BEFORE THE 1 FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

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DOCKET NO. 060455-TP

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In the Matter of:

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COMPLAINT AGAINST AT&T COMMUNICATIONS OF THE SOUTHERN STATES, LLC D/B/A AT&T D/B/A LUCKY DOG PHONE CO. D/B/A ACC BUSINESS D/B/A SMARTALK D/B/A UNISPEAKSM SERVICE D/B/A WWW.PREPAIDSERVICEGUIDE.COM D/B/A

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ACCESS CHARGES PURSUANT TO EMBARO'S TARIFFS, BY EMBARQ FLORIDA, INC.,

F/K/A SPRINT-FLORIDA, INCORPORATED. 9


PROCEEDINGS:

BEFORE:

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CONQUEST FOR FAILURE TO PAY INTRASTATE

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AGENDA CONFERENCE

ITEM NO. 3

CHAIRMAN LISA POLAK EDGAR

COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON COMMISSIONER ISILIO ARRIAGA

COMMISSIONER MATTHEW M. CARTER, II

COMMISSIONER KATRINA J. TEW

Tuesday, August 29, 2006

Betty Easley Conference Center

Room 148

4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida

JANE FAUROT, RPR

Official Commission Reporter

(850) 413-6732

DOCUMENT NUMBER-DATE

FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 8/18 SEP-5 8

FPSC-COMMISSION OF FRA

1	PARTICIPATING:
2	BRUCE MAY, ESQUIRE, and TRACY HATCH, ESQUIRE,
3	representing AT&T.
4	SUSAN MASTERTON, ESQUIRE, representing Embarq.
5	MICHAEL COOKE, ESQUIRE, and ADAM TEITZMAN, ESQUIRE,
6	representing Commission Staff.
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PROCEEDINGS

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: We will begin our discussions with Item 3.

MR. TEITZMAN: Good morning, Commissioners. Adam
Teitzman on behalf of Commission staff.

Commissioners, Item 3 is staff's recommendation addressing the motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, stay the proceeding filed in Docket Number 060455-TP. Staff is recommending that the Commission deny the motion because it fails to raise arguments sufficient to support dismissal of the complaint.

AT&T has requested oral argument, and staff is recommending granting oral argument with ten minutes per party.

MR. MAY: Madam Chair, Commissioners, I'm Bruce May with the law firm of Holland and Knight, appearing today on behalf of AT&T. With me is Tracy Hatch also with AT&T.

With the Chair's permission, what I would like to do in my ten minutes of allotted time is to give you some brief background as to why we're here.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Okay. Mr. May, just a moment, if you would, and thank you.

So we've got Mr. May, we have Mr. Hatch, we have Ms. Masterton.

Commissioners, the first issue before us is whether we would like to hear oral argument.

1 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Move staff on Issue 1.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Second.

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CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Okay. All right. Then show Issue 1 approved.

Now, Mr. May, if you will give me a minute. Ten minutes, and I think we are ready to go into it.

Ms. Masterton, do you have a comment you need to make before we do that?

MS. MASTERSON: No, I will just wait until after Mr. May is done with his remarks.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Okay. Now, Mr. May.

MR. MAY: I apologize for being presumptuous.

The reason we're here, Commissioners, is that on June 14th of this year, Embarq filed virtually identical complaints in three separate jurisdictions. One complaint was filed in the Western District of the United States District Court in Missouri, the other complaint was filed before the North Carolina Public Utility Commission. And then, of course, this complaint was filed. Again, those complaints were filed on the same day in three separate jurisdictions. Each complaint is based on a common theme and a common claim, and that claim is that AT&T owes Embarq additional intrastate access charges for enhanced prepaid calling card traffic.

Embarq's scatter-gun litigation tactic has placed my client in the uncomfortable and awkward position of having to

try the same case three different times in three different forums with the potential for three different results. Faced with those multiple filings, what we have asked the Commission to do is to dismiss the complaint because the federal court and not the Commission has all of the requisite jurisdictional tools to comprehensively resolve this dispute. In the alternative, what we have asked is that the Commission, recognizing the principles of comity and judicial and administrative economy to defer any further proceeding in this case, pending the outcome of the federal court litigation.

Now, Embarq asserts, and your staff has recommended that both of our alternative motions be denied and you proceed forward, notwithstanding that there is a pending federal court proceeding on virtually the identical case. We respectfully disagree with staff's recommendation primarily for two reasons. And given the limited amount of time, I'm going to focus on these two reasons.

First, the recommendation itself is founded on the premise, we believe a faulty premise, that you can resolve this complaint simply by reviewing and enforcing the intrastate access charge tariff. That premise ignores AT&T's fundamental defense to this claim.

The staff recommendation overlooks the fact that AT&T's defense to each of the three complaints in each of the three jurisdictions is the same, and that is Embarg is barred

from recovering additional access charges because it has entered into a series of private settlement agreements with AT&T wherein it has released and has waived its right to recover these additional access charges from my client. Those private contractual agreements, Commissioners, go to the very heart of AT&T's defense in this case and in the federal case. Affirmative Defense Number 9 in the federal court litigation is just that, that Embarq has released AT&T and is not entitled to recover these additional access charges by virtue of it entering into these series of private settlement agreements.

Because those private contractual agreements are at the core of this case, in order to resolve this case you're going to have to do more than simply enforcing the tariffs.

You're going to have to review, interpret, and enforce these private settlement agreements. The Commission does not have that kind of authority. In fact, if you look at staff's recommendation, and, in fact, if you look at Embarq's response to our motion to dismiss, both staff and Embarq acknowledge that the Commission does not have the authority to enforce private settlement agreements.

There are a couple of cases that I would like to bring your attention to. The KMC case, the KMC order. Order Number PSC-05-1122, which staff cites for the proposition and Embarq sites for the proposition of allowing the Commission to interpret private settlement agreements really does just the

opposite. Let me quote what you said, and this was in your November 7th, 2005, order. And I quote, "This Commission has recognized that it has no general authority to enforce contracts and that a settlement agreement is, in essence, a contract." You went on to say, and I quote, "This Commission is not the appropriate forum to enforce this settlement agreement that was neither filed nor approved by us."

Now, because the Commission does not have the authority to -- clearly does not have the authority to enforce the settlement agreements upon which we base our fundamental defense, we submit that you don't have all the necessary jurisdictional tools to resolve this case. It's like building a house with just a hammer. You need more than simply the ability to look at the tariff, you need to be able to enforce these private settlement agreements. Again, for that reason, we have asked you to defer to the federal court which clearly has much broader and comprehensive jurisdiction to enforce these settlement agreements.

Our second concern with staff's recommendation is really it is not a fault we are finding with staff's recommendation, it's the fact that there has been some recent developments after we filed our motion to dismiss that I want to bring your attention to. Staff's recommendation does not bring you up to speed and apprise you of the fact that there is a mandatory mediation proceeding ongoing in the federal court

in the Western District of Missouri, which if allowed to run its course, we believe, could resolve all or perhaps most of the issues in this case.

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The mandatory mediation process for the Western

District of Missouri is somewhat of a unique process, and if I might take a little bit of time to give you the history there.

