” is mandatory.

3

4 If neither of these “triggers” is met in a given geographic area, the FCC
5 requires that state commissions determine whether there is sufficient *potential*
6 for competitive deployment in any of these areas to warrant a finding of “no
7 impairment.” The “potential deployment” test is independent of the triggers
8 tests and requires the state commissions to consider the economics of an
9 efficient CLEC looking to provide service in a geographic market.

10

11 Finally, the FCC delegated to the state commissions the separate task of
12 determining for which geographic markets a “batch hot cut process” is needed
13 and approving such a batch process.

14

15 Q. PLEASE PROVIDE AN OVERVIEW OF BELL SOUTH’S TESTIMONY IN
16 THIS PROCEEDING.

17

18 A. Consistent with the charge given to the state commissions by the FCC, I divide
19 BellSouth’s testimony into five major areas and identify the corresponding
20 issues established by this Commission in this proceeding.

21

22 First, certain words and phrases used in the TRO must be defined, and the
23 geographic market areas for evaluating the FCC’s triggers must be established.

24 This portion of the testimony relates to Issues 1 and 2, Market Definition.

25 Second, the geographic areas in which the FCC’s “triggers” are met and no

1 impairment is found are identified. This portion of the testimony covers Issue
2 4, Local Switching Triggers. Third, where the FCC's triggers are not met, the
3 issue of "potential deployment" is addressed, which corresponds to Issue 5,
4 Potential for Self-Provisioning of Local Switching. Fourth, the testimony
5 addresses BellSouth's hot cut process, which is Issue 3 in this docket. Finally,
6 I will end my testimony with a brief discussion of Issues 5(c)(2) and 5(c)(3) as
7 well as Issue 6.

8
9 **ISSUES 1 AND 2: MARKET DEFINITION**

10
11 Q. TURNING TO THE FIRST TOPIC (ISSUES 1 AND 2), WHAT ARE THE
12 CRITICAL DEFINITIONS THAT BELLSOUTH PROVIDES?

13
14 A. BellSouth's witnesses provide a logical and economically sound definition of
15 the "geographic markets" in which the "triggers" and other tests for
16 impairment should be applied. As set forth by the FCC in the TRO, state
17 commissions were given some parameters that must be used in defining the
18 appropriate geographic market. Specifically, the FCC said: "In defining
19 markets, a state commission shall take into consideration the locations of mass
20 market customers actually being served (if any) by competitors, the variation
21 in factors affecting competitors' ability to serve each group of customers, and
22 competitors' ability to target and serve specific markets profitably and
23 efficiently using currently available technologies. A state commission shall
24 not define the relevant geographic area as the entire state." (47 C.F.R.
25 §51.319(d)(2)(i)). The FCC further notes that the geographic market in which

1 the triggers and potential deployment tests are applied must be large enough to
2 permit CLECs to realize economies of scale and scope, ruling out, as Dr. Chris
3 Pleatsikas will testify, wire centers as the market definition.

4
5 After examining a number of alternatives, BellSouth has concluded that the
6 appropriate “geographic markets” for use in these proceedings are the
7 individual UNE rate zones adopted by this Commission, subdivided into
8 smaller areas using the Component Economic Areas (“CEAs”) as developed
9 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the United States Department of
10 Commerce. CEAs are defined by natural geographic aggregations of economic
11 activity and cover the entire state of Florida. UNE rate zones are an
12 appropriate starting point for the market definition because, by design, they
13 reflect the locations of customers currently being served by CLECs, which are
14 predominantly UNE zones 1 & 2, as well as the costs that affect competitive
15 ability to serve customers profitably. As Dr. Pleatsikas will explain further
16 dividing UNE zones by CEAs allows for an extremely granular assessment of
17 impairment.

18
19 In short, BellSouth’s proposed geographic market definition is consistent with
20 the existing distribution of customers and the other factors that the FCC
21 indicates should be considered in setting a market definition. By selecting
22 these boundaries for the set of geographic markets to be examined under the
23 state commission’s impairment analysis, BellSouth offers a geographic market
24 definition smaller than the entire state, but large enough so that a competitor
25 can realize appropriate economies of scope and scale. This definition of

1 geographic market results in 31 separate geographic markets in BellSouth's
2 service area in Florida. Attached hereto as Exhibit JAR-1 is a map of the state
3 of Florida showing these 31 geographic market areas. As I noted, Dr.
4 Pleatsikis will provide further detailed information regarding the definition of
5 "geographic market."

6
7 In addition to defining the appropriate geographic market, the Commission
8 must also establish an appropriate definition for the "mass market" customer.
9 In this proceeding, BellSouth accepts the FCC's default delineation between
10 "mass market" customers and "enterprise" customers - that is customers with
11 three or fewer CLEC DS0 lines serving them are deemed "mass market"
12 customers. This is a reasonable assumption, and is quite conservative given
13 the FCC's direction to define the cross-over point as "where it makes sense for
14 a multi-line customer to be served via a DS1 loop." (TRO, ¶ 497).

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1 **ISSUE 4: ACTUAL SWITCH DEPLOYMENT**

2 **LOCAL SWITCHING TRIGGERS**

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4

5 Q. WITH THESE DEFINITIONS OF THE RELEVANT GEOGRAPHIC
6 MARKET AND "MASS MARKET", LET US MOVE TO THE SECOND
7 MAJOR AREA OF THE TESTIMONY. IN WHAT GEOGRAPHIC
8 MARKETS ARE CLECS NOT IMPAIRED WITHOUT ACCESS TO
9 BELL SOUTH'S UNBUNDLED SWITCHING BECAUSE THE TRIGGERS
10 TEST IS MET?

11

12 A. BellSouth's witness Pamela A. Tipton provides evidence that the self-
13 provisioning switching trigger established by the FCC in its TRO is met in
14 thirteen of the thirty-one geographic markets in Florida. That is, Ms. Tipton
15 will demonstrate that CLECs are not impaired in thirteen geographic markets,
16 because there are mass market customers in those geographic areas actively
17 being served by at least three (and often more) CLECs using self-provisioned
18 switching. Ms. Tipton has obtained this evidence from the CLECs themselves
19 and from BellSouth's business records. Although there is a second and
20 separate "trigger" involving the situation where a CLEC obtains switching
21 from a wholesale provider, BellSouth has not relied upon that trigger in
22 establishing the geographic areas where CLECs are not impaired. Attached
23 hereto as Exhibit JAR-2 is a map that indicates the geographic areas in which
24 the FCC's self-provisioning switching trigger is met.

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ISSUE 5: POTENTIAL FOR SELF-PROVISIONING
OF LOCAL SWITCHING

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Q. REGARDING THE THIRD MAJOR AREA OF THE TESTIMONY, WHERE THE FCC'S SWITCHING TRIGGERS ARE NOT MET, WHAT EVIDENCE DOES BELLSOUTH PRESENT WITH REGARD TO "POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENT"?

A. In ten of the remaining eighteen geographic market areas where the triggers tests are not met, BellSouth's witnesses will provide evidence to demonstrate that the FCC's potential deployment test is met and that CLECs are not impaired in those markets without access to BellSouth's unbundled switching. Attached hereto as Exhibit JAR-3 is a map that illustrates the ten additional geographic market areas where CLECs are not impaired without access to BellSouth's unbundled switching.

Q. PLEASE PROVIDE ADDITIONAL DETAILS REGARDING BELLSOUTH'S "POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENT" CASE, AS IT RELATES TO WHETHER CLECS ARE IMPAIRED WITHOUT ACCESS TO BELLSOUTH'S UNBUNDLED SWITCHING.

A. While the "triggers" test is a "bright line" test, the FCC recognized that the current availability of unbundled switching may influence the nature and extent of actual competition. In other words, the fact that fewer than three CLECs are self-provisioning switching to mass market customers in a

1 particular geographic market is not necessarily dispositive on the issue of
2 whether impairment exists in that geographic market. To address this, the FCC
3 created a different test that can be used to determine whether CLECs are
4 impaired where the triggers tests are not met. In creating this alternative, the
5 FCC instructed the state commissions to weigh three things which, taken
6 together, constitute the “potential deployment” approach to making a “no
7 impairment” finding where the FCC “triggers” are not met:

8

9 First, the FCC told the states to look at actual competition where it did not rise
10 to the level necessary to meet the triggers tests. Ms. Tipton will provide
11 testimony regarding the actual level of competition from CLECs that self-
12 provision switching but where the triggers tests are not met.

13

14 Second, the FCC also instructed the state commissions to consider any
15 operational barriers to entry, specifically mentioning non-discriminatory
16 provisioning of loops, access to collocation, and access to co-carrier cross
17 connects. Mr. Alphonso Varner will present BellSouth’s testimony
18 demonstrating that BellSouth provides CLECs with non-discriminatory access
19 to unbundled loops. I discuss the availability of collocation in BellSouth’s
20 offices in Florida, as well as BellSouth’s provision of co-carrier cross connects
21 to any carrier who requests such cross connects.

22

23 Finally, the FCC directed the states to consider any economic barriers to entry
24 when determining whether CLECs are impaired to serve the mass market
25 customer in a particular geographic market without access to BellSouth’s

1 unbundled local switching. To address the economic issues, BellSouth has
2 commissioned the creation of a highly detailed, economic model, a CLEC
3 business case, that, in accordance with the TRO's guidance, can be used to
4 evaluate whether an efficient CLEC could economically enter individual
5 markets without access to BellSouth's unbundled switching.

6
7 The model itself will be described and discussed by Mr. Jim Stegeman, whose
8 company created the model. Dr. Debra Aron, an economist, will discuss how
9 the model meets the criteria laid out in the TRO, the model's economic
10 underpinnings, some of the model's key economic inputs and the results of the
11 potential deployment analysis. Dr. Randall Billingsley will provide
12 information regarding the cost of capital that has been used as an input into the
13 model. Finally, Mr. Keith Milner will discuss the network design that the
14 model emulates.

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ISSUE 3: BATCH CUT PROCESS

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Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE FOURTH MAJOR AREA OF BELL SOUTH'S TESTIMONY ADDRESSING "HOT CUTS".

A. Apart from testimony demonstrating the results of the triggers and potential deployment analyses, BellSouth will also present testimony showing that an efficient hot cut process is in place, enabling competitors to compete by obtaining access to BellSouth's unbundled loops and using either the competitors' own switches or wholesale switching. Further, BellSouth will present testimony demonstrating BellSouth has a seamless and effective batch hot cut process in place that enables competitors to convert existing Unbundled Network Element – Port/Loop Combination ("UNE-P") lines to unbundled loops and switching that is not provided by BellSouth.

Q. WHAT DECISION MUST THE COMMISSION MAKE REGARDING HOT CUTS?

A. The hot cut case is simple because it involves a process that has been around for 100 years – moving a jumper from one location to another. BellSouth can do it, AT&T can do it, and MCI can do it. As of October 2003, there are 156,746 lines in Florida served by a combination of a BellSouth unbundled loop and a CLEC's switch, which demonstrates without doubt that BellSouth has a hot cut process that has been tested, and that works.

1 The case is also simple because it is familiar to this Commission. The
2 Commission expended a great deal of time and energy reviewing the
3 provisioning of hot cuts in the Section 271 case (FPSC Docket No. 960786).
4 That work will inform and facilitate its decision-making in this case.

5

6 Q. WHO ARE THE BELLSOUTH WITNESSES THAT WILL TESTIFY
7 ABOUT THE HOT CUT PROCESS?

8

9 A. There are a number of witnesses. Mr. Ken Ainsworth explains BellSouth's hot
10 cut process that handles both the migration from a BellSouth retail customer to
11 an Unbundled Network Element – Loop ("UNE-L") terminating in a CLEC's
12 collocation space and the migration of a UNE-P to a UNE-L. Mr. Ainsworth
13 also addresses BellSouth's seamless and cost-effective batch hot cut process
14 that enables BellSouth to manage the volume of hot cuts that will be presented
15 to BellSouth when local circuit switching is no longer a UNE.

16

17 Mr. Ron Pate provides testimony that explains the ordering process BellSouth
18 has developed for UNE-P to UNE-L Bulk Migration/batch hot cut process
19 when CLECs migrate existing multiple UNE-P customers to UNE-L.

20

21 Mr. Al Heartley testifies that the BellSouth Network Services organization is
22 prepared to handle the batch hot cut process for the volume of orders with
23 which BellSouth will be presented.

24

1 Given the simple process, all the Commission needs to decide is whether
2 BellSouth can carry out this process in sufficient volumes, and with sufficient
3 speed and accuracy, to allow CLECs to compete using UNE-L. BellSouth's
4 witnesses will demonstrate that BellSouth absolutely can execute hot cuts in
5 this manner, and as Mr. Varner will explain, BellSouth's performance
6 measurements will demonstrate its ability to accomplish these tasks.

7

8 Q. GIVEN THIS COMMISSION'S EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE WITH HOT
9 CUTS, WHY IS BELL SOUTH DEVOTING SO MUCH TESTIMONY TO
10 THIS ISSUE?

11

12 A. BellSouth would prefer not to do so. However, when faced with the
13 overwhelming evidence that BellSouth has regarding the actual facilities-based
14 competition that exists in Florida and the geographic areas where the FCC's
15 triggers are met, it is most likely that the CLECs will try to make a stand and
16 protect their cheap access to BellSouth's network by focusing on the hot cut
17 process. When faced with this straightforward issue, the CLECs have resorted
18 to delay and obstruction. In New York's Bulk Migration/Hot Cuts proceeding
19 (Case No. 02-C-1425), in an obviously circular argument, AT&T contended
20 that "until Verizon demonstrates that it can execute a hot cut process at high
21 volumes, we do not have a process that can handle mass market volumes in a
22 post UNE-P world." (Falcone Testimony, Case No. 02-C-1425, filed October
23 24, 2003, at p. 78.) Of course, so long as UNE-P exists, CLECs have no
24 incentive to order UNE-L, making AT&T's purported threshold impossible to
25 meet. To further delay, AT&T has argued that state commissions must first

1 adopt a hot cut process, but “refrain from approving those processes until
2 appropriate metrics have been developed and approved.” (Nurse Testimony,
3 Case No. 02-C-1425, filed October 24, 2003, at pp. 8-9.) AT&T, of course, is
4 counting on months of delay from extended negotiations about performance
5 measures.

6
7 To complicate and obscure the straightforward issue, certain CLECs, and
8 specifically AT&T in proceedings before the FCC, have argued, and will
9 probably argue here, that until BellSouth makes changes to its network that
10 would cost billions of dollars, no adequate hot cut process is possible. An
11 adequate process, according to AT&T, will require “some form of electronic,
12 not manual, loop provisioning.” The FCC already rejected AT&T’s proposal,
13 but based on the issues that the FCCA offered in this proceeding, it is all but
14 certain that AT&T, if not the FCCA, intends to advance this very same tired
15 old argument again. The CLECs’ suggestion that BellSouth must overhaul its
16 existing network to provide electronic loop provisioning prior to a state
17 commission finding that BellSouth, or any ILEC, has an adequate hot cut
18 process, whether “batch” or otherwise, is what this Commission can expect to
19 hear. As a result, BellSouth offers extensive testimony from Messrs.
20 Ainsworth, Varner, Pate and Heartley regarding the hot cut issues to
21 demonstrate that nothing more is necessary.

22

23

1 Q. HAS THIS COMMISSION PREVIOUSLY REVIEWED THE ISSUE OF
2 BELLSOUTH'S HOT CUT PROCESS? IF SO, WHAT WAS ITS
3 DETERMINATION?

4

5 A. Yes. This Commission reviewed BellSouth's hot cut process during
6 BellSouth's 271 proceeding and UNE Cost proceeding. In Docket No.
7 960786, the Commission determined that BellSouth's policies and procedures
8 relating to its ordering and provisioning met the requirements of the Act and
9 were non-discriminatory. In the UNE Cost docket, the Commission approved
10 the TELRIC-based nonrecurring rates applicable to hot cuts.

11

12 Q. IN THE TRO, WHAT DID THE FCC REQUIRE STATE COMMISSIONS
13 TO DO WITH RESPECT TO HOT CUTS?

14

15 A. The FCC urged state commissions to require ILECs to develop a bulk
16 migration process. The FCC stated, "[t]he record evidence strongly suggests
17 that the hot cut process could be improved if cut overs were done on a bulk
18 basis, such that the timing and volume of the cut over is better managed. We
19 expect that such improvements would result in some reduction of the non-
20 recurring costs."

21

22

23

24

25

1 Q. HAS BELLSOUTH DEVELOPED SUCH A PROCESS?

2

3 A. Yes. As BellSouth Witnesses Ainsworth, Pate and Heartley explain, BellSouth
4 has developed and implemented a bulk migration process that meets the
5 concerns expressed by the FCC.

6

7 Q. WHAT RATES DOES BELLSOUTH PROPOSE FOR THE BULK
8 MIGRATION HOT CUT PROCESS?

9

10 A. In the TRO, the FCC suggested that the batch hot cut rates “should reflect the
11 efficiencies associated with batched migration of loops to a competitive LEC’s
12 switch, either through a reduced per-line rate or through volume discounts.”
13 (TRO ¶ 489.) BellSouth proposes a 10% discount of the total amount of the
14 Commission approved nonrecurring UNE rates applicable for hot cuts.¹ Based
15 on a recent cost study, BellSouth determined that the nonrecurring cost for
16 certain elements are actually lower than the ordered rate with the 10%
17 discount. For those elements where the cost study results are lower than the
18 discounted rate, BellSouth will charge the CLECs the rate produced by the cost
19 study.

20

21

22

¹ BellSouth will apply the net 10% discount to the Service Level 1 (SL1) loop, the Service Level 2 (SL2) loop and the Unbundled Copper Loop - Non-designed (UCL-ND) nonrecurring rate.

1 Q. DO UNE LOOP NONRECURRING CHARGES CONSTITUTE AN
2 ECONOMIC BARRIER?

3

4 A. No. This Commission approved the UNE loop prices currently charged by
5 BellSouth in the UNE Cost proceeding. BellSouth's proposal to offer a 10%
6 discount off these nonrecurring prices when CLECs use the batch hot cut
7 process is an incentive for CLECs to use that process.

8

9 **ISSUES 5 (C)(2) and(C)(3): OPERATIONAL BARRIERS –**
10 **COLLOCATION AND CROSS-CONNECTS**

11

12 *ISSUE 5(C)(2) – COLLOCATION SPACE*

13

14 Q. TURNING TO OPERATIONAL ISSUES, PLEASE DISCUSS THE
15 AVAILABILITY OF COLLOCATION SPACE IN BELL SOUTH'S
16 CENTRAL OFFICES.

17

18 A. Space is available for CLECs to collocate equipment in all of BellSouth's
19 Florida central offices, except two. For one of these two offices, the
20 Jacksonville J. Turner Butler Central Office (CLLI Code JCVLFLJT), the
21 Florida Commission has granted a waiver for collocation until October 31,
22 2006. The J. Turner Butler Central Office is located in a multi-tenant, multi-
23 story office building that BellSouth does not own. BellSouth leases its space
24 under terms that allow for renewals for 10-year intervals at pre-negotiated,
25 below market rates. If BellSouth were to enter into a collocation arrangement

1 with a CLEC, such arrangement would be a sublease, which is only allowed
2 pursuant to the terms of the lease agreement upon approval of the building
3 owner. Accordingly, if BellSouth enters into a sublease arrangement without
4 prior approval, BellSouth violates the lease agreement, potentially is liable for
5 contract penalties and waives and terminates its right to the renewal options
6 provided in the agreement, thus potentially putting at risk its facilities currently
7 in place. BellSouth would also waive its option to lease additional space at the
8 landlord's discretion. In addition to the lease agreement issues, there is a
9 building code restriction requiring sprinklers in any additional space acquired.
10 BellSouth has received an exemption from this requirement for its existing
11 space, but the Fire Marshall has refused to extend this exemption to any
12 additional space acquired by BellSouth in the future.

13

14 The other office, Lake Mary Main (CLLI LKMRFLMA), is scheduled for
15 relocation on March 26, 2004, because the existing building is located over a
16 sinkhole and must be vacated. Consequently, no new collocation arrangements
17 are being provided in the current Lake Mary Main Central Office. Once the
18 new building is complete, BellSouth will offer space for collocation giving
19 priority to those CLECs who are on a waiting list.

20

21 Q. ARE THERE ALTERNATIVES TO PHYSICAL COLLOCATION IN THE
22 CENTRAL OFFICE IN THE RARE CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE
23 PHYSICAL COLLOCATION IS NOT VIABLE?

24

25 A. Yes. CLECs may elect either adjacent collocation or virtual collocation.

1 Q. IS BELLSOUTH PROVIDING PHYSICAL COLLOCATION TO CLECS
2 TODAY?

3

4 A. Yes. CLECs currently lease approximately 130,010 square feet of collocation
5 space within 128 of BellSouth Florida's 198 central offices.

6

7 Q. DOES BELLSOUTH PROVIDE COLLOCATION SPACE TO CLECS IN A
8 TIMELY MANNER FOLLOWING CLECS' REQUESTS FOR SPACE?

9

10 A. Yes. As Mr. Varner discusses in his testimony, over the past year, BellSouth
11 has achieved 100% performance in meeting the collocation provisioning
12 intervals established by this Commission. In fact, of the 470 collocation
13 requests received, BellSouth consistently has completed these orders in much
14 shorter intervals than required.

15

16 Q. ARE THERE MEASURES IN PLACE TO ASSURE THAT BELLSOUTH'S
17 LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE REGARDING COLLOCATION DOES NOT
18 DIMINISH?

19

20 A. Yes. This Commission has ordered Performance Measurements that are in
21 place today. Should BellSouth fail to meet these metrics, BellSouth would be
22 subject to penalty payments under the Self-Effectuating Enforcement
23 Mechanism ("SEEMs") plan. However, as Mr. Varner's testimony explains,
24 BellSouth has met all of these metrics since September 2002.

25

1 Q. IS A CLEC'S ABILITY TO OBTAIN COLLOCATION A BARRIER TO
2 CLEC ENTRY IN BELLSOUTH'S MARKETS?

3

4 A. Absolutely not.

5

6 *ISSUE 5(C)(3) – CROSS-CONNECTS*

7

8 Q. WHAT IS A "COMPETITIVE LEC-TO-COMPETITIVE LEC CROSS-
9 CONNECT"?

10

11 A. "Competitive LEC-to-Competitive LEC Cross-Connects" are commonly
12 referred to as Co-Carrier Cross Connects ("CCXCs"). A CCXC is a
13 connection between two CLECs' facilities located in the same BellSouth
14 premises. A CCXC must be provisioned using facilities owned by the ordering
15 carrier and must use BellSouth's common cable support structure. The CLECs
16 must also contract with a BellSouth Certified Supplier to place the CCXC.

17

18 Q. WHY WOULD TWO COLLOCATORS USE CO-CARRIER CROSS-
19 CONNECTS?

20

21 A. There are a couple of potential uses. A CLEC might use CCXCs to share
22 facilities and/or equipment or exchange interexchange traffic

23

24

1 Q. DOES BELLSOUTH ALLOW CO-CARRIER CROSS-CONNECTS
2 TODAY?

3

4 A. Yes, and BellSouth has done so for several years. Today, a CLEC can connect
5 its collocation arrangement to another CLEC's collocation arrangement by
6 enlisting a certified installation vendor from the list of BellSouth certified
7 vendors to place the cabling necessary to make the connections. Beginning
8 first quarter 2004, BellSouth will provide another means for CLECs to obtain
9 CCXCs. BellSouth will make CCXCs available pursuant to its FCC No. 1
10 Tariff, whereby BellSouth (rather than a third-party vendor) will provide a
11 CCXC for both CLECs at a demarcation point.

12

13 Q. ARE THERE CLECS WHO HAVE CO-CARRIER CROSS-CONNECTS IN
14 SERVICE TODAY IN BELLSOUTH'S CENTRAL OFFICES?

15

16 A. Yes. In Florida, there are over 500 existing CCXCs in BellSouth central
17 offices.

18

19 Q. IS THE ABILITY OF CLECS TO OBTAIN CROSS-CONNECTS IN
20 BELLSOUTH CENTRAL OFFICES ON A TIMELY BASIS A BARRIER
21 TO CLEC ENTRY IN BELLSOUTH'S MARKETS?

22

23 A. Absolutely not.

24

25

1 **ISSUE 6 – TRANSITIONAL USE OF UNBUNDLED**

2 **LOCAL SWITCHING**

3

4 Q: CAN YOU BRIEFLY DISCUSS THE TRANSITIONAL USE OF
5 UNBUNDLED LOCAL SWITCHING?

6 A: Yes. As the testimony of BellSouth's witnesses sets forth, CLECs in Florida
7 are not impaired in 23 of 31 geographic markets. Consequently, the
8 transitional use of unbundled local switching is not needed at this time because
9 the switching triggers and economic analysis mandate relief. If the transitional
10 use of unbundled local switching were necessary, the appropriate time period
11 for that switching should not exceed ninety (90) days.

12

13 Q: PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR TESTIMONY.

14

15 A. I anticipate that the CLECs will contest the issues in this proceeding in every
16 way possible and throw road block after road block in the path of progress
17 toward real competition in the telecommunications industry in Florida.
18 However, the simple truth of the matter is that facilities-based competition has
19 arrived in Florida and has been in place for some time. Those CLECs who
20 have chosen to invest in the state of Florida have put in switches and are
21 actively serving mass market customers in a number of geographic areas in the
22 state, other CLECs want to continue to provide services using nothing but
23 BellSouth's network. Such competition, however, cannot be sustainable in the
24 long run. Requiring BellSouth to unbundle its network, as is presently the
25 case, creates disincentives for CLECs to invest in Florida, which no doubt

1 explains why there is not more facilities-based competition than there is now.
2 Any argument that BellSouth's "hot cut" process is to blame is simply a red
3 herring. Thousands and thousands of lines have been moved from BellSouth's
4 switches to CLEC switches. The Commission has looked at BellSouth's hot
5 cut process and found it sufficient to support BellSouth's entry into the
6 interLATA long distance business. As discussed in my testimony and the
7 testimony of BellSouth's other witnesses, BellSouth has met the requirements
8 given in the TRO to have switching relief in 23 of its geographic market areas.
9 It is time to take the next step and begin weaning carriers like MCI and AT&T
10 from the cheap switching that BellSouth is currently required to offer, and time
11 to compel these and other companies to make real investments in Florida that
12 will be of real benefit over time.

13 Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?

14

15 A. Yes.

16 [515427]

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1 BELL SOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.
2 REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF JOHN A. RUSCILLI
3 BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
4 DOCKET NO. 030851-TP
5 JANUARY 7, 2004
6

7 Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, YOUR POSITION WITH BELL SOUTH
8 TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. ("BELL SOUTH") AND YOUR
9 BUSINESS ADDRESS.

10

11 A. My name is John A. Ruscilli. I am employed by BellSouth as Senior Director
12 – Policy Implementation and Regulatory Compliance for the nine-state
13 BellSouth region. My business address is 675 West Peachtree Street, Atlanta,
14 Georgia 30375.

15

16 Q. HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY FILED TESTIMONY IN THIS PROCEEDING?

17

18 A. Yes, I filed direct testimony and three exhibits on December 4, 2003.

19

20 Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?

21

22 A. My rebuttal testimony addresses numerous comments contained in the direct
23 testimony filed by other witnesses in this proceeding on December 4, 2003.
24 Specifically, I address portions of the testimony of Mr. David E. Stahly
25 representing Supra Telecommunications and Information Systems, Inc.

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1 (“Supra”), Mr. Joseph Gillan representing the Florida Competitive Carriers
 2 Association (“FCCA”), Dr. Mark T. Bryant, Mr. James D. Webber, and Ms.
 3 Sherry Lichtenberg representing MCI WorldCom Communications, Inc. and
 4 MCIMetro Access Transmission Services LLC (“MCI”), Mr. Brian K. Staihr
 5 representing Sprint-Florida and Sprint Communications Company LP
 6 (“Sprint”), and Mr. Stephen E. Turner and Mr. Mark D. Van de Water
 7 representing AT&T Communications of the Southern States, LLC (“AT&T”).
 8

THE ROLE OF THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

10
 11 Q. AT PAGES 6-10 OF HIS TESTIMONY, MR. GILLAN IMPLIES THAT
 12 SECTION 364 OF FLORIDA STATUTES REQUIRES THAT BELLSOUTH
 13 UNBUNDLE EVERY PART OF ITS LOCAL NETWORK, REGARDLESS
 14 OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF
 15 1996 (THE “ACT”). HE STATES THAT THE ONLY REASON HE IS NOT
 16 RECOMMENDING THAT THE COMMISSION “INDEPENDENTLY
 17 ORDER THE ILECS TO OFFER UNBUNDLED LOCAL SWITCHING
 18 UNDER STATE LAW” IS BECAUSE “SUCH ACTION IS
 19 UNNECESSARY” DUE TO THE FCC’S NATIONAL FINDING ON MASS
 20 MARKET SWITCHING. PLEASE RESPOND.

21
 22 A. There is no question that the Florida Legislature passed landmark legislation in
 23 1995, well ahead of many other states in the nation. That legislation opened
 24 the local exchange markets in Florida to competition. The legislation also
 25 provided incumbent local exchange carriers (“ILECs”) regulatory flexibility

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1 via price regulation in order to respond to the competition that was already
2 present in Florida and the competition that was coming.

3
4 The real issue in this case, however, is reconciling the language of the Florida
5 statute, with the terms of the Act. In 2001, the Florida Public Service
6 Commission (“Commission”) addressed the scope of its decision-making
7 authority in connection with unbundling, considering both the state and federal
8 statute. The following excerpt from the Commission’s Order No. PSC-01-
9 0824-FOF-TP in Docket No. 000649-TP (MCI Arbitration) demonstrates the
10 Commission’s interpretation of its jurisdiction:

11 We find that under Section 252(e) of the Act, we could impose
12 additional conditions and terms in exercising our independent state law
13 authority under Chapter 364, Florida Statutes, so long as those
14 requirements are not inconsistent with the Act, FCC rules and orders,
15 and controlling judicial precedent. (Page 10.)

16
17 The Commission’s position is consistent with the FCC’s discussion of state
18 authority in the *Triennial Review Order (“TRO”)*.¹

19 [W]e find that the most reasonable interpretation of Congress’ intent in
20 enacting sections 251 and 252 to be that state action, whether taken in
21 the course of a rulemaking or during the review of an interconnection
22 agreement, must be consistent with section 251 and must not

¹ *In the Matter of Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, et al.*, CC Docket No. 01-338, et al., *Report and Order and Order on Remand an Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking*, FCC 03-36, released August 21, 2003.

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1 “substantially prevent” its implementation...If a decision pursuant to
2 state law were to require the unbundling of a network element for
3 which the Commission has either found no impairment – and thus has
4 found that unbundling that element would conflict with the limits in
5 section 251(d)(2) – or otherwise declined to require unbundling on a
6 national basis, we believe it unlikely that such decision would fail to
7 conflict with and “substantially prevent” implementation of the federal
8 regime, in violation of section 251(d)(3)(C). Similarly, we recognize
9 that in at least some instances existing state requirements will not be
10 consistent with our new framework and may frustrate its
11 implementation. It will be necessary in those instances for the subject
12 states to amend their rules and to alter their decisions to conform to our
13 rules. (*TRO* ¶¶ 194-195).

14
15 There is no question that the FCC’s framework for finding market-by-market
16 non-impairment for mass-market switching is an integral part of the federal
17 regime and any state decision regarding the local circuit switching impairment
18 issue must be consistent with that federal regime. Despite Mr. Gillan’s
19 arguments, the plain language of this Commission’s prior decision as well as
20 the *TRO* shows the policy error in his approach.

21
22 Q. AT PAGE 16, IN DISCUSSING THE TASKS ASSIGNED TO STATE
23 COMMISSIONS BY THE FCC, MR. GILLAN SUGGESTS THAT THIS
24 COMMISSION’S ROLE IS TO SIMPLY “CONFIRM THAT THERE ARE
25 NO EXCEPTIONS TO” THE FCC’S NATIONAL FINDING OF

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1 IMPAIRMENT WITH RESPECT TO MASS MARKET SWITCHING.

