1 BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 2 DOCKET NO. 050059-TL 3 In the Matter of: 4 PETITION TO REFORM UNBUNDLED NETWORK ELEMENT (UNE) COST OF CAPITAL AND 5 DEPRECIATION INPUTS TO COMPLY WITH FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION'S 6 GUIDANCE IN TRIENNIAL REVIEW ORDER, 7 BY VERIZON FLORIDA INC. 8 9 ELECTRONIC VERSIONS OF THIS TRANSCRIPT ARE A CONVENIENCE COPY ONLY AND ARE NOT 10 THE OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF THE HEARING, THE .PDF VERSION INCLUDES PREFILED TESTIMONY. 11 12 PROCEEDINGS: AGENDA CONFERENCE 13 ITEM NO. 8 14 BEFORE: CHAIRMAN BRAULIO L. BAEZ COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON 15 COMMISSIONER RUDOLPH "RUDY" BRADLEY COMMISSIONER LISA POLAK EDGAR 16 17 DATE: Tuesday, June 21, 2005 18 19 PLACE: Betty Easley Conference Center Room 148 20 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 21

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APPEARANCES:

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PROCEEDINGS

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Commissioners, we are on Item 8.

MR. SUSAC: Commissioners, Jeremy Susac on behalf of the Commission staff.

Item 8 is staff's recommendation in Docket Number 050059 to deny Verizon's request to reform its UNE cost of capital and depreciation inputs. Various parties are present to address the Commission today, and staff is available for questions.

> Thank you, Mr. Susac. CHAIRMAN BAEZ:

And just for the benefit of those that are waiting, we have a couple of dockets that are waiting out there. my intention is, is to dispose of this or have the Commission address this docket that we have in front of us that just got introduced and also take up Item 12, the Tampa Electric petition. And then we are going to break for lunch. And we're going to come back, say, about an hour after and reconvene and take up the storm docket. So for those of you, Item 11 is going to be taken up after lunch, which will proceed after these next two dockets, Items 8 and 12. Thank you, and sorry for the interruption.

Mr. Susac, do you want to introduce the parties or are we --

MR. SUSAC: Since it's Verizon's petition, I believe Verizon can qo first.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Correct. Go ahead.

MS. HYER: Hi. I'm Leigh Hyer for Verizon. Good morning, Commissioners.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Good morning.

MS. HYER: Verizon objects to staff's recommendation on both substantive and on procedural grounds. With respect to the substantive grounds, in the recommendation staff, quote, agrees with Verizon that the 9.63 percent cost of capital input does not technically comply with the TRO. That 9.63 percent cost of capital input is the one that was approved by this Commission in the UNE docket in November of 2002. In other words, staff admits that that rate, because it was derived prior to the FCC's clarifications in the triennial review order, or TRO, that it's not TELRIC compliant as it stands.

However, staff does not advocate actually updating that rate that it concedes is not TELRIC compliant. It makes two claims to try to justify leaving that rate in place. They are two important leaps of logic that we think have no basis.

First of all, staff claims that the Commission can simply import the cost of capital input from the collocation docket that was approved by this Commission in September of 2004, claiming that it is TELRIC compliant for collocation services and you might as well apply it for UNE services, as well. That's problem number one.

Second of all, staff claims that although 9.8 percent

is obviously different than the 9.63 percent rate, that it concedes is not TELRIC compliant, that we should leave the 9.63 percent rate in place and not change it, claiming that a strong case can be made that the cost of capital has decreased since the Commission approved the 9.8 percent return in September of 2004. However, staff does not actually make that case. They just say it could have been, it could be made, therefore, let's just leave it in place.

With all due respect, this recommendation is very arbitrary. The Commission can't simply take a cost of capital derived in a collocation docket for a collocation cost study and then import it into a UNE cost case. The contexts are very different, and this Commission explicitly distinguished those two contexts when it originally approved the cost of capital of 9.8 percent in the collocation docket.

Second of all, the Commission can't simply assume that a TELRIC compliant cost of capital from the collocation docket has somehow decreased since September of 2004, and now it's, you know, about 9.63 percent, so we can just leave it in place. You can't do that without actually developing the record to prove that assumption. You need the facts.

Now, with respect to our procedural objection,

Verizon objects to the recommendation to issue a PAA order in
this matter, rather than simply setting the case for a hearing.

Verizon has already filed its -- it has filed its petition and

filed its testimony with the petition, and we are proposing that the Commission set it for hearing and establish a procedural schedule for that. A hearing in this case is ultimately going to be inevitable. Even if the Commission were to adopt staff's recommendation to issue a PAA order that implements what they have recommended, Verizon is going to protest that PAA, and then there will be a hearing on that matter. We don't see any reason why we should have to wait and -- why the Commission should wait for that procedural hurdle for the hearing that is going to be inevitable anyway. Instead, we would propose that we go ahead and set this matter for hearing.

