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1	BEFORE THE
2	FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
3	In the Matter of:  DOCKET NO. 140142-EM
4	PETITION FOR DECLARATORY
5	STATEMENT OR OTHER RELIEF REGARDING THE EXPIRATION OF
6	THE VERO BEACH ELECTRIC SERVICE FRANCHISE AGREEMENT,
7	BY THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, INDIAN RIVER
8	COUNTY, FLORIDA. /
9	In the Matter of:
10	DOCKET NO. 140244-EM
	PETITION FOR DECLARATORY
11	STATEMENT REGARDING THE EFFECT OF THE COMMISSION'S ORDERS
12	APPROVING TERRITORIAL AGREEMENTS IN INDIAN RIVER
13	COUNTY, BY THE CITY OF VERO BEACH.
14	/
15	
16	PROCEEDINGS: COMMISSION CONFERENCE AGENDA ITEM NO. 2 and ITEM NO. 3
17	COMMISSIONERS
18	PARTICIPATING: CHAIRMAN ART GRAHAM COMMISSIONER LISA POLAK EDGAR
19	COMMISSIONER RONALD A. BRISÉ COMMISSIONER JULIE I. BROWN
20	COMMISSIONER JIMMY PATRONIS
21	DATE: Tuesday, February 3, 2015
22	PLACE: Betty Easley Conference Center Room 148
23	4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida
24	REPORTED BY: LINDA BOLES, CRR, RPR Official FPSC Reporter
25	(850) 413-6734

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## PROCEEDINGS

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Okay, Commissioners, back up to the top of the agenda, Item Number 2. I believe we're going to take both Item Number 2 and Number 3 up together, so make that so.

MS. COWDERY: Good morning, Commissioners.

I'm Kathryn Cowdery with the Office of General Counsel.

As you stated, Chairman, staff is recommending that Items 2 and 3 be heard together because both dockets are petitions for declaratory statements and involve similar questions.

Item 2 is Indian River County's petition for declaratory statement regarding the rights, duties, and responsibilities of the County upon expiration of the Vero Beach electric service franchise agreement and how electric service may thereafter be provided to county customers.

Item 3 is the City of Vero Beach's petition for declaratory statement regarding the effect of the Commission's orders approving territorial agreements in Indian River County.

Staff recommends the Commission deny the County's petition because it does not meet the requirements for issuance of a declaratory statement. Staff recommends that the Commission

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issue a declaratory statement on Vero Beach's petition because it does meet the requirements for issuing a declaratory statement, and that the Commission declare that Vero Beach has the right and obligation to continue to provide retail electric service in the territory described in the territorial orders upon expiration of the franchise agreement between the County and Vero Beach.

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FPL and Orlando Utilities Commission have been granted intervention on the County's petition.

Tampa Electric Company, Duke Energy Florida, the Florida Electric Cooperatives Association, and the Florida Municipal Electric Association have been granted amicus curiae status in both dockets.

Oral argument on the petitions has been requested. Staff recommends that the Commission should grant the motions to address the Commission, and all parties in amicus curiae should be allowed to participate on the issues raised in both petitions. Staff is recommending the oral argument on both petitions should be heard together and that the Commission should allow 15 minutes for each side.

However, in addition, there is a preliminary matter on the County's petition.

Issue 1 of Item 2 is Indian River County's request for reconsideration of the Prehearing Order granting Orlando Utility Commission's motion to intervene. The County has requested oral argument on the motion.

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Staff recommends that before addressing the petitions, the Commission should rule on the County's motion for reconsideration. Staff recommends that the Commission should deny the County's request for reconsideration because the request does not identify a point of fact or law which was overlooked. And even if the Commission — the County's request for reconsideration is treated as a response in opposition to OUC's motion to intervene as requested by the County, the arguments do not support denial of Orlando Utility Commission's motion to intervene.

Staff recommends that the Commission deny the County's request for oral argument on its motion for reconsideration because the County's arguments are fully set forth in its motion, and oral argument would not aid the Commissioners in understanding or evaluating the issues to be decided. The Commission does have sole discretion to grant or deny requests for oral argument. Staff is available to answer any questions.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Okay. So, Commissioners, it looks likes we have to deal with Issue Number 1 on Item 2 first before we move forward. Commissioner Edgar.

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not believe that there is a need for oral argument on Issue 2, which is the request for reconsideration on the intervention by OUC, so I would move approval of issue -- of the staff recommendation for Issues 1 and 2 on Item 2. And if that motion carries, then that would lead us to the point where we can consider oral argument on the other issues.