2 PLEASE COMMENT.

3

4 A. Mr. Gillan's suggestion is misguided. While the FCC did make a national
5 finding that competitive local exchange carriers ("CLECs") are impaired
6 without access to mass market switching on an unbundled basis, the FCC did
7 not simply ask the states to confirm that there are no exceptions. To the
8 contrary, in footnote 1404 of the *TRO*, the FCC specifically stated that their
9 intent was to "make a national finding based on a more granular inquiry". In
10 its *Order*, the FCC determined that this granular inquiry would be most
11 appropriately conducted by the state commissions. Further, in paragraph 461
12 of the *TRO*, the FCC stated,

13 We also recognize that a more granular analysis may reveal that a
14 particular market is not subject to impairment in the absence of
15 unbundled local circuit switching. We therefore set forth two triggers
16 that state commissions *must* apply in determining whether requesting
17 carriers are impaired in a given market. Our triggers are based on our
18 conclusion that actual deployment is the best indicator of whether there
19 is impairment, and accordingly evidence of actual deployment is given
20 substantial weight in our impairment analysis. (Emphasis added.)

21

22 The FCC's intent that the states conduct a granular analysis of markets within
23 the state is a far cry from Mr. Gillan's interpretation, which is much akin to
24 simply "seconding a motion from the chair".

25

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1 Q. AT PAGE 67, MR. GILLAN RECOMMENDS THE COMMISSION OPEN
2 YET ANOTHER PROCEEDING TO ESTABLISH A MARKET RATE FOR
3 NETWORK ELEMENTS NO LONGER SUBJECT TO SECTION 251
4 PRICING STANDARDS. IS THIS APPROPRIATE?

5
6 A. No. When an ILEC has been relieved of its obligation to offer a network
7 element under Section 251 of the Act, such as local circuit switching, it means
8 that CLECs are no longer impaired without access to that network element.
9 Under a finding of no impairment, there are sufficient alternatives in the
10 market such that CLECs do not need to rely on ILEC services at regulated
11 prices. Because CLECs have alternatives, competition will drive the market
12 price of the network element. As such, it is appropriate for BellSouth to set its
13 rate according to those market conditions through negotiations with the CLEC.
14 It is neither necessary nor appropriate for this market rate to be set in a
15 Commission proceeding. Mr. Gillan's suggestion should therefore be rejected.

16
17 Q. MR. GILLAN RECOMMENDS A TWO-YEAR QUIET PERIOD
18 FOLLOWING THIS PROCEEDING, IN WHICH THE ILECS MAY NOT
19 SEEK FURTHER UNBUNDLING (PAGES 68-69). IS THIS
20 APPROPRIATE?

21
22 A. Absolutely not. Under the guise of "providing certainty to the industry", Mr.
23 Gillan is merely attempting another strategy designed to extend the unbundled
24 network element platform ("UNE-P") as long as possible. Although it may be
25 appropriate to set some basic guidelines for subsequent proceedings, it should

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1 be for the purpose of acknowledging and furthering competition rather than in
2 protecting UNE-P. Two years in this business is a very long time and much
3 can happen. Delaying an ILEC's ability to obtain further relief from its
4 unbundling obligations due to an arbitrary "quiet period" is unfair to the ILEC
5 and does not recognize the dynamics of the marketplace.

6
7 Further, with respect to those markets where CLECs continue to be impaired
8 without access to unbundled switching, Dr. Bryant states, "If CLECs are not
9 impaired without access to UNE switching, I would expect more CLECs to
10 self-provision switching in the relatively near future." When that activity
11 occurs or other evidence of no impairment surfaces, BellSouth should have the
12 option to immediately petition for relief in that market.

13
14 Q. AT PAGES 11-13 OF HIS TESTIMONY, MR. STAHLY EXPRESSES
15 CONCERN THAT BELL SOUTH WILL "BLATANTLY" IGNORE ANY
16 LAWFULLY ISSUED ORDERS OF THIS COMMISSION. PLEASE
17 COMMENT.

18
19 A. Mr. Stahly's "concern" is nothing more than an obvious attempt to disparage
20 BellSouth by suggesting that BellSouth does not comply with lawful orders of
21 this Commission. BellSouth has a long history of complying with orders of
22 this Commission and there is no basis for believing that BellSouth will not
23 continue to do so. Further, this Commission certainly has remedies including
24 fines if the Commission believes BellSouth has willfully ignored its lawful
25 orders. The Commission has not done so in connection with any of the claims

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1 that Supra has leveled against BellSouth over the years.

2

3

COMPETITION AND UNE-P

4

5 Q. MR. GILLAN DISCUSSES WHAT HE CALLS THE “COMPETITIVE
6 PROFILE” IN FLORIDA (PAGES 28-31) CONCLUDING THAT UNE-P
7 PRODUCES STATEWIDE COMPETITION. FROM HIS ASSESSMENT,
8 MR. GILLAN STATES THAT THE COMMISSION “SHOULD NOT
9 RESTRICT THE AVAILABILITY OF UNBUNDLED LOCAL SWITCHING
10 AND UNE-P UNLESS IT CAN CONCLUDE THAT AN ALTERNATIVE
11 WILL PRODUCE A SIMILAR COMPETITIVE PROFILE.” DO YOU
12 AGREE?

13

14 A. No, I do not. First, Mr. Gillan appears to suggest that the entire state of Florida
15 should be the market area, because he says the UNE-P produces statewide
16 competition and any alternative should do the same. As the FCC was specific
17 in pointing out, “State commissions have discretion to determine the contours
18 of each market, but they may not define the market as encompassing the entire
19 state.” (*TRO* ¶ 495).

20

21 Second, there is no reference in the *TRO* that places a requirement upon this
22 Commission to ensure that a statewide alternative to UNE-P is in place before
23 the Commission can find no impairment in a particular market. Indeed, such a
24 requirement would make no sense given the fact UNE-P itself will remain in
25 place in those markets where relief is not granted.

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1 However, there most definitely is a requirement that this Commission
2 determine that CLECs are not impaired in a market when either the self-
3 provisioning or wholesale triggers are met or the market is found to be
4 conducive to competitive entry. This analysis is done on a market-by-market
5 basis, as BellSouth has done in establishing the 31 distinct geographic markets
6 in its territory in Florida.

7
8 Finally, it is not surprising at all that UNE-P produces some level of
9 competition in most wire centers in the state of Florida. After all, UNE-P is
10 nothing more than the incumbent LEC's local service offering at cheap prices.

11

12 Q. SEVERAL PARTIES ALLEGE THAT COMPETITION IN FLORIDA
13 DEPENDS ON THE AVAILABILITY OF THE UNBUNDLED NETWORK
14 ELEMENT PLATFORM OR UNE-P. DO YOU AGREE?

15

16 A. No. There seems to be a theme that runs through the testimony of witnesses
17 Stahly (p. 6), Gillan (p. 58) and Bryant (pp. 15-16), that is based on the
18 mistaken notion that CLECs cannot compete in Florida without UNE-P.

19

20 These witnesses are all incorrect. First, the *TRO* requires that either a
21 provisioning trigger be met or potential competition be shown before a state
22 commission can find that no impairment exists for local switching. Second,
23 the Act envisioned provisioning of local exchange competition by three means;
24 resale of the incumbent's retail services, purchase of unbundled network
25 elements ("UNEs"), and interconnection via a CLEC's own facilities. All

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1 three options, or combination of options are available to CLECs. CLECs are
2 certainly not limited to UNE-P as an entry method.

3

4 In the markets where the state commission finds CLECs are not impaired
5 without unbundled switching, the CLEC has the means to supply its own
6 switching or can use BellSouth's local circuit switching at market prices.

7 BellSouth must continue to provide local switching to CLECs under Section
8 271(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Therefore, BellSouth will offer local switching at a
9 competitive market rate in those markets where the Commission determines
10 that CLECs are not impaired. In addition, there will be a transitional period
11 sufficient to allow CLECs to implement their chosen options (e.g., *TRO* ¶ 532
12 describes how, even after a finding of no-impairment in a particular market,
13 UNE-P will not be phased out for a subsequent 27 months). Therefore,
14 contrary to Dr. Bryant's statement, all consumers currently served by UNE-P
15 CLECs will not be forced to make a change in their telephone service.

16

17 Finally, although at this time BellSouth has not attempted to demonstrate the
18 presence of wholesale switch providers in this case, it is reasonable to expect
19 that in markets where no impairment is found, wholesale switching will
20 become more prevalent as an option for CLECs. For example, Florida Digital
21 Network, Inc. ("FDN") has indicated that:

22

23 ***** BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL *****

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***** END CONFIDENTIAL *****

Once the subsidized switching that BellSouth is currently required to offer is replaced by a just and reasonable market rate, switch providers will likely find that wholesale switching offers a viable and long-term market where they can compete effectively with BellSouth's market-based switching rate. The presence of a competitive switching rate should induce switch providers to market their switching to local service providers.

In summary, the parties that attempt to minimize CLEC opportunity in the absence of unbundled local switching are doing so only to preserve the cheap prices they currently pay for the UNE-P. They give little credence to the options available to them including the multiple sources of switching, and BellSouth's local switching at market rates.

Q. ON PAGES 60-62 MR. GILLAN SUGGESTS THAT UNE-P ENCOURAGES INVESTMENT. DO YOU AGREE?

A. Absolutely not. The use of UNE-P, if anything, discourages investment in facilities for both CLECs and ILECs. UNE-P is basically the resale of an

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1 ILEC's services. While Mr. Gillan claims that CLECs invest in "billing
2 systems, computer systems, offices and, perhaps most importantly, human
3 capital", such investment is easily terminated if business plans change. The
4 FCC has recognized that a CLEC who invests in facilities, i.e. collocation
5 space, transport facilities, etc., has made a commitment to provide service in a
6 particular market by investing in network infrastructure. In its *Pricing*
7 *Flexibility Order*, in discussing the necessary competitive showing test for
8 common line and traffic-sensitive services, the FCC states, "resold services
9 employ only incumbent LEC facilities and thus do not indicate irreversible
10 investment by competitors whatsoever. Similarly, a competitor providing
11 service solely over unbundled network elements leased from the incumbent
12 (the so-called "UNE-platform") has little, if any, sunk investment in facilities
13 used to compete with the incumbent LEC." (*Pricing Flexibility Order* ¶ 111).
14 Thus, the lack of sunk investment affords a CLEC more flexibility in its ability
15 to exit a market rather than a commitment to provide service to its customers.

16
17 Mr. Gillan also suggests that UNE-P provides the capability for data LECs to
18 continue to have access to end users. His argument for encouraging
19 investment with this example is not clear. With the elimination of the line
20 sharing requirement, a data LEC will be required to either purchase the entire
21 loop to provide service to its customer or to enter into a line splitting
22 arrangement with a "voice partner". Neither of these situations encourages
23 investment. In both situations, the data LEC is still purchasing a stand-alone
24 UNE loop that uses BellSouth's existing network facilities. In markets where
25 there is no switching impairment, the only change is that switching is no longer

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1 available at TELRIC-based rates and the data LEC or their “voice partner”
2 purchases an unbundled network element-loop (“UNE-L”). There is no new
3 investment by a data LEC.

4

5 Q. IS MR. GILLAN CONSISTENT WITH HIS ARGUMENTS ABOUT UNE-P
6 ENCOURAGING INVESTMENT?

7

8 A. No. There are several statements that Mr. Gillan makes that appear to actually
9 be arguing against UNE-P encouraging investment.

10

11 On page 60, Mr. Gillan states “Although I would disagree generally with the
12 claim that unbundling discourages investment, there should be no debate as to
13 whether sharing the inherited legacy network to offer conventional POTS has
14 that effect.” Also on page 62, lines 1-5, Mr. Gillan states “The POTS market is
15 shrinking as customers chose [sic] (for themselves, and not under regulatory
16 direction) to move to more advanced services. There is no valid policy reason
17 to encourage additional investment in the generic local exchange facilities that
18 underlie UNE-P.” These two statements bolster BellSouth’s position that
19 UNE-P does nothing to advance the development of new technologies in a
20 UNE-P world. CLECs who have control over their own switch decide what
21 software and hardware to install in order to customize their various offerings.
22 In such cases, CLECs may find new technologies that offer services ILECs are
23 not offering. Such enhancements to their switches will drive competition and
24 innovation among competitors and will lead to a market driven by new
25 offerings based on new technologies.

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GEOGRAPHICAL MARKET DEFINITION

1

2

3 Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE APPARENT CONFLICT BETWEEN SPRINT
4 AND MCI REGARDING THE APPROPRIATE GEOGRAPHIC MARKETS
5 FOR MASS MARKET SWITCHING.

6

7 A. The problems with the market definitions proposed by Sprint and MCI are
8 discussed further in the rebuttal testimony of Dr. Pleatsikas. Let me note
9 however that what at first seems to be a conflict in their positions on
10 geographic markets is, in reality, a design by both companies to secure the
11 continuation of UNE-P indefinitely. Sprint suggests that geographic markets
12 should be defined as the Metropolitan Statistical Area (“MSA”). In making
13 this recommendation, Sprint goes on to say that there must be competition
14 throughout the MSA and uses as support for this position a *de minimis*
15 argument not contained in the *TRO*, which I will discuss further below. The
16 outcome of Sprint’s way of thinking is that because the geographic area of an
17 MSA is so large and the FCC’s non-impairment criteria, by Sprint’s definition,
18 is so stringent, it becomes virtually impossible for the Commission to find that
19 CLECs are not impaired in a given MSA. By Sprint’s definition of markets, it
20 is not surprising that Sprint is not asking for relief in any market.

21

22 MCI on the other hand, recommends that markets be defined as wire centers.
23 By defining markets as wire centers, MCI simply hopes to limit the loss of
24 UNE-P to the greatest extent possible. MCI expects that BellSouth may be
25 relieved of its UNE switching obligation in some wire centers, but hopes to

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1 confine the “damage to UNE-P” to relatively small pockets. Both strategies by
2 Sprint and MCI are designed to limit the amount of relief and continue to the
3 extent possible the use of UNE-P in BellSouth’s territory.

4
5 Q. PLEASE FURTHER ADDRESS MCI’S CHOICE OF THE WIRE CENTER
6 AS THE CORRECT DEFINITION OF GEOGRAPHIC MARKET IN THIS
7 PROCEEDING?

8
9 A. MCI’s position is inconsistent with testimony filed by its own witnesses in
10 previous proceedings. Here, Dr. Bryant touts the wire center as the appropriate
11 market definition, stating at page 29, “ILEC wire center boundaries are the
12 most natural geographic boundaries for purposes of defining markets for
13 several reasons.” In contrast, in testimony filed in previous arbitration cases,
14 MCI discounts the geographic area of an ILEC’s wire center when compared
15 to the more updated CLEC networks. Specifically, in Georgia Docket No.
16 11901-U, Mr. Ron Martinez compared BellSouth’s network to MCI’s network:

17 ILEC networks, developed over many decades, employ an architecture
18 characterized by a large number of switches within a hierarchical
19 system, with relatively short copper based subscriber loops. By
20 contrast, WorldCom’s local network employs state-of-the-art
21 equipment and design principles based on the technology available
22 today, particularly optical fiber rings utilizing SONET transmission. In
23 general, using this transmission based architecture, it is possible for
24 WorldCom to access a much larger geographic area from a single
25 switch than does the ILEC switch in the traditional copper based

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1 architecture. This is why, in any given service territory, WorldCom has
2 deployed fewer switches than the ILEC. Any CLEC will begin serving
3 a metropolitan area with a single switch and grow to multiple switches
4 as its customer base grows.

5
6 In general, at least for now, WorldCom's switches serve rate centers at
7 least equal in size to the serving area of the ILEC tandem. WorldCom
8 is able to serve such large geographic areas via fiber network and bears
9 the cost of transport of that owned network. (Emphasis added.) (Direct
10 Testimony, pp. 35-36.)

11
12 MCI demonstrates with its previous testimony that a geographic market should
13 not be defined by the decades old ILEC wire center because MCI reaches well
14 beyond the wire center to serve its market. By its own admission MCI does
15 not use the wire center to identify the customers it targets. It uses a number of
16 other factors and appears to be limited in its market reach only as a function of
17 its fiber network.

18

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1 Q. WHAT GUIDANCE DID THE FCC PROVIDE IN DETERMINING
2 GEOGRAPHIC MARKETS?

3

4 A. Paragraph 495 of the *TRO* gives guidance to state commissions in designing
5 geographic markets. State commissions must consider locations of customers
6 actually being served, variation in factors affecting the competitors' ability to
7 serve groups of customers, and the ability to target and serve specific markets
8 economically and efficiently using currently available technology. However,
9 the FCC was also specific in pointing out

10 While a more granular analysis is generally preferable, states should
11 not define the market so narrowly that a competitor serving that market
12 alone would not be able to take advantage of available scale and scope
13 economies from serving a wider market. State commissions should
14 consider how competitors' ability to use self-provisioned switches or
15 switches provided by a third-party wholesaler to serve various groups
16 of customers varies geographically and should attempt to distinguish
17 among markets where different findings of impairment are likely. The
18 state commission must use the same market definitions for all of its
19 analysis. (Footnotes omitted)

20

21 If the FCC believed that the ILECs' wire centers represent the appropriate
22 geographic markets, it would have said so in the *TRO*. The fact that it was
23 concerned that the geographic area not be defined as the entire state indicates
24 its belief that market areas would be something substantially larger than the
25 ILECs' wire centers. BellSouth's proposal to use the individual UNE rate

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1 zones adopted by this Commission, subdivided into smaller areas using the
2 Component Economic Areas (“CEAs”) as developed by the Bureau of
3 Economic Analysis of the United States Department of Commerce represents a
4 more appropriate definition of geographic markets. UNE rate zones are an
5 appropriate starting point for the market definition because, by design, they
6 reflect the locations of customers currently being served by CLECs. CEAs are
7 defined by natural geographic aggregations of economic activity and cover the
8 entire state of Florida. BellSouth recommends the Commission adopt its
9 definition of geographic markets and reject both MCI’s and Sprint’s proposed
10 definitions of geographic markets.

11

12

SWITCHING TRIGGERS

13

14 Q. IN DISCUSSING WHAT CRITERIA HE RECOMMENDS THE
15 COMMISSION APPLY WHEN IDENTIFYING SELF-PROVISIONING
16 TRIGGER CANDIDATES, MR. GILLAN STATES THAT THE
17 COMMISSION SHOULD EXCLUDE CANDIDATES THAT DO NOT
18 RELY ON ILEC ANALOG LOOPS (PAGES 36 & 44-47). PLEASE
19 ADDRESS THIS COMMENT.

20

21 A. Mr. Gillan states that “Self-Providers Must Be Relying on ILEC Loops” (page
22 44) in order for them to be included as candidates that meet the self-
23 provisioning trigger. This is clearly inconsistent with the *TRO* – as footnote
24 1560 explains:

25

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1 We recognize that when one or more of the three competitive providers
2 is also self-deploying its own local loops, this evidence may bear less
3 heavily on the ability to use a self-deployed switch as a means of
4 accessing the incumbent's loops. Nevertheless, the presence of three
5 competitors in a market using self-provisioned switching and loops,
6 shows the feasibility of an entrant serving the mass market with its own
7 facilities.

8
9 Mr. Gillan would have this Commission exclude carriers that do not rely upon
10 BellSouth's local loop facilities to provide service to their customers.

11 However, the *TRO* clearly states that the Commission can, and should consider
12 such carriers as trigger candidates.

13

14 A. MR. GILLAN RECOMMENDS THAT A "*DE MINIMUS*" [SIC]
15 CRITERION BE ADDED BY THE STATE COMMISSIONS TO THE
16 TRIGGERS TEST (PAGE 49). IS THIS ADVICE CONSISTENT WITH
17 THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE *TRO*?

18

19 A. No. The *TRO* does not establish any size requirements or specific quantitative
20 standard regarding the number of customers in a market that must be served
21 before a self-provisioning carrier can be "counted" for purposes of the triggers
22 test. Any imposition of a *de minimis* requirement regarding the number of
23 customers served would be completely outside the explicit dictates of the *TRO*.

24

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1 Q. WHY DO THE PARAGRAPHS CITED BY MR. GILLAN NOT SUPPORT
2 A REQUIREMENT THAT A TRIGGER CANDIDATE PASS A *DE*
3 *MINIMIS* TEST?

4
5 A. The only support that Mr. Gillan provides for his assertion that there should be a
6 quantitative analysis is language in a section of the *TRO* (§ 438) that appears
7 well before the section that establishes the triggers test (§§ 498 – 505).
8 Paragraph 438 of the *TRO* addresses the finding of *national* impairment and
9 merely indicates that the FCC found *in aggregate* that the evidence in the
10 record regarding the *overall* level of switch deployment was insufficient to
11 warrant a finding in the *TRO* that CLECs are not impaired on a national basis.
12 By contrast, the triggers tests, which are described some forty pages later in the
13 *TRO*, posit a set of bright-line rules that, if met, overcome this presumption of
14 national impairment. The discussion in paragraph 438 of the *TRO* is neither a
15 part of the triggers tests nor is it logically linked to the tests.

16
17 Q. ARE THERE REASONS TO BELIEVE THAT THE FCC INTENDED TO
18 ESTABLISH A *DE MINIMIS* STANDARD AS A PART OF ITS TRIGGERS
19 TESTS?

20
21 A. No. At one point in his testimony, Mr. Gillan argues that the *TRO* requires
22 state commissions to apply “judgment, experience, and knowledge of local
23 competitive conditions” to implement the triggers test, but he is simply
24 grasping at straws. In fact, the *TRO* is clear that it wishes to *remove* as many
25 subjective elements as possible from the triggers test, and that is why the test is

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1 defined so objectively. (*TRO* ¶ 428, ¶ 498). The FCC was clear to spell out a
2 number of criteria that it *did* intend for the state commissions to apply (e.g., the
3 number of carriers required to demonstrate “multiple, competitive supply”,
4 *TRO* ¶ 501). If the FCC had intended state commissions to assess the “size” of
5 carriers or their operations, it surely would have explicitly said so – just as it
6 has done in countless other instances where it has established such bright line
7 tests. Indeed, after describing in paragraph 499 the factors that are to be
8 considered by the state commissions, the *TRO* explicitly indicates that “[f]or
9 purposes of these triggers, we find that states shall not evaluate any *other*
10 factors...” (*TRO* ¶ 500, emphasis added).

11

12 Q. ARE THERE GOOD REASONS THAT THE FCC WOULD HAVE
13 REJECTED THE ADDITION OF A *DE MINIMIS* SIZE REQUIREMENT TO
14 THE TRIGGERS TEST?

15

16 A. Yes. Apart from the desire for administrative simplicity and to avoid interpretive
17 ambiguity, it makes good sense not to add a *de minimis* size requirement to the
18 triggers test. As Chairman Powell notes in his separate statement, there is
19 significant evidence that the availability of TELRIC-priced, wholesale
20 switching deters facilities-based competitors. (Separate Statement of
21 Chairman Michael Powell at p. 6). This suggests that creating a minimum
22 penetration standard would virtually ensure that the non-impairment tests
23 would never be met, because the availability of UNE-P would itself deter the
24 level of penetration required for a finding of non-impairment.

25

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1 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE DR. STAIHR'S RELATED ARGUMENT (PAGE 14-
2 15).

3
4 A. Dr. Staihr proposes that the self-provisioning trigger test requires some minimum
5 number of mass-market lines served by the CLECs, in aggregate, using their
6 own switches, and that these lines be distributed generally throughout the
7 market area. Dr. Staihr describes his numbers-related proposal as a "*de*
8 *minimus*" [sic] test. I will address this test, and Dr. Pleatsikas addresses Dr.
9 Staihr's proposal that these lines must be dispersed throughout the relevant
10 geographic market.

11
12 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE FLAWS WITH DR. STAIHR'S "*DE MINIMUS*"
13 [SIC] TEST.

14
15 A. Like Mr. Gillan's proposal, Dr. Staihr's proposal is not supported by the *TRO*, and
16 its use by this Commission would invite precisely the sort of analytical
17 quagmire that is contrary to the provisions of the trigger tests in the *TRO*, and
18 contrary to the FCC's desire to fashion objective tests that are not subject to
19 delays caused by protracted administrative proceedings.
20 Moreover, the FCC specifically requires that there be *three* self-provisioning
21 CLECs in a market, rather than one or two. A smaller required number of
22 CLECs would also arguably demonstrate that entry is not impaired without
23 access to unbundled local switching, but the FCC chose to impose a higher
24 standard and a specific quantitative threshold. As I discussed in response to
25 Mr. Gillan, had the FCC wanted to add an additional quantitative threshold in

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1 addition to the one it articulated, it presumably would have done so explicitly
2 and not left it to argument and advocacy to determine what the test was in fact
3 meant to be. Dr. Staihr does not explain why, conceptually, it would be
4 appropriate to add an aggregate line test on top of the existing three-CLEC
5 requirement for the self-provisioning trigger. It is clear that none is called for
6 in the *TRO*.

7

8 Q. WHAT BASIS DOES DR. STAIHR CLAIM FOR HIS “*DE MINIMUS*” [SIC]
9 TEST?

10

11 A. Like Mr. Gillan, Dr. Staihr points to paragraph 438 of the *TRO* as being generally
12 supportive of a “*de minimus*” [sic] test. Dr. Staihr also points to paragraph 441
13 of the *TRO*. In reality, neither paragraph proposes or even mentions anything
14 about a *de minimis* or any other market-share test related to the self-
15 provisioning trigger. Instead, these paragraphs are found within a general
16 discussion mass-market competition and the hot cut process. In this
17 discussion, the FCC is arguing that there is considerable evidence of switch
18 deployment, but that the deployment primarily appears to serve enterprise
19 customers and does “not accurately depict the ability of an entering
20 competitive LEC to overcome the barriers to entry generated by the hot cut
21 process, and to serve the mass market using incumbent LEC loops.” (*TRO* ¶
22 439) Thus, in this discussion, the FCC addresses the issue of hot cuts, not
23 trigger candidates. The FCC does not mention trigger candidates at all in this
24 discussion. There is simply no reasonable basis for inferring anything about
25 triggers candidates from that discussion.

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1 Q. DOES DR. STAIHR PROVIDE ANY OTHER SUPPORT FOR HIS
2 PROPOSED “*DE MINIMIS*” TEST?

3

4 A. Dr. Staihr argues that the lack of a *de minimis* test would be contrary to situations
5 that the FCC seeks to avoid, such as CLECs serving (and intending to serve)
6 only a handful of mass-market customers. However, the need to discern the
7 “intentions” of CLECs is the type of ambiguity that the FCC sought to avoid in
8 fashioning bright-line rules for the triggers. (*TRO* ¶ 428, ¶ 498)

9

10 Q. DOES DR. BRYANT PROPOSE A “*DE MINIMIS*” TEST?

11

12 A. Yes. In response to BellSouth’s interrogatory 3-119 on this topic, Dr. Bryant
13 admits that he proposes such a test and cites to paragraph 499 of the *TRO*. In
14 that response, Dr. Bryant specifically points to the FCC’s statement that “. . .
15 the identified competitive switch providers should be actively providing voice
16 service to mass market customers in the market” as implying “that some
17 determination be made regarding the number of customers being served.”

18

19 Q. PLEASE COMMENT ON THE INTERPRETATION OF THE *TRO* AS
20 MADE BY DR. BRYANT.

21

22 A. Dr. Bryant’s proposal simply is not supported by the FCC’s statement. There
23 is no mention in that statement of customer counts, hurdles, market shares or
24 any other quantitative indicator of “active” provision of service. The FCC is
25 perfectly capable of making such quantitative requirements, but it did not.

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1 Indeed, a further reading of that general section of the *TRO* shows that the FCC
2 proposes a *qualitative* indicator of “active” provision of service. In footnote
3 1556, the FCC notes that “actively providing” can be determined by reviewing
4 whether the competitive switching provider has filed a notice to terminate
5 service in the market. Such an investigation should satisfy the Commission
6 that there is “active” provisioning of service, since in paragraph 500 of the
7 *TRO*, the FCC obliges states *not* to evaluate any other factors regarding CLEC
8 provisioning because, as the FCC notes, even carriers in Chapter 11
9 bankruptcy protection “are often still providing service.” The FCC’s
10 proscriptions would rule out open-ended requirements such as Dr. Bryant’s
11 proposal and the similar arguments made by Mr. Gillan (p. 8) and Dr. Staihr
12 (p. 40). Dr. Bryant’s attempt to bootstrap an additional rule is undermined, not
13 supported, by the section of the *TRO* that he identifies and his proposal should
14 be rejected as being inconsistent with the FCC’s desire for a bright-line test
15 that is designed to reduce administrative delay.

16
17 Q. SHOULD THIS COMMISSION CONSIDER ANY OF THESE
18 ARGUMENTS?

19
20 A. No. These arguments do not represent genuine proposals. Rather, they are
21 assertions of vague and unspecified steps that would compromise the bright-
22 line test that the FCC requires. In creating the triggers tests, the FCC
23 concluded that the thresholds that it created are “based on our agency
24 expertise, our interpretation of the record, and our desire to provide bright-line
25 rules to guide the state commission in implementing section 251.” (*TRO* ¶

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1 498) The FCC declined to create ambiguous thresholds that would result in
2 implementation issues and administrative delay.

3

4 Q. MR. GILLAN AND DR. STAIHR CONTEND THAT, IN CONDUCTING A
5 TRIGGERS ANALYSIS, THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN
6 “ENTERPRISE SWITCH” AND A “MASS MARKET SWITCH”. (GILLAN
7 DIRECT PP. 37-39; STAIHR DIRECT PP. 12-13). CAN YOU RESPOND
8 TO THAT?

9

10 A. Certainly. This contention is simply a distraction that the Commission should
11 reject. The actual rules refer only to “local switches” (for the self-provisioning
12 trigger) and “switches” (for the wholesale trigger). There is no distinction
13 between a so-called “enterprise” and “mass market” switch, despite Mr. Gillan
14 and Dr. Staihr suggestions to the contrary.

15

16 The text of the *TRO* is consistent with the rules – in the triggers analysis
17 portion of the text, the FCC does not make any distinction between or require
18 that a particular switch be dedicated solely to providing enterprise or mass
19 market switching. Contrary to these witnesses’ contentions, the language of
20 the *TRO* clearly contemplates that carriers will use a single switch or switches
21 to serve *both* enterprise *markets* and mass *markets*. This language is reflected
22 in the paragraphs Mr. Gillan relies upon in his testimony,

23

24 specifically, at ¶ 441 the FCC states:

25

1 For example, in order to enable a switch serving large enterprise
2 customers to serve mass market customers, competitive LECs *may*
3 need to purchase additional analog equipment, acquire additional
4 collocation space, and purchase additional cabling and power.
5 (Emphasis added).

6

7 Likewise, at ¶ 508:

8

9 We determine that to the extent that there are two wholesale providers
10 or three self-provisioners of switching serving the voice *enterprise*
11 market, and the state commission determines that these providers are
12 operationally and economically capable of serving the *mass* market,
13 this evidence must be given substantial weight by the state
14 commissions in evaluating impairment in the mass market. We find
15 that the existence of serving customers in the *enterprise* market to be a
16 significant indicator of the possibility of serving the mass market
17 because of the demonstrated scale and scope economies of serving
18 numerous customers in a wire center using a single switch. (Emphasis
19 in original.)

20

21 Clearly, the FCC expects carriers to use a single switch to serve customers in
22 both the enterprise and mass markets. While the FCC has precluded the use of
23 switches that serve *only* the enterprise market from qualifying for the triggers
24 analysis, it is ludicrous to exclude as triggers candidates switches that serve
25 *both* markets, which is the ultimate outcome of a competitive market. It would

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1 be equally absurd to engage in some type of capacity counting exercise, as
2 witness Staihr suggests, and try to allocate switch capacity between various
3 markets. The rules require only that the switches used to meet the triggers
4 analysis are serving either mass market customers or DS0 capacity loops and
5 any attempt to create additional requirements where none exist should be
6 rejected by this Commission.

BELLSOUTH'S HOT CUT PROCESS

7
8
9
10 Q. PLEASE ADDRESS MR. STAHLY'S COMMENTS ON PAGES 42-43,
11 CONCERNING BELLSOUTH'S PRICES FOR CONVERTING UNE-P
12 SERVICE TO UNE-L SERVICE.

