1 BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 2 DOCKET NO. UNDOCKETED 3 In the Matter of 4 IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 366.91, FLORIDA STATUTES, CONCERNING STANDARD OFFER CONTRACTS FOR 5 RENEWABLE ENERGY RESOURCES. б 7 8 9 10 11 ELECTRONIC VERSIONS OF THIS TRANSCRIPT ARE 12 A CONVENIENCE COPY ONLY AND ARE NOT 13 THE OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF THE HEARING, THE .PDF VERSION INCLUDES PREFILED TESTIMONY. 14 15 PROCEEDINGS: WORKSHOP 16 BEFORE: CHAIRMAN LISA POLAK EDGAR 17 COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON COMMISSIONER ISILIO ARRIAGA 18 COMMISSIONER MATTHEW M. CARTER, II COMMISSIONER KATRINA J. TEW 19 DATE: Monday, March 6, 2006 20 TIME: Commenced at 9:30 a.m. 21 Concluded at 1:38 p.m. 22 PLACE: Betty Easley Conference Center Room 148 23 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 24 REPORTED BY: JANE FAUROT, RPR 25 OFFICIAL COMMISSION REPORTER (850)413-6732

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PROCEEDINGS

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Good morning. I think we are about ready to get started.

Commissioners, as you are aware, last session the legislature passed House Bill 77 which was sponsored by Senator Bennett and by Representative Littlefield. As part of that bill, Section 366.91 was created which requires utilities to continuously offer purchased power contracts to renewable generating facilities. The statute requires that these purchased power agreements be for a term of at least ten years, and be available beginning January 1st, 2006.

As I know you also recall, this past December at an agenda conference here in this room our staff raised several issues for us regarding implementation of the new statute and how it would work with our existing standard offer contract rules. We had a lengthy discussion, and at that time we decided that there were a number of these issues that we would like to flesh out a little more fully, and we requested a workshop. And it is that workshop that is the reason for us being here together this morning.

This workshop is an opportunity for all of the interested parties to come together to propose solutions that go beyond a business as usual approach to purchasing power from renewable generation resources. It's an opportunity,

Commissioners, to ask questions if you have them. Again, to

have discussions. If we can implement solutions without amending our rules, we will do so. We will move forward that way. If solutions that are proposed that, Commissioners, we are interested in pursuing require rule changes, then we will pursue those amendments as expeditiously as possible. And with that, I'm going to turn it over to Tom Ballinger on our staff to get us started.

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MR. BALLINGER: Thank you, Chairman Edgar.

A few preliminary matters before we get started.

Commissioners, I have laid on your desk up there -people brought in presentations this morning. I know we
brought you packages of everyone's presentation earlier, but
these are the ones that arrived today. Let's make sure I've
got everybody's, and that you have everyone's up there.

Probably the top one should be comments from the investor-owned utilities, that is one of the packets. Another one are some revised comments from Montenay-Dade, and I've been assured they're not substantive, it's more grammatical in changing who actually signed the contract, so it is very similar to what you already have. The third one would be comments on behalf of the City of Tampa, The Solid Waste Authority of Palm Beach, and the Florida Industrial Cogeneration Association. And then the fourth packet would be from Covanta, and it consists of two documents, the letter from Senator Bennett and the slide show from Covanta.

I think that's everyone. If I missed somebody's that needed to get a presentation, let me know now. I think that is everything. And staff had given you their presentation earlier, that has not changed, we will go through that as we go through.

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I have queried everyone about time-wise, and it's a very good possibility we might be done by lunch, if we go along. It's looking like we have some brief presentations.

Staff's will take approximately 40 or 45 minutes at most to go through it. The utilities have told me maybe 30 to 40 minutes. We will take questions after the presenters are done, first by the Commissioners, and then by members of the audience. I would ask you to please come to a microphone if we have a question, because we are transcribing this and recording it. With that, I guess we can get started.

Should we read the notice?

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Let's read the notice.

MR. KEATING: Thank you for making me feel useful this morning.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Keating, please.

MR. KEATING: Pursuant to notice, this time and place have been set for a staff workshop in this undocketed matter.

The notice does indicate that the Commissioners, one or more Commissioners may attend and participate in the workshop. I think that should cover it.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you, Mr. Keating.

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And, again, Commissioners, just to point out, this is a workshop, it is for the benefit of staff and each of us for discussion. No action to be taken today. Staff will take back the information that comes out of this, and then will come back to us with any proposed action if, indeed, that is required, merited, or desired, and there will be the opportunity to ask questions. Again, we will kind this kind of informal, since it is a workshop.

As Mr. Ballinger pointed out, it looks like we may be able to be done by lunch time. If we hit that 12:00, 12:15 time and we are almost done, then I'll look to each of you, of course, but we may push through. If it looks like we have had a lot of discussion and have presentations to go, then we'll take a lunch break.

Mr. Ballinger.

MR. BALLINGER: Thank you.

What we have today is staff, it will be the three of us doing kind of a group presentation. I will lead you into an introduction, a little bit of history, and Mr. Haff will go through talking about the topic of avoided costs, and Ms. Harlow will pick up contract terms and capacity limits.

Go to the next slide.

This is kind of the introduction. I just want to briefly remind everyone of our current policy that the

Commission has had for many years, which has always been to encourage renewable generation wherever cost-effective. And, basically, in staff's mind, we consider we would rather have renewable generation than any other type of generation, but

that needs to be cost-effective and ratepayer neutral.

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The new statute that has come out, in staff's mind, has opened a window of opportunity for both the Commission and the industry to go beyond a business-as-usual approach. Let's be creative. Let's look at other ways that we can encourage renewable generation without giving away the store, so to say.

A little reminder, there has been a new upsurgence in the balanced fuel supply approach to planning, and renewables play a great role in that. However, we must remember that a balanced fuel supply but also balance ratepayer risk, that purchased power has to be at or below avoided cost in order to keep ratepayers neutral and not to oversubsidize renewable generation.

A long-running policy at the Commission has always been a preference for negotiated contracts. Negotiated contracts are best worked out between two parties. They have their individual circumstances, their individual wants and needs, and the Commission has always encouraged negotiated contracts over anything. It seems to be the typical win/win situation.

A standard offer contract is a fall back. If parties

can't reach agreement in negotiations, a standard offer is available for certain types of generators, but it also provides useful information to the market with which to start negotiations. It allows the competitive market forces to work as they should to arrive at the best deal for the ratepayers.

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Now, the whole purpose of this workshop with the advent of the new legislation is to ask ourselves a question:

Can we do something other than the business-as-usual approach to encourage renewable generation but without breaking that ratepayer-neutral philosophy and policy that we have.

A little summary of where we are currently in Florida with renewable generation. Utilities currently purchase about 500 megawatts from renewable generation in various forms. In a recent assessment that we have done with DEP, I guess it was two years ago now, showed that approximately the most potential for new generation in the renewable form was from biomass, maybe 200 megawatts. But, as you can see, this is still a small percentage, totally, in the state of regeneration. We have a regeneration fleet now of probably close to 40,000 megawatts. So renewable generation, while important, it is still a small role.

Most of the existing contracts are negotiated contracts, they have an average term of about 18 years, and most of them are from municipal solid waste facilities. So the bulk of that 500 megawatts is from municipal solid waste

facilities whose primary purpose is to dispose of municipal solid waste, and electricity is a secondary source. So their primary motive is not to generate electricity.

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Most of these contracts will expire in the years 2009 through 2011, so we are going to see a time period where the facilities will be in place, but the contracts will expire, and they will be wanting, probably, to renegotiate new contracts to continue to sell capacity and energy to have a revenue stream.

The recent rise in natural gas prices has helped to facilitate negotiations amongst utilities and renewables and other generators, as well. And a few agendas ago the Commission was presented with a negotiated contract between Progress Energy and a company called G2, which used landfill gas to power small generators, and it's a good example of how the negotiated market is working.

A quick summary of our existing rules, which is really what we are going to be talking today, to see can the new statute can be fitted in and implemented under our existing rules. One of the very first ones we have is each public utility shall submit tariff or tariffs and a contract or contracts for purchase of capacity and energy. And that's going to be very important as we get later on in the avoided cost discussion with Mr. Haff. That you can have a single tariff or multiple tariffs or a single contract or multiple contracts.

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This next rule reflects our policy of negotiated contracts, that in lieu of negotiated contracts, standard offers are reserved for only renewables, municipal solid waste facilities, and very small, less than 100 kW facilities pursuant to PURPA, which was a federal law enacted in 1978. Staff is probably proposing that those very small generators, less than 100 kilowatts be absorbed, if you will, in the renewable standard offer contracts, as well. It doesn't make sense to staff to have two separate standard offer tracks, one for just renewables, and one for very small generators. So I think we are proposing, and I believe the utilities agree, it makes administrative sense to just have one contract for all of these. Even though the statute didn't mandate a purchased contract, it makes sense from staff's standpoint to include those facilities, as well, and there are no changes to our rules in order to do that.

Again, our rules say they must be equal to the avoided cost of the utility, and avoided cost means what the utility would have spent absent the purchase, so it keeps the ratepayers neutral. The standard offers must contain an open solicitation period which closes prior to issuing an RFP. And Ms. Harlow will talk about that as far as the continuous offer and the term. It also comes into play with avoided cost. And the new statute now said that standard offers must be continuously available, so an open season may not be applicable

anymore.

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A standard offer must identify the total amount of committed capacity needed to fully subscribe the avoided unit. Again, this will be discussed by Ms. Harlow on the cap, if you will, on standard offers. And our current rules say a minimum term is five years from the in-service date of the avoided unit. Again, Ms. Harlow will talk about that in hers on the term of the contract.

Now, let us go to the new statute. And I'm not going to read this, but it is direct quoted from the statute, and it would be a good reference as we go through. I'll try to summarize it as quick as I can. The basic intent was the legislature found it is in the public interest to encourage renewables, and I think staff agrees with that. Like I said earlier, we would rather have a renewable generator than any other source. It lists the types of renewable generators, there are several of them, and it comes everything from municipal solid waste to products from livestock and poultry operations.

Next slide, please.

The statute required that on or before January 1st each utility have a contract in place. We complied with that on our December 20th agenda. The utilities have contracts in place that are set to expire by June 1st. So as a follow-up, we're going to have new contracts filed probably sometime in

May that the Commission will have to act on to see if we continuously offer them again.

The statute required that the avoided cost principle continue. The statute also provided that a minimum term of now ten years must be applied. So that is a slight change from what our existing rules say. The statute also recognized that no capacity payments are required if the renewable generator does not perform or provide a capacity benefit, so it's not a mandated right of capacity payments. It is a pay per performance type of statute, and that the renewable generator must pay for interconnection.

At the December 20th agenda you'll remember we had a lively discussion on some topics, and I think this workshop is an extension of that, and I would like to keep it and remind the presenters that we are trying to stay on these three basic topic areas. We talked about avoided costs, and staff proposed two options. One to continue with a sequential single avoided unit approach, or perhaps think a little bit outside the box and look at multiple avoided units or a portfolio approach.

Mr. Haff will talk about that in his presentation.

The contract term limit. Our existing rule required a five-year minimum, the statute requires a minimum of ten years. The question that arose at the December 20th agenda is what is the starting date. Is it the in-service date of the avoided unit or is it when contract payments start? I believe

this is an issue that had some merit, had some discussion going on, and I think we have reached an agreement with the utilities. We will hear about that a little later.

Then the subscription limit. This was something that came about back in the early days of standard offers when they were available to all types of generators, even large three or 400-megawatt qualifying facilities. The Commission implemented a subscription limit to put a cap on that, so we didn't get too much generation. What we're thinking now with the new statute, it may be time for a change to maybe remove that barrier, especially since it's limited to just renewable generators. They're such a small portion of the entire system, that maybe that artificial barrier doesn't need to be there anymore. And Mr. Harlow will talk about that more in her presentation.

And now I would like to turn it over to Mr. Haff.

MR. HAFF: Commissioners, I'm going to talk about avoided cost. The first slide here is a summary of the history of, I guess, the topic of avoided cost. As Mr. Ballinger stated, the statute defines avoided cost as the cost that a utility would pay to build or buy capacity, absent purchasing from a qualifying facility.

In the 1980s, when the Commission began to implement cogeneration contracts, the avoided cost was based on what is known as a theoretical state-wide avoided unit that is allowed by the Florida Statutes. At that time the statewide avoided

unit was based on coal, a coal plant. It was determined that a coal-fired facility was, if the State of Florida were one utility, that would be what the one State of Florida utility would need as the least-cost option.

It further helped the development of cogeneration because of higher capacity payments. Coal-fired plants have higher fixed costs, and thus the fixed capacity payments associated with a solid fuel plant would be greater, and thus better for a qualifying facility for their revenue stream.

The Federal Fuel Use Act was repealed in 1987, and coal capacity payments were offered to facilities that actually burned gas and other types of fuel. And under cogen contracts, at the time utilities individual ten-year site plans consisted mostly of gas-fired units, combined cycles, combustion turbines, because that was what was least cost for those individual utilities. Those type of facilities, as the converse of coal, they would have lower fixed capacity payments and maybe higher variable payments associated with the fuel.

In the early '90s the Commission, we modified our rule to define the avoided cost based on the individual utility's ten-year site plans, generation expansion plans. As a result, because the payments to cogenerators were based on the actual avoided cost of each utility, it was considered to be more ratepayer neutral than the statewide avoided coal unit.

The staff believes there's two options for satisfying

the renewable energy statute's requirement to continuously offer to purchase at avoided cost. As Mr. Ballinger discussed, one is the sequential approach which is sort of how we have been doing it in the past, and that is based on a single individual avoided generating unit. A standard offer is available until that unit becomes committed, construction begins, or a need determination is filed, and then the next standard offer contract becomes effective with the closure of the first one.

Under the portfolio approach, we would view that as every unit in the 10-year site plan becomes available for renewable energy contracts regardless of fuel type until the construction date or the need determination filing date. Every year on April 1st when new ten-year site plans would come in, I guess we would see that the generating units available for the portfolio of avoided units would be updated every year.

The Commission's current rules are silent on whether we should take a sequential or portfolio approach, it just didn't contemplate this discussion. We believe that you may wish to consider the portfolio approach as a way to encourage renewable generation, because if there happens to be a unit in the Ten-Year Site Plan, it is not the next unit, but is more appropriate for a particular qualifying facility or renewable energy facility, then there would be an opportunity to sign a contract based on something other than the first unit in the

plan.

approach, satisfy the definition of avoided cost because they are based on the individual utility's plan. There are some pros and cons to both approaches in our view. The sequential approach is similar to the current process we have now, which the utilities and the Commission have been administering for probably over 20 years. It more closely matches the utility planning process and there is less forecast uncertainty because you are dealing with the first unit in a stream of units over a ten-year planning horizon.

Staff views one of the disadvantages of this approach is that it could lead to possible gaming of the ten-year siting plan process with only combustion turbine units offered as avoided units. These units, as I said before, have lower capacity payments because of lower fixed costs. And what could happen is on, you know, April 1st, the new ten-year site plans arrive, we may suddenly see a higher capacity payment type unit such as coal or combined cycle, but there is not enough time prior to having to commit to starting that unit to allow for a standard offer contract.

The pros or the advantages of the portfolio approach in staff's mind is that it allows the renewable facility to pick any unit in the Ten-Year Site Plan. As I said before, one of the further off units in the Ten-Year Site Plan may better

match the timing and the operating characteristics of the renewable facility. One disadvantage of the portfolio approach is there is more forecast uncertainty. And what I mean by that is if you're a renewable energy facility and you may decide that a unit in the Ten-Year Site Plan that is offered in, say, year nine or ten, when the subsequent ten-year site plans come out, that unit may shift, it may go away and be replaced by another unit, because it is based on a long-term expansion plan. And that unit is subject to some uncertainty. A load forecast may change causing the unit to be needed sooner or later, and so you may have capacity payments for a unit that either gets deferred or avoided through those changes, or through conservation.

I'm going to turn it over to Ms. Harlow now to discuss the contract term.

MS. HARLOW: Good morning. I have a quick review of two issues related to renewable standard offer contracts, and that is how should the contract term be established and should there be a capacity limit that is less than the size of the avoided unit. I will just briefly touch on these and skip part of the slides, because it's our understanding that we have some agreement on these issues, and I believe they will also be covered by the utility presentation.

Beginning with the contract term, the question on the contract term is it is clearly stated in the statute that the

minimum term is ten years on the renewable standard offer contracts. However, there had been some disagreement at the December 20th agenda on when that ten years should start. Should it start at the in-service date of the avoided unit or should it start at the beginning of payments since the Commission rule allows for early capacity payments.

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A brief history on contract term. The Commission's rule originally stated that there was a ten-year minimum term. This was put in place because at the time the rule was passed it was a new industry with qualifying facilities and the Commission wanted to ensure that the capacity from these units would be there when the ratepayers needed that capacity, so they wanted a longer term at that time in history.

In 2002, after several Commission orders and response to rule waiver requests from the utilities, the Commission reduced the minimum term to five years. However, the rule currently states that while there has to be a minimum term of five years, the term can go up to the life of the avoided unit. So there is a range in the rule today on what the term can be.

A related issue in the Commission's current rule is that the rule allows there to be early capacity payments to the renewable provider or other qualifying facilities. However, the rule states that the present value of these early capacity payments cannot exceed the payments which would have otherwise been paid to the renewable facility. So there's a cap on the

present value of these payments, and that is an important point.

The statutory requirement, as I just said, is that there is a ten-year minimum term for renewable standard offer contracts, and the statute is silent on the start date of that term. So staff's concern on this issue was if the term is not from the in-service date, if it does not start from that, we were concerned that the utilities could have had the potential to game the contract term in order to minimize total capacity payments paid to the renewable generator. And I have a slide with an example of that. Staff believes there is no rule change necessary to implement the statute on this issue.

Next slide, please.

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This is an example of the contract term, and I'm starting it either with option one at the start of early capacity payments, or option two, which is starting with the in-service date of the avoided unit. For example, beginning with a combustion turbine unit. A combustion turbine unit, gas-fired unit is very quick to site and build. It takes approximately 18 months to site and build a combustion turbine unit. So if there were early capacity payments, according to the Commission rule, those payments could start 18 months prior to the in-service date of the unit.

