BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION DOCKET NO. 080317-EI

IN RE: TAMPA ELECTRIC COMPANY'S

PETITION FOR AN INCREASE IN BASE RATES

AND MISCELLANEOUS SERVICE CHARGES



OF
DIANNE S. MERRILL

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REBUTTAL TESTIMONY AND EXHIBIT

OF

DIANNE S. MERRILL

FPSC-COMMISSION CLERK

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 1 REBUTTAL TESTIMONY 3 OF 4 DIANNE S. MERRILL 5 Please state your name, business address, occupation, and Q. 6 7 employer. 8 My name is Dianne S. Merrill. My business address is 702 9 A. North Franklin Street, Tampa, Florida 33602. 10 Ι am employed by Tampa Electric Company ("Tampa Electric" or 11 "company") as Director, Staffing and Development. 12 13 Are you the same Dianne S. Merrill who filed direct 14 testimony in this proceeding? 15 16 17 Α. Yes I am. 18 19 Q. What is the purpose of your rebuttal testimony? 20 A. purpose of my rebuttal testimony is to address 21 22 serious errors and shortcomings in the prepared direct 23 testimonies of Helmuth W. Schultz, III, testifying on behalf of the Citizens of the State of Florida and Jeffry 24 Pollock, testifying on behalf of the Florida Industrial 25 DOCUMENT NUMBER-DATE

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Power Users Group. 1 2 3 Q. Have you prepared an exhibit supporting your rebuttal testimony? 4 5 A. Yes I have. I am sponsoring Rebuttal Exhibit No. (DSM-2), consisting of two documents, prepared by me or under 7 my direction and supervision. These consist of: 8 Document No. 1 2007 BENVAL Study - Defined Contribution Document No. 2 2007 BENVAL Study - Defined Benefit and 10 Defined Contribution 11 12 Please summarize the key concerns and disagreements you 13 Q. have regarding the substance of Messrs. Schultz 14 Pollock's testimony. 1.5 16 My key concerns and disagreements with Messrs. Schultz 17 A. and Pollock's testimonies relate to their conclusions 18 1) certain costs in 19 the company's incentive 20 compensation plan should be excluded, 2) the 401(k) fixed 21 expense should be reduced, and 3) stock 22 compensation should be excluded from cost of service. 23 24 Q. What is Tampa Electric's compensation philosophy?

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- Tampa Electric's philosophy is to provide a compensation Α. system that aligns with business strategies and offers competitive rewards for outstanding accomplishments toward the success of the organization. Total compensation is designed to be competitive so that the company can attract and retain the most qualified individuals.
- Q. Please describe Tampa Electric's compensation plan.

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A. For all employees of Tampa Electric, there are two parts of compensation; base salary, which is the fixed portion of total compensation and short-term incentive, which is the cash portion of compensation that is "at risk". The company targets total compensation at the 50th percentile when comparing external market data to similar company positions.

key employees, officers and there is а third component, long-term incentive, which is the portion of total compensation. The company considers these components to be key elements of its total rewards plan, which also includes other benefits such as health life insurance benefits. care and Each of these components plays an important role in enabling Tampa

Electric to remain competitive with other companies seeking to attract similarly qualified employees.

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Q. Please describe the company's three short-term employee incentive plans.

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A. Tampa Electric has three types of incentive plans; an officer short-term incentive plan, a key employee short-term incentive plan, and a general employee short-term incentive plan known as Success Sharing.

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The officer's short-term incentive plan provides consistent framework for applying annual incentive pay to officers of Tampa Electric. Each participant is assigned target award amount, expressed as a percentage of annual base salary. The target award levels are established at a level that, when combined with each participant's base salary, provides a competitive total cash compensation opportunity. The incentive portion reflects compensation "at risk" which is directly related to performance and results achieved. Performance is measured, in part, against a combination of quantifiable financial and operational goals. Each participant has a "business plan" goal, which reflects the participant's contribution to achieving initiatives in support of the

business plan and overcoming any business changes by mitigating the impact of unexpected adverse business developments or enhancing profitability through effective management initiatives beyond the business plan.

The key employee short-term incentive plan works virtually identically to the incentive plan for officers. As with officers, key employees have both financial and operational goals.

The general employee short-term incentive plan is known as Success Sharing and it is available to all other employees working at least 20 hours per week. For 2008, the plan is comprised of customer-focused operational and financial goals. The maximum payout percentage is applied to the higher of the employee's total earnings or job market value for the calendar year.

The incentive plans put a portion of employees' compensation "at risk". This means that if performance goals are not met, the payout is not made. If certain performance results are achieved, a predictable award will be earned based upon objective criteria. The actual amount of the award depends upon the achieved results.