13
14 A. Mr. Stahly says BellSouth's nonrecurring charge to convert UNE-P service to
15 UNE-L is "exorbitant" and estimates that the charge is 20 times more than the
16 actual cost to BellSouth. Like some other witnesses in this case, Mr. Stahly
17 wants this Commission to believe that a conversion to UNE-L is as
18 inexpensive as the conversion from BellSouth's retail service to UNE-P. Had
19 this been the case, however, the Commission would have set the UNE-L
20 nonrecurring charges in Docket No. 990649A-TP at the same level as the price
21 to convert retail services to UNE-P. Instead, the Commission recognized the
22 physical activity associated with provisioning a UNE-L to a CLEC's
23 collocation space and set a rate based on the cost of that activity. As Mr.
24 Stahly correctly points out, that rate is \$49.57 for the first loop and \$22.83 for
25 each additional loop on the same order. However, what Mr. Stahly regards as

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1 a further increase of the rate to \$51.09, citing a May 21, 2003 letter from
2 BellSouth simply reflects the inclusion of the \$1.52 electronic service ordering
3 charge approved by this Commission.

4
5 Mr. Stahly argues that such a nonrecurring rate is not contained in Supra's
6 interconnection agreement with BellSouth. He is incorrect. The applicable
7 rates for either installing a new UNE-L or converting retail service or UNE-P
8 service to UNE-L are the rates approved by this Commission in the UNE Cost
9 Docket (990649A-TP) and are set forth in the parties' interconnection
10 agreement. Moreover, although Supra was a party to the UNE Cost Docket,
11 Supra did not dispute the Commission's determination of cost-based rates in
12 that docket including the nonrecurring charges of \$49.57 and \$22.83 for
13 installation of first and additional UNE-L service in Florida. Finally, Supra
14 has made an identical claim at the FCC and thus should be barred from raising
15 it here.

16
17 Q. THE CLECS CITE TO THE FCC'S CONCLUSIONS ON THE HOT CUT
18 PROCESS AS EVIDENCE THAT BELLSOUTH'S HOT CUT PROCESS IS
19 FLAWED. IS THIS VALID?

20
21 A. No. The FCC's reasoning on hot cuts in the *TRO* is flawed. The FCC ignored
22 specific data, the same data upon which it relied in its 271 decisions, in favor
23 of vague, unreliable and out-of-date information. For example, the *TRO*
24 credited an AT&T assertion that, several years ago, it lost customers in several
25 states, including Texas and New York, because of hot cut difficulties.

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1 Conversely, the FCC rejected nearly identical claims made by AT&T when it
2 granted long-distance authority to Verizon and SBC in each of these states.
3 Since that time, the FCC has considered hot cut issues in all other 271
4 proceedings and has reached the same conclusion; that RBOCs are meeting
5 their 271 obligations. Thus, the FCC has granted their applications. However,
6 the FCC's analysis on this issue in the *TRO* was woefully inadequate, and its
7 conclusion that *all* RBOC hot cut processes are flawed should not be relied
8 upon by this Commission.

9
10 Q. AT&T WITNESS VAN DE WATER, AT PAGE 61, MCI WITNESS
11 WEBBER, AT PAGE 7, AND MCI WITNESS LICHTENBERG, AT PAGES
12 19-21, SUGGEST THAT THE HOT CUT PROCESS SHOULD MIRROR
13 THE SEAMLESS NATURE OF UNE-P MIGRATIONS AND PIC
14 CHANGES. DO YOU AGREE?

15
16 A. Absolutely not. To implement the scenario the CLECs advocate would require
17 as much as an \$8 billion region-wide investment on BellSouth's part. Neither
18 BellSouth nor any other RBOC can accomplish electronic loop provisioning
19 ("ELP") today with existing network architectures. Rather than discussing the
20 hot cut process applicable to the network that exists today, the CLECs are
21 talking about a process that might only be possible in an entirely new network.
22 BellSouth witness Gary Tennyson discusses the impact of the CLEC position
23 in detail.

24

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1 Q. MS. LICHTENBERG ALLEGES (PAGE 16) THAT THE FCC
2 "RECOGNIZED" THAT HOT CUTS MUST BE "AS SEAMLESS AND
3 TROUBLE-FREE AS THEY ARE WITH LONG-DISTANCE AND UNE-P."
4 IS SHE RIGHT?

5
6 A. No. In fact, the FCC found exactly the opposite when it flatly rejected
7 AT&T's ELP proposal. The FCC declared that to make the necessary system
8 changes called for by AT&T's ELP proposal "would require significant and
9 costly upgrades to the existing local network at both the remote terminal and
10 central office. AT&T's ELP proposal proposes to 'packetize' the entire public
11 switched telephone network for both voice and data traffic, at a cost one party
12 estimates to be more than \$100 billion. Incumbent LECs state that AT&T's
13 proposal would entail a fundamental change in the manner in which local
14 switches are provided and would require dramatic and extensive alterations to
15 the overall architecture of every incumbent LEC local telephone network.
16 Given our conclusion above, we decline to require ELP at this time..." (TRO ¶
17 491). This Commission should give ELP no more consideration than did the
18 FCC.

19
20 Q. MR. VAN DE WATER CONTENDS (AT PAGE 18) THAT THE RATE FOR
21 HOT CUTS SHOULD BE BASED ON ELECTRONIC LOOP
22 PROVISIONING. DO YOU AGREE? DID THE FCC AGREE?

23
24 A. No, I do not agree and neither did the FCC. As stated above, the FCC flatly
25 rejected AT&T's ELP proposal. The FCC directed state commissions to

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1 approve a batch cut process which it expects will be lower in cost than single
2 hot cut rates. BellSouth has developed such an offering. Mr. Van de Water
3 compares the rate BellSouth charges for PIC changes and UNE-P changes to
4 the rate for hot cuts. As noted above, such a comparison is inappropriate. The
5 cost incurred for PIC changes and UNE-P migrations are different than the cost
6 incurred to perform a hot cut of a UNE-L because the UNE-L hot cut requires
7 physical work. The Commission already has considered these facts and
8 established TELRIC hot cut rates.

9
10 Q. MR. STAHLY STATES (PAGE 39) THAT "BELLSOUTH HAS PROPOSED
11 A RATE OF MORE THAN \$50.00 TO SUPRA FOR A SINGLE CUT OVER.
12 WHILE I DO NOT OFFER A SPECIFIC PRICE POINT AT THIS TIME, I
13 SUSPECT THAT THE ACTUAL COST IS LESS THAN 5% OF
14 BELLSOUTH'S ACTUAL CHARGE." PLEASE RESPOND.

15
16 A. First, if Mr. Stahly is not proposing a specific price point "at this time," I
17 wonder at what time Mr. Stahly will introduce such a proposal. Second, a 95%
18 reduction would result in a per hot cut charge of \$5.00. Mr. Stahly offers no
19 process, no work times, no salary or wage calculations, no overhead
20 determinations, or anything else for that matter that might substantiate such a
21 rate.

22
23 Q. MR. WEBBER STATES (PAGE 25) THAT ONE OF THE REASONS ILECS
24 ARGUE AGAINST THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN AUTOMATED

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1 MIGRATION SYSTEM IS TO PRECLUDE THE GROWTH OF UNE-L.

2 DO YOU AGREE WITH HIS ASSESSMENT?

3

4 A. No, I do not agree. The creation of an automated UNE-L migration system
5 would be cost prohibitive for all carriers involved in interconnecting to the
6 network. Such a change would be a fundamental change in how the telephone
7 network processes information. The FCC recognized this when they rejected
8 AT&T's ELP proposal. Mr. Webber's argument that "the largest hindrance
9 with respect to these automated systems is one of incentive, not of technology"
10 is absolutely incorrect. As BellSouth witness Gary Tennyson describes,
11 moving to an automated system, one that is not in place today, would cost
12 billions of dollars to develop and would require deployment of equipment that
13 in many cases does not ever exist at commercially viable levels.

14

15 Q. ON PAGES 41-42, MR. TURNER ALLEGES THAT BELLSOUTH'S
16 FLORIDA HOT CUT CHARGES CONSTITUTE AN ECONOMIC
17 IMPAIRMENT TO UNE-L. ARE BELLSOUTH'S HOT CUT CHARGES
18 TELRIC-COMPLIANT AND COMMISSION-APPROVED?

19

20 A. Yes. This Commission approved the non-recurring charges for the elements
21 necessary for hot cuts in its UNE Cost Docket (Docket No. 990649).² When
22 the Commission released its order approving BellSouth's UNE rates (Order
23 No. PSC-01-1181-FOF-TP), AT&T had the opportunity to raise its concern

² The elements included in a hot cut are the type of loop (i.e., SL1, SL2, UCL), order coordination, electronic service order, and cross connects.

1 that nonrecurring charges constituted an economic impairment. While AT&T
2 did file a Motion for Reconsideration, there was no mention of a concern
3 relating to nonrecurring charges for UNE-Ls. Raising the argument now, as
4 AT&T and others have attempted to do, constitutes an untimely request for the
5 Commission to reconsider the rates they approved two years ago.

6
7 **OTHER ISSUES**

8
9 Q. MR. WEBBER, ON PAGE 59 OF HIS TESTIMONY, TRIES TO LINK THIS
10 COMMISSION'S DECISION ON SWITCHING WITH THIS
11 COMMISSION'S DECISION ON TRANSPORT. IS THAT
12 APPROPRIATE?

13
14 A. Absolutely not. This Commission has established a separate proceeding
15 (Docket No. 030852-TP) to determine impairment issues relating to UNE
16 Transport. Any issues that Mr. Webber wants to raise relating to UNE
17 Transport should be addressed in that proceeding, not this one.

18
19 Q. ON PAGE 44, MS. LICHTENBERG ARGUES THAT MCI IS ENTITLED
20 TO A "DUMP" OF THE ILEC DATABASES. HASN'T THIS ISSUE
21 ALREADY BEEN RAISED AND REJECTED?

22
23 A. Yes. In Docket No. 000649-TP, MCI raised this same issue during its
24 arbitration with BellSouth. In Order No. PSC-01-0824-FOF-TP, this
25 Commission determined that "BellSouth currently meets its obligation to

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1 provide unbundled access to its calling name (“CNAM”) database. WorldCom
2 has not demonstrated that it would be impaired if it did not have physical
3 custody of BellSouth’s CNAM database. Accordingly, we find that BellSouth
4 is not required to provide WorldCom the calling name database via electronic
5 download, magnetic tape, or via similar convenient media.

6

7 Q. ON PAGE 16 OF HIS TESTIMONY, MR. STAHLY STATES “USING UNE-
8 P OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS, SUPRA HAS BEEN ABLE TO SAVE
9 FLORIDA’S RESIDENTIAL TELEPHONE USERS CLOSE TO \$100
10 MILLION DOLLARS.” DO YOU AGREE WITH MR. STAHLY’S
11 STATEMENT?

12

13 A. While I have no reason to dispute Mr. Stahly’s statement, I must take issue
14 with the circumstances that enabled Supra to offer lower prices to its retail
15 customers. When a company refuses to pay portions of its suppliers’ bills it can
16 naturally afford to offer service to its retail customer at lower prices. As long
17 as Supra did not pay BellSouth for the services it obtained pursuant its
18 Interconnection Agreement, Supra was able to pass those “savings” along to its
19 end users. However, once the Federal judge handling Supra’s bankruptcy
20 proceeding ordered Supra to make weekly payments to BellSouth for those
21 services BellSouth provided after Supra’s voluntary bankruptcy filing, Supra
22 almost immediately raised the prices it charges its customers. See Supra’s
23 “Notice to Customers” posted on its website shortly before year-end 2002
24 regarding rate increases effective January 1, 2003. I have attached a copy of
25 Supra’s website notice to my testimony as Exhibit JAR-4.

1 Q. ON PAGE 16 OF HIS TESTIMONY, MR. STAHLY GOES ON TO STATE
2 "BELLSOUTH FURTHER ADDS INSULT TO INJURY BY OFFERING
3 LARGE DISCOUNTS AND CASH BACK OFFERS, WHICH NO CLEC
4 CAN MATCH, AND WHICH UNDERCUT THE DISCOUNTS AND CASH
5 BACK OFFERINGS CLECs CAN OFFER." DO YOU AGREE WITH MR.
6 STAHLY'S STATEMENT?

7
8 A. Of course not. As this Commission is aware, BellSouth must notify CLECs in
9 advance of any special promotions BellSouth will offer. That notification
10 allows CLECs to match or beat BellSouth's offer in the marketplace. More
11 importantly, Mr. Stahly once again offers not even one example to support his
12 view that CLECs cannot match BellSouth's retail offers.

13
14 Q. ON PAGE 2 OF HIS TESTIMONY, MR. STAHLY STATES "BELLSOUTH
15 SUCCESSFULLY RAN ADS OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS
16 DISPARAGING CLECs AS COMPANIES WITH UNRELIABLE
17 NETWORKS. TO WHAT ADVERTISEMENTS IS MR. STAHLY
18 REFERRING?

19
20 A. I don't know and he doesn't say. As with so much of his testimony, Mr.
21 Stahly is long on hyperbole and short on facts. BellSouth's policy is to not
22 disparage its CLEC customers and its advertisements follow that policy.

23

PUBLIC DISCLOSURE DOCUMENT

1 Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY?

2

3 A. Yes.

4

5

6 # 517730

7

1 BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.
2 SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF JOHN A. RUSCILLI
3 BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
4 DOCKET NO. 030851-TP
5 JANUARY 28, 2004
6

7 Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, YOUR POSITION WITH BELLSOUTH
8 TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. ("BELLSOUTH") AND YOUR BUSINESS
9 ADDRESS.
10

11 A. My name is John A. Ruscilli. I am employed by BellSouth as Senior Director --
12 Policy Implementation and Regulatory Compliance for the nine-state BellSouth
13 region. My business address is 675 West Peachtree Street, Atlanta, Georgia
14 30375.
15

16 Q. HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY FILED TESTIMONY IN THIS PROCEEDING?
17

18 A. Yes, I filed direct testimony and three exhibits on December 4, 2003 and rebuttal
19 testimony and one exhibit on January 7, 2004.
20

21 Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY AND HOW HAVE YOU
22 ORGANIZED IT?
23

24 A. My surrebuttal testimony addresses numerous comments contained in the rebuttal
25 testimony filed by other witnesses in this proceeding on January 7, 2004.

1

2

In the first section of my testimony, I make some general observations regarding the rebuttal testimony filed in this proceeding. I then walk through each step of the investigation that the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) asked the state commissions to undertake to determine whether CLECs are impaired without unbundled local switching – namely, in this proceeding established by the Florida Public Service Commission (“Commission”), to determine the definition of the geographical market and the mass market/enterprise crossover (Issues 1 and 2), the application of the triggers and potential deployment tests (Issues 4 and 5), and the approval of a batch cut process (Issue 3) – and discuss the remarks of other witnesses who have filed rebuttal testimony relevant to each issue. I highlight areas of agreement and summarize rationales for BellSouth’s positions where disagreement exists. More detailed arguments can be found in the testimonies of other BellSouth witnesses, who I will refer to as appropriate. As no one has presented meaningful rebuttal of my original discussion of Issue 6, the transitional use of unbundled switching, I do not discuss this topic further here.

17

18

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

19

20

Q. ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH THE REMARKS OF OTHER WITNESSES WHO HAVE FILED REBUTTAL TO BELLSOUTH’S DIRECT TESTIMONY?

21

22

23

A. Yes. I have studied the testimonies of the numerous witnesses who have filed rebuttal testimony in this proceeding, including that on behalf of AT&T, the FCCA, FDN, MCI, Sprint, Supra, and the Citizens of the State of Florida.

24

25

1

2 Q. WHAT IS YOUR GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE REBUTTAL
3 TESTIMONY?

4

5 A. I would make three general observations. First, there seems to be a general
6 tendency toward selective obfuscation. That is, although the FCC has left some
7 issues to the interpretation of this Commission, there are other issues – such as the
8 application of the triggers tests or the type of CLEC to be modeled in the potential
9 deployment test – on which the *TRO* is crystal clear. Although one would expect
10 there to be legitimate differences of opinion where interpretation is required, I
11 find an unfortunate tendency to cloud issues where clarity has been provided by
12 the FCC. As I will discuss below, Drs. Staihr, Johnson and Bryant and Messrs.
13 Gillan and Bradbury are all particularly prone to this, creating unnecessary
14 complication where none is required, presumably because they do not like the
15 clear direction given by the *TRO*.

16

17 Second, there seems to be substantial disagreement amongst the parties attacking
18 BellSouth's positions: some find BellSouth's suggested market definition too
19 small, others find it too large; some find the BACE model too sensitive to inputs,
20 others too insensitive; some claim that BellSouth has counted the wrong trigger
21 candidates, but then admit in other forums (notably the current appeal from the
22 FCC's *TRO* order pending in the courts) that these companies (the cable
23 companies) can be counted. To me, this lack of consensus supports my conviction
24 that in areas where judgments need to be made, and where legitimate differences

1 of opinion are therefore to be expected, BellSouth has proposed reasonable
2 middle-ground positions that this Commission can feel comfortable adopting.

3
4 Finally, there are several witnesses (e.g., Messrs. Wood and Gillan) who seek to
5 downplay the responsibility that this Commission has to determine where
6 impairment exists and where it does not. They imply that the *TRO*'s presumption
7 of impairment for mass-market switching based on aggregate, nationwide data
8 shuts the door to a finding of non-impairment based on data reflecting local
9 market conditions. In fact, nothing could be farther from the truth. The whole
10 point of devolving responsibility to the states is so that commissions such as this
11 one can use their knowledge to conduct the granular decision making that an
12 important issue such as this deserves. Indeed, as the FCC itself explained in their
13 brief to the DC Circuit Court of Appeals: "In making certain national findings of
14 impairment, the Commission also recognized that the record before it was not
15 sufficiently detailed to support the nuanced decisionmaking that *USTA* required.
16 To address those situations – involving, for example, local circuit switching, high
17 capacity local loops, and dedicated transport – the Commission enlisted state
18 commissions to gather and evaluate information relevant to impairment in their
19 states. These very specific delegations were reasonably designed to ensure
20 accurate and nuanced analyses of impairment on a market-specific basis." (Brief
21 for Respondent at 21, *USTA v. FCC*, Case No. 00-1012 (DC Cir.)) (Emphasis
22 added). Therefore, if one believes what the FCC has said, to suggest all this
23 Commission has to do is apply nationwide CLEC market share to local markets
24 (Gillan, pp.21-22) or that the potential deployment test is essentially irrelevant
25 (Wood, pp. 6-7) is clearly incorrect.

1

2

ISSUES 1 AND 2: MARKET DEFINITION

3

4 Q. WHAT IS BELLSOUTH'S POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE DEFINITION
5 OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL MARKET THAT SHOULD BE USED TO
6 EVALUATE IMPAIRMENT?

7

8 A. BellSouth has proposed the use of UNE rate zones that this Commission has
9 defined previously, subdivided into component economic areas ("CEAs") as
10 defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce. As
11 described in the direct, rebuttal, and surrebuttal testimonies of Dr. Christopher
12 Pleatsikas, this definition satisfies the multiple criteria laid out in the *TRO* and
13 results in economically meaningful "markets" in which to consider impairment.

14

15 Q. WHAT HAVE OTHER WITNESSES SUGGESTED IN THEIR REBUTTAL
16 TESTIMONY FOR THE GEOGRAPHICAL MARKET DEFINITION?

17

18 A. Mr. Gillan on behalf of the FCCA recommends that the entire service footprint, or
19 else the LATA, should be considered a market. Notwithstanding his client's
20 membership in the FCCA, on whose behalf Mr. Gillan testifies, Dr. Bryant, on
21 behalf of MCI, suggests that each individual customer represents the appropriate
22 economic market, although he concedes that a wire-center definition would be
23 administratively simpler. Dr. Staihr suggests MSAs combined with RSAs, Mr.
24 Nilson mentions retail rate centers, although he finally recommends wire centers,
25 and Dr. Johnson, on behalf of the Citizens of the State of Florida, recommends *ad*

1 *hoc* aggregations of wire centers that have “reasonably homogeneous [demand]
2 characteristics”. Although Mr. Bradbury is keen to defend wire centers as the
3 geographical unit of competition (pp. 22-23), another witness for AT&T has
4 suggested LATAs as the appropriate market definition in discovery. (AT&T
5 Response to Interrogatory No. 156.)

6

7 Q. HOW WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE THESE ALTERNATIVE POSITIONS?

8

9 A. Geographical market definition is one of those issues that supports my general
10 observation above: while Mr. Gillan and AT&T find BellSouth’s market
11 definition is too small, Messrs. Bryant, Staihr, and Nilson find it is too large, and
12 as Dr. Pleatsikas describes, Dr Johnson’s suggestion is logically impossible to
13 implement, which to me suggests BellSouth’s proposal may actually be just right.

14

15 Furthermore, it is interesting that the parties not only contradict each other, but
16 also appear to be contradicting themselves: MCI is arguing for a larger market
17 definition through the FCCA’s witness Mr. Gillan and a smaller definition
18 through its own witness, Dr. Bryant; AT&T is suggesting a LATA in discovery
19 (AT&T Response to Interrogatory No. 156), while its witness, Mr. Bradbury,
20 emphasizes that this Commission “must assure itself that UNE-L competition will
21 exist in every wirecenter.” Both MCI and AT&T have previously argued against
22 too small a geographical market definition because their switches can provide
23 service to a comparable area as BellSouth’s tandem switches (see Ruscilli
24 Rebuttal, p. 15), even though both are now defending individual wire centers as
25 the unit of meaningful competition (Bradbury, pp. 22-23, Bryant p. 43-51).

1

2 Q. WHAT SHOULD THE COMMISSION DECIDE IN THE FACE OF THESE
3 COMPETING ALTERNATIVES?

4

5 A. It is hardly surprising that many alternative definitions of the geographical market
6 have been propounded – this is an issue that has been left up to this Commission’s
7 judgment, and where, although I believe that UNE Zones cut by CEAs is the most
8 logical definition, there is likely no “right answer.” As Dr. Pleatsikas explains,
9 however, there are two definite “wrong answers,” both of which should obviously
10 be avoided. The first would be to define the whole State of Florida as a market;
11 the second would be to define every wire center within Florida as a market. Either
12 of these approaches would run afoul of *TRO* ¶ 495 (the former is too big, the latter
13 is too small). As long as the Commission steers between these two “icebergs,”
14 however, I believe its analysis will be reasonable.

15

16 Q. TURNING FROM THE GEOGRAPHICAL MARKET TO THE DEFINITION
17 OF “MASS MARKET,” WHAT IS THIS COMMISSION’S TASK?

18

19 A. The *TRO* (¶ 497) is quite clear on this point: “Some mass market customers (i.e.,
20 very small businesses) purchase multiple DS0s at a single location... Therefore as
21 part of the economic and operational analysis discussed below, a state must
22 determine the appropriate cut-off for multiline DS0 customers as part of its more
23 granular review.” The Commission’s task is no more and no less than to set a
24 number of DS0s below which a customer is classified as “mass market” and

1 above which it is classified as “enterprise” (and therefore no longer eligible for
2 unbundled switching, per *TRO* ¶ 419).

3

4 Q. WHAT IS BELLSOUTH’S POSITION REGARDING THE APPROPRIATE
5 CUTOFF?

6

7 A. As described in my direct Testimony (p.8), BellSouth has accepted the FCC
8 default delineation that customers with three or fewer CLEC DS0 lines serving
9 them should be deemed “mass market.” This position has also been tentatively
10 adopted by the Ohio PUC. (See *In the Matter of the Implementation of the*
11 *Federal Communications Commission’s Triennial Review Regarding Local*
12 *Circuit Switching in the Mass Market*, Case No. 03-2040-TP-COI, *Entry*, dated
13 October 2, 2003, p.5.)

14

15 Q. WHAT HAVE OTHER WITNESSES SUGGESTED IN THEIR REBUTTAL
16 TESTIMONY FOR THE CUTOFF?

17

18 A. On this issue, there is a lot of smoke, but not much in the way of concrete
19 suggestions. Mr. Gillan proposes a 12-line cutoff for BellSouth’s territory, and an
20 *ad hoc* definition for Verizon’s territory (although why the crossover should vary
21 by ILEC is not explained). Mr. Nilson variously suggests 6-8 lines (footnote 10,
22 p. 14), 5-6 lines (p. 52) and 10-12 lines (p. 53). Mr. Johnson agrees that “the FCC
23 adopted a cut-over of four lines” (p. 36) (contrary to Mr. Gillan, who claims that
24 they didn’t (p.17)) and correctly points out that the higher the cut-over is set, the
25 more customers are included in the “mass market” category, and so the more

1 likely it is that no mass-market impairment will be found. However, he then goes
2 on a somewhat bizarre tangent (pp. 38-47) in which – directly contradicting the
3 *TRO* as quoted above – he suggests that the “mass market” should be further
4 subdivided into “residential” and “small business” segments to which the triggers
5 tests should be applied independently (p. 46), or as an alternative, the cutoff
6 should be performed “on the basis of revenue per customer, or on the basis of
7 gross profit margin per customer (revenues minus direct costs), rather than purely
8 on the basis of the number of DS0 lines.”

9
10 Q. WHAT SHOULD THE COMMISSION DECIDE IN THE FACE OF THESE
11 COMPETING ALTERNATIVES?

12
13 A. Again, there is likely no “right” answer. Obviously, BellSouth believes its
14 position is a reasonable one and comes closest to assuaging Mr. Johnson’s
15 concern that “no other party in this proceeding has recognized the importance of
16 studying residential and small business customers separately,” (p.38) by staying
17 within the *TRO*’s mandate to include multiline DS0 customers while establishing
18 an explicit cutoff. On the other hand, raising the cutoff, as Mr. Gillan suggests,
19 only improves the chances of finding mass-market non-impairment, and so is not
20 unappealing to BellSouth. The only thing that I would propose this Commission
21 avoid is not following the clear guidance of the *TRO* and the FCC rule by failing
22 to come up with a single, clear cutoff point between “mass market” and
23 “enterprise” customer segments.

24

1 ISSUES 4 AND 5: THE TRIGGERS AND POTENTIAL

2 DEPLOYMENT TESTS

3

4 Q. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY THE “TRIGGERS AND POTENTIAL
5 DEPLOYMENT TESTS”?

6

7 A. Having defined the geographical markets and the “mass market” cutoff, the *TRO*
8 lays out a clear process by which this Commission should determine whether
9 impairment exists for local switching. All witnesses in this proceeding agree that
10 the Commission should examine each geographical market in turn, first applying
11 the “triggers tests,” which examine whether there is actual deployment of CLEC
12 switching on either a retail or wholesale basis, and then – if neither of those tests
13 are passed – the “potential deployment test,” which weighs evidence of actual
14 deployment, operational barriers, and economic barriers to determine whether
15 self-provisioning of facilities is potentially economic, even if it has not yet
16 occurred to the extent required to meet either of the triggers.

17

18 Q. LET US BEGIN WITH THE TRIGGERS TESTS. WHAT IS BELLSOUTH’S
19 INTERPRETATION OF THESE TESTS?

20

21 A. Actually, very little interpretation is required. The *TRO* is crystal clear about the
22 nature of these tests. Furthermore, BellSouth is not claiming that the wholesale
23 facilities trigger is met in any market at this time, which simplifies matters
24 because it means that this Commission only has to consider the self-provisioning
25 trigger. As it is easy to get lost in the lengthy, seemingly plausible, but in fact

1 mostly fictitious, “interpretations” of the trigger test presented by Drs. Staihr,
2 Johnson and Bryant and Messrs. Gillan, Nilson and Bradbury in their rebuttal
3 testimonies, let me quote *in its entirety* the FCC’s rule describing this test: “Local
4 switching self-provisioning trigger. To satisfy this trigger, a state commission
5 must find that three or more competing providers not affiliated with each other or
6 the incumbent LEC, including intermodal providers of service comparable in
7 quality to that of the incumbent LEC, each are serving mass market customers in
8 the particular market with the use of their own local switches.” (47 C.F.R. §
9 51.319 (d)(2)(iii)(A).)

10
11 Although BellSouth would prefer the trigger to be met with the presence of one or
12 two competing providers, the text is quite clear that three is the threshold.
13 Similarly, although many witnesses would prefer the trigger to be met only if
14 additional criteria – such as a *de minimis* threshold, or a requirement that every
15 customer in the market be served, or that trigger candidates have to use ILEC
16 loops and “mass market switches” (whatever those may be) are satisfied – the text
17 is quite clear that none of these additional standards have been imposed.

18
19 Ms. Pam Tipton further elaborates on these fictional criteria in her testimony, and
20 describes how, in contrast, BellSouth has simply applied the FCC’s
21 straightforward test to the markets that have been proposed. That is, in each
22 market BellSouth has counted how many competing providers – through their
23 own admission in discovery and BellSouth’s internal data – are serving mass-
24 market customers. In the markets where there are three or more competing
25 providers, the trigger has been met, and this Commission should immediately find

1 non-impairment. In the markets where there are fewer than three competing
2 providers, the trigger has not been met, and therefore, the Commission should
3 continue their examination to see if the markets pass the potential deployment
4 test.

5

6 Q. HOW HAS BELLSOUTH DEFINED “COMPETING PROVIDERS”?

7

8 A. BellSouth has been rather conservative in defining “competing providers.” For
9 example, despite the evidence in the *TRO* itself that “local services are widely
10 available through CMRS providers” (¶ 230), that CMRS providers are sufficiently
11 competitive with the incumbent LEC that they should qualify for UNEs (¶ 140),
12 and that CMRS is “growing as a...replacement for *primary* fixed voice wireline
13 service” (¶ 230), BellSouth chose not to challenge the FCC’s statement that “at
14 this time we do not expect state commissions to consider CMRS providers in their
15 application of the triggers” (fn. 1549). Similarly, BellSouth did not include
16 internet-based telephone providers, such as Vonage, as trigger candidates,
17 although internet-based telephone providers and CMRS providers are clearly a
18 growing presence and a direct and ubiquitous substitute for the incumbent LEC’s
19 voice service in Florida. (See Exhibit JAR-5.)

20

21 Eliminating these two categories of trigger candidates leaves only wireline
22 CLECs as included as “competing providers.” I should mention in passing that
23 BellSouth has of course included cable companies as trigger candidates – this is
24 contrary to the assertions of Mr. Nilson (pp. 36-38) and Mr. Bryant (pp.10-12),
25 but more importantly is consistent with the *TRO* and with the CLECs own

1 position in their DC Circuit brief where they state that “the FCC acknowledged
2 that its triggers may ‘count’ carriers like cable companies”. (Brief of CLEC
3 Petitioners and Intervenors, *USTA v. FCC*, Case No. 00-1012 (DC Cir), p. 37.)
4

5 Q. ON PAGE 39 OF HIS TESTIMONY, MR. NILSON SUGGESTS THAT
6 FUTURE MERGER ACTIVITY THAT RESULTS IN A REDUCTION IN THE
7 NUMBER OF LOCAL EXCHANGE CARRIERS IN A GIVEN MARKET
8 WOULD REQUIRE THE COMMISSION TO REVISIT WHETHER THE
9 TRIGGER HAD BEEN MET FOR THAT MARKET. DO YOU AGREE?
10

11 A. No. First, this point is well beyond the scope of this proceeding and outside of the
12 issues presented. This point anticipates what will happen in the future, after the
13 Commission has made a finding of “no impairment” in a market. However, even
14 with this said, Mr. Nilson’s point is simply wrong. The FCC has established the
15 triggers as the proof that CLECs can serve mass market customers without
16 unbundled switching. Once that proposition has been established by applying the
17 triggers, it is established regardless of whether three CLECs continue indefinitely
18 to provide service in that particular market. Subsequent merger activity has
19 absolutely no impact on this finding once it has been made.
20

21 Q. WITH RESPECT TO THE “POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENT” TEST, HOW
22 SHOULD THIS TEST BE APPLIED?
23

24 A. Although it is not quite as straightforward as the “bright-line” self-provisioning
25 trigger test, the potential deployment test is also well described in the *TRO*. In

1 markets where neither of the triggers tests has been met, this Commission needs
2 to examine three criteria: evidence of actual switching deployment, operational
3 barriers (such as the availability of collocation space and cross-connects), and
4 economic barriers. (47 C.F.R. § 51.319 (d)(2)(iii)(B)(1)-(3).) If, having weighed
5 these criteria, the Commission decides that self-provisioning of local switching
6 could be economic, then it should make a finding of non-impairment.

7

8 Q. HOW HAS BELLSOUTH APPLIED THIS TEST?

9

10 A. BellSouth has presented details regarding each of these three criteria: evidence of
11 actual switching deployment is described in the direct testimony of Ms. Tipton;
12 the lack of operational barriers is described in my direct testimony, pp.19-23, and
13 the assessment of economic barriers is discussed in the direct testimony of Dr.
14 Aron.

15

16 Q. WHAT HAVE OTHER WITNESSES SUGGESTED IN THEIR REBUTTAL
17 TESTIMONY REGARDING THE POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENT TEST?