Now, with that summary out of the way, I wanted to sort of expand on a couple of the points that I have made.

First of all, with respect to staff's recommendation that we simply, you know, adopt the cost of capital input from the collocation docket, even if the Commission's cost of capital input from the collocation docket is TELRIC compliant with the -- you know, based on the TRO clarifications, the Commission can't simply use that for UNE pricing. The contexts are different.

For a collocation cost study, as the Commission recognized in its order explicitly when it rejected Verizon's risk premium in the collocation docket, that a cost study for collocation assumes that collocation will be requested in

central offices that exist in Florida today, and there won't be any new construction involved. Therefore, quote, TELRIC rates will not be based on the assumption that the telecommunications network will be reconstructed each time rates are set. That was the justification in the collocation order for the lower cost of capital input.

But in the UNE context, the FCC has said that TELRIC rates must be based on that very assumption. Specifically, the FCC specified in the local competition order in 1996 that UNE cost models should seek to measure the cost of reconstructing and operating the local exchange network using the most efficient technology in current wire center locations.

Thus, for TELRIC purposes there is a fundamental difference between a collocation environment where the Commission assumes no new central office space is constructed, and the network element environment where you must assume a scorched node environment. That is that you assume that the entire network is newly reconstructed except for the central offices.

Obviously, the risks in the marketplace are much higher in that kind of environment. Verizon has to have -- be provided the opportunity to recover its costs, and the risks in the marketplace, the risk that Verizon is not able to recover its cost of a totally newly reconstructed network is something that the Commission needs to take into consideration. And that

was not taken into consideration in the collocation docket.

This and other distinctions between TELRIC assumptions for Collocation and TELRIC assumptions for UNE cost studies clearly demonstrates that this Commission cannot simply pluck the cost of capital input from the collocation docket and claim that it is TELRIC compliant for a UNE cost study. You need to have a hearing and listen to the facts and the evidence before you make any kind of assumption like that. It is just not proper.

And, also, the Commission has a statutory obligation under Section 364.013 to encourage investment in telecommunications infrastructure. And if this Commission's goal is to promote facilities-based competition, which it should be and which it must be under that statute, then it is important to make sure that we send the proper pricing signals to the market. And in order to do that we need to correct the cost of capital input in light of the TRO.

Now, Verizon also disputes that the cost of capital of 9.8 percent that was ordered in the collocation docket is, in fact, TELRIC compliant. Specifically, the Commission imposed a 9.8 percent rate on Verizon, but a 10.24 percent rate on BellSouth without explaining, you know, what the differences were in the risks, why Verizon's risks were lower. In addition, they applied a -- you applied a book value capital structure rather than a market value capital structure. And

the FCC's Wire Line Competition Bureau has explained how under the TRO clarifications the market value structure is the appropriate one.

But the most fundamental problem with this -- and, you know, all of this would come out in a hearing -- the biggest problem with staff's recommendation is just simply taking the collocation risk factor without change and importing it into a UNE docket.

Now, the second piece of staff's recommendation is that the 9.8 percent from the collocation docket is close enough to 9.63 that we can just ignore the difference. That lacks any foundation in either the law or common sense. The difference is not de minimis. It is 17 basis points. And when you compare the 9.63 percent rate that staff concedes is not TELRIC compliant with the cost of capital that was ordered for BellSouth in the collocation docket, you are looking at 61 basis points. This is not de minimis.

Staff, nevertheless, claims that a strong case can be made that the 9.8 percent rate that was ordered in the collocation docket has since diminished to 9.63 percent; and, therefore, there is no use in having a hearing in this case. But staff has not made that case. It just says that it might be made. This is pure speculation. And no reasonable fact finder and no appellate reviewer can accept this kind of speculation as the basis for a factual decision.

Now, I will briefly address depreciation since

Verizon has raised it as well in its petition. Staff proposes
that we leave the depreciation inputs from the UNE docket in
place because the FCC did not issue any clarification with
respect to depreciation life or salvage value. And with all
due respect, that is not correct. Actually, what the FCC did
was clarify that under its economic depreciation requirement
ILECs can use accelerated depreciation in lieu of straight line
depreciation in order to capture the expected rate of decline
in prices over time, and has urged state commissions to look at
that issue in their UNE proceedings.

One of the things that they said that you could consider is, quote, whether shorter asset lives represent an alternative method of capturing this decline in lieu of accelerated depreciation. And that is what Verizon is proposing here, shorter depreciation lives as opposed to the BellSouth lives that the Commission had ordered for Verizon in the UNE docket.