In 1990 Congress enacted the Civil Justice Reform Act, and in so doing designated the Western District of Missouri and four other federal district courts as demonstration projects to test whether alternative dispute resolution was effective.

By all accounts, this test proved very successful and very effective. And as a result of that test, the Western District of Missouri has adopted a special local rule which requires all civil litigation such as this to go through a mandatory mediation process. Again, we believe that process would be productive and could, in fact, resolve all of the issues before you today. We simply ask you to stay this proceeding to allow the parties to focus their efforts on potentially settling this dispute through this mandatory mediation process.

Now, I fully expect Ms. Masterton to argue that this is simply another delay tactic on behalf of AT&T. That's not the case. The mandatory mediation process in federal district courts is a fast-track process. Within the next three days, before September 1, the parties are required to appoint a

mediator and then conduct that mediation session within the next 30 days. So by the end of September, this mediation session will have occurred, and it is fully expected that the mediation process itself will be fully concluded within the next 60 days. Holding this proceeding in abeyance and allowing that mediation process to work itself out we think is a prudent course of action, and it's not going to cause any undue harm or delay.

Finally, Commissioners, staff's recommendation suggests that unless you move forward -- there is a suggestion that unless you move forward with this complaint you are somehow abdicating your statutory responsibility to enforce Chapter 364. I think that argument and that position or that suggestion ignores a long line of cases in Florida which encourage state courts and administrative agencies like you to defer to the federal court where the federal court has jurisdiction. The fact that you would defer to the federal court, at least hold this proceeding in abeyance pending the outcome of that mandatory mediation process I don't believe in good faith can be characterized as an abdication of your statutory responsibilities.

I know I'm approaching the end of my time, but before
I conclude I want to leave with you with a clear understanding
of what we are asking for here. And perhaps the best way to do
that is to first let you know what we are not asking you to do

or we're not asserting. We're not claiming that you lack jurisdiction to interpret and enforce the intrastate access charge tariff of Embarq which you have approved. My client fully recognizes your authority in that regard and it respects your authority. What AT&T is saying is that the resolution of this case involves much more than simply looking at and enforcing an access charge tariff.

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Again, the private contract, the private settlement agreements that the parties have entered into must be reviewed, interpreted, and enforced in order for AT&T to have its day in court. Again, we respectfully submit that that particular jurisdictional authority is not with you today. For that reason, we're simply asking that you allow the federal court to rule on these contractual defenses. If the court finds that those contracts would bar Embarq from recovering additional access charges, the need for this proceeding would evaporate. On the other hand, if the federal court were to determine that those contracts do not bar Embarq from recovering these additional access charges, then a proceeding before this Commission could be appropriate. However, we believe, again, it would be inefficient for all the parties concerned, and the Commission, to proceed forward with this case before the federal court rules on the threshold contract defenses.

In our original motion, Commissioners, we asked for two things. We asked for you either to dismiss the complaint

in deference to the federal court, or you hold this proceeding in abeyance until the conclusion of the federal court process. In light of the new development, the fact that there has been mandatory mediation required in this case, we think there is a third alternative that you should consider, and that is to hold this proceeding in abeyance until the federal court's mandatory mediation process runs its course.

Again, that's not an unduly long delay. We are talking 30 to 60 days. And, again, allowing the federal court mediation process to work, we believe, would conserve the resources of the parties, would conserve the resources of the Commission, and, more importantly, would advance your longstanding policy of encouraging settlement. That concludes my remarks. I will be glad to answer any questions.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you.

Ms. Masterton.

MS. MASTERSON: Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Commissioners, AT&T has asked you to dismiss Embarq's complaint by suggesting that the Commission does not have jurisdiction to resolve it. In the alternative, AT&T pleads with you to stay Embarq's complaint pending resolution of a complaint filed by Embarq in federal court in Missouri. As your staff has recommended, you should deny AT&T's motion.

First, the Commission clearly has jurisdiction under state and federal law to resolve Embarg's complaint

demonstrating that AT&T failed to pay intrastate access charges that are due on AT&T's enhanced prepaid calling card traffic.

And, second, while the Commission theoretically has the discretion to grant a stay, the Commission should decline to stay the proceeding because under state law it is the agency entrusted to resolve the issues raised in Embarg's complaint.

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And I want to address a couple of the issues that AT&T raised. AT&T is saying that this is not just an issue to determine the applicability of Embarq's intrastate access tariff. But, in fact, the complaint -- on the four corners of the complaint Embarq has alleged a violation of that tariff and also provisions of state law that require AT&T to pay intrastate access charges and does not address the contract issues. I think those are defenses of AT&T, factual issues that the Commission may deem relevant to this case as it proceeds forward, but the law is clear that you can't dismiss a complaint because of the facts that are to be alleged, but rather it has to be decided within the four corners of the complaint as filed. And all of the allegations have to be construed in favor of the complaining party.

So I think that while that may be the defense that AT&T raises, it cannot serve as a grounds for dismissing AT&T's complaint today. And Embarq was a party in the KMC case that AT&T mentioned, and I think that they overlooked the true thrust of that ruling, that that was a case to interpret an

interconnection agreement and also to enforce a settlement agreement. And while the Commission granted Embarq's motion to dismiss the settlement agreement count, they were very clear, you all were very clear that you had the authority to consider and interpret the settlement agreement if it was relevant to the resolution of the interconnection agreement dispute. And I think that is entirely the same as the issue here where we are alleging a complaint under the tariff and perhaps those agreements may be relevant to the settlement of that dispute.

In addition, I wanted to address AT&T's point about the pending mediation in the federal court. It's true that that is a pending matter, and I understand the parties are working to establish a date, but the order that requires the parties to mediate on the federal court makes it clear that the federal litigation is not stayed while mediation is pending. In other words, everything proceeds forward in its normal course.

Certainly it is not intended to be a reason to stay a state proceeding. And given the history of negotiations between the parties, we have been discussing this issue with AT&T for a long time, including a significant time since the FCC issued the ruling that is the basis of Embarq's complaint and have not yet been able to come to an agreement, so there is no reason to anticipate overly eagerly that this mediation, this mandatory mediation process in the federal court will

result in a resolution.

Embarq filed its federal complaint under the federal court's diversity jurisdiction primarily to seek recovery in several states where the amount of traffic in each jurisdiction made it uneconomical for Embarq to pursue individual Commission complaints. In Florida, however, and also in North Carolina where we have filed a complaint to recover the North Carolina access charges, and I would say that, you know, they are actually three identical complaints. Obviously North Carolina is the jurisdiction where we would pursue the intrastate North Carolina access charges, and Florida is the jurisdiction where we would pursue the Florida access charges, and you can't pursue one in the other. They are separately under the jurisdiction of those respective state commissions.

In Florida and North Carolina the amount of traffic and the value of the avoided intrastate access charges that are in dispute represent a significant portion of the total traffic and amount that Embarq is seeking to recover. And, in addition, and perhaps more importantly, the access avoidance effects on the Florida and North Carolina competitive markets is much more material than in the other states where Embarq serves. And that justifies a resolution of these claims by this Commission as well as the North Carolina Commission for the North Carolina claims.

