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July 5, 2013

-VIA HAND DELIVERY -

Ms. Ann Cole, Director Division of the Commission Clerk and Administrative Services Florida Public Service Commission 2540 Shumard Oak Blvd Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850

Re: **Docket No. 130009-EI**

Dear Ms. Cole:

Please find enclosed for filing in the above referenced docket the original and fifteen (15) copies of the rebuttal testimony and exhibits of the following Florida Power & Light Company witnesses: T. Jones; S. Sim; J. Reed, Concentric Energy Advisors; T. Deason, Radey Thomas Yon and Clark.

If there are any questions regarding this transmittal, please contact me at 561-304-5253.

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Sincerely, Rynne D. Goame

Bryan S. Anderson Fla. Authorized House Counsel No. 219511 Admitted in IL, Not Admitted in FL

Enclosures Counsel for Parties of Record (w/encl.) cc:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE DOCKET NO. 130009-EI

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing rebuttal testimony of Terry Jones, Steven Sim, John Reed, and Terry Deason was served by overnight delivery this 5th day of July, 2013 to the following:

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By:

Bryan S. Anderson Fla. Authorized House Counsel No. 219511 Admitted in IL, Not Admitted in FL

BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. 130009-EI FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

IN RE: NUCLEAR POWER PLANT COST RECOVERY AMOUNT FOR THE YEAR 2014

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF:

JOHN J. REED

1		BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
2		FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
3		REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF JOHN J. REED
4		DOCKET NO. 130009
5		July 5, 2013
6		
7	Q.	Please state your name and business address.
8	A.	My name is John J. Reed. My business address is 293 Boston Post Road West,
9		Marlborough, Massachusetts 01752.
10	Q.	Have you previously filed direct testimony in this proceeding?
11	А.	Yes, I have.
12	Q.	Please state the purpose of your rebuttal testimony.
13	А.	I have been asked by Florida Power & Light Company ("FPL" or the
14		"Company") to respond to the direct testimony of William Jacobs, Jr., and
15		specifically Witness Jacobs' recommendation that the Florida Public Service
16		Commission (the "Commission") disallow \$200 million of Extended Power
17		Uprate ("EPU") project (i.e., EPUs at Turkey Point ("PTN") and St. Lucie
18		("PSL"), which I refer to as the "EPU Project" or the "Project") costs incurred
19		by FPL.
20	Q.	Please summarize your conclusions regarding the direct testimony of
21		OPC Witness Jacobs.
22	А.	It is my opinion that Witness Jacobs' recommendation to disallow \$200 million
23		of EPU Project costs is inconsistent with both a reasonable application of the
24		prudence standard (as described in my direct testimony in this proceeding and

1 further in my rebuttal testimony) and the scope of this proceeding. Specifically, 2 Witness Jacobs' recommendation to disallow \$200 million is not linked to any 3 imprudent decision or action by the Company in 2012 (i.e., the period of review 4 in this proceeding) or in any other period. A reasonable application of the 5 prudence standard involves evaluating decisions and actions, and, if there is a 6 finding of imprudence, quantifying the cost impact that can be attributed to 7 those decisions and actions. Witness Jacobs has not done that and simply relies 8 on a results-oriented analysis to create a recommended disallowance.

9 The prudence standard also requires an exclusion of hindsight. Wimess 10 Jacobs, however, embraces rather than excludes hindsight from his evaluation, as 11 he performs a review of the EPU Project based on information that was not 12 available at the time FPL had to make its decisions, and uses the results of that 13 approach to question decisions made by FPL as far back as 2007 (i.e., the year 14 FPL decided to undertake the EPU Project). All of FPL's decisions that 15 occurred prior to 2012 were previously reviewed by the Commission, and were 16 found to be reasonable. Witness Jacobs recounts how all of his previous 17 challenges to those actions were found by the Commission to be without merit, 18 but he attempts to revisit those recommendations, and reverse the Commission's 19 prior findings, based solely on the fact that the Project has turned out to cost 20 more than expected. That is the epitome of reliance on hindsight. For that 21 reason, among others, I conclude that the Commission should reject Witness 22 Jacobs' recommendation to disallow \$200 million of EPU Project costs.

I also disagree with Wimess Jacobs' suggestions that excluding sunk costs
from forward-looking feasibility analyses is a flawed approach, and that the PTN

and PSL uprates should be evaluated on a separate, stand-alone basis. I note that both of these arguments by Wimess Jacobs have been rejected by the Commission in the past. The Company's assessment of the economic feasibility of the EPU Project must only focus on avoidable expenses and must ignore sunk or unavoidable costs that have already been incurred. In addition, because of the high levels of joint costs and project interdependence, the EPU Project is best considered on an integrated basis as a single project.