18

19 A. The focus of other witness's rebuttal testimony has been on BellSouth's
20 assessment of the economic barriers. This assessment was based on the BACE
21 model, a detailed business case for a UNE-L CLEC entering the Florida market.
22 In sponsoring the BACE model, BellSouth has made an effort unparalleled by any
23 other carrier in the country to provide the Commission with a tool to assess
24 economic impairment in a way that meets the criteria laid out in the *TRO* (see for
25 example *TRO* ¶ 485 and the direct testimony of Mr. James Stegeman, pp. 6-18).

1 Indeed, no other party has even attempted to claim that the models they originally
2 presented in direct testimony are better suited to the task at hand. Unfortunately,
3 instead of engaging in a constructive debate about the BACE model, the rebuttal
4 testimonies of Drs. Staihr and Bryant and Messrs. Dickerson, Nilson, Webber,
5 Bradbury and Wood by and large satisfy themselves with making unfounded
6 attacks on the input parameters or superficial complaints about the structure of the
7 model. The former group of complaints is comprehensively dealt with in the
8 surrebuttal testimonies of Drs. Aron and Billingsley, who show that most of the
9 issues are the results of definitional misunderstandings or attempts to substitute
10 the months of documented research that the BellSouth witnesses have performed
11 regarding variables such as churn, cost of capital, and selling, general and
12 administrative (“SG&A”) costs, with offhand assumptions. The latter group of
13 complaints is handled in the surrebuttal testimonies of Messrs. Stegeman, Milner
14 and Gray, who demonstrate that none of the witnesses appear to have made a
15 good faith attempt to understand the model, with the result that many of their
16 alleged critiques are inaccurate and mutually contradictory.

17
18 I would urge this Commission to make use of the powerful tool that is the BACE
19 model. Contrary to the assertion of Mr. Wood that the potential deployment test
20 is essentially irrelevant because the absence of self-deployment “should eliminate
21 any question regarding the ability of CLECs to enter a market and successfully
22 compete for mass market customers is impaired without access to UNE local
23 circuit switching [sic]” (pp.6-7), the *TRO* lays out a detailed and thoughtful test
24 for state commissions to apply where the triggers are not met. So long as UNE-P
25 promotes artificial competition by distorting market prices and subsidizing

1 arbitrage players with no interest in making real investments in the state of
2 Florida, this test may be consumers' only hope of benefiting from real, facilities-
3 based competition and therefore deserves to be taken seriously.

4

5

ISSUE 3: BATCH CUTS

6

7 Q. ON PAGES 5-6 OF HIS TESTIMONY, MR. VAN DE WATER CLAIMS THAT
8 THIS COMMISSION CAN NOT RELY ON ITS 271 FINDINGS WITH
9 RESPECT TO THE HOT CUT PROCESS. HOW DO YOU RESPOND?

10

11 A. The FCC's decision not to rely on the objective hot cut performance data on
12 which it relied in at least forty-nine 271 cases to find that ILECs provide
13 nondiscriminatory access to loops is erroneous. This Commission should not
14 make the same error. It would make no sense for this Commission to ignore its
15 finding from a year ago that BellSouth has a 251/271-compliant hot cut process,
16 and then today, find that the process is unacceptable.

17

18 Moreover, even if this Commission does not rely solely on its 271 holding,
19 BellSouth's objective performance data should inform this Commission's
20 decision far more than the CLEC's uncorroborated and anecdotal evidence that
21 BellSouth's process "might not work." BellSouth's witnesses have presented a
22 seamless and efficient batch hot cut process, and have presented performance data
23 and a third party test that demonstrates its effectiveness. When weighed against
24 the CLECs' speculative musings, BellSouth's case is far more compelling. There
25 is no doubt that the Commission's findings in the 271 case should inform its

1 decision, but the Commission can, and should, adopt BellSouth's batch hot cut
2 process based on the evidentiary record in this case.

3

4 Q. MR. VAN DE WATER (PAGES 27-28) AND MR. GALLAGHER (PAGE 14)
5 CRITICIZE BELLSOUTH FOR NOT FILING THE COST STUDY YOU
6 MENTION IN YOUR TESTIMONY (RUSCILLI DIRECT, P. 18). IS A COST
7 STUDY RELEVANT TO THIS PROCEEDING?

8

9 A. No. The cost study BellSouth conducted of the batch hot cut process was done
10 using BellSouth's cost model with the inputs BellSouth contends are correct. The
11 estimated costs for the batch hot cut process were less than the original filed costs
12 for the standalone loop; however, they were still higher than the ordered loop
13 rates set by this Commission because of the adjustments made by the Commission
14 to the inputs. To account for the Commission's Order, BellSouth applied the
15 same adjustments and discounts that the Commission applied to BellSouth's filed
16 costs for the loop that established the individual hot cut rate to the estimated batch
17 hot cut rates. This resulted in the proposed batch hot cut rate being approximately
18 10% below the ordered loop rate. The rate is driven, therefore, not by BellSouth's
19 cost study so much as by the Commission's UNE Cost Order.

20

21 Q. MR. VAN DE WATER AND MR. NEPTUNE ARGUE THAT THE RATE
22 BELLSOUTH IS PROPOSING IS TOO HIGH. PLEASE COMMENT.

23

24 A. As I discussed in my rebuttal testimony, the rate BellSouth is proposing for the
25 batch hot cut process is a discount off the Commission-approved TELRIC-based

1 rates set forth by this Commission in the UNE Cost Proceeding, Docket No.
2 990649-TP, Order No. PSC-01-2051-FOF-TP. During the UNE Cost Proceeding,
3 this Commission engaged in a thorough, detailed analysis of the evidence (from
4 BellSouth and CLECs) regarding the proposed hot cut rates. At the conclusion of
5 the proceeding, this Commission ordered the nonrecurring rates for hot cuts with
6 modifications of certain inputs, as well as reductions to certain work times. As a
7 result, the Commission's established rate was substantially lower than what
8 BellSouth had proposed. Taking into consideration the already reduced hot cut
9 rates, BellSouth's additional 10% discount for the batch hot cut process is a true
10 cost-savings for CLECs.

11

12 Q. DID AT&T OR SUPRA PARTICIPATE IN THE UNE COST PROCEEDING?

13

14 A. AT&T did, Supra did not. However, AT&T never raised a concern about the
15 proposed hot cut costs. Even after the UNE Cost Order had been issued, AT&T
16 did not request the Commission to reconsider the rates established for hot cuts.
17 Now, some 2 ½ years after the fact, AT&T is attempting to request a modification
18 of the UNE Cost Order.

19

20 Q. MR. VAN DE WATER AND MR. NEPTUNE CONTINUE TO TRY AND
21 COMPARE A RETAIL TO UNE-P MIGRATION TO A RETAIL TO UNE-L
22 MIGRATION. IS SUCH A COMPARISON APPROPRIATE?

23

24 A. Absolutely not. As I explained in detail in my rebuttal testimony, the work
25 required to migrate a CLEC's service from UNE-P to UNE-L is much more

1 involved than converting retail service to UNE-P. The Commission has
2 recognized this fact in at least two ways. First, it established higher rates for hot
3 cuts than for conversions to UNE-P, recognizing the different work effort in each.
4 Second, it established different benchmarks and retail analogues for UNE-L
5 performance measures than for UNE-P performance measures. The fact that
6 UNE-L and UNE-P are different is no surprise to this Commission. Congress also
7 recognized the difference between UNE-L and UNE-P – it is simply the
8 difference between true facilities-based competition with the UNE-L and
9 synthetic competition with the UNE-P. The question for the Commission is not
10 whether UNE-P is the same as UNE-L, but rather whether an efficient CLEC can
11 economically enter the market without access to unbundled switching. Because
12 the answer to the second question, the correct question, is unequivocally “yes”,
13 the CLECs are trying to change the question.

14

15 Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?

16

17 A. Yes.

18

19 [#522525]

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21

Errata for John A. Ruscilli Direct Testimony filed 12/4/2003
Docket No. 030851-TP

1. On page 9, line 14, change "thirteen" to "twelve."
2. On page 9, line 15, change "thirteen" to "twelve."
3. On page 10, line 9, change "ten" to "nine" and change "eighteen" to "nineteen."
4. On page 10, line 13, change "ten" to "nine."
5. On page 24, line 7, change "23" to "21."
6. On page 25, line 8, change "23" to "21."
7. Replace Exhibit JAR-1 with Revised Exhibit JAR-1.
8. Replace Exhibit JAR-2 with Revised Exhibit JAR-2
9. Replace Exhibit JAR-3 with Revised Exhibit JAR-3

**Errata for
John A. Ruscilli Testimony
Filed in Florida Docket No. 030851-TP**

Direct – filed 12/4/03

1. On page 4, line 18, insert the words “that are unaffiliated with each other or the ILEC” after the word “customers”.
2. On page 4, line 20, insert the words “unaffiliated with each other or the ILEC” after the word CLECs.
3. On page 5, line 13, delete the word “approving” and insert “to approve and implement” before “such a batch process.”
4. On page 5, line 22, change “phases” to “phrases”
5. On page 17, line 15, insert “In paragraph 423, the FCC ordered ‘specifically, we ask the state commissions, within nine months of the effective date of this Order, to approve and implement a batch cut migration process – a seamless, low-cost process for transferring large volumes of mass market customers – or to issue detailed findings that a batch cut process is unnecessary in a particular market because incumbent LEC hot cut processes do not give rise to impairment in that market.’ Further in paragraph 474, ...”
6. On page 23, line 16, change “500” to “200”.

Rebuttal – filed 1/7/04

1. On page 25, line 12, delete “40” and insert “20-21”.
2. On page 32, line 18, delete “\$5.00” and replace it with “\$2.50”.
3. On page 35, line 5, add an end quotation at the end of the line, reading “media.”

Surrebuttal – filed 1/28/04

1. On page 6, line 25, insert “Direct” after “Bryant”.

1 MS. MAYS: The next BellSouth witness will be
2 Mr. James W. Stegeman. He has direct, surrebuttal and
3 supplement -- I'm sorry. He has direct, supplemental direct,
4 surrebuttal and supplemental testimony and an errata. We would
5 ask that all of those be admitted, and we would ask that his
6 exhibits be collectively identified as Exhibit 68.

7 CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Without objection, show the direct,
8 supplemental direct, surrebuttal and supplemental testimony of
9 Witness Stegeman, including errata, entered into the record as
10 though read, and accompanying exhibits marked as Composite 68.

11 (Exhibit 68 marked for identification.)
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1 **DIRECT TESTIMONY OF JAMES W. STEGEMAN**
2 **ON BEHALF OF BELL SOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.**
3 **BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION**
4 **DOCKET NUMBER 030851-TP**
5 **December 4, 2003**

6
7 **Section 1. INTRODUCTION**
8

9 **Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS AFFILIATION.**

10
11 A. My name is James W. Stegeman. I am the President of CostQuest Associates, Inc. I am
12 testifying on behalf of BellSouth Telecommunications (“BellSouth,” “BST,” or the
13 “Company”).
14

15 **Q. PLEASE OUTLINE YOUR EXPERIENCE AND QUALIFICATIONS.**

16
17 A. I have a Bachelors degree in Mathematics and Statistics and a Masters degree in Statistics
18 from Miami University, Oxford, Ohio. Previously I was employed with Merrell Dow
19 Research Institute, Cincinnati Bell Telephone, and INDETEC International. My work
20 has included statistical evaluation of data, training, cost estimation, and financial
21 analysis. I have developed systems and models to perform a variety of functions
22 including the following: cost estimation; competitive assessment; product profitability;
23 and budgeting.
24
25

1 **Q. WHAT IS YOUR ROLE IN THIS PROCEEDING?**

2

3 A. I led the design, development, and implementation of the BellSouth Analysis of
4 Competitive Entry (“BACE”) model that is being filed by BellSouth in this proceeding.

5

6 **Q. WHAT IS YOUR EXPERIENCE WITH MODELS DESIGNED TO ESTIMATE**
7 **THE PROFITABILITY/VIABILITY OF TELECOMMUNICATION PRODUCTS,**
8 **MARKETS, AND FIRMS?**

9

10 A. I was involved in the design, development, and implementation of numerous
11 telecommunication profitability systems used throughout the world (systems in Hong
12 Kong and the United States) including INDETEC’s CPMS and ProfitMap systems. In
13 fact, I just finished managing the design and implementation of a profitability model for a
14 U.S. based fiber overbuild company that sells bundled video, data and voice services.

15

16 **Q. DO YOU HAVE EXPERIENCE WITH MODELS DESIGNED TO ESTIMATE**
17 **THE COSTS OF TELEPHONE SERVICE AND ITS COMPONENTS?**

18

19 A. Yes. I designed, coded and implemented the BellSouth Telecommunication Loop Model
20 (BSTLM[®]) that was used in UNE proceedings in eight of the nine of BST’s states. I also
21 developed the CostPro Loop model that is being used in a number of states in the U.S.,
22 and the Cost Proxy Model (CPM) currently in use in California. I assisted in the design,
23 coding and implementation of the Benchmark Cost Proxy Model (BCPM). I designed the
24 Universal Service Cost model adopted for use in Hong Kong and more recently the
25 switching and transport portions of the universal service cost model used by the New

1 Zealand Commerce Commission. I led the development of the Australian Universal
2 Service Cost model, and consulted on the development of similar costing models in
3 Japan. I have also reviewed the HAI and HCPM models during their development.
4

5 **Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY IN THIS PROCEEDING?**

6
7 A. I describe the BellSouth Analysis of Competitive Entry (BACE) model (referred to as
8 “BACE” or “the model”). This includes an overview of the model development, the
9 basic approach employed in the model, the architecture, logic, and processing of the
10 model, the data required, and the model’s reporting capability. BellSouth witnesses
11 Dr. Aron and Dr. Billingsley, discuss various inputs into the model, the assumed CLEC
12 engineering used in the model and the model results. A copy of the model, which is
13 provided via CD, accompanies my testimony.
14

15 **Q. WHICH OF THE ISSUES IN THIS PROCEEDING DOES YOUR TESTIMONY**
16 **ADDRESS?**

17
18 A. My testimony addresses Issue 2, Market Definition. I specifically address subparts (b)
19 and (c) of issue 2, which relate to the variation in factors affecting CLEC’s ability to
20 serve customers and CLECs’ ability to target and serve specific markets profitably and
21 efficiently using currently available technologies. My testimony also addresses Issue 5,
22 Potential for Self-Provisioning of Local Switching. I address subparts (d) and (e) of Issue
23 5, which relate to potential economic barriers to CLEC entry and the markets in which
24 CLECs can economically self-provision local switching.
25

1 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE HOW YOUR TESTIMONY RELATES TO THE**
2 **FOREGOING ISSUES.**

3

4 A. My testimony focuses primarily on issues 2 (c) and 5 (e). At the conclusion of my
5 testimony, I describe how the BACE model is also relevant to issues 2 (b) and 5 (d).

6

7 **Q. BRIEFLY OUTLINE YOUR TESTIMONY.**

8

9 A. The major sections of my testimony discuss the following topics:

- 10 1) Introduction.
- 11 2) BACE background. This includes a discussion of why the model was built, the
12 nature of its development, and the fundamental approach employed by the model.
- 13 3) A discussion of how BACE is consistent with the FCC's TRO.
- 14 4) An overview of the model architecture, various processing steps, and a
15 description of some of the advantages of BACE.
- 16 5) An overview of the BACE data requirements.
- 17 6) A discussion of price calculation in BACE.
- 18 7) A discussion of quantity calculation in BACE.
- 19 8) A discussion of revenue calculation in BACE.
- 20 9) A discussion of cost calculation in BACE, including optimization steps.
- 21 10) A discussion of tax calculation in BACE.
- 22 11) A discussion of the reports obtained from BACE.
- 23 12) A discussion of the tests performed on the BACE model.
- 24 13) A description of how BACE relates to issues 2 (b) and 5 (d).

25

1 For convenience, I have provided a list of acronyms used in this testimony as Exhibit
2 JWS-1.

3
4 **Section 2: BACKGROUND**

5
6 **Q. WHY WAS BACE BUILT?**

7
8 A. In the proceedings leading up to the FCC's release of its Triennial Review Order (TRO)
9 BellSouth recognized that there would be a need for an economic model to determine if
10 and where Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs) would be impaired without
11 access to BellSouth's unbundled switching. As a result, they commissioned CostQuest
12 Associates to develop such a model.

13
14 **Q. WHAT IS THE BASIC APPROACH TO THE CALCULATION OF**
15 **IMPAIRMENT USED BY BACE?**

16
17 A. BACE provides a framework to determine whether a CLEC can economically provide
18 telecommunication-based service, without the ability to obtain unbundled switching from
19 the Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier (ILEC). BACE provides the framework to
20 estimate the revenues available to CLECs in a geographic market and the outlays, or
21 costs, CLECs will incur when providing services in that geographic market. The present
22 value of the CLEC costs are compared to the present value of the CLEC revenues for
23 specific geographic markets to determine the Net Present Value (NPV) of CLEC entry
24 for that market, using an appropriate network infrastructure. BellSouth witness Dr.

1 Debra Aron explains how a positive NPV for CLECs in the geographic market being
2 studied indicates an absence of impairment in that market.

3
4 **Q. HOW IS THE BACE MODEL DOCUMENTED?**

5
6 A. BACE has two forms of documentation, a Users Guide and a Methodology Manual. The
7 BACE Users Guide is designed to help the user install the software, examine and modify
8 study assumptions and produce output reports. The BACE Methodology Manual
9 discusses how BACE addresses applicable regulatory guidelines, follows standard
10 economic and business practices and calculates the cash inflows and outflows necessary
11 to determine NPV during the study horizon.

12
13 I have attached to my testimony the BACE Users Guide as Exhibit JWS - 2, and the
14 BACE Model Methodology Manual as Exhibit JWS - 3.

15
16 **Section 3: BACE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE TRO**

17
18 **Q. WHAT IS YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE ROLE OF AN ECONOMIC**
19 **MODEL IN ANY DECISION REGARDING WHETHER CLECS ARE**
20 **IMPAIRED WITHOUT ACCESS TO ILEC SWITCHING?**

21
22 A. My understanding is that state commissions are charged with considering three tests for
23 impairment due to lack of the switching UNE in mass markets. The first two tests are
24 “triggers” that involve an analysis of the existing levels of actual competition in relevant
25 markets. The third test is more complex and involves an analysis of the viability of

1 “potential deployment” where actual competition does not meet the “triggers” involved in
2 the first two tests. In essence, the third test involves a determination of whether the
3 absence of the switching UNE makes CLEC entry into a market uneconomic. As I
4 understand this third test, an evaluation of any operational barriers to CLEC entry in the
5 relevant geographic markets and an analysis of economic barriers must be made. BACE
6 assists in the evaluation of whether there are any economic barriers to CLEC entry in a
7 particular geographic market. All of these tests are discussed in the Triennial Review
8 Order “TRO” (FCC 03-36, released August, 21, 2003).

9
10 **Q. HOW DOES BACE RELATE TO THE TWO SWITCHING TRIGGERS**
11 **IDENTIFIED BY THE FCC IN THE TRO?**

12
13 **A.** BACE is not tied to the FCC’s triggers tests. Instead, BACE is used in addressing the
14 FCC’s “potential deployment” analysis when examining a geographic market where the
15 FCC’s triggers do not lead to a required finding of no impairment. BACE allows the user
16 to determine whether CLEC entry is uneconomic without access to the switching UNE,
17 regardless of the triggers tests for impairment.

18
19 For ease of discussion, I will generally use the phrases impairment, or modeling
20 impairment, to refer to the third test for impairment (for uneconomic CLEC entry) and
21 not to the two triggers tests.

1 **Q. DOES THE TRO PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR STATE COMMISSIONS IN**
2 **CONSIDERING UNECONOMIC ENTRY IN THE ABSENCE OF THE**
3 **SWITCHING UNE FOR THE MASS MARKET?**

4
5 A. Yes. While the TRO does not provide strict criteria, it does provide guidance in
6 paragraphs 517-520. These paragraphs include the following headings: Evidence of
7 Whether Entry is Economic (§ 517); Potential Revenues (§ 518); and Potential Costs (§
8 520). Other relevant language exists at paragraphs 472, 485, and 495.

9
10 **Q. IN ORDER TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE TRO, WHAT ARE THE MAJOR**
11 **CHARACTERISTICS OF AN ECONOMIC MODEL TO BE USED TO**
12 **EVALUATE CLEC ENTRY?**

13
14 A. While I am not a lawyer and am not attempting to offer a legal opinion, my team has
15 reviewed the order to understand what guidance the FCC has provided. Based on this
16 reading, my familiarity with the FCC's past work involving modeling, and my familiarity
17 with the requirements that the FCC has imposed on modeling over time, certain
18 characteristics appear to be the basic building blocks that the FCC requires for an
19 economic model that examines impairment. These characteristics are as follows: 1) The
20 model must be capable of granular analysis; 2) the model must allow inputs consistent
21 with an efficient CLEC business model and efficient CLEC network architecture; 3) the
22 model must incorporate all likely CLEC revenues and costs; and 4) the model must
23 perform a business case analysis using Net Present Value (NPV) calculations.

24

1 **Q. WITH RESPECT TO THE FIRST CHARACTERISTIC OF A MODEL,**
2 **GRANULARITY, WHAT GUIDANCE DOES THE TRO PROVIDE WITH**
3 **RESPECT TO AN ANALYSIS OF IMPAIRMENT?**

4
5 A. The TRO notes the importance of granular analysis at several points. For example at ¶
6 472 the FCC said “[w]e find that technical shortcomings in each of these studies [those
7 studies filed previously with the FCC] preclude us from relying on their results to
8 evaluate impairment at the national level. These shortcomings include...(2) insufficient
9 granularity in their analyses.” (emphasis added). Also, at ¶ 485 the FCC stated “[a]ll of
10 these studies...strongly support the need for a more granular analysis of impairment. We
11 have insufficient evidence in the record, however, to conduct this granular analysis. Such
12 an analysis would require complete information about UNE rates, retail rates, other
13 revenue opportunities, wire center sizes, equipment costs, and other overhead and
14 marketing costs. ... That market-specific data is needed is indicated by the significant
15 variation in the costs and revenues an efficient entrant is likely to face. For example,
16 costs appear to vary significantly among locations and types of customers.” (emphasis
17 added). Likewise, at ¶ 99 the FCC noted “[w]e will also give consideration to cost
18 studies, business case analyses, and modeling if they provide evidence at a granular level
19 concerning the ability of competitors to economically serve the market without the UNE
20 in question.” (emphasis added).

21
22 Finally, at ¶ 495 the FCC stated “[r]ather, state commissions must define each market on
23 a granular level, and in doing so they must take into consideration the locations of
24 customers actually being served (if any) by competitors, the variation in factors affecting
25 competitors’ ability to serve each group of customers, and competitors’ ability to target

1 and serve specific markets economically and efficiently using currently available
 2 technologies.” (emphasis added).

3
 4
 5 **Q. CONCERNING THE SECOND CHARACTERISTIC OF A MODEL, WHAT**
 6 **GUIDANCE DOES THE TRO PROVIDE WITH RESPECT TO AN EFFICIENT**
 7 **CLEC BUSINESS MODEL AND AN EFFICIENT CLEC NETWORK**
 8 **ARCHITECTURE?**

9
 10 A. At ¶ 517, the FCC found that “[s]pecifically, state commissions must determine whether
 11 entry is likely to be economic utilizing the most efficient network architecture available
 12 to an entrant. ... The analysis must be based on the most efficient business model for
 13 entry rather than to any particular carrier’s business model.” (emphasis added). At
 14 footnote 1579, the FCC said: “State Commissions should determine if entry is economic
 15 by conducting a business case analysis for an efficient entrant.” (emphasis added).
 16 Moreover at ¶ 495 the FCC said: “ ... competitors’ ability to target and serve specific
 17 markets economically and efficiently using currently available technologies.” (emphasis
 18 added).

19
 20 **Q. TURNING TO THE THIRD CHARACTERISTIC OF A MODEL, WHAT**
 21 **GUIDANCE DOES THE TRO PROVIDE WITH RESPECT TO**
 22 **INCORPORATING ALL LIKELY CLEC COSTS AND REVENUES?**

23
 24 A. The TRO provides at ¶ 517 that “[i]n considering whether a competing carrier could
 25 economically serve the market without access to the incumbent’s switch, the state

1 commission must also consider the likely revenues and costs associated with local wire
 2 center mass market service, as detailed below.” (emphasis added). Thereafter, at footnote
 3 1581, the TRO provides “[u]nlike in the *UNE Remand Order*, we do not intend that the
 4 availability of any UNE at state established wholesale (TELRIC) rates could by itself
 5 constitute impairment without considering all costs and revenues in a business case
 6 analysis.” (emphasis added).

7
 8 Also, the Final Rules, set forth in Appendix B, CFR § 51.319(d)(2)(iii)(B)(3), states
 9 “[s]pecifically, the state commission shall examine whether the costs of migrating
 10 incumbent LEC loops to requesting telecommunications carriers’ switches or the costs of
 11 backhauling voice circuits to requesting telecommunications carriers’ switches from the
 12 end offices serving their end users render entry uneconomic for requesting
 13 telecommunications carriers.” (emphasis added).

14
 15 **Q. DOES THE TRO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL DETAIL WITH RESPECT TO**
 16 **INCORPORATING ALL LIKELY CLEC REVENUES?**

17
 18 A. Yes. At ¶ 519 the TRO states “... [i]n determining the likely revenues available to a
 19 competing carrier in a given market, the state commission must consider all revenues that
 20 will derive from service to the mass market, based on the most efficient business model
 21 for entry. These potential revenues include those associated with providing voice
 22 services, including (but not restricted to) the basic retail price charged to the customer,
 23 the sale of vertical features, universal service payments, access charges, subscriber line
 24 charges, and, if any, toll revenues. The state must also consider the revenues a competitor

1 is likely to obtain from using its facilities for providing data and long distance services
2 and from serving business customers.” (italics in the original, underline added).

3
4
5 **Q. DOES THE TRO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL DETAIL WITH RESPECT TO**
6 **INCORPORATING ALL LIKELY CLEC COSTS?**

7
8 A. Yes. At ¶ 520 the TRO provides under the heading, *Potential Costs*, that “[s]imilarly, the
9 state must consider all factors affecting the costs faced by a competitor providing local
10 wire center service to the mass market. If the state commission determines that a UNE-L
11 strategy is the most efficient means of serving the customer, these costs would likely
12 include (among others): the cost of purchasing and installing a switch; the recurring and
13 non-recurring charges paid to the incumbent LEC for loops, collocations, transport, hot
14 cuts, OSS, signaling, and other services and equipment necessary to access the loop; the
15 cost of collocation and equipment necessary to serve local wire center customers in a
16 wire center, taking into consideration an entrant’s likely market share, the scale
17 economies inherent to serving a wire center, and the line density of the wire center; the
18 cost of backhauling the local traffic to the competitor’s switch; other costs associated with
19 transferring the customer’s service over to the competitor; the impact of churn on the cost
20 of customer acquisitions; the cost of maintenance, operations, and other administrative
21 activities; and the competitors’ capital costs. State commissions should pay particular
22 attention to the impact of migration and backhaul costs on competitors’ ability to serve
23 the market. ...”

24

1 **Q. TURNING TO THE FOURTH AND FINAL CHARACTERISTIC OF A MODEL,**
2 **WHAT GUIDANCE DOES THE TRO PROVIDE WITH RESPECT TO A**
3 **BUSINESS CASE ANALYSIS?**

4
5 A. The TRO uses the phrase “business case analysis[analyses]” at several points, including
6 footnote 1579. This phrase was also used in citations in the preceding three questions
7 and answers. Similarly, at footnote 1579, the TRO states “...[e]ven if interconnection
8 and unbundling are performed as efficiently as is technically feasible, these costs must
9 still be considered in our business case analysis to determine whether entry is
10 uneconomic without access to a particular network element.” (emphasis added).

11
12 **Q. WHAT GUIDANCE DOES THE TRO PROVIDE WITH RESPECT TO THE USE**
13 **OF NET PRESENT VALUE (NPV)?**

14
15 A. At footnote 260, the following language is included: “... Stated in more technical terms,
16 the condition [of a firm entering the market, and hence no-impairment] is whether the net
17 present value of the expected economic profit is positive.” (emphasis added).

18
19 **Q. IS BACE’S APPROACH TO DETERMINING IMPAIRMENT CONSISTENT**
20 **WITH THE TRO?**

21
22 A. Yes. BACE was developed to determine whether CLEC entry is economic in the absence
23 of the switching UNE. In creating BACE, BellSouth was keenly aware of the FCC’s
24 finding of prior modeling deficiencies and of the needs and requirements of an
25 impairment model in meeting a state commission’s need to implement the TRO.

1 **Q. IS BACE GRANULAR IN ITS APPROACH?**

2

3 A. Yes, BACE is very granular in its approach. The model allows the user to input complete
4 information about UNE rates, retail rates and other revenue opportunities specific to each
5 wire center. BACE allows variations in product offerings and prices across five customer
6 segments (residential and four business segments) and by customer-spend categories
7 within each customer segment. The model provides for bundles of product and service
8 offerings and price discounts. In addition, BACE identifies the specific operational and
9 capital cost requirements of the CLEC in rolling out its network. Finally, cost and
10 revenue information is developed at the wire center level, thereby allowing the user to
11 roll the results up to any geographic level. The current geographic levels of analysis
12 possible include:

- 13 a. LATAs;
- 14 b. Wire centers;
- 15 c. MSAs (Metropolitan Statistical Areas), as defined in 1990 and used in the FCC's
16 special access decision);
- 17 d. MCSAs (Micropolitan Statistical Areas), as defined in 2003 by the OMB in its
18 definition of MSAs and MCSAs);
- 19 e. CEAs (Component Economic Area);
- 20 f. UNE Zones; and
- 21 g. Any combination of the above.

22

23

1 **Q. DOES BACE ALLOW THE USER TO EMPLOY INPUTS AND CHOICES THAT**
2 **ARE CONSISTENT WITH AN EFFICIENT CLEC BUSINESS MODEL AND**
3 **EFFICIENT CLEC ARCHITECTURE?**

4
5 A. Yes. BACE provides user adjustable toggles and user input choices that are consistent
6 with an efficient CLEC business model and an efficient CLEC architecture. For
7 example, the model allows for least-cost choices of architecture (e.g., EELs or
8 collocation); concentrates traffic to take advantage of cost savings; determines whether
9 DSL offerings are economic; and determines whether entry into a geographic market
10 and/or LATA is efficient using a business case analysis approach.

11
12 For reasons of practicality, the user of the model cannot consider every possible network
13 architecture, potential product offerings, or business plan approach that a CLEC might
14 choose. However, the purpose of the model is to replicate the business plan and
15 architecture of an efficient CLEC. The model was built to allow the user to enter markets
16 selectively and control the major choices and architectures available to a CLEC.

17
18 **Q. DOES BACE HAVE THE ABILITY TO REFLECT THE EFFICIENT USE OF**
19 **CURRENTLY AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGIES?**

20
21 A. Yes. In developing BACE, my team designed the platform to accommodate numerous
22 potential network inputs to allow the user to deploy an efficient CLEC network
23 architecture. In creating this model approach, I relied upon network specialists from
24 BellSouth to provide a description of the specific network components required for a
25 CLEC to provide the modeled services, using currently available technologies. This

1 includes both CLEC capital investments (e.g., cash outlays for switches) and the use of
2 unbundled network elements and wholesale services/components. This assumed network
3 architecture is described in more detail in the testimony of BellSouth witness Mr. Keith
4 Milner.

5
6 **Q. DOES BACE ALLOW THE USER TO CONSIDER ALL CLEC REVENUES AND**
7 **COSTS?**

8
9 A. BACE is designed to let the user capture all CLEC costs including those capital outlays
10 for CLEC-owned investments and the major sources of CLEC revenues, including: local
11 service; vertical features; voice mail; long distance and switched access, data services
12 including Digital Subscriber Line (DSL); line maintenance; service
13 connection/installation; directory assistance; and data services. I would note, however,
14 that BACE does not consider video services, programming or other services that a CLEC
15 may offer and which may generate an additional value for the CLEC. Also, to the extent
16 that a CLEC might create some brand new service that might generate additional
17 revenues, such revenues would not be included in the model, but such products and
18 revenues should improve the CLEC's ability to enter a market even further. Nonetheless,
19 the services that are currently modeled in BACE are likely to represent the great majority
20 of the services that CLECs will offer and that have been outlined in the TRO.

