

Public Service Commission

-M-E-M-O-R-A-N-D-U-M-

DATE: October 11, 2004
TO: Parties of Record
FROM: Lisa S. Harvey, Chief, Bureau of Regulatory Review
RE: Docket No. 000121A-TP
Comments on Six-Month Review of BellSouth's Performance Assessment Plan

On August 18, 2004, BellSouth and the CLECs filed proposed changes to BellSouth's SEEM Plan in conjunction with the six-month review process. Staff created a template that identifies the parties' proposed changes to the SEEM plan. Staff requests that parties respond with an agreement or disagreement for each itemized change proposed by either BellSouth or the CLECs. For those areas of disagreement, please provide a basis for disagreeing. The template is filed in Docket 000121A-TP and can be downloaded from the Commission's website at <u>www.psc.state.fl.us</u> or be obtained by contacting Jerry Hallenstein at <u>jhallens@psc.state.fl.us</u> or (850) 413-6818. Please provide to Jerry Hallenstein an electronic version of responses to items 1-42 by October 19, 2004, and items 43-72 by October 26, 2004. Please file responses in Docket No. 00021A shortly after the response due dates.

DOCUMENT NUMBER-DATE

SEEM Non-Technical Matrix CLEC Coalition Proposed Changes

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Proposed Change	CLEC Reasoning	BST Response
Administrative Review: After 6 consecutive violations, the affected CLEC has the right to request an administrative review by Staff. Similarly, after 6 months of Tier 2 violations, any CLEC with volume for that submeasure has the right to request an administrative review.	At the review, the CLEC could propose additional actions to identify the source of that problem and to alleviate it.	
 PARIS Reporting The CLEC Coalition requests that this Commission require BellSouth to report the specific information in its CLEC-specific PARIS reports for each submeasure to Disclose Degree of Non-Compliance. The CLEC Coalition proposes that BellSouth be required to Disclose Source of Adjustments and cite detailed requirements as to what information should be disclosed and how.	 Disclose Degree of Non-Compliance Currently: Inadequate to understand level of severity Only remedy amounts are provided No underlying data for compliance determination calculations Disclose degree of non-compliance for a given violation Greater visibility into non-compliance determination Better understanding of how remedy amounts were derived Data currently reported in LA, but not necessarily useful to them Should help to provide delta comparisons Disclose Source of All Adjustments No disclosed substantiation for adjustments No reference linking adjustment to a notification or description to clearly determine the source Multiple adjustments, possibly from different errors, sometimes posted in single total adjustment 	

SEEM Non-Technical Matrix BellSouth Proposed Changes

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Row #	Proposed Change		
1	Reporting	Clarification and correction.	>
	2.1:with BellSouth's SQMs and pay penalties in accordance with the applicable SEEMs, which are posted on the Performance Measurement Reports website.		
2	Reporting	Correction.	>
	2.2: BellSouth will also provide electronic access to the available-raw data underlying the		
<u> </u>	SOMs.		
3	Reporting	Clarification	×
	2.4: Final validated SEEM reports will be posted on the <u>Performance Measurements</u>		
	<u>Reports website on the 15th day</u> of the month, following the <u>posting of final validated</u>		
<u> </u>	SQM reports for that data month or the first business day thereafter.		
4	Reporting	Only changes that are significant	>
	2.6: BellSouth shall pay penalties to the Commission, in the aggregate, for all incomplete	enough to trigger reposting according	
	or inaccurate reposted SQM reports in the amount of \$400 per day.	to the criteria could have a meaningful	
<u> </u>	See Appendix G for definition of "reposted."	effect on data accuracy.	
5	Reporting	To the extent that posted performance	×
	2.7: Tier II SEEMS payments and Administrative fines and penalties for late, incomplete,	measurement reports are incomplete,	
	and reposted reports will be sent via Federal Express to the Commission. Checks and the	the Reposting Policy covers the	
	accompanying transmittal letter will be postmarked on-or before the 15th of the month or	requirements to repost the data, and	
	the first business day thereafter.	consequently to pay associated	
		penalties. Accordingly, there is no	
		need to reflect separately a penalty	
		associated with incomplete reports. Wording is also provided to clarify	
		that the due day for the postmarked	
		transmittal of payments is based on	
		the first relevant business day based	
		on standard business practices.	
6	Reporting	Language is applicable to performance	>
	2.9 : BellSouth will provide documentation of late and incomplete occurrences during the	measurement data posting as required	
	reporting month that the data is posted to the website.	by the SQM only and not SEEM.	· ·
7	Review of Measurements and Enforcement Mechanisms	The review process lasts for several	>
l '	3.1: BellSouth will participate in six-month annual review cycles starting six months after	months and a series of six-month	
	one year from the date of the Commission order.	review cycles is not feasible.	
		Therefore, BellSouth propose an	
		annual review cycle, which may be	J
		more manageable for all parties	
		involved.	
8	Modification to Measures-Review of Measurements and Enforcement Mechanisms	Unnecessary because Commission or	-
Ĭ	3.2 BellSouth and the ALECs shall file any proposed revisions to the SEEM plan one	Staff will establish schedule.	
]	month prior to the beginning of each review period.		
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Florida Public Service Commission SEEM Non-Technical Matrix