COMMISSIONER BRISÉ: Second.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: It's been moved and seconded, staff recommendation on Issues 1 and 2, Item 2. Commissioner Brown.

COMMISSIONER BROWN: Thank you. And I would support the motion, too. I do understand the County's argument and strict interpretation of the Rule 28-105. However, I looked at it; there's no error of fact or law. And OUC is a directly affected party in this docket and, hence, I support the motion.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Any further discussion of the Edgar motion? Seeing none, all in favor, say aye.

(Vote taken.)

Any opposed? By your action, you've approved the motion.

Okay. So now we will have oral argument for both Items 2 and 3. We're going to go with staff recommendations on 15 minutes on each side, and we'll start with Indian River County. Mr. Floyd [sic], you're on.

MR. SELF: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,

Commissioners. Good morning. I am Floyd Self of the

Gonzalez, Saggio & Harlan law firm representing Indian

River County. Also with me today is the County

Attorney, Mr. Dylan Reingold. I would also like to

specifically introduce the members of our county

commission that are with us today. We have the Vice

Chairman, Bob Solari, and Commissioners Peter O'Bryan

and Tim Zorc. We also have the County Administrator,

Mr. Joe Baird.

The fundamental issue before you today is the City's attempt to declare the franchise agreement between the City and the County void and without a fact and to eviscerate the authority of Indian River County to issue a utility franchise.

My comments will focus on the five most important reasons why you should deny the City's petition, while also addressing several relevant

aspects of the County's petition.

cts of the country's petition.

The first and most significant reason to deny the City's petition is that it seeks to materially and adversely affect the County. As the staff tells you in its recommendation on the County's petition, it is a fundamental tenet of declaratory statement law that you cannot determine and affect third parties through a declaratory statement, and yet this is exactly what the City is asking for.

If you read the two requests that they have, they very expressly and directly attempt to affect the County in both of them, and indeed they are seeking, quote, the expiration -- or they're seeking a determination that, quote, the expiration of the franchise agreement has no legal effect on the City's right and obligation to serve in its Commission-approved service areas.

But the City does not stop there. The City is also seeking a broader, more far-reaching authorization by asking you to protect the City from, quote, any action that the County might take. A declaratory statement is not a proper means for attempting to restrain the County, as the City is seeking here.

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If you still have any remaining doubt about what is really going on here, then I simply ask you to look around the room at all of the other utilities that are here today against the County, none of which serve in the county except for FPL. If the City of Vero Beach can stop the County and the franchise agreement and serve customers solely on the basis of a territorial order, then no utility with a territorial agreement will ever subject itself to a franchise. Thus, the City's petition is to eliminate the County's ability to require a franchise as a precondition of utility service and, more directly, to render the existing franchise agreement with the County meaningless. These actions are clearly outside the scope of authority in a declaratory statement, and so you should deny the petition of the City.

The second reason for denying the City's petition is that the exclusive and superior authority that you have under Chapter 366 does not support granting the City's declaratory statement. The County agrees that the PSC has exclusive and superior jurisdiction over those matters that are enumerated in Chapter 366, but there are no facts that would support a violation of any of these three

statutes that are relied upon by the City.

First, there is no territorial agreement before you for approval, modification, or revocation. The County is not asking you to amend or repeal any territorial agreement or order, and

franchise by itself does not modify or terminate any

agreement or any order of this Commission.

the County agrees that the expiration of the

Second, you do not have a territorial dispute. You do not have two utilities fighting about which should serve where. Likewise, the expiration of the franchise agreement does not automatically give rise to a territorial dispute.

Third, there is no uneconomic duplication of generation, transmission, and distribution facilities. Before you may consider taking action under the grid bill on a claim of uneconomic duplication, you must first conduct a formal evidentiary hearing, and a declaratory statement is not such a proceeding.

The requirement for an evidentiary hearing was demonstrated by the Florida Supreme Court in a case where the Commission refused to draw a territorial boundary in a dispute between two electric utilities. The Commission found commingled

facilities, but the evidence of record did not support a finding that those facilities were, in fact, uneconomic within the meaning of the statute. Today everyone agrees, I hope, that there are no duplicative facilities in place. The only evidence of duplicative facilities arises from some of the questions that the County has posed in its petition and which the staff says are too speculative and insufficient to support the granting of a declaratory statement. Thus, there are no facts supporting any of the three statutes upon which the City relies that would support the issuance of the declaratory statement that they seek today.

The third major reason to deny the City's petition is that the City and staff in both dockets completely ignore the County's exclusive authority with respect to franchises and the right to control and regulate its property.