To fully protect all of Embarq's legal rights, Embarq

included the Florida and North Carolina traffic in its federal complaint in addition to filing the state complaints. And, there are issues related to statutes of limitation and claims that are appropriately pursued in a civil court rather than a administrative proceeding that needed to be included in that federal complaint. And to some extent it's like when you file a complaint in civil court that has regulatory issues and it's referred to the regulatory agency to address the regulatory issues and then back to the civil court to address the civil issues that are outside the jurisdiction of the Commission.

And we see that as what would be operating here, given the usual course of the state administrative process compared to the federal court process, and the breadth of the issues in the federal complaint compared to the Florida complaint. We believe this Commission is likely to reach a decision on the Florida issues much more quickly than the federal court will resolve the issues in that complaint. And in that event, the federal court is likely to rely on the Commission's decision on the Florida tariff issues in resolving any remaining Florida issues in the federal complaint as well as the issues in general.

We have no intention of pursuing double recovery of our claims, and legal principles would not allow that kind of double recovery in any event. As far as administrative efficiency, which AT&T has pointed out as a reason for staying

the complaint, Embarq has indicated its readiness and willingness to work cooperatively with AT&T, and the staff has suggested its willingness to assist the parties in working out procedures that would eliminate any burdens from potentially overlapping discovery processes.

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And I would note that the North Carolina Commission has already denied a similar motion by AT&T there, and is already in the process of litigating Embarq's complaints there. And part of that they are in the process of developing discovery procedures that will address some of those concerns, so should the Commission decide to go forward that would facilitate those discussions in Florida, I believe.

It's true that in the past the Commission has stayed proceedings because of pending federal actions, but typically those actions have involved policy considerations that the Commission felt would have an effect on its decision in the state, either would preclude it or would guide it. In this case, the FCC has already made the relevant policy determination when it issued its enhanced prepaid calling card order in response to a request from a declaratory statement by AT&T. In that decision the FCC said that the jurisdiction of those enhanced prepaid calling cards is to be determined by the originating and terminating points of the calling and called parties. So that some of the traffic is intrastate, not all of it interstate as AT&T had positioned in the request for the

declaratory statement.

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And in issuing that ruling, the FCC recognized that the state commissions would be an appropriate forum for determining any retroactive access charges that were due. And that is exactly what Embarq is asking this Commission to decide. The Commission has an interest in these and the related state law violations that Embarq alleges. The statutes make the Commission responsible for ensuring that intrastate interexchange companies pay the appropriate intrastate access charges and it also asks the Commission to prevent the discriminatory effects on competition that might result when companies such as AT&T evade access charges and regulatory assessment fees that other providers who are operating lawfully must pay.

The Florida Commission should do as the North

Carolina Commission has done. It should vote to approve the

staff recommendation and proceed expeditiously to resolve

Embarq's complaint. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you.

Commissioner Deason.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I have a question for Ms.

Masterton. You indicated that the Florida traffic was included in the federal case, is that correct?

MS. MASTERSON: Yes, that's correct.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: What happens if you have

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conflicting decisions between the jurisdictions?

MS. MASTERSON: The Florida Commission decision would not be overruled by the federal court decision.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: How do you know that?

MS. MASTERSON: Just by the normal course of a court having jurisdiction to tell you what to do. The federal court in Missouri does not have that ability to guide the Commission. It's not like the Eleventh Circuit decision would govern what you all do. But the decision --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Because the federal court -it's in a district, obviously, that doesn't have the impact,
doesn't cover this geographic area, correct?

MS. MASTERSON: Right.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. Now, what happens if a favorable decision is obtained in Missouri, and it's to AT&T's benefit, and they seek to have that -- and we decide something contrary. Can't they basically take that to the Eleventh Circuit, or whatever circuit we're under. Is it the Eleventh circuit?

What I'm trying to get at is what is the most efficient way to handle this? It seems to me that -- and I have said it over and over again. I don't mind sitting here, taking evidence, making a decision, as long as our decision means something, and it's not going to be overturned either by the FCC or federal court. That's my concern.

How do you assure me that is not going to be the case here?

MS. MASTERSON: I don't think I can guarantee you that whatever you decide here that there might not be, you know, grounds to appeal it in the process here, and that if the federal court made a decision that was -- on the tariff issue that was different from the one here, that that would not, somehow, influence the --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: If you're convinced that the jurisdiction is here and we are the proper -- this is the proper forum to hear this complaint and resolve it, why did you include the Florida traffic in a separate court case in Missouri?

MS. MASTERSON: We felt that we had to to fully protect the rights because of the statute of limitations issues that were out there. Even though we could pursue the tariff issue here, our research indicated that probably that wouldn't toll the statute of limitations for some of the other claims we made in the federal court, which included fraud and the contract violations which might allow us some additional damages in addition to what you all can --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, haven't you already chosen where you want this issue heard then by doing that?

MS. MASTERSON: We didn't believe so, no. We believed that the tariff issues can be addressed in the Florida

Commission, will be addressed more quickly. Therefore, I mean, just under any normal process of a federal court, it's not likely that that process will be complete before this one would be, and that the decision that the Florida Commission made here would actually govern what occurred in the federal court on those issues.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Have you filed anything in the Missouri court asking them to hold in abeyance the Florida traffic until a decision is made by the Florida PSC because there is a separate proceeding?

MS. MASTERSON: No, we have not done that yet.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioner Tew.

COMMISSIONER TEW: I have a question for Ms.

Masterton, also. I think you mentioned that the FCC recognized that the states would be the appropriate forum for the intrastate traffic, and I was just wondering if you could help me -- could you point me specifically to where in that order it says that? I actually do have it.

MS. MASTERSON: It is actually Footnote 58 of the enhanced prepaid calling card order, and I will read it to you when I get there. "Claims for unpaid intrastate access charges should be filed in the appropriate court or state commission." And then it goes on to say the Commission, meaning the FCC, has held that it does not act as a collection agency for carriers with respect to unpaid tariff charges.

MR. MAY: Madam Chair, may I respond to --

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. May.

MR. MAY: Just to follow up on Commissioner Deason's point. I think the line of questions that Commissioner Deason just posed to Ms. Masterton was the very reason why we have asked as a third alternative to allow the mandatory mediation process to run its course. The potential for inconsistent results, and I disagree with Ms. Masterton, I think there is a real legitimate potential for inconsistent results. And in that event, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction could be invoked, also the doctrine of res judicata. It's a very uncertain area as to which decision would control.

Some of the case law suggests that the federal court's decision would control. There's other case law that suggest it is first in time. If the federal court were to rule first, then its decision on that particular issue could be res judicata for the case and control the Florida Commission. It's not a clear-cut -- there is no clear-cut answer to which decision would control. And, again, for that reason, because of the potential for inconsistent results, we think the most efficient way to do this is to allow the federal proceeding to run its course, at least through the mandatory mediation session, so that the parties can, at minimum, narrow the issues and decide which forum, or the mediator could suggest which forum is supposed to address which issues.

Embarq has invoked the jurisdiction of the federal court. We did not invoke that jurisdiction. And I would respectfully submit what is good for the goose is good for the gander. You can't forum shop, and then suddenly when you get a forum that asks you and requires you to do something say, whoa, wait a minute, we didn't really want this, we want to go down to Florida now.