In any event, staff also recognizes in its recommendation that the existing straight line depreciation cost studies that are used in UNE proceedings, and that have been used in UNE proceedings, such as the one here, do not or may not capture that rate of price decline; and, therefore, they may result in underrecovery. This is yet another reason why it is important to take a look at the cost of capital input

in the cost study. If you have got a situation where the TELRIC rates that are imposed based on the way that cost studies are structured under TELRIC that reduce the ability to actually recover your costs of constructing this new network, the theoretical network under TELRIC, it is that much more important to recognize the risk that the marketplace is going to see in that environment for an ILEC's ability to attract capital.

Now, I want to briefly, also, address staff's recommendation in the alternative, which is that if the Commissioners see merit in Verizon's position, that instead of setting this matter for hearing and moving forward, that Verizon be required to recalculate the UNE rates using the proposed inputs for staff's review first. In other words, they want to know, you know, what is the bottom line here.

With all due respect, this is just a means of trying to back into the UNE rates. The FCC has given the guidance on how the cost of capital should be calculated for a UNE case.

You have got to follow TELRIC. You can't figure out what rates you want and then back into them by manipulating the rate that would apply to get you there. So with all due respect, we don't think that this is a permissible way of applying TELRIC in a cost study.

The bottom line is that staff has admitted and, you know, we obviously agree with this, otherwise we wouldn't have

brought this petition, that the existing 9.63 percent rate that was approved in 2002 does not meet the TELRIC standards as clarified by the FCC, and so it needs to be updated in order to send the right signals to the marketplace. And, therefore, we respectfully request that the Commission go ahead and set this matter for hearing and establish a procedural schedule so other parties can submit testimony and we can build the record.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Thank you, Ms. Hyer.

Mr. Hatch.

MR. HATCH: Tracy Hatch appearing on behalf of AT&T. We are here to support the staff recommendation. We think in view of the way this petition was filed and how it has shaped up it is the appropriate way to go. With respect to setting it straight for hearing, we certainly don't object to that. It is clearly within your discretion to do so. Potentially I think there is a good probability that either side will protest if they don't like what happens. Verizon has made it very clear if they don't like the staff rec, they will protest it. So setting it for hearing is an option. But let me just add a couple of points here.

With respect to whether the staff's original 9.6 is TELRIC compliant, whether the 9.8 in the collo docket is TELRIC compliant, I would disagree with counsel for Verizon on whether the collo ROE is TELRIC compliant. One of the things that was discussed in the collo case, what she claims is a distinction,

is that collo cost of capital should not apply to UNE cost of capital. We argued that in the collo case, and we lost, frankly. And essentially what the Commission ended up with is that you don't have truly service specific cost of capital.

Investment is investment, and it is the company that investors look to for rates of return, whether to invest their capital.

It is not whether they have collo or whether they have an unbundled loop or whether they have unbundled switching. Those are not the issues that investors look at in determining whether to invest in a company. It is the overall returns of the company that drive that.

Another thing that I would suggest to you is that one of the things that the staff looked at is whether the 9.8 is comparable in view of time. I would suggest to you that that 9.8, as was said even in the collo order, that 9.8 is a very generous cost of capital. One of the things that we argued in the collo order is that you take the same cost of capital -- if nothing else, you take the same cost of capital that you applied for UNEs, since collo is considered amongst the family of UNEs, certainly at the time. And we lost on that and the Commission gave them a slightly higher ROE.

One thing you have to keep in mind is the FCC has established what are the standards for cost of capital under TELRIC. You may or may not be aware, vaguely or otherwise, that in Virginia there was an arbitration between AT&T and

Verizon in Virginia. The Verizon Corporation Commission declined to arbitrate that case and sent it to the FCC. The FCC took a good long while before it issued its decision in that case. And what it said was -- now, bear in mind that the Virginia arbitration order was done by the FCC staff, the order in the Virginia arbitration came out after the TRO order. For cost of capital what the FCC said was 8.2 was a good cost of capital for Verizon. So that ought to give you -- and that is post-TRO, so that ought to give you at least some comfort that the 9.6 or the 9.8 are more than ample in terms of equity rates for Verizon.

Stepping back, one other point that I would like to make that the staff does not make really in its recommendation, is the Commission has a very long-standing tradition that it doesn't look at individual factors in isolation. It takes all the pieces of the puzzle and makes a complete decision at one time. And there is some reason for that. Even with my whole history at the Commission, while I advocated from time to time that the Commission should, in fact, do limited proceedings and look at individual factors, the Commission has almost universally rejected that notion, saying it is not the right thing to do.

In this case what Verizon is asking you to do is set depreciation, reset depreciation at a higher level, reset the cost of capital at a higher level, and completely ignoring all

the other inputs that go into a cost model. Now, bear in mind that yet once again in the BellSouth 120-day proceeding, if you recall that, it was an offshoot from the BellSouth UNE proceeding, there were issues in the 120-day proceeding regarding the inflation factors. And what AT&T and MCI argued in that case was, and even BellSouth conceded on the stand that inflation had changed, inflation rates had gone down, and that their original inflation factors were not accurate based on current information. BellSouth even conceded that. But the Commission -- but BellSouth further argued that it is not appropriate to look at anything in isolation, and the Commission decided that is correct, that you shouldn't just look at one thing that changed in isolation. Because if you do, then everybody comes in all the time looking for one factor.

