



**John T. Butler**  
**Assistant General Counsel – Regulatory**  
**Florida Power & Light Company**  
**700 Universe Boulevard**  
**Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420**  
**(561) 304-5639**  
**(561) 691-7135 (Facsimile)**  
**E-mail: john.butler@fpl.com**

September 30, 2016

**-VIA ELECTRONIC FILING -**

Ms. Carlotta S. Stauffer  
Commission Clerk  
Florida Public Service Commission  
2540 Shumard Oak Blvd.  
Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850

**Re: Docket No. 160001-EI**

Dear Ms. Stauffer:

I enclose for electronic filing in the above docket Florida Power & Light Company's prepared rebuttal testimony of Gerard J. Yupp.

If there are any questions regarding this transmittal, please contact me at (561) 304-5639.

Sincerely,

*s/ John T. Butler*  
John T. Butler

Enclosures  
cc: Counsel for Parties of Record (w/encl.)

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**  
**Docket No. 160001-EI**

I **HEREBY CERTIFY** that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by electronic delivery on the 30th day of September 2016 to the following:

Danijela Janjic, Esq.  
Suzanne Brownless, Esq.  
Division of Legal Services  
Florida Public Service Commission  
2540 Shumard Oak Blvd.  
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850  
djanjic@psc.state.fl.us  
sbrownle@psc.state.fl.us

Andrew Maurey  
Michael Barrett  
Division of Accounting and Finance  
Florida Public Service Commission  
2540 Shumard Oak Blvd.  
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850  
amaurey@psc.state.fl.us  
mbarrett@psc.state.fl.us

Beth Keating, Esq.  
Gunster Law Firm  
Attorneys for Florida Public Utilities Corp.  
215 South Monroe St., Suite 601  
Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1804  
bkeating@gunster.com

Dianne M. Triplett, Esq.  
Attorneys for Duke Energy Florida  
299 First Avenue North  
St. Petersburg, Florida 33701  
dianne.triplett@duke-energy.com

James D. Beasley, Esq.  
J. Jeffrey Wahlen, Esq.  
Ashley M. Daniels, Esq.  
Ausley & McMullen  
Attorneys for Tampa Electric Company  
P.O. Box 391  
Tallahassee, Florida 32302  
jbeasley@ausley.com  
jwahlen@ausley.com  
adaniels@ausley.com

Jeffrey A. Stone, Esq.  
Russell A. Badders, Esq.  
Steven R. Griffin, Esq.  
Beggs & Lane  
Attorneys for Gulf Power Company  
P.O. Box 12950  
Pensacola, Florida 32591-2950  
jas@beggslane.com  
rab@beggslane.com  
srg@beggslane.com

Robert Scheffel Wright, Esq.  
John T. LaVia, III, Esq.  
Gardner, Bist, Wiener, et al  
Attorneys for Florida Retail Federation  
1300 Thomaswood Drive  
Tallahassee, Florida 32308  
schef@gbwlegal.com  
jlavia@gbwlegal.com

James W. Brew, Esq.  
Laura A. Wynn, Esq.  
Attorneys for PCS Phosphate - White Springs  
Stone Mattheis Xenopoulos & Brew, PC  
1025 Thomas Jefferson Street, NW  
Eighth Floor, West Tower  
Washington, DC 20007-5201  
jbrew@smxblaw.com  
laura.wynn@smxblaw.com

Robert L. McGee, Jr.  
Gulf Power Company  
One Energy Place  
Pensacola, Florida 32520  
rlmcgee@southernco.com

Matthew R. Bernier, Esq.  
Duke Energy Florida  
106 East College Avenue, Suite 800  
Tallahassee, Florida 32301  
matthew.bernier@duke-energy.com

J. R. Kelly, Esq.  
Patricia Christensen, Esq.  
Charles Rehwinkel, Esq.  
Office of Public Counsel  
c/o The Florida Legislature  
111 West Madison Street, Room 812  
Tallahassee, Florida 32399  
kelly.jr@leg.state.fl.us  
christensen.patty@leg.state.fl.us  
rehwinkel.charles@leg.state.fl.us

Mike Cassel, Director/Regulatory and  
Governmental Affairs  
Florida Public Utilities Company  
911 South 8th Street  
Fernandina Beach, Florida 32034  
mcassel@fpuc.com

Paula K. Brown, Manager  
Tampa Electric Company  
Regulatory Coordinator  
Post Office Box 111  
Tampa, Florida 33601-0111  
regdept@tecoenergy.com

Jon C. Moyle, Esq.  
Moyle Law Firm, P.A.  
Attorneys for Florida Industrial Power  
Users Group  
118 N. Gadsden St.  
Tallahassee, Florida 32301  
jmoyle@moylelaw.com

By: /s/ John T. Butler  
John T. Butler  
Fla. Bar No. 283479

**BEFORE THE FLORIDA  
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION**

**DOCKET NO. 160001-EI  
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY**

**SEPTEMBER 30, 2016**

**IN RE: LEVELIZED FUEL COST RECOVERY  
AND CAPACITY COST RECOVERY**

**REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF:**

**GERARD J. YUPP**

1                   **BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION**

2                                   **FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY**

3                                   **REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF GERARD J. YUPP**

4                                   **DOCKET NO. 160001-EI**

5                                   **SEPTEMBER 30, 2016**

6

7   **Q.     Please state your name and address.**

8   A.     My name is Gerard J. Yupp. My business address is 700 Universe  
9           Boulevard, Juno Beach, Florida, 33408.

10 **