8 Q. Please briefly describe the testimony that was filed by Witness Jacobs that 9 you will address in your Rebuttal Testimony.

10 А. In his direct testimony, Witness Jacobs reviewed and evaluated FPL's request for 11 authority to collect historical and projected costs associated with the EPU 12 Project and FPL's new nuclear project. Winness Jacobs accepts the charges 13 incurred by FPL for the new nuclear project. He recommends, however, a 14 disallowance associated with the EPU Project. Witness Jacobs assessed the 15 economic feasibility of the EPU modifications at PTN and PSL on separate 16 bases and concluded that the EPU modifications at PTN are uneconomic. 17 Witness Jacobs recommends an arbitrary disallowance of \$200 million, which he 18 asserts at page 27 of his testimony "provides only partial protection to the 19 ratepayers" based on the difference between Witness Jacobs' assessment of 20 actual spending at PTN in 2012 and the estimate provided by the Company in 21 April 2012. As discussed earlier, Winess Jacobs does not identify any specific 22 decision that led to this \$200 million of "disallowed" cost as having been 23 imprudent, and he has not tied this amount to any excess costs based on what he 24 believes would have been an alternative prudent decision.

- Q. Witness Jacobs implies on page 24 of his testimony that FPL's decision to
 undertake the PTN EPU was imprudent. Is that decision relevant to this
 proceeding?
- 4 A. No. FPL's decision to undertake the EPU Project, including modifications at 5 PTN, was approved by the Commission over five years ago in the certificate of 6 need filing in Docket No. 070602-EI.¹ Since that time, the Commission has 7 approved FPL's request to recover all of its prudently-incurred costs through the 8 annual Nuclear Cost Recovery Clause ("NCRC") proceedings. Wimess Jacobs 9 therefore suggests that the Commission essentially reverse former prudence 10 findings, which I believe is both unfounded and inconsistent with NCRC rules 11 and basic ratemaking principles.
- Q. Witness Jacobs asserts that the PTN EPU was uneconomic in 2012, which
 suggests the project should have been abandoned. Does Witness Jacobs
 demonstrate that FPL should have abandoned the PTN EPU in 2012?

15 A. No, nor could he. In 2012, at such a late stage in the implementation process of 16 a mega project such as the EPU Project, there would typically be very few 17 remaining costs that were truly avoidable. As stated in my direct testimony, at 18 page 20, in late 2012 the Engineering Analysis Phase of the EPU Project was 19 completed, the Long Lead Equipment Procurement Phase and the Engineering 20 Design Modification Phase were essentially completed, and the Implementation 21 Phase of the EPU Project was well underway and nearing completion. At that 22 point, therefore, the vast majority of the EPU Project costs were either spent 23 (*i.e.*, sunk costs), or unavoidable (*i.e.*, unspent but contractually obligated). In my 24 direct testimony, I described the steps FPL took to control costs in the late

1 stages of the Project, including incorporation of lessons learned from earlier 2 outages into the design, engineering, and implementation of subsequent outages, 3 and the re-assignment of work scope from the Engineering, Procurement, and 4 Construction ("EPC") vendor to other, qualified specialist firms in order to 5 efficiently manage the multiple outages, along with rigorous oversight and 6 management of those vendors. Witness Jacobs fails to address those decisions 7 and actions by the Company. Instead, he focuses on the end result with no 8 analysis of the challenges faced by FPL in implementing the EPU Project and the 9 Company's response to those challenges.

10 Q. Is Witness Jacobs correct to assess the prudence of FPL's decision to
11 undertake and complete the PTN uprate based solely on the final cost of
12 the project?

13 A. No. Witness Jacobs concludes that the PTN EPU is uneconomic based on his 14 assessment of the near-completed cost of the PTN modifications. Further, 15 Witness Jacobs states at page 12 of his testimony that "[n]ow that the full cost of 16 the Turkey Point EPU project is finally coming into focus, the magnitude of the 17 harm to ratepayers can be comprehended," and at page 24 of his testimony that 18 "sometimes the impact of an imprudent decision does not show up in the form 19 of unreasonable (and even inordinate) costs until subsequent periods." This is 20 incorrect and an unreasonable application of the prudence standard described in 21 my direct testimony for two reasons. First, Wilness Jacobs implies that we do 22 not know whether a decision is prudent or imprudent until the final cost is 23 This approach clearly relies on hindsight and is a violation of the known. 24 prudence standard that has been consistently applied by the Commission.