If this were the case with the renewable standard offer contract, what would happen is that ten years would start

a year and a half before the unit was in-service, and it would extend, if it were ten years, eight and a half years beyond the in-service date. If that were the case, the present value of those payments would be less than the present value of the payments if the contract payments started with the in-service date and extended ten years beyond that. So under the Commission's current rules, if we had that payment stream start early and the contract term started at that point in time, the renewable generator would receive a smaller amount present value of capacity payments.

The second example is a coal unit. And what we will see with a coal unit is if it takes longer to site and build a unit, and coal is kind of an extreme example, because it takes seven to eight years to site and build a coal unit, then the problem is exacerbated. So with option one, if we start with the early capacity payments, then the contract would just extend three years beyond the in-service date of the unit. And what we see there is that our capacity payments to the renewable provider would be much smaller than if the ten years extended beyond the in-service date.

The second issue that we discussed at the December 20th agenda was whether there should be a capacity limit or not and should this be set at the size of the avoided unit, or should it be less than the size of the avoided unit, as is the Commission's policy today. A brief history of this. At the

time the Commission's rule was put in place, we had a broad definition of what a qualifying facility was. And so at that point we had, perhaps, 4,000 or more megawatts of cogeneration capacity in the state, and they were each vying for a standard offer contract. So there had to be a limit on how much capacity could be available under each contract and the limit was set at the size of the avoided unit.

However, over time the Commission had several rule waiver requests, and the definition of a QF was reduced, and there was very little QF capacity available. And over time the Commission reduced the capacity limit to five to ten megawatt portion of the avoided unit. And that is the policy that is currently in place.

The statute is silent on whether there should be a capacity limit or not, but it does strongly state that the intention of the statute is to promote the development of renewable energy resources in the state, and that this is in the public interest. So the staff believes that setting the capacity limit at the size of the avoided unit has several advantages. First of all, we believe that it allows existing renewable facilities to sign one of these contracts for their full capacity when their current contract expires. And, secondly, we believe that it encourages the development of larger scale renewables in the future because they would be able to sign for the entire size of the unit perhaps, and that

would significantly help them in obtaining financing to build that renewable unit.

And, finally, as I just said, we think it's very important in obtaining financing for the renewable unit. And it's our belief that the lower capacity limit that's in place today for all QFs may be an artificial barrier to renewable development, and we also believe that we could remove this barrier without a rule change.

And staff is available for any questions.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioners, any questions for staff before we move into industry presentations?

Commissioner Deason.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Explain to me how there is not a need for a rule change to implement the ten-year statutory period.

MS. HARLOW: The current rule states that the term has to have a minimum of five years up to the life of the avoided unit. So the current rule has a range of terms.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: The current rule states a minimum of five. So by having that language in there, that is compatible with the ten-year minimum in the statute?

MS. HARLOW: Yes, sir. We believe it is, at least to implement these contracts as soon as possible. We believe that the current language gives us the flexibility on that issue to move forward under the tight time frame of the statute. And

that if that process becomes unwieldily over time, we could certainly go to rulemaking then.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioner Arriaga for a question.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: Thank you. When we were talking about the avoided cost you gave us two options. One is the sequential and one is the portfolio. And you mentioned a disadvantage to the portfolio option. Could you enhance your explanation on that, please? Especially what worries me is what would happen in the case that you mentioned that the unit is changed in the Ten-Year Site Plan? You have it this year, and you contract based on that unit this year, but two years down the line it is taken way from the Ten-Year Site Plan because of the planning process in the company and it is no longer there. What happens?

MR. HAFF: That's a good point that we discussed internally, what to do. At the point in time if the contract were to be signed on a future unit under the portfolio approach, and that unit were either to disappear or to move around, the contract, of course, would be honored. It just would not be based on your avoiding a unit that is no longer in the Ten-Year Site Plan. We, of course, would honor the contract, but we see that as the problem with picking a unit in the future. You know, the forecasts are going to change.

MR. BALLINGER: Commissioner Arriaga, I can add a little bit more. Let's think of this -- let's say the utility

files a Ten-Year Site Plan. They have one unit in their horizon, and it's in year nine, and let's say it is a combustion turbine. They are nowhere near committing for that unit, but the statute requires that a contract be continuously available. So even if they just have the one unit, I think by statute we're required to put some offering on the table. And granted, that does incur some additional risk to the ratepayers of early commitment, as you pointed out, but I think we are still bound to at least put out one contract. So doing a portfolio is no different than if you had a single unit that was out in the future, in my mind. You still have the same risk, but I think it is a risked imposed on us by the statute to make these continuously available.

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COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioner Carter.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Thank you, Madam Chairman. I just wanted to ask staff, I see where several times you say no rule change necessary, no rule change necessary, and in one place you say there is no rule change necessary to implement the statute. So basically whatever we do, notwithstanding the provisions of 366.91 that is per Senator Bennett, whatever we do will be consistent with that, is that what you're saying to us?

MR. BALLINGER: Yes, sir. We tried to approach this, because of the early implementation date required in the

statute, to first look at could the statute be fitted in with our existing rules, and we think it can. We think we can accomplish the objectives of the statute under our existing rules which does two things: It get a product out there for the renewables quicker, and it avoids lengthy deliberations in rulemaking that would bring up other side issues that weren't really addressed by the statute.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Thank you, Madam Chairman.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you.

Mr. Ballinger.

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MR. BALLINGER: That went quicker than I thought it would. What we have now is the presentation by the investor-owned utilities by Mr. Bryan Anderson from Florida Power and Light Company and Mr. Bill Ashburn of Tampa Electric Company.

MR. ANDERSON: Good morning, Chairman Edgar, how are you? Good morning, Commissioners. Thank you all very much for the opportunity to be here today. My name is Bryan Anderson.

I'm an attorney with Florida Power and Light Company. I'm joined here today with Mr. William Ashburn, who is the Director of Pricing and Financial Analysis of Tampa Electric Company.

We thank the Commissioners and the Commission Staff for this opportunity to provide some overview comments of Florida's investor-owned utilities concerning the 2005 renewable energy legislation and its implementation by the

Commission and our companies. Mr. Ashburn's and my comments reflect input from Florida Power and Light Company, Progress Energy Florida, Tampa Electric Company, and Gulf Power Company. Representatives of these companies are present and look forward to participating in the workshop today.

My remarks will outline some legal principles that the utilities believe should be kept in mind as we work together towards implementing the new renewable energy law.

Mr. Ashburn will then outline some recommendations prepared by the investor-owned utilities for implementing the renewable energy law. The recommendations reflect consideration of the requirements of the new law, and lessons learned from the utilities' collective history and experience of more than twenty years involving standard offer contracts.

This is a substantial history we all have together.

There are currently more than 1600 megawatts of capacity from cogenerators and small power producers under firm contract to the investor-owned utilities in Florida representing considerable experience in implementing the Commission's policy direction related to qualified facility negotiated and standard offer contracts.

The utilities have prepared a set of written comments setting forth our thinking in more detail. These have been distributed and made available. We offer these and hope they will be a useful resource. It's not our intention to go

through each and every detail point in there, but we wanted to have all that information.

Let's turn to some key legal and regulatory points to keep in mind as we work on implementing the new renewable energy law. It is clear that the newly adopted legislation is intended to encourage the development of renewable resources and sources of power production here in Florida in order to decrease dependence on gas and oil and diversify the sources of fuel. The law creates some new requirements for public utilities. A requirement to continuously offer a purchased contract to producers of renewable energy. A requirement to offer a contract term of at least ten years. These kinds of new requirements present greater opportunities for renewable energy producers.

Mr. Ashburn will describe some of the utilities' recommendations for implementing the requirements in a way that can be expected to benefit renewable energy producers and utility customers. For example, by providing for many megawatts of capacity requirements being available for consideration for renewable standard offer contracts.

At the same time, as we consider the changes provided for a renewable energy law, it is equally important to focus on what has not changed and is retained from existing law and regulation in the renewable energy law. The most important point we would like to communicate is that the renewable energy

law is not written on a blank slate. For example, the renewable energy law, and Mr. Ballinger and others have stated this very clearly, expressly refers to and incorporates the legal, economic, and policy concept of avoided cost contained in a longstanding statute, Section 366.051, and there are many rules and decisions of this Commission concerning standard offer contracts that are detailed in our more extended written comments.

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I want to take a moment to provide a brief overview of several key legal rules and decisions that are prominent features of the legal landscape as the Commission, staff, utilities, and others think about using avoided costs for pricing standard offer contracts for renewable energy. Each of these is a well-established decision, policy, rule of the Commission reflected in the Commission's rules and orders.

One is the comment that Mr. Ballinger and others referred to, Mr. Haff, also, about using the value of deferral methodology in relation to avoided costs. It has been mentioned that the avoided cost definition is a utility's full avoided cost or the incremental costs to the utility electric energy or capacity or both, which but for the purchase from cogenerators and small power producers such utility would generate itself or purchase from another source.

It is useful focussing on those words, such utility would generate itself or purchase from another source. We

believe that pretty firmly reinforces the direction of this Commission in looking at the specific circumstances of individual utilities and specific units.

The key function of the avoided cost requirement is to protect electric service customers. By setting an avoided cost limit in the law promoting renewable sources of energy, customers are protected from standard offer contracts that would require payment amounts greater than avoided cost. If contracts result in payment in excess of avoided costs, then utility customers would pay more than the legislature has authorized. And, again, I want to reinforce that statutory bedrock that these avoided costs are in reference to a utility that it would generate itself or purchase.

The Commission has adopted the value of deferral methodology for determining the avoided costs that a qualifying facility may receive for capacity. The Commission's definition of this, going back to 1983 in its order in Docket 820406-EU, there are several orders detailed in our written comments. The value of deferral is, in essence, a calculation of the value of deferring the revenue requirements of new generating plants by one year.

Essentially, it compares the difference in annual requirements if the revenue requirement stream begins in Year X as compared to beginning in Year X plus one. In reaching this decision, the Commission expressly rejected alternative methods

of computation. But based upon very, very extensive records, extensive discussions, that in the Commission's view incorrectly inflated prices to be paid as avoided costs. The Commission stated in that same docket and those orders, we will not consider supply-side alternatives more costly than the value of deferral because it would not benefit the ratepayers to pursue them regardless of the source.

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I'd like to talk to you about performance requirements and security requirements for a few moments.

Mr. Ballinger correctly pointed out that pay-for performance is start of the renewable law that we have before us. And the Commission has a longstanding set of rules and practices in relation to this, also. The Commission's QF rules for standard offer contracts recognizes the importance of parties satisfying their contractual obligations. This is in order, again, to protect utility customers.

Stepping back, remember as regulated investor-owned utilities, we are entirely subject to the jurisdiction of this Commission. In contrast, third-party providers of capacity and energy, pursuant to standard offer or renewable contracts, are not directly under this Commission's jurisdiction. Rather, the key and only means of protecting long-term customer's interest is in the terms of those contracts. So when we look at standard offer contracts, sometimes it's tempting to say it looks like there is a lot of boilerplate, or this or that, but

it is really important to slow down and analyze and look at those elements.

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For example, if you look about performance requirements, the idea behind performance requirements is that when we look at what is being paid for capacity, paid for energy from a unit, that that be expressly comparable to the same type of unit that the utility would build. That's how we know that the avoided cost standard is being met. If a renewable producer wishes to propose a different type of unit with different performance characteristics, I think all the utilities welcome the opportunity for those discussions.

Probably it would be handled in a negotiated contract type of circumstance. But because of the fallback role of the standard offer contract, it is very important to keep the alignment between price, performance requirements, and other performance security requirements.

The Commission's rules recognize this. They say each standard contract offer contract shall, at a minimum, specify minimum performance standards for the delivery of firm capacity and energy during the utility's daily seasonal peak and off-peak periods. These performance standards, and this goes for the avoided unit, shall approximate the anticipated peak and off-peak availability and capacity factor of the utility's avoided unit over the term of the contract. So that comparability idea is really built throughout our rules.

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On the top of the financial security requirements, the Commission's existing rules state the utility may include the following provisions: Provisions to protect the purchasing utility's ratepayers in the event the qualifying facility fails to deliver firm capacity and energy. For those of us who have been energy lawyers for awhile, what we are talking about is circumstances where capacity and energy are not delivered, you need to make it up, you need the ability to purchase or obtain that from another source. And a party that is committed to deliver that to you really needs to be prepared and ready to make that good to our customers.

And that is why the rule goes on to say that these types of security arrangements may be through the form on an upfront payment, surety bond, or equivalent assurance of payment. We are all familiar with letters of credit and things like that. We go on and note that because renewable energy providers are not subject to Commission regulation, again, it is the only way these kinds of protections for customers can be created and preserved is through the specific terms of the contracts.

I would like to touch on, briefly, avoided unit selection. This is a terrifically important point. I anticipate there will be considerable discussion from a variety of folks. Mr. Ashburn, in particular, will talk a little bit more about the utility's point of view about this.

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In our written comments there is a detailed, and I found very interesting, discourse on the Commission's development of its rule on avoided unit selection for purposes of QF standard offer contracts. You can see some of the discussions, the points raised by individual Commissioners in years past. The points in the orders and the very, very careful thinking. All the opportunities for points of view that are reflected that have come out in what is our existing policy of this Commission.

The bottom line is that the Commission, after a great deal of consideration, chose to use each individual utility's next generating unit. Not a portfolio basis, not a statewide unit, et cetera, not a hypothetical statewide unit, as the basis for determining avoided costs. The utilities believe this is the right approach. Because from an economics perspective, it is the best and most accurate way of ensuring that avoided costs are correctly computed. You will recall that is a touchstone in this renewable energy law.

More hypothetical approaches, and staff has correctly noted this, such as trying to figure out a single statewide unit or a menu means less accurate representations of avoided costs for a host of reasons which Commissioner Arriaga was beginning to explore. Keep in mind when people use the words more ratepayer neutral, what are we talking about? Overall, we are talking about what costs should be charged to our

upon the methodology selected. In the view of the utilities, the methodology which has been adopted by this Commission is economically sound, has served well, and should be preserved.

Thank you for the opportunity to present these legal points. I would like to turn now to Mr. Ashburn from Tampa Electric who will outline investor-owned utility recommendations.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Madam Chair.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Ashburn, just a moment.

Commissioner Carter.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: If I may.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Of course.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: A question, please. You said in your presentation that you see that what staff has recommended can increase the capacity for renewable energy providers, correct? Did you say that?

MR. ANDERSON: I'm sorry, Commissioner Carter. I'm having difficulty hearing you from here. My fault.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Okay. I'll get closer to the microphone.

You said in your presentation that based upon your review of what staff had presented is that the results would be that it would increase the capacity for renewable energy providers, correct? Did you say that?

MR. ANDERSON: I think when we listen to

Mr. Ashburn's comments in a moment, you will see that

utilities' consideration of the new law does result in

substantial increased opportunities for renewable providers.

Is that your question?

COMMISSIONER CARTER: So that's what you said, right?

MR. ANDERSON: That's what I said. Absolutely right.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Okay. Good. Then do you agree that there is no rule change necessary to implement the statute?

MR. ANDERSON: What I would like to do is defer on that type of point. Because for now I'm speaking with respect to all the agreed-upon points of all the utilities. I will be happy to answer that question on behalf of Florida Power and Light at any point, if you choose, but I would really like to let other utilities and their counsel speak to their view on that.

But I do have a view, and I'm happy to tell you Florida Power and Light's perspective. Florida Power and Light's perspective is that we have a statute in hand, it requires these contracts to be made continuously available. We believe that these contracts through a tariffed standard offer contract submitted and approved by the Commission can get to a proper standard offer contract consistent with the law and that that can be done without rule changes. That's the position of

Florida Power and Light. I would need other investor-owned utilities to speak to that, sir.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Ashburn.

MR. ASHBURN: Thank you, Chairman Edgar and Commissioners. My name is Bill Ashburn with Tampa Electric Company.

Since the December agenda, the four utilities got together and talked about the three issues that were discussed by the staff as remaining from that agenda, and we worked quite hard over the last couple of months trying to craft a common position that we could present to you and hopefully resolve the issue. So what I'm going to do is go through the points that we all agreed to, and we think that resolves the issue, at least from our perspective, and we would like to present that for your consideration.

The first items is the question about having continuously on file with the Commission a renewable standard offer contract, and we talked a lot about the issue as far as putting it all together. And as Mr. Ballinger was suggesting, there is really only the one piece left, which is the 100 kW regular cogenerator standard offer. And so the four utilities have agreed that for purposes of this, we could have one standard offer that would cover all of those perspectives, all the renewables as well as this 100 kW generator.

The second item that we all agreed to was that the

capacity payments included in that standard offer for renewable would be based on the capacity costs associated with the utility's next planned generating unit, which is the generating unit with the earliest projected in-service date as reflected in the utility's Ten-Year Site Plan as it might be amended from time-to-time by the utility. Also that energy payments would continue as they are now to be based on the lesser of the system incremental energy costs, or the energy costs that would have incurred if the energy had been generated by that avoided unit. So that's the second item.

The third item that we agreed on was that the subscription limit on capacity in any renewable standard offer contract would equal the total stated megawatts of the capacity of the avoided unit, minus any megawatts of capacity from previously executed contracts that the utility entered into based on that same avoided unit. So this is the 10 and 20-megawatt subscription limit issue. We have all agreed that we should take the next avoided unit and do the complete capacity for that unit, minus whatever contracts we enter into based on that unit.

The generating unit utilized for pricing capacity payments for renewable standard offer would be changed from that avoided unit to the generating unit next and earliest projected in-service date in the utility's Ten-Year Site Plan, upon any of the following, whichever occurs first: The first

being the utility fully subscribes to subscription limit on capacity of its avoided unit as we described above. The second is if the utility commences construction of its avoided unit, this is the turning dirt thing that Mr. Ballinger was talking about, or the utility issues an RFP required by Rule 25-22.082 for the avoided unit. And any change would be recognized via filing by the utility with the Commission to change the renewable standard offer contract to the next unit in sequence in the Ten-Year Site Plan.

The fifth point we agreed on and present is that the renewable standard offer would have a closure date of the due date for the next annual filing of the utility's Ten-Year Site Plan. When the Ten-Year Site Plan has been filed with the Commission, which happens annually around April, but sometimes happens in between, if the avoided unit -- if the same avoided unit is identified in that next Ten-Year Site Plan, then the staff would be given the administrative ability to approve an extension in each utility's then in effect renewable standard offer contract reflecting a closure date changed to the date of the next annual filing. This is the sequential approach that we have talked about that staff brought up.