All of the incentive plans are designed to emphasize key operational and financial goals; link pay with business and personal contributions to results; performance achieve high levels of motivate participants to performance; and reinforce desired business behaviors and Incentive plans such as these encourage cost control and resource optimization, both of which benefit customers. While there is no empirical evidence to support it, the company attributes its incentive plans to helping manage costs for so long without a base rate increase and to performing favorably under the Commission's O&M benchmark.

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Q. On page 7, lines 1 through 3 of his direct testimony, Mr. Schultz claims that the company has failed to document the need to include incentive pay above employee base salaries to retain or motivate its employees. Do you agree?

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A. No, I do not agree. Incentive pay is a key component of total compensation. The company uses market data and benchmarking results for similarly situated companies to measure the competitiveness of its compensation. In a time when the electric industry is facing workforce challenges while numerous industry-wide initiatives are

required, it is critical for Tampa Electric to attract and retain talented individuals. Its total compensation plan, including incentive compensation, is designed to do so.

Q. How does the company determine reasonable and appropriate compensation levels?

A. The company uses market data and benchmarking results to measure the competitiveness of its compensation. For each company position, it matches essential job functions to those found in external market surveys. These same surveys show that incentive compensation programs like Tampa Electric's are commonly used by similarly situated companies. Based on the World At Work 2008/2009 Annual Salary Budget Survey, over 80 percent of the 2,375 companies surveyed use an incentive pay program.

Incentive compensation plans are not new. In fact, Tampa Electric's Success Sharing plan has been in place since 1990 and its appropriateness was approved by the Commission in the company's last rate case in 1992. In Gulf Power Company's ("Gulf") most recent base rate proceeding (Docket No. 010949-EI), Mr. Schultz made similar arguments about their incentive compensation plan

as he does about Tampa Electric's, but the Commission did not agree with him and made no adjustment. The Commission noted that Gulf offers a plan consisting of base salary and incentive compensation and that only receiving a base salary would mean Gulf employees would be compensated below employees at other companies. I am not familiar with the details of their plan, their approach to utilize market data appears to be similar. One apparent difference is that Gulf's philosophy is to 75th percentile the pay employees at while Tampa Electric's is to target the 50th percentile.

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Q. Would Tampa Electric need to consider restructuring its total compensation package if any incentive compensation expenses were excluded?

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Α. Yes. Tampa Electric would need to consider raising base salaries while decreasing or eliminating the "at-risk" incentive compensation component. It is inappropriate to single out the incentive component of an employee's total compensation for scrutiny just because it is called "incentive" compensation. Tampa Electric's total compensation package, including the portion that contingent on achieving incentive goals, is set near the median level of benchmarked compensation, which is the

relevant level of cost that should be considered for ratemaking purposes. Accepting Mr. Shultz's recommendation to disallow incentive compensation would adversely affect the company's ability to compete in attracting and retaining a high quality and skilled workforce. Otherwise, total compensation would be below the median for comparable jobs. Under this scenario, it would not be reasonable to expect that the company could continue to attract and retain quality employees.

Using incentive compensation programs is less costly than increasing base salaries because incentive compensation is "at risk" and, by definition, not guaranteed. The "at risk" component motivates employees to perform at high levels and results in more efficiency, which translates to direct benefits for the company's customers.

Q. On page 7, lines 13 and 14 of his direct testimony, Mr. Schultz claims that the goals set by the company and the determination of eligibility payments under the plan are seriously flawed, particularly from a ratemaking and ratepayer prospective. Do you agree?

A. No. Although it is not clear from Mr. Schultz's testimony which plan he is referencing, his examples

relate to Success Sharing goals. The goals established each year to focus the organization on the operational customer-oriented most important and The goals are designed to financial challenges. still measurable and attainable but represent significant challenge to achieve. The goal setting process includes a review of historical results achievements, the challenges of the goal the applicability to the upcoming year's operational financial objectives. The goals are set to have a reasonable chance of achievement while requiring efforts that challenge the organization's employees and balance the cost to provide targeted levels of service. goals have been appropriately set and have helped Tampa Electric accomplish overall operational and financial objectives over the years.

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Q. Describe in more detail how Success Sharing goals are currently structured.

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A. The maximum annual payout under Success Sharing is 12 percent; five percent is tied to customer-focused operational goals, five percent is tied to Tampa Electric net income, and two percent is tied to TECO Energy net income. The two net income goals are self-funding.

Tampa Electric witness Jeffrey Chronister describes what is meant by "self-funding" in his rebuttal testimony.

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Q. Mr. Schultz asserts the company's operational goals and targets, specifically related to customer favorability, SAIDI, safety and environmental, are set so that employees are not required to improve performance in order to receive payout. How do you respond to this?