I think the most efficient way, again, to resolve all of these issues is to allow the federal court proceeding to move forward and ferret out the issue. We're not asking for an indeterminate delay. We are asking for just everybody to catch their breath, allow the mediation process to run its course for the next 60 days, and then come back to this. At that point in time, again, the entire proceeding could be resolved, or if not, the entire proceeding could be narrowed with respect to the issues.

Finally, I wanted to just mention something just to correct Ms. Masterton with respect to the North Carolina proceeding. The North Carolina Commission has not ruled on that. There is an order of a prehearing officer which is subject to reconsideration. Reconsideration will be requested by the end of this week, and the full Commission will address this issue sometime thereafter. But the full North Carolina Commission has not ruled. Even if it has ruled, I would submit to you that the jurisdiction of that commission is state

specific and it should not control what you do down here.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioner Tew.

COMMISSIONER TEW: This is for Mr. May. Does the federal court have subject matter jurisdiction to address the statutory violations that Embarg has alleged here?

MR. MAY: The statutory -- well, let me back up. The federal court does have the jurisdiction to address the relief requested by Embarq in this proceeding, and that's to recover additional access charges from AT&T. Embarq has conceded that by filing in the federal court. As far as enforcing the statutory violations, I think clearly that's within your bailiwick. And as I said at the outset, Commissioner Tew, we are not contesting your jurisdiction to do that. We just think it is putting the cart before the horse.

I think, back to Commissioner Deason's question of what is the most efficient way to resolve this, typically I would defer to the court with the most comprehensive jurisdiction. And the federal court recognizes your experience and your expertise and your authority over your tariffs that you have approved. Allow the federal court to get the proceeding on track and then call on you at the appropriate tire to address these statutory violations, to address the access charges that are due under the tariff, et cetera. I think that is the more efficient and effective and productive way to proceed forward.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioner Deason.

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COMMISSIONER DEASON: I have a question for staff.

If we were to approve your recommendation and proceed, what is the time frame anticipated to process this case?

MR. TEITZMAN: Actually it would be moving along fairly quickly, Commissioner. We have scheduled next week an issue identification conference to identify the issues, and I would say that they are reserved this time because the order establishing procedure has not come out, but currently we have reserved a hearing date in December, the first half of December.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: You heard Mr. May indicate that there is an expedited process at the federal level. I guess it's the Western District, is that correct, for Missouri?

MR. MAY: Yes, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And that he anticipates that it would be fully concluded within 60 days. If that is correct, what is the harm in simply holding our proceeding in abeyance for at least 60 days, or until there is some type of an indication as to what the results are from the mandatory mediation proceeding?

MR. TEITZMAN: Commissioner, I don't know that there is a harm. Staff's main concern was making sure that because we're talking about intrastate traffic and charges, and because we are talking about specific Florida Statutes that Florida's

voice is heard on this matter. Therefore, if there is mediation, and it does, like Mr. May said, only take 60 days, I don't know that there would be a specific harm because the Commission could then still have the opportunity to address the issues raised in Embarq's complaint, and I guess we would see what would happen at the federal level, as well.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And if the end result of all of this is that there are additional access charges which -- intrastate access charges which must be paid, that amount is still going to be determined and is not going to effect the amount whether we add an additional 60 days to our proceeding, is that correct?

MR. TEITZMAN: As I understand it, there are late payment fees that I imagine would continue to accrue. So I think it would -- the 60 days would affect the amount, depending on what the Commission's final determination is, but if late payment fees are applicable, the 60 days would add to those.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So, in other words, the parties are going to be made whole whatever the decision is. The fact that there is a 60-day delay is not going to harm one party to the benefit or detriment of the other party.

MR. TEITZMAN: I do not believe so.

MR. HATCH: Madam Chair, may I follow up on Commissioner Tew's question earlier?

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Hatch.

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MR. HATCH: She seemed to be particularly interested in the state law claims and whether there is any federal jurisdiction to resolve those. There is essentially three core statutory claims that Embarq has raised in its complaint. The first one is we didn't pay sufficient access charges. That's the first one. The second one is that AT&T is in violation of 364.08, 364.09, and 364.10. The third one is that AT&T, by virtue of misreporting jurisdictional traffic splits, didn't pay sufficient regulatory assessment fees.

With respect to the first one on the access charges, clearly that's a legitimate complaint that they can file and they have made sufficient allegations to that. With respect to their statutory violations of 364.08, .09, and .10, those statutes no longer apply to IXCs since 2003 and the partial deregulation of IXCs. The only part of those statutory sections that apply to IXCs currently is 364.10. I think it's D and E or C and E. But those sections have only to do with Lifeline and that is not at issue here. So those statutory violations clearly as a matter of law can't stand.

The third one, which is regulatory assessment fee, I would respectfully submit that Sprint does not have standing to prosecute a complaint against AT&T for failure to pay regulatory assessment fee. The Commission may well have a bone to pick with us if we didn't pay a sufficient regulatory

assessment fee, but Sprint can't come in the door and file a complaint that says they didn't file enough regulatory assessment fee. That's strictly between the Commission and the carriers. If that is a legitimate basis for a complaint, then I can file the same complaint against Sprint saying they didn't pay enough regulatory assessment fees because they didn't report enough intrastate revenue through their access revenues that they should have gotten.

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More to the point, and this is really, I think, the irony of that allegation is that the revenue that we derived on an intrastate basis is based on intrastate access charges. That's how we reported it. The intrastate revenue or the interstate access charges are somewhere in the neighborhood of a penny a minute, and our revenue is based on those access charges. For example, in the case of prepaid cards, you look at the Sam's card. They are three cents a minute. So if we are going to take three cents a minute, report that at intrastate access rates, Sprint's access rates for the relevant time period are in the neighborhood of nine to ten cents a minute. So in a sense we are going backwards on our RAF fee. We would report revenue at three cents a minute, but because IXCs deduct access from the calculation of RAF, it would be something in the order of a negative five cents a minute that we would owe you, which means then technically you would owe us money for the RAF.

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Apparently Mr. Hatch is now arguing that Embarq's complaint fails to state a cause of action on certain issues. However, that was not an argument of rationale that was presented in its motion to dismiss, therefore, Sprint has not had an opportunity -- I'm sorry, Embarq. I knew I was going to do that at least once today. Embarq has not had an opportunity to review them and adequately respond. And it just sounds to me like Mr. Hatch is making AT&T's case that would be made in testimony and in its answer here in our discussion of this motion to dismiss, which is inappropriate.

MS. MASTERSON: Madam Chairman, may I respond?

I also, though, wanted to address Commissioner

Deason's question about prejudice to the parties if we delay.

Any delay is going to delay everything. Right now we have outstanding discovery requests that have already been deferred until the ruling on this motion today. So if you delay for 60 days, then AT&T won't even have been to begin responding to those discovery requests until after we see what the outcome of the mediation is. And that's going to put our testimony back, AT&T's testimony back, the hearing date back.