Now, as the Commission has acknowledged, and I think everybody would acknowledge, factors will change. Costs will go up, costs will go down. You can't look at one factor to determine the appropriate rate at any given time for any particular service or any particular UNE, and I think that is the situation you have here. They are trying to look at cost of capital and depreciation out of context with everything else and get you to change that one thing, when there are other things that should be changed.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Mr. Feil.

MR. FEIL: Matthew Feil for FDN Communications. I don't want to redundant of much of what Mr. Hatch said. I agree with what he said. I want to make a few additional points, though.

With respect to the staff recommendation on Issue 1, cost of capital, and Issue 2, on depreciation, FDN supports the end result that the staff is recommending.

On the cost of capital question, I wouldn't have framed the statement precisely the way, perhaps, the staff did with respect to whether or not the cost of capital approved in the generic UNE docket was TRO compliant. I think that it is probably safe to say that the framework of analysis used then was not TRO compliant because it was before the TRO, but that is not to say that the end result is not TRO compliant. And we maintain that it is.

One of the things that Mr. Hatch pointed out I wanted to emphasize as well is when the Commission approved the collocation order and the cost of capital therein at 9.80 percent, that was nine months ago, not two years ago, not three years ago, nine months ago that order came out. And at that time the Commission said that it felt that those numbers were conservatively high on both the cost of equity and the cost of debt.

Ms. Hyer indicated that the Commission had approved in that case, in the collocation case, a book capital

structure. That is not correct. The Commission did not approve a book capital structure in that case. Rather, the Commission approved a prudent or optimal capital structure for Verizon in that case.

Ms. Hyer indicated that she didn't think it was proper for the Commission to incorporate ideas from one order into a PAA in this setting. Well, in a PAA you can rely on whatever evidence or information you choose to rely on as long as you think it is reasonable to do so. And I would submit to you that at least in this context it is reasonable for you to rely on, as staff recommends, the cost of capital approved in the collocation case.

Ms. Heir said that she didn't think it was appropriate procedurally for the Commission to ask the -- to ask Verizon to submit what the final proposed UNE rates would be if you changed the cost of capital and depreciation inputs. Frankly, I don't agree with that. That is something that I think has been lacking in some of the UNE and collo cost analysis that the Commission has been doing that oftentimes you make your decisions without the benefit of seeing what the rates are before and after. And I think that it is prudent for you to do that. You do that in the context of electric cases, water and wastewater cases, telecom cases back under rate base regulation. It permits you to take in the whole picture, and I think that you should do that. That was all I had. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Thank you, Mr. Feil.

Commissioners, do you have questions?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Hatch, can we do what Virginia did?

MR. HATCH: I'm sorry, Commissioner Deason?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Can we do what Virginia did?

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Is that a motion?

MR. HATCH: I believe that you can, as a Commission, decline to arbitrate. You have historically not done that, but I think it is permissible under the Act.

know, that question was a little bit tongue-in-cheek. But to put it on a little more serious note, if we believe staff's recommendation that things have not materially changed enough to warrant a hearing, are we still obligated to have a hearing, or can we just say, Verizon, if you don't think that these rates are good enough, take it to the FCC?

MR. HATCH: I think that Verizon is entitled to file it here. I think if the Commission declines to arbitrate it, they can take it to the FCC. To the extent that you think that nothing has changed sufficiently, and that is your view of the matter based on the information before you today, then that is the reason that you issue a PAA. Then the party making the filing ultimately, under Chapter 120, has an opportunity to request a hearing in order to put on its full-blown case.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So if we issue the PAA, and a hearing is requested, we can either hold the hearing here or we have the ability to refer it to the FCC?

MR. HATCH: I believe you could probably decline to arbitrate it and send it to the FCC, although you have never done that.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Under 120?

MR. HATCH: Not under Chapter 120. Under 251 and 252 of the Act if the Commission declines to arbitrate a case that is brought before you, then it automatically would revert to the jurisdiction of the FCC is my understanding.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: And I guess I'm having -- I guess I have a little trouble separating how we are issuing a PAA. It starts getting a little gray there as to what --

MR. HATCH: A PAA is a procedural vehicle under Florida law.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: And do we have to respect the procedural vehicle all the way through? I mean, we can't very well issue a PAA under our authority or based on 120 procedures and then neglect the necessary rights available to the parties post-PAA.