The City argues that since it has provided electric service prior to the 1987 franchise that it simply does not need any permission from the County. What the City and the staff recommendation ignore in both dockets is the fundamental change in law that occurred with the adoption of the 1968 Florida Constitution. At whatever time the City began

serving outside its corporate limits as a non-charter county, at that time Indian River County had no authority over its property under the then existing law. But with the 1968 constitution and the subsequent actions of the Florida Legislature, non-charter counties have gained essentially the same powers as charter counties. These powers now include the ability to control and regulate the use of streets, bridges, rights-of-ways, easements, and other property through a franchise.

Now, the City has tried to mitigate the importance of the franchise agreement by claiming that a franchise is only relevant for franchise fee purposes, but this is not true. As the Florida Legislature's Office of Economic and Demographic Research says, quote, the fee, meaning the franchise fee, is considered fair rent for the use of such rights-of-way in consideration for the local government's agreement not to provide competing utility services during the term of the franchise agreement.

This is exactly why the Florida Supreme

Court and other appellate courts refer to franchises
as a bargained-for exchange and why those courts

have held that such franchises are fully and

completely enforceable. The Courts have said that
the bargains that can be enforced include all manner
of things, including the right to purchase a
utility's assets at the end of a term, a limited
term of time, an exclusive service area, insurance
indemnification, and whatever other terms the
parties have bargained for.

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A stated term in the franchise, one of the key issues here, is especially relevant and enforceable because the general state of the law is without a stated term, a franchise is considered irrevocable. This franchise agreement is fully enforceable. It's a bargained-for exchange that includes, among other terms, the termination in 2017.

To ignore the constitutional and statutory framework that supports the franchise is to deny the board its fundamental right to govern and control its own property. The PSC cannot take this away from the County in a declaratory statement.

The fourth reason to deny the City's petition is that the City has no authority to grant, modify, or extend franchises or to otherwise convey property rights. For you to grant the City's petition and to declare that the City can continue

to serve regardless of the expiration of the franchise, you are effectively extending the term of the franchise into perpetuity or you're otherwise determining that an essential bargained-for term of that franchise is meaningless.

The staff acknowledges in the County's docket that the Commission has no jurisdiction over county franchise agreements, and this has been supported by the courts as well. If you have no jurisdiction over county franchise agreements, then you certainly do not have authority to extend an existing franchise or to otherwise declare it meaningless.

As for property rights, a territorial order does not grant a utility any authority to place its infrastructure. This is because Chapter 366 does not contain any authority for you to grant a lease, a license, an easement, a franchise, or to otherwise convey real property rights.

The property rights a utility must, must secure to actually serve in an area can only be conveyed by the underlying property owners, which in this case for the County's property is the County through a franchise.

The fifth reason for rejecting the City's

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petition is that the Town's lawsuit is a complete bar to the City's petition. In the County's petition, the Staff states that you are not permitted to opine on questions that are subject to other legal proceedings. The staff then cites the County's resolution 2014-069, which is attached to the staff recommendation, wherein the County indicated that it shares the same conflicts with the City regarding the City's unreasonable rates, the failure to comply with the referendum requirements of 366.047, and the removal of the City's electric facilities upon the expiration of the franchise.

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On the basis of this resolution, the staff recommends that you not answer one of the questions since it's subject to litigation. Following that same principle, since both of the City's requested declarations involve the expiration of the franchise agreement and since that is an issue in the litigation, it would not be appropriate for you to answer either of the City's questions since both deal with the expiration of the franchise.

So where does that leave us? Any one of the five reasons I've cited I believe is sufficient alone to deny the City's petition, but together they demonstrate that the scope of what is being sought

bottom line is simple; you need to deny the City's petition.

With respect to the County's petition, in

by the City is completely inappropriate for any

action by you through a declaratory statement.

With respect to the County's petition, in an ideal world it would be nice to have some additional time to discuss with you the problems we have with the staff recommendation on the County's requests. However, we focused our time on the City's petition because of the outrageous and illegal relief that the City is seeking from you today.

If you are inclined to deny the County's petition, we believe that you should provide some context for that decision and make clear two points that the staff relates in their recommendation with which we agree.

First, the County has no jurisdiction or authority with respect to territorial agreements and orders. And, second, the PSC has no jurisdiction or authority with respect to local government franchise agreements.

I don't know how much time I have left, but I -- Mr. Chairman, I'd like to reserve any remaining time and, of course, have the appropriate

opportunity to respond to the cast of thousands that are lined up to speak. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: You have, you have three minutes left.