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As I stated above, the goals are set to have a reasonable A. chance of achievement but require focus on all employees' parts and require them to achieve high levels performance given all of the other operational financial challenges before them. The targets and goals are not driven by continuous improvement as Mr. Schultz suggests they should be but instead are focused providing quality service for customers. If the goals and targets were set to focus on continuous improvement year over year, the cost of providing service would be significantly higher than what the company is currently proposing in this proceeding.

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The goal setting process is not taken lightly by the company and there are numerous factors that go into setting goals and targets each year, including past

achievements, organizational changes, and system enhancements. In the rebuttal testimony of Tampa Electric witness Regan Haines, he explains the types of factors that have impacted the SAIDI goal over the past years.

Q. On pages 9 and 10 of his direct testimony, Mr. Schultz claims that the company failed to achieve its target for five of the seven Success Sharing goals in 2003. He also claims that two of seven goals were not achieved in 2004, five of seven goals were not achieved in 2005, two of seven goals were not achieved in 2006 and two of seven goals were not achieved in 2006 and two of seven goals were not achieved in 2007; yet, despite the fact that goals were not achieved in each of the five years, the company still expensed and paid 18 to 49 percent more than the target level of incentive compensation budgeted during the years 2004 through 2007. Is this true?

A. It is unclear what data Mr. Schultz used to derive his conclusion, but his assertion is incorrect. For 2002 and 2003 when eligible employees could earn up to 10 percent incentive compensation, payout was 9.25 to 10 percent and 3.83 to 4.43 percent, respectively. For 2004 through 2007 when the maximum achievement was 12 percent, actual payout was 4.94 percent, 6.03 percent, 4.86 percent and

6.41 percent, respectively.

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Q. Mr. Schultz also asserts that the 2005 Success Sharing results showed that the company failed to meet five of seven targets (safety, environmental, SAIDI, cost recovery clauses, and Tampa Electric net income), yet its incentive compensation expense was more than 49 percent above the target incentive amount. Is this true and if so, does it mean that the incentive plan is flawed or that the related costs should be excluded from the company's cost of service?

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A. is not true. In 2005, when the maximum achievement was 12 percent, the payout was only 6.03 The incentive plan is not flawed and the costs related to the plan are appropriately included calculation of the company's revenue requirement for the test year.

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Q. On page 12, lines 6 through 8 of his direct testimony,
Mr. Pollock claims that any Success Sharing "payout to
all participants is zero if TECO Energy's income
threshold set for that year by the Compensation Committee
is not achieved." Is this correct?

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A. No. The Success Sharing payout is not contingent upon TECO Energy achieving certain financial goals. If the TECO Energy net income goal is not met, two percent of the eligible 12 percent is not paid.

Q. Messrs. Pollock and Schultz assert that only 50 percent of the Success Sharing payout should be included in operating expenses because both shareholders and ratepayers benefit equally. Do you agree?

A. No, I do not agree. The Success Sharing operational and financial performance measures are heavily weighted toward providing benefits to customers. They promote safety, reliable service, cost containment and financial soundness of Tampa Electric among other things. The entire amount of this program should be allowed because it is designed to achieve favorable customer results.

- Q. Describe in more detail how the 2008 officer and key employee short-term incentive plan goals are structured.
- A. Tampa Electric officers' short-term incentive plan consists of 60 percent financial and 40 percent operational goals. Two thirds of the financial goals are focused on Tampa Electric net income with the remainder

on TECO Energy results. For key employees, 50 percent of their goals are operational and 50 percent are financial. Seventy percent of the financial goals are focused on Tampa Electric net income with the remainder on TECO Energy results.

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Q. Mr. Pollock recommends 100 percent disallowance of officer and key employee short-term incentive plan expense because "those payments are contingent upon TECO Energy achieving a specific level of net income." Is he correct and is his recommendation appropriate?

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Α. is not correct and the recommendation is not appropriate. While officers' payout is contingent upon TECO Energy achieving certain financial results, employee payout is not and the overall focus of both programs remains on Tampa Electric's operational financial results. Participants in these plans help ensure the company's goals of providing customers with safe and reliable service. The participants also focus on ensuring an adequate return to shareholders. Both of these objectives benefit the ratepayers. directly benefits ratepayers who rely on electric service to meet their needs and the second indirectly benefits ratepayers by having a company that is able to attract

needed capital at a reasonable cost to provide safe and reliable service. If the Commission were to agree with Mr. Pollock on a policy basis, which it should not, the amount of incentive compensation expense included in the 2009 test year associated with TECO Energy's financial performance is only about eight percent, not 100 percent as he proposes. Mr. Chronister addresses this in more detail in his rebuttal testimony.

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Q. Please describe the company's long-term incentive compensation plan.