The sixth item we came to some agreement on was that, as Mr. Anderson was talking about, protections for the utilities' customers should be retained in the renewable standard offer contracts. One would be, for example, terms

that state how capacity payments would be adjusted if the supplier's performance does not conform to performance requirements. Another would be a requirement that any renewable served offer contract enter to -- that includes capacity payments, must provide a true capacity benefit to the utility. Those types of things that currently exist in the rules would continue.

The last item we talked about was that renewable capacity sign-ups should be reflected prospectively in the utility's next planning cycle. So as we sign contracts with the renewable standard offers contracts with customers who are selling us capacity, we would reflect that in our Ten-Year Site Plan that we have entered into this capacity, and it might have an effect on the Ten-Year Site Plan going forward.

We think these elements achieve some important objectives in implementing this legislation. They bring some organization and order to the planning process of each utility, which is very important. They allow the standard offer contract to be based on reasonable assumptions, and they provide the best opportunity to achieve the result of actually avoiding and/or deferring the next unit in each utility's plan.

Staff teed up the issue that I think is still out there from our perspective, which is the menu approach or portfolio approach. This is kind of the choice between the sequential and portfolio approach. The reason we are thinking

that the sequential approach is a better one, I think, was brought up in the discussion you have already had about risk.

If you look at the whole Ten-Year Site Plan, and if you look at a series of Ten-Year Site Plans going back over time, they change. Particularly the outer years change. You have a lot of time between the next unit coming up and things change. Gas prices go up, technology changes, environmental rules change, policy changes occur. The outer years are quite at risk for really happening. The next unit is very highly to happen, because it is very often within a few years. It is more likely that that will happen than the one out in the eight, nine, or ten-year period.

If we put those units out with specific standard offers that could be taken by a renewable standard offer or another cogenerator, those are at risk of not actually being an avoided cost, because that unit may never occur. It's not to say that those aren't out there already. Ten-Year Site Plans are published and public documents looked at by cogenerators. They are talked about by cogenerators. It's an option they can talk to us about in negotiation.

It's important to realize, as well, that the standard offer contract is, as discussed, a fallback. This is an opportunity for the cogenerator, the renewable standard offer contractor is an opportunity for them to just take it without negotiating, or if negotiations fail. We negotiate with these

folks all the time. We enter into many negotiated deals. And these Ten-Year Site Plans are available for them to look at, to talk to us about, to see, if, hey, what about this unit out seven or eight or nine years out from now, that's maybe what I'm thinking about building, and we can come up with a negotiated deal that works on that. So we think that is a better approach than having a series of standard offer contracts, the outer year ones of which would be much more risky and less likely to occur. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioner Carter.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Thank you for your indulgence. I'm looking here at these seven items that you have agreed upon and your review of the staff's menu approach, and I still come back to my same question. Do you agree with staff that there is no rule change necessary to implement this statute?

MR. ASHBURN: Well, as Mr. Anderson mentioned, we really never came to -- I don't think the four utilities ever talked about that issue, that is why you don't see it as one of the items. But from a Tampa Electric perspective, I can tell you that we think we can do this without a rule change. But the things that we have agreed to here, the things that we would all commit to put into our tariffs -- you approve each tariff as it comes forward. I think it fits within the scope of the current rules, so we don't think it's necessary to

change rules.

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COMMISSIONER CARTER: Madam Chairman -- thank you.

The reason I'm asking the question is sometimes we get into the gobbledygook, but we don't get to the bottom line. And I'm just trying to get to the bottom line. And if there's no rule change necessary to implement the statute, then I think we can talk from that standpoint. But if that's not the case, then we are just kind of spitting off the back of the pick-up.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you, Commissioner Carter.

As I mentioned in my opening comments, at our discussion at the agenda conference on December 20th when this came before us, we did have some discussion about did we need to go into rulemaking, did we not. And my feeling on that, as I hope I have mentioned, is that if we need to we will, and we will do it in a manner that is thorough, thoughtful, and timely. But if, indeed, our procedural mechanisms are in place now so that we can spend our time on the intent of the law and the direction that this Commission wants to take, then I would rather we spend our time and the resources of all interested parties doing that rather than on a procedural rulemaking. But if we need to, obviously we will move in that direction.

Commissioner Arriaga.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: Mr. Ballinger. You just heard a presentation of seven items in which the IOUs agreed upon.

MR. BALLINGER: Yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: Has that been discussed with staff, and do you agree with the seven items?

MR. BALLINGER: It has been discussed with staff. I don't know that we are in total agreement of all of them, of what they're proposing. And I think the remaining issue out there is the portfolio approach.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: Yes. And that was going to be my next question. So choosing or selecting the portfolio approach would, of course, have an impact on the seven times.

MR. BALLINGER: Yes, sir.

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COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: Could you go into the extent of the impact?

MR. BALLINGER: Okay. If possible, can I ask the utilities some questions, and it might clarify things? I want to understand their proposal entirely, if you don't mind.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: This is a workshop.

MR. BALLINGER: The other thing I would like to ask, too, I know Commissioner Carter has asked at least two utilities if rule revisions are necessary, and I would like to add a clarification to that. Rule revisions aren't necessary if we adopt the utility sequential avoided unit approach. Are rule revisions necessary if we adopt a portfolio approach? And I would also like to hear from Gulf Power and Progress Energy on that question, I think, to get all four perspectives.

So if we could go down again with Florida Power and

Light and TECO, would rule revisions be necessary if a 1 portfolio approach were proposed? 2 MR. ANDERSON: From a Florida Power and Light 3 perspective, I can't say I have analyzed that from a legal 4 5 perspective. MR. BALLINGER: And TECO? 6 MR. ASHBURN: I, frankly, don't know. I don't think 7 I looked at that very carefully. I'm not a lawyer, so I'll 8 have to ask our lawyers that, too. 9 MR. BALLINGER: We've got a lawyer for Progress, so 10 maybe --11 MR. BURNETT: John Burnett of Progress Energy 12 13 Florida. I'm going to have to give a similarly ambiguous answer. I have not analyzed that, as well. I can say that as 14 to the IOU recommended approach, as to Commissioner Carter's 15 16 question, I do not think a rule change would be needed to implement what the utilities propose. However, again, 17 unfortunately I cannot speak to the portfolio approach. 18 MR. BALLINGER: And Gulf Power. 19 20 MR. GRIFFIN: Steve Griffin (phonetic) on behalf of Gulf Power. Again, unfortunately, I would have to echo Mr. 21 22 Burnett's statements. COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: May I make a comment? 23 CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioner Arriaga. 24 COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: Let me interrupt you for a 25

second. And I'm going to say this with absolute due respect to all of you and consideration. But you knew that we were having this workshop today. How can you come here and tell me that you have not analyzed legally for your clients one of the approaches that you know that we care about that is within an interpretation of the statute that the staff has been saying that you should be able to read into the possibility?

So we sit here today for a workshop, and you tell me that you haven't looked at the issue. I think that you are making me waste my time, honestly. I mean, I came here to hear from you about the different issues that you were going to discuss and avoided -- the portfolio approach is one of them. So why waste our time here today? Isn't this business as usual? I mean, I say this with respect, I really mean respect to all of you, but have some consideration for my time, please. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Ballinger.

MR. BALLINGER: I had a few more questions. If I understand the utilities, the approach that you have outlined here is, one, you would include the 100 kW facilities in the same standard offer.

MR. ASHBURN: Yes.

MR. BALLINGER: And we've talked, I have been in discussions with the utilities throughout this. I just want to make sure we have got this straightened out. It would be the

next unit from an in-service date perspective as far as standard offer payments. It could be closed I'll call it at the utility's discretion if you fully subscribe. So if you negotiate contracts and fill it up, if the unit changes, come April 1st you can close that contract and reopen a new one. Am I couching it correctly?

MR. ASHBURN: Well, we have to file with you to let you know it's changing, so that is not exactly our discretion, but, yes.

MR. BALLINGER: Correct. But you are watching your plan so that when a unit changes or something like that, you can file a petition with us, close one and do it. It's under your control.

MR. ASHBURN: That's right.

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MR. BALLINGER: That's what I thought. Which you can do now at any time? I mean, that's kind of how the current rules operate.

MR. ASHBURN: That's correct.

MR. BALLINGER: You would close standard offers when you issue an RFP for, like I say, a combined cycle or coal unit, that would be --

MR. ASHBURN: For that avoided unit.

MR. BALLINGER: Right. If there was a standard offer on that unit, it would close when you issue the RFP.

MR. ASHBURN: That's the proposal, yes.

MR. BALLINGER: You've asked for administrative approval of staff to, if the contract is extended, in other words, if it is the same unit, the Ten-Year Site Plan comes out and the unit hasn't changed --

MR. ASHBURN: If none of those three things have occurred, and we come in with a Ten-Year Site Plan and it's the same avoided unit, we're just saying you could have the administrative approval to say it's the same unit, so we can just change the date for the closure date on the current standard offer.

MR. BALLINGER: Another approach to that would be not have a specific closure date and leave it to the utility's discretion to close it. So if you saw no change, it just stays open until you file a new one or something like that.

MR. ASHBURN: Right. I thought the discussion back in December was that the rule said we had to have a closure date, at least that's what staff said to us.

MR. BALLINGER: True. True. All right.

If I can, I have one more slide. I was anticipating this question. I thought we might have worked out our differences, but we weren't able to, and I'd like to just have one slide put up.

Mike, if you could put up that one of in-service, and I just want to kind of walk through and see that I understand.

And we're talking about sequential versus portfolio here. And

what you have got is -- let's say the utility's plan has a combined cycle, a combustion turbine, and a coal unit in the plans, and here's the in-service dates of them. It's two years out in the future for a combustion turbine, four years for a combined cycle, and seven years for a coal unit. Those are pretty typical lead times for those types of facilities, I think. So if that was the utility's plan today, they would have to commit to all three of those units basically today, based on the lead times involved. So which one would be the standard offer? And if I understand the utilities' proposal, it would be the combustion turbine unit, because that's the first one on the in-service date.

So on this scenario, we would never get a combined cycle or a coal unit as a standard offer because you have issued an RFP for the coal unit in year zero, or the combined cycle, and therefore the standard offer would be closed. Is that accurate of how things would work out if this were the --

MR. ASHBURN: With respect to the exact standard offer that was on file?

MR. BALLINGER: Yes.

MR. ASHBURN: Yes. Because even though the standard offer was for the next unit, which actually would be the year before, I assume.

MR. BALLINGER: Right.

MR. ASHBURN: Which would be outside those periods

for those other two units, the standard offer would be open for the CT up to the time that it was gone for the RFP, or whatever. But the Ten-Year Site Plan is available, which has both of those other units on it, so they are available for negotiation, the utility would make it aware to any one company 5 for the standard offer, they very regularly ask for what is 7 your plan, show me your Ten-Year Site Plan, that kind of thing. 8 So that's available for negotiation.

MR. BALLINGER: So it would be available for negotiation, but not for a standard offer?

MR. ASHBURN: Right.

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MR. BALLINGER: That's all I'm trying to understand. Now, I had other slides, but I trimmed it down to one, but let me just talk from this one. Let's say, if we can imagine, that the only unit in the plan, as I discussed earlier with Commissioner Arriaga, was a combustion turbine in year seven, that's the only unit in the plan. Now, under the statute you have to continuously offer a contract, so you would have to offer a contract for that combustion turbine starting now?

MR. ASHBURN: Yes.

MR. BALLINGER: Even though you may not have to commit to it for five years from now?

MR. ASHBURN: Yes.

MR. BALLINGER: So you run the same risk, if you will, of an outer unit. What I'm getting at is don't you think

the statute kind of forces that risk on us, since we have to 1 continuously offer it now? 2 MR. ASHBURN: It forces that risk on you if your unit 3 is a CT in year seven. 4 MR. BALLINGER: 5 MR. ASHBURN: But what other option have you got? 6 What if there is no units at all in the Ten-Year Site Plan? 7 MR. BALLINGER: Then I think you can offer zero as a 8 unit, in my thinking of it. You're going to have a unit out 9 10 there. Okay. 11 MR. ASHBURN: MR. BALLINGER: You can put out purchases, you can 12 put out as-available, something of that nature. 13 Thank you for your indulgence, Commissioner. 14 to kind of walk through the example a little bit to make sure I 15 understand and, hopefully, clarify some things. 16 17 CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Ballinger, just a moment. Commissioner Arriaga. 18 19 COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: Back to the question. you had this interchange here, what would be the answer to my 20 question? 21 MR. BALLINGER: You'll have to refresh me on your 22 23 question. I'm sorry. COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: I said originally you agree 24 with all seven items presented by the IOUs except that the 25

option of the portfolio approach would impact all of this. So if we adopt the portfolio approach, tell me the impact of the seven items.

MR. BALLINGER: Let me first say I think that what the utilities have proposed has come a little bit further than what they were first proposing in December, that being the term being from the in-service date in ten years and not just ten years total, and removing the subscription limit. I think those two factors go a long way to further encouraging renewable generation and are a step beyond the business as usual approach and what we have been doing. What we have left now is the portfolio.

If the portfolio approach is approved, it may add a little bit more risk to ratepayers. However, on the flip side, I think, it offers a bit more encouragement to renewables, it offers a bit more information to them, and truly gives them a fall back for something.

You have to understand, too, if a unit is not planned for seven or eight years in the future, a renewable generator may be hesitant to commit to sign a contract to be available in seven or eight years in the future. So it's not just one-sided. So even though there's an offer, there may not be any takers for that as a standard offer, they may wish to negotiate a contract to allow them some outs, if you will, as it gets closer and things of that nature. So it may not be as

dire as the utilities propose. Does that help?

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: Thank you.

MR. BALLINGER: And I would also offer, I know the utilities haven't analyzed the rulemaking portfolio, but I think staff has done it, and we don't believe a rule requirement is necessary, if you go to the portfolio approach, mainly from our existing rules, as I said earlier, require a tariff or tariffs, it has the plural in there for contract or contracts for standard offers. I believe there's nothing going along or above avoided costs of having two or three standard offers as opposed to one. The statute, in my mind, has imposed that risk of early commitment by making standard offers continuously available, and we're just doing the best we can with it. And we think a portfolio may give some other opportunities out there and better information.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Ballinger, I think we are ready to move along, if you are.

MR. BALLINGER: We're going to be done quick. And thank you, everyone, for being so patient and short.

Commissioners, I have given you an outline with presenters' names. There is going to be a change in order, I was advised this morning. Mr. Moyle is going to go first and introduce Mr. Frank Ferraro. He's just kind of going to kick it off to Mr. Ferraro from Wheelabrator. After that will be Mr. Schef Wright on behalf of Miami Dade. After that will be

Mr. Rich Zambo. And then after that will be Mr. Sami -
Kathryn Cowdery will introduce Mr. Sami Kabbani for Covanta.

I've been told, also, that these presentations are pretty

similar, so there may be a lot cut out from the later ones, so

they may move along quickly. Looking at probably ten to

fifteen minutes per presenter, at most.

MR. CEPERO: Excuse me. This is Gus Cepero, I also signed up for a presentation.

MR. BALLINGER: We have you down, Gus, you're number six.

MR. CEPERO: Okay.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Moyle.

MR. MOYLE: Thank you, Madam Chairman.

For the record, Jon Moyle, Jr., with the Moyle

Flanigan Law Firm. I'm here today on behalf of Wheelabrator,

which is a waste-to-energy company that is involved in the

production of renewable energy.

And I want to start my comments just by thanking you for convening this workshop to have this discussion. I think its a good exchange of ideas. I know when we were together last at the December agenda there was a lively discussion, and thank you for getting us together today to, again, give us the opportunity to talk about an issue that I think is very important to the state.

And you have heard your Staff talk about the

legislation that passed the legislature last year that specifically encouraged the development of renewable energy. I listened to the comments of the investor-owned utilities. And, again, I think there is no dispute or debate that the legislation really is designed to encourage the development of renewable energy.

There is one thing that has happened between the December meeting of the agenda conference and today that I thought should be put on the table, which is the release of Florida's Energy Plan that the Governor by Executive Order directed that there be a workshop, and I think many of you were there. That plan has been out there, January 17th was when it was issued, and it also speaks to renewable energy and encourages the development of renewable energy. It recognizes that fuel diversity is important and encourages the development of additional renewable energy.

One of the topics of discussion today, and I'm not going to take a lot of time, Mr. Ferraro and others are going to talk about some of the technical aspects of it, but it seems to me, given the legislative action, and given the energy plan, and given the letter that Senator Bennett wrote just to the Commission recently with respect to the bill that had his name that he sponsored, that there really is a direction to kind of think outside the box and do some things to encourage renewable energy.

I noted in the Florida's Renewable Energy Plan when they had the breakdown of all the different types of generation that renewable energy was one percent. It doesn't seem to me to be unreasonable to say, hey, as a goal we ought to double that, we ought to have two percent renewable energy. And I know costs have been talked about, and what not, but if you go from one percent to two percent, I'm not sure that the costs outweigh the policy directive of trying to really move forward with respect to renewable energy.

The comments made by Mr. Anderson on the avoided cost, you know, the statute says that you have to base compensation on avoided costs. And everything I heard was reading that as to say limited to. You know the statute doesn't say that it has to be limited to. It has to be based on avoided costs. So I think you could construct an argument to say, you know, we will pay not more than 10 percent over your avoided cost. If that was a policy decision that this Commission wanted to make to encourage renewable energy up until you got to a two percent, I would think that would be an interpretation which deference is given to you that could be made.

So I'll wrap up. But I would, again, thank you for having this forum and for giving us the opportunity to present some ideas to you. And with that I'll introduce Frank Ferraro from Wheelabrator.

MR. FERRARO: Good morning. My name is Frank

Ferraro. I'm the Vice President of Environmental Management

and Public Policy for Wheelabrator Technologies. But I'm here

today in my role as Chair of the State Legislative and

Regulatory Committee of the Integrated Waste Services

Association or IWSA, as we like to call it.

The association appreciates the opportunity to present our comments to the Commission regarding the implementation of Section 366.91. IWSA represents the waste energy industry and the municipalities that rely upon our facilities for safe, effective trash disposal and the generation of clean renewable energy.

IWSA members with facilities in Florida include
Covanta Energy Corp., Montenay Power Corp, Wheelabrator
Technologies, the City of Tampa, Miami-Dade County, Broward
County, and Pinellas County. There are eleven waste-to-energy
facilities in Florida, the majority of which are owned by the
Florida communities they serve. IWSA members operate ten of
the eleven waste energy facilities in Florida, generating 425
megawatts of electricity from the disposal of more than 15,000
tons per day of municipal solid waste.