MR. SELF: Wow. I'm impressed. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Self.

Side number two. I take it, Mr. Wright,

you're going to orchestrate?

MR. WRIGHT: That's, that's very kind and generous of you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. I'm going to lead off for those of us who oppose the County and support the City.

Good morning. As you know, I'm Schef
Wright. I'm with -- a partner in the Gardner, Bist,
Wiener law firm. Also appearing with me today is my
partner, John T. LaVia, III. I'd also like to
specifically introduce to you the Honorable Mayor
Dick Winger of the City of Vero Beach who is here,
and also the Honorable council member Pilar Turner,
also here in case you want to ask them any
questions. But we take this very seriously and
that's why they're here.

Mr. Chairman, I'm shooting to have eight or nine minutes of prepared comments that will probably get a little longer responding to some of

the things Mr. Self said. After that, several of the amicus curiae have a few things to say. I'm just going to start with a summary and then launch into some specific commentary on the County's

petition and the City's petition.

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In summary, the City strongly supports the staff's recommendations that you deny the County's petition for declaratory statement and, likewise, that you deny the County's request for alternative relief to initiate proceedings. The County's petition is procedurally flawed, as your staff have correctly concluded, and the staff have recommended it be denied. It's substantively flawed as well for many of the reasons that the staff supports the City's petition for declaratory statement that you don't even need to get there.

Similarly, we strongly support the staff's recommendation that you issue the declaratory statement requested by the City. Where the County failed to provide any adequate basis for declaratory statement, your staff correctly recognized that the City has met the legal requirements for issuance of a declaratory statement. They have further concluded that the City's legal analysis of your jurisdiction and the effectiveness of your orders is

correct and, accordingly, have recommended that you issue the statement.

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With my specific comments I'll first address the County's petition. The staff have correctly analyzed the County's petition according to Florida law applicable to declaratory statements, and they have correctly concluded that you should deny the requested statements for the following reasons.

The County improperly, unlawfully assumes that the Commission's territorial orders are either invalid or inapplicable. In essence, the majority of the County's requested statements, the majority of their 14 requested statements are simply attempts to usurp your exclusive jurisdiction over territorial matters and to end run your orders. They want to be able to designate a successor utility. Only you, the Florida Public Service Commission, gets to say who serves where.

The County's petition fails to state particular presently existing ascertained or ascertainable facts upon which you might issue a statement. Rather, as the staff recognizes, the County has simply offered assumed legal conclusions that the Commission's orders are invalid, that it

has the legal authority to operate an electric utility system, and that it has the legal authority to choose the utility that provides service within its jurisdiction. They haven't cited any facts to

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support this.

The County's petition does not explain how your statutes and orders may substantially affect the County. The petition seeks general and very broad legal advisory opinions on a large number of hypothetical assumed scenarios. The County's petition improperly seeks a declaratory statement that would determine the conduct and rights of the City of Vero Beach, Florida Power & Light Company, and probably the Orlando Utilities Commission. The County's petition asks the Commission to interpret statutes and the constitution that are outside the Commission's jurisdiction.

With respect to the referendum issue, which is 567-J in the County's petition, staff's recommendation correctly applies case law confirming that you should deny this request and that you take administrative notice of the pending proceedings in the circuit court. This is the referendum issue under Section 366.04(7). We would also suggest to you that you should deny this request outright,

because even if the issue were not pending in circuit court, this request is legally inappropriate for declaratory statement. Since the County has raised it, however, you need to know that the City, in 2008, right after the statute was enacted, considered and evaluated the criteria in the statute and determined that the City, which was not named in this general act, the City did not fall within the scope of the specific enumerated applicability criteria because on the date specified in the statute, September 30th, 2007, the City had fewer than 30,000 named retail electric customers, which was the criterion set forth in the statute. We also served outside our home county on that date. So we didn't meet two of the criteria.

Finally, in their pleadings, although

Mr. Self didn't talk much about it this morning, the

County goes on at length about rates, rates, rates,

rates, rates, rates. The arguments about

rates are utterly irrelevant. This is clear from

many decisions of this Commission and decisions of

the Florida Supreme Court.

As the Court said in *Storey v. Mayo* cited many times by you and the Court since, "An individual has no organic, economic, or political

right to service by a particular utility merely because he deems it advantageous to himself."