Row #	Proposed Change SEEW NOII- Technical	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
9	Modification to Measures-Review of Measurements and Enforcement Mechanisms Commission to modify or amend the SQMs or SEEMs. Nothing will preclude any party from participating in any proceeding involving BellSouth's SQMs or SEEMs from advocating that those measures be modified.	Superfluous	> •
10	Enforcement Mechanisms Definitions SEEM measurements within the SEEM in this pPlan .	Correction to reflect removal of SEEM submetric identification from SQM.	>
11	Enforcement Mechanisms Definitions 4.1.2 Enforcement Measurement Bbenchmark compliance – competitive-level of performance established by the Commission used to evaluate the performance of BellSouth and each ALEC for CLECs for penalties where no analogous retail process, product or service is feasible.	Clarification and correction	>
12	Enforcement Mechanisms Definitions 4.1.3 Enforcement Measurement rRetail aAnalog cCompliance – comparing performance levels provided to BellSouth retail customers with performance levels provided by BellSouth to the <u>CLEC ALEC</u> customer for penalties measures where retail analogs	Clarification and correction.	>
13	Enforcement Mechanisms Definitions 4.1.4 <i>Test Statistic and Balancing Critical Value</i> – means by which enforcement will be determined using statistically valid equations. The Test Statistic and Balancing Critical Value properties are set forth in Appendix C, incorporated herein by this referenceD. Statistical Formulas and Technical Description.	Correction.	>
14	Enforcement Mechanisms Definitions Section 4.1.5: Cellall BellSouth retail ISDN (POTS) services, for residential customers,	Clarification and Correction	>
15	Enforcement Mechanisms Definitions 4.1.8 <i>Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms</i> – assessments paid directly to the Florida Public Service Commission or its designee. Tier 2 Enforcement Mechanisms are triggered by three consecutive monthly failures in Tier 2 enforcement measurement elements in which BellSouth performance is out of compliance or does not meet the benchmarks for the aggregate of all <u>CLEC ALEC</u> data as calculated by BellSouth for a particular Tier-2 Enforcement Measurement Element.	Clarification and correction.	>
16	controlled by, or is under common ownership or control with, another person. For equivalent thereof) of more than 10Percent.	This term is not used in applying the methodology of the Plan therefore the definition is not needed.	*
17	Enforcement Mechanisms Definitions 4.1.9: Affected Volume – that proportion of the total impacted CLEC volume or CLEC Aggregate volume for which remedies will be paid.	New definition required for operation of proposed transaction-based remedy mechanism.	Ÿ
18			×

