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## Assessing U.S. Investor-Owned Utility Regulatory Environments

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# Assessing U.S. Investor-Owned Utility Regulatory Environments

Regulatory advantage is the most heavily weighted factor when Standard & Poor's Ratings Services analyzes a regulated utility's business risk profile. One significant aspect of regulatory risk that influences credit quality is the regulatory environment in the jurisdictions where a utility operates. A utility management team's skill in dealing with regulatory risk can sometimes overcome a difficult regulatory environment. Conversely, companies' regulatory risk can increase even with supportive regulatory regimes if management fails to devote the necessary time and resources to the important task of managing regulatory risk. We modify our assessment of regulatory advantage to account for this dynamic in our ratings methodology (for the criteria we use to rate utilities, see "Corporate Methodology," and "Key Credit Factors For The Regulated Utilities Industry," published Nov. 19, 2013, on RatingsDirect.)

There are specific factors we use in the U.S. to assess the credit implications of the numerous regulatory jurisdictions here that help us determine the "preliminary regulatory advantage" in our credit analysis of each investor-owned regulated utility. We organize the subfactors of regulatory advantage into four categories:

- Regulatory stability,
- Tariff-setting procedures and design,
- Financial stability, and
- Regulatory independence and insulation.

## Regulatory Stability

The foundation of our opinion of a jurisdiction is the stability of its approach to regulating utilities, encompassing transparency, predictability, and consistency. Given the maturity of the U.S. investor-owned utility industry, the long history of utility regulation (going back to the early 20th century) and the well-established constitutional protections accorded to utility investments, we emphasize the principle of consistency when weighing regulatory stability. We also incorporate the degree to which the regulatory framework either explicitly or implicitly considers credit quality in its design.

### Durability of regulatory system

An established, dependable approach to regulating utilities is a hallmark of a credit-supportive jurisdiction. Bondholders lend capital to utilities over long periods to fund the development of long-lived assets. A firm understanding of the basic "rules" that will govern how the utility will recover its costs, including servicing its debt and the return on its capital over an extended period, is essential to accurately assess credit risk. Major or frequent changes to the regulatory model invariably raise risk due to the possibility of future changes. Steady application of transparent, comprehensible policies and practices lowers risk.

How long a regulatory framework has been in place is the most important factor in this area. We view jurisdictions as most supportive when there have been no major changes or where the approach has been consistent for a long time and is not prone to further changes. Jurisdictions that have undergone a major, fundamental change in the regulatory

paradigm that seems to be working well are a little less supportive, and less so a jurisdiction that is transitioning to a new regulatory approach. Credit risk rises if the transition attracts negative political attention. The less-supportive jurisdictions are those that frequently alter the basic regulatory approach. We also view less favorably the framework's development if policy disputes or legal actions cause contention, indicating that the political consensus regarding utility regulation is fragile.

Some jurisdictions permit competitive markets to prevail for some important functions of the delivery of utility services, notably wholesale markets for electricity and retail markets for electric or gas service. In others, vertical integration is the norm. A jurisdiction's credit-supportiveness can suffer if market forces directly influence major cost items that utilities could otherwise control through cost-based regulation because of the potential volatility it creates. The risk inherent in a market-based model is straightforward: utility rates are more volatile when markets influence them rather than fully embedded costs, and regulators are apt to resist full and timely recovery when market price changes are abrupt and substantial (and perhaps misunderstood). We observe less support for credit quality in jurisdictions that are in the midst of deregulating important parts of the utility framework. The uncertainty of the timing of reaching the outcome--and what the result will be--is a negative factor from a credit perspective. Utilities are also prone to financial stress when the transition to competition causes potential "rate shock" for customers that regulators could resist.

### **Transparency of regulatory framework and attitude toward credit quality**

We believe regulation works best when it is rule-based. Bondholder interests are better protected by the presence of and adherence to a pre-set code of rules and procedures that we can look to when assessing risk. Risk is lower when the rules are more transparent and when they take into account utilities' financial integrity. We regard jurisdictions that require regulators to protect utilities' financial soundness and have transparent policies and procedures as the most credit-supportive. We ascribe higher risk in jurisdictions where policies and procedures support financial integrity, but where inconsistency can selectively arise. We believe a jurisdiction provides even less support when transparency merely exists. We see less support when any of these credit factors are absent, or if the regulator's record on following precedent is poor.