The County tries to argue that there's some unique reason here for the Commission to act on this because our rates are high. Our rates are higher than we wish they were. We're working on it. But they say it's because such a high percentage of the customers are outside the city limits. This is, one, factually unfounded. There are at least five other utilities that have more than 50 percent, munis that have more than 50 percent of their customers outside the city limits, and it's old news. In 1972, when FPL filed the first petition, application for approval of a declaratory statement, they stated in their petition that more than 50 percent of the City's customers were located outside the city limits.

Even if the County could allege facts specific enough to give you something to act on, you should still deny the requested statements or issue them in the negative because substantively their arguments are wrong.

Finally, with respect to the County's petition, you should deny the County's request for alternative relief, basically do something. It's

not appropriate for a petition for declaratory statement, it doesn't include facts or information upon which you could decide whether to do so, and we strongly believe, the City strongly believes that based on directly applicable case law, AmeriSteel v. Clark, that the County lacks standing to initiate such proceedings in any event.

In summary, the County's petition is an attack on your jurisdiction and on your orders, as well as on the overall statutory system for regulating territorial issues to prevent the uneconomic duplication of facilities. Your staff have correctly analyzed the County's petition in accordance with Florida law, and they have correctly recommended that you deny the County's petition. We urge you to do so.

Responding to a couple of things Mr. Self said, we're not asking you to declare that the franchise is void. We're asking you to declare our rights under your statutes and your territorial orders. Those orders will remain in effect after the franchise expires. We have duly fulfilled our, all of our responsibilities under the franchise. They're not suing us for breach of the franchise. The suggestion that the utilities would never

subject themselves to franchise agreements is just off base. Mr. Self did not even mention Alachua County and the statement by the Florida Supreme Court in Winter Park where they said, "Moreover, we reiterate that Alachua validates fees that are reasonably related to the government's cost of regulation or the rental value of the occupied land, as well as those that are the result of a bargained-for exchange." That's what the Florida Supreme Court has had to say about this.

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We don't say that the County can't try to issue a franchise. What we do say is made clear in our response in regard to our petition is this: If the County issues a franchise, tries to issue a franchise, that will create a territorial dispute on its face. That dispute is squarely under your jurisdiction. And the lawsuit is not a complete bar to our petition because, as the staff have correctly noticed — have correctly noted, our petition addresses only our relationship to the County and our service in unincorporated Indian River County.

With regard to our petition, we strongly support the staff's recommendation, and we urge you to approve it. We have clearly stated facts that warrant, explain our need for the requested

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statement. The County is threatening to evict us. We have to make significant planning decisions starting last fall, starting before then. We're working on renegotiating contracts. We're making decisions whether to shut down our power plant or keep it operating, and we have to make some significant distribution systems -- distribution system and T&D decisions. If we don't know who we're going to serve, we can't do it. We need your statement.

On the law, as the staff have correctly concluded, your jurisdiction is exclusive and superior. You, the Florida Public Service Commission, have, through your territorial orders, exercised this jurisdiction and granted Vero Beach the right and obligation to serve in the service territory described in your orders. Only you, the Commission, can modify your orders. And absent such modification, those orders, pursuant to your exclusive and superior jurisdiction under 366.04(1), will continue, as will our right and obligation to serve.

You don't have jurisdiction over the franchise agreement, but that doesn't matter. City didn't have a franchise with the County before 1987, and even after 1968, you know, we went 19
years without one, and in the meantime the grid bill
was enacted, which gave you even more jurisdiction
than you had before. The staff have it right; the
City has met our legal requirements for issue of
declaratory statement and the staff has correctly
stated the law. We respectfully ask that you issue
the statement. Thank you.

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CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: You have about six minutes left.

MR. WILLINGHAM: Thank you, Chairman Graham.

Good morning, Commissioners. I'm Bill Willingham, the

Executive Vice President and General Manager of the

Florida Electric Cooperatives Association, and we're

participating today as an amicus. We greatly

appreciate the opportunity to appear today. The issues

in these dockets are critical to the long-term planning

that Florida's electric utilities have to undertake in

order to maintain a reliable grid and keep rates as low

as possible.

We agree with staff's recommendation on both petitions and we agree with the points just made by Mr. Wright. However, we take great exception with the County's claims that its franchise authority supersedes the Commission's

territorial jurisdiction and that it can evict an electric utility and bring in another utility once a franchise agreement expires, which also means the County could evict the utility at any time if there is no franchise agreement.

Some electric co-ops have entered into

territorial -- into franchise agreements, but in

many areas our member co-ops have refused to do so

and they operate without a franchise agreement.

If the County could evict a utility when there is

no franchise agreement or the agreement has expired,

it would completely undermine the clear intent

of the grid bill, which is to have a coordinated grid

and to prevent the uneconomic duplication of facilities.