24 Enforc 4.3.2.1 genera Enforc	23 Enforc 4.3.2 T applics Bench three c Appen	22 Enforc 4.3.1.2 calcula descrit	21 Enforc 4.3.1.1 purpos	a resul Tier-2 compli	<u>The Er</u> a volur	It is no Mecha will no any ass	state o The pa any lia	20 Enforo 4.2.2: shall n	19 Enforc The ap other le	4.1.10 Paris This is also Description	Row # Propos
Enforcement Mechanisms Methodology 4.3.2.1 Tier- 2 Enforcement Mechanisms apply, for an aggregate of all <u>CLEC</u> <u>ALEC</u> data generated by BellSouth, on a per measurement <u>transaction</u> basis for a particular Enforcement Measurement Element each Enforcement Mechanism Element for which	Enforcement Mechanisms Methodology 4.3.2 Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms will be triggered by BellSouth's failure to achieve applicable Enforcement Measurement Compliance or Enforcement Measurement Benchmarks for the State <u>of Florida</u> for given Enforcement Measurement Elements for three consecutive months. <u>The based upon the method of calculation is set forth in</u> Appendix D, incorporated herein by this reference <u>Statistical Formulas and Technical</u>	Enforcement Mechanisms Methodology 4.3.1.2 When a measurement has five or more transactions for the <u>CLECALEC</u> , calculations will be performed to determine remedies according to the methodology described in the remainder of the document.	Enforcement Mechanisms Methodology 4.3.1.1 All OCNs and ACNAs for individual <u>CLECs ALECs</u> -will be consolidated for purposes of calculating <u>transaction</u> measure-based failures.	a result. CLECs may not use the existence of this section or any payments of any Tier-1 or Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms under this section as evidence that BellSouth has not complied with or has violated any state or federal law or regulation.	The Enforcement Mechanisms contained in this Plan have been provided by BellSouth on a voluntary basis in order to maintain compliance between BellSouth and each CLEC. As	It is not the intent of the Parties that BellSouth be liable for both Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms and any other assessments or sanctions imposed by the Commission. CLECs will not oppose any effort by BellSouth to set off Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms from any assessment imposed by the Commission.	state or federal law or regulation. The payment of any Tier-1 Enforcement Mechanism to a CLEC shall be credited against any liability associated with or related to BellSouth's service performance.	Enforcement Mechanisms Application 4.2.2:performance and the payment of any Tier-1 or Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms shall not be used as evidence that BellSouth has not complied with or has violated any	Enforcement Mechanisms Application 4.2.1 The application of the Tier1- and Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms does not foreclose other legal and regulatory claims and remedies available to each <u>CLECALEC</u> .	4.1.10 Parity Cap – refers to the incremental departure from a compliant-level of service. This is also referred to as "diff" in Appendix D. Statistical Formulas and Technical Description.	Proposed Change
See the discussion for section 4.5.1.5 above concerning the recommended change for Tier 1 from per-measure to a per-transaction based plan.	Clarification.	Correction.	Transaction-based plan rather than a measure-based plan is proposed.	Clarification to remove potential controversy about whether the proposed SEEM can be mandated.	represent dual assessments against BellSouth for the same performance related problems.	CLECs. Similarly, Tier-2 penalties, which are paid to the Commission, should not	same transaction or occurrence. Certainly the purpose of plans like the SEEM plan is not to unduly penalize BellSouth and unjustly enrich the	These changes are to avoid situations where the CLECs are paid multiple times for problems associated with the	Correction.	of proposed transaction-based remedy mechanism.	BS1 Keasoning
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v •	Prevent unreasonable situation where	Enforcement Mechanisms Payment of Tier-1 and Tier-2 Amounts	30
	extent necessary by revised audit provisions. The Audit Policy is provided herein as section 4.8. Correct oversight by adding procedure to address clarification requests for Tier 2 by the Commission, which already exists for Tier 1 for CLECs.	 Enforcement Mechanisms Payment of Tier-1 and Tier-2 Amounts 4.4.5 At the end of each calendar year, an independent accounting firm, mutually agreeable to the Florida Public Service Commission and BellSouth, shall certify that all penalties under that the results of all penalties under Tier-1 and Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms were paid and accounted for in accordance with Generally Accepted Account Principles (GAAP). These annual audits shall be performed based upon audited data of BellSouth's performance measurements. For Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms, if the Commission requests clarification of an amount paid, a written claim shall be submitted to BellSouth within sixty (60) days after the date of the performance measurement report for which the obligation arose. BellSouth shall investigate all claims and provide the Commission written findings within thirty (30) days after its findings along with 6% simple interest per annum. 	29
	Clarification and correction.	Enforcement Mechanisms Payment of Tier-1 and Tier-2 Amounts 4.4.4:within sixty (60) days after the payment due date of the performance measurement report for which the obligation arosewithin thirty (30) days after its findings along with 6Percent ¹ / ₂ simple interest per amnum. However, the ALEC shall be responsible for all administrative costs associated with resolution of disputes that result in no actual payment. Administrative costs would include, but not be limited to, postage, travel and lodging, communication expenses, and legal costs. If BellSouth and the ALEC have exhausted good faith negotiations and are still unable to reach a mutually agreeable settlement pertaining to the amount disputed, the Commission will be pursued.	22
v		Enforcement Mechanisms Payment of Tier-1 and Tier-2 Amounts 4.4.3 For each day after the due date that BellSouth fails to pay the Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms, BellSouth will pay the Commission an additional \$1,000 per day.	27
V	Correc n.	Enforcement Mechanisms Payment of Tier-1 and Tier-2 Amounts 4.4.2 For each day after the due date that BellSouth fails to pay an <u>CLECALEC</u> the required amount, BellSouth will pay the <u>CLECALEC</u> -6% simple interest per annum.	26
•	Clarification and to ensure consistency.	Enforcement Mechanisms Payment of Tier-1 and Tier-2 Amounts 4.4.1 If BellSouth performance triggers an obligation to pay Tier-1 Enforcement Mechanisms to an <u>CLECALEC</u> or an obligation to remit Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms to the Commission or its designee, BellSouth shall make payment in the required amount by the 15th day of the second month following the month for which disparate treatment was incurred on the day upon which the final validated SEEM reports are posted on the	25
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	BellSouth provides nondiscriminatory access. The standards for nondiscriminatory access are defined for each metric in the SQM.	Measurements or Remedy Plans in a proceeding expressly applicable to all CLECs. BellSouth shall implement such performance measures and remedy plans covering its performance for the CLECs, as well as any changes to those plans ordered by the commission on the date specified by the Commission. If a channe of law relieves	
Y	The Affiliate Keporting section is eliminated because it is irrelevant for SEEM. That is, this provision is	Enforcement Mechanisms Affiliate Reporting Change of Law 4.6.1	38
V	This is a new section that uses the section number previously designated for Affiliate Demotion	Enforcement Mechanisms Affiliate Reporting 4.6 Affiliate Reporting-Change of Law	37
v	Clarification by identifying the specific source of the definition of a Force Majeure event	 Enforcement Mechanisms Limitations of Liability 4.5.4:a Force Majeure event (as defined in the most recent version of BellSouth's standard Interconnection Agreement) 	36
V	Covered in revised Section 4.5.2	Enforcement Mechanisms Limitations of Liability 4.5.3 BellSouth shall not be obligated for Tier-1 or Tier-2 Enforcement Mechanisms for noncompliance with a performance measure if such non-compliance was the result of an act or omission by a ALEC that was in bad faith.	35
v	Clarifies current provisions by stating additional specific instances where BellSouth should not be obligated to pay SEEM.	Enforcement Mechanisms Limitation of Liability 4.5.2: BellSouth will not be obligated to pay Tier-1 or Tier-2 if such noncompliance results from failure to follow established and documented procedures.	34
v	Addressed in new Section 4.7 entitled "Enforcement Mechanism Cap."	Enforcement Mechanisms Limitations of Liability 4.5.1 BellSouth's total liability for the payment of Tier 1 and Tier 2 Enforcement Mechanisms shall be collectively and absolutely capped at 39 % of net revenues in Florida, based upon the most recently reported ARMIS data.	33
Ŷ	Clarity by stating current practice used to make adjustments and address CLEC questions.	Enforcement Mechanisms Payment of Tier-1 and Tier-2 Amounts 4.4.8 Any adjustments for underpayments will be made in the next month's payment cycle after the recalculation is made. The final current month PARIS reports will reflect the final paid dollars, including adjustments for prior months where applicable. Questions regarding the adjustments should be made in accordance with the normal process used to address CLEC questions related to SEEM payments.	32
v	This provision is provided to formalize the incorporation of the Reposting Policy.	Enforcement Mechanisms Payment of Tier-1 and Tier-2 Amounts 4.4.7 Any adjustments for underpayment or overpayment of calculated Tier 1 and Tier 2 remedies will be made consistent with the terms of BellSouth's Policy On Reposting Of Performance Data and Recalculation of SEEM Payments, as set forth in Appendix G of	31
	BellSouth is paying SEEM to a CLEC who is not paying an undisputed bill.	4.4.6 : BellSouth may set off any SEEM payments to a CLEC against undisputed amounts owed by a CLEC to BellSouth pursuant to the Interconnection Agreement between the parties which have not been paid to BellSouth within ninety (90) days past the Bill Due Date as set forth in the Billing Attachment of the Interconnection Agreement.	
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	Matrix	Florida Public Service Commission SEEM Non-Technical Matrix	Flori