Florida waste energy facilities are renewable sources that produce electricity using renewable fuels within the meaning of applicable Florida law. I have presented our written testimony, but I will try to summarize that because I

don't want to repeat what some other people here may say today.

With regard to the choice of avoided unit, IWSA strongly supports option two relating to the choice of avoided units for renewable standard offer contracts as described in staff's December 8th, 2005, memorandum. In enacting 366.91, the legislature clearly intended to support existing renewable energy resources as well as foster the development of new renewable energy resources in Florida. It is also clear that the direction given by the legislature requires the Commission to provide appropriate incentives to renewable energy producers to develop, operate, and maintain their facilities, and that Florida utilities be required to purchase the energy produced by these renewable facilities.

Given the variety of renewable energy technologies that are included in 366.91, it is a logical conclusion that renewable energy producers should be given their choice of any unit in the utility's Ten-Year Site Plans as the avoided unit upon which their payments will be based. This will provide maximum incentives to new renewable producers and support for existing renewable energy producers. Allowing renewable energy producers the choice can only offer greater economic incentives to those producers to develop new plants and continue to make power available from existing plants.

With regard to contract term, and here I'll point out that there is a typographical error in our written testimony

where it lists three of the IWSA members. That should just read the IWSA. IWSA supports a minimum standard offer contract term of ten years and a maximum contract term equal to the physical life of the renewable energy facility. Again, as I mentioned previously, the purpose of 366.91 was and is to foster further development, operation, and maintenance of renewable energy facilities in Florida. Allowing the renewable energy producers to choose among shorter, i.e., the minimum of ten-year term, and longer terms up to the physical life of the renewable energy facility will meet this policy goal. And I also might point out that limiting contracts to only ten years may present problems in financing more capital intensive renewable energy sources like waste energy facilities, which can cost hundreds of millions of dollars in capital.

With regard to subscription limits, IWSA strongly supports no subscription limits on the amount of energy, renewable energy facilities operated and/or built in the state. Three utilities proposed small subscription limits in their renewable standard offer contracts submitted last fall. Any subscription limit runs counter to the clear language in 366.91, which states that utilities, and I quote, "Must continuously offer a purchase contract to producers of renewable energy." Imposing any subscription limit would be contrary to this requirement and would provide nearly meaningless incentives to developers of substantial renewable

energy production facilities. Again, as I mentioned previously, the purpose of 366.91 was and is to foster further development, operation, and maintenance of renewable energy facilities. Allowing renewable energy facilities to subscribe renewable standard offer contracts up to the capacity of the renewable energy facility will meet this policy goal.

I thank you for the opportunity to provide these comments and I welcome any questions you might have.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Ballinger.

MR. BALLINGER: I don't think staff has any questions. We can move on to the next one.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioners?

Commissioner Arriaga.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: Ten years minimum. So are you and staff not on the same page? Staff is saying ten years. Am I correct, Mr. Ballinger, you're saying ten years? You're talking a minimum of ten years. Staff is saying maximum of ten years?

MR. BALLINGER: This is another issue. The statute said a minimum of ten years. Our current rules allow for a range, a minimum of five, a maximum the life of the unit. The Commission has gone to setting a fixed term, if you will, on standard offer contracts to encourage negotiated contracts. In other words, we would say it is ten years, period. That's it. If a longer term is desired for financing or something like

that, I think it has been the Commission's policy to encourage negotiated contracts.

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Again, the standard offer is a fallback. It's not going to satisfy everyone's needs and everyone's desires. It is a fallback. It's a one-time option. And I think correctly the Commission has gone to fixing that term to encourage negotiated contracts, and term may be one of them.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: Good. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Moyle, Mr. Ferraro, thank you.

MR. BALLINGER: Next would be Mr. Wright.

MR. WRIGHT: Good morning, Madam Chairman,

Commissioners, Staff, everybody else. I'm Schef Wright. I'm

an attorney here in Tallahassee, and I have the privilege to

speak to you today on behalf of Montenay-Dade Limited and Lee

County.

I did distribute some slightly revised comments this morning that reflect that these are the comments of Montenay-Dade Limited and Lee County. I do want to mention that the staff and management of the Miami-Dade County Solid Waste Division have reviewed these comments and agree with and support the positions advocated in these comments. The revision is to reflect that they are not the official comments of the body politic, Miami-Dade County. They are supported by the folks who run the Dade County Resources Recovery Facility, which is owned by Miami-Dade County and operated by

Montenay-Dade.

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Lee County owns the Lee County Resource Recovery

Facility, which is operated by Covanta. Both of these electric

generating facilities produce electricity using renewable fuels

within the meaning of applicable Florida law.

We really appreciate the opportunity to address you this morning. Mr. Ferraro stated many of the things that I would state, so I'm going to be very quick with those and just flesh out a couple of things.

As I proceed, I do intend to keep in focus what I think was the key policy question articulated by Mr. Ballinger in the staff's preliminary comments, and that is can we do more, can the Commission do more to encourage renewable energy without violating the ratepayer neutral principle. Our position is, yes, you can.

We believe you can do so by implementing a portfolio approach as opposed to a sequential approach. The legislature clearly intends to foster renewables. And giving renewable energy producers their chose of any unit in the plan can only provide greater incentives to develop renewable resources.

You need to keep in mind that renewables provide physical fuel diversity de facto. They also will provide financial fuel diversity to the extent they choose different avoided units in the plan. The classic example of this would be a coal plant as an avoided unit which would typically have

coal-type pricing attached to it. In today's -- a while back we kind of wanted to go to gas, maybe, when we had a higher percentage of coal and oil. Today when we are headed to a situation where we are looking at, in the near term projections, at close to half of the electricity produced in Florida being either produced from natural gas or priced on natural gas, probably almost all of it is both, it would be highly desirable, I think, from the perspective of maintaining and promoting fuel diversity to offer the opportunity to have coal-based energy pricing out there. Either way, ratepayers will be protected if payments are no greater than the utility's 11 avoided cost. This portfolio approach will provide greater 12 13 incentives.

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Now, a sequential set of contracts will not do as much to encourage renewables, at least not as far as the standard offers go. Yes, it may add some risk to ratepayers in that there is some uncertainty in the out years, but it may provide some protection, as well.

There is a flip side to forecast uncertainty. Whatever you do, there is forecast uncertainty and it can cut either way. Units don't just get avoided or move out. Units move up. You will might be sitting here today, and I really like the staff's slide that showed the commit dates, where you've got the same commit date today for a CT two years from now, a combined cycle three and a half to four years from now, and a coal unit seven or eight years from now. That coal unit could move up. And I'll bet you that if you had looked at plans going from, say, 2004 to 2005, you would see the coal plants moved up after the big price run up in natural gas that started in 2004.

The point is that if you go with a sequential approach as opposed to portfolio, you may not get renewables that you later wish you had. With regard to contract term, again, we think that allowing the renewable energy producer or the renewable QF to choose the contract term, minimum of ten years, maximum of the life of the unit, will encourage renewables more than a fixed ten-year contract. We think you can do more in this regard to encourage renewables without violating ratepayer neutrality.

There is nothing wrong, certainly, with encouraging negotiated contracts. But the point of these standard offers that we are here talking about today is to encourage renewables. I'll concede there is a tension there, but we think you ought to come out on the side of promoting renewables.

Finally, as to subscription limits, I think we all seem to now be on the same page in that we should -- that we would all have subscription limits at least as to any avoided unit equal to the capacity of that avoided unit, and that is a good thing. That will also do more to promote renewables than

these little bitty subscription limits that were reflected in three of the utilities standard offers. Not FPL, they did, at least, have the full capacity of their avoided CT unit as they were filed.

Thanks very much. I did want to answer Commissioner Arriaga's question, if I might, and that related to do you need to change the rules to implement the portfolio standard. You can look at it in two ways. If the utilities were to voluntarily come forward with portfolio approaches, I believe that that could be accommodated within the existing rules. However, I believe that if the Commission wishes to impose, as we advocate, wishes to impose a portfolio of standard offer requirements based on any unit within the Ten-Year Site Plan, I believe that you would have to do that by rule.

Otherwise, you could arguably try to do it by forcing them to file individual tariffs, but in my view and analysis of rulemaking under the Florida Administrative Procedures Act, that becomes a forward-looking statement of agency policy to be applied regularly and routinely, and that is a rule and rulemaking is required. So if the utilities do it voluntarily, you don't have to change the rule. If you want to require it, I believe you do have to change the rule.

Thanks again.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioner Arriaga.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: Madam Chairlady, this is one

of those days that makes this job so interesting. I'm having fun, because now I see the utilities so worried and concerned about the ratepayers, that it's -- I'm joking, I'm only joking. But, in any case -- and I understand your point of view, believe me I do. And you have a point, absolutely. But, Mr. Wright, because I'm also confused, now I see you promoting a little bit of risk from the ratepayers' point of view, and I've seen you doing the other job before. But I seriously want to ask this question.

Staff sees it as a risk on the consumer, and I understand the risk, and I also understand the intent of the legislature to go ahead and do renewable energy. But staff sees a clear risk on the consumer. How come you don't see it that clear?

MR. WRIGHT: I see that it's there, and I said as much in my comments. There is a risk. Because as you move out in time, the band around what you are looking at gets bigger.

My point is that there are risks both ways. There are risks of not allowing a portfolio approach that may not get you some renewable power based on a coal plant that you might wish you had.

The risk cuts both ways. That's the point that I was trying to make, Commissioner. Yes, there is risk, and there is more uncertainty, but the uncertainty goes both ways. Because that coal plant could move up, to the extent it was physically

possible to move it up, it could move up from year nine to year seven. Or even though you couldn't physically move it from year seven, if you had a big price run up in natural gas, like we did, you could all of a sudden wish you had it yesterday.

In fact, we had exactly that happen in 1991 when some planning assumptions changed in what was then Florida Power Corporation's planning process, and they realized they needed 645 megawatts of new capacity almost immediately, and further realized that the most cost-effective power plant that they could put into their plan, if they could have done it, was a coal plant.

Now, you can't build a coal plant in two years, but they were able to sign up a number, a lot, it was 650/700 megawatts, I think, by the time all was said and done and all the options were exercised. They did sign up a lot of QF capacity that was based on coal payments. Because QFs could build their plants in two and a half years. You couldn't get a coal plant, but you could get a gas plant with coal pricing.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: So, Mr. Ballinger, will that mitigate, will that explanation mitigate the risk that you have been talking about from the beginning?

MR. BALLINGER: I think that, and also the fact that the legislature told us to make it continuously available. So I think we are stuck with that risk. I go back, again, to if a utility just had one unit in its plan and it was eight years in

the future, we would have to put a standard offer contract out on the streets for that unit, and we're facing that same risk of early commitment.

I agree with Mr. Wright, it can go both ways. Units can move forward and backward, but I think we're stuck with that risk. So doing a portfolio approach, in my mind, doesn't add any additional risk than what has already been imposed because of the continuous offering requirement.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: I think staff had a question or two for Mr. Wright.

MS. HARLOW: Mr. Wright, you said that you believed that we had an agreement on subscription limits, but Item 3 on the utilities' list of agreed-upon items says that the subscription limit would be set at the stated megawatts of capacity of the awarded unit minus the total megawatts of capacity from all previously executed contracts that were based on that unit. And I wanted to ask you your opinion on whether that should include negotiated contracts that were priced based on the avoided unit, whether those contracts should be applied toward the subscription limit capacity.

MR. WRIGHT: I think the answer is that, yes, that it is appropriate. Because you've got one unit. And let's say it's a 540-megawatt nominal combined cycle unit, and you have got 200 megawatts of negotiated contracts subscribed against

it, you would then totally avoid that unit by subscribing an additional 340 megawatts of capacity. After the unit is subscribed, whether it's by negotiated or standard offer contract, it's subscribed. So I think the answer in this context has to be yes.

There is another body of thought that you shouldn't have any subscription limits, and I don't think -- I think that is at least consistent with the intent of the legislature to really get out there and promote renewables, but that's not my clients' comment today. But as to your question, yes.

MR. BALLINGER: I have one more, Mr. Wright.

The utilities propose to update the standard offers, I guess, every April when they file their Ten-Year Site Plans, and if nothing changed, staff could administratively extend them. So, in other words, my understanding the contracts are available for a year, from April to April, unless nothing happens. But if something happens in between, load forecasts change, things like this, and the unit changes, the utilities are free to come in, close out one standard offer but offer another one. Are you okay with that approach of it? And I guess it goes along with what Ms. Harlow was saying with the negotiated. If they find by the next April that they have signed up other contracts that their plans change, yes, they need to update and close one and open another standard offer. I know it was a long question.

MR. WRIGHT: As long as there is a portfolio approach, and as long as we have our choice of the term, you know, I guess I would say I think -- I don't think we would have a problem with that.

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MR. BALLINGER: Let me back up and have maybe one more question or make it simpler. Let's say it's sequential let's say we go with the utility, but they update it every April. So if I understand it, every April is kind of when we get a new batch of standard offer contracts from everybody. And you're okay with the concept that those may change every April because the units may change. You know, things happen in the plan. Does that sound like an appropriate way to administratively go about this, at least having the April deadline?

MR. WRIGHT: Oh, you're really just asking about the procedure of updating them in April concomitantly with the Ten-Year Site Plan?

MR. BALLINGER: Yes.

MR. WRIGHT: That makes real good sense to me. You know, and if there is a change in the meantime, you know, we wouldn't want there to be sudden intermittent changes in the plans that disadvantaged us. But assume that away, that would not be a problem. You know, we have seen cases, historically, where we're going along and it looks like the avoided unit is a combined cycle, and all of a sudden it's a coal plant, you

know, and the QFs didn't really get a shot to avoid that coal plant. With that caveat, you know, procedurally what you suggested, I think is great.

MR. BALLINGER: Okay. Thank you.

Next one the list would be Mr. Zambo.

MR. ZAMBO: Good morning, Madam Chairman,
Commissioners. My name is Rich Zambo, and I, too, want to
thank you for convening this workshop and giving us an
opportunity to address these important issues.

You should have a handout, the slide show in front of you has the names of the City of Tampa and the Solid Waste

Authority on it. It may seem pretty thick, but I assure you the printing is very large, so it will go very quickly.

I'm here speaking on behalf of the City of Tampa, the Solid Waste Authority of Palm Beach County, and the Florida Industrial Cogeneration Association. The City and the Authority generate electricity using garage or municipal solid waste. The Industrial Cogeneration Association's members use waste heat from manufacturing processes. They're both defined as renewable energy resources under the Florida Renewable Energy Bill, 366.91.

What I wanted to point out from the outset,

Commissioners, and looking at the first slide I've got an

excerpt from your existing rules on standard offers. From our

perspective, the only thing that has changed in the proposals

that the utilities have submitted to you is that maybe we'll now have a standard offer contract that is available continuously. But other than that, this was already available to my clients and I dare say most of the renewable energy facilities that are either represented here today or who are likely to come into the state.

I've got to think the legislature had something more in mind than changing the name of a contract to include the words renewable energy. It seems like the approach taken by the utilities is that we have to base everything we're doing today on PURPA, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act. That seems to be the basis for the standard offers that you approved in December and for the avoided costs contained in those. As you know, PURPA was adopted in 1978, about 28 years ago, and its primary objectives were two-fold. One was to reduce our reliance on imported fuels, and the second one that a lot of people lose sight of that I think has a relationship to how you view avoided costs is it was also intended to reduces the utilities need to invest in new power plants.

That was a time in our history when interest rates were so high and the growth rates and electric demand were so high that there was tremendous pressure being put on the utility industry to keep pace with the growth. And there was some concern about their financial ability to keep pace with that. So what PURPA did, basically, was created a new class of

nonutility generators that they called qualifying facilities, and they did some things to encourage them to come on line, generate electricity, provide capacity to relieve the burden on the utilities, but also they defined these qualifying facilities in a way that they would help reduce our reliance on foreign fuels.

One type of qualifying facility, or QF, as we call it, was a small power producer. A small power producer generated electricity using what at the time we called alternative energy resources, but they were biomass, solar, geothermal, what we today refer to as renewable fuels.

There was another class of QFs called cogeneration facilities or cogenerators, who used traditional fuels, but they did it in a way where they produced two useful forms of energy. One would be steam for process heating, or heating an apartment complex, and then they would also generate electricity. So the sequential use of energy resulted in very high efficiencies that did two things, reduced the consumption of fuels and it provided electricity to the grid.

Before these qualifying facilities could fulfill their role, however, PURPA had to eliminate certain barriers to them in the electric industry. And what they did was they first required utilities to interconnect with QFs. Prior to that time, nonutility generators were not allowed to connect to the electrical grid. They exempted QFs from regulation, so

they weren't regulated at the state or federal level. They required utilities to purchase at avoided cost, and they required utilities to sell electricity back to QFs when they needed it.

Now, Florida implemented PURPA in the early 1980s, and as luck would have it, we were facing a similar fuel diversity problem at the time. Florida at that time was very heavily dependent on oil. Some of the unusual things the Commission did during that time period is we approved the advanced cost-recovery of transmission lines between Florida and Georgia to bring coal capacity into the state in order to help the diversity and add nonoil-based fuels to our generation mix. The Commission also during that time approved the need through the need determination process for several power plants that were coal-fired but were not needed to meet load or energy demand, they were needed rather to help diversify the fuel portfolio.

And what the Commission did in the '80s is it established an avoided unit that was a coal-based power plant, it was a statewide coal-based power plant, and it established -- that policy was tremendously successful during the time it was in effect, from about 1983 to about 1990.

During that time period, I would venture to guess most of the QF capacity that was developed in the state and committed to firm capacity contracts came into being.

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Around 1990, it was '90 or '91, the Commission abandoned this policy and switched instead to the next available generating unit on a utility-by-utility basis. they made that change, the amount of QF capacity developed and committed to firm contracts in the state dropped significantly and continues to that day. I don't recall how many or don't recall many standard offer contracts having been executed in the last five or ten years. I think you have a history lesson here, Commissioners, you kind of know what works and what didn't work based on your own policies.