1 Second, Witness Jacobs points to and seeks to revisit decisions that happened 2 long before 2012 (i.e., the period under review), such as FPL's decision to 3 "undertake the Turkey Point EPU." As stated above, those decisions were 4 evaluated and approved by the Commission in prior NCRC proceedings, and 5 Witness Jacobs' implication that they should be revisited now is clearly 6 inconsistent with the scope of this proceeding and a reasonable application of 7 the prudence standard. Further, Wimess Jacobs' recommendation to assess the 8 prudence of FPL's decision to undertake and complete the PTN uprate based 9 solely on the final cost of the project is reminiscent of the highly unsuccessful 10 "all-or-nothing" regulatory paradigm that was applied in some jurisdictions in the 11 1980s. It was the avoidance of this kind of hindsight-based review that led to the 12 establishment of the NCRC, and the desire to avoid the highly contentious and 13 destructive results that occurred in the 1980s.

14 Q. Please explain.

15 A. The regulatory processes applied to the development of nuclear generation in the 16 1980s were characterized by significant cost disallowances, at times owing to 17 results-oriented hindsight reviews that determined whether plants turned out to 18 be economic a decade or more after construction had begun. The standards 19 used by regulators at that time evolved from traditional prudence reviews to 20 include an "economically used and useful" standard that, based on hindsight, 21 determined what portion of a plant's prudently incurred cost was "economically" 22 useful in providing service to customers. The recovery of prudently-incurred 23 costs was further narrowed by the adoption of more onerous standards such as 24 an "economic benefits test" and eventually simple "risk sharing," whereby costs 1 were simply declared unrecoverable on the basis that the total cost was too large 2 for customers alone to bear the burden. By recommending a disallowance based 3 on the final cost of the EPU Project, regardless of the Commission's views on 4 the prudence or imprudence of the actions of the utility, Witness Jacobs is 5 essentially calling for a return to mistaken methodologies of the distant past. The 6 Nuclear Cost Recovery rule, however, demonstrates that the Florida Legislature 7 and the Commission wished to provide a framework within which the 8 Commission has the opportunity to address and avoid many flawed aspects of 9 those past regulatory processes.

10 Q. Did Witness Jacobs address any of the specific actions and decisions of 11 the Company as they related to FPL's execution of the EPU Project?

A. No. Witness Jacobs asserts at page 24 of his testimony that FPL Witness Jones
has not established the reasonableness of FPL's PTN expenditures, yet Winness
Jacobs does nothing to establish their unreasonableness other than to point out
that the EPU Project's costs were higher than anticipated. This is an
inappropriate application of the prudence standard.

17 Q. What is an appropriate application of the prudence standard as it relates to 18 FPL's 2012 expenditures?

A. As described in my direct testimony, at pages 11 and 12, the prudence standard is
captured by three key features: (1) prudence relates to actions and decisions;
costs themselves are not prudent or imprudent; (2) the standard incorporates a
presumption of prudence, which is often referred to as a rebuttable presumption;
and (3) there is a total exclusion of hindsight. An appropriate application of the
prudence standard also considers a range of reasonable behavior regarding

elements of the EPU Project that are within FPL's control. That standard of
 prudence is consistent with the standard applied by the Commission, many other
 state and federal utility regulators, the U.S. Supreme Court, and regulatory
 advisory groups such as the National Regulatory Research Institute ("NRRI").²

5 Winess Jacobs has violated all of the above-mentioned features of an 6 appropriate application of the prudence standard by: (a) focusing on the end 7 result (*i.e.*, total costs), rather than the Company's decisions and actions in 8 implementing the EPU Project; (b) assuming imprudent management of the 9 Project by the Company based on his assessment of increasing costs, rather than 10 any analysis of specific decisions FPL made in implementing the Project; and (c), 11 as described above, relying on hindsight.

Q. Witness Jacobs states at page 26 of his testimony that if the Commission
had known FPL's actual total calendar year 2012 expenditures in Docket
No. 120009-EI, "it may have decided the issue of disallowance that OPC
raised at that time differently." Do you agree with Witness Jacobs'
speculation?