Florida Public Service Commission

Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response •
	BellSouth of the obligation to provide any UNE or UNE combination pursuant to Section 251 of the Act, then upon providing the Commission with 30 days written notice, Bellsouth will cease reporting data or paying remedies in accordance with the change of law. Performance Measurements and remedy plans that have been ordered by the Commission can currently be accessed via the Internet at http://pmap.bellsouth.com. Should there be any difference between the performance measure and remedy plans on BellSouth's website and the plans the Commission has approved as filed in compliance with its orders, the Commission-approved compliance plan will supersede as of its effective date.	Adds specific provision to address how changes of law will be handled in SEEM. This provision represents a reasonable balance between providing adequate notice that payments will cease with prompt relief for BellSouth to discontinue payments that should no longer be required.	1
40	Affiliate Reporting-Enforcement Mechanism Cap BellSouth shall provide monthly results for each metric for each BellSouth ALEC affiliate; however, only the Florida Public Service Commission shall be provided the number of transactions or observations for BellSouth ALEC affiliates. Further, BellSouth shall inform the Commission of any changes regarding non-ALEC affiliates' use of its OSS databases, systems, and interfaces. 4.7 Add Section: Enforcement Mechanism Cap	Separates provisions related to the Enforcement Mechanism Cap into its own section. Formerly, this information was reflected in section 4.5.1.	*
41	<u>Audits</u> <u>4.8 – 4.8.1</u> : Add new section: <u>Audits</u>	Incorporates a more thorough audit plan into SEEM. Having all parties share in the cost provides equal incentive to limit the scope of the audit to meaningful activities.	*
42	Dispute Resolution 4.74.9 Notwithstanding any other provision of the Interconnection Agreement between BellSouth and each <u>CLECALEC</u> , any dispute regarding BellSouth's performance or obligations pursuant this Plan shall be resolved by the Commission.	Correction.	
43	Regional and State Coefficients Section 4.10	Provided for completeness of documentation. Describes method currently used to apportion penalties calculated for regional measures and modified based on the proposed change from a measurement-based plan to a transaction-based plan.	λ.
44	Fee Schedule Liquidated Damages for Tier-2 Measures Table 2 Appendix A, Table A.2, reflects the current and proposed changes to the Fee Schedule. See Redlined SEEM plan, Exhibit B, for proposed changes.	Same rationale as for Table 1 above. See Attachment 1 to this exhibit for the rationale for changes in specific fees.	*
45	SEEM Sub-metrics Applicable to all SEEM sub-metrics Tables B-1 and B-2. General approach taken to set of measures included in plan.	Generally, one measure of timeliness and one measure of accuracy should apply to each major domain; e.g., Ordering, Provisioning, Maintenance & Repair, etc. In addition to the specific reasons given below,	*

Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
		BellSouth is proposing to move closer to this general concept with the following changes. Also, measures of some intermediate processes were removed because such process may have little if any customer effect and any significant customer effect would likely be reflected in other measures.	
46	SEEM Sub-metrics Measure OSS-1 Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics Remove measure OSS-1, Average Response Interval and Percent within Interval (Pre- Ordering/Ordering), from Tier 2 of the SEEM plan.	BellSouth proposed removal of this measure from the SQM. See SQM matrix filed on July 28, 2004 for the rationale.	>
47	SEEM Sub-metrics Measure OSS-4 Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics Remove measure OSS-4, Response Interval (Maintenance & Repair), from Tier 2 of the SEEM plan.	BellSouth proposed removal of this measure from the SQM. See SQM matrix filed on July 28, 2004 for the rationale.	>
48	SEEM Sub-metrics Measure PO-1 Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics Remove measure PO-1, Loop Makeup –Response Time-Manual, from Tier 1 and Tier 2 of the SEEM plan.	BellSouth proposed removal of this measure from the SQM. See SQM matrix filed on July 28, 2004 for the rationale.	>
49	SEEM Sub-metrics Measure O-1 Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics Remove measure O-1, Acknowledgement Message Timeliness from Tier 1 and Tier 2 of the SEEM plan.	BellSouth proposed removal of this measure from the SQM. See SQM matrix filed on July 28, 2004 for the rationale.	>
50	SEEM Sub-metrics Measure O-2 (AKC) Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics Remove measure O-2, Acknowledgement Message Completeness, from Tier 1 of the SEEM plan. This measure would apply to Tier 2 only.	Measure O-2 tracks whether an acknowledgement is returned to the CLECs after an LSR or transmission is electronically submitted. If acknowledgments are not being sent, it does not directly affect the CLECs ability to provide service to its customer but is a secondary measure of an intermediate process. As such, intermittent deficiencies, particularly with the high benchmark do not indicate a significant problem. Consequently, penalties should only apply if there are persistent problems	

 in this area, which is the situation that Tire 2 was designed to address. Also, this measure captures performance related to an electronic process that uses regional systems, problems that occur Are not limited to individual CLECs. Second the makes this problem largely self- correcting and any harm that occurs affects the industry as a whole not an individual CLEC. Therefore, this measure should be included in Tier 2 only. If BellSouth's performance for a given month riggers the Low Performance Fee Schedule, BellSouth will pay Tier 1 penalities in addition to Tier 1 penalities in addition to Tier 2 penalty for the month involved. SEEM Sub-metrics Measures 0-3 & O-4; (PFT) Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics BellSouth recommended combining measure O-4, Flow-Through Service Requests (Detail), with measure O-3, Flow-Through Service Requests (Detail), with measure O-3, Flow-Through Service Requests (Detail), with measure 0-3, Flow-Through Service Requests (Detail), with olonger exist as a separate measure and measure O-3, as modified, would only apply to Tier 2; Tier 1 vould not apply. Also change disaggregation for this measure as follows: 1. Combine Residence and Business into Resale. 2. Combine UNE Loop & Port Combo and UNE Other into UNE. The resulting disaggregation would be: Resale, UNE and LNP. 	Row #	Proposed Change SEEM Non-Technical	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
are based on the operation of regional systems and impact CLECs equally, based on the products or feature that they order. Because this measure captures performance related to an electronic process that uses regional systems, problems that occur are not limited to individual CLECs, as intended when Tier 1 penalties apply. Flow through typically only increase		SEEM Sub-metrics Measures O-3 & O-4; (PFT) Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics BellSouth recommended combining measure O-4, Flow-Through Service Requests (Detail), with measure O-3, Flow-Through Service Request (Summary). Thus, measure O-4 would no longer exist as a separate measure and measure O-3, as modified, would only apply to Tier 2; Tier 1 would <u>not</u> apply. Also change disaggregation for this measure as follows: 1. Combine Residence and Business into Resale. 2. Combine UNE Loop & Port Combo and UNE Other into UNE.	in this area, which is the situation that Tier 2 was designed to address. Also, this measure captures performance related to an electronic process that uses regional systems, problems that occur Are not limited to individual CLECs, as intended when Tier 1 penalties apply. Further the nature of electronic systems usually makes this problem largely self- correcting and any harm that occurs affects the industry as a whole not an individual CLEC. Therefore, this measure should be included in Tier 2 only. If BellSouth's performance for a given month triggers the Low Performance Fee Schedule, BellSouth will pay Tier 1 penalties in addition to Tier 2 penalty for the month involved. BellSouth, in its current proposal, recommends that measures <i>O-3,</i> <i>Percent Flow-Through Service</i> <i>Requests (Detail)</i> be combined into a single SQM that shows both the Aggregate CLEC data (Summary) and CLEC Specific data (Detail). The SEEM penalty, in BellSouth's proposal, would apply to the Aggregate CLEC data as a Tier 2 measure only. Flow Through results are based on the operation of regional systems and impact CLECs equally, based on the products or feature that they order. Because this measure captures performance related to an electronic process that uses regional systems, problems that occur are not limited to individual CLECs, as intended when Tier 1 penalties apply.	a 1