21
22
23
24

1 **Q. DOES BACE PROVIDE A PLATFORM FOR A BUSINESS CASE ANALYSIS OF**
2 **THE CLEC ENTRY DECISION?**

3

4 A. Yes. BACE was specifically designed to evaluate whether CLEC entry is economic for
5 user-defined markets, using a business case analysis approach. The model considers
6 prices, market penetrations, and costs by market segment, by geography and by year.
7 The potential for bundling of services is considered, as are opportunities for CLECs to
8 make rational choices about their footprint by not serving some geographic areas and
9 choosing between service approaches (EELs or collocation).
10 Moreover, BACE uses a discounted cash flow approach in evaluating the cash outflows
11 (costs) and cash inflows (revenues) over time. Tax liabilities are also estimated and the
12 final cash flows are discounted to net present value. In addition to the NPV calculations,
13 BACE also provides estimates of accounting net income and cash flow over time. In
14 total, the model provides the framework to perform a reasonable business case analysis
15 for evaluating a CLEC entry decision.

16

17 **Q. HOW DOES BACE PERFORM NET PRESENT VALUE CALCULATIONS?**

18

19 A. The Net Present Value of a stream of cash flows is the difference between the present
20 value of the cash inflows and the present value of the cash outflows. In other words,
21 $NPV = PV_{\text{inflows}} - PV_{\text{outflows}}$. The Present Value (PV) of a cash flow is today's value of a
22 cash in-flow (or out-flow) received (or paid) at some time in the future. Present Value
23 takes into account the effects of the time value of money (which is reflected in the
24 interest rate or discount rate). Present Value is calculated by applying the discount rate to
25 the cash flow. In other words, $PV = \text{Future Value} / (1+i)^t$, where i is the annual interest rate

1 (discount rate) and t is the number of annual periods. BACE calculates the discount rate i
2 from user adjustable inputs. The annual periods in BACE are based upon a mid-year
3 convention. That is, any cash transaction (e.g., an expenditure) that occurs during each
4 year is assumed to occur, for present value purposes, at the mid point of the company's
5 fiscal year. The exception to this rule is that BACE assumes that all initial start-up costs
6 are assumed to occur at time zero and therefore require no present value adjustment.

7
8
9 **Section 4: OVERVIEW OF THE MODEL ARCHITECTURE, VARIOUS PROCESSING**
10 **STEPS, AND A DESCRIPTION OF SOME OF THE ADVANTAGES OF BACE**

11
12 **Q. WHAT CLEC CHARACTERISTICS AND RELATED FACTORS DOES BACE**
13 **TAKE INTO ACCOUNT?**

14
15 A. The model accounts for the following CLEC characteristics and related factors:

16
17 CLEC Size – recognizing that there are different sizes of CLECs, the model accounts for
18 the key implications of the CLEC's size (e.g., impact on purchasing power, cost
19 implications of outsourcing certain functions, etc.).

20
21 Customers – the model accounts for how many customers in total reside in the relevant
22 markets, how many customers the CLEC might expect to serve (i.e., the CLEC market
23 share), and the types of customers the CLEC will attract (e.g., what types and sizes of
24 customers, and what products and services will they buy). It also accounts for how much
25 customers will pay and the level of customer churn that may be experienced.

1 Products – the model accounts for the typical products the CLEC might offer, how those
2 products may be bundled, and the implications of bundling on prices and customer take
3 rates.

4
5 Quantities – the model accounts for the quantities of products to be sold to those
6 customers choosing CLEC service.

7
8 Pricing – the model develops initial prices using user inputs, initial CLEC price discounts
9 and product price changes over time.

10
11 Network Costs – the model accounts for the network infrastructure requirements specific
12 to the markets, customer profiles, and product portfolios being modeled and how those
13 network requirements might be met (e.g., lease or own).

14
15 Operational Costs – the model accounts for the nature and level of CLEC operating costs
16 allowing for effects due to the size of the modeled CLEC.

17
18 Trends – the model accounts for the changes that might be experienced over a ten-year
19 period (e.g., customer buying behavior trends, pricing trends, and cost trends).

20
21 Optimization – the model allows the user to assume that the CLEC management team
22 will use reasonable judgment and as such may decide not to serve unprofitable products
23 and markets. The user can control the degree to which a CLEC could/would identify
24 unprofitable sub-markets and avoid service in such sub-markets.

25

1 Sensitivity of Assumptions – the model allows the user to create scenarios and analyze
2 the impact of assumptions upon the financial metrics of impairment. Within the
3 components (and inputs) outlined above, the BACE model computes a) the CLEC market
4 share achieved (i.e., percentage of products purchased by market segment, by territory),
5 b) the resulting revenue (including the impact of product bundling), and c) the network
6 and operational costs incurred in serving the market (considering the implications of
7 CLEC size).

8
9 The model allows the inputs and assumptions to change over a ten-year period as the
10 CLEC grows, costs change, and as anticipated price trends are realized. The results are
11 presented in terms of the anticipated cash flows for the ten-year period and the associated
12 net present value calculated from the user adjustable discount rate.

13
14 **Q. WOULD YOU PLEASE PROVIDE A BASIC OVERVIEW OF THE MODEL**
15 **AND ITS ARCHITECTURE?**

16
17 A. Yes. First, BACE allows the user to identify which products and services the CLEC will
18 choose to offer. Second, BACE develops a price for products or groups of products
19 (bundles) for each customer segment. This is the task of the “P-Process” within the
20 model. Third, after the price has been established, a quantity demanded for each service
21 or group of services in each wire center must be calculated. I will generally refer to
22 “demand” to mean the quantity demanded and actually sold. This is the task of the “Q-
23 Process” within the model.

24

1 Fourth, knowing the Price (P) and Quantity Demanded (Q) of each service or group of
2 services, BACE can derive the total Revenue (P*Q) by product, location, and customer
3 segment (and customer-spend sub-segment). Calculating the Revenue is the task of the
4 “R-Process.” Knowing the Gross Revenue available to the firm represents the total cash
5 inflow for the period.

6
7 Fifth, cash outflows are calculated in the Operations and Network Process (“ON-
8 Process”). This process is dependent upon the outputs of the P, Q, and R processes. The
9 O portion of the ON-Process derives those expenses that are operationally associated with
10 the firm. For example Sales, General and Administrative (SG&A), is an operational
11 expense. The N portion of the ON-Process derives those outflows necessary to create a
12 network sufficient to handle the voice and data traffic identified in the Quantity Process.
13 In other words, the cash expenditures involved with setting up, maintaining and growing
14 the telecommunications network.

15
16 Sixth, six optimization routines provide the opportunity to drop negative NPV products
17 and geographic areas (three of which can be toggled on/off by the user).

18
19 Seventh, income taxes are determined based on the year-by-year income and expenses of
20 the modeled firm. These tax calculations allow for various treatment of tax losses and
21 allow the user to input state-specific tax rates.

22
23 Eighth, output reports are generated reflecting NPV by geographic entity, and/or
24 accounting-like net income statements.

25

1 Q. CAN YOU PLEASE PROVIDE A VISUAL REPRESENTATION OF THE
2 MODEL ARCHETECTURE?


3

4 A. Yes, the table below provides a visual representation of the BACE architecture:

5

6 **SIMPLIFIED PROCESS FLOW**

7



1 **Q. HOW IS USER INPUT AND PROCESSED OUTPUT DATA STORED AND**
2 **UTILIZED IN BACE?**

3

4 A. BACE retrieves and stores all input and output data in a consistent and logical format. Input
5 and processed data are stored as a scenario database. Each scenario is a Microsoft Access
6 database stored in a like-named folder within the scenario directory. Report data are stored in
7 the same directory. Reports are created as either Microsoft Excel worksheet files or Excel
8 compatible, comma separated variables (CSV) files.

9

10 **Q. HOW DOES BACE ORGANIZE THE STUDY DATA?**

11

12 A. BACE organizes study data in two ways: Scenarios and Inputs. A named collection of all
13 Inputs used in a study is called a Scenario. The Scenario is the large-scale way of storing
14 all study assumptions and inputs. Within a Scenario there are a series of tables used to
15 manage individual inputs. Inputs are logically grouped and displayed within a table
16 structure. Common tables are organized into groups. Data can be reviewed and managed
17 manually or via a user-friendly wizard.

18

19 **Q. IS THERE A HIERARCHY AMONG DATA COMPONENTS?**

20

21 A. Yes, BACE uses four sets of hierarchies to drive cash flow calculations and reporting:
22 location, customer, product, and cost. Hierarchies are necessary to allow the user to
23 define, at a particular level, specifically how a cost or revenue is triggered (e.g., by line,
24 minute, or initial provision of service in a LATA). The use of hierarchies allows cost and

1 revenue drivers to be set and output structured in a way as to make the cost and revenue
2 implications of these actions clear and traceable to levels at which reporting will occur.

3
4 The location hierarchy is used to specify from broad levels of geography to narrow
5 levels. The reason the location hierarchy is important is that certain costs are location
6 specific, e.g., a switch placed in a LATA. The customer hierarchy allows the user to
7 trigger certain costs or revenues based upon specific attributes of customer classes or
8 segments. For example certain costs should be attributed a business customer (equipment
9 to provide DS1 data service rather than DSL) but not a residential customer. The product
10 hierarchy is similarly designed. It allows granular identification of products. And
11 finally, the cost hierarchy is designed to let the user input a logical structure of the inputs
12 that in turn flow to a logical structure in the reporting output.

13
14 **Q. WHAT ARE SOME OF THE KEY ADVANTAGES OF BACE?**

15
16 A. Many of the key advantages of BACE correspond to the characteristics that make BACE
17 consistent with the FCC's TRO; BACE: 1) is granular in its analysis; 2) allows the user to
18 provide inputs consistent with an efficient CLEC business model and architecture; 3)
19 incorporates likely CLEC revenues and costs; and 4) performs a business case analysis
20 using net present value.

21
22 Many of the other advantages of BACE are embodied in the abilities of the model that the
23 user can decide to use (or not use) and the degree of control the user has over the inputs
24 and the impairment analysis. The user can adjust, control, and consider (or not consider)
25 the following factors (not an exhaustive list): 1) prices, 2) market penetration, 3) cost

1 levels, 4) cost drivers (i.e., how costs are assigned); 5) whether some forms of
2 optimization will occur; 6) whether to use a wizard or perform calculations “manually”
3 (i.e., without the wizard); 7) the types of reports generated; 8) consider NPV and/or
4 accounting metrics; 9) trends in many of the factors above over time; and 10) size and
5 scope of the CLECs operations.

6
7 Another advantage of BACE is that it uses a scenario structure to allow the user to bundle
8 assumptions together into a scenario that identifies the inputs and outputs that correspond
9 with one another. By maintaining a separate inputs database and reporting structure for
10 each scenario, BACE simplifies what-if analysis and sensitivity tests.

11
12 **Section 5: OVERVIEW OF THE BACE DATA REQUIREMENTS.**

13
14 **Q. WHAT TYPES OF DATA DOES BACE USE?**

15
16 A. BACE uses five broad categories of data: 1) customer, 2) products and services, 3) price,
17 4) quantity, 5) CLEC properties; and 6) cost.

18
19 **Q. WHAT CUSTOMER DATA IS USED BY BACE?**

20
21 A. Total market (CLEC plus ILEC) customer data is required by wire center, by customer
22 segment (residential and four business segments) and by customer spend level (high to
23 low level groupings of customers). BACE imports an Wire center Demographic table
24 that provides total customer population for each BellSouth wire center. BACE uses one
25 residential segment and four business segments: 1) 1-3 line small office/home office

1 (SOHO in the model); 2) 4-8 lines small-sized business (SME/A in the model); 3) 9-23
 2 line medium-sized business (SME/B in the model); and 4) 24+ line large-sized business
 3 (SME/C in the model). Each customer segment is further divided into categories based
 4 on the amount of customer spending. The residential segment is divided across the state
 5 into five spend categories (quintiles) with an equal number of customers in each. Each of
 6 the four business segments is divided across the state into three spend categories (high
 7 spend, medium spend, and low spend) with an equal number of customers in each. Since
 8 the expenditure categories are determined at the state level, each wire center will contain
 9 a unique profile and count of the customer segment /spend data.

10
 11 **Q. WHICH PRODUCTS AND SERVICES ARE INCLUDED IN BACE?**

12
 13 A. BACE allows for consideration of the following types of services: local access; customer
 14 calling features, long distance usage and switched access; Digital Subscriber Line (DSL);
 15 DS1 Internet access; line maintenance; service connection/installation; and directory
 16 assistance. The user has the ability to determine whether the CLEC sells a service and/or
 17 whether there is a non-zero, positive price for each service. As noted in Section 3 above,
 18 BACE represents the great majority of telecommunication services that are likely to be
 19 offered but not the absolute scope of services that might be offered (e.g., video is not
 20 included).

21
 22 **Q. WHAT PRICE DATA IS USED BY BACE?**

23
 24 A. BACE requires a baseline price file that contains the current market price for each of the
 25 products offered, by customer segments, by customer-spend categories. BACE uses six

1 main product classifications: 1) Long distance services; 2) voice mail; 3) switched access
2 services (payments by long distance/inter-exchange carriers to terminate local calls to
3 CLEC customers); 4) DSL (standard high-speed connection); 5) non-DSL business data
4 service; and 6) Local (this includes local access, local usage, subscriber line charge
5 (SLC), directory assistance (DA)/operator services, and customer calling features other
6 than voice mail). BACE allows the user to include separate prices, quantities, and
7 revenues for line maintenance if the user has the relevant values, including quantities, for
8 this service.

9
10 BACE also recognize the current market trend of bundling by allowing the user to
11 identify bundles of services, and prices (or price discounts) for the bundled offerings.

12
13 In addition, BACE allows the user to change each price in each year over the 10-year
14 study period.

15
16 **Q. WHAT QUANTITY DATA IS USED BY BACE?**

17
18 A. "Quantity" is a term that BACE uses to refer the number of products or services
19 demanded and actually sold, not the number of customers. BACE uses quantities by wire
20 center, for each of the products offered, by customer segment, by customer-spend
21 category. Note the user has the option to establish zero quantities for some segments
22 (e.g., no sales of non-DSL data services to residential customers). BACE also allows for
23 the quantities of products and services that are sold in bundles as well as those sold a-la-
24 carte. In addition, quantities can change by year over the 10-year study period.

1 **Q. WHAT CLEC GLOBAL PROPERTIES DATA IS USED BY BACE?**

2

3 A. The "CLEC global properties data" inputs are those that define the characteristics of the
4 CLEC and how it performs its business. These inputs consist of four basic types: 1) those
5 that act as filters; 2) those that act as descriptors; 3) those whose value will have an
6 impact on calculated values; and 4) those that are toggles for optimization.

7

8 Filter inputs tell BACE whether a value should be used or filtered out. An example of
9 such a filter input is whether to include (or not) a terminal value for CLEC assets at the
10 end of the 10-year study period. Descriptor data inputs are optional and can be used for
11 documentation and informational purposes only. Many of the CLEC properties data
12 inputs have values that are used in the calculations. These include: tax rates; equity
13 percentage, pre-tax cost of capital, and scope of CLEC operations contained within the
14 BellSouth service territory. And finally, toggles for optimization control how BACE
15 optimizes the CLEC's business offerings within a state. This includes analyses of
16 product offerings for the efficient operating footprint of the firm.

17

18 **Section 6: THE PRICE CALCULATIONS IN BACE.**

19

20 **Q. CAN YOU DESCRIBE THE PRICE PROCESS (P-PROCESS)?**

21

22 A. Yes. As noted above, the Price Process (P-Process) derives the market prices for each of
23 the six main products and product bundles offered by the CLEC, by customer segment,
24 by year.

25

1 The challenge in the P-Process is to find not only the per-unit price for each individual
2 product sold, but also to account for the implied price of individual products sold as
3 components within bundles. In BACE, a bundle is a group of products or services that
4 are sold together as a single unit. The user defines each bundle and its component
5 products in the Bundles Table. In order to generate inputs for BACE's Revenue Process
6 (R-Process), implied "prices" for each product/component of a bundle are imputed and
7 stored. This implied or imputed price approach for bundled product/components allows
8 for revenue calculation and reporting of revenues at distinct levels along the location and
9 customer hierarchies.

10
11 **Q. WHAT INPUTS ARE REQUIRED FOR THE P-PROCESS?**

12
13 A. Several tables provide input to the P(rice) Process. The tables and their key input fields
14 are described below. The relevant tables can be thought of as having two characteristic
15 dimensions: 1) bundles versus *à-la-carte*; and 2) starting versus future prices.

16
17 The following tables are used in the P-Process:

18 Baseline Bundle Price - This table defines the initial bundle prices offered to each
19 customer segment in a defined geographic area.

20
21 Bundle Price Curves - This table defines the price trend (expressed as a decimal)
22 per year for each product bundle over the ten-year study. This will capture any
23 expected bundle price increase or decreases over time.

24

1 Baseline Product Price - This table defines the current prices of individual
2 products by geographic area. The values in this table can be thought of as
3 representing initial market prices off of which the user can apply a CLEC
4 discount to. This discount may reflect the market entry discount to expand market
5 share.

6
7 Baseline Bundle Price - This table defines the current prices of the bundles by
8 geographic area.

9
10 Product Price Curves – This table defines the price trend (expressed as a decimal)
11 per year for each product over the ten-year study. The values in this table will
12 capture any increase or decrease in product prices over time. (Note that in BACE,
13 the term “curve” is used to reflect changes in values over time, by year, during the
14 10-year modeling period).

15
16 CLEC Baseline Price Discount - This table defines any discounts off of the
17 current prices and is used to create the initial CLEC prices of individual products
18 by geographic area.

19
20 **Q. WHAT TASKS ARE PERFORMED BY BACE DURING THE P-PROCESS?**

21
22 A. Once the tables described above are populated, BACE performs seven key tasks (or
23 categories of tasks) during the P-Process. The first three tasks develop prices for
24 individual products and bundles, while the later three tasks relate to the prices that are
25 implied for the components of bundles.

1 The first task is to create the bundle price profile over time. This is done by multiplying
2 the initial bundle price (Baseline Bundle Price) by the bundle price curves (Bundle Price
3 Curves table). The Bundle Price Curves table reflects changes in bundle prices over time.
4 This task calculates a price per bundle per year for every year, for each relevant market.
5 This information is added to the BACE processing table P1.

6
7 The second task is to develop the initial discounted price for each product by applying the
8 CLEC pricing discount to the Baseline Product Price. This task discounts current
9 baseline market-like prices for assumed CLEC discount levels. This information is added
10 to the BACE processing table P2 (e.g., baseline CLEC price per product, per market).

11
12 The third task is to calculate the CLEC product price profile over time. This is done by
13 multiplying the initial discounted product price (found in table P2) by the CLEC price
14 curves (in the Product Price Curves table). This leads to a calculation of the CLEC
15 *à-la-carte* product price for each year. This information is added to the BACE
16 processing table P3.

17
18 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE P-PROCESS TASKS RELATED TO THE IMPLIED**
19 **PRICES FOR SERVICES WITHIN A BUNDLE.**

20
21 A. During the fourth task, using the *à-la-carte* product price in table P3, these inputs are
22 combined with the Bundle table to find the sum of *à-la-carte* prices in a given bundle in a
23 given area by year. This derives the price that would exist if the bundle were sold at list
24 or retail price for each of the individual components (i.e., at *à-la-carte* prices). This
25 information is appended into the BACE processing table P4.

1 Fifth, bundle adjustment factors are determined for each product in each market. By
2 comparing the sum of *à-la-carte* prices in table P4 (for a given customer bundle in a
3 given area with actual demand levels) with the actual bundle price for the same area and
4 customer group (table P1), a retail price to bundle price adjustment factor can be
5 calculated. The user has the ability to indicate to which products within the bundle this
6 adjustment should be applied. The resulting adjustment factor is added into the BACE
7 processing table P5.

8
9 The sixth task is to determine the implied or imputed product prices for each product (this
10 is controlled by the user as noted in the prior paragraph) within the bundles. This is
11 accomplished by multiplying bundle adjustment factors from P5 for each bundle by the a-
12 la-carte prices for each bundle component. As noted above, the user has the option of
13 excluding bundle components from this discounting process. At this stage, BACE has
14 determined the per-unit product price (or implied price) for each individual product
15 offered a-la-carte, and within each bundle by all levels of location and customer
16 hierarchy.

17
18 The seventh task is to append these product prices (both *à-la-carte* and bundles) into the
19 BACE processing master pricing table, PMaster. All prices that were established on an
20 *à-la-carte* basis have “*à-la-carte*” appended into the bundle field.

1 Q. CAN YOU ILLUSTRATE THE P-PROCESS WITH A DIAGRAM?

2

3 A. Yes, a diagram summarizing the P-Process is shown below:

4

5 **P-Process: Determine the Price for a la carte and bundled product offerings**

6

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
19 **Section 7: THE QUANTITY CALCULATIONS IN BACE (Q-PROCESS)**

20

21 Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE QUANTITY PROCESS (Q-PROCESS)?

22

23 A. The Quantity Process (Q-Process) derives the quantity demanded/sold for each product
24 and service offered by the CLEC. Calculating the quantity demanded of CLEC products



1 takes into account customer segment demographics, anticipated CLEC market share, year
2 of product rollout, and anticipated customer churn (disconnects).

3
4 The starting point for BACE's Q-Process is a set of user input tables necessary to
5 calculate CLEC quantities.

6 **Q. WHAT TABLES ARE NEEDED FOR THE Q-PROCESS?**

7
8 A. In addition to the demographics tables (described in Section 5 above), users provide
9 additional input in the following tables:

10
11 CLEC Profile Products - This table allows the user to indicate which products are
12 offered by the CLEC and within what study year the product is first offered.
13 Beyond the first year, the user can also input the product's last offering year.

14
15 Baseline Demand - The Baseline Demand table describes the expected initial
16 demand for products and services offered by the CLEC.

17
18 Demand Curves - The Demand Curves table describes the total anticipated market
19 demand change for each product by customer segment, by customer-spend
20 category, by year for study years 2 through 10.

21
22 Penetration Curves for Products - This table describes the anticipated CLEC
23 market share of customers for each product by customer type over the ten-year
24 study horizon. This table relies upon user adjustable inputs, and also allows the
25 user to tie product penetration to DSL Addressability.

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Churn - This table allows the user to describe the annual churn for each customer grouping for each product offered by the CLEC. For BACE, churn is described in terms of disconnects each year by product.

Bundles - The Bundles table describes those products and services that are sold within each bundle.

CLEC Profile Bundles - This table allows the user to indicate which bundles are offered by the CLEC and within what study year the bundle is first offered. Beyond the first year, the user can also input the bundle's ending year.

Penetration Curves For Bundles - This table allows the user to determine the proportion of CLEC customers whose product sales occur via bundles, by year, by customer segment and customer-spend category, over the ten-year study horizon. For example, a penetration rate of .5 indicates that 50% of the customers of the CLEC for a particular customer segment subscribe to the CLEC services through bundles.

Market Growth – This table allow the user to indicate how the current customer base will grow over time. This represents the growth of population and businesses over time.

1 **Q. WHAT TASKS ARE PERFORMED IN THE Q-PROCESS?**

2

3 A. Given the contents of the demographics and user input tables, BACE performs ten key Q-
4 process tasks. The first six tasks are related to the calculation of the number of customers
5 subscribing to products, by type and location, the CLEC will serve over time. A key
6 concept to understand is that there is a CLEC market penetration of customers and then
7 within those customers a market penetration of the CLEC products. For example, a
8 CLEC may sign up a customer that takes local service and DSL, but chooses a different
9 carrier for long distance services.

10

11 In the first task, BACE develops the CLEC customer penetration for each product on a
12 percentage basis. This key data is contained in the Penetration Curves for Products table.
13 This table contains the product records defining the “anchor” product the customer will
14 buy. In effect, this defines the customer count for the CLEC. This table also contains
15 non-anchor product penetrations. These penetration values are applied against the anchor
16 penetration percentages to derive the customer penetration for the various non-anchor
17 products. This data is adjusted to match the first year the CLEC offers each product.
18 This is done by extracting from the CLEC Profile Products table the first year for which
19 the CLEC offers the product or service, and adjusting the market share per period found
20 in table the Penetration Curves for Products table. The starting year is used to reflect the
21 CLEC market share in the first year the product is offered. After the ending year (if it
22 occurs before the end of the study horizon), CLEC market share percentage is set to 0.
23 This information is appended into the BACE processing table Q2.

24

1 Second, BACE accounts for the fact that a portion of the products are sold as bundles.
2 Similar to the way BACE adjusts the product offerings, the user controls the bundle
3 offerings by adjusting the bundle penetration curves in the Penetration Curves for Bundles
4 table that match up to when the CLEC will offer each bundle (provided by the CLEC
5 Profile Bundles table). This customer/product penetration information is appended into
6 the BACE processing table Q4.

7
8 Third, using the percentage of each customer segment taking CLEC products in general
9 (table Q2) and those taking CLEC bundles of products (table Q4) specifically, this step
10 delineates the CLEC market share for each product per period by how the product is sold
11 (i.e., as part of a bundle or *a la carte*). This information is used to update the BACE
12 processing table Q4.

13
14 Fourth, BACE retrieves the initial number of total market customers (assumed to include
15 ILEC plus CLEC customers) by wire center, by customer segment and customer-spend
16 category from the Wire center Demographics table.

17
18 Fifth, BACE allows the user to identify growth in the number of total market customers,
19 by year, over the 10-year period (in the Market Growth table). This is combined with the
20 Wire center Demographic table to create a total customer curve, representing the change
21 in the number of total market customers year by year.

22
23 Sixth, CLEC market share percentages (on a product basis) must be translated into an
24 absolute number of customers taking each CLEC product. BACE calculates this by
25 multiplying the CLEC market share values (table Q4) with the demographics of each

1 customer segment and customer-spend category found in the Wire center Information
2 table (adjusted for market growth). These data are appended into the BACE processing
3 table Q6.

4
5 **Q. WHAT TASKS ARE PERFORMED IN THE Q-PROCESS AFTER THE**
6 **NUMBER OF CLEC CUSTOMERS IS DETERMINED?**

7
8 A. After the first six tasks, the focus changes from determining the numbers of customers
9 subscribing to products to calculating quantities of products sold.

10
11 In the seventh task, BACE allows the user to identify changes in the baseline demand
12 (from the Baseline Demand table) per customer segment and sub-segment by product, by
13 year using the Demand Curve table . (Note, user-adjustable changes in quantities of
14 products demanded per customer is different from task 2, which accounted for growth in
15 the number of customers). The end result provides the expected average customer market
16 demand over time for each product, by study year. These data are added to the BACE
17 processing table Q3.

18
19 Eighth, CLEC customer counts by product on a wire center basis are multiplied by the
20 expected per-customer product quantities, by wire center, to determine total CLEC
21 product quantities. Using a mid-year convention, the quantity of CLEC product
22 demanded for the year is calculated as the average of the end of year demand and prior
23 year's end of year demand. Therefore, the amount reported is actually the mid year
24 balance. This information is appended into the BACE processing table QMaster.
25

1 Ninth, BACE calculates the percentage of expected CLEC net additions for each product
2 by year. These percentages are calculated on a product-by-product basis for each
3 customer type. Percentages are derived by applying the disconnect percentages (from the
4 Churn table) to the expected product penetration levels (Penetration Curves for Products
5 table) over the ten years. These net addition percentages are applied to the customer
6 count information in the Wire center Demographic table to derive the counts of customer
7 additions.

8 Tenth, the count of product quantity additions (over the prior year), are appended into
9 table QMaster. These are used to determine the number of customer/product installs in
10 each year.

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1 Q. CAN YOU ILLUSTRATE THE Q-PROCESS WITH A DIAGRAM?

2

3 A. Yes, a diagram summarizing the Q-Process is shown below.

4

Q-Process: Determine the quantity of products demanded/sold

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
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18 **Section 8: THE REVENUE CALCULATIONS IN BACE (R-PROCESS)**

19

20 Q. IN GENERAL TERMS, HOW ARE CLEC REVENUES CALCULATED IN
21 BACE?

22 A. In BACE, the Revenue Process (R-Process) takes information from the Price and
23 Quantity Steps and derives the Gross Revenue due to the CLEC.

24

25

1 **Q. WHAT DATA IS USED BY BACE TO CALCULATE REVENUES?**

2

3 A. Five data tables are used as inputs by BACE in the R-Process. Table P Master contains
4 the CLEC price information for each product by customer type in each served location
5 (wire center) over the ten years of the study. Table Q Master contains the CLEC quantity
6 sold information for each product by customer type in each served location (wire center)
7 over the ten years of the study. Table USF – Interstate Access Support and table USF –
8 High Cost Loop Support provide inputs on the universal service funds available in the
9 state to a CLEC. Finally, table Alternative Units of Measure provides inputs to allow the
10 user to define additional cost drivers for the O and N processes, which are described later
11 in this testimony.

12

13 **Q. WHAT STEPS ARE USED IN THE R-PROCESS?**

14


15 A. The R-Process process is a four-stage process. First, the CLEC quantity of each product
16 demanded (by customer segment and location) from table Q-Master is multiplied by the
17 CLEC price of each product (by customer segment and location) from table P-Master.
18 This information is calculated for each study year and appended into table R-Master as
19 the revenue in each study year. Second, using the universal service funding tables (USF
20 – Interstate Access Support and USF – High Cost Loop Support) the amount of revenue
21 from these funding sources is appended to the R-Master table. Third, to allow the user to
22 drive costs based on specific product quantities, data from table Alternative Units of
23 Measure is applied against the R-Master table to develop additional quantity records.
24 These records are appended to R-Master. Fourth, the present value of the revenue is
25 derived. The present value is derived on a mid year basis; in other words, Year 1 is

1 discounted six months, Year 2 discounted 18 months, etc, to bring the values back to time
 2 zero.

3
 4 **Q. CAN YOU ILLUSTRATE THE R-PROCESS WITH A DIAGRAM?**

5
 6 A. Yes, a diagram summarizing the R-Process is shown below.

7 **R-Process: Determine the revenue (Price x Quantity)**



1 **Section 9: COST CALCULATIONS IN BACE (ON-PROCESS)**

2

3 **Q. HOW DOES BACE ACCOUNT FOR CLEC CASH OUTFLOWS?**

4

5 A. BACE accounts for CLEC cash outflows in the Operations/Network Cost Process (ON-
6 Process). For ease of discussion, I will use the term “cost” to generically refer to cash
7 outflows. The ‘N’ portion (of the ON-Process) calculates investments and costs specific
8 to the network engineering necessary to originate, transport and terminate CLEC voice
9 and data traffic. As I noted previously, to create the network infrastructure process, I
10 relied upon network specialists from BellSouth to provide a description of the specific
11 network components that would be required by the CLEC. These components include
12 both CLEC capital investments as well as unbundled network elements and wholesale
13 network services/components. The ‘O’ Portion calculates cash outflows specific to the
14 operations of the company. Additional detail on the ‘N’ and ‘O’ processes can be found
15 in the BACE Methodology Manual, attached to my testimony as Exhibit JWS - 3.

16

17 CLEC income tax liabilities (and cash outflows) while part of the O and N processes, are
18 handled as separate step in the processes. The calculation of income taxes will be
19 described in more detail later in this testimony.

20

21 **Q. IN BACE, WHAT KINDS OF ACTIVITIES CAUSE CASH OUTFLOWS?**

22

23 A. In BACE cash flows are caused by (driven by) the following factors: 1) the existence of
24 the CLEC as an operating entity in total (e.g., certain of the sales, general and
25 administrative, SG&A costs); 2) the existence of CLEC service within a geographic area

1 (e.g., the placement of a switch for each LATA); 3) the acquisition of a customer; 4) the
2 initial choice of a specific product or service by a customer (e.g., the customer chooses to
3 take DSL); 5) the volumes of products and services used; 6) the disconnection of a
4 customer (as evidenced through churn); and 7) composite triggers as the total number of
5 customers or the total volume of products or services within an area can exhaust the
6 usable capacity of equipment (e.g., the number of lines in a wire center), causing the
7 expansion of equipment placed.

8
9 **Q. WHAT INPUTS ARE REQUIRED FOR THE ON-PROCESS?**

10
11 A. Several tables provide input to the O and N Process. The tables are described below.