MR. HATCH: The way the typical PAA process works under the Administrative Procedure Act, and there is some minor differences vis-a-vis the Commission and how it operates under PAAs, because there is a provision in Chapter 120 that says if

you don't protest everything, the things that you don't protest are deemed admitted. But setting that aside, the whole function of a PAA historically, and the reason it was created, was to allow parties that had an argument to bring it to the Commission. And rather than go all the way through the process of putting on a case and getting a decision, if the Commission, based on just what it saw before them, said this looks like a reasonable resolution, so they issue a proposed agency action. Then if both sides say, okay, that is good enough, it obviates the necessity of litigation. That is the whole purpose of the PAA.

Once you have gone through that exercise, if somebody files a protest, I mean, essentially, the PAA goes poof. It has no further legal effect. It's as if it never happened once the protest is filed. Then you revert to the formal litigation process under 120.57(1). That's the whole point of the PAA. It was designed and created essentially by the Commission to avoid having to go through a hearing every time if there was, you know, the notice and opportunity.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: I understand that, but I guess I'm trying to marry up what you have represented -- what you represented to Commissioner Deason as an option, a very attractive option, I might add. But, you know, that we can -- that under 120 when something is presented for us, we can say, you know what, we are just not going to entertain it.

MR. HATCH: I think for matters under the Telecom Act there are two jurisdictional venues. The first one is here.

You can choose to exercise that jurisdiction or you can choose not to. This is a matter that would be under the Telecom Act.

Now, in the normal course of things, in the absence of Telecom Act, for example, in the electric industry, if somebody brought something to you, you are the jurisdiction in this state. There are no other jurisdictional vehicles for you. So in a sense I believe you are obligated to perform your statutory duty and hear it. The Telecom Act has given you a safety valve, if you want to think of it that way, in some sense. Where I think you can decline to -- you have jurisdiction in the first instance, but I think you can decline it under the Telecom Act and send it to the FCC.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Commissioners, any other questions?

MR. HATCH: I'm not suggesting you do that, but I

think just intellectually. And you might want to check with

your general counsel on this issue, as well. He has been in

this business longer than I have.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: I gave him a quick glance, and I don't know. I'm not a card player, but he doesn't seem to be leaning back in his chair. There's no tell there.

MR. MELSON: Commissioners, I think you may be answering some potentially unanswerable questions. This is not an arbitration, per se. And it is arbitrations, I think, under

the federal act where the FCC clearly steps in if the state agency declines to arbitrate.

If you were going to decline to hear this, to hear a case and to leave it to the FCC, you might want to consider doing that at the very outset rather than, as you say, proceeding down a path of a PAA which, at least, arguably, you know, triggers some state law processes.

We have also got another provision in Chapter 120. It sort of says notwithstanding anything in Chapter 120, in implementing the Telecom Act of 1996, you are authorized to employ procedures consistent with the federal act. As I sit here today trying to --

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: What does that mean, consistent with the federal act.

MR. MELSON: -- trying to fit all those puzzle pieces together and tell you absolutely what you can or can't do, I don't feel real comfortable doing that.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: And following, you know, the tongue-in-cheek spirit in which it was offered, unfortunately this is a rate that we set ourselves. I think it would be -- I would feel kind of irresponsible not addressing it. But having said that -- and, Commissioners, I don't know what you think, I think we really need to address the issue of how -- you know, we are going to go to hearing on this. And I think maybe I would like to focus on your thoughts as to the value of

actually issuing a PAA.

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COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me ask another procedural If we issue a PAA, is the question of depreciation and ROE the only issues that are permissible, or can other parties raise other issues as it pertains to the ultimate bottom line UNE rates? And that was part of Mr. Hatch's presentation. And it seems to me, you know, that when we do employ the PAA process, part of the process is that, you know, it is kind of weighing the bird in the hand versus two in the If you protest something, well, then you may be subject bush. to litigate something that you are happy with. Somebody else -- you know, you can accept this or that. And once you open up the door, litigation is open and all issues are fair game when it comes to establishing UNE rates. And that's part of the risk of filing a petition like this.

MR. MELSON: Again, we have got our unique provision in Chapter 120 that says, in the event of a protest of a PAA, essentially the only issues that go forward to hearing are those that are protested. And the first item we took up this morning was a rule proposal that would allow protests and then cross-protests to bring in additional issues. Without that, I think the ordinary rule would be if you were to do it as a PAA, in essence, you are limiting it to the issues that were raised in the petition and ruled on in the PAA.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So we could reject it as a PAA

and just say we are going to set -- Verizon, if you really want to go forward with this, you feel that strongly about it, all issues are on the table.

MR. MELSON: Set it directly for hearing and let the parties follow the normal issue identification process where ultimately a prehearing officer rules what is an appropriate scope for the proceeding.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And that would be permissible?

MR. MELSON: That would be permissible, yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: And I feel compelled to allow some fancy dancing now, I guess.