Another thing I wanted to mention was -- Mike, if you will move up to slide eight -- the Commission, when it adopted its rules in the early 1980s, we have to remember that QFs were kind of a new commodity. We really had no experience working with them, and there was some concern about whether they would be reliable, whether they would be there for the longhaul. And the concept of value of deferral, I believe, arose out of that concern. Value of deferral sort of inverts the payment stream so that payments to a QF would begin at a very low level and they would increase over time. There would be an incentive for the QF to continue on its contract over the longhaul. I'm not sure that mechanism is any longer required, since the industry has pretty much proven its reliability and longevity over the last 20-plus years.

So turn now to the Florida Renewable Energy Bill and

just sort of contrast that in some ways with PURPA. And, also, raise some of the issues that I see as having been raised by the bill, some issues that haven't been addressed yet today.

Basically, if you boil it down to what does the Renewable

Energy Bill do, it establishes three goals. One is to promote the development of Florida renewable energy resources. The next is to diversify our fuel mix to reduce the dependence on natural gas and, three, is to minimize the volatility of fuel costs.

Now, the Renewable Energy Bill does address avoided cost, and I have a different interpretation of what that law means. In my view, avoided costs now can be determined under Florida law rather than previously determined under federal law. The federal law applied to cogenerators and small power producers, they identified those entities and they came up with very strict guidelines that all the states were required to implement. Well, I submit to you that you now have a new law, a Florida law that is encouraging renewable energy for reasons different than the reasons PURPA was adopted.

So, in my opinion, and for your consideration, I think you have an opportunity here, not to use an overworn expression, but to think outside the box and maybe look at avoided cost methodologies that are a little different than what we have looked at in the past.

And it was noted earlier that the definition of

avoided cost in 366.051 does give the Commission the ability to use the statewide avoided unit. So the concept that I'm going to address a little later and also the one that the Commission used in the 1980s where it used the statewide avoided unit is now codified in the Florida law.

And, Commissioners, what I would like to do is just go through a couple of issues that are raised when you look at the renewable energy law and you look at the contracts that were filed in response to those laws. And one thing I noticed is that all the renewable energy standard offers used natural gas-fired combustion turbines for determining avoided cost.

Well, one of the goals of the law is to reduce the volatility of fuel prices. So if your avoided unit is a natural gas-fired plant, and the pricing is based on natural gas, you're not going to have any reduction in fuel price volatility because the renewable energy facility's price is going to be tied to the price of gas.

And, basically, that is inconsistent with what I believe is one of the primary purposes of 366.91. And I think why this occurs is because the utility planning process is conducted sort of in a vacuum. They only look at three types of units, and maybe now four. They look at combustion turbine simple cycle, they look at combustion turbine combined cycle, they look at coal plants, and maybe some of them are now starting to look at nuclear plants. But they don't look at

what renewable energy plants could be available to them, and they don't put those units and those characteristics into the plans.

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Now, when you talk about avoided cost, one of the things that concerned me over the years is that the utilities may be building these simple cycle gas-fired turbines as sort of a stop-gap measure while they can plan and procure, engineer and design coal plants for use in the future. Well, if they had a technology that was similar to coal plants in operating characteristics that they could put in sooner than the coal plant, maybe the costs that the customers are being asked to pay for in terms of high energy prices on those gas plants, maybe those should be captured and calculated in the avoided cost.

Fuel risk. You talked about risk with Mr. Wright and some of the other witnesses. One of the biggest risks we face with those combustion turbines, of course, is fuel costs. I dare say if you look back at utility forecasts of natural gas prices four or five years ago, those prices we are seeing today are probably two, three, four times higher than they ever forecasted them to be. So who bears that risk? So I think there is offsetting risks, if you look at generation that has attributes that can help you avoid that.

Which brings me to my next concept, and that is that the Commission policy should recognize and optimize the use of

the unique characteristics of renewable energy facilities in meeting the goals of 366.91. Frankly, renewable energy facilities don't operate like a gas turbine. Most of them run 24 hours a day, seven days a week, with very high capacity factors and they are capable of producing energy over a long term, kind of like a coal plant would.

So what are some of the attributes of renewable energy. There's a lot of them, but I think the three most important ones are that renewable energy facilities, at least in my experience, and what I see developing in Florida, is they are dissimilar to utility plants in that their design, permitting, and construction cycles can be significantly shorter. They are also dissimilar in that their fuel source is not subject to price fluctuation or supply interruptions like you might typically have with traditional fuels.

But they are similar in the sense that they operate like base load coal plants. They have high capacity factors, they displace natural gas and oil fuels, they reduce average energy costs, and they reduce risk on the customer.

The question of whether or not we should have a rulemaking is a pretty big one in this proceeding, and I'm a firm believer that we should have a rulemaking. It's not a question of do we need to have one, the question is should we have one to address the issues. You know, for example, why are so few utilities including base load coal plants in their

generation plans even though we know that that would add diversity and fuel price stability to the state's fuel mix? Is it because growth is proceeding so rapidly that they don't have time to bring enough on-line, so they fall back to a quicker technology. And with fuel adjustment, the risk of fuel cost flows through to the ratepayers, so there may be some incentives to use a cheaper shorter lead time facility.

My question, would the utilities if they had available to them a technology that was similar to a coal plant but could come on-line quicker, say two or three or four years, would that affect their generation plan? Would you look at a Ten-Year Site Plan that shows three years from now that you have got 500 megawatts of renewable instead of 500 megawatts of gas-fired combined cycle.

I wonder is it prudent that utility planning ignores the potential availability of renewable energy resources? Can planning be improved to include renewable energy resources in the planning options? Should the Commission reinstitute the annual planning hearings? Back in the '80s, every year the Commission would convene a hearing, they called it an annual planning hearing, and it was used primarily to set the avoided unit and the avoided cost for cogenerators. And during that process the Commission considered other alternatives, including conservation programs. The planning hearing concept was abandoned sometime in the early '90s, but maybe it's time to

bring that back, at least to sort of jump start the renewable energy process to get a sense of what might be out there in terms of renewable energy capacity that can be plugged into the utilities plans.

So bottom line, my clients support a number of things. One is we believe that the avoided unit should be a base load coal plant because it very closely resembles the operating characteristics of the renewable energy facilities. We also believe that the Commission should use a statewide avoided unit, again to offer optimum encouragement to renewable energy facilities. If you had a statewide unit, you would have the same price statewide so that you wouldn't have a utility up in the panhandle whose avoided cost is too low, but you have got a potential for a large renewable energy facility up there. I think it optimizes the development opportunities and opportunity to benefit the state.

I also think it's time to look at replacing the value of deferral pricing methodology. The avoided cost payments should be, perhaps, equal to the revenue requirements formula that would replicate more closely how a utility recovers its cost. It recovers the bulk of its cost in the early years, and it decreases over time as the plan is depreciated.

Not to spend all my time talking about energy and capacity payments and those sort of issues, but it is also important that contract terms and conditions must be fair and

reasonable and not act as a disincentive. A few of the potential problem areas I've seen in looking through the contracts, I have listed here one is some utilities require that the plants be dispatchable. Well, a garage burning plant may not be dispatchable. A plant that uses energy from a manufacturing process may be dispatchable. So that automatically would disqualify those plants.

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There is some unreasonable performance requirements. You may have a combustion turbine as your avoided unit that is designed to operate 10 percent of the time, but the requirement in the standard offer is that the renewable energy facility has to operate under an 80 percent capacity factor in order to meet the capacity payments. There's not an apples-and-apples comparison there.

There's questions over ownership of renewable energy attributes. There are questions over who is liable for income taxes: One of the renewable contracts has a provision that is so broad that says the renewable facility is responsible for any taxes paid by the utility. So if the utility makes a profit on the sale of the electricity it buys from the renewable facility, can they come back to the renewable facility and ask to be reimbursed. I'm sure that is not their intent, but that is what the language says. There are several other issues like that.

And, Commissioners, as I mentioned earlier, I don't

think it's a question of whether we need to have a rulemaking, it's a question of whether we should have a rulemaking. And I've got an excerpt here from the Commission in September of 1983 where they talked about the hearings that they held on rulemaking to implement PURPA. And it was just interesting to me to see, to be reminded of the fact that the Commission actually not only conducted rulemaking, but it conducted them under the auspices of 120.57, which was like an adjudicatory proceeding, because they realized the importance and complexity of the factors they were dealing with.

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Now, turning to the positions on the three staff issues. The choice of avoided unit. As I said earlier, we would support a statewide baseload coal plant, and we would make an assumption that it goes into operation in the year that the renewable energy facility wants to commence delivery of energy and capacity. If we had to choose just between the two options provided by Staff, we would choose the menu option, option two.

The contract term, we believe, should be at the option of the renewable energy facility. It should be for a minimum of ten years and a maximum of 30 years. And we believe the subscription limit should be equal to a typical megawatt size of a baseload coal plant that would be built in Florida. And the last page is a summary of my comments, which I will skip, and I appreciate the opportunity. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you. Commissioner Carter.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Just two questions, please.

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What is the potential capacity of renewables in terms of the amount of -- I heard somebody say one percent to two percent. What is the real capacity, in your opinion, for generating power from renewable sources?

MR. ZAMBO: Commissioner, I really have no idea. But I think it is a lot more than the two or 300 that somebody mentioned earlier. I would just say that I don't have any idea, but what history showed is that in the early '80s, after the Commission implemented its cogeneration rules, I think the utilities in pretty short time signed up for three or 4,000 megawatts worth of capacity. And that was more than renewable, that was cogeneration, which also -- some of it burned coal, some of it burned oil and gas, but it was a tremendous amount. I've heard estimates of perhaps another thousand. But that is just based on indigenous, you know, Florida industry; the pulp and paper industry, the sugar industry, the citrus industry, the fertilizer and chemical industries, if they all optimized or maximized their generating potential, you could, perhaps, have another thousand.

That doesn't even take into account, I guess, the e-grass or the biofarms that they talk about that are being encouraged under the Energy Policy Act of 2005 creates some

incentives for people to basically come in and grow acres and acres of fuel that they chop down and put in a boiler and burn and make electricity. So I don't know, but I imagine it is in the thousands.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Madam Chair.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioner Carter.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: I have a follow-up question, but I think Mr. Wright wanted to answer that, too, is that right?

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, sir.

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COMMISSIONER CARTER: There is a follow-up question to where I'm headed here.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Wright.

MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, Madam Chairman.

One quick conceptual point, and that is it depends on what the price of natural gas and oil do. And, of course, what the price of coal does. The higher the prices of fossil fuels, the more renewable energy is going to be feasible. The number that Mr. Zambo suggested based on indigenous Florida industry of another thousand megawatts is probably about right. I think that might or might not include another 500 megawatts of waste to energy, which I think is entirely viable in our extraordinarily growing state. I think that there is at least a thousand megawatts of capacity available from biomass crops that can be developed over, say, the next six to eight years in

Florida. There is an opportunity to develop small scale Gulf current ocean hydro. They're small scale units, but you put a bunch of them out in the Gulfstream and they'll make electricity..

I think with natural gas prices staying in the eight to ten dollar range, I think you are probably looking at at least 3,000 megawatts of additional capacity that could be developed within the next ten years, probably more.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: What would that cost? That's my follow-up question. What would it cost for those 3,000 megawatts; what would that cost? Because the bottom line is that there is a person at the end of the economic system there, there is a ratepayer. What would that cost in order to generate that capacity?

MR. WRIGHT: I don't think -- I can give you a conceptual answer. I don't think I can give you dollars as a total pot. I'll get back to you on that soon. But I think the answer is that if you were to make available a portfolio approach or a statewide coal unit as the avoided cost basis which provides -- back up one step. The renewable facilities generally have high capital costs and significantly lower operating costs than, say, peakers or combined cycle units. So if you make available a pricing regime that offers high fixed capacity payments with no or very, very low equity penalties and lower coal type energy costs, I believe you would see a

whole lot of that development occur within what the utility's avoided costs would otherwise be.

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I can get back to you with some better estimates of what the total investment would be, but remember this is private sector investment. And I think the more important point from your perspective is can we do it cost-effectively versus the utility's avoided cost? And if you're using a coal plant, I think the answer is you can get a whole lot of it, yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you, Madam Chair.

MR. ZAMBO: Can I follow up on that, Commissioner?

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Zambo, yes.

MR. ZAMBO: Yes. I was going to say, I guess the answer depends on how you set your prices. If you did like the Commission did in the early '80s and used the baseload coal plant statewide availability, I think you will get a lot of capacity. And what that costs, you know, I'm curious if the utility industry could take a coal plant, say we can bring a coal plant on line in, say, three years, which is about what it takes some renewable facilities to come on line, would that show up as the next unit in their generation plan? And if it did, it's not costing anything, it is just basically equal to what costs the utility would have otherwise incurred. A lot of it -- you know, it's hard to answer the question without some assumptions, but if you have very, very costs in your standard

offer contract, you're not going to get much. If you have reasonable costs, you are going to get a lot more.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Thank you, Madam Chair.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you. Commissioner Arriaga.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: Mr. Zambo, on Page 23 of your presentation, Slide 23 caught my attention, and you were talking about contract issues. I would like to point out that -- take Mr. Ballinger's recommendation of always pursuing a negotiated contract. The issues that I see on Page 23 are something that you should be able, or whoever you represent should be able to negotiate on a one-to-one basis and not to expect the Commission, I hope, to get involved in those issues. I think market negotiation is always a good thing to do.

But there is one specifically that caught my attention, which is unreasonable performance requirements.

Unreasonable in what sense? Or are you expecting to have less than performance requirements, optimum performance requirements?

MR. ZAMBO: No, my issue there is that the performance requirements don't match the performance of the avoided unit on which the payments would be based. For example, one of the contracts, I don't recall whose it was, had an avoided unit, was a combustion turbine fired on natural gas. Those units are typically what they call peaking plants and they run for maybe five percent of the year during peak load

periods. This particular contract is requiring this plant to run like 80 percent of the time. If you wanted a standard offer based on -- and get that avoided cost, you have got to perform at a much, much higher standard than the utility plant on which the costs are based.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: I would the ask the representatives of the utilities, how would you view that? Is that unreasonable?

MR. ASHBURN: Well, I don't know which one he is talking about. I sort of know ours a little bit. You know, I think theoretically the performance requirements should match what the avoided unit is.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: Okay.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioner Deason.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Zambo, to follow up on that. It's an interesting example, but I guess the question is, if there were not a requirement to operate at 80 percent capacity factor, would you be willing to commit your unit to guarantee that it would be able to provide the peaking capacity that the avoided unit otherwise would be providing, i.e., your plant would be dispatchable at the time that the demand is needed. I mean, that the capacity is needed to meet the demand.

MR. ZAMBO: Let me answer that question this way:

The part I left out is there was also an availability

requirement, so, yes, we would meet that availability requirement which would mean we could meet the on-peak requirement but would not necessarily have to be dispatched. If we weren't available during peak periods, we wouldn't get our capacity payment.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Staff.

MR. HAFF: I had a question for Mr. Zambo. You were discussing the statewide avoided unit as your recommendation, and I guess my question would be how would you propose that the allocation of that unit amongst the investor-owned utilities, you know, which utility gets which piece of that avoided unit?

MR. ZAMBO: I hadn't gotten that far, to be honest with you. But what the Commission did -- again, I hate to keep harkening back to the '80s, that wasn't exactly my favorite decade, but the Commission in that case just said we're going to leave it to the utilities and make it the utilities' responsibility to make sure that that capacity gets to the utility who most needs it, regardless of who buys it in the first instance. I think that was called the policy of amiable terrorism, as I recall.

MR. HAFF: And I guess the reason for my question is if you are having this unit for a utility that doesn't need that capacity, then, you know, what is your recommendation as to administering that type of contract?

MR. ZAMBO: Well, again, I'm not sure how you define

need. The legislature has said we have a need to diversify our fuel resources. That tells me that all the utilities have a need to diversify their fuel resources. So it's a question of how you want to look at need. I think we get hung up on the capacity to serve new load. But, like I said, in the '80s the Commission ignored that. We built coal plants, we built transmission lines, we did things to diversify our fuel mix.

So we have a need, the legislature has told us we have a need to diversify. And I guess the utilities who have the highest percentage of natural gas, maybe that's the ones who out to be -- that is where it all ought to be funnelled to.

MR. BALLINGER: I have one question. I understand your response to Commissioner Carter's question about if the prices are more reasonable, or based on a baseload unit you will get capacity, if we continue to price them on combustion turbines we will get less capacity. Do you think, though, if that was the real intention of the legislature, to get as much renewable as possible, that they would have told us to go ahead and price it as a baseload unit or price it as a statewide hypothetical unit rather than referring back to the existing statute of avoided cost?

MR. ZAMBO: You know, not necessarily. The legislature delegates an awful lot of responsibility to the Commission. They have a lot of confidence in the Commission's expertise, I think, with the idea that they established the

three goals to encourage -- to reduce fuel price fluctuations and to reduce our reliance on natural gas. I think you then have to make the decision as to how to best do that. That may change over time. So rather than having it in a statute, I think it is better for the legislature to give you those general directives and then you implement that from time to time as is most appropriate.

MR. BALLINGER: Okay. So that may require a balance between what do we pay to encourage renewables versus how do we keep ratepayers from paying too much, if you will, and try to keep those two perspectives in line.

MR. ZAMBO: And in regard to that, one of the things I would point out is that one of the costs that is not included in avoided cost today is the risk that the ratepayer assumes when the utility builds a natural gas-fired power plant. If those avoided costs had been included from the onset, it's unlikely that a lot of those plants would have been built. So, if you are going to use a gas-fired unit as the proxy for avoided cost, maybe what you need to do is add into that avoided cost the price of hedging your fuel so you can guarantee that your fuel price will never exceed what you based your projections and your planning on.

MR. BALLINGER: That's all I have. Chairman, I would let you know we have one more that is in the same group, I believe, with the waste energy folks, Sami Kabbani. I guess we

could take that up and then we could decide if you want to take 1 2 a break for lunch or continue on. 3 CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Well, I am getting to the point where I could use a stretch, and I'm thinking perhaps our court 4 5 reporter could, as well. So, Commissioners, do you have a 6 preference as to a short break and then we push through, or a 7 longer lunch break and then we come back? 8 COMMISSIONER CARTER: It's at your discretion. 9 CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you. COMMISSIONER DEASON: What do we anticipate? I mean, 10 11 how many more presentations and what length are they going to 12 take? 13 MR. BALLINGER: We have four more presenters, each 14 one ten to fifteen minutes. 15 CHAIRMAN EDGAR: A short break and push through? Okay. Then I suggest we come back at ten after 12:00 by the 16 17 clock on the wall. 18 (Lunch recess.) 19 COMMISSIONER DEASON: I'm going to ask you to please 20 take your places and we'll go ahead and get started. 21 MR. BALLINGER: Commissioners, the next presenter 22 will be Ms. Kathryn Cowdery, and then she will be introducing 23 Mr. Sami Kabbani for Covanta.