12
13 Cost Input Network and Cost Input Operations – these are the key tables in the
14 determination of the costs of the CLEC. The entries in these tables largely
15 determine the magnitude of a CLEC’s network infrastructure and operations costs
16 and how these costs are incorporated into the BACE analysis. The tables also
17 allow the user to include cost records that apply to various CLEC network and
18 operational scenarios. From these tables, the ON-Process determines the
19 appropriate cost records to be included in the BACE analyses in accordance with
20 the quantities of products sold obtained from the Q, P, and R processes and user
21 entries in other BACE tables including those that specify cost drivers (as
22 described in the question and answer above).

23
24 Within the Cost Input tables for Network and Operations, the fields are used in
25 three ways: 1) as filters or cost triggers (identifying whether a value is relevant to

1 a particular product or geographic area); 2) as descriptors for ease of
2 understanding and documentation; and 3) as values used for cost calculations.

3 Inplant and Loadings – this table provides the inputs to turn the material prices of
4 the capital inputs in the Cost Input Network table into fully capitalized costs that
5 could include: engineering, power, land, building, supplies, and other items.

6
7 Retirement Inputs – this table provides the inputs required to determine the levels
8 of replacement capital due to the retirement of plant. The inputs are used in the
9 Gompertz-Makem retirement rate estimation approach, described later in this
10 testimony.

11
12 Tax Depreciation Schedule – this input contains the IRS MACRS tables. These
13 tables are used in the calculation of income taxes.

14
15 **Q. HOW DOES BACE TREAT CAPITAL EXPENDITURES (CAPEX)?**

16
17 A. Capital expenditures are treated as any other cash flow and recorded at the time the
18 investment is made. Capital within BACE is deployed as needed based on the quantities
19 of the cost drivers that require the capital. Since some types of plant investments are
20 more economic when built for multiple years of demand, BACE does allow the user to
21 define a time period of demand (DemandYearForBuild field) to use in sizing plant (i.e.,
22 the plant placed today is sized sufficiently to meet the demand into future years).

23
24 In addition to the initial capital deployment, BACE recognizes that plant retires over time
25 and needs to be replaced. BACE uses a probabilistic approach to retirements based upon

1 the Gompertz-Makem retirement curves. These Gompertz-Makem curves are a standard
2 approach used in the telecom industry to understand the retirement patterns of
3 telecommunication assets. From the use of Gompertz-Makem, BACE derives the
4 probability of retirement, by type of asset, in each year. This probability is used to
5 estimate the expected value of plant replacement in year.

6
7 Finally as noted previously, initial start-up investments are assumed to occur at time zero
8 and no discount is applied to the cash outflow. All other capital placements, growth in
9 assets over time and the retirement replacement capital are assumed to occur mid-year for
10 discounting purposes.

11
12 **Q. DOES BACE USE AMORTIZED COST COMPONENTS FOR DEPRECIATION?**

13
14 **A.** BACE uses an amortized measure of depreciation expense only in the income tax module
15 of the model (which I will discuss later) and the associated calculations of accounting net
16 income. For a discounted cash flow calculation, the original cash outflow for the capital
17 expenditure is all that is required; depreciation expense is not needed (and would not be
18 appropriate) for a discounted cash flow, net present value calculation. Since the full cash
19 outlay for the capital expenditure is recorded in the year that it occurs, adding
20 depreciation expense would be tantamount to double counting these costs in a discounted
21 cash flow.

1 **Q. DOES BACE REFLECT A HIERARCHY OF COST INPUTS?**

2

3 A. Yes. However, cost hierarchy inputs are typically for information only and are referred
4 to as descriptor inputs. They are used in reporting to clarify costs to levels of the CLEC
5 location, product or customer hierarchy; in limited cases, they are used as filters. The
6 cost hierarchy is: cost family, cost area, cost center, and cost element.

7

8 **Q. WHAT IS THE ORDER OF THE TASKS PERFORMED IN THE ON-PROCESS?**

9

10 A. The Operations and Network ON-Process is split into three major phases. First is the cost
11 preparation phase during which all of the costs are filtered and arranged in preparation for
12 aligning the costs with the results of the price, quantity and revenue processes. The
13 second phase develops appropriate network and operational costs using the cost records
14 prepared in the first phase. The third phase of the ON process incorporates a series of
15 optimization routines to assist in reflecting efficient CLEC operations.

16

17 **Q. WHAT ARE THE MAJOR TASKS THAT OCCUR IN THE COST**
18 **PREPARATION PHASE?**

19

20 A. The following tasks are performed in the cost preparation phase:

21 1) The first task is to identify all of the possible investment items that can be driven
22 by BACE. This requires resolving all of the wildcard logic that exists in the
23 Network and Operations Cost Input tables. Wildcard inputs and the
24 corresponding model logic are used to minimize the input requirements for the
25 BACE user.

- 1 2) Since BACE's network and operations cost tables may have inputs for various
2 alternative network and operational scenarios, BACE has several user inputs that
3 act as filters on the network and operations cost input tables. These include:
4 CLECType, DS1ToDS0XOver, and UseSPAorUNET.
- 5 3) BACE applies the user-adjustable scope and purchase power factors to reflect the
6 CLEC's scope of operations and relative purchase power vis-à-vis BellSouth.
- 7 4) Loadings are applied to capital investments. These loadings allow the user to
8 capture capital expenditures beyond the material price. These may include:
9 engineering, supplies, storage/warehousing, land, power, building, and other
10 items.
- 11 5) BACE identifies how the vendor prices and investment values will change over
12 the 10-year study. These factors are a user input into the Cost Trends table.
- 13 6) The implications of customer churn are considered. The rate of customer churn
14 has an impact on how often some costs will occur. This is reflected in the Weight
15 value in the Cost Input tables
- 16 7) Next, to accommodate the fact that a CLEC, by installing certain equipment in a
17 LATA, may be able to serve customers via UNEs from carriers other than
18 BellSouth within that same LATA, BACE includes a variable accounting for the
19 percentage of these UNE-available customers within each LATA that are served
20 by BellSouth. This allows BACE to apportion some of the fixed costs within a
21 LATA to both the BellSouth operating area and the other ILECs within the
22 LATA.
- 23 8) BACE translates all monthly non-capital recurring costs into annual cost amounts
24 (since the present value calculations are performed on an annual basis).
- 25

1 **Q. WHAT ARE THE MAJOR TASKS THAT OCCUR IN THE NETWORK**
2 **REQUIREMENT AND COST DEVELOPMENT PHASE?**

3

4 A. With the appropriate cost records identified, annualized, and trended through time, BACE
5 develops the foundation for determining costs incurred by the CLEC by calculating the
6 underlying service and equipment requirements. Results from the Q-Process that identify
7 demand (where appropriate) for each of the various levels of the product, customer and
8 location hierarchies provide the basis for establishing an appropriately sized CLEC
9 network architecture.

10

11 For network equipment purchased by the CLEC, determining the appropriate equipment
12 and number of units to install relies on network engineering rules and equipment
13 capacities. Practically, CLEC engineers would likely examine demand forecasts for a
14 period of time (the time frame is dependent on the type of equipment), work with vendors
15 to identify the equipment appropriate to meet the demand and purchase equipment
16 sufficient to accommodate the expected demand, any administration requirements, spares
17 and perhaps growth. The identification of the number of capital cost units to install
18 within BACE is similar to this process.

19

20 For each of the capital cost records, BACE develops the demand requirements in each
21 year based on the product, customer and location hierarchies specified in the Network
22 Cost Input table (based upon output of the Quantity process). BACE accounts for the
23 years to build for and minimum/maximum ranges for sizes of network components.

24

1 For non-capital cost records that have a Frequency of Recurring or NonRecurring, BACE
2 uses the demand requirements in each year (from the Q Process) based on the product,
3 customer and location hierarchies and the UNEZone and RateCenter entries in the
4 Network and Operations Cost Input tables to determine the year by year cash outflows.
5 For capital components and non-capital cost records that have a Frequency of
6 NonRecurringNetwork, BACE uses the incremental change in demand year over year to
7 determine the year-by-year cash outflows.

8
9 Next BACE determines the replacement capital expenses based upon the retirement of
10 plant. Based on the user entered asset class specific values in the Retirement Input table,
11 Gompertz-Makem survival curves are used to estimate the likelihood of retirement in
12 each year.

13
14 Finally, with the costs of each network component and/or service developed for each year
15 of the 10-year period based on demand, BACE develops the net present value for each
16 cost record using the methods I described earlier. Whether the terminal values of assets
17 (at the end of the 10 years) is included or ignored (i.e., assumed to zero) in this
18 calculation is user adjustable.

19
20 **Q. WHAT ARE THE MAJOR TASKS THAT OCCUR IN THE NETWORK**
21 **OPTIMIZATION PHASE?**

22
23 A. With the NPV of each cost record identified, BACE lets the user control the ability to
24 identify economically efficient ways for the CLEC to optimize its operations. BACE
25 provides for six types of optimization processes, five of which are user adjustable. The

1 six types of optimization processes each search for specific activities that yield a negative
 2 net present value, and then eliminate that activity. The six activities can be optimized
 3 are: 1) the use of EELs and/or full end-office collocation; 2) the provision of DSL within
 4 the wire center (not user adjustable); 3) keep or eliminate CLEC service in total for a wire
 5 center; 4) keep or eliminate CLEC service for Mass Market customers for a market; 5)
 6 keep or eliminate CLEC service for a market; and, 6) keep or eliminate CLEC service in
 7 total for a LATA.

8
 9 **Q. EARLIER YOU DESCRIBED HOW BACE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE TRO.**
 10 **WOULD YOU PLEASE DESCRIBE IN ADDITIONAL DETAIL HOW BACE**
 11 **CAPTURES THE COST CATEGORIES DISCUSSED IN THE TRO?**

12
 13 A. Yes. BACE is designed to allow the user to capture all likely potential costs
 14 corresponding to CLEC entry. Below I list the cost items specifically mentioned in the
 15 TRO, and how each item is incorporated into BACE.

- 16 1) “Costs of purchasing and installing a switch” (TRO, ¶ 520) - Incorporated into
 17 table Cost Input Network.
- 18 2) “[T]he recurring and non-recurring charges paid to the incumbent LEC for loops”
 19 (e.g., TRO, ¶ 520, and n. 1588) - Incorporated into table Cost Input Network.
- 20 3) “[T]he recurring and non-recurring charges paid to the incumbent LEC for ...
 21 transport” (e.g., TRO, ¶ 520, and n. 1588) - Incorporated into table Cost Input
 22 Network.
- 23 4) “[T]he recurring and non-recurring charges paid to the incumbent LEC for ... hot
 24 cuts” (TRO, ¶ 520) and “... costs of migrating incumbent LEC loops to

- 1 requesting telecommunications carriers' switches ..." (Appendix B – Final Rules,
 2 page 22, 51.319(d)(2)(iii)(B)(3)) — Incorporated into table Cost Input Network.
- 3 5) “[T]he recurring and non-recurring charges paid to the incumbent LEC for ...
 4 signaling” (TRO, ¶ 520) - Incorporated into table Cost Input Network.
- 5 6) “[T]he recurring and non-recurring charges paid to the incumbent LEC for ...
 6 other services and equipment necessary to access the loop” (TRO, ¶ 520) -
 7 Incorporated into table Cost Input Network.
- 8 7) “[T]he cost of collocation and equipment necessary to serve local wire center
 9 customers in a wire center” (TRO, ¶ 520) - Incorporated into table Cost Input
 10 Network.
- 11 8) “... taking into consideration an entrants likely market share” (TRO, ¶ 520) -
 12 Incorporated into table Penetration Curves for Products.
- 13 9) “taking into consideration ... the scale economies inherent to serving a wire
 14 center and the line density of the wire center” (TRO, ¶ 520) - Incorporated in
 15 BACE’s approach to cost development.
- 16 10) “taking into consideration ... the cost of backhauling the local traffic to the
 17 competitor’s switch” (TRO, ¶ 520, and similar language at Appendix B – Final
 18 Rules, page 22, 51.319(d)(2)(iii)(B)(3)) - Incorporated into table Cost Input
 19 Network.
- 20 11) “taking into consideration ... other costs associated with transferring the
 21 customer’s service over to the competitor” (TRO, ¶ 520) - Incorporated into table
 22 Cost Input Network.
- 23 12) “taking into consideration ... the impact of churn on the cost of customer
 24 acquisitions” (TRO, ¶ 520) - Incorporated into table Churn and table Cost Input
 25 Network.

- 1 13) “taking into consideration ... the cost of maintenance, operations” (TRO, ¶ 520) -
 2 Incorporated into table Cost Input Operations.
- 3 14) “taking into consideration ... the cost of ... other administrative activities” (TRO,
 4 ¶ 520) - Incorporated into table Cost Input Operations.
- 5 15) “taking into consideration ... the competitors’ capital costs” (TRO, ¶ 520) -
 6 Incorporated into table CLEC Study Properties.

7

8 **Section 10: TREATMENT OF INCOME TAXES IN BACE**

9

10 **Q. HOW ARE INCOME TAXES TREATED IN BACE?**

11

12 A. The final step in BACE processing is the calculation of the income tax liability. The
 13 calculation of tax liability (profit/positive liability as well as any loss/negative liability)
 14 uses inputs from the core of BACE, but the tax calculations are essentially performed in a
 15 separate module. This is because unlike discounted cash flow calculations of net present
 16 value, income taxes for most corporations are calculated on an accrual basis.

17

18 **Q. HOW IS THE ACCRUAL TREATMENT OF ASSETS (E.G., FOR TAX**
 19 **CALCULATION PURPOSES) DIFFERENT FROM CALCULATIONS OF NET**
 20 **PRESENT VALUE OF CASH FLOWS?**

21

22 A. With cash flow calculations, the cash outlay for an asset is simply shown in its entirety at
 23 the time it occurs. For tax purposes, under the accrual method, a capital expenditure
 24 generates tax-deductible expenses over time via depreciation expense.

25

1 **Q. HOW IS THE COST OF DEBT AND EQUITY TREATED FOR TAX PURPOSES**
2 **AND IN THE CASH FLOW PORTION OF BACE?**

3

4 A. For corporate income tax purposes, the cost of debt is reflected as a tax-deductible
5 expense like other expenses. For corporate income tax purposes, the cost of equity is the
6 one economic cost that is not considered a tax-deductible expense. In discounted cash
7 flow calculations, the cost of debt and the cost of equity are reflected via the discount
8 rate; i.e., when a cash outflow is made in time zero, but revenue (cash inflows) occur at
9 future time periods, the discount rate implicitly captures the costs of debt and equity as
10 the future revenue cash inflows are discounted.

11

12 **Q. HOW ARE LOSSES FOR ANY GIVEN YEAR TREATED IN BACE?**

13

14 A. The user can choose how a tax loss (a negative tax liability) will be treated. The user has
15 the option of carrying any loss forward to future years to offset future taxable profits, or
16 taking the loss during the year in which is incurred as a current offset to current taxable
17 profits in other divisions. If the user selects "CurrentYearCredit" the tax loss is actually
18 shown as a contra-expense in that year for cash flow purposes. This selection implies
19 that the CLEC has other "profitable" business entities, and that the modeled operations
20 loss will be used to offset some portion of the total CLEC tax liability created from
21 accounting profits in its other operations. Otherwise, the loss is carried forward to offset
22 future profits.

23

24

25

1 **Q. DOES BACE ESTIMATE NET INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES?**

2

3 A. Yes. Once the user selects the Tax-treatment method, BACE calculates an estimated net
4 income statement for tax calculation purposes. This includes an estimate of the yearly
5 tax depreciation (which is based on the IRS's depreciation lives for each of the plant
6 items in BACE). In addition, an estimate of the yearly interest expense is made using the
7 sum of the capex in the current period and from succeeding periods multiplied by the
8 debt percentage (1-EquityPct) and a debt rate calculated in the model from the user's
9 inputs in the CLEC Study Properties for EquityPct, EquityRate, PreTaxCostOfCapital.

10

11 From the net income statement, the model calculates the estimated annual income taxes
12 based upon an effective tax rate that is based on the user inputs in the CLEC Study
13 Properties for StateTaxRate and FedTaxRate. The effective tax rate accounts for the fact
14 that state taxes impact federal tax liabilities.

15

16 **Q. FOR EASE OF REPORTING, DOES BACE ASSIGN INCOME TAXES TO**
17 **PRODUCTS AND GEOGRAPHIC AREAS?**

18

19 A. Yes. Once the estimated income taxes are calculated, a tax-to-NPV ratio is developed so
20 that the income taxes can be apportioned down to the reporting levels in BACE. This
21 apportionment is only performed to allow the user to analyze impairment using any of the
22 various data dimensions in the model.

23

24

25

1 **Section 11: REPORTS FROM BACE**

2

3 **Q. WHAT REPORT GENERATING CAPABILITIES EXIST IN BACE?**

4

5 A. Several standard reports are available through the BACE wizard and from predefined
6 report templates. In addition, there is a very wide array of reports and data views that can
7 be user defined.

8

9 **Q. WHAT STANDARD REPORTS ARE AVAILABLE THROUGH THE BACE**
10 **WIZARD?**

11

12 A. The four major categories of reports available through the BACE wizard are: 1) NPV by
13 market; 2) average revenue by product category per customer by market; 3) total
14 estimated net income; 4) total estimated net income per line.

15

16 **Q. WHAT ADDITIONAL REPORTS ARE AVAILABLE THROUGH BACE?**

17

18 A. BACE comes pre-populated with a number of report templates. These templates can be
19 used to create various reports including: cost and revenues over time, cost summaries,
20 negative margin markets, etc.. User-defined reports and data views can vary widely. The
21 limits of the possible reports are largely determined only by the data used by and
22 produced by BACE. Typically, a user-defined report is determined with four steps: 1)
23 identify the data source (e.g., cash flow data); 2) identify the calculations within BACE to
24 view (e.g., NPV by customer segment by year); 3) identify any desired selection criteria
25 (e.g., specific level of geography or geographic area); and 4) describe how the data is to

1 be reported. An example of a user-defined report is one showing all operating expenses
2 in a state for two specific LATAs for the 10-year study. BACE allows the user to save
3 reports and report templates.
4

5 **Section 12: TESTING BACE**

6
7 **Q. HAS BACE BEEN TESTED AS A MODEL?**

8
9 A. Yes. My team and I tested BACE to confirm it worked logically (i.e., implementation
10 corresponding to intent, processes proceeded logically), to confirm it worked technically
11 (i.e., the model processes are mathematically correct); and to identify problems or errors
12 in the model and to identify improvements to the model.
13

14 **Q. WHAT TYPES OF TESTS WERE PERFORMED?**

15
16 A. Four types of tests were performed: 1) transactional tests (which focused largely on the P,
17 Q, and R processes); 2) output reasonableness tests (which focused on the overall results
18 and the change in results as input values changed); 3) processing tests (running the model
19 and reports in various ways); and 4) platform mechanics test (e.g., that it loads properly
20 and runs with the hardware specified).
21

22 **Q. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY TRANSACTIONAL TESTING?**

23
24 A. The logic of each process was broken down into key steps and the key components and
25 drivers of the process were identified. Tests were designed to confirm that the processes

1 handled the driver (or variable) correctly and that the system's calculations were
2 mathematically correct.

3
4 **Q. WHAT WERE THE RESULTS OF YOUR TESTING?**

5
6 A. BACE passed all four types of testing.

7
8 **Section 13: BACE ALLOWS THE USER TO ADDRESS ISSUES 2 (B) AND 5 (D)**

9
10 **Q. HOW DOES BACE ALLOW THE USER TO ADDRESS ISSUE 2 (B), THE**
11 **VARIATION IN FACTORS AFFECTING CLECS' ABILITY TO SERVE EACH**
12 **GROUP OF CUSTOMERS?**

13
14 A. BACE allows the user to address the variation in factors affecting CLEC's ability to serve
15 customers in several ways. For example, as outlined in Section 3 above, BACE allows
16 analysis at several geographic levels: LATAs; wire centers; MSAs; MCSAs; CEAs; UNE
17 Zones; and any combination of the above. Second, BACE allows variations in product
18 offerings and prices across five customer segments (residential and four business
19 segments) and by customer-spend categories. Third, BACE allows the user to identify
20 bundles of product and service offerings and price discounts that can vary over time.
21 Fourth, the user can adjust customer penetration by segment and customer-spend
22 categories by year. Fifth, BACE allows the user to choose the products offered. Finally,
23 BACE allows the user to determine whether certain optimization techniques are
24 employed (e.g., to drop negative NPV wire centers).

25

1 **Q. HOW DOES BACE ALLOW THE USER TO ADDRESS ISSUE 5 (D), MARKETS**
2 **IN WHICH POTENTIAL ECONOMIC BARRIERS MAY RENDER CLEC**
3 **ENTRY UNECONOMIC?**

4

5 A. BACE allows the user to address CLEC costs, which were discussed above in Section 9.
6 There, I describe how BACE incorporates the relevant CLEC costs, which factors are
7 largely incorporated through the table Cost Input Network. The ON cost process is also
8 described in more detail in the BACE Model Methodology, which is attached to my
9 testimony.

10

11 **Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?**

12

13 A. Yes.

14

15

1 **SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECT TESTIMONY OF MR. JAMES W. STEGEMAN**
2 **ON BEHALF OF BELL SOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.**
3 **BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION**
4 **DOCKET NUMBER 030851-TP**
5 **JANUARY 21, 2004**

6
7
8 **Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS AFFILIATION.**

9
10 A. My name is James W. Stegeman. I am the President of CostQuest Associates, Inc. I am
11 testifying on behalf of BellSouth Telecommunications (“BellSouth”, “BST” or the
12 “Company”).

13
14 **Q. ARE YOU THE SAME JAMES W. STEGEMAN THAT FILED DIRECT**
15 **TESTIMONY IN THIS PROCEEDING?**

16
17 A. Yes. In my direct testimony I described the BACE model used for evaluations of
18 economic impairment.

19
20 **Q. WHY ARE YOU FILING SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECT TESTIMONY?**

21
22 A. As outlined in Ms. Nancy White’s letter dated December 23, 2003, I am filing
23 supplemental direct testimony with the most recent iteration of the BACE (BellSouth
24 Analysis of Competitive Entry) model. This supplemental testimony explains the
25 corrections to the BACE model. I have attached the following revised exhibits and

1 attachments to my Direct Testimony: JWS-3 and BACE model.

2
3 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE CORRECTIONS MADE TO BACE.**

4
5 A. In the version of BACE that was filed with my direct testimony, two of the reports that
6 the model can generate -- "Revenue_CEA-UNEZone" (which produces the average
7 revenue per customer and is available from the Wizard reporting and from the Saved
8 reports) and "NetIncome-Per Line" (which produces the net income report on a per line
9 basis and which is also available from the Wizard reporting and from the Saved reports) --
10 produce results that could not be utilized. This error did not affect NPV calculations.
11 The underlying SQL query that develops these reports has been corrected in the current
12 version of BACE and the reports can now be produced correctly

13
14 **Q. WAS THERE A CHANGE IN THE OPTIMIZATION CODE IN BACE?**

15
16 A. Yes, there were two changes to the optimization code in BACE. First, Enterprise
17 optimization logic was added to provide a user with additional optimization flexibility.
18 Enabling the new toggle found in the CLEC Study Properties Table,
19 **FilterNegativeMarginEnterpriseInMarkets**, allows BACE to filter out enterprise
20 customers within markets when the entire collection of enterprise customers in the market
21 produce a negative margin. Additional detail on this new toggle can be found in the
22 revised JWS-3 Methodology Manual.

23
24 This additional optimization step has no impact on BellSouth's filing in Florida because
25 all Enterprise customer groups in the positive NPV markets provide a positive margin. In

1 other words, in Florida, this additional optimization step does not change the number of
2 markets that are found not to be impaired, and it does not change the magnitude of the
3 positive NPV values for the markets that are not impaired.
4

5 **Q. WHAT IS THE SECOND CHANGE TO OPTIMIZATION CODE IN BACE?**

6
7 A. Optimization in BACE is also now modified to allow optimization by different
8 definitions of markets. In my direct testimony (page 51, lines 5-6) I described
9 optimization tasks 4 and 5 as: “4) keep or eliminate CLEC service for Mass Market
10 customers for a market; 5) keep or eliminate CLEC service for a market.” For each of
11 these optimization tasks, the prior version of BACE only allowed these optimization
12 tasks to be performed for a market defined as the CEA-UNEZone (the use of only CEA-
13 UNEZone was noted in the description of the filters in the CLEC Study Properties table).
14 In the version of BACE I am filing today, optimization in these tasks (including the
15 Enterprise optimization I described above in my supplemental testimony) is now based
16 upon the user's selection of Market in the wizard. However, since BellSouth is using the
17 CEA-UNEZone as the market, this change has no effect on BellSouth’s filed results.
18

19 **Q. ARE THERE ANY OTHER CORRECTIONS THAT YOU ARE MAKING?**

20
21 A. Yes, four wire centers were missing in the original BACE filing (PMBHFLNP,
22 FTLDLFLAP, HMSTFLAF and MIAMFLAG) which are now included in the current
23 version of BACE for Florida.
24
25

1 Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECT TESTIMONY?

2

3 A. Yes it does.

4

1 **SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF MR. JAMES W. STEGEMAN**
2 **ON BEHALF OF BELL SOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.**
3 **BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION**
4 **DOCKET NUMBER 030851-TP**
5 **JANUARY 28, 2004**

6
7 Section 1. **INTRODUCTION**

8
9 **Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS AFFILIATION.**

10
11 A. My name is James W. Stegeman. I am the President of CostQuest Associates, Inc.
12 I am testifying on behalf of BellSouth Telecommunications (“BellSouth”, “BST”
13 or the “Company”).

14
15 **Q. ARE YOU THE SAME JAMES W. STEGEMAN THAT FILED DIRECT**
16 **TESTIMONY IN THIS PROCEEDING?**

17
18 A. Yes. In my direct testimony I described the BACE model used for evaluations of
19 economic impairment.

20
21 **Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY?**

22
23 A. I respond to the rebuttal testimony of Dr. Mark Bryant and Mr. James Webber
24 (MCI), Mr. Kent Dickerson and Dr. Brian Staihr (Sprint), and Mr. Don Wood
25 (AT&T). Each of these witnesses addresses the BACE model in their rebuttal

1 testimony. My surrebuttal is confined to issues related to the operations and
2 methods of the BACE model itself, Drs. Aron and Billingsley will primarily
3 respond to issues relating to BACE model inputs and interpretation of the results.
4

5 **Q. HOW IS YOUR SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY ORGANIZED?**

6
7 A. I have divided my surrebuttal testimony into six sections:

- 8 1) Introduction.
- 9 2) The BACE model is open to review, structurally sound, and is a
10 valid TRO potential deployment tool.
- 11 3) The rebuttal by CLECs concerning BACE is inconsistent and
12 contradictory.
- 13 4) Clarification of BACE features and misinterpretations of BACE.
- 14 5) Additional Rebuttal of Mr. Wood.
- 15 6) BACE is clearly superior to AT&T's model in meeting the
16 requirements of the TRO and criteria discussed by Mr. Wood.
17

18 Section 2. **THE BACE MODEL IS OPEN TO REVIEW, STRUCTURALLY**
19 **SOUND, AND IS A VALID TRO POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENT TOOL**
20

21 **Q. HAVE ANY WITNESSES CLAIMED THAT BACE IS NOT OPEN TO**
22 **REVIEW?**
23

24 A. Yes, Mr. Wood (e.g., page 22, lines 12-14), Dr. Bryant (page 31), and Mr.
25 Dickerson (pages 7 and 8) claim that BACE is not sufficiently open to review to

1 allow a full analysis of the model.

2

3 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE HOW PARTIES CAN REVIEW THE BACE**
4 **MODEL.**

5

6 A. My direct testimony included several capabilities to aid the user in evaluating
7 BACE, including:

- 8 1. A detailed Users Guide (Exhibit JWS-2);
- 9 2. A detailed Methods Manual (Exhibit JWS-3);
- 10 3. A data dictionary and table layout (contained within the Methods Manual).

11

12 **Q. WHAT OTHER MEANS TO EVALUATE BACE HAVE BEEN**
13 **PROVIDED TO PARTIES?**

14

15 A. There are several.

- 16 1) BellSouth offers, at no charge, BACE model support, by telephone or email.
- 17 2) I was a key presenter at public workshops on the model at the November 2003
18 NARUC meetings and before this Florida Commission on December 4, 2003.
- 19 3) I also presented information on the model at the Kentucky commission on
20 December 3. Many of the CLECs that are actively participating in this docket
21 attended this workshop.
- 22 4) Through counsel, parties were provided with access to BACE before my
23 direct testimony was filed and without the need for a formal discovery
24 request. Specifically, the link to the CostQuest website was forwarded
25 electronically to AT&T on November 27, 2003 and to MCI on December 2,

1 2003. This version of BACE was substantively the same as the version of
2 BACE filed with my direct testimony (notwithstanding a few input changes).

3 5) In addition, the majority of inputs (all non-proprietary inputs) are user
4 adjustable so that changes can be made to test impacts and sensitivities; and
5 various scenarios can be run either through the wizard or by modifying inputs
6 and creating scenarios directly.

7

8 **Q. HAVE YOU TAKEN ANY OTHER STEPS TO PROVIDE FULL ACCESS**
9 **TO BACE?**

10

11 A. Yes, I have. I filed supplemental direct testimony on January 21, 2004, to make
12 certain corrections to BACE and provided with that testimony the most recent
13 iteration of BACE. This version of BACE includes a linked database file (the file
14 name is "Scenario"_Intermediate.MDB which resides in the "Scenario" folder)
15 that allows the user to view non-sensitive intermediate processing tables for
16 scenarios based upon the proprietary BellSouth customer data.

17

18 On January 22, 2004 BellSouth filed supplemental responses to Staff's Third Set
19 of Interrogatories, which responses included updated versions of the proprietary
20 BACE tables.

21

22 On January 23, 2004, BellSouth filed supplemental responses to Sprint's First
23 Request for Production of Documents, which included a BACE Demonstration
24 scenario ("Demo") that is fully open for review. The processed Demo scenario is
25 unprotected. (the "data" in the BACE Demo is for illustrative purposes only and

1 should not be interpreted or construed to reflect values for any particular
2 geographic area).

3
4 With these additional capabilities, the user can see the structure of the system, all
5 tables (input and processed), and follow the processing of the model much in the
6 same way as I (and my team) have in developing, testing and refining BACE. In
7 short, all of the filings made, in addition to the telephone and email BACE model
8 support and workshops, allow any party to review BACE at a detailed level.

9
10 **Q. THE DEMONSTRATION SCENARIO DOES NOT HAVE ACTUAL**
11 **FLORIDA DATA. WHY ARE CERTAIN TABLES AND INTERMEDIATE**
12 **RESULTS STILL LOCKED FROM THE USERS' VIEW IN THE FULL**
13 **BACE MODEL WITH ACTUAL FLORIDA DATA?**

14
15 A. BACE uses a proprietary database containing commercially sensitive and
16 valuable information. Naturally, this data has to be protected. My objective in
17 developing BACE was to make the model as open and easy to use, review, and
18 evaluate, while still protecting this sensitive and powerful data. Certainly, with
19 the additional filed material (via supplemental direct and responses to discovery),
20 BACE users have reasonable opportunities to use, review and evaluate the model.

21
22 **Q. WITHIN THE FILED BELLSOUTH SCENARIO, ARE THERE INPUTS**
23 **THAT CANNOT BE MODIFIED BY THE USER IN BACE?**

24

1 A. The user cannot modify the initial input values for market prices and quantities.
2 These “locked” quantities include both the total number of customers and the
3 number of each product category sold. However, the user has the ability to
4 control modeled CLEC prices via the CLEC price discount and the bundle price
5 inputs. The user also can control the CLEC quantities via the CLEC market
6 penetration inputs. The user can also change prices, price discounts and
7 penetration over time.

8

9 **Q. WHY CAN'T THE USER DIRECTLY MODIFY THE UNDERLYING**
10 **MARKET PRICE AND QUANTITY INPUTS?**

11

12 A. The underlying market price and quantity information is proprietary and it is not
13 possible to protect this proprietary information and still allow the user to change
14 it. As a result, we designed BACE to provide the user the ability to create CLEC
15 prices and quantities without adjusting the underlying data. There is a modeling
16 trade-off between allowing the user to change every input and having a model that
17 uses detailed, proprietary data. The clearly superior choice is to use proprietary
18 data and provide other methods for the user to obtain modeled CLEC prices and
19 quantities.