17 A. No. Witness Jacobs' argument is predicated on the Commission agreeing with 18 the approach to determining a disallowance that Witness Jacobs presented in 19 Docket No. 120009-EI. As Witness Jacobs acknowledges, at page nine of his 20 testimony, the Commission did not adopt his recommendation in that 21 proceeding. In addition, Witness Jacobs already concluded that the PTN EPU 22 was uneconomic in the 2012 proceeding, and recommended a cap on FPL's 23 recovery of EPU costs. Simply because Witness Jacobs finds the PTN uprate to 24 be more "uneconomic" this year does not mean the Commission would have

1 reversed its rejection of his analytical framework and recommendations in that 2 prior proceeding. In addition, as discussed by Winness Jones in his rebuttal 3 testimony, it is notable that the final cost of the EPU Project on a cost per 4 kilowatt basis is only modestly higher than the non-binding cost estimate 5 presented by Winness Jones in April 2012 in Docket No. 120009-EI, despite 6 what Witness Jacobs attempts to demonstrate in his testimony. Lastly, as 7 discussed above, Witness Jacobs fails to consider that nearly all of the Project's 8 costs were either sunk or unavoidable in 2012, and that FPL had to make its 9 decision on whether or not to complete the project based on a comparison of 10 avoidable costs and lost benefits.

Q. Witness Jacobs recommends a disallowance of \$200 million for the EPU Project. Is such a disallowance formulated consistently with a sound application of the prudence standard?

14 A. No. A proper application of the prudence standard involves: (a) finding that 15 specific actions or decisions were within or outside a range of reasonable 16 behavior; and (b) quantifying the impact of those specific actions or decisions. 17 That quantification should occur by comparing what did occur to what would 18 have occurred under a "minimally prudent" course of action. Witness Jacobs has 19 done neither. His recommendation, therefore, is simply based on his view that 20 the Project costs more than was expected or more than he now believes it is 21 worth, and does not reflect any application of the prudence standard.

1	Q.	Witness Jacobs asserts that FPL Witness Sim has a "flawed insistence on
2		ignoring sunk costs." ³ Do you agree?
3	A.	No. Sunk costs are costs that have already been incurred up to a given point in a
4		project and it is important to note that sunk costs cannot be avoided whether the
5		project is cancelled or not. The irrelevance of sunk costs for purposes of
6		determining the forward-looking economic feasibility of a project is a basic
7		principle of economics and corporate inance. ⁴ Due to the fact that sunk costs
8		cannot be changed or avoided based on decision-making today, those costs don't
9		affect or even enter into the analysis underlying a decision as to whether it is
10		economically advisable to complete a project or not.
11	Q.	Does Witness Jacobs' Exhibit No. WRJ-7, that he relies on, support his
12		position?
13	A.	No, in fact it supports my conclusion, which is the opposite of Witness Jacobs'
14		conclusion. Exhibit No. WRJ-7 of Witness Jacobs' direct testimony is an article
15		titled "Successful Software Management: How to Improve Your Decision
16		Making - Sunk Costs". The first page of that article states the following:
 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 		Sunk costs are money that you've already spent on one of the options, before making the decision. Regardless of which option you choose, the money has already been spent. That money is, for all intents and purposes, gone. If you choose option A, the money is spent. If you choose option B, the money is spent. If you choose to do nothing, the money has still been spent. The result is that <i>sunk costs should not be considered in your decisions</i> . Sunk costs do not alter the future costs and revenues of your options, so they should not be included in the analysis.
27		Witness Jacobs' exhibit clearly supports the position that FPL Witness Sim has
28		taken, and provides strong support for the exclusion of sunk costs when
29		assessing the economic feasibility of large capital projects. Under the correct

- 1 methodology, there is no question that it was prudent for FPL to complete the
- 2 EPU Project, and that this decision maximized the benefits to ratepayers.

3 Q. Does this conclude your testimony?

4 A. Yes, it does.

¹ Order No. PSC-08-0021-FOF-EI, Issued January 7, 2008, in Docket No. 070602-EI, <u>In re: Petition</u> for determination of need for expansion of Turkey Point and St. Lucie nuclear power plants, for exemption from Bid Rule 25-22.082, F.A.C., and for cost recovery through the Commission's Nuclear Power Plant Cost Recovery Rule, Rule 25-6.0423, F.A.C.

² For example, as contained in National Regulatory Research Institute, <u>The Prudent Investment Test in</u> the 1980's, April 1985.

³ Direct Testimony of William R. Jacobs, Jr., Ph.D., at 26.

⁴ See, e.g., Ross, Stephen A., Westerfield, Randolph W., and Jordan, Bradford, Jordan D., Fundamentals of Corporate Finance, 4th ed., at 280.