MS. COWDERY: I'm Kathryn Cowdery with Ruden

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Ms. Cowdery.

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McCluskey law firm in Tallahassee, Florida, representing

Covanta Energy Corporation, which is a waste to energy company,

and with me is Mr. Sami Kabbani. He's the Utilities Director

for Covanta.

The sponsor of Section 366.91, State Senator Michael S. Bennett, has provided us with a brief letter, and I would like to read this into the record, because it sets the tone for the presentation that Mr. Kabbani with make, and I think it sets the tone for this workshop, as well.

It is dated March 3rd, 2006, and we do have a handout of it. "To members of the Florida Public Service Commission, regarding standard offer contracts for renewable resources."

And it reads, "In anticipation of the upcoming March 6th workshop on the above matter, I urge the Commission to implement Section 366.91 according to the intent of the statute, 'The legislature finds that it is in the public interest to promote the development of renewable energy resources in the state.'

"This intent is vital to your appropriate implementation of the subsequent requirement that, 'Each public utility must continuously offer a purchase contract to producers of renewable energy.' The contracts for these valuable resources must yield rates that encourage new development as well as keeping existing facilities financially sound. The current standard offer contracts available to these

plants do not reflect their value to Florida's energy portfolio because the avoided cost formula currently in use does not translate into revenue that encourages renewable energy generation.

"Commissioners, it would be a disservice to the state of Florida and our eminent energy needs if this statutory language is not translated appropriately into contracts for existing and future renewables. As you proceed with implementing the legislation I sponsored last year, I caution you not to maintain the status quo. The legislature clearly intends in Section 366.91 that the purchase of renewable energy be encouraged, and that means at a price that reflects their value to our state. Sincerely, Michael S. Bennett, State Senator, District 21."

With that, Mr. Kabbani has a PowerPoint presentation, and you have a handout on it, also.

MR. KABBANI: I appreciate the opportunity to present the comments for Covanta Energy. I'm Sami Kabbani. I'm the Director of Energy for Covanta.

The purpose of this document is basically to address some of the specific questions that came in the workshop regarding the standard offer contracts. More importantly, to determine if the proposed standard offer contracts meet the intent of Section 366.91. And I want to leave you with a couple of thoughts about recommendations as to how we improve

this.

I was going to go through a little bit of background on Covanta. The second point I want to address, what is the role of waste to energy in the state of Florida, and leave you with some comments for your consideration. Covanta Energy Corporation is a publicly traded company with about 44 domestic and international plants. Waste-to-energy represents the majority of the plants the company owns and operates. Regarding waste-to-energy, nationally the company has 31 waste-to-energy facilities. These combined facilities, they dispose about seven percent of the nation's waste, they process about 15 million tons of waste per year, and produce about 1,200 megawatts of clean renewable energy.

In Florida, specifically, Covanta Energy operates four facilities: Pasco County, Hillsborough County, Lee County, and Lake County. These provide local disposal services for these counties. And the second point I would like to make, the majority of the revenue, especially on the electrical side, goes to these communities. These facilities process about 1.25 million tons per year of municipal solid waste and generate about 114 megawatts.

The next point I want to touch on is what is the value of waste-to-energy and why it should be encouraged and why it should be part of the renewable portfolio of the state.

Basically, one ton of municipal solid waste replaces one barrel

of oil, or ten MCFs of natural gas. In the State of Florida, there is about 31 million tons of waste produced in the state;
6.5 million tons basically represent the current
waste-to-energy that is being generated. The 6.5 million tons,
they eliminate 65 million barrels of oil. I'm sorry,
6.5 million barrels of oil, or 65 million MCFs of natural gas.
In the process they produce about 500 megawatts.

The question was asked what is the potential for renewables in the state. I can't comment regarding other forms of renewables, but if you take this chart and extrapolate 31 million tons of municipal solid waste, compare it to the existing, and do the math, that results in about -- if we are to utilize the remaining waste in the state that is currently being landfilled, we would be building about 2,000 megawatts of municipal solid waste facilities, waste-to-energy facilities.

Next we want to talk about what is being done today and what is feasible. It relates to the prior slide. There are currently talk with each of the counties we work with regarding expanding the existing facilities. Expanding the existing facilities is easy because you have the infrastructure in place. The point -- and it's going to result in raising the amount of megawatts coming from waste-to-energy in the state to a total of 591 megawatts, which represents less than 25 percent of the municipal solid waste produced in the state.

The last bullet point is the important point. More

is possible, and I calculated the math to about 2,000 more megawatts. Now, how do we encourage renewables in the state of Florida. I would like to take a step back and talk about the Florida energy plan that Mr. Moyle showed. The plan itself has two pie charts right next to each other.

The first one talks about where we are today, and basically 63 percent of Florida's generation comes from oil and gas. Yet, basically the waste-to-energy facilities receive relatively low rates inhibiting development. We are talking today about whether we need new rules, old rules, and so on. The way we would comment on this, if the old rules worked, why we're not seeing new projects? Why we haven't seen new renewable projects in at least the past five years, if not the past ten years. Something is wrong and something needs to be fixed.

Regarding the future, 81 of Florida's capacity comes from oil and gas. We must encourage renewables and we must include existing and new waste-to-energy facilities and we must create markets for them. Creating markets for these facilities entails two points. First, offer standard offer contracts for long term. We are going to discuss long term in a minute. And also encourage the development of functional liquid wholesale markets. Currently we have no option. We can't sell our energy as in other states into the spot market. We only have -- the only option we have -- well, I shouldn't say the

only option, but the wholesale option is very limited. In other states we could just go to the spot market and sell to a third party. It doesn't have to be a utility. This is nonexistent in Florida.

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And the last point is to encourage IOUs, investor-owned utilities, to diversify their portfolio and include the renewables proactively. I want to direct our comments now to the three issues that came during the workshop. Basically, they echo some of the recommendations made by my colleagues in here, however, I would like to make additional comments here. The choice of avoided units, we recommend the staff option number two. We think this would encourage these facilities and meet the requirements and intent of the law. I'm not going to go through the details of this slide.

The next point on the contract term. If you look at any facility that is capital intensive, we are basically amortizing the cost of this facility over 20 years, so offering a contract of ten years might not be enough to recover all the capital and be able to invest in such large capital projects. I think the utilities themselves don't expect to recover the cost of a coal unit over ten years, and I bet you they wouldn't even build it. So our recommendation is to go over ten years, not view the ten years as a max, it should be a minimum. This is how the legislation is written and we think 20 years might be appropriate.

The next area we want to discuss is the subscription limits. The bottom line here, we believe there should be no subscription limits. If the intent of the legislature is to encourage renewables, that means any renewable contract -- I'm sorry, facility that is proposed in the state with demonstrated technology that is capable of generating on a reliable basis should be purchased because there is no alternate market, so there should be no subscription limits.

I am going to skip Number 10. Everybody can read it later. I want to go to Number 11. There are more issues. The number one issue here is we feel this process is being rushed. It should be considered in more detail. The legislation was passed in mid-'05, the public process in our view started in December of '05, we don't feel there is sufficient time or consideration was given or even conversation was done with potential renewable developers. All of this stuff you heard about in the early part of the day was discussed basically in a vacuum. The utilities having conversation with staff. We were not included in this process and we feel we need more time.

The next point I want to make is we spent some time looking at the standard offer contracts. I just pulled, for example, one of the contracts and we looked at it. The first thing that jumped at me, and I read it twice, it looks like these contracts required the facility to be a QF under the PURPA law that was addressed by Rich Zambo. There is no

requirement in the new legislation to require a facility to be QF. We might want to be a QF, but there is no requirement, and it is a requirement in the contract. And it goes even further. It says it has to be a new facility under PURPA law.

PURPA law is being repealed as we speak. As a matter of fact, FERC right now has an NOPR in front of them, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, that eliminates the requirements for utilities to purchase QF power. So, theoretically, if this is applied to Florida and we go and ask for a standard power contract, we are in violation of the contract already. That is why we are advocating taking more time and reviewing these contracts and understanding that the old rules might not fit the new environment and the new requirements.

There are issues that are not clearly understood in the contracts, including how the avoided unit cost is calculated. There are terms and conditions that we feel are unreasonable, such as the availability and performance requirements. Yes, we intend to perform. Yes, we do have a history of very good reliable performance, 24 hours seven days a week. The only time the plant is shut down is when we have either planned outage or forced outage. We are not trying to escape from performance, but we think these standards are too severe.

There is also evaluation criteria, subjective evaluation criteria in the standard offer contracts that a

utility could basically go through that process and say we reject signing a standard offer contract with you. You don't meet one of these criterias. Well, we should examine all of those and understand them and make sure they encourage rather than they discourage renewable project development.

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There are also on the performance payment, there are issues around that. And if there is a high availability requirement, such as the 97 percent availability requirement, basically that says if your availability is not 70 percent, if you drop down to 70 percent, you are not going to receive any capacity payment, zero. We think this might be too severe. What we recommend here is time and stakeholder process to address the issues.

The last slide is the closing slide, and I want to summarize our recommendations on the three issues. The avoided unit is to use the staff option number two at least. On the term of the contract, they should be at least 20 years. On the subscription limits, there should be none. And there should be more review of the standard offer contracts. We should eliminate all of this old QF regime out of those.

The next point to make is if we think we're going to encourage renewables in the State of Florida, we need to make a paradigm shift. We need to ask yourself the question: If the old regime and the old avoided cost and everything is functional, why we have not seen new development in the state?

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Obviously there is something broken that needs to be fixed.

There were questions regarding developing whether we need to go into rulemaking process. The way we would suggest to approach this is the answer most likely is yes, but maybe there should be a series of workshops and a time period given to the stakeholders to sit down in an even less formal environment than this and discuss the details and see if there is an agreement to be reached. Then the existing rules could be amended and the new agreement could be introduced to the existing rule. If all fails, that means we need to go into rulemaking process. This keeps all the parties involved, because nobody wants to go to a rulemaking process. It forces the parties to compromise and work on these issues.

Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you.

Commissioner Arriaga.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: Mr. Ballinger, this issue of time has been brought up, and I think it was brought up at the agenda conference when we were discussing this issue. Are we pushing too fast? Are we taking all the necessary steps to guarantee the participation of everyone in the process? what about our June 1st deadline?

MR. BALLINGER: I was going get to that. recall, the statute required an implementation date of January 1 of '06. Although the statute didn't become effective until,

I believe it was October of '05, so it gave us three months to implement the statute or at least get the contracts out there, which we did, we met that date. It wasn't perfect, but we did it. We have contracts in place that expire June 1st of '06, so we are going to be revisiting the contract issues again.

Part of the reason for this workshop was to get additional information. Do we need to go to rulemaking to implement the statute? So, no, I don't think we are progressing too fast. We have been taking comments from people. We had that agenda in December. We are having this workshop. We will have another agenda in May, I guess, to address the new contracts that come up. So we are proceeding along.

A lot of these same arguments were made at the December agenda. I haven't heard much that has been new, but we are getting a little bit more information on it.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: So, Mr. Kabbani, why would you feel so strongly that we are going so fast? And why don't you think that you have the appropriate forum, or you have had the appropriate forum so far to express your point of view?

MR. KABBANI: I'm not criticizing the forum. I feel time is needed. Because as we look into these standard contracts, even the ones that were filed, we are finding issues in them. And we are feeling that in terms of answering the question whether we need to have a formal rulemaking, that

question is still out there. And that is why we need to take time to address this.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Madam Chairman.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioner Carter.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: I thought it was going to be a question, but it is really more of a thought is that the question is can additional steps be taken to cost-effectively encourage renewable generation through standard offer contracts, absent a rule change. Our mission in life is to balance the efficiencies of the market with the rights of the public so that the public don't pay too much for what is essentially a necessary service.

I mean, if we are going to keep doing the same old thing then we are going to keep getting the same old results. And it seems like to me that if those of the investor-owned utilities, those in renewable energy utilities and the people in Florida, it seems like to me that we have made the transition where we are saying bring us some ideas, let's be a forward-looking state. And what I'm hearing now is that although I was not party to the -- I was not officially on the Commission, but I did sit in and listen, it seems more of the same to me. I mean, where are the new ideas? Where are the bold new frontiers? Where are the use of all of these great technologies that we have come up with? Where can we use efficient resources at the lowest possible cost to our

consumers, but to show that we are a leader in the field of energy? Where is it? I haven't heard anything, not today.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Ballinger.

Slide 4, I think it was, of your presentation is where you had a summary of what is being processed now. And I think you came up with a number of possibly an additional 2,000 megawatts of generation.

MR. BALLINGER: I have one question for Mr. Kabbani.

MR. KABBANI: Correct.

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MR. BALLINGER: Okay. Is it correct now that the waste is being generated, it's just not being processed today?

MR. KABBANI: Correct.

MR. BALLINGER: So that means that those municipalities or whatever, it is more cost-effective to landfill that waste than to burn it?

MR. KABBANI: It might be. This is a potential fuel resource that is not being utilized, and that is the point I'm making. By utilizing that fuel resource you will be able to introduce more renewables.

MR. BALLINGER: But I guess unlike other renewables, like the biograss or the e-grass where they plant a crop specifically for fuel, municipal solid waste relies on the waste generated by its cities, its county, as the fuel. So it has the fuel thrust upon it, if you will, and it has to find something to do with it. It has two choices, either landfill

or it can process it and generate electricity.

So is it really the same, or is it appropriate to put them in the same boat as other renewables, like the biograss, or, I guess, a wind or a solar? Are they slightly different?

MR. KABBANI: I think they are the same by law, federal law and state law. They are renewable. We are not sitting here and discussing whether they are renewable or not, I'm assuming.

MR. BALLINGER: No, I agree with you there. But the question is more of in my mind those have a -- their primary purpose for being developed is to generate electricity. They are going to invest capital into, let's say, the e-grass. To plant a crop, have the harvesting equipment, and the sole purpose is to generate electricity. Whereas a municipality solid waste facility, its sole purpose is to not put it in a landfill. It has to get rid of this waste somehow.

The municipality has to get rid of this waste. It has two choices; it can either landfill or it can burn it and make electricity. And it becomes an economic choice at that juncture. And that's where I see they are different. So why would pricing have the same impact on a municipal solid waste facility as pricing would on a biograss facility?

MR. KABBANI: It is the same issue. It affects the economics of whether you would landfill this waste or build a facility to process it. The purpose of these municipal

waste-to-energy facilities, the dual purpose is basically to process the waste, get rid of the waste and generate electricity.

MR. BALLINGER: Okay. And on the next slide, Number 5, you pointed out some expansions that are planned for some facilities in Florida. And I think earlier I had a slide that showed a lot of the contracts are expiring between 2009 and 2011. Do you know if these four facilities have existing contracts?

MR. KABBANI: Yes, all of them do.

MR. BALLINGER: Do you know if they expire in that time frame?

MR. KABBANI: Some in the same time frame.

MR. BALLINGER: Okay. Thank you. That's all I have.

MS. HARLOW: I have one additional question. Mr. Kabbani, you suggested a 20-year contract term. Could you discuss for us, kind of give us some details on the financing of these units and how the contract term is relevant to your ability to obtain financing?

MR. KABBANI: Financing is basically done in one of two ways. Sometimes the municipalities themselves finance it through bonds, other times, not necessarily in Florida, Covanta Energy or the developer itself would go obtain financing. In both environments having a long contract term really enables obtaining better interest rates, better commitments from

financial institutions, being able to issue better bonds
without affecting your bond rating for the county. So that is
how financing affects these facilities.

MS. HARLOW: And, also, could you tell us your average contract term in Florida, or give us a feel for the contract terms that you have currently?

MR. KABBANI: I think the shortest term we have is about 25 years. We have longer terms than this.

MR. BALLINGER: Sorry, I had one or two more. On your Slide 6, your third bullet from the bottom there about encouraging the development of functional liquid wholesale markets. Are you really talking about developing a type of RTO system in Florida?

MR. KABBANI: Yes.

MR. BALLINGER: I thought that's what you were saying.

MR. KABBANI: Modeled after the traditional or the new FERC mandated standard market design.

MR. BALLINGER: Okay. I thought that's what you were saying, I just wanted to make sure. And the last bullet requiring an IOU portfolio, are you talking about like mandating a percentage be from renewable, or some other megawatts, or something like that?

MR. KABBANI: I'm talking about mandating a percentage, as in other states, and I'm talking about in the

planning process itself to include when they develop their 1 integrated resource plan or the ten-year site plan to include 2 some renewables in there. 3 MR. BALLINGER: Okay. Are you aware if when this 4 legislation was passed, which was in '05, that there was also 5 6 legislation proposed that dealt with the portfolio standard 7 approach, a percentage that was before the legislature? 8 MR. KABBANI: Yes. 9 MR. BALLINGER: Okay. So there was one and the 10 legislature chose to go with this? 11 MR. KABBANI: For the time. It might come back. 12 MR. BALLINGER: I understand. Thank you. 13 CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioner Arriaga. 14 COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: Mr. Kabbani, I'm just going to take on Commissioner Carter's idea before. Not the last one, 15 previous to that. And you're talking about mandating a 16 17 percentage. Have you calculated the cost of mandating a percentage, like minimum ten percent, minimum five percent, the 18 impact that that has on the consumer? 19 20 MR. KABBANI: Let's separate the issue of mandating 21 percentage and cost of implementing the current requirements, 22 the 366.91. Maybe eventually we will combine the two thoughts.

MR. KABBANI: Regarding the current cost of 366.91, if it is based on avoided portfolio plants or one plant, that

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: We have to.

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means the consumer is revenue neutral. So there is no incremental cost to the customer by definition, because we're using avoided cost units, or avoided cost portfolio of units. All we are doing is rather than building the combustion turbine, or the combined cycle, or the coal plants, we are building renewables.

As in the percentage of, requiring a percentage as in other markets, I don't have statistics or analysis done as to what would be the cost of that.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: Well, you may want to look into that because that is something we need to consider.

MR. KABBANI: Sure.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Ballinger.

MR. BALLINGER: Next I have on the list Mr. William Henry for Bay County. I believe he is here.

MR. HENRY: Good afternoon, Commissioners. My name is Bill Henry. I am with the Burke, Blue, Hutchison and Walters law firm in Panama City, Florida. We are the county attorneys for Bay County.