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Row #	Proposed Change		BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
			the standard for measuring FOC	
			timeliness by 7 hours. The	, in the second s
			mechanized FOC Timeliness standard	
			is 95% in 3 hours and for orders that	•
			do not flow through and should do so,	
			the FOC Timeliness standard is 95%	
			in 10 hours. Such delay periodically	
			does not directly affect the CLECs	
			ability to provide service to its	
			customers. As such, intermittent	
1			deficiencies, particularly with the high	
			benchmark do not indicate a	
			significant problem. Consequently,	
			penalties should only apply if there are	
			persistent problems in this area, which	
			is the situation that Tier 2 was	
			designed to address.	
			Further, the nature of electronic	
			systems usually makes this problem	
			largely self-correcting and any harm	
			that occurs affects the industry as a	
			whole not an individual CLEC	
			Therefore, this measure should be	
			included in Tier 2 only.	
			Finally, since all CLECs are affectedly	
			similarly, Tier 1 penalties should not	
			apply. If BellSouth's performance for	
			a given month triggers the Low	
			Performance Fee Schedule, BellSouth	
			will pay Tier 1 penalties in addition to	
			Tier 2 penalty for the month involved.	
			The proposed disaggregation for this	
			measure in the SEEM plan is the same	
			as the SQM. See the SQM matrix filed	
			on July 28, 2004 for the rationale for	
			this change.	
52	SEEM Sub-metrics		BellSouth's Proposed SQM	>
	Measure O-8; (RI)		disaggregates the Reject Interval	
	Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics		measurement by 3 methods of	
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Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
	Remove Partially Mechanized and Non-Mechanized disaggregations for O-8, Reject	submission – fully mechanized,	-
	Interval, from Tier 1 and Tier 2.	partially mechanized and non-	
		mechanized (manual). For an effective	
		enforcement plan, however, only the	
		fully mechanized portion of this	
		measurement should be included since this is the method of submission	
		where the preponderance of CLEC	
		activity occurs. Also, such treatment	
		provides a further incentive for CLECs to move to electronic system	
		that BellSouth has expended huge	
		resources to develop and maintain at the CLECs request. Finally, partially	
		mechanized and non-mechanized	
		methods of submission are subject to	
		gaming by the CLECs. LSRs can	
		effectively be submitted with known	
		errors in such a way as to guarantee a	
		penalty payment.	
53	SEEM Sub-metrics	This measure was proposed for	>
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	Measure O-9; (FOCT)	removal from the SQM. See the SQM	
	Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics	matrix filed on July 28, 2004 for the	
	Remove measure O-9, Firm Order Confirmation (FOC) Timeliness, from the both Tier 1	rationale. It should be noted that	
	and Tier2.	although this measure is being	
		removed from SEEM, this function	
		will still be measured in the new	
		measurement Firm Order	
		Confirmation Average Completion	
		Interval (FOCI) that BellSouth is	
		proposing to include in both Tier 1	
		and Tier 2 of SEEM. The FOCI	
		measure will combine the two current	i i
- 1		measures, FOC Timeliness and	
		Average Completion Interval (OCI) &	
		Order Completion Interval	
		Distribution, into a single metric as	
		requested by CLECs in the past	
		Since the failure to return FOCs to	
		CLECs in a timely manner will show	1
		up in the FOCI metric, which is	
		proposed for both Tier 1 and Tier 2,	

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w #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
		including FOC Timeliness in the	
		SEEM plan as well would result in	
		dual penalties for the same failure.	a
		Therefore, BellSouth's proposal	
		excludes FOC Timeliness from the	
		SEEM plan.	
4	SEEM Sub-metrics	BellSouth's proposal excludes this	r
	Measure O-11; (FOCRC)	measure from Tier 1 of the SEEM	
	Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics	plan and includes it as a Tier 2	
	Remove measure O-11, Firm Order Confirmation and Reject Response Completeness,	measure only. This is not a primary	
ĺ	from Tier 1 of SEEM.	indicator of the timeliness or accuracy	
		of the ordering process. The systems	
		and processes that generate Reject	
		Notices and FOCs are regional in	
		nature and this measure simply tracks	
		whether one of these two responses to	
		a request was sent – not how long it	
		takes to send it. If a response is not	
		sent it is typically due to a system	
		problem, which affects CLECs in	
		general rather than only specific	
		CLECs. Further the cure is fairly	
		simple, which is for the CLEC to	
		resubmit the order. Consequently this	
		area becomes a problem only if	
		persistent problems arise, which	
		makes it more appropriate to include	
		this measure in Tier 2 only. Further,	
		Tier 1 penalties are already paid, and	
		would be paid under BellSouth's	
		proposal, for the Reject Interval and	
		FOCI measures. Further, if	
		BellSouth's performance for a given	4
		month triggers the Low Performance	
			1
		Fee Schedule, BellSouth will pay Tier	
		1 penalties in addition to Tier 2	
		penalty for the month involved.	
5	SEEM Sub-metrics	Although this measure is being	>
	Measure P-4	removed from SEEM, this function	
	Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics	will still be measured in the new	
	Remove measure P-4, Average Completion Interval (OCI) & Order Completion Interval	measurement Firm Order	
	Distribution, from Tier 1 and Tier 2 of the SEEM plan.	Confirmation Average Completion	

Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
		Interval (FOCI) that BellSouth is proposing to include in both Tier 1 and Tier 2 of SEEM. The FOCI measure will combine the two current measures, FOC Timeliness and Average Completion Interval (OCI) & Order Completion Interval Distribution, into a single metric as requested by the CLECs in the past. Since the failure to complete orders within appropriate intervals will show up in the FOCI metric, which is proposed for both Tier 1 and Tier 2, including a separate OCI measure in the SEEM plan as well would result in dual penalties for the same failure.	
56	SEEM Sub-metrics New Measure; FOCI Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics Add the measure Firm Order Confirmation Average Completion Interval to both Tier 1 and Tier 2 of SEEM.	New measure that combines former measures FOC Timeliness and Average Completion Interval. These two functions are proposed to be in SEEM.	>
57	SEEM Sub-metrics Measure P-7A; HCT Table B-1: Tier1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics Combine the existing disaggregation levels for measure P-7A, Coordinated Customer Conversions Hot Cut Timeliness – Percent within Interval, into single a single sub-metric for "UNE Loops."	The proposed SQM reflects two levels of disaggregation for this measure, namely "Non-IDLC" and "IDLC." See the SQM matrix filed on July 28, 2004 for the rationale for that change. For purposes of the SEEM plan, while the proposed disaggregation for this metric in SEEM only reflects one category for "UNE Loops," the calculations for penalties actually applies the separate benchmarks for Non-IDLC and IDLC Loops. The penalties would simply be reported as a single category designated as UNE Loops.	2
58	SEEM Sub-metrics Measure P-7C; (PT) Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics Remove measure P-7C, Hot Cut Conversions - Percent Provisioning Troubles Received within 5 Days (formerly 7 Days) of a Completed Service Order, from Tier 1 and Tier 2.	BellSouth's proposal excludes this measure from Tier 1 and Tier 2 of SEEM. This is because the same data are captured in the measure <i>Percent</i> <i>Provisioning Troubles within "X"</i>	X

#	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
		<i>Days</i> , which is included in Tier 1 and Tier 2. Including both these measures in SEEM would subject BellSouth to dual penalties for the same failure.	
9	SEEM Sub-metrics Measure P-8 Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics Remove measure P-8, Cooperative Acceptance Testing, from Tier 1 and Tier 2 of the SEEM plan.	BellSouth proposed removal of this measure from the SQM. See SQM matrix filed on July 28, 2004 for the rationale.	
60	SEEM Sub-metrics New measure: CNDD Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics Add measure CNDD, Non-Coordinated Customer Conversions – Percent Completed and Notified on Due Date, to both Tier 1 and Tier 2.	BellSouth proposes to add this new measure to both Tier 1 and Tier 2 of SEEM. This measure, as described in the SQM matrix filed on July 28, 2004, captures the percentage of non- coordinated customer conversions that BellSouth completes and provides notification to the CLEC on the due date. Considering the increased role that non coordinated hot cuts may have in the future and the potential direct impact on customer service this measure is being proposed for inclusion in SEEM.	F
61	SEEM Sub-metrics Measures P-13B (LOOS), P-13C (LAT), and P-13D (DTNT) Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics Remove measures P-13B, LNP-Percent Out of Service < 60 Minutes, P-13C, Percentage of Time BellSouth Applies to 10-Digit Trigger Prior to the LNP Order Due Date (LAT), and P- 13D, LNP-Disconnect Timeliness (Non Trigger) (DTNT), from Tier 1 of SEEM.	BellSouth's proposal includes these three measures as Tier 2 only. These metrics evaluate a combination of largely automated processes and procedures performed by technicians in a centralized work center. The result is that the processes are the same from CLEC to CLEC and, if there is a problem, the problem affects all CLECs, rather than an individual CLEC. Consequently, a Tier-2 enforcement mechanism is appropriate for these measurements. Further, if BellSouth's performance for a given month triggers the Low Performance Fee Schedule, BellSouth will pay Tier 1 penalties in addition to Tier 2 penalty for the month involved.	•