Clearly, the new utility's facilities would uneconomically duplicate the existing utility's facilities if there was a changeover, so I strongly disagree with the point that was previously made on behalf of the County. If this was allowed to happen, it would cripple the incumbent utility's ability to utilize long-term planning to keep costs down. Under the County's scenario, a utility's stranded costs could quickly mount and rates would increase unnecessarily due to uneconomic duplication of facilities, which is exactly what the grid bill

was supposed to prevent.

We believe the law is very clear that the Commission's jurisdiction over territorial issues is exclusive and superior to any jurisdiction alleged by the County, and we urge that you approve staff's

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Mr. Moline.

recommendation on both petitions. Thank you.

MR. MOLINE: Good morning. I'm Barry Moline with the Florida Municipal Electric Association and appear as an amicus.

FMEA supports staff's recommendation and Vero Beach in its comments made by Mr. Wright this morning, and I'm here for your questions. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Mr. Beasley.

MR. BEASLEY: Thank you, Commissioners. Jim Beasley for Tampa Electric Company.

I'll just say that we support the staff's recommendations in both dockets. We think they're well-reasoned and consistent with your authority under the grid law and Chapter 366.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Yes, sir.

MR. BERNIER: Good morning, Commissioners.

Matt Bernier for Duke Energy.

We appreciate the opportunity to

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participate in these dockets. We also support the staff's recommendations and the City and FEECA's arguments today. We urge you to adopt staff's recommendations. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Okay.

MR. WRIGHT: Mr. Chairman, may I know, may I know how much time our side has left?

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: You have about two and a half minutes.

MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, sir. We would like to reserve it for rebuttal. I thought that was clear from what I asked you.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Sure.

MR. WRIGHT: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Mr. Self.

MR. SELF: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a couple of quick points. Quite frankly, I haven't heard anything out of Mr. Wright that changes anything that I said. Whatever situation you have in place today is, at best, speculative. The mere fact that we have noticed that we're not renewing the franchise in and of itself, again, doesn't have any impact or affect on any of your orders. We're not challenging those orders or anything like that. So I think, at a minimum, what you may have is something that's, that's premature.

The only other thing that I'd like to point out to you is what happened in the Winter Park case back in the early 2000s. The facts are slightly different admittedly. In that situation, the franchise between Winter Park and Progress was about to expire. They had a right to purchase. And what the Commission did throughout that entire process was basically let the parties work through the property rights issues in terms of valuing and ultimately the City acquiring assets from Progress. At the appropriate times, you, you relieved Progress of its obligation to serve within that area, and you ultimately then approved a territorial agreement just last year between Winter Park and Duke.

The staff and the others make the point that, oh, well, wait a minute, there was no territorial order there, and that makes all the difference in the world. The reality is utilities serve some pursuant to franchise agreements, some not; some pursuant to territorial agreements and orders, some not. You have to work together in terms of all -- both the Commission's jurisdiction and authority and local government's jurisdiction and authority with respect to property rights in order to make these things work.

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The claims of stranded investment and the grid is going to go all to hell if you start allowing the counties to enforce their property rights I think is, is ridiculous, and there's certainly no evidence to support that. And, again, I would say if you look back to what happened in the Winter Park scenario, none of those types of things happened. The Commission, the local government ultimately worked together to effectuate the timely and efficient transfer of those facilities, and at best or worst that's exactly what may happen here. We don't know exactly how this is going to play out, but what we are trying to work toward is the ability to respect the County's property rights, while at the same time respecting the Commission's jurisdiction. Thank you.

> CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Thank you, Mr. Self. Mr. Wright.

MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In arguing that the, that ruling on our petition is speculative, Mr. Self is basically arguing on behalf of the County that their whole petition is speculative. Contrary in our case, he makes it sound like it's speculative. They have told the world they're going to try to kick us out.

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We have to make decisions, like I said, starting last fall. We are in active discussions with OUC regarding renegotiating our major power purchase agreement through which we buy about 60 percent of our power. We need to know what our status is before we can make a rational, efficient decision on that. We're in active consideration of shutting down our power plants. We've already shut one of our five units down. We need to know what our status is in order to proceed. It's not premature.

Winter Park is not slightly different from this case. In Winter Park, the City of Winter Park had a contract right to purchase the facilities of Florida Power Corporation. The Court -- that was challenged by Florida Power. They lost, and the Court said, yes, you have the right to buy the system. What happened after that was an extended series of arbitration. There was, there was also litigation over whether the, whether Florida Power had to continue collecting franchise fees, and the Court said, yes, you do. But the real guts of it was that there was a contract right that the courts of Florida, properly within their jurisdiction, enforced in favor of the City of Winter Park allowing them to buy Florida Power's facilities.