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A. The company's long-term incentive plan is another component of officers' key employees' and total compensation packages. Through stock awards, company's plan is designed to reward long-term company and individual success and, as such, it is used as a retention tool. For eligible employees, the company awards a mix of 70 percent performance and 30 percent time-vested restricted shares based on an annual market review conducted by outside consultants that compares the value of the grants to salary levels to determine the appropriate award amounts. The company's performance must be strong and employees must remain employed by the company for the duration of the vesting period to be

eligible for any possible payout.

For performance restricted shares, the company's performance is measured against a set of peer companies. The performance measurement period is three years and the award depends on the company's total return as compared to other peer companies. Performance-based restricted stock vests anywhere from zero to 150 percent of the grant amount.

Unlike performance restricted shares, time-vested restricted shares are not measured against TECO Energy total shareholder return but are used solely as a retention tool. The eligible employee must be employed at the end of a three-year vesting period in order to receive payment of these shares.

Q. On page 16, lines 3 through 9 of his direct testimony,

Mr. Pollock proposes that the cost associated with

performance and time-vested restricted stock be removed

from cost of service. Do you agree?

A. No I do not. The long-term incentive program is part of
Tampa Electric's total compensation package and it
specifically allows the company to retain some of its key

talent. Accordingly, the associated costs are appropriately included in its cost of service.

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Q. Mr. Schultz asserts that effective April 2007, the fixed company match for the 401(k) plan was increased from 30 to 50 cents and it is not appropriate for the company to increase the contribution to its employees' second retirement plan. Do you agree?

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Α. No, I do not agree. In April 2007, Tampa Electric did change the company fixed match from 30 cents to 50 cents to be more comparable to other utilities. Towers Perrin's 2007 Energy Services BENVAL study, the employer contribution aspect of TECO Energy's 401(k) plan ranked fourth from the bottom and significantly below the The study also illustrates that the industry average. majority of companies in the "Energy Services" category have a defined benefit plan along with a contribution plan. Among companies providing both a defined benefit plan and a defined contribution plan, TECO Energy is still next to last among "Energy Services" companies. These results are shown in Documents No. 1 and 2 in my rebuttal exhibit.

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Q. On page 16, lines 3 through 7 of his direct testimony,

Mr. Schultz criticizes the studies used to justify the company's level of employee benefits. He claims they reflect a limited sample of companies. Do you agree and is it relevant that the surveys do not reflect the small companies that offer limited health care and/or retirement plans or do not offer any health care or retirement plans?

A. I do not agree and Mr. Schultz is incorrect. The BENVAL Study is used by a wide range of peer companies to benchmark benefits. Forty-nine energy services companies participated in the 2007 Energy Services BENVAL Study. Of those 49 companies, 16 were benchmarked against TECO Energy, Inc. These 16 companies were selected for comparison based on similar revenue ranges. To benchmark the company against small companies that are not in the utility industry and without comparative benefits would not provide meaningful information to determine the reasonableness and competitiveness of overall benefits.

Q. Do you agree that a 40 percent downward adjustment for 401(k) expense should be made to adjust for a "special add on"?

A. No. The company's change in its fixed match contribution

from 30 to 50 cents is not a "special add on". It was an adjustment to get its plan closer to industry market value. His recommended disallowance is totally improper.

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Q. On page 18 of his direct testimony, Mr. Schultz claims that employee medical costs may not reflect a proper level of employee contributions. Do you agree?

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Α. Document No. 8 of Exhibit No. (DSM-1) in my direct testimony illustrates that Tampa Electric's medical cost per employee in 2007 was \$6,377 compared to the national average of \$7,983. The company attributes this favorable result to successful cost strategies including designing employee contribution amounts that encourage cost-effective plan selections through annual adjustments and indexing of deductibles, co-payments and out-of-pocket amounts. The company's level of expense for employee healthcare is reasonable and prudent.

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Q. Please summarize your rebuttal testimony.

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A. The criticisms raised by the intervenors regarding Tampa Electric's compensation and benefits are without merit and none of their proposed adjustments are warranted.

Total compensation, which includes short and long-term incentive plans, is designed to be competitive so that the company can attract and retain the most qualified individuals. Incentive compensation includes customer-focused operational and financial goals. The company's total compensation plan and benefits are set at a level that is comparable with the market. The associated expenses are reasonable, prudent and appropriately reflected in the 2009 test year budget.

Q. Does this conclude your rebuttal testimony?

A. Yes, it does.

TAMPA ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 080317-EI

WITNESS: MERRILL

REBUTTAL EXHIBIT NO.___ (DSM-2)

REBUTTAL EXHIBIT

OF

DIANNE S. MERRILL

TAMPA ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 080317-EI WITNESS: MERRILL

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
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WITNESS: MERRILL

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Source: Energy Services Towers Perrin - Revenue Grouping B


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
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
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