So what looks like just a 60-day delay ends up into what I believe would ultimately be a several month delay. And Embarq would just say why can't we go forward with this process? And if the issues are narrowed by the mediation or whatever, we can consider that at that time. I could

understand having testimony filing dates after the deadline for mediation to avoid the parties filing testimony on issues that might not be necessary, but not delaying the entire proceeding, particularly the discovery that we have outstanding.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioner Arriaga.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: Mr. Teitzman, I want to say first that I appreciate the effort that you have made and staff has made to preserve the jurisdiction of the Commission on certain issues. Those are issues that are very dear to me and permanently -- I'm looking over those specific issues.

I have a question regarding the private contracts that are alleged as part of this whole proceeding. Is your recommendation that we enforce contracts or that we just use the contracts to analyze the case? What specifically are you recommending regarding private contracts?

MR. TEITZMAN: Commissioner, it would be the latter, that we would interpret the contracts, but as correctly stated earlier, this Commission cannot enforce those contracts.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: So we are not looking to enforce any contract, but to use them in order to come up with a decision.

MR. TEITZMAN: They would be taken in as evidence, that's correct, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: May I continue?

Mr. May, you have introduced in your initial remarks

an additional item which seems to be reasonable at first. So, are you still using the same arguments to question the jurisdiction? I think my question would be what is it specifically that you question regarding the jurisdiction of this Commission in this proceeding, and why did you introduce a third item, and does it variate from your original arguments in the docket?

MR. MAY: To answer your last question first, the reason we introduced the third item was because the designation for mandatory mediation occurred after the pleadings had been filed in this case. Therefore, I thought it was important to bring that new development to the Commission's attention.

To your first question, Commissioner Arriaga, again, we are not claiming that the Commission does not have jurisdiction to enforce the access charge tariffs. What we're saying is that our affirmative defense, AT&T's affirmative defense to this complaint and to the federal court complaint has been and will be that Embarq and its predecessor, Sprint, have entered into a series of private settlement agreements which, if enforced, would preclude them or bar them from recovering these additional access charges.

As your counsel has already conceded and stated, you don't have the authority to enforce those private contracts.

Therefore, again, you are trying to -- I think you are put in a position of having to build a house with just a hammer. You

don't have all the tools necessary to construct a full and fair settlement. For that reason, again, I don't want to go too far on the jurisdictional issues, because I think for purposes of today, we recognize the jurisdiction of the Commission to address the access charge issues at the appropriate time. We are simply saying now is not the appropriate time. The more efficient course is to allow the mediation process to run through its processes, to conclude, and then determine whether you want to go forward with this case.

As I have said earlier, potentially all of these issues could go away in the mediation. If not, at least a lot of the issues will be ferreted out and the issues will be narrowed and so there will be a clear direction for this Commission to take in 60 days as opposed to where it is now.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: Let me address the last statement that you made. Let us assume that 60 days from now you have cleared -- let's say there are ten items to be cleared and three remain. I went back to square one again. You're going to come back here to this Commission and this whole docket is going to be repeated all over again, isn't it?

MR. MAY: I don't think so, because the docket is not going to be dismissed. What we are asking for is simply this docket to be held in abeyance or stayed, allow the mediation process to run its course, and if the issues are not resolved, then, reenergize this proceeding and move forward.

I disagree with counsel for Embarq in that as

Commissioner Deason pointed out and as counsel for the

Commission pointed out, interest is continuing to accrue on

these alleged outstanding amounts. The late payment penalties

continue to accrue. So the parties are going to be held

harmless. Embarq is going to be held harmless regardless of

whether this case is tried in December or whether this case is

tried before the Commission in February.

Again, I'm just asking for a mediation process to move forward and for you to recognize, as you have long recognized, the benefits of settlement discussions. We're simply asking you to allow this potential for settlement to run its course and hopefully resolve this matter short of litigation.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: One last question, please.

Mr. Teitzman, it has been stated that we should wait for the court decision in order to guide our actions. That is what I'm understanding, but at the same time I have heard staff in several opportunities say that the courts give a lot of deference to the decision that this Commission makes. So where is the horse and where is the cart? What is it? Is it the courts pay attention to us or we pay attention to the courts, or both? How does it work?

MR. TEITZMAN: Commissioner, it's a difficult question to answer. I think, as you have heard earlier, if

there were opposing decisions, it is a fairly uncertain area, so I really -- I can't give you a specific answer to that question, and I apologize for that. I think there is certainly a lot of uncertainty as to what would occur. As I stated earlier, staff's concern in addressing this motion and addressing this complaint is making sure that Florida's voice is heard. Will there be uncertainty if there is a different federal decision? I'm afraid the answer to that is probably yes, there is uncertainty, and I do not know what might take place at that point.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioner Tew.

COMMISSIONER TEW: I have a series of questions, if that's all right, maybe directed at different folks. My first question, I guess I will start with Mr. May. Is this mediation binding? I think the mediation is not, but --

MR. MAY: That's correct, Commissioner, it is not a binding mediation, but it is mandatory, and it is an interesting process. It's not an informal mediation by any stretch of the imagination. The local rules require that each principal have present during the mediation session a person who can actually make decisions and resolve all of the issues that are in dispute. Also, to the extent there are is any insurance coverage issues, the insurance carrier has to be present at the mediation. So this is not an informal kind of

loosey-goosey process. While it is not binding, it does set a structure, I believe, that would certainly facilitate settlement discussions among the parties.

COMMISSIONER TEW: And as a follow-up to that, and then I would like Ms. Masterton to address both questions, too. What if this mediation process doesn't get us any farther along? What would you suggest we do next?

MR. MAY: Is that directed to me, Commissioner Tew?

COMMISSIONER TEW: Yes.

MR. MAY: If the mediation process proves unsuccessful, I would hope that during the mediation process at least the parties would be able to agree on allocating these issues among the different forums so that you don't have duplicative efforts. The parties are not required to try the same case three different times in three separate forums.

Now, I have confidence that we will able to work through that process and arrive at an efficient mechanism to the extent that this dispute is not resolved. But if you are not able to reach an issues agreement or some kind of structure with respect to issues, then I think at that point in time this proceeding kicks back in and you move forward with the items that are within your jurisdiction.

Again, our concern is if you do that, and maybe this is getting ahead of the game here, but our concern is if you do that and we answer the complaint, our first affirmative defense

is Embarq is barred from recovering additional access charges by virtue of it entering into this series of private settlement agreements, which Mr. Teitzman has already indicated you can't enforce.

So you are back in the position where you are almost spinning your wheels. Again, that is why I'm hoping what I think the appropriate course to take would have the federal court take control of this proceeding and then call on the North Carolina Commission, call on the Florida Commission to say in a vacuum, assuming all other things being equal, what kind of access charges are owed here. And then the federal court could take that information and could offset it against some of the other contractual claims that it has the authority to enforce.

The federal courts do that all the time. They call on you. They specifically target issues and direct them to you for your consideration and your ruling. But to do that in advance of this mandatory mediation process, again, we believe is inefficient and would run counter to the longstanding policy of promoting settlement.