There is no such contract right here. We never agreed to one and we do not intend to voluntarily sell our system.

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rights issues -- and we only, we think only
20 percent or so of our facilities are even in the
County's rights-of-way, so, you know, there may be
some court proceedings as to whether they can evict
us from their rights-of-way, but there's a whole
other body of property law that's not really
relevant to y'all that will come up if we ever get
there. But it's not, it's not really -- it's not
something you need to worry about. If there's
property rights litigation, that will occur in the
courts.

And the other stuff that he said about what you did and didn't do in Winter Park is just utterly irrelevant, as are their rates arguments. Thanks very much.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Thank you, Mr. Wright.

Commissioners, I would like to take up the three questions in Item Number 3 first, and then we'll conclude Item Number 2. I'll let you -- let's take a, like a five-minute break so we can all organize our thoughts, and we'll reconvene by that

1 clock in the back, let's say by 10:30. Thank you.
2 (Recess taken.)

2.0

Okay. So let's deal with the issues on Item Number 3. We've already handled Issue Number 1 with the oral arguments. Commissioner Brown.

COMMISSIONER BROWN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And first I just want to say these local government issues are near and dear to my heart. I came from local government; it's kind of what led me to this job. And so we all do take these very seriously. I also want to thank the public -- the elected officials here for driving up to Tallahassee, and for those that are here when they could be in committee meetings. We appreciate you being here. And, Representative Mayfield, I know this is an issue near and dear to your heart. It's one that I absolutely on a personal level agree with. I don't know today if it's the proper forum for us to address, but I know that you're going to continue working on the issue going forward. So thank you for being here and speaking.

That being said, Ms. Cowdery, can we, can you please address some of the arguments that

Mr. Floyd [sic] made with regard to the City's petition? Particularly they alleged -- he alleged

that the City's petition deals with the expiration 1 of the franchise agreement, which is the subject of 2 pending litigation. Can you provide a brief 3 response to that allegation? 4 MS. COWDERY: First, I want to make clear 5 that the Town of Indian River Shores litigation is 6 7 dealing with a completely separate franchise agreement. It was not clear, I don't think, from Mr. Self's 8 9 comments, but that is a completely different situation. 10 COMMISSIONER BROWN: Thank you. MS. COWDERY: Okay. I think that might clear 11 12 up your questions there. 13 MR. SELF: Commissioner, if I may, I agree 14 that the Town has its own separate franchise agreement. 15 I certainly agree with that, and I apologize if I confused that issue. 16 17 The County participated because while the 18 Town has its franchise, the County has its own, and 19 the issue of expiration of the franchise is 2.0 obviously --21 COMMISSIONER BROWN: Oh, I get it. I just 22 wanted her to clarify that. 23 MR. SELF: Thank you. 24 MS. COWDERY: Okay. So just going a little 25 bit further with that, Mr. Self had mentioned that then the Town's lawsuit is a complete bar to the declaratory statement, which I would, I would disagree with that because the issues in that pending litigation have no bearing on what is in front of us. It's a completely different situation. They accept --

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COMMISSIONER BROWN: Uh-huh.

MS. COWDERY: Yes, thank you.

As we have heard, and it is correct, the Commission is not addressing any franchise agreement in this declaratory statement. What the Commission is addressing is application of its statutes and the territorial orders, its orders to the specific facts of the City of Vero Beach. We are not addressing the franchise agreement. We are not taking action that would render a franchise agreement void, without effect, or meaningless. We're just not going there.

Mr. Floyd [sic] mentioned that we, the Commission does not have authority under 366 to issue a declaratory statement looking at there's no territorial order agreement in front of us, there's no territorial dispute in front of the Commission, there's no unnecessary, unnecessary duplication, but this, this does not, this is not why we would be issuing a declaratory statement.

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We are issuing a declaratory statement because the petition meets the requirements of the Florida Administrative Procedure Act, Section 120.565. Those requirements are met and we're issuing, we're recommending that the declaratory statement be issued.

Most of Mr. Self's arguments that I see having to do with the Commission ignoring the exclusive authority to issue a franchise agreement go back to the same, my same statement that we're not addressing the franchise agreement. So the 1968 constitutional argument, whether or not franchise agreements are only relevant for collection of franchise fees, really have no bearing on what the Commission is doing here today.