What I have to say puts more of the perspective on one individual renewable energy source. Bay County owns a 10 to 13-megawatt municipal solid waste plant that has been operational since the mid-1980s. We have just completed a major retrofit, over \$20 million, that should extend the life

of the plant another 30 years.

Bay County and its plant are located with Gulf
Power's franchise service territory and Bay County is a retail
customer of Gulf Power. Currently the power generated at our
plant is wheeled by Gulf Power to Progress Energy under an old
1980s contract. That contract is due to expire at the end of
this year. And one of the major problems with that contract
was that not only were we paying wheeling fees and interconnect
fees, we were suffering a 7 percent line loss in the revenues
that we received from Progress Energy.

Now, Mr. Ballinger talked about, you know, either you landfill or you burn it, and you have got to decide where the costs are. Well, the cost to the consumer is also premised on the tipping fees. The main value of the revenues from energy production to Bay County is holding the tipping fees down. If you can hold the tipping fees down and make the plant close to self-supporting you avoid more landfills and things of that nature, or hauling the refuse further. All of those things can add to the cost. It's not just an incremental cost to the user of electricity. That same ratepayer is also paying ad valorem taxes and through his garbage contract is paying if the tipping fees go up. So everything is interrelated. All of these different costs are interrelated.

Bay County intervened in this case back in January, because as a small stand-alone facility we don't belong to any

of the organizations that have made presentations today, and we thought we were on our own. We needed a new purchased power agreement. But when we looked at the standard offer contract for Gulf Power that was approved back in December, the availability rate of 94 percent is totally unrealistic for a plant of our type.

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Historically, our plant before the retrofits was in the high 70s, was the availability rate. But under the standard offer contract we would have to guarantee 94 percent or pay damages or penalties. Also in that standard offer contract the avoided cost was pushed back to 2012, but we need to maximize our revenues now. Other than that, I'm not going to waste the Commission's time reiterating what other presenters have said or will say today, but I would ask the Commission one thing, and that's as Mr. Ballinger started out, let's think outside the box.

Our legislature in Florida is trying to promote renewable energy. The federal government is doing the same thing. In fact, it has mandated all the federal executive agencies increase their use of what they call green power, renewable energy. The United States Air Force is the lead agency so far of all the federal agencies in getting there. We have a big air base in Bay County, Tyndall Air Force Base. And the folks out there, which is not only the fighter wing that is there, but also the Air Force Engineering Services Agency,

which purchases utilities worldwide, is also headquartered there. They would love to be able to get our renewable energy. It helps them in meeting their goals in the federal government.

Something to bring in thinking outside the box. We just finished the latest round of BRACC, the Base Realignment and Closure Commission. It scares local communities that they may lose their military bases. The State of Florida and a large number of local governments put in a great deal of time and effort to show that we in Florida want those bases to stay here, that we want them to be part of our community.

If we can work out -- or if the Commission allows us and encourages flexible negotiating with Gulf Power, we would like to have our power, at least on paper, going to Tyndall Air Force Base. We all win. We will get a reasonable revenue from our power generated, the Air Force will be helped in meeting its standards, and Gulf Power will show that it is interested in helping both the county and the Air Force as part of this community effort.

Because we are already getting ready for the next round of BRACC. Our chamber of commerce is working hard on it. The military affairs committee of the chamber of commerce is constantly working on it and so is the State of Florida. So what we would like the Commission to consider is allowing us flexibility, but giving us the encouragement. Because we, as a small plant, are not in a very good bargaining position with

Gulf Power, and especially under the standard offer contract that was okayed back in December. And that's all that I want to ask the Commission today. Just think outside the box and give us a little bit of flexibility and a little bit of encouragement to both us and Gulf Power to work out something between us and not lock us into the standard offer contract.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you, Mr. Henry.

Commissioner Deason.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Henry, has Bay County attempted to negotiate these matters with Gulf?

MR. HENRY: We have. And we're starting to move closer together, but we need more encouragement, sir.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: What do you really mean by encouragement? I mean, do you want us to just say we encourage you, or do you want to see something like a five-point plan that says --

MR. HENRY: Rather than lock us into -- as far as I know, there is only one other renewable energy plant in Gulf Power's service territory. And what they're doing, I have no idea. But we're the issue. That standard offer contract really only applies to us and that one other plant.

We would like the Commission to say, Gulf Power, hey, there's reasons to do things beyond the standard offer contract. Now, I have heard earlier today encouraging

negotiations. But when you are negotiating from a bad bargaining position, like you have nothing to offer except run the electricity into the ground, we need the other side, Gulf Power, to have the okay from the Commission to say this is the type of agreement that benefits Florida in several different ways, renewable energy and BRACC at the same time. And that's what I'm asking, sir.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Under the BRACC process, an Air Force Base, such as Tyndall, do they get extra credit if they can show somehow that they are utilizing a renewable energy source?

MR. HENRY: Well, they get credit under the mandated program that they are getting some of what they call green power. But from the BRACC process, what you really want to show is community involvement and cooperation with the local military base. And that's things from promoting affordable housing to improving education in certain areas of, in our case, the county, which Tyndall is at the east end of the county. This is just one more weight to put on that scale if it gets close of are they going to start cutting missions out of Tyndall or shutting it down.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: May I follow up?

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioner Deason.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Under the energy procurement requirements of the Air Force, do they have the flexibility or

the ability to pay a premium for green energy?

MR. HENRY: That I don't know, sir. They would not like to pay a premium, I know that. A lot of their green energy that they've gotten so far is federal hydropower out west. When the transmission grids finally opened up in the '90s, they were able to get some very inexpensive federal hydropower in. We're not talking about that. We're talking about 10 to 13 megawatts of municipal solid waste renewable energy.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioner Carter.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Commissioner Deason asked my question. I was going to ask what are some of the things we could do to assist in that process. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Just one follow-up, if I may. The BRACC process I know was of interest to all communities in the State of Florida, particularly those in northwest Florida where there is Tyndall and Eglin, I believe. And I know, of course, Northwest Florida is the service territory of Gulf, as you indicated. I know that President Story of Gulf Power, she is very involved in the community's response to the BRACC process. I would think that there would be the potential for some common ground if you think you could proverbially kill two birds with one stone, if you could promote renewable energy and somehow enhance Tyndall's standing in the BRACC process. I think there may be common ground there. So at this point not

knowing more, I would just encourage the negotiation process 1 2 that apparently you are already engaged in. MR. HENRY: Yes, sir. And, obviously we're 3 interested in Tyndall and the Naval Coastal Systems Lab, but 4 5 MacDill, we have had people representing the City of Tampa and Hillsborough County. MacDill is sitting right there in Tampa 6 That's a big air base, too. And if this could carry 7 Bav. forward to others, I think it would benefit the whole state. 8 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Maybe you could come up with a 9 model that would demonstrate that. 10 MR. HENRY: I hope so, sir. 11 CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioner Arriaga. 12 COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: Commissioner Deason, just to 13 add a little bit of information too about President Story. She 14 15 happens to be the Vice Chair of Enterprise Florida, the agency by choice that takes care of economic development in the state. 16 17 So there you have another little more of encouragement that Gulf Power will need, because, I mean, who else but her. 18 Economic development, Enterprise Florida, Gulf Power, you guys. 19 It's there. Twist the arms appropriately. 20 MR. HENRY: Yes, sir. 21 CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Ballinger. 2.2 23

MR. BALLINGER: I don't think staff has any questions and we can move on to our next presenter.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you, Mr. Henry.

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FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

MR. HENRY: Thank you.

MR. BALLINGER: Mr. Gus Cepero.

MR. CEPERO: Thank you. My name is Gus Cepero. I'm with Florida Crystals Corporation. We are the owners and operators of a biomass facility in Palm Beach County. I think it's the largest biomass facility in the country. And we have been generating power and selling it to the market for probably about eight or nine years now. We appreciate the opportunity to present our thoughts to you.

I would like to first give you sort of a bottom line impression. I have heard that phrase used a couple of times by the Commissioners, and then I would like to get into some of the specifics. I think that we can all agree that the legislature intended to encourage the development of renewable energy. We have read one of the standard offer contracts pretty carefully, and we have scanned the others, and our experience has been that in order for contracts to be successful you really need to have a willing buyer and a willing seller. When you really do not have two willing parties coming together to do a contract, you run the risk of having problems pretty early on.

I read the standard offer contract, and I must tell you that in our view the buyer of that contract is not a real happy fellow, is not a willing buyer that is coming voluntarily into this process eager to buy renewable energy. In fact, I

would say that the buyer under that contract is being dragged into this process kicking and screaming and has come up with a series of obligations and standards for performance, some of which are impossible to meet by any generating technology, and I will get into some specifics in a couple of minutes. And then has wired this whole process with hairthin triggers that will go off as soon as there is any misstep or just a bad step by the seller of power, and that will give them the right to declare default, and default will give them the right to terminate the contract, which is the death penalty.

So from our perspective as a biomass producer who has been in business for nearly ten years, I can tell you without hesitation that we would not sign this contract and it would not take us very long to make that decision. So if we are trying to encourage renewable energy, this contract, Commissioners, does not do that.

Let me try to be a little more positive now and say that we have done business with most of the utilities in this room, and I think we have developed successful relationships with at least some of them. I will single out Tampa Electric as being particularly helpful, particularly supportive of our plant, and we have done a lot of business with them. And collectively under bilateral contracts we have probably sold tens of millions of dollars, perhaps approaching \$100 million worth of power over the last few years. So I think there's

hope. I think there is a willingness to do something, but this standard offer contract is just -- it certainly doesn't do it.

It doesn't do it for us. And it's not that it needs a little tweaking, I think it just needs major surgery or replacement with a different form of contract altogether.

I would like to cover three or four specifics, not as an all-inclusive list, but as an illustration of some of the major problems that we see with the contract. First, I would like to talk about the delivery obligation, and let me preface that by saying that I think three out of the four standard offer contracts by IOUs specify a combustion turbine as the avoided unit. And they also specified, under the energy rate, that the utility or the buyer would pay the lower of the unit energy cost or the as-available cost.

Now, in one of the standard offer contracts, I think it was FPL's, under Section 8.4.7, the buyer has the right to schedule the seller basically without limitations at all times. The only thing the buyer has to do is give the seller ten minutes of notice. So, theoretically, the buyer can schedule this resource at a 97 percent capacity factor, which is probably 8500 hours or so during the year. They would pay the unit energy cost, which is the cost that really would be incurred by the avoided unit, 500 hours a year, 1,000 hours a year. The rest of the time, the vast majority of the time, 90 or 95 percent of the time they would pay the as-available

energy rate.

Now, I would ask if there is any generating technology out there, coal, nuclear, combined cycle, whatever, that can survive under a regime where you are getting paid capacity charges on the basis of a combustion turbine. The lowest possible capacity rate, and you are required to deliver energy at a 97 percent capacity factor. And most of that energy is going to be paid well below the cost to generate energy by a combustion turbine. I don't think there's any technology out there. And if I'm misreading the contract, I stand to be corrected.

Now, the other alternative is to say, well, we're really not going to dispatch this unit. Even though we have the right, even though we have the right, we are not going to patch this unit as a base load unit. We're going to dispatch it just the way a combustion turbine would be dispatched, which, again, I think we could all agree would be somewhere between 500 and 1,000 hours a year.

Then there is another provision, I think it is 4.1, that requires the seller to sell all of its energy from that facility to the buyer. So the seller does not have the ability to go into the market and sell to third parties. So the other possible scenario under this delivery obligation is the buyer will schedule the seller 5 or 10 percent of the time. The other 90 percent of the time the seller sits there and cannot

generate power. You're a waste-to-energy facility, like most of the folks that are presented here, and the material is coming in and is piling up, and you are not able to generate because you are not being scheduled by the buyer. Or you are a biomass facility, like we are, where the material is coming in, where we have obligations to deliver steam to a sugarmill next door, and we can't operate because we are not being scheduled and we don't have the right to sell to third parties.

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So this delivery obligation puts the seller in a box which, in my view, is impossible to exist. So put aside pricing, put aside prescription limits, put aside term, the delivery obligation as it stands today does not work, in my view. That's one example.

The second example, the pricing mechanism. Let's accept in arguendo that 97 percent availability rate is a reasonable availability rate. I'm not going to argue that it is not reasonable. If the seller fails to meet the 97 percent availability rate, for each percentage point below 97 that the seller delivers, the capacity payment is reduced. The first one percent I believe is 10 points, the second is five points. So by the time -- if you deliver at 90 percent, for example, instead of 97, you're getting 60 percent of the capacity payment, which was inadequate to begin with. So that pricing mechanism, in my view, is quite, quite onerous and quite out of step with anything that I have seen in the industry in the last

several years. And certainly quite out of step with the way that the utilities, the risk that the utilities run or accept when their resources do not operate as advertised.

Beyond that, you've got the capacity test that is required six times a year for the duration of the contract. I have never seen such a term before. I imagine it may be in some older standard offer contracts. Each of these capacity tests is a bullet to your head. If you miss it or if you don't meet the full committed capacity, then the capacity, the committed capacity gets reduced. And the next test is not scheduled until the utility determines when it gets scheduled. So I think the capacity commitment section is very onerous, the maintenance scheduling I think is very onerous, and, finally, I don't want to forget about the default section, Section 12.

I read about 12 or 15 different bases in which the seller could default. I guess that there is no conception that the buyer could default. The only way that this section works is under a seller default. I don't know what would constitute a buyer default, but it's not conceived by the contract.

Moreover, there are no notice or cure provisions. If there is a default, the utility has a right to terminate. So, again, commercially I don't think that that is a reasonable default provision. So I appreciate you guys have a full plate here with this standard offer contract and with the mandate that you have from the legislature, and I appreciate that you

are trying to balance encouraging renewable energy on the one hand with the avoided cost standard with no increased price to the ratepayer, and I'm not advocating at all that we increase the price or the cost to the ratepayer.

So I'm not sitting here just trying to throw rocks, but I do want to point out that this contract in our opinion does not work. And I would encourage you to think about a different form of contract altogether. For example, the Edison Electric Institute, which I think is primarily an investor-owned utility organization, there may be other members, but primarily the majority of the membership of the Edison Electric Institute, EEI, is investor-owned utilities.

They have developed a standard master contract for the purchase and sale of energy and that contract is pretty widely used, I think, in industry. We have those contracts with several utilities in this room as well as in the southeast. The beauty of that contract is that either party can be a buyer or a seller. So Party A can buy or sell and Party B can buy or sell. You would be amazed at the amount of discipline and rigor and balance that that brings to the process.

Perhaps you guys ought to consider something like an EEI style format for the standard offer. It's very simple.

It's an enabling agreement. And after that with two or three pages you can do a transaction. It takes 250 or 300 words. We

do it all the time and it works very well. Perhaps it's not suitable for real long-term contracts and some adjustments may be necessary, but I would encourage you guys to look at something like that, because this standard offer contract, for us at least, I'll speak for my company, doesn't do the trick.

mentioned?

And before somebody says go out and negotiate a contract, we have tried that. Negotiating a contract typically is tougher than doing a standard offer contract. These become sort of the beginning point, the starting point, and the utilities will typically expect discounts or concessions either in pricing or in terms and conditions from the standard offer contract. Those are my comments.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you. Commissioner Carter.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Madam Chairman, to staff, are
you guys familiar with this EEI standard contract he has

MR. BALLINGER: No, sir, I have never seen it.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: We'll take a look.

MR. CEPERO: I will say this, that it is designed for a broader range of transactions, including financial forward transactions, which may not be applicable here. So there's a lot of financial and collateral type of requirements, which, again, may not be applicable. But at the core of it, it's a fairly standard almost simple contract, and then you have a transaction schedule that says whose a buyer, whose a seller,

what's the term, what's the quantity, what's the delivery, the delivery obligation, what's the price, and that's it. It defines force majeure, it defines a lot of standard stuff.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Ballinger.

MR. BALLINGER: I don't think staff has any questions, but we can see -- I will get with Mr. Cepero and see if I can find that EEI contract and look it over.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioner Carter.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Just a follow-up to any of the panelists. Are you gentlemen and ladies familiar with this contract that he mentioned, the EEI contract, both from the industry -- either industry, whomever?

MR. ANDERSON: At Florida Power and Light Company, I know we have attorneys and business people that work with EEI type of contracts all the time, what is being described is a wholesale power contract. And in the industry there are several kind of standard agreements. On the gas side, you have the North American Energy Standards Board Agreement. Some people have modified that for large electric agreements like that. I believe there is also a standard agreement off the northwest part of the country. I'm forgetting the name of that. And then I am recalling that there is a -- I am familiar, but don't use it, as a retail lawyer in Illinois, the EEI master agreement with transaction confirmations and things.

I don't know if it is the right fit for this type of

arrangement, but it is correct there are such agreements and they have use typically for sales between very large utilities for very large amounts of electricity for different parts of time. And I think they are more typically used for shorter time period transactions as opposed to, you know, multi-year, multi-decade, but that is just a recollection without having studied more closely. That's the thoughts I have.

MR. ASHBURN: That is my general understanding, as well. It is sort of a standard form that was developed to help facilitate transactions between utilities, and it is typically for shorter periods than longer term, decade type contractual arrangements.

MR. KABBANI: If I may. It is an existing EEI.

Traditionally in the early years it is used for trading between nonregulated arms of different utilities or some regulated arms. I know that the New York Power Authority has utilized this type of contract for long-term, and it is adaptable. It would require some revisions, but it's adaptable for a long-term contract such as the standard offer.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Thank you, Madam Chair. It just seemed like to me, if something is that simple, although according to the statutory guidelines from 366.91, thinking outside of the box, to use a worn-out phrase, if there is something simple out there that will bring the parties to the table to make a decision faster so we can move on and do

something in the best interest of the consumers as well as generating a viable market and diversity of fuel mix, then maybe we should look at those things.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: I certainly always urge striving for simplicity where appropriate and clarity almost always. And one of the things I know I was going to talk with our staff about also is seeing if there is some model language or language from standard operating contracts or other vehicles from other states that are also looking at renewables. Now, often Florida is in the lead, but clearly if there are some good ideas out there that we could use, as well, I know we are interested in doing that.

Quickly. It's time to move on.