## **Tariff-Setting Procedures**

We review rate decisions as part of our surveillance on each U.S. utility. We focus on the jurisdiction's overall approach to setting rates and the process it uses to establish base rates (practices pertaining to separate tariff provisions for large expenses are in the "Financial Stability" part of our analysis). We focus on whether base rates, over time, fairly reflect a utility's cost structure and allow its managers an opportunity to earn a compensatory return that provides bondholders with a financial cushion that supports credit quality. If the process is geared toward an incentive-based system, our analysis centers on the risks related to the incentive mechanisms. If the jurisdiction has vertically integrated utilities, we review the resource procurement process and assess how it affects regulatory risk.

### **Ability to timely recover costs**

We review authorized returns and capital structures in our analysis, but we focus mainly on actual earned returns. Examples abound of utilities with healthy authorized returns that have no meaningful expectation of earning those

returns due to, for example, rate case lag (i.e., the relationship between approved rates and the age of the costs used to set those rates) or expense disallowances. Also, the absolute level of financial returns is less important in our analysis than that return's stability, and we note the equity component in the capital structure used to generate the revenue requirement in rate proceedings. Higher authorized and earned returns and thicker equity ratios translate into better credit measures and a more comfortable equity cushion for bondholders. We consider a regulatory approach that allows utilities the opportunity to consistently earn a reasonable return as a positive credit factor.

A very credit-supportive jurisdiction is one in which all of the utilities it regulates consistently earn above-average returns. We assess jurisdictions lower if only some of them do, and lower still if the earnings records are below average or highly variable from year to year. We deem jurisdictions as weaker when all utilities earn well-below-average returns, and we consider jurisdictions where all utilities consistently earn exceedingly poor returns, including years with negative returns, as weakest.

We examine "regulatory lag" along with the record of earned returns to assess timeliness. Credit-supportive jurisdiction typically have a track record of little regulatory lag, indicating that responsibility for a poor or uneven earnings history lies more with management than its regulators. In addition to the regulator's efficiency in completing rate cases, we consider the obsolescence of the costs on which the rates are based, the timing of interim rates, and other practices (such as allowing rates to automatically change in a future period based on inflation) that affect a utility's ability to earn its authorized return.

If a jurisdiction uses incentives as the primary ratemaking tool and institutes a comprehensive incentive program that allows revenues and costs to diverge, we evaluate the incentive mechanisms' effect on a utility's earnings capability and stability. A common approach features an extended period between base rate reviews, during which rates change according to a formula based on inflation, a predetermined productivity factor, and capital spending. An incentive-based program can be close to credit-neutral compared with systems that permit more frequent and dynamic rate changes if the risk is symmetrical (i.e., an equal opportunity to earn over or under the authorized return and equivalent reward or penalty for doing so) and limited (a maximum or minimum earnings band). The effect on regulatory risk depends on whether we believe the efficiency targets are realistic and achievable, the regulator's treatment of disparities in actual versus authorized spending, and the framework's flexibility to adjust returns for capital market conditions. If there are operating standards, we determine whether they fairly reward or punish utilities if performance deviates from expectations.

There is a muted effect on regulatory risk in jurisdictions where incentives are not central, but are instead used only to augment cost-of-service regulation. A moderate amount of incentives that carry symmetrical risks can even modestly support better credit quality. For example, a fuel-adjustment and purchased-power clause with a sharing mechanism that affects less than 10% of the total fuel costs and cuts both ways when commodity markets change can modestly reduce risk by offering the utility a mild incentive for effective procurement and efficient operations, without unduly exposing it to commodity price risk.