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N #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
	Measure M&R-2 CTRR	timeliness nor accuracy of	
	Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics	maintenance and repair. It is not a	
	Remove measure M&R 2, Customer Trouble Report Rate, from both Tier 1 and Tier 2.	measure of whether troubles actually	
		exist, but is at best a broad indicator of	•
		whether customers choose to submit	
		trouble reports. Consequently, low	
		results do not mean that there is a	
		performance problem, instead it	
		simply provides information that	
		indicates whether a part of the	
		maintenance process needs to be	
		examined to see if a problem exists.	
		Experience has shown that results	
		vary widely due to differences in the	
		way that CLECs choose to maintain	
		their services. For example, some	
		CLECs do a better job of isolating	
		troubles to their network than others.	
		Those that don't isolate troubles well	
		have higher trouble report rates, and it	
		hardly seems appropriate to penalize	
		BellSouth because a CLEC did not	
		isolate its troubles properly. Also,	
		very small differences in performance	
		result in large penalties for this	
		measure as shown in the examples in	
		our comments. Typically, some of the	
		highest penalties are paid for this	
		measure, and it is typically one of the	
		areas where the measure usually	
		indicates a high level of performance	
		for both CLECs and retail. For	
		example, overall, Trouble reports rate	•
		are usually less that 3% and the	
		difference between CLEC and retail	
		performance is less than 2%, but the	[
		penalties are among the highest of any	
		measure. This occurs even though for	:
		many of the reports no actual trouble	
		exists. SEEM penalties will apply to	
		the measures Maintenance Average	
		Duration and Repeat Troubles, which	
		together measure the accuracy and	

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Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
		timeliness of Maintenance and Repair efforts.	·
63	SEEM Sub-metrics Measure M&R-5 Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics Remove measure M&R-5, Out of Service (OOS) > 24 hours, from Tier 1 and Tier 2 of the SEEM plan.	BellSouth proposed removal of this measure from the SQM. See SQM matrix filed on July 28, 2004 for rationale.	۶ ،
64	SEEM Sub-metrics Measure B-1 Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics For measure B-1, Invoice Accuracy, change the disaggregation to eliminate separate submetrics for Interconnection, Resale and UNE.	This metric is simply an indication of whether BellSouth provides the CLECs with accurate bills. There is no need to show separate disaggregations for Interconnection, Resale and UNE.	>
65	SEEM Sub-metrics Measure B-3 Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics Remove measure B-3, Usage Data Delivery Accuracy, from Tier 1 and Tier 2 of the SEEM plan.	BellSouth proposed removal of this measure from the SQM. See SQM matrix filed on July 28, 2004 for rationale.	>
66	SEEM Sub-metrics Measure B-10 Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics Remove measure B-10, Percent Billing Errors Corrected in "X" Business Days, from Tier	BellSouth proposed removal of this measure from the SQM. See SQM and Tier 2 of the SEEM plan. matrix filed on July 28, 2004 for rationale.	-
67	SEEM Sub-metrics Measure C-3; PMDD Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics For measure C-3, Collocation Percent of Due Dates Missed, remove the separate disaggregations for Virtual, Physical, which were further disaggregated by Initial and Augment.	This metric simply tracked whether a committed due date is met or missed. Specific disaggregation by Virtual or Physical (also Initial and Augment) is unnecessary. This especially true since BellSouth rarely missed a due date for this measure.	,
68	 SEEM Sub-metrics SEEM Measurement Disaggregation - General Table B-1: Tier 1 Sub-metrics & Table B-2: Tier 2 Sub-metrics Decrease the level of disaggregation for many SEEM Tier 1 and Tier 2 measurements. The measures within the Provisioning and Maintenance & Repair domains for which BellSouth proposes a reduction in disaggregation are shown below (the actual changes to the level of disaggregation is shown in Appendix B, Tables B-1 and B-2, of the redlined SEEM plan included in this filing as Exhibit B): Provisioning PIAM: Percent Installation Appointments Met (currently reflected as P-3, Percent Missed Installation Appointments). PPT: Percent Provisioning Troubles within 5 Days (previously 30 Days) of Service Order Completion. 	As discussed concerning the excessive disaggregation in the current SQM, there are a large number of sub- metrics for which there is little or no activity month-to-month. There is, obviously, no benefit to maintaining the current level of disaggregation, which produces so many meaningless data reports. The resulting need, therefore, and the approach reflected in BellSouth's proposal, is for more aggregation rather than disaggregation. That is, grouping	>

Row #	Proposed Change	BST Reasoning	CLEC Response
		minimal problem if it exists at all as indicated by an analysis conducted by AT&T. The truncated Z methodology was specifically designed to allow aggregation of several products without creating a problem with masking. According to the design of the statistical methodology used in the SEEM plan, given that like-to-like comparisons are made at the cell level, it is unnecessary for the SEEM plan payment categories of sub-metrics to be the same as the SQM level, which	
69	SEEM Sub-metrics SEEM Retail Analogs B.3 Add new section to show the retail analogs for the measures in the SEEM plan.	is used for reporting and monitoring. Added for completeness of SEEM documentation.	>
70	SEEM Sub-metrics SEEM Benchmark Thresholds B.4 Add new section to show the benchmarks for the measures in the SEEM plan.	Added for completeness of SEEM documentation.	>
71	Appendix F OSS Tables F.1 – F.2 Added the OSS designations to SEEM	This section was added to reflect the OSS applied to the SEEM plan parity determinations.	>
72	Appendix G Reposting of Performance Data and Recalculation of SEEM Payments Reposting policy added to the SEEM plan.	This is the policy concerning the reposting of data that was approved by the Commission. This policy is included in the SEEM plan documentation for completeness.	>

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