20

21 **Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL RESPONSE TO MR. DICKERSON'S**
22 **AND MR. WOOD'S CLAIM THAT EXECUTABLE SOURCE CODE IS**
23 **REQUIRED FOR A REVIEW OF A MODEL?**

24

1 A. Yes. Mr. Dickerson's claim (rebuttal page 8) and Mr. Wood's claim (rebuttal
2 page 2, lines 10-12) suggesting that lack of executable source code impedes
3 model review is wrong for several reasons. First, as the primary designer,
4 debugger, and developer of the code, I do not have the executable version of the
5 source code (and have never had it). I have a word processor document (similar
6 to a PDF) that I use to analyze the code in conjunction with the ability to review
7 the intermediate tables.

8

9 Second, in contrast to the suggestion of Mr. Dickerson (rebuttal pages 8 and 9)
10 executable source code for key components of the telecommunications models he
11 discusses typically have not been provided to parties in a format allowing the user
12 to make code changes, which is what Sprint asked for in this case. For example,
13 the FCC's HCPM, HAI, and original Hatfield models, which rely on customer
14 data developed by PNR / TNS Telecom, have never provided executable source
15 code or the key customer data openly to parties. Instead, parties are required to
16 visit a PNR/TNS site and use the PNR/TNS computers to review the code and any
17 party making such a visit is precluded from copying anything, or leaving with any
18 material. In fact, PNR/TNS charged reviewers a fee for the use of their machines.

19

20 Similarly, consider the telecommunications model BCPM. This was a joint
21 project of BellSouth, Sprint and USWest. It was written in Excel, VBA and C++.
22 While the Excel and VBA programming were available to users, only a word
23 document of the C++ code (which created the clustered customer data) was
24 provided to parties.

25

1 With respect to Sprint's Loop model (a derivative of the BCPM), my
2 understanding is that there is preprocessing of the customer data (similar to the
3 C++ process in BCPM) that has not been released to users in executable format
4 (and in fact may not be available even to Mr. Dickerson).

5
6 Finally, the source code for the BSTLM was released in PDF form, i.e., in the
7 same format that BACE source code was provided to Sprint prior to Mr.
8 Dickerson's rebuttal filing. Mr. Dickerson's reference to identification of model
9 errors and suggested improvements occurred with no greater access to the
10 BSTLM source code and other materials than have been provided for BACE.

11

12 **Q. ARE YOU AWARE OF ANY COMMISSION ORDERS ADDRESSING**
13 **EXECUTABLE SOURCE CODE?**

14

15 A. Yes. My understanding is that the Commission ruled that the release of the
16 executable source code was not required in Docket No. 990549-TP and did not
17 impede model review. The relevant language provides (at pages 130-31):

18

19 ... the AT&T/WorldCom witnesses complain that they were not given the
20 source code to the BSTLM; rather, they were provided with a password
21 protected .pdf version of the model . . . upon consideration of the evidence,
22 we find that BellSouth's actions here did not impede AT&T/WorldCom's
23 ability to review and critique the BSTLM. (emphasis added.)

24

1 **Q. MR. DICKERSON STATES (REBUTTAL PAGE 4) THAT “MANY OF**
2 **THE REFERENCED INPUT DATA TABLES ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO**
3 **THE USER FOR INPUT OR VIEWING.” DO YOU AGREE?**

4
5 A. No, quite the contrary. As originally filed, 45 of 48 input Access Tables in BACE
6 were open to any user. Of the three tables that are protected, PDF versions of the
7 data have been made available to Sprint and other parties through discovery. In
8 addition to the PDF versions of the three tables, the user can control how these
9 three protected tables are used via the use of the other 45 tables.

10

11 **Q. MR. DICKERSON STATES (REBUTTAL PAGE 5) THAT “THE**
12 **PMASTER RESULTS TABLE IS NOT AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW ...”**
13 **IS THERE A TECHNIQUE TO REVIEW THE PMASTER RESULTS**
14 **RECORDS?**

15

16 A. Yes. While not labeled as such, the contents of PMaster are available through the
17 Reporting screen of BACE. To access the PMaster file, the user would select
18 “Price” as the “Report Data Source” on the Report screen of BACE.

19

20 Additionally, the BACE demonstration scenario provided as a supplemental
21 discovery response, opens all intermediate tables are to user review, including
22 table PMaster.

23

24 **Q. ON PAGE 6 OF HIS REBUTTAL TESTIMONY MR. DICKERSON**
25 **STATES THAT “THE QMASTER RESULTS TABLE IS NOT**

1 **AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW ...” IS THERE A TECHNIQUE TO VIEW**
2 **QUANTITY RECORDS?**

3

4 A. Yes. The Quantity contents of QMaster are available through the Reporting
5 screen of BACE. These Quantity records are contained within RMaster, but are
6 post optimization. To access the Quantity contents of the RMaster file, the user
7 would select “Quantity and Customer Counts” as the “Report Data Source” on the
8 Report screen of BACE. Also, the Demonstration database allows the user to
9 open intermediate results tables, including table QMaster.

10

11 In addition, it appears that Mr. Dickerson was able to utilize the quantities in
12 BACE since his confidential Exhibits KWD-4 and KWD-5 to his rebuttal
13 testimony include line quantity counts by year for several wire centers. So
14 although he may not have been able to find the table name, he was able to identify
15 and extract the data he required from BACE.

16

17 **Q. ON PAGE 6 MR. DICKERSON STATES THAT “THE RMASTER**
18 **RESULTS TABLE IS NOT AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW ...” IS THERE A**
19 **TECHNIQUE TO VIEW THE RMASTER DATA?**

20

21 A. Yes. As noted above, the post optimization Quantity contents of RMaster are
22 available from the reporting screen. In addition, the revenue contents of RMaster,
23 post optimization, are available through the use of the Reporting screen of BACE.
24 To access this revenue data, the user would select “Revenue and Cost” as the
25 “Report Data Source” on the Report screen of BACE and select “Rev” as the

1 "Account Category" as the filter. Also the new Demonstration database allows
2 the user to open intermediate results tables, including table RMaster.

3

4 **Q. MR. DICKERSON (REBUTTAL PAGE 2, LINES 14-17) INDICATES**
5 **THAT BACE IS "FATALLY FLAWED." MR. WOOD (REBUTTAL**
6 **PAGE 2, LINE 10) INDICATES THAT BACE IS STRUCTURALLY**
7 **LIMITED. WHAT IS YOUR RESPONSE?**

8

9 A. I disagree. While some of the parties have identified what they may believe are
10 unusual results (which I will describe later in my testimony), there is nothing in
11 the testimony of Mr. Dickerson, Mr. Webber, Mr. Wood, Dr. Staihr, or Dr. Bryant
12 that indicates anyone has identified any fatal errors, or for that matter any errors,
13 in the model platform or model operations. Outside of misunderstandings of the
14 operations of BACE, all the issues that have been raised in regard to BACE and
15 its output are input driven. In fact, Dr. Bryant states (page 31 of his Rebuttal): "I
16 cannot fault the general approach outlined in Mr. Stegeman's testimony and in the
17 model documentation."

18

19 **Q. DESPITE CRITICISMS, HAVE OTHER WITNESSES USED BACE TO**
20 **SUPPORT THEIR POSITIONS?**

21

22 A. Yes. While some of the reviewers claim that BACE is flawed, the reviewers use
23 the model, with inputs of their choice, to support their own positions. For
24 example, Mr. Wood states (rebuttal page 2, line 13): "it is impossible in many
25 cases to populate the model with meaningful input values" and (rebuttal page 22):

1 "I have not been able to determine whether the model calculations are
2 accurate...renders the results unreliable." Yet on page 19, lines 20 and 21 he
3 states: "When inputs and assumptions are used that do reflect such reasonable
4 judgment, the results of the BACE indicated that a rational CLEC" and at
5 page 8, line 9: "As BellSouth's BACE model can be used to demonstrate"
6 (emphasis added).

7
8 It appears that Mr. Wood populated the model with (what he considered to be)
9 meaningful inputs and the results were reliable (unless he is indicating that his
10 inputs and results are not meaningful or reliable). Alternatively, he has
11 concluded, albeit in a circular fashion, that the only reliable and meaningful inputs
12 are those that show impairment in every wire center in Florida. In either case, his
13 approach appears self-serving.

14
15 **Q. MR. WOOD CLAIMS (PAGE 5 OF HIS REBUTTAL) THE MODEL IS**
16 **NOT STABLE AND DOES NOT PRODUCE CONSISTENT RESULTS? IS**
17 **THIS TRUE?**

18
19 A. Not at all. I will focus specifically upon Mr. Wood in more detail later in this
20 testimony, however, Mr. Wood's accusation is unsupported and unjustified.

21
22 **Q. ARE YOU MAKING ANY MODIFICATIONS TO BACE WITH THIS**
23 **FILING TO ENSURE IT PROVIDES THE MOST ACCURATE**
24 **INFORMATION?**

25

1 A. I am. As an initial matter, I remain committed to submitting the best possible
2 model to this Commission. This means that any modifications, even minor
3 modifications, will be made, if necessary to present the most accurate version of
4 BACE. There are three corrections I am making with this filing. One correction
5 relates to two wire centers -- MIAMFLAG and HMSTFLAF -- which were
6 inadvertently assigned to the Fort Lauderdale FL CEA in the supplemental filing
7 made on Jan. 21st and which should have been assigned to the Miami FL CEA.
8 This correction can be made manually by correcting the CEA assignment in
9 tblExchangeInfo (within Access) or Exchange Information (within the BACE
10 interface) for the two wire centers.

11

12 The second correction addresses LATA codes within the BellSouth scenario.
13 Inadvertently, the original data had a mix of 3 digit and 5 digit LATA codes. The
14 5 digit codes are actually sub-LATAs and were not intended for use within
15 BACE. Subsequently, the 4th and 5th digits are being truncated, thereby reducing
16 the "LATA" count in the model from 10 to 7.

17

18 Third, in creating the mileage from the wire centers to the access tandem in the
19 LATA for the truncation issue noted above, we discovered that the mileage values
20 in the current BellSouth scenario were calculated incorrectly. These distances
21 have been corrected.

22

23 While these changes can be made manually, the number of changes is easier to
24 handle by issuing an updated BellSouth scenario. To that end, an updated

1 BellSouth scenario (BellSouth_FL_Refiled_Jan28) can be downloaded from the
2 BACE support site (topp.costquest.com).

3
4 The update to this scenario is the replacement of the tblExchangeInfo and
5 tblLocHierarchy tables. A user should be aware that older scenarios will be
6 incorrect. The user can either replicate the changes they have made to this new
7 scenario or simply copy tblExchangeInfo and tblLocHierarchy from the new
8 scenario to any old scenario.

9
10 Section 3.

11 **THE REBUTTAL BY CLECS CONCERNING BACE IS INCONSISTENT AND**
12 **CONTRADICTIONARY**

13
14 **Q. EARLIER YOU STATED THAT THE REBUTTAL TESTIMONY BY THE**
15 **CLEC WITNESSES IS INCONSISTENT AND CONTRADICTIONARY**
16 **REGARDING BACE. PLEASE EXPLAIN THIS STATEMENT.**

17
18 **A.** There are four major areas of inconsistency and contradiction: 1) whether the
19 fundamental BACE approach is reasonable; 2) whether BACE is sensitive or
20 insensitive to changes in inputs; 3) whether BACE optimization should be
21 utilized; and, 4) which inputs are appropriate. I address the first three items in my
22 testimony. With respect to inputs, these will be addressed in the testimony of
23 other BellSouth witnesses such as Drs. Aron and Billingsley.

24

1 **Q. WHAT INCONSISTENCIES EXIST IN THE CLEC WITNESSES**
2 **TESTIMONY REGARDING THE FUNDAMENTAL APPROACH**
3 **UTILIZED BY BACE?**
4

5 A. Mr. Wood makes vague and unsubstantiated claims about the appropriateness of
6 BACE. For example, he states: “the structural limitations of the model cannot be
7 corrected ...” (Wood rebuttal, page 2, line 10) and “I have been able to determine
8 that the model does not consider all barriers to entry, ...” (Wood rebuttal page 22,
9 lines 14, 15).

10
11 In contrast, Dr. Bryant states: “... with one or two exceptions that I discuss below,
12 I cannot fault the general approach outlined in Mr. Stegeman’s testimony and in
13 the model documentation.” (Bryant rebuttal, page 31, lines 4-6) And, “... I do not
14 disagree with the general approach to estimating CLEC profitability outlined in
15 Dr. Aron’s and Mr. Stegeman’s testimony.” (Bryant rebuttal, page 31, lines 4-6)

16
17 **Q. WHAT INCONSISTENCIES EXIST IN DISCUSSIONS OF WHETHER**
18 **BACE IS SENSITIVE OR INSENSITIVE TO CHANGES IN INPUTS?**
19

20 A. Mr. Wood claims that even slight changes to key inputs yield drastically different
21 results (Wood rebuttal, page 18, lines 15-18). In contrast, Dr. Bryant believes that
22 BACE is not sensitive to at least some input changes (Bryant rebuttal, pages 30-
23 31).
24

1 Q. **IS IT POSSIBLE TO ASSESS MR. WOOD'S CLAIM THAT SLIGHT**
2 **CHANGES TO INPUTS YIELD DRASTICALLY DIFFERENT RESULTS?**

3

4 A. No. Like much of Mr. Wood's testimony regarding BACE, this is an
5 unsubstantiated assertion. Unlike other witnesses reviewing BACE, Mr. Wood
6 does not cite or provide even a single numerical result from BACE. Moreover,
7 Mr. Wood only suggests one input change with any specificity. That change is
8 the suggested 5.1% annual price change (based on a review of long distance
9 prices 1984-1993). Even in this case, he does not specify whether he would apply
10 this change to the default input values (which already reflect price reductions
11 below existing prices).

12

13 Q. **WHAT INCONSISTENCIES EXIST ACROSS THE PARTIES IN**
14 **DISCUSSIONS OF WHETHER THE BACE OPTIMIZATION ROUTINES**
15 **SHOULD BE UTILIZED?**

16

17 A. Dr. Staihr suggests that some, but not all, of the BACE optimization toggles
18 should be turned off. In addition, Dr. Staihr adds the equivalent of a new user-
19 created optimization: "Sprint eliminated the lowest quintile of residential
20 customers ..." Indeed, the elimination of the lowest quintile of residential
21 customers obviously more than offset turning off three of the BACE optimization
22 toggles (since he notes the somewhat higher overall NPV in the Sprint run for
23 BellSouth's markets as compared to BellSouth's BACE runs) (Staihr rebuttal,
24 page 18).

25

1 In contrast, Mr. Wood appears to believe that segmentation, optimization and
2 cream skimming are to be abhorred and no amount of data could convince him
3 that they do, or even could, exist (Wood rebuttal, pages 32-37). Mr. Wood claims
4 that firms investing in switches "... will have the incentive to serve as many
5 customers as possible as quickly as possible ... and will hardly be in the position
6 to be selective about its customer base." (Wood rebuttal, pages 35-36) (the error
7 of this argument is discussed by Dr. Aron).

8
9 Mr. Dickerson runs BACE with the optimization filters off (e.g. Dickerson
10 rebuttal, page 33, line 15), but later complains that now some wire centers and
11 some customers segments for wire centers now have negative NPVs (Dickerson,
12 pages 31-34) and it is possible for one to aggregate profitable and unprofitable
13 segments and geographic areas. Dr. Bryant used a similar approach is used
14 (rebuttal page 33), with a similar complaint: that now positive and negative NPV
15 results can be aggregated together (citing one wire center with negative NPV
16 mass market customers, but more than compensating positive NPV enterprise
17 customers). It appears the solution is the continued use (rather than the
18 abandonment) of a number of the optimization filters. More importantly, the
19 power and (ease of use) of the BACE model allows Dr. Bryant, and Mr.
20 Dickerson to consider (and describe in their rebuttal testimony) results at such a
21 granular level of detail (e.g., NPV by customer type by wire center).

22
23 Section 4. **CLARIFICATION OF BACE FEATURES AND**
24 **MISINTERPRETATIONS OF BACE**

25

1 **Q. MR. WOOD CLAIMS THAT BACE PRICE INPUTS DON'T REFLECT**
2 **VARIATIONS IN RETAIL PRICES ACROSS THE STATE. IS HE**
3 **CORRECT?**

4
5 A. No. While the quintile (in the case of retail customer's) average price/average
6 revenue per user (ARPU) is determined at the state level, the number and the
7 percentage of customers falling into each quintile (for residence for example)
8 varies by wire center based on both the retail prices that actually exist in the wire
9 center and the propensity of customers in the wire center to purchase services in
10 each of the major service categories.

11
12 For example, if wire center A is in a low-priced rate center (i.e., customers facing
13 low tariffed rates), it will tend (other things being equal) to have customers with
14 actual spend characteristics that are below the state wide average and will
15 therefore have a higher proportion of mass-market customers in the lower spend
16 quintiles. If wire center B is in a high-priced rate center, its customer's actual
17 spend levels are likely to be relatively high and they will tend to have a higher
18 proportion of mass-market customers in the higher spend quintiles.

19
20 Mr. Wood's claim (rebuttal page 37, line 23 - page 38, line 3) that customers are
21 "allocated" from the state level down to wire centers is incorrect. And while the
22 actual spend information by individual customers is not retained from the original
23 data source, actual customer spend information by wire center is used to
24 determine the number of customers in each wire center that fall into each of the
25 customer spend categories.

1 From this starting point of actual expenditures by wire center by customer group,
2 the user can establish starting CLEC price discounts, changes in the discounts
3 over time, starting bundle prices, and changes in bundle prices over time.
4

5 **Q. MR. WEBBER STATES (REBUTTAL PAGES 5 AND 6) WITH REGARD**
6 **TO EELS THAT “THE BACE MODEL RELIES ON NETWORK**
7 **ARCHITECTURES THAT ARE COMPLETELY UNPROVEN IN THE**
8 **MARKET.” CAN YOU CLARIFY HOW EELS WORKS WITHIN BACE**
9 **AND COMMENT ON MR. WEBBER’S ASSERTION?**

10
11 A. Yes. In regard to EELs, if the user specifies, the model will determine whether
12 collocation or EELs will be used on a wire center by wire center basis. This
13 determination considers the difference in NPV between a full collocation
14 approach and a full EELs approach at each wire center. Regardless of one’s
15 perspective regarding the use of EELS, Mr. Webber is incorrect since the user of
16 the model is free to turn EELs completely off so that only collocation is used.
17 Moreover, in a run that I made without EELs, no market changed in classification
18 (impaired / non-impaired), no wire center changed from positive to negative NPV,
19 and the total CLEC NPV decreased by less than \$300,000 or by less than one
20 tenth of 1%. Obviously, whether EELs are employed or not is not a critical issue
21 (indeed, it is virtually irrelevant) in the determination of impairment.
22

23 **Q: IS MR. DICKERSON’S COLLOCATION BUILD OUT COST ANALYSIS**
24 **AN APPLES-TO-APPLES COMPARISON?**

25

1 A: No. In Mr. Dickerson's attempts to compare the ColloBuildOut cost element
2 within BACE to Sprint's collocation build out costs, he has incorrectly included
3 Sprint's engineering and DC power cabling costs in the comparison because these
4 costs are included elsewhere in BellSouth's filed inputs to BACE, which I will
5 discuss later in this testimony. Thus, Mr. Dickerson's conclusion that BACE has
6 understated the costs related to collocation build-out is based on a flawed
7 analysis.

8

9 **Q: HAVE YOU BEEN ABLE TO CORRECT MR. DICKERSON'S ANALYSIS**
10 **TO MAKE A FAIR COMPARISON OF THE COLLOBUILDOUT COST**
11 **ELEMENT WITH SPRINT'S COSTS AS IDENTIFIED IN KWD-4?**

12

13 A: Yes. Holding aside a determination as to whether Mr. Dickerson's values are
14 correct (or not) and whether his DC power assumptions are correct, removing the
15 Engineering Initial, Engineering Augment and Power Cabling costs from Mr.
16 Dickerson's analysis (since they are accounted for elsewhere in BACE) changes
17 the results significantly. Rather than underestimating ColloBuildOut costs by
18 554% for the six (6) randomly selected wire centers as Mr. Dickerson suggests,
19 Mr. Dickerson's analysis indicates that BACE over-estimates ColloBuildOut
20 costs by 50% as can be seen in the table below.

21

22

23

24

25

		a	b	c = a-b	d = c/b	
		Sprint Calc		BACE Calc of		
		of	DSO			
		Lines	Collo Build	ColloBuildOut	Percent	
<u>Line</u>	<u>Wire Center</u>	<u>Year 10</u>	<u>Out NPVs</u>	<u>NPVs</u>	<u>Difference</u>	<u>Difference</u>
1	DYBHFLPO	6,605	\$3,072	\$6,898	\$(3,826)	-55%
2	HLWDFLPE	17,440	\$3,072	\$6,998	\$(3,926)	-56%
3	MIAMFLOL	3,990	\$3,072	\$5,988	\$(2,916)	-49%
4	MRTHFLVE	1,311	\$3,072	\$5,759	\$(2,687)	-47%
5	PRSNFLFD	339	\$3,072	\$5,724	\$(2,652)	-46%
6	SBSTFLMA	2,253	\$3,072	\$5,856	\$(2,784)	-48%
7	Total		\$18,432	\$37,223	\$(18,791)	-50%

1

2 **Q: WHERE ARE CLEC ENGINEERING AND DC POWER CABLING**
3 **COSTS CAPTURED WITHIN BACE?**

4

5 **A:** BACE captures the initial engineering of collocation space (and augments) as part
6 of the general engineering costs which are included in the G&A costs of BACE.

1 This is noted in BellSouth's response to interrogatory No. 6 of Sprint's Third Set
2 of Interrogatories. An excerpt from the response follows:

3

6512	Provisioning expense	G&A
6531	Power expense	G&A
6533	Testing expense	G&A
6535	Engineering expense	G&A

4

5 Further, as noted in BellSouth's response to No. 15 of Sprint's Fifth Set of
6 Interrogatories, the costs related to DC power cabling is captured as part of the
7 cost generated via the application of the InPlant and Power factors to the
8 collocation equipment (e.g., DLC, multiplexing, etc). Since these factors are
9 applied within BACE whenever the CLEC requires additional capacity due to
10 demand, these costs are demand sensitive.

11

12 **Q: MR. DICKERSON CLAIMS THAT THE BACE COLLOCATION BUILD-**
13 **OUT COSTS ARE NOT DEMAND-SENSITIVE. IS THIS CORRECT?**

14

15 **A:** No. While it is true that the ColloBuildOut cost element in BACE is not demand
16 sensitive, Mr. Dickerson's failure to properly identify other collocation cost
17 elements has lead to his misunderstanding and further demonstrates flaws in his

1 analysis. As just noted, DC Power cabling costs that Mr. Dickerson has included
2 as part of collocation build out are captured by BACE within the factors which are
3 applied to collocation equipment and are thus demand sensitive. In addition,
4 although Mr. Dickerson's analysis ignores these costs completely, and as noted in
5 Wayne Gray's surrebuttal testimony, BACE includes the non-recurring cost of
6 Cable Records, rates for which are based per 100 pair.

7
8 **Q: ARE THERE POTENTIAL DEMAND-SENSITIVE COSTS INCLUDED IN**
9 **BACE AS FIXED COSTS?**

10
11 **A:** Yes. For ease of modeling and based on the relative magnitude of these potential
12 demand-sensitive costs relative to the overall CLEC costs, BellSouth has made
13 some assumptions and captures these costs as part of a fixed monthly collocation
14 cost element. For example, although Mr. Dickerson is correct that floor space
15 requirements are dependent on the number of frames required which is ultimately
16 dependent on demand (non-linear), BACE assumes that each CLEC cageless
17 collocation site has 100 square feet. As noted in the surrebuttal testimony of Mr.
18 Wayne Gray, the use of 100 square feet should provide ample space at most
19 collocation sites (and is thus somewhat conservative). However, given that floor
20 space accounts for only a fraction (0.18%) of the overall CLEC PV cost, and the
21 additional modeling rigor required to account for these relatively minor costs,
22 BellSouth decided to make a standard, conservative assumption to capture these
23 costs.

24

1 **Q: ARE MR. DICKERSON'S CLAIMS THAT BACE UNDERESTIMATES**
2 **DC POWER CONSUMPTION COSTS SIGNIFICANT?**

3
4 A: No. Even if we were to assume that the underlying assumptions and inputs used
5 in Mr. Dickerson's analysis are correct, the changes suggested have a minimal
6 impact on the BACE results. Based on results from the original BACE filing in
7 FL that Mr. Dickerson analyzed, the power consumption cost accounts for
8 approximately 30% of the MonthlyCollo cost element. But with the total PV cost
9 of MonthlyCollo representing only 0.5% of the total PV cost for the CLEC, the
10 affect of changing the power assumption would impact only 0.15% of the total
11 CLEC cost.

12
13 Finally, it is important to note that the user of BACE decides what inputs should
14 be broken out in more detail and how the costs are triggered and driven. That is,
15 the user limits input specificity, BACE does NOT limit the specificity.
16 Therefore, if Mr. Dickerson feels that the cost for power input is insufficient and
17 needs to be adjusted, he can make changes to the inputs to capture his desired
18 specificity.

19
20 **Q. MR. DICKERSON STATES (REBUTTAL PAGE 12) THAT THE**
21 **COLLOCATION VS. EELS OPTIMIZATION WITHIN THE BACE**
22 **MODEL IS UNRELIABLE. PLEASE RESPOND.**

23
24 A. First, note that Mr. Dickerson's characterization of the collocation vs. EELs
25 optimizations is based solely on his claims regarding costs; he does not appear to

1 provide any consideration of revenues. It also appears that Mr. Dickerson has
2 misunderstood how this optimization in the BACE model is performed. The
3 collocation/EELs optimization routine within the BACE model does not simply
4 compare the initial costs (or PVs) of implementing collocation and EELs. Such
5 an approach would be short-sighted and insufficient to represent a sound business
6 case analysis as is required by the TRO. Rather, the BACE model optimization is
7 a comparison of the 10-year NPV (revenue less cost) associated with the
8 collocation and EELs approaches. All possible revenue streams and cost outlays
9 are included in the NPV analysis ensuring that the most economic approach is
10 selected. Key components of the differences between the EELs and collocation
11 scenarios are:

- 12 1. DSL service can only be offered in the collocation scenario. Therefore,
13 the EELs scenario is (potentially) at a significant revenue disadvantage
14 depending on the CLEC demand of the wire center.
- 15 2. Collocation thus has the additional burden of the DSL costs, but since
16 DSL can provide positive contribution, the collocation scenario has an
17 advantage.
- 18 3. EELs transport from the BellSouth end office to the BellSouth Access
19 Tandem is not concentrated and thus is significantly more expensive than
20 the concentrated transport that is used when the CLEC collocates at the
21 end office.

22

23 **Q. DR. BRYANT SUGGESTS (REBUTTAL PAGE 31) THAT BACE**
24 **SOMETIMES PRODUCES “ANOMALOUS RESULTS.” PLEASE**
25 **COMMENT ON THIS.**

1 At page 31 of his rebuttal testimony, Dr. Bryant states that he increases "...
2 customer churn rate from 6.5% to 8.33%. All other inputs to the model were
3 held constant." He claims that this resulted in 29 wire centers becoming more
4 profitable. I attempted to replicate Dr. Bryant's finding by changing the churn of
5 Mass Market customers only, changing the churn all customers, leaving
6 optimization as filed, and turning it off. In each instance, when I increased the
7 customer churn rates, NPV declined. Based on my review, I suspect that Dr.
8 Bryant changed more than one input value. Perhaps he created a scenario with
9 one input change, then he made an additional change without changing and
10 renaming the scenario.

11

12 Section 5. **ADDITIONAL REBUTTAL OF MR. WOOD**

13

14 **Q. DOES MR. WOOD MAKE UNDOCUMENTED ASSERTIONS**
15 **REGARDING BACE?**

16

17 A. Yes. Mr. Wood makes a variety of claims and assertions regarding BACE.
18 However, unlike other witnesses in this proceeding, he fails to provide a single
19 numerical result from BACE, nor does he provide an exhibit with any BACE
20 results. Such undocumented assertions provide no available information by
21 which his assertions can be evaluated, and should be viewed with skepticism
22 given the lack of foundation.

23

1 **Q. DOES MR. WOOD CONFUSE SHORTCOMINGS OF A MODEL (BACE**
2 **IN THIS CASE) WITH DISAGREEMENT REGARDING INPUT**
3 **CHOICES?**

4
5 A. Yes. At several points in his rebuttal testimony, Mr. Wood makes assertions
6 regarding BACE, but only provides associated rhetoric related to the choice of the
7 input values. For example, at page 38, he states: “The BACE goes on to assign
8 different CLEC market share for the different customer spending segments ...”.
9 The user of course determines CLEC shares by segment, over time if they choose.
10 However, as I note elsewhere in my surrebuttal testimony, when Mr. Wood
11 populates the model with unspecified inputs of his choosing it provides results he
12 finds comport with his view of the world.

13
14 **Q. DOES MR. WOOD MAKE UNDOCUMENTED AND MISLEADING**
15 **ASSERTIONS REGARDING CRASHES OF THE BACE MODEL?**

16
17 A. Yes. At page 5 of his rebuttal he asserts that he has not been able to complete
18 analysis of BACE, apparently in part since “[o]ur efforts continue to be
19 encumbered by the frequent crashes of the model and the limitations of the model
20 wizard.” I have several responses.

21
22 First, Mr. Wood’s comment is surprising in light of the fact that in operating
23 BACE, I (and my team) and the LECG team have had no problems with crashes.
24 I have determined that the model is stable, consistent, and operates as stated in the
25 documentation.

1 Second, I am unaware of similar complaints from other parties. Given the
2 number of runs documented by Sprint and MCI in their rebuttal testimony, the
3 natural conclusion would be that problems with crashes in BACE would have
4 been raised through these parties, had they occurred.

5
6 Third, emails and phone calls to the BACE model support team are illustrative.
7 When an employee of Wood and Wood Consulting contacted BellSouth's BACE
8 support manager in early December 2003, raising concerns with initial slow run
9 times and log-in problems in running BACE, these concerns appeared to be
10 caused because an attempt to run BACE in a shared-server environment. BACE
11 was not designed to run in, nor was it tested for, a shared-server environment.
12 These concerns appeared to be resolved by December 11, 2003 through the use of
13 BACE on a stand-alone computer platform. Thereafter, BellSouth responded to
14 additional questions from Wood and Wood consulting about how to perform runs
15 on the model from December 11-15, 2003. However, no concerns relating to
16 frequent "crashes" were raised between December 11, 2003 (once the appropriate
17 computer platform was used) and the filing of Mr. Wood's rebuttal testimony.

18
19 Since Mr. Wood's rebuttal testimony was filed with this Commission on January
20 7, 2004, nearly four weeks later, to state that AT&T's "efforts continue to be
21 encumbered by frequent crashes ..." (emphasis added) is misleading. On January
22 15, 2004, after Mr. Wood's rebuttal testimony was filed, a concern relating to
23 crashes was communicated to BellSouth. The timing of this "concern", in light of
24 Mr. Wood's other unsubstantiated claims, seems somewhat questionable.

25

1 Q. MR. WOOD ALSO COMPLAINS THAT LIMITATIONS OF THE BACE
2 MODEL WIZARD HAVE ENCUMBERED HIS EVALUATION OF BACE
3 (WOOD REBUTTAL PAGE 5). IS THIS A VALID COMPLAINT?

4

5 A. Certainly not, for at least three reasons. First, the user has the option to either use
6 the BACE wizard, or create and run scenarios outside the wizard. Second, other
7 models (e.g. HCPM, BCPM) either do not have a wizard, or do not have an
8 extensive wizard. Third, the BACE model wizard is designed for ease of use,
9 especially for those without the skill or time to examine the model in great detail.
10 Anyone genuinely seeking to evaluate a model, and having the skills to even
11 initially evaluate a model, should not need to rely only on a model wizard alone.
12 For example, any party requesting the source code to a model should not need to
13 rely upon the model wizard for evaluation. Claiming that the limitations of a
14 model wizard creates an encumbrance to review is akin to an auto mechanic
15 claiming that a car needs more gauges and lights by the steering wheel in order to
16 readily evaluate the engine; popping the hood is still an option if you are actually
17 a mechanic.

18

19 Q. MR. WOOD STATES (REBUTTAL, PAGE 21, LINE 18) THAT BACE
20 HAS NO PLACE TO ENTER A PROJECT BETA. IS IT NECESSARY TO
21 INPUT A PROJECT BETA IN ORDER TO CALCULATE ECONOMIC
22 IMPAIRMENT?