COMMISSIONER BROWN: Thank you. Excellent analysis. I know you could continue to go on, but I will say I think Mr. Wright hit it out of the park today on his legal arguments, and I completely agree with him.

One thing though with regard to this issue, and we'll get to the next one, but with regard to Mr. Self wanted two things included in our order if we agree with staff's recommendation.

The first, he said he wanted -- which was

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not included in the petition for a dec statement. 1 don't know if we can legally even do that, but he 2 wanted the inclusion that the County had no 3 authority with respect to the territorial 4 agreements, as well as the Commission has no 5 authority with respect to franchise agreements. 6 7 What are your thoughts on that? MS. COWDERY: I would not go there. The way 8 9 I heard it, what you would be doing is issuing a general legal opinion. And I would, you know, I would 10 stick to what has been alleged in the petition, and I 11 would not expand upon that. We addressed those points 12 in the staff recommendation and it will be in the 13 14 order, but that is not the specific question that's in front of us. 15 COMMISSIONER BROWN: Commissioners, I agree 16 17 with the City and I agree with staff's recommendation on all issues. 18 19 CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Other Commissioners? 2.0 Commissioner Brown, would you like to make 21 a motion? 22 COMMISSIONER BROWN: Move staff 23 recommendation on all issues under Item 3. 24 CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: It's been moved and

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seconded, staff recommendations on all issues on Item

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Number 3. Any further discussion? Seeing none, all in favor, say aye.

(Vote taken.)

2.0

Any opposed? By your actions, you've approved the staff recommendations on Item Number 3, which brings us back to Item Number 2. We've already dealt with Issues 1 and 2 under Item Number 2 and 3. Commissioner Brown.

COMMISSIONER BROWN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have to ask Mr. Self and the County a few questions

just because back in November you asked for a deferral

to amend your pleadings, your petition, but we never

had any supplemental modifications or amendments.

Could you explain why not?

MR. SELF: Let me answer your question this way. We drafted something, and when we got done and looked at the original and compared it to the amended one, we determined that it was in the County's best interest to proceed, to proceed with the original.

COMMISSIONER BROWN: So a lot of time has been spent on, by all the parties, by the City, by the County, by our Commission staff on this particular petition. And I'm just curious, you've got a pending acquisition with FPL and the City of Vero Beach, which you've acknowledged in your petition would be, would

basically make the petition moot if that is consummated. We have a pending civil litigation that touches upon an issue in here. Why would you proceed with a petition for dec utilizing all of the resources when, quite frankly, I think it's pretty clear that there are several flaws in the actual petition, as Mr. Wright enumerated in his oral arguments? Back in November I was wondering why you went ahead and did it rather than wait with all these pending actions.

MR. SELF: Well, the fact of the matter is,

Commissioner, is it was imperative to come here first
and to receive your, your opinion on certain issues. I

won't go into the merits of why we think at least some
of those questions should have been answered, but the
fact of the matter is that it's important -- it was
important to us to go to the PSC first because we knew
there would be certain issues there. And so regardless
of the declaratory statements that you issue as a
result of the two petitions, that's going to be helpful
to all of the parties as they move forward with their
next steps.

**COMMISSIONER BROWN:** I have no further questions.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Any other Commissioners? I would entertain a motion for items -- I'm sorry --

1	Issues Number 4 and 5 on Item Number 2.
2	COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Move staff, Mr.
3	Chairman.
4	COMMISSIONER BRISÉ: Second.
5	CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: It's been moved and
6	seconded, staff recommendations on Issues Number 4 and
7	5, 4 and 5 under Item Number 2. Any further
8	discussion? Seeing none, all in favor, say aye.
9	(Vote taken.)
10	Any opposed? By your action, you've
11	approved staff recommendation.
12	(Agenda item concluded.)
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1	STATE OF FLORIDA ) : CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
2	COUNTY OF LEON )
3	
4	I, LINDA BOLES, CRR, RPR, Official Commission
5	Reporter, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceeding was heard at the time and place herein
6	stated.
7	IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that I stenographically reported the said proceedings; that the
8	same has been transcribed under my direct supervision; and that this transcript constitutes a true
9	transcription of my notes of said proceedings.
10	I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor
11	am I a relative or employee of any of the parties' attorney or counsel connected with the action, nor am I
12	financially interested in the action.
13	DATED THIS 9th day of February, 2015.
14	
15	Ginda Boles
16	LINDA BOLES, CRR, RPR
17	FPSC Official Hearings Reporter (850) 413-6734
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