We typically view jurisdictions as credit-supportive if regulators use symmetrical incentive mechanisms sparingly in the rate-setting process. When incentives play a larger role in the rate-setting approach, but are well-designed to evenly allocate risk, we see less support for credit quality. We regard still lower jurisdictions where incentives

dominate and are poorly designed. Jurisdictions where incentives significantly degrade risk and are part of a comprehensive incentive regime harbor the most risk for creditors.

### **Oversight of resource procurement**

When applicable, a resource-procurement process that uses objective guidelines to evaluate competing proposals to meet service obligations and keeps the regulator informed and involved in the decisions can, in our view, help to reduce the risk of subsequent disallowances. If the jurisdiction has an "Integrated Resource Plan" or similar mechanism that includes the participation of many parties and it uses it to definitively establish the need for new generation, it diminishes credit risk further.

We typically view the resource-procurement process more favorably if it's competitive, overseen by the regulator, and the regulator must validate the results. A jurisdiction is weaker when the process only features some of those elements. We deem jurisdictions with no regulator involvement in the process--other than to later disallow some cost recoveries based on perfect hindsight--as even less credit-supportive.

Another key issue that can fall under this part of our analysis is the regulatory oversight of large capital projects with long lead times that carry out-sized risks to a utility and its bondholders. Practices such as legislative or regulatory recognition of the need for preapproval of such endeavors, periodic reviews that substantively involve the regulator in the project's progress, and rolling prudence determinations during construction can reduce the general level of risk associated with a utility committing substantial capital well in advance of the rate proceeding that results in the project's placement into the rate base.

We view jurisdictions more favorably when they have an oversight process that includes the regulator's preapproval, ongoing regulatory oversight of a project, and provisions for rolling prudence determinations that improve the chances that all project costs will eventually be reflected in rates. We deem jurisdictions weaker when the process only features some of those elements. We consider jurisdictions even weaker when they don't have any regulatory involvement in the process and have a track record of significant post hoc disallowances of capital costs.

## **Financial Stability**

When we evaluate U.S. utility regulatory environments, we consider financial stability to be of substantial importance. Cash takes precedence in credit analysis. A regulatory jurisdiction that recognizes the significance of cash flow in its decision-making is one that will appeal to bondholders.

### **Treatment of significant expenses**

When utilities have major expenses such as fuel and purchased power/gas/water, the presence of separate tariff provisions to facilitate full and contemporaneous recovery is the most prominent factor in this part of our analysis. The timely adjustment of rates in response to changing commodity prices and other expenses that are largely out of management's control is a key feature of a credit-supportive regulatory jurisdiction. The analysis centers on the special tariff mechanisms to determine their effectiveness in producing the cash flow stability they are designed to achieve. The frequency of rate adjustments, the ability to quickly react to unusual market volatility, and the control of opportunities to engage in hindsight disallowances of costs could affect our analysis almost as much as whether the

tariff provisions exist at all. The record of disallowances plays a part when we assess regulatory advantage.

We consider jurisdictions to be very credit-supportive if utilities can recover all high-expense items through an automatic tariff clause that is based on projected costs, adjusts frequently, and has no record of any significant disallowances. We see more risk if separate mechanisms exist, but lack some of the above features. We view jurisdictions that lack independent rate mechanisms for large expenses and have a record of significant disallowances as weakest.

### **Treatment of capital spending**

When applicable, a jurisdiction's willingness to support large capital projects with cash during construction is an important aspect of our analysis. This is especially true when the project represents a major addition to rate base and entails long lead times and technological risks that make it susceptible to construction delays. Broad support for all capital spending is the most credit-sustaining. Support for only specific types of capital spending, such as specific environmental projects or system integrity plans, is less so, but still favorable for bondholders. Allowance of a cash return on construction work-in-progress or similar ratemaking methods historically were extraordinary measures for use in unusual circumstances, but when construction costs are rising, cash flow support could be crucial to maintain credit quality through the spending program. Even more favorable are those jurisdictions that present an opportunity for a higher return on capital projects as an incentive to investors.

