## FINANCING and RISK MANAGEMENT



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New York Chicago San Francisco Lisbon London Madrid Mexico City Milan New Delhi San Juan Seoul Singapore Sydney Toronto money for capital expenditures comes from. Managers could assume all-equity financing, for example, to simplify matters. If proposition I holds, that is exactly the right approach.

We believe that in practice capital structure *does* matter, but we nevertheless devote all of this chapter to MM's argument. If you don't fully understand the conditions under which MM's theory holds, you won't fully understand why one capital structure is better than another. The financial manager needs to know what kinds of market imperfection to look for.

In Chapter 6 we will undertake a detailed analysis of the imperfections that are most likely to make a difference, including taxes, the costs of bankruptcy, and the costs of writing and enforcing complicated debt contracts. We will also argue that it is naive to suppose that investment and financing decisions can be completely separated.

But in this chapter we isolate the decision about capital structure by holding the decision about investment fixed. We also assume that dividend policy is irrelevant.

## THE EFFECT OF LEVERAGE IN A COMPETITIVE TAX-FREE ECONOMY

We have referred to the firm's choice of capital structure as a *marketing problem*. The financial manager's problem is to find the combination of securities that has the greatest overall appeal to investors—the combination that maximizes the market value of the firm. Before tackling this problem, we ought to make sure that a policy which maximizes firm value also maximizes the wealth of the shareholders.

Let *D* and *E* denote the market values of the outstanding debt and equity of the Wapshot Mining Company. Wapshot's 1,000 shares sell for \$50 apiece. Thus

$$E = 1,000 \times 50 = $50,000$$

Wapshot has also borrowed \$25,000, and so V, the aggregate market value of all Wapshot's outstanding securities, is

$$V = D + E = $75,000$$

Wapshot's stock is known as *levered equity*. Its stockholders face the benefits and costs of **financial leverage**, or *gearing*. Suppose that Wapshot "levers up" still further by borrowing an additional \$10,000 and paying the proceeds out to shareholders as a special dividend of \$10 per share. This substitutes debt for equity capital with no impact on Wapshot's assets.

What will Wapshot's equity be worth after the special dividend is paid? We have two unknowns, *E* and *V*:

Old debt \$25,000 \ New debt \$10,000 \} \$35,000 = D \ Equity 
$$? = E$$
 Firm value  $? = V$ 

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<sup>2</sup>See E. F. Fama, "The 272–284, for a rigorouthe stockholders.

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