Ms. Hyer, how do you feel about that, in light of your suggestion --

MS. HYER: Well --

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: -- adverse to the PAA?

MS. HYER: I mean, I think that what we would like for the Commission to do is to go ahead and set this matter for hearing. The other parties would then -- we would then set a procedural schedule. The other parties would file their testimony, and they, you know, raise whatever they raise.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: So you are okay with the --

MS. HYER: Well, that's not that we are proposing.

We don't think -- because I do take issue with -- I think it

was Mr. Hatch that made this point, that this is a case where,

you know, everything gets put back on the table. We would

argue that it doesn't, because we are not talking about an issue where, you know, since the rates were set, you know, inflation changes or, you know, this or that occurs so that a rate that was correct when made or an input that was correct when made has changed over time.

We are talking about a completely different situation here where the inputs, because the FCC's clarification came back and said -- you know, they didn't say this is new. They said this is a clarification of what you should have done. And it is not the Commissioners' fault with respect to this rate; it is just that the clarification in the TRO came after the fact. But what that meant was that the inputs when made were incorrect. And we're just asking that we update them so that the correct inputs that should have gone in in the first place are there and that there is no reason to change everything else. But the other parties, you know, when they come in, you know, they can argue what they argue with respect to that.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: So you're not -- I guess I want to understand. We're going to go back, and if I understand your argument, whatever inputs Verizon feels were inappropriate or incorrect at the time are the only ones that are to be corrected. It is not an update. It is not, in fact, an update of any inputs. It is not inputs as of today what you are suggesting.

MS. HYER: Yes. It is not updating in the sense that

we are updating, you know, everything to take into consideration, you know, things that have changed in, you know, the economy, et cetera, since that time. What we are saying is that the inputs when they were issued were incorrect. The FCC has said you are actually supposed to look at competition, you know, future competition and a lot of the other risk factors that were not taken into consideration. So it is updating in the sense of putting in the correct rate that should have been there at the beginning, and then the rates are what the rates will be.

We don't think that there is any grounds for necessarily, you know, and we were not asking for the Commission to, you know, update any other input based on, you know, external factors that aren't based on the TELRIC methodology. We are just asking the Commission to apply the correct TELRIC methodology for inputs that were not correctly set.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So are you saying, then, we should go back and apply the methodology specified by the FCC as if we knew what that standard was back two years ago and calculate cost of capital as it would have been two years ago, or do we take that standard and apply it to today's economics and determine what the rate is as of today compliant with that standard set forth by the FCC?

MS. HYER: Well, I think you should probably -- you

might as well do the latter.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: All right. So you are talking about updating, then, what we did before. And if we update something, why don't we just open it up to all updates?

MS. HYER: Well, I mean, we are not -- we are not coming in and asking you to do an entirely new UNE rate proceeding. We are just asking that the incorrect inputs be updated. And be updated -- I'm using the wrong term, but that they be corrected so that the proper TELRIC methodology applies.

I mean, if you know that an input was set based on the wrong TELRIC methodology because of the FCC's clarification of what the right TELRIC methodology should have been, then, it makes no sense to leave that incorrect input in place. We are not -- in our petition, we are not asking for the Commission to revisit every other input in the cost study. That is not the purpose of our petition. If another party, you know, wants to bring that petition, then that is up to them. But that's not the relief that we are asking for here.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Can they do it within the context of your petition if we set it for hearing?

MS. HYER: I assume that they can request whatever relief they want. We would argue against that, but that would be part of the hearing process.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Oh, I see I'm the prehearing

officer on this.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: You start it.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Chairman, let me tell you where I am.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Okay.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And I have reviewed staff's recommendation very thoroughly. I even reviewed the collocation order. I was shocked at the length of it when I got it. Thankfully, Casey just kind of narrowed it down to the relevant pages.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: And carried it downstairs for you?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: He needed, you know, a cart to carry it in.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Right.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And I have listened very carefully to everything that has been said here today. And where I am is I'm not convinced that there is any need to change the UNE rates. And I think our current UNE rates are TELRIC compliant even though they were established before the order was issued. I just think that it is going to be a tremendous burden and cost on the Commission and the parties to litigate this. But if the parties are intent on doing so, you know, so be it. But I don't think we need to do it.

And I'm almost at the point that, you know, if we are here because the FCC changed the rules again, just let Verizon

take it to the FCC and let them determine it. I'm convinced that these rates are good enough and they don't need to be changed. We talk about 17 basis points on ROE and whether it is or is not TELRIC compliant. You know, and maybe the FCC is a lot smarter than we are, and they can tell the difference between 17 basis points and whether it is or is not TELRIC compliant.