23

24 A. No. From a modeling perspective, BACE provides input values for the pre-tax
25 cost of capital, the cost of equity, federal and state tax rates and the proportion of

1 equity. Nothing more is required to determine the cost of capital used in BACE.
2 As Dr. Billingsley has described, beta is fully reflected in these values, so there is
3 no further role for beta to play. To the best of my knowledge, no other
4 telecommunications cost model (e.g., BCPM, HCPM, HAI, BSTLM) allows for
5 the specific input of a project beta. Indeed, it appears that AT&T's cost
6 disadvantage model does not allow the input of a beta.

7
8 **Q. MR. WOOD ASSERTS (REBUTTAL PAGE 26, LINES 16-18) THAT IT IS**
9 **IMPOSSIBLE TO ACCURATELY DETERMINE THE REVENUES THAT**
10 **A CLEC IS LIKELY TO RECEIVE WITHOUT THE ABILITY TO INPUT**
11 **FUTURE PRICE CHANGES BY WIRE CENTER. DO YOU AGREE?**

12
13 A. No, for several reasons. First, as I discussed above, BACE already leverages a
14 powerful database that reflects actual prices and actual spend levels by wire
15 center. Therefore, the starting market prices and customer expenditures are
16 specific to the wire center and customer segment.

17
18 Second, BACE allows the user to determine CLEC price discounts by customer
19 segment, by market, over time (if the user wishes). BACE also allows the user to
20 establish bundle prices by customer segment by market and changes in bundle
21 prices over time. Further, BACE allows the user to determine CLEC penetration
22 by customer segment over time. In designing BACE, there seemed to be no need
23 to forecast prices changes on a wire center basis.

24

1 Third, it is unreasonable to expect a user would be willing to perform the task of
2 inputting even initial prices by wire center, let alone forecast future prices by wire
3 center. BellSouth has a large number of wire centers in its service area in Florida
4 each with 17 customer-spend categories in BACE. Each of these would have with
5 approximately 15 services, each requiring data (under Mr. Wood's approach) for
6 10 years; this leads to over a half million data entries.

7
8 Fourth, Mr. Wood's claim that wire-center level price forecasts are necessary is at
9 odds with AT&T's model which provides no price information, nor ability to
10 input price forecasts of any kind.

11
12 Fifth, Mr. Wood's claim that wire-center level price forecasts are necessary is at
13 odds with his prior claim (rebuttal page 5) that he and his team are encumbered by
14 the limitations of the BACE wizard. Recall that Mr. Wood is also the only party
15 to complain about the limitations of the wizard. Logic suggests that Mr. Wood
16 should be the last party to attempt the daunting and unnecessary task of
17 forecasting prices by wire center

18

19 **Q. MR. WOOD CLAIMS "THE [BACE] USER HAS NO ABILITY TO**
20 **CONSIDER A SHORTER INVESTMENT HORIZON [THAN 10 YEARS]**
21 **THAT A RATIONAL INVESTOR WOULD CONSIDER BEFORE**
22 **MAKING AN INVESTMENT IN A LARGE, FIXED ASSET SUCH AS A**
23 **LOCAL CIRCUIT SWITCH." WHAT IS YOUR REACTION?**

24

1 A. First, Mr. Wood's statement is at odds with the time horizon of AT&T's cost
2 disadvantage model. Mr. Turner indicates (direct, page 27, line 23) that AT&T's
3 analysis uses a 10-year study period.

4

5 Second, my team has examined the inputs to the model, both the Input Portfolio
6 attached to Turner's testimony and the software itself, and there does not appear
7 to be any mechanism to change the study period. We can only assume that the
8 overall study period of AT&T's model is fixed at ten years.

9

10 Third, other models use a 10-year period or a longer period for the evaluation of
11 economic impairment. The NRRI model (the pre-cursor of Dr. Bryant's model)
12 used asset lives to determine impairment analysis through a TELRIC type costing
13 approach. As such, the time horizon for the costs of assets ranges from 6-30
14 years. The switch was ten years. In looking at other industry models, the SPR
15 model submitted in other states actually uses a 25-year time horizon for cash
16 flows.

17

18 Fourth, in is my understanding that AT&T and MCI have consistently advocated
19 the use of FCC depreciation lives in cost proceedings. My understanding is that
20 the prescribed FCC depreciation lives applicable to BellSouth range from 8 to 30
21 years, depending on the type of equipment and the low and high ranges.

22 Moreover, Mr. Turner employed a 13-year switch life input in the AT&T model.

23 However, in his rebuttal testimony, Mr. Wood implies that a switch needs to be
24 recovered in some period less than ten years. Certainly, a 10-year study period is
25 conservative for assets with lives longer than ten years.

1 Fifth, BACE allows at least an approximation of shorter period analyses by
2 zeroing out market share inputs for later years, although as discussed by Dr. Aron
3 this type of procedure, if done correctly, should not alter the NPV of the CLEC.

4

5 Section 6. **BACE IS CLEARLY SUPERIOR TO AT&T'S MODEL IN MEETING**
6 **THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE TRO AND CRITERIA DISCUSSED BY MR.**
7 **WOOD.**

8

9 **Q. ISN'T AT&T THE SAME PARTY THAT SPONSORED A MODEL THAT**
10 **MR. WOOD CLAIMED IS RELEVANT FOR THIS PROCEEDING?**

11

12 **A.** Yes, and Mr. Wood mentions Mr. Turner's results (Wood rebuttal pages 14 and
13 15).

14

15 **Q. GIVEN THE MODEL REQUIREMENTS IMPLIED BY THE TRO, AND**
16 **THE MODEL CRITERIA DISCUSSED BY MR. WOOD, HOW DOES**
17 **BACE COMPARE WITH THE AT&T MODEL?**

18

19 **A.** BACE is clearly superior.

20

21 **Q. MR. WOOD (REBUTTAL PAGE 29) CLAIMS THAT BACE FAILS TO**
22 **MEET THE BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR AN IMPAIRMENT MODEL**
23 **THAT YOU SPECIFY IN YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY. PLEASE**
24 **COMPARE AND CONTRAST BELL SOUTH'S BACE MODEL WITH**
25 **AT&T'S MODEL.**

1 A. In my direct testimony I discussed at length (pages 8-18) the characteristics that
 2 must exist for a model to be consistent with the TRO. Below I provide a table
 3 with the four major categories of characteristics, comparing how BACE and
 4 AT&T's model meet the four required characteristics.

Characteristic	BACE	AT&T model
1) Capable of granular analysis	yes	yes as to cost, no as to revenue
2) Consistent with efficient CLEC business model & architecture	yes	no
3) Incorporate all likely CLEC revenues and costs	yes	no
4) Perform a business case analysis using NPV	yes	no

6

7 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE ENTRIES IN THE TABLE ABOVE.**

8

9 A. In my direct testimony I described in detail how the BACE model meets these
 10 four major characteristics. Thus, I will briefly describe the entries for the AT&T
 11 model only. First, in regard to "Capable of granular analysis," while the AT&T
 12 model considers some cost information at the wire center level, its level of
 13 granularity is not sufficient for this proceeding since it does not consider key
 14 information on all CLEC cost components. In addition, the AT&T model has no
 15 information at a gross or granular level regarding revenues. Having a model that
 16 is capable of granular analysis for only a subset of the information needed to
 17 assess economic impairment is simply not useful. This is analogous to needing

1 detailed loop costs but only having the granularity in the feeder portion of the
2 loop; it simply doesn't provide sufficient information to meet the needs of the
3 Commission in this proceeding.

4
5 Second, concerning "Consistent with efficient CLEC business model &
6 architecture," the AT&T model does not provide for optimization in CLEC
7 service offerings and engineering, does not consider all potential CLEC product
8 offerings, and does not consider all potential customers (e.g., across multiple
9 ILECs in a wire center). If a model does not consider the opportunities for a
10 CLEC to optimize its business, it will tend to overstate CLEC costs and/or
11 understate CLEC revenues; this could lead to an erroneous finding of impairment.

12
13 Third, regarding "Incorporate all likely CLEC revenues and costs," the AT&T
14 model does not consider revenues at all, and it ignores certain CLEC costs. Thus,
15 the AT&T model fails to provide any meaningful result; it only provides a cost
16 /output picture that is, incomplete, and insufficient to satisfy the requirements of
17 the TRO.

18
19 And fourth, concerning "Perform a business case analysis using NPV," while the
20 AT&T model does appear to use some present value calculations, it does not
21 perform a business case analysis. A net present value calculation reflects the
22 present value of revenues net of the present value of costs; yet the AT&T model
23 does not consider revenues nor does it consider all relevant costs. Because the
24 AT&T model has no revenue information at all, it cannot provide an NPV

1 calculation and cannot be utilized to measure economic impairment as established
2 within the TRO.

3

4 **Q. CAN YOU ELABORATE ON THE SECOND (OF THE FOUR MAJOR**
5 **MODEL CHARACTERISTICS YOU LIST ABOVE), WHICH REFERS TO**
6 **AN EFFICIENT CLEC BUSINESS MODEL AND DESCRIBE WHETHER**
7 **BACE AND THE AT&T MODEL SATISFY THIS CHARACTERISTIC?**

8

9 A. Yes. In order to satisfy the TROs requirements to reflect an efficient CLEC's
10 activities, BACE allows the user to incorporate CLEC optimizing activities that
11 could lead to either lower CLEC costs or greater opportunities for CLEC
12 revenues. In the table below, I have identified some of the key dimensions over
13 which a CLEC might optimize its network or its service offerings in order to be
14 efficient, and whether each of the models allows optimization for that dimension
15 of activity.

Dimension Over Which to Optimize	BACE	AT&T model
1) EELs or collocation	yes	no
2) DSL within the wire center	yes	no
3) Provide (or not provide) service in total for a wire center	yes	no
4) Provide (or not provide) service for Mass Market customers for a market	yes	no
5) Provide (or not provide) service for Enterprise customers for a market	yes	no
6) Provide (or not provide) CLEC service in total for a market	yes	no

7) Provide (or not provide) CLEC service in total for a LATA	yes	no
8) Place (or not place) a switch in each LATA	no	no
9) Place (or not place) a fiber ring	no	no

1

2 **Q. WHAT IS THE IMPLICATION OF BOTH BACE AND THE AT&T**
3 **MODEL NOT OPTIMIZING ON ITEMS 8 AND 9 IN THE TABLE**
4 **ABOVE?**

5

6 A. Any model that does not incorporate an opportunity for the CLEC to reduce costs
7 or gain revenues, by not providing optimization in a dimension of CLEC
8 activities, has the potential to overstate the CLEC's costs, or understate revenues.
9 Such omissions therefore have the potential to overstate impairment, i.e. to
10 indicate economic impairment when it does not actually exist. BACE is therefore
11 conservative in these two dimensions and it may overstate CLEC costs. As a
12 result, BACE may overstate economic impairment. The AT&T model is very
13 conservative (it may overstate CLEC costs) since it does not optimize in any of
14 the dimensions listed in the table above and further the AT&T model does not
15 model any CLEC revenues.

16

17 **Q. MR. WOOD CLAIMS (REBUTTAL PAGE 22, LINES 14-16) THAT BACE**
18 **DOES NOT REFLECT ALL CLEC BARRIERS TO ENTRY. HOW DOES**
19 **BACE COMPARE TO THE AT&T MODEL WITH RESPECT TO**
20 **CAPTURING ALL CLEC COSTS?**

21

1 A. Beginning at page 51 of my direct testimony, I list 15 cost items that are discussed
2 in the TRO and I describe how these cost items are included in BACE. While
3 AT&T's model incorporates many of the 15 cost items, it does not incorporate the
4 following (numbered in the same fashion as my original list of 15):

- 5 1) "Costs of purchasing and installing a switch" (TRO, ¶ 520);
6 2) "[T]he recurring and non-recurring charges paid to the incumbent LEC for
7 loops" (e.g., TRO, ¶ 520, and n. 1588) (The AT&T model only considers
8 the non-recurring costs);
9 5) "[T]he recurring and non-recurring charges paid to the incumbent LEC for
10 ... signaling" (TRO, paragraph 520); 9) "taking into consideration ... the
11 scale economies inherent to serving a wire center and the line density of
12 the wire center," the AT&T model deploys various levels of equipment
13 capacity and collocation space dependent upon the number of lines they
14 expect to serve in each wire center. However, the model serves all wire
15 centers regardless of the economics of serving all wire centers and
16 therefore it fails to reflect an efficient CLEC (see the rebuttal testimony of
17 Dr. Aron).
18 13) "taking into consideration ... the cost of maintenance, operations" (TRO,
19 ¶ 520); and 14); "taking into consideration ... the cost of ... other
20 administrative activities" (TRO, ¶ 520). (Underlining in my original
21 direct testimony.)
22

23 **Q. MR. WOOD COMPLAINS (PP. 23-27) ABOUT BACE'S TREATMENT OF**
24 **REVENUES AND PRICES. PLEASE COMPARE AND CONTRAST**
25 **BACE AND THE AT&T MODEL IN THESE DIMENSIONS.**

- 1 A. In the table below I compare BACE & the AT&T model with respect to their
 2 treatment of prices and revenues in relation to the TRO requirements and the
 3 complaints by Mr. Wood.
 4

Item	BACE	AT&T
Incorporates initial prices via a detailed database on revenues	yes	no
Incorporates geographic differences in the initial prices by wire center via variations in revenues by customer spend categories by wire center	yes	no
Number of major product categories	6	model has no revenue
Allows CLEC to introduce services over time	yes	no
Allows the use of initial CLEC price discount for a la carte services	yes	no
Considers the size of the total market in determining revenues	yes	no
Considers the effects of bundles of services	yes	no
Allows user to input price changes for a la carte prices	yes	no
Considers CLEC penetration in determining CLEC revenue	yes	no
Allows user to input price changes for bundle prices	yes	no
Allows changes in CLEC penetration over time and its affect on revenue	yes	no

Allows the user to vary price changes by service category (e.g., long distance)	yes	no
Provides a user with hundreds or thousands of pages of inputs to allow the user to establish prices by wire center	no	no
Allows the user to input different CLEC penetration rates by customer spend group	yes	no

1

2 **Q. ARE THERE OTHER COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE MODELS THAT**
 3 **ARE RELEVANT BASED ON THE TRO AND MR. WOOD’S REBUTTAL**
 4 **TESTIMONY?**

5

6 A. Yes. In the table below I list other comparisons that are relevant for the
 7 Commission in evaluating a model to assess economic impairment.

Item	BACE	AT&T
Number of years considered	10	10
Allows user to consider salvage value of equipment	yes	yes (but input is zero)
Provides a model wizard	yes	no
Considers income taxes	yes	no
Considers calculations of net income	yes	no
Allows the user to enter a project beta	no, not necessary	no, not necessary
Allows for revenue and penetration trends	yes	No for revenue, allows

		demand trend for cost
Allows costs to change over time	yes	no
Sizes equipment to correspond to demand	yes	yes
Allows the user to size equipment for specific number of years	yes	no
Allows the user to consider the economies gained from serving two or more ILEC territories in a LATA	yes	no
Provides a bright line test for impairment	yes	no

1

2 **Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?**

3

4 **A.** Yes it does.

1 **SUPPLEMENTAL TESTIMONY OF MR. JAMES W. STEGEMAN**
2 **ON BEHALF OF BELL SOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.**
3 **BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION**
4 **DOCKET NUMBER 030851-TP**
5 **FEBRUARY 23, 2004**

6
7 **Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS AFFILIATION.**

8
9 A. My name is James W. Stegeman. I am the President of CostQuest Associates, Inc.
10 I am testifying on behalf of BellSouth Telecommunications (“BellSouth”, “BST”
11 or the “Company”).

12
13 **Q. ARE YOU THE SAME JAMES W. STEGEMAN THAT FILED DIRECT**
14 **AND SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY IN THIS PROCEEDING?**

15
16 A. Yes. In my direct testimony I described the BellSouth Analysis of Competitive
17 Entry (“BACE”) model. In my surrebuttal, I addressed arguments concerning
18 BACE raised by Dr. Brian Stahr and Mr. Kent Dickerson (of Sprint), Mr. Don
19 Wood and Mr. Webber (of AT&T), and Dr. Mark Bryant (of MCI).

20
21 **Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR SUPPLEMENTAL TESTIMONY?**

22
23 A. I respond to the supplemental testimony of Sprint witnesses Kent W. Dickerson
24 and Christy Londerholm of Sprint (hereinafter the “Sprint witnesses”), the
25 confidential version of which I obtained Sunday, February 22, 2004.

1

2 **Q. THE SPRINT WITNESSES CLAIM THAT THEIR REVIEW OF BACE**
3 **HAS BEEN HINDERED BY THEIR LACK OF ACCESS TO EDITABLE**
4 **VERSION OF THE BACE SOURCE CODE IN A DEQUATE. HOW DO**
5 **YOU RESPOND?**

6

7 A. As an initial matter, there is nothing described by the Sprint witnesses that
8 required access to the editable version of the BACE source code (or for that
9 matter, any source code) and which could not have been discovered with the use
10 of the BACE model as originally filed on December 4, 2003. It seems that
11 Sprint's complaints concerning the editable version of BACE were used as a ploy
12 to provide additional arguments that could have been filed in either rebuttal or
13 surrebuttal testimony.

14

15 **Q. DO YOU HAVE ADDITIONAL COMMENTS CONCERNING SPRINT'S**
16 **ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE EDITABLE VERSION OF THE BACE**
17 **MODEL?**

18

19 A. Yes. Since the time that Sprint first formally requested the editable version of the
20 source code – which I understand was not requested until January 16, 2004 –
21 Sprint has framed their source code arguments as one of vital importance. Having
22 now filed supplemental testimony, it is obvious that the efforts BellSouth has
23 made to ensure Sprint's access to the editable source code were for naught. It
24 bears repeating that through exhibits, discovery, and informal communications
25 that Sprint has had access to:

- 1 (1) the pdf version of the BACE source code;
- 2 (2) 45 of 48 input Access Tables in BACE;
- 3 (3) pdf versions of two of the three remaining Access tables;
- 4 (4) computer access to the final Access table;
- 5 (5) ability to control the three protected tables via the remaining 45 tables.
- 6 (6) And, a demonstration scenario that opens up all input, processing and
- 7 output tables within BACE so that any reviewer can walk through and
- 8 verify the workings of BACE.
- 9

10 **Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER COMMENTS CONCERNING SPRINT'S**
11 **CONTINUED ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE ADEQUACY OF ITS**
12 **ABILITY TO REVIEW BACE?**

13
14 A. I do. To ensure a complete record, I need to outline the timeline leading to
15 Sprint's supplemental testimony filing.

16
17 In late December 2003, I put the pdf version of the BACE source code onto the
18 CostQuest website. I provided the proprietary password to access that website to
19 BellSouth. My understanding was that both AT&T and Sprint had informally
20 requested the BACE source code and that website access would be provided so
21 that the parties could review the source code.

22
23 During late December and continuing into January, I personally participated in
24 three conference calls with Sprint personnel. At no time during these
25 conversations did any of the Sprint participants raise any issue or concern with

1 their access to the pdf source code. Sprint never requested a printable version of
2 the pdf source code before we posted an updated, printable version; had it done so
3 a printable version would have been provided earlier.

4
5 In mid January 2004, I received data requests from Sprint. These data requests
6 included a request for the editable version of the BACE source code. Thereafter,
7 on January 30, 2004, I understand that BellSouth offered to make an editable
8 version of the BACE model available at a BellSouth location. I have learned that
9 this offer was emphatically rejected by Sprint witness Dickerson during a
10 conference call between BellSouth, the Commission staff, and Sprint. While I did
11 not personally participate in the conference call, I was on standby in case my
12 participation in the call was needed.

13
14 BellSouth reiterated its offer to make the editable version of the BACE source
15 code available in early February 2004. I personally arranged for a computer to be
16 sent to BellSouth's Tallahassee office, which computer was delivered to
17 Tallahassee and available to Sprint on February 13, 2004.

18
19 I have since learned that the Commission staff accessed the computer on February
20 14, 2004. However, Sprint did not review the computer until the afternoon of
21 February 17, 2004.

22
23 Thus, when Sprint argues that access to the editable source code was not available
24 to them until after a ruling on its Motion to Compel, this disregards completely

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1 prior efforts to resolve this matter by providing access to a computer, which
2 computer was available prior to any ruling made by this Commission.

3

4 **Q. THE SPRINT WITNESSES CLAIM (P. 7, LINE 22) THAT SPRINT WAS**
5 **NOT AWARE THAT A PRINTABLE VERSION OF THE PDF SOURCE**
6 **CODE WAS AVAILABLE UNTIL JANUARY 23, 2004. PLEASE**
7 **COMMENT.**

8

9 A. I find this argument without merit. Sprint was provided access to the pdf version
10 of the source code on December 23, 2003. As I noted in my answer to the
11 previous question, to the best of my knowledge, Sprint did not request a printable
12 version (although one was available on the BellSouth website).

13

14 **Q. THE SPRINT WITNESSES ALSO CONTEND THAT CERTAIN**
15 **PORTIONS OF THE EDITABLE SOURCE CODE REMAINED**
16 **UNAVAILABLE TO THEM AND THEREFORE THEY COULD NOT**
17 **WALK THROUGH ANY OF THE CODE. DO YOU HAVE ANY**
18 **COMMENT?**

19

20 A. Yes. Their contention that they could not walk through the code is without merit.
21 First, there are differences between the calculation code -- which was available in
22 an editable form beginning February 13, 2004 -- and the two other executable
23 files referred to in the Sprint witnesses' supplemental testimony. My specific
24 concern here is how Sprint artfully turns the question from one of Calculation
25 Code (page 3) to the concept of "Open Access" which never is defined.

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Let me explain. The BACE model is comprised of three executable programs. Each program performs a very specific function. BACE.exe provides the user interface. In other words, it allows a user to open a scenario, see a menu tree of available tables, click a button, save a report and many other non-calculation tasks. These are tasks not relevant to calculations within BACE. BACEu.exe provides database utility functions, such as linking a table or compressing a database. BACEu.exe relies heavily on Microsoft's DAO technologies. Again, BACEu.exe has nothing to do with calculations within BACE. The only executable file that is relevant to calculations is the BACE engine or BACEe.exe. Requesting an unlocked version of BACE.exe or BACEu.exe is a bit like asking for an editable version of Microsoft's Excel program because one is examining the data within a cell in an Excel spreadsheet; it should be essentially irrelevant.

I do not associate BACEu.exe and BACE.exe files with the calculation source code, and as a result the files were not "unlocked" initially, simply due to my understanding of what the parties were interested in. I later learned that parties desired access to these files. I immediately worked with BellSouth personnel in the Tallahassee office to provide access to these additional components of BACE. These files were provided on Friday, February 20, 2004.

Q. WITHOUT THESE FILES WOULD IT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE FOR SPRINT TO REVIEW BACE CALCULATIONS?

1 A. Yes. The calculation code is a stand-alone set of code that handles the
2 calculations within BACE. Let me provide a very specific example. BACEe.exe,
3 the calculation engine, is called from the User Interface (BACE.exe) when a user
4 clicks the Process button. This button click starts BACEe.exe. This can be seen
5 with the BACEe window popping up on the user's computer as the P,Q,R and ON
6 processes run. A person with the ability to modify the BACEe.exe calculation
7 engine can use these skills to analyze calculations by calling their modified
8 BACEe.exe from the command line. In other words, after Sprint completes their
9 modifications to BACEe.exe, they can build their executable, move it into the
10 BACE program directory and call the BACEe.exe by going to a DOS window and
11 typing *BACEe.exe BACE* to start the calculation engine. This eliminates any
12 need to interact with the code for the interface BACE.exe or table utilities.

13
14 **Q. HOW DOES THIS PROVE THAT THERE ARE NO CALCULATION**
15 **DEPENDENCIES FROM BACE?**

16
17 A. Because the BACE calculation engine (BACEe.exe) can be modified and then
18 called from the Command Prompt, a user can demonstrate that their BACEe.exe
19 has no affect (if un-modified) or some effect (if modified) when the appropriate
20 BACEe.exe is placed in a fully installed BACE directory.

21
22 **Q. IN THE SUPPLMENTAL TESTIMONY, THE SPRINT WITNESSES**
23 **PROVIDE AN ANALYSIS OF SWITCHING INVESTMENT. (P. 8-9,**
24 **EXHIBIT KWD-13). WAS IT NECESSARY TO HAVE ACCESS TO THE**

1 **EDITABLE VERSION OF THE BACE SOURCE CODE TO PREPARE**
2 **THIS ANALYSIS?**

3
4 A. Absolutely not. Indeed, the notes regarding the source of the BACE values
5 (KWD-13, page 1 of 3, lines 29-35) indicate that the Sprint witnesses used the
6 standard reporting features in BACE. Thus, this analysis did not require any
7 source code and could have been prepared using the BACE model filed December
8 4, 2003, since no switching investments changed with the later filings of BACE

9
10 Sprint could have performed this analysis with the original version of BACE and
11 include any arguments concerning the switching investment in its rebuttal
12 testimony filed on January 7, 2004. It seems that Sprint has relied upon its
13 disagreement concerning the editable version of the BACE source code as a ploy
14 to file additional testimony four days prior to the hearing.

15
16 **Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER COMMENTS CONCERNING THE**
17 **SPRINT SWITCH INVESTMENT ANALYSIS?**

18
19 A. Yes, the analysis provided by the Sprint witnesses is invalid. The presentation of
20 values by lines per switch is highly misleading. By year 10, in the BellSouth
21 Florida BACE run, the modeled CLEC has placed 13 switches. From KWD-13
22 (line 6), the CLEC is serving 836,320 lines or over 64,000 lines per switch. In
23 contrast, Sprint only serves *** _____ *** lines per switch (KWD-13
24 C11/*** ____**, the *** ____** was obtained from Telcordia's LERG). And as
25 I am sure the witnesses from Sprint are aware, the greater the number of lines per

1 switch will have a significant impact on the investment per line. Thus, contrary to
2 Sprint's assertions, because the modeled CLEC can aggregate traffic and gain
3 economies of scale in switching, one should expect that the CLEC would have
4 much lower investment or costs per line than Sprint has currently in its ILEC
5 operations.

6
7 Consider an alternate calculation. The BACE aggregate switch investment by
8 year 10 is over \$5.25 million per switch. In contrast, Sprint's switch investment
9 is only *** _____ *** million per switch (KWD-13, C11/*** _____ *** switches.
10 By Sprint's convoluted logic, BACE has overstated investment per switch
11 upwards of *** _____ ***% as compared to Sprint.

12
13 **Q. THE SPRINT WITNESSES CLAIM THAT THE HYPOTHETICAL CLEC**
14 **WOULD NOT HAVE THE PURCHASING POWER OF BELL SOUTH.**
15 **WHAT IS YOUR REACTION?**

16
17 A. I find it rather odd coming from a company that has over *** _____ *** total
18 switches located in Florida. It would seem that a firm with nearly the equivalent
19 count of switches should have a nearly equivalent purchasing power. Sprint may
20 well have more switches on a national basis than BellSouth.

21
22 **Q. THE SPRINT WITNESSES PROVIDE AN ANALYSIS OF DLC**
23 **INVESTMENT (P. 9-10, EXHIBIT KWD-13). WAS AN EDITABLE**
24 **VERSION OF BACE SOURCE CODE NECESSARY TO PREPARE THIS**
25 **ANALYSIS?**

1

2 A. No. Similar to the Sprint's switching arguments, the notes regarding the source of
3 the BACE values (KWD-13, page 1 of 3, lines 29-35) indicate that the Sprint
4 witnesses used the standard reporting features in BACE. Thus, this analysis did
5 not require source code and could have been prepared using the BACE model
6 filed December 4 2003, since no DLC investments changed with the later filing of
7 BACE.

8

9 **Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS CONCERNING THE DLC**
10 **INVESTMENT ANALYSIS?**

11

12 A. Yes. First, the Sprint witnesses claim that BACE in Florida has approximately
13 *** _____ *** DLCs in Florida. This is incorrect. While in the BACE BellSouth
14 Florida run there are *** _____ *** wire centers served (or DLC locations), there
15 are a larger number of DLC systems (multiple systems per location).

16

17 The BACE DLC inputs are based upon the BellSouth DLC investments as
18 reflected in recent BellSouth TELRIC calculations. Certainly, the Sprint DLC
19 investments could be higher than the modeled CLEC for a number of reasons.
20 Sprint is likely to have some portion of UDLC, which is more expensive
21 (including significant investments for central office terminal equipment); the
22 BACE modeled CLEC has only the more efficient IDLC (since the CLEC has no
23 obligation to provide unbundled network elements). In addition, Sprint has a
24 much larger number of DLC locations, not only switch locations, but a much
25 larger number of remote terminals. (Indeed, the HCPM indicates that Sprint-

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1 Florida (the ILEC) has an average of 23 main clusters per wire center). Such
 2 remote location service is not required by the modeled CLEC, and it is unlikely
 3 that the Sprint CLEC company incurs such costs. By definition, some of these
 4 areas are likely to be remote locations (requiring DLC equipment since they are
 5 too remote to be served via copper). These areas will likely often represent a
 6 small number of lines per DLC location and therefore Sprint can't achieve the
 7 economies of scale and utilization factors that a CLEC serving only *** ____ ***
 8 locations can achieve.

9
 10 **Q. THE SPRINT WITNESSES ALSO DISCUSS OSS COSTS. (P. 10-12).
 11 WAS ACCESS TO THE EDITABLE VERSION OF THE BACE SOURCE
 12 CODE NECESSARY TO PREPARE THIS ANALYSIS?**

13
 14 A. Absolutely not. This analysis requires no source code and could have been
 15 prepared using the BACE model filed December 4, 2003, since OSS costs did not
 16 change with the later filing of BACE.

17
 18 **Q. THE SPRINT WITNESSES DISCUSS COSTS RELATED TO NETWORK
 19 AND GENERAL SUPPORT ASSETS. (P. 12-13). WAS ACCESS TO THE
 20 EDITABLE VERSION OF THE BACE SOURCE CODE NEEDED TO
 21 PREPARE THIS ANALYSIS?**

22
 23 A. No. Again, this analysis requires no source code and could have been prepared
 24 using the BACE model filed December 4, 2003. Costs related to network and
 25 general support were not changed with the later filing of BACE.

1

2 **Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR SUPPLEMENTAL TESTIMONY?**

3

4 **A. Yes it does.**

Errata for the testimony and exhibits of James W. Stegeman

Direct Testimony:

Page 3, line 10: insert the words "Mr. Milner" after the word witnesses;

~~Page 16, line 12: delete the words "line maintenance"~~

Page 21, line 17: strike the word "three" and replace it with the words "all but one"

Page 26, line 15: delete the words "line maintenance"

Page 27, lines 6-8: Strike the entire sentence beginning with the word BACE ...

Page 30, lines 7-8: Strike the entire sentence beginning with the word Baseline ...

Revised Exhibit JWS-3, pages 40/41, strike the paragraph under the "ApplyLoadings (Network Cost table only)" heading that originally read:

"The Yes/No flag indicates whether BACE should apply the InPlant and Loadings factors from the InPlantAndLoadings table to the cost record.

Possible entries include Y or N. Typically, costs that are capital expenditures represent material only and will require the application of InPlant and Loading factors and have ApplyLoadings set to "Y"."

And replace it with:

"The Yes/No flag indicates whether BACE should apply the Loadings factors from the InPlantAndLoadings table to the cost record. Possible entries include Y or N. Typically, costs that are capital expenditures represent material only and will require the application of InPlant and Loading factors, the latter of which are applied to those cost elements with the ApplyLoadings toggle set to "Y"."

Surrebuttal Testimony

1. Page 11, line 12: insert the word "substantive" after the second occurrence of the word "any".
2. Page 33: strike lines 1-3.

(Transcript follows in sequence with Volume 5.)

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1 STATE OF FLORIDA)
2 COUNTY OF LEON)

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER


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I, LINDA BOLES, RPR, Official Commission Reporter, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceeding was heard at the time and place herein stated.

IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that I stenographically reported the said proceedings; that the same has been transcribed under my direct supervision; and that this transcript constitutes a true transcription of my notes of said proceedings.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor am I a relative or employee of any of the parties' attorneys or counsel connected with the action, nor am I financially interested in the action.

DATED THIS 26TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2004.


LINDA BOLES, RPR
FPSC Official Commission Reporter
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