COMMISSIONER TEW: Before I ask Ms. Masterton to answer that question also, I was a little bit confused about something you said about if our proceeding kicks back in then you would make an argument that essentially Embarq would be barred from making certain claims here. So with your

alternative that you have proposed today to hold it in abeyance until the mandatory mediation at least concludes, are we essentially back to the original alternative to stay the whole proceeding because of the argument you just made? I mean, it sounds like we really -- or at least you'll make an argument that we won't be able to continue the case at that point if it's unsuccessful.

MR. MAY: Yes, ma'am. I really don't think that's the case. I think, the way I see things unfolding, if at the end of the mandatory mediation process things do not go as we hope and there is no resolution, we're back here, you could go forward and issue an order. But I don't think you could rule on our fundamental affirmative defense, so you would have to issue the order and couch it in terms of we have not been able to reach some of the fundamental threshold issues with respect to contract barred or claims being barred by contracts. But what we can tell you is setting those aside, if there is no bar, if there is no contractual bar, then AT&T would owe Embarq X or Embarq would owe AT&T X. I think that would be what would occur at that time. To me that would be the most efficient way to handle it.

COMMISSIONER TEW: So that argument is pertaining to the part where you're saying that this Commission can't determine the amount of interstate access that you may have already paid and that we can't determine that amount. That's

the --

MR. MAY: It really goes to your authority. It is really back to -- again, I'm repeating myself, I apologize, but it is back to our fundamental affirmative defense in this complaint and every other complaint, including the federal complaint, is that Embarq by entering into these settlement agreements with AT&T has waived its right to recover these additional access charges. And the only way we can have our day in court is for a tribunal to have the statutory or the authority to enforce those private agreements. And I think your counsel has already said you don't have that authority. So that is the dilemma we find ourselves in.

COMMISSIONER TEW: Ms. Masterton.

MS. MASTERSON: I'm sorry, could you repeat the first question because that was awhile ago and I want to make sure I got it.

COMMISSIONER TEW: The first question was is the mediation binding, and Mr. May said that it was not, but it was not an informal process, also. And you can speak to that. But then the follow-up was where will we be if the mandatory mediation doesn't resolve these issues, at least the ones that you brought before the Commission?

MS. MASTERSON: First, I agree with what Mr. May -how he described the mediation process. So basically if the
mediation -- AT&T is asking to delay it because they are saying

we might resolve the issues in mediation, or at least some of the issues in mediation. So if that didn't occur, we'd be back where Embarq thinks we should be and should continue to be and that is pursuing the Florida claims based on the Florida tariff and the Florida law in Florida.

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And I want to respectfully disagree with Mr. May's characterization that the Commission cannot rule on AT&T's affirmative defense. I believe it's clear that the Commission could take the provisions of any agreements that AT&T asserts are relevant into consideration in interpreting the tariff, how those agreements affect the implementation of the tariff. And if they determine that those agreements bar the application of the tariff, I believe that is fully within the jurisdiction of the Commission to decide.

What they can't do is if Sprint had made a claim for damages under the contract, the Commission does not have jurisdiction to rule on that. But that does not mean that the Commission cannot consider those contracts and interpret them as they relate to the claims that Embarg has made.

COMMISSIONER TEW: Something Mr. May said, too, about allocating the issues among the different forums, and I think that goes along with something Commissioner Deason mentioned earlier when he asked you if you, Ms. Masterton, if you had requested holding those issues with respect to Florida in abeyance in the federal proceeding. I guess I'll be putting

you on the spot, but would you consider holding those issues in abeyance?

MS. MASTERSON: I mean, to the extent that that would be something that the Commission would consider important, as to their decision whether to go forward with these claims, Embarq would consider that. We would like to ask that we would have an opportunity to discuss it. I couldn't make a representation today. I would have to discuss it with my clients and would ask that you defer your decision today and let us have an opportunity to do that if, in fact, that is the key issue as to whether you all decide to go forward with Embarq's complaint. I should say we are actually talking to our corporate people to try to get an answer, but I can't say that we will have something before you all have to make a decision today.

COMMISSIONER TEW: Okay. Well, maybe I can delay a little bit, ask some more questions. I have some questions specifically with regard to some things Mr. Hatch mentioned about 364.08, .09, and .10. And he pointed out that those statutory references do not apply to IXCs any longer. And my question for AT&T, whoever wants to answer it, because these statutes -- and I'll read a section of 364.08, which says a telecom company may not charge, demand, collect, or receive for any service rendered, or to be rendered any compensation other than the charge applicable to such services specified in its

schedule on file in effect at that time. And, of course, that is just a portion, and I realize we're not getting into the substantive issues too much today. But my question is could that requirement, and actually some of the other statutory references to me seem to sort of suggest that Embarq can't give certain deals to one entity that it doesn't provide to all of its customers. So could this situation that we are discussing today cause Embarq not to comply with Florida Statutes?

MR. HATCH: Technically, I think the answer is yes. I think the point of those statutes is it prohibits a carrier from doing things that are discriminatory. That's the thrust of all three of those sections. But the solution is not to file a complaint against the guy that got the benefit, the customer, if you will, to seek reimbursement for the benefit that was conferred. The solution is -- well, historically the solution would have been under rate base regulation to impute those revenues to the carrier and it all comes out even when you do calculate rates. And the carrier that violated the statute essentially is punished by imputation of the revenues.

In a competitive market where you don't do rate base regulation anymore, I think the solution for discriminatory conduct is to make the carrier give the same deal to everybody else. I mean, that's the real short answer to your question. But however you choose to proceed with it, it isn't the basis of the complaint against the customer.

COMMISSIONER TEW: Ms. Masterton, would you like to respond to that?

MS. MASTERSON: Embarq is alleging, yes, that derivatively AT&T, I suppose -- and I'm admitting this is a novel claim that I don't believe the Commission has considered yet, but we're saying that by its behavior and because Embarq itself could not know that it was giving AT&T the specific benefit due to the manner in which this occurred, that it caused Embarq to violate those statutes. And, yes, that the remedy for that would be to have AT&T pay the monies that should have been due to put it on the same playing field as all of the other carriers who were paying the appropriate fees.

COMMISSIONER TEW: I think I have one more, so hopefully someone is getting their answer.

Mr. May, you mentioned the release, and I don't fully understand it, so maybe if you could explain that a little bit more about the release in the settlement agreement you mentioned. But I guess my overall question is if there is a release that is so, in a sense, binding upon the decision that is made, why is there a reluctance to bring it here and point that out to us so that we can use that and make any determination about the interstate fees?

MR. MAY: There is absolutely no reluctance on our part to bring it to your attention. We'll certainly do that if you decide to move forward with this case. We have not yet

filed our answer to the complaint. We filed a motion to dismiss and, in the alternative, a request for abeyance. I would, again, submit to you that the order, the KMC order that is cited for the proposition by Embarq that you have the authority to interpret and apply these contracts, take a close look at that. That argument was raised, but at the end of the day what the Commission said was we do not have the authority to enforce private settlement agreements. And that is what we would be asking you to do. Not to interpret and apply, we would be asking you to enforce. Enforce our rights to bar Embarq from recovering these additional access charges. Again, at the appropriate time that will be an affirmative defense, if we are required to respond to the complaint, that will be affirmative defense number one to our answer.