But when we set a return on equity in an electric case, we allow 100 points and it is determined to be reasonable, and anything within that range is considered to be, because we are not precise enough when we are establishing an ROE to begin with to get that precise as to whether 17 basis points makes an ROE reasonable or unreasonable. And maybe if we go to a proceeding we can get educated to the point that we can tell that difference. I am just not so sure it is a wise use of our resources to try to get that precise.

MS. HYER: Commissioner Deason, I would like to actually clarify something. The 17 basis points is just the difference between the 9.8 percent from the collocation docket and --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I understand exactly what that 17 basis points is. And I also recognize that our staff is saying that it is probably, if we go to the full proceeding, we very well could end up with a ROE lower than 9.63 percent.

MS. HYER: Yes, but Verizon believes that that would

be -- that that would be improper, which is one of the reasons why we need to have a hearing. But the cost of capital that we are proposing here in this docket is not 17 basis points higher than the 9.63 percent. It is in the nature of 300-and-something basis points.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And if we open up a hearing,

I'm sure that you will have a much higher rate, and I would

assume that there would be other intervenors who would be much

lower than 9.63 percent.

MS. HYER: I just wanted to make sure that that was clear. That that wasn't -- 17 was not what we were proposing.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So, Mr. Chairman, I don't really know what to do, other than I don't think we need to have a full-blown docket to look at these UNE rates.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: You know what the sad part about it is --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Do we have the ability just to reject the petition? And if they are dissatisfied with that, they can take it to the FCC. But we are not going to set it for hearing. We will just reject it. We're satisfied UNE rates are adequate and TELRIC compliant. Or is that something that we have to do after hearing?

MR. MELSON: I think you probably have to do that after hearing, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let's send it to the FCC.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Wait, wait, wait. I know how you feel, Commissioner Deason. I want to understand -- I want to understand how you capture and -- what the most efficient way and the most appropriate way to capture that sentiment is.

And, you know, we had a little bit of conversation as to what our responsibilities under 120 were assuming -- and I guess I'm still trying to fight through whether it is best to accept the -- you know, issue a PAA, in essence, and what the fallout of that is, understanding and accepting Ms. Hyer's statement initially that they will avail themselves of the hearing process.

Two questions to keep in mind. There was some conversation as to what the breadth of a docket that gets set for hearing directly, and I'm interested in knowing what the effect of a PAA, and maybe I missed the answer to that, but what the effect of actually going ahead and, you know, voting on a PAA and letting it get protested, what the effect of that is in terms of controlling the scope of a docket -- of a hearing, subsequently.

MR. MELSON: Commissioner, what I said earlier is that if you go the PAA route, there is a strong argument that the scope of the hearing is going to be limited to that which is in the PAA order and that is which is protested. I'm not going to sit here and tell that another party can't argue something else and might not persuade us otherwise. But my

take going in is that we could rely on the statute to say we have limited it to those two issues.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: And, is there any legal -- I have got to tell you, Ms. Hyer, I'm a little troubled by what Verizon's suggestion is. Because, essentially, what you are asking -- what you are asking anyone to do, and I can't find a good analogy in real life, but what you are asking the Commission to do in essence is, you know, nevermind everything that's happened from then to now, just go back and correct it to what it should have been.

And the possibilities that the cost of capital might even be lower today, that enough circumstances have changed that would merit an updating, as you call it, to something else, ignore all of that. Get the benefit of what potentially may be a higher rate or, rather, would otherwise be a lower rate today. And it is that whole aspect of having to turn a blind eye to what has happened, what may have happened in the interim that troubles me. And I don't know how to get past that.

And I guess my question would be, Mr. Melson, are there any legal impediments to being able to do that? I mean, would we be setting -- A, would we be setting the depreciation and cost of capital on a prospective basis? Is this something that is intended to reach back?

MR. MELSON: My understanding of the petition is it

is intended to be forward-looking. I'm not sure you could go back and reset those retroactively. And the way to avoid a potential limitation on the issues, if you think that in order to -- that it may not be appropriate to look at depreciation and cost of capital in isolation, you want to preserve the flexibility to look at other issues, setting it directly for hearing and seeing what other issues other parties bring in would probably give you the maximum flexibility.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: I am not saying -- commenting on that one way or another. I just want to understand, can we legally actually reach back and say we will take no actual timely evidence, but rather reach back and rewrite history and let that history stand into the future.

MR. MELSON: Are you asking can you take the record that was built originally in the case and go back and re-examine that record in light of the new clarified TELRIC standard?

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Right.

MR. MELSON: I don't know.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Well, okay.

Well, Commissioners, I can't make a motion, so I have to rely on you all.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I would certainly like to hear from Commissioner Edgar and Commissioner Bradley as to what their views are. I kind of laid it out for -- I don't

think it is necessary for this Commission to entertain this petition and try to reset UNE rates when I think they are just fine as they are. But, now, I have to admit that is not having the benefit of Verizon's testimony. I did not look at that.

