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April 8, 2004

Ms. Blanca S. Bayo, Director Division of the Commission Clerk and Administrative Services Florida Public Service Commission 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee FL 32399-0870 COMMISSION

HECEIVED FRSC

Dear Ms. Bayo:

RE: Request for Exclusion under Rule 25-6.0455(3)

Enclosed are an original and fifteen copies of Gulf Power Company's Request for Exclusion under Rule 25-6.0455(3) on March 17, 2004.

Sincerely,

lw

Attachment

cc: Beggs and Lane

Russell A. Badders, Esquire

isan D. Literous

DOCUMENT NUMBER-DATE

FPSC-COMMISSION CLERK

Date: April 6, 2004



Subject: Gulf Power Company request for Exclusion under Rule 25-6.0455 (3) for an outage event on March 17, 2004 which was caused by a self propelled deep water buoy tender. This vessel contacted the Bayou Chico 12.47 KV aerial water crossing on feeder 6522 served from Bayou Chico Substation.

Reason for Exclusion: The outages associated with this incident were not within Gulf Power Company's control and could not reasonably have been prevented. The quality of the data utilized as a basis for the Annual Distribution Service Reliability Report is critical and directly impacts the usefulness of that report to the FPSC and other stakeholders. The integrity of the report is maintained by using the best, most indicative data available from the individual utility. Inclusion of data in the report that does not properly account for actual events experienced by the utility would result in the report not being representative of actual distribution reliability. The value of a report based on faulty or unrepresentative data is clearly much less than one based on information that closely represents actual events.

Background: Gulf Power originally constructed the Bayou Chico crossing in 1966 in proximity to a draw bridge. The crossing was permitted under a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers permit at 60 feet. In 1999, a new 65 foot bridge was constructed to replace the draw bridge; the crossing was re-permitted for an elevation of 85 feet. The rebuilt crossing has a span of 468 feet using two 125 foot concrete poles. Attached is Exhibit A, a map showing the location of the crossing.

Summary of the Event: Wednesday, March 17, 2004 at approximately 8:45 am a buoy tender barge equipped with three deep water stabilizing legs called spuds contacted the primary feeder crossing Bayou Chico in Pensacola. The craft was observed entering Bayou Chico in the early morning of March 17th to refuel. Comments received from witnesses were that the barge personnel were looking up at the aerial crossing as they passed under it, apparently concerned with the amount of clearance, but they were able to make it under without incident. Upon attempting to leave Bayou Chico, the craft heavily laden with fuel was running low in the water. In order to keep the spuds from hitting and dragging on the bottom in the bayou they put them in the fully raised position resulting in the contact with the feeder as they passed underneath. The barge operator called our customer service center to report the incident and continued on into the Gulf. The contact burned down the west phase of the 12.47 KV feeder 6522 served from Bayou Chico Substation. Attached is Exhibit B, pictures of the crossing structures and damaged line. Gulf's review of the primary crossing using actual and calculated clearances shows that all code and permit requirements were met. Gulf's clearance at worst case high tide is 89.06 feet which exceeds the 85 foot permitted height. The owners have been identified and Gulf is in communication with the company to recover damages. They will also be sent a warning letter.

Impact: The number of customers interrupted were 313 and the outage duration was 173 minutes.

- Impact to indices from this incident:
 - \circ SAIDI = 0.603471
 - \circ SAIFI = 0.004728
 - o Number of Customer Interruptions (CI) = 313
 - Number of Total Customers (C) = 393,858

Exhibit A

Map Showing Affected Feeder and Location of Event






Exhibit B
Pictures of Crossing Structure and Damaged Line



The above picture shows the 125 foot structure located on the North side of the crossing. The picture below is a close up of the 125 foot structure located on the South side of the crossing with the damaged primary phase hanging down.