Very supportive jurisdictions offer a separate recovery mechanism for all capital spending, a mandated current cash return during construction, and a bonus return for some or all capital projects. We deem a jurisdiction weaker if there is a separate mechanism for only certain kinds of spending and the cash return and higher return are subject to the regulator's discretion. We view jurisdictions that don't allow separate recovery or a current return as being lower on the scale. We assess a jurisdiction as weaker still when it doesn't have independent rate mechanisms for capital projects, and we view it as most risky when full recovery occurs only after a utility's assets become operational.

### **Cash-smoothing mechanisms**

We have a more positive view of jurisdictions that use innovative regulatory provisions that help to smooth cash flow from period to period. For a jurisdiction that focuses on incentives in its basic approach to ratemaking, through multiyear rate plans or a formula rate plan, we view the availability of "reopeners" (to adjust rates for unexpected events out of the utility's control) as key to this part of our analysis. The utility's ability to petition for a rate increase when unexpected or uncontrollable costs arise in the midst of a long-term rate plan is a critical risk mitigant.

Other examples of risk-dampening regulatory policies include hedging program approvals, and decoupling (the separation of a utility's profits from sales) or weather-related mechanisms. If a utility seeks approval of a hedging program to manage exposure to commodity prices, it can reduce risk if there's a clearly stated hedging policy that its regulator has endorsed, and a track record of activity that conforms to the policy that has not been subject to regulatory second-guessing. A well-designed decoupling or weather-normalization mechanism that efficiently adjusts rates to offset the sales effect of economic conditions, customer usage trends, or weather will soften earnings and cash flow volatility to the benefit of bondholders. If applicable, we view a record of regulatory responsiveness to extreme events for utilities that are prone to violent or disruptive weather (like hurricanes) as favorable for credit quality.

A jurisdiction is more credit-supportive if it makes extensive use of extraordinary and credit-supportive rate

mechanisms. Also favorable are jurisdictions that use innovative mechanisms selectively, or have regulators that are receptive to reopeners where incentives are the main ratemaking method.

## **Regulatory Independence And Insulation**

The role of politics in U.S. utility regulation is often misunderstood. In most jurisdictions, the regulator's function is to set and regulate rates and service standards with due regard not only for the interests of those who advance the capital needed to provide safe and reliable utility service, but for other constituents as well. Bondholders should recognize that utility regulation harbors political as well as economic risks. Therefore, how politics could influence regulation helps us evaluate a regulatory environment.

### **Political independence of regulator**

The primary factor in this part of our analysis is the regulators' (and, when relevant, the judicial body that reviews the regulators' decisions) political independence. We think it's more credit-supportive when the regulator is substantially independent of the political process. Jurisdictions are somewhat less favorable when insulation is strong, such as when the executive branch of government appoints regulators subject to legislative approval. We consider jurisdictions to be further down the scale when the same voters who pay utility bills directly elect the regulators, but institutional efforts have been made to erect some shield for regulators from transient political concerns. We view jurisdictions that arrange for direct political accountability of regulators that persistently influences regulatory decisions as less supportive.

### **Record of direct political intervention**

The overall atmosphere that a regulator operates in can affect its ability to deliver sound, fair, and timely rate decisions and set prudent regulatory policies that assist utilities in managing business and financial risk. In this part of our evaluation, we may consider the tone that politicians set, the history of political insulation given to the regulatory body, and the behavior of important constituencies that intervene in utility proceedings. We also track the public visibility of utility issues, because we believe that the likelihood of constructive regulatory behavior increases with the comparative obscurity of utility issues.

We view a jurisdiction as having a lower risk if the regulatory environment is marked by cooperative attitudes and constructive interventions in important matters before the regulator. We assess a jurisdiction lower when the atmosphere is more combative and restricts the regulator's ability to act in the long-term best interests of all parties. We consider jurisdictions as weaker if the regulatory environment is so infused with short-term political influence over regulatory decisions that the regulator can't effectively consider investor interests in its decisions.

## **Related Criteria And Research**

### **Related Criteria**

- Criteria | Corporates | General: Corporate Methodology, Nov. 19, 2013
- Criteria | Corporates | Utilities: Key Credit Factors For The Regulated Utilities Industry, Nov. 19, 2013

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