And if it goes to a hearing, I will have an open mind on it, and I will certainly evaluate it. The question is when we have a backup jurisdiction, and let's face it, we are here because of what the FCC did, it just seems fair to let them deal with it.

And I would -- you know, I would be just fine to say we are denying the petition. There is an avenue for Verizon to have its due process rights preserved and to hear its case, and that's at the FCC. They are the experts there anyway when it comes to being TELRIC compliant or not. So if that is a motion, I will make it. You know, if that's legally permissible. I don't want to move anything that is not --

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: And I guess I'm just trying to -- I'm trying to square what you are saying with, I think, an answer that Mr. Melson gave you before.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Was that it's not permissible?

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: I don't want to say that's what I heard, but I think --

MR. MELSON: That's probably what you heard.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: You also read that provision in the law that says that we can do anything -- adopt any

procedures or whatever that's -- and it is certainly consistent with federal law that this matter can be heard by the FCC realizing that it is not an arbitration. So is that the distinction?

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MR. MELSON: And, Commissioner, at this point I'm going to confess ignorance of the details of that piece of federal law. I don't know if Ms. Keating can help me out at all. Can you simply deny the petition without a hearing and do nothing else? I think the answer to that is no. Can you deny the petition on the grounds that you are not going to hear it, but are going to leave it to the FCC, I think so, if it is one of the types of things that the FCC can hear. And that is where I don't know the answer.

MS. KEATING: If I understand the question correctly, it was a question about whether we could just -- whether you could just decline and let the FCC take action. I guess it does get back to the question of how you interpret Section 252 of the Act. And there is a provision in there that says that if a state commission fails to act to carry out its responsibility under this section in any proceeding or other matter under this section, then the Commission shall issue an order -- the Commission in this case being the FCC -- preempting the state commission's jurisdiction of that proceeding or matter within 90 days after being notified of such failure and shall assume the responsibility of the state

commission.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: You said fails to carry out its responsibility. That gives me a little concern.

MS. KEATING: And the responsibility that is referred to there is the responsibilities under Section 252. And that goes to whether your interpretation is whether 252 provides any responsibilities to this Commission beyond conducting of arbitrations and resolutions of complaints regarding interconnection agreements. We have --

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Commissioners, I have to take a point of personal order, and if you will forgive me, can we take a five-minute break? Thank you.

(Recess.)

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Go back on the record.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Chairman, I'm prepared to make a motion unless there is further discussion. And if there is, sobeit.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: I just want to make sure that the Commissioners, the other Commissioners have no further questions or --

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: I have a comment.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: You have a comment?

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: A comment.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: All right. Let's hear it before a motion.

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: You know, of course, I wasn't a participant in the past hearing on these issues, and so I did not have the benefit of all of the discussion and evidence that was presented at that point in time. And I'm probably going to regret this.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Probably? I can guarantee you.

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: I see long hours in my future.

But I would put out there perhaps for just a little bit more

discussion the possibility that we reject the staff

recommendation that is before us and consider going to hearing

under the normal practices of the Commission and full

cognizance of the prehearing officer assigned.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: I'm not sure how the prehearing officer would take that. But, Commissioner Deason --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me say that -- let me ask a clarification. Is that a motion?

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Are you moving?

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Yes, I am.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Okay.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me ask a clarification on the motion. Do you envision that if we set this for hearing, that the Commission would be free to entertain other issues in addition to cost of capital and depreciation, or are we limiting it just to those two issues?

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: My motion would be that we leave

1	that to the prehearing officer to work out with the parties.
2	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay.
3	CHAIRMAN BAEZ: It doesn't get any better than that.
4	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I can second the motion.
5	CHAIRMAN BAEZ: There is a motion and a second to set
6	it directly for hearing. All those in favor say aye.
7	(Unanimous affirmative vote.)
8	CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Thank you. Thank you to the parties
9	and thank you to staff for your input and comments.
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1	STATE OF FLORIDA)
2	: CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
3	COUNTY OF LEON)
4	T TAND DAY DDD Gh' C OSS' C T
5	I, JANE FAUROT, RPR, Chief, Office of Hearing Reporter Services, FPSC Division of Commission Clerk and Administrative Services, do hereby certify that the foregoing
6	proceeding was heard at the time and place herein stated.
7	IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that I stenographically reported the said proceedings; that the same has been
9	transcribed under my direct supervision; and that this transcript constitutes a true transcription of my notes of said proceedings.
LO	I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor am I a relative
L1 L2	or employee of any of the parties' attorney or counsel connected with the action, nor am I financially interested in the action.
13	DATED THIS 27th day of June, 2005.
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15	- Aguerat
16	JANE FAUROT, RPR Official FPSC Hearings Reporter FPSC Division of Commission Clerk and
17	Administrative Services (850) 413-6732
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