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COMMISSIONER TEW: Itty-bitty, maybe.

I just want to clarify what you just said, and I guess the way to ask it is can't we look to the contract and determine whether it should apply to whatever issues we determine are necessary in this case before the Commission without enforcing the contract?

MR. MAY: I really don't think -- I mean, it's a fine line to me. Interpreting and applying and enforcing, that's a distinction without a difference. If you are going to interpret a contract and apply the contract that infringes or impinges upon the rights of a party under that contract, you're

enforcing the contract. And, in the KMC case, again, you didn't do that. What you did, you took the terms of that settlement agreement and you considered it as evidence as to whether there was a violation of an interconnection agreement which you had approved. That's not something that we would be asking you to do. We would be asking you to enforce our rights under that settlement agreement that would bar Embarq from recovering these additional charges.

COMMISSIONER TEW: That's the only thing, is if

Ms. Masterton wanted to reply to anything else. And then, I

guess, staff, too, if they wanted to reply to anything that I

had asked.

MS. MASTERSON: I mean, just to the issues of the settlement agreement. I mean, first, as we have said, that is a factual issue. It cannot be considered in determining whether to dismiss Embarq's complaint. In fact, we have positions as to the meaning of that settlement agreement that are contrary to AT&T positions. The agreement itself has confidentiality provisions that prohibit me from today going into detail about that, although I think we're going to have to work that issue out as we go forward on the confidentiality, but I don't feel free to get into the specifics of the agreement today.

But what you decided in the KMC complaint was actually very similar to this. KMC was alleging that a

settlement agreement was violated in addition -- a settlement agreement, in addition to the interconnection agreement terms, in asking the Commission to enforce that. The Commission said -- they dismissed the count relating to enforcing the settlement agreement, but said, "However, the dismissal of Count 4 does not prevent us from considering the settlement agreement as evidence in this current dispute." And I think the intent of that was in the very same fashion as what we would say with the settlement agreement would be, the role it would play in this dispute. And I'm aware of cases where those types of agreements have been raised as evidence and considered by the Commission in resolving disputes under either interconnection agreements -- well, interconnection agreements largely, but where settlement agreements have been considered by the Commission as evidence. And the Commission has not -and neither have parties objected to the Commission's ability to consider those agreements in reaching a decision.

Thank you.

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CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. May, did you have a brief follow-up?

MR. MAY: Just to conclude. Again, without getting into the weeds as far as what our positions will be in the future, we're asking the Commission to consider our third alternative, and that is simply to hold this proceeding in abeyance until the mandatory mediation runs its course, which

shouldn't be longer than 30 to 60 days. And at that time, just the potential benefits for that approach we think far outweigh any minor inconvenience that delay might cause. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Teitzman.

MR. TEITZMAN: Just real quick, Chairman. I would like to agree with Ms. Masterton's assessment that the contract is a factual matter that cannot sustain the motion to dismiss today. And I would also like to point out something important that Commissioner Tew mentioned, which is we don't even know what that contract says. We haven't seen it, we don't know what it applies to, so I just wanted to out that out, as well.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you.

Commissioner Carter.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Thank you, Madam Chair. For our legal staff just a couple of questions. This is the underlying matter with us, but there is also a federal case that has already been filed, correct?

MR. TEITZMAN: Yes, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: And in the federal case that has already been filed, they are operating under the law of the case, correct? The law of the case. When they file a case there is a law that applies, remember that procedure?

MR. TEITZMAN: Yes, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Good. And in that law of the case, there is a procedure that is employed by the case, the

courts, and under our local rules, or in this case based upon the Southern District of Missouri these are the procedures that we have employed. They may be local rules, and under the local rules one of the requirements is in this case mandatory mediation.

MR. TEITZMAN: (Indicating affirmatively.)

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Notwithstanding what we say or do here today, those rules still apply, am I correct?

MR. TEITZMAN: Yes, Commissioner.

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COMMISSIONER CARTER: Madam Chairman. About the only thing that what we do today would have an impact on is possibly the mediation process, at best?

MR. TEITZMAN: At best, yes.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioner Deason.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I have a question for Mr. Teitzman, and you may have already answered it in a previous response that you gave. But the question that I have is what is staff's understanding of the private settlement agreements? And I think you indicated you have not seen those, you have not reviewed them.

MR. TEITZMAN: Yes, I really couldn't comment specifically on them. I have not seen them. All I know is what I have read in the motion and the response.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Is the first instance where we

have seen a private settlement agreement somehow alter, amend, or change obligations under a tariff? I mean, it seems like it is a relatively new thing. I don't recall it before, but it may have happened.

MR. TEITZMAN: I'm not aware of it coming before this Commission previously.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me ask Ms. Masterton.

There are private settlement agreements that affect your rights or obligations under a tariff?

MS. MASTERSON: Well, Embarq is not conceding that, okay. I mean, we are not conceding that that settlement agreement does what AT&T is alleging that it does. That is what AT&T is saying that it does, we are not saying that that is the case.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, have you entered into a private settlement agreement which somehow addresses your obligations or rights under a tariff?

MS. MASTERSON: We entered into a settlement agreement that addressed issues in dispute not just in Florida, but it was a global settlement agreement related to the PIUs reported by AT&T for its traffic. There are parts of the settlement agreement that are directly relative to this dispute, and I guess with AT&T's permission, since they have raised the settlement agreement, I can breach the confidentiality and --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: No, I'm not asking you to do that, so please don't go there.

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MS. MASTERSON: We do not believe that the settlement agreement in any way overrides the tariff or our rights under the tariff.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And who is going to make that determination? Is that something that a federal court needs to determine?

MS. MASTERSON: I mean, we think this Commission can make that determination in applying our tariff, which is what we have asked you to do. If you believe that anything that we have agreed to in the settlement agreement precludes you from making that tariff determination we believe you have the ability to decide that.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: But you just said that agreement was a global agreement which interpreted the minutes of use allocations, I guess, between jurisdictions, between interstate and intrastate, is that correct?

MS. MASTERSON: No, it was a lot more complicated than that. In fact, the issues were actually addressed in the settlement agreement. The issues that were settled have nothing to do with this dispute, in Embarq's opinion, and that is what we will argue.

MR. COOKE: Madam Chairman.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Cooke.

MR. COOKE: I think the issue of the settlement agreement is raising a lot of questions. And just to be clear, maybe to break this down into actionable items, the primary issue to be addressed is whether AT&T has supported a motion to dismiss. And I think on that issue AT&T bears the burden of showing that there are not facts in question and that the complaint on its face does not state a cause of action.

So to the extent that the settlement agreement raises questions of fact, for example, then it will be my view that that burden hasn't been met. The issues on the abeyance, et cetera, is much more of a policy issue as to how to effectively and efficiently administer this process.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you, Mr. Cooke.

Commissioner Arriaga.

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introduced today was completely new to the record that I was reading before, and I welcome that, I really do, because it opens up a door. But nevertheless I think Embarq also deserves consideration and deserves a timely response from the Commission, and even from the courts. Can your proposal be tweaked so that it is not open ended until the mediation process takes place?