MR. ANDERSON: Okay, great. On the EEI point, though, one important point to keep in mind is our standard offer contracts in Florida are specifically drafted to implement the Commission's regulations, which are very, very particular. And as I think about it, the EEI agreement really don't have any of those obligations, so that is probably one of the key reasons they're so different.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Understood. Mr. Ballinger.

MR. BALLINGER: We don't have any more questions. I would ask Mr. Cepero, though, if he has an example of this, we're going to solicit post-workshop comments, and we would be glad to take those if somebody has them and we can look them

over. We would appreciate that.

MR. CEPERO: We will be happy to cooperate.

MR. BALLINGER: Our next presenter is Mr. Gregory

Blair. I haven't -- he may not even be -- oh, there he is.

Okay. Thank you, Mr. Blair.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Blair.

MR. BLAIR: Thanks for inviting me here today. This has been a very interesting session thus far. We come to it from a slightly different perspective. We're little guys. We operate a 25-megawatt wood-fired project in Southern Oregon. You might ask what are we doing in Florida? We would like to develop other projects. I have actually been in the development and operations business for 15 years, and for 10 years prior to that I founded the Project Finance Department at National Westminster Bank USA, where we financed about 600 megawatts in renewable projects during the heydays of the 1980s.

So I know a little bit about what is financeable. I know a lot more about what is operational and what works from a business standpoint. And we have a pretty good database on what is involved in making a biomass project work. And I can't say that I know specifically everything I would want to know about developing a project in Florida, but the starting point is what kind of a deal is out there in order to determine what type of project might be feasible.

The deal that is presented in the standard offer is 100 percent nonfinanceable. I might sign up for it if I had an existing facility that I was otherwise looking to shut down or continue operating. And I might give it a go at continuing to operate, with the caveat that I would not want to make a terribly large investment given some of the draconian measures that are in the contract that could basically take the contract away from me in very short order. And those are some of the primary weaknesses in the contract, putting price aside for the moment.

I'd like to begin just by commenting for a moment. Tom Ballinger said something earlier on that I think, you know, made a lot of sense. It would be great to be able to do a negotiated contract for these types of projects. It's a very complicated process; it's a very complicated business. Every plant is different; every location is different. And every plant in the development time line is going to be different. Earlier plants will have lower fuel costs, and as you proceed in development down the road, five years from now you may find that you have burned through, theoretically, or committed all of the cheaper fuel that is most readily available and is a true waste, and now you are moving into other types of fuel.

But just to stay on the negotiated contract subject for a moment, the issue, in my mind, is absent the renewable portfolio standard in the state, which the legislature did not

approve, you don't have an even field of negotiation for a negotiated agreement. There is no inducement, basically, for the utility to sign. And, in fact, I would suggest that there is an inherent conflict of interest for the people who would be looking to negotiate those contracts.

The alternatives are, basically, well, let's go with the renewable project, it's great for the ratepayers, and we are revenue neutral because the price of the contract gets passed on to the ratepayer. Unfortunately, it's not shareholder neutral because the avoided unit that's not built doesn't bring earnings per share down to the bottom line. The utilities are in the business of growing their business. And if they can't grow their business in-state by adding capital equipment, then they are not growing their business.

So any asset that is built by someone else is an asset -- is basically an avoided earnings for the shareholders of the utility. So there is a disincentive, absent some sort of regulatory push or some sort of mandate or renewable portfolio standard for there to be a fair bilateral negotiation in such a process. And if I were working for FPL or Tampa Electric or Gulf Power or Progress, I would be taking the position -- and they would be delinquent in their duties if they didn't take the position -- that a renewable asset is not a plus it's a minus. It may be a minor minus, just because there is not going to be a large proliferation of these plants

given the limitations of the market. The theoretical limit to biomass in the state of Florida is probably about 1,000 megawatts. We are probably talking about another 600 to 1,000 megawatts of MSW in terms of maximize penetration, and then we are getting into other technologies. We are getting into, you know, putting hydroturbines in the Gulfstream and things of that nature, and solar, and looking for potential wind sites.

But looking at the low-hanging fruit, and biomass is a low-hanging fruit for the State of Florida, to the extent that all of the resources are not currently being harvested, are not currently used in the production, utilized in the production of electricity, the issue is, and the conundrum for a regulatory body is where to set the price. If we set it too high, all the plants get built but we paid too much and we burdened the ratepayers with too high a cost. If we set the price too low, or allow for more onerous contract terms, then no projects get built and we haven't met the requirements of the statute and people are not able to benefit from a large proliferation of renewables.

I'm going to share with you some information from our experience that may or may not be relevant for the State of Florida, but the all-in (phonetic) cost, and this is in response to Commissioner Carter's question earlier about what would it cost, it's around 9 cents a kilowatt hour, around \$90 a megawatt hour. And that's what it is for us right now. Our

operations, maintenance, property taxes, insurance, salaries, everything and anything in an area with a median income range of about \$32,000. So that is the local economy that we operate in. We are at about \$32 a megawatt hour for all of those fixed operating costs and some of the variable costs of chemicals. So this is nonfuel.

Our capital cost is about another \$30 a megawatt hour, and our fuel cost is -- right now our fuel cost is about \$28, and we have seen it as high as \$36 a megawatt hour, depending on variations in fuel costs. With recent increases in diesel fuel prices, there is some correlation, though it's not tremendous. But it has more to do with market factors, shortages, with how much waste is coming into the stream, and those are the things that are a little bit more difficult to manage. But it's not cheap.

Now, when I initially looked at the standard offer contract, I was encouraged. I said, oh, 8 cents. Five bucks a kilowatt month is not so great, but 8 cents a kilowatt hour as a sort of forecasted energy rate is pretty good. And it's a great starting point, and you might actually be able to make the dog hunt here.

When I got into reading it a little further, though,
I realized that that price is not a price that's going to hold,
it's going to fluctuate with the price of natural gas. So it
would be incumbent upon us, we would necessarily need to lock

that in because \$5 a kilowatt month as a capacity payment doesn't even begin to pay the cost of a solid fuel plant.

A biomass plant is as capital intensive as a coal-fired plant and it suffers from diseconomies of scale. A biomass plant by its very nature, because it has to gather fuel from a radius around the plant, really can't be any larger than 50 megawatts, unless you're in an area that is just producing biomass at an incredible clip. Our fuel area that we pull from has -- we pull from a radius of about 180 miles, and we pull from four pulp mills and about a dozen lumber mills, and then we also go to timber landings and gather culls, tops, limbs.

We go to area landfills and gather urban woodwaste that has been segregated, clean urban woodwaste, pallets and construction debris. We send out bin boxes to local areas for clean woodwaste only at a reduced rate to local residents. So we charge \$100 for our bin, whereas, you know, a Waste Management or a Wheelbrater might charge \$300, because they will take everything. We say segregate it into wood, we charge \$100.

So we get material in from a bunch of different places. We get 30,000 tons a year in by operating a public woodwaste yard at our plant. And the local community, which is about 110,000 people, bring their woodwaste to the plant and we charge them five bucks to dump a pick-up truck, so it's cheaper than the landfill. So all of these things together, you know,

these plants draw from a great many sources. And the fuel prices, though, can fluctuate. It can fluctuate with temporary shortages, it can fluctuate with fluctuations in the lumber industry, in the sugar industry, with respect to Florida, it can fluctuate with, you know, hurricane debris that might be showing up in the waste stream. So there's a lot of variables that come into play, so the fuel cost is not static. And those are some of the risks that we take.

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The risks we take are building the plant, that its going to operate, that we're going to maintain it, it's going to maintain reliability. Because if we don't produce power we don't get paid. And we need to be able to source fuel economically so that we preserve a profit margin and maintain a coverage ratio on our debt and generate a return for our equity investors.

The issue, I guess, some of the specific issues I have with the contract is there is a lot of discussion about avoided cost and not burdening the ratepayer with more costs than they would otherwise experience from the avoided unit.

The issue is -- the flip-side of that is if the renewable project is not built, the avoided project does get built. The avoided project is got going to have a ten-year PPA. The avoided project is going to have a 25 to 30-year PPA.

Because once it goes into rate base, the ratepayer has signed a 25 to 30-year PPA. He is obligated. He is not

only tied to that capacity payment to support that plant for 25 to 30 years, but he is also signed on to that heat rate and that energy efficiency and that fuel source for 25 to 30 years. And he is bound to those set -- to those economic parameters. He is also not hedged, because the utility is not allowed to hedge its fuel supply. So he is at risk to the vagaries of the market.

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So when a hurricane hits the Gulf and New Orleans is devastated and the refineries are devastated and the gas delivery infrastructure is devastated, Florida catches a major cold. Your prices go up, you know, four dollars per MMBtu, five dollars per MMBtu. Retail in New York, I'm paying \$16 right now per MMBtu, and I'm paying 22 cents a kilowatt hour all because of a hurricane in New Orleans. Prior to that it was no bargain, either, but it was probably about 25 to 30 percent less. And that may come down.

But right now the ratepayer is not hedged. He is not hedged for coal, he is not hedged on gas. But he would be hedged with biomass. And it has been done in other states where a fixed price, or a fixed price with a minor inflation escalator has been set, and biomass producers have abided by that and continued to produce energy in that environment. And that hedge in and of itself has been determined to be in the ratepayer interest in those states where that has come into play.

And, you know, it's not always a bargain. Hindsight is 20/20, and when we look back everybody is an expert. And in some cases, you know, the seven cent contract didn't look like such a good deal under the New York long-run avoided cost structure, the L-rack (phonetic) structure in 1993. So all of those contracts got bought out. But, boy, in 1999 and '01 and '05, it would have been nice to have those around.

One other thing I would like to mention just about the nature of biomass plants is our plant has been around for 22 years -- I'm sorry, 19 years, we have got a 25-year contract, and it will run for another 25 years. And it will run for another 25 years -- it's a \$36 million facility, it will run for another 25 years at a cost of about a million and a half a year. So one of the other conundrums that you face as a regulatory body is you're trying to encourage the development of renewables.

If you set a standard offer contract and a lot of existing facilities that are already built and paid for renew their contracts through this standard offer mechanism, you will get renewable energy but not at any greater level than you have been getting it, you will just end up paying more for it than you might otherwise have paid. As I mentioned right now, when our contract is up, we could probably make the dog hunt at about 6.5 cents a kilowatt hour. If I am building a new plant, I need about 9.1. But if somebody offers me 6.5 or 6.8, I'm

going to run, and I'm going to deliver power.

And that is the market that we are looking at on the west coast. At a 6.5 cent rate on the west coast, if I'm looking at that rate, and I have to decide whether I'm going to build a new plant, no, I'm not. But I will build a new plant at 9.1 or 10, because our fuel market is getting a little tight.

The 97 percent availability factor has been discussed a lot. The impact is on a very de minimis capacity payment. I don't see it as a big deal, but it's appropriate to the combustion turbine that only runs for a couple hundred hours a year that's a peaker, a super peaker. If the capacity payment was more like California's standard offer contract in 1987 that resulted in 1,000 megawatts of new biomass projects at \$187 a kilowatt year, about \$15 or \$16 a kilowatt month, which is three times your 2005 rate, that rate resulted in a proliferation of projects in 1986, 1987 dollars.

This rate may result in a proliferation of projects if somebody can tell me that I can lock in 8 cents on the energy rate. Because my contract right now has a similar capacity payment in Oregon, but my energy payment is much larger. So my energy payment, I'm used to getting paid to produce power, and I can get a plant financed on an energy rate where I'm servicing capital needs through the sale of electricity. So the capacity payment doesn't have to be

there -- when you build a biomass plant, you expect to run it, it's a boiler. You don't get any power unless you get up a head of steam. They are not dispatchable. You can't turn them on and off. And if you do on a regular basis, and there was an experience in a plant in Burlington, Vermont, that was cycled daily for three years and had to have the whole boiler retubed and had to have the turbine overhauled after three years of operation, when that normally should have happened after about 20 years. Because they cycled it on a daily basis, and the thermal shock to the engine, to the boiler and all the equipment was just too severe. Once you bring it up to temperature, you want to run it and you want to continue to run it. And to run it any other way is foolhardy.

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So the dispatch and control thing doesn't work. What is of greater concern is the inherent economic dispatch language, which is what tells me that we don't get eight cents under this contract. Okay. First, you don't get eight cents because it's not locked in. I would have to hedge the gas price in order to be sure that if the price of gas went down below the forecasted level, that I'd be making money on my hedge when I'm losing money on power contract, in which case I might elect to shut down and just make money on my hedge, because I would be making more money on the hedge than I would on the power contract.

But the dispatchability issue is of grave concern,

and it's sort of a hidden issue in the contract. Because the plant is dispatchable and because it's subject to this economic dispatch against the estimated unit fuel cost, the way it works is since this unit is slotted in against the cost of a peaker that only runs for several hundred hours a year, economically that plant will never slot in, economically, at night, in the spring, in the fall, in the winter, and perhaps even at night sometimes during the summer.

It will never be at -- the marginal heat rate in Florida during those off-peak or shoulder-peak hours is not 10,500, that is not the marginal heat rate of the state. The marginal heat rate of the state is at that level when it's 90 degrees outside and all the combustion turbines are the last units that are operating.

So inherently what that means is by saying that

Florida Power and Light or Tampa Electric or Gulf or Progress

has the right to turn your unit off because they don't want to

throttle down or turn off a unit that has better economics,

well, during certain times of the day I can tell you I can

guarantee you that their units have better economics. And so,

in that sense, you know in a very strict interpretation of

avoided cost, that's correct, our plant should be shut down.

But if we read the contract correctly and it means that we are going to be shut down, it means that we are not going to make enough revenue, and it means we are going to be

abusing our equipment. And what that means is we're not going to build it. And if we don't build it, then we are back to the legislature again with the legislature saying how do we encourage renewables, it didn't happen the last time.

So I'm trying to give you an insight into some of the other things that we deal with on the business front. You know, the worst thing you could do is set the price at 20 cents a kilowatt hour because you will immediately get 1,500 megawatts of renewable energy, but you will have overpaid. The second worst thing you can do is approve this standard offer, because you will get no new generation from that. So it's somewhere in the middle that has to be determined.

Gus said earlier, Mr. Cepero, that this contract looks like the kind of contract that was drafted by someone who didn't want to do a deal. I agree wholeheartedly. There are trip wires in this thing every step along the way that say if you do this, you lose your contract; if you do this, you lose your contract; if you do this, you lose your contract.

Well, when a banker looks at that, and I was a banker, you say, "You're going to lose your contract, you're not going to get the loan." Because there are things outside of your control that will happen in the normal course of business. Tell me if you don't operate you're not going to get paid, I'm okay with that, because I know that you're going to build a plant that's going to run. Tell me if you don't

operate not only are you not going to get paid, which should be economic penalty enough, but you're going to lose your contract and the right to be paid forever more, I'm not going to build that asset, and I'm not going to invest in putting something that is not on wheels in the State of Florida. If it's on wheels, I might build it, because I can move it somewhere else. But power plants aren't on wheels, they're not portable assets.

So, you know, that's about it. I don't want to take

-- I'm sort of the lunch spoiler here. Everybody is hungry.

So I think I'm done. But if there are any questions, I'd be happy to answer them.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you, Mr. Blair.

Commissioners?

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A lot of information. Thank you.

Mr. Ballinger.

MR. BALLINGER: I don't think staff has any questions for Mr. Blair. And with that, we can move to, kind of, the wrap-up here of administrative things.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Please.

MR. BALLINGER: Mike, I think on the very first presentation, the last slide, there you go, our next steps we have. And one that is not on here, we didn't think about, is filing of post-workshop comments. And I know this was noticed as a staff workshop, and I guess we'll suggest that if we're going to have any post-workshop comments from any of the

presenters or anyone else that we get those by March 20th, that gives people a couple of weeks to put together their thoughts and send them in, I guess just to staff. You can send them to -- I guess I'll pick Judy to get those, to be the organizer of these things.

But then what's going to be coming up next is we have to address the new standard offer contracts, because the old ones expire by June 1st. And staff's idea is that the utilities would file around April the 3rd new standard offer contracts with petitions for approval. When we see those, staff will continue mediation as we do with any PAA item, and talk with other parties. And when other parties see them they can, you know, call me on the phone and give me your comments of what you think of the contracts, this kind of thing.

That would give staff about a month to put together recommendation and then be at the May 16th agenda with the Commission to discuss this, the approval of the new contracts or what role we go from there. I'm open for feedback from the Commission if that sounds like a workable schedule. Or if you have any thoughts on that, I'll be glad to hear them.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioners, any thoughts?

No. But I'm sure as we are thinking it through that we may have some over the next little while that each Commissioner can get with you individually or from their offices.

So any additional written comments on these items to 1 Ms. Harlow by March 20th, that's roughly two weeks from now. 2 MR. BALLINGER: Yes. 3 CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Any other closing thoughts? 4 Mr. Keating, anything else that we need to do 5 procedurally to conclude our business here today? 6 7 No, Chairman. MR. KEATING: 8 CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you, Mr. Keating. 9 that --10 COMMISSIONER CARTER: Madam Chairman. 11 CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Carter. 12 COMMISSIONER CARTER: I just wanted to say to all the 13 participants, particularly great staff as well as those of you from the industry, thank you so very much for your 14 15 participation and your education. I learned a lot today. 16 I've still got a lot more to learn, but I think your thoughts 17 were -- it seemed like to me everybody was candid, and I appreciate that. 18 19 Thank you, Madam Chairman, for your indulgence. 20 CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Absolutely. Interesting issues. 21 Much more discussion to look forward to, I think. 22 And, yes, on behalf of myself and my colleagues and 23 our staff, thank you for your participation today. we've run long and everybody is probably hungry, but I 24

appreciate the opportunity to push through to cover the

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1 2 STATE OF FLORIDA 3 CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER COUNTY OF LEON 4 5 I, JANE FAUROT, RPR, Chief, Office of Hearing Reporter Services, FPSC Division of Commission Clerk and 6 Administrative Services, do hereby certify that the foregoing 7 proceeding was heard at the time and place herein stated. 8 IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that I stenographically reported the said proceedings; that the same has been transcribed under my direct supervision; and that this 9 transcript constitutes a true transcription of my notes of said 10 proceedings. 11 I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor am I a relative 12 or employee of any of the parties' attorney or counsel connected with the action, nor am I financially interested in the action. 13 14 DATED THIS 17th day of March, 2006. 15 16 JANE FAUROT, RPR icial FPSC Hearings Reporter 17 FPSC Division of Commission Clerk and 18 Administrative Services (850) 413-6732 19 20 2.1 22 23 24

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