Because as a good attorney as you are, you know that we know when we go into court, but we don't know when we are going to get out. So my problem here is you say until the

mediation process ends, but it could end five months from now,
it could end 60 days from now. What if it doesn't end? I
would prefer to see something that says you need X amount of
days, and if you don't come to the mediation agreement you are
right back here where you started.

MR. MAY: May I consult with my client? (Pause.)
Commissioner Arriaga, I will amend my proposal. We

Commissioner Arriaga, I will amend my proposal. We feel confident enough to say that within 60 days there will be a conclusion to the mediation. So we would ask no more than 60 days for this proceeding to be abated to allow that process to run its course. And, again, you know, if it's not finished in 60 days, we will take our medicine, but we feel confident that it will be concluded within 60 days.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: Okay.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioners, further questions?

Commissioner Tew.

COMMISSIONER TEW: I was wondering if we had an answer on that earlier question of Embarq?

MS. MASTERSON: No. No answer today. Although, as I said, we could offer, you know, to further pursue that and ask that this be deferred while we determine whether that's a viable option for us.

COMMISSIONER TEW: But not 60 days?

MS. MASTERSON: Not 60 days.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioners, we have had good

discussion and questions. Is there further discussion or a question at this time?

Commissioner Deason.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Madam Chairman, I agree that the motion to dismiss should be denied. But at the same time, I think there is a legitimate question as to whether we should abate this proceeding for 60 days to at least get the benefit of whatever may be the result of the mandatory mediation proceeding. I just think it may be a wise use of resources and time. And when I say abated, that would mean discovery. We would just simply abate the proceeding for 60 days, and then at the end of the 60 days, I believe the parties would be free or staff would be free to advise us of the status of the mediation proceeding and we would be better advised as to how to proceed from that point forward.

So, I guess I would -- on Issue 2, I guess I would agree with staff that we would deny the motion to dismiss, but that we would abate the proceeding here for 60 days.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioner Tew.

COMMISSIONER TEW: I don't know if this is actually a request for an amendment in any way, but I just wanted to try something. Mr. May said earlier something that caught my attention. I think I already asked a question about it earlier about allocating the issues among the different forums. And I think within that 60 days, I think, of course, they will be

working together through the mandatory mediation process anyway, and I think he was suggesting that during that process that they hope that that would be an outcome.

and I would like to encourage that outcome and for each party to get clear, at least in their minds, and hopefully an agreement collectively, which issues they want to bring here and which issues need to go to federal court. And if there are filings that need to be made in each forum to make that clear, to consider that. And I don't know if that is really an amendment to the motion or not, or a request for a friendly amendment to the motion.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: If that is an amendment, it is certainly acceptable to me.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Teitzman.

MR. TEITZMAN: It might assist staff if the Commission was to require the parties to file a status report on the 60th day from this decision. Each party could then file the status report on the mediation.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: If that is an amendment, that is agreeable to me, as well.

MR. TEITZMAN: Thank you, Commissioner.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioner Arriaga.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: It's a question of the motion, Madam Chair. Commissioner Deason, I just want to clarify. Is your motion saying that if at the 60th day after the filing has

motion, the Commission's own motion we are going to abate the proceeding for 60 days and require a status report at the conclusion of the 60 days addressing the mandatory mediation proceedings. And we will then make a decision as to how we proceed.

And, Commissioner Tew, I will let you offer your amending language to that basic motion.

COMMISSIONER TEW: I think I would add that we strongly encourage that the parties make their best effort to allocate issues among the different forums and make whatever filings they deem appropriate to get us there.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Okay. Commissioners, I think this is where we are as of almost 11:00 o'clock. We have a motion to deny the motion to dismiss, to abate this proceeding for 60 days with a status report to come in at the end of that 60 days addressing the mandatory mediation proceedings that will be going on, and a direction from this Commission encouraging the parties to allocate issues by forum for clarification and hopefully efficiency.

With that being the motion, we had a second that stands. Is there further discussion? Okay. Seeing none, all in favor of the motion say aye.

(Unanimous affirmative vote.)

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Opposed?

Show the motion carried.

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been done as requested by staff, mediation is still going on, does that mean that we cannot continue the proceeding?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: No, no, it's just 60 days. It is not contingent upon there being a result from the mediation at all, that we are just going to abate for 60 days and get a status report filed by the parties at the conclusion of the 60 days and then we can assess where we go from that point forward.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: Thank you, Commissioner.

Then I would second the motion with all the amendments that have been discussed.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioners, we have a lengthy motion and we do have a second. Is there discussion or further clarification?

Commissioner Tew.

COMMISSIONER TEW: I'm just seeing confusion over to my left with all the amendments we added, and I'm not sure I can piece it together again. Perhaps if Commissioner Deason could try his part, I can perhaps better word my part and add in staff's.

COMMISSIONER ARRIAGA: We are going to miss you, Commissioner Deason. We are going to miss you.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: The motion simply was to approve staff's recommendation to deny the AT&T motion to dismiss. It fails. But we are going to, perhaps on our own

We need to address Issue 3, which would be to close 1 2 the docket, and administratively the docket will need to remain 3 open per the motion that we just passed. Do I have a motion to that effect? 4 COMMISSIONER CARTER: So moved. 5 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Second. 6 CHAIRMAN EDGAR: A motion and a second. All in favor 7 8 say aye? (Unanimous affirmative vote.) 9 CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Opposed? Show the motion carried. 10 And that concludes --11 MS. MASTERSON: Madam Chairman, could I just ask --12 13 CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Ms. Masterton. 14 MS. MASTERSON: -- a procedural question about the 15 effect of what you all just did. We have an order outstanding 16 that made AT&T's -- our discovery to AT&T due 14 days after the 17 ruling on this motion today. Would this 60 days toll that, and 18 then the 14 days would run at the end of the 60-day period? that how --1.9 2.0 CHAIRMAN EDGAR: That is my understanding, but I'm 21 going to ask Mr. Cooke to please address your question. MR. COOKE: Based on what I understood of the motion, 22 23 you are holding everything in abeyance, so it would toll that

MS. MASTERSON: Thank you.

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period.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Okay. Thank you, Ms. Masterton. That concludes our discussions on Item 3. Let's take kind of an informal five minutes to regroup, and then we will come back in approximately five minutes and begin for Item 4.

1 STATE OF FLORIDA 2 CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER 3 COUNTY OF LEON 4 5 I, JANE FAUROT, RPR, Chief, Hearing Reporter Services Section, FPSC Division of Commission Clerk and Administrative 6 Services, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceeding was 7 heard at the time and place herein stated. 8 IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that I stenographically reported the said proceedings; that the same has been transcribed under my direct supervision; and that this 9 transcript constitutes a true transcription of my notes of said proceedings. 10 I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee, 11 attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor am I a relative or employee of any of the parties' attorney or counsel 12 connected with the action, nor am I financially interested in the action. 13 DATED THIS 5th day of September, 2006. 14 15 16 JANE FAUROT, RPR Official FPSC Hearings Reporter 17 FPSC Division of Commission Clerk and Administrative Services 18 (850) 413-6732 19 20 21 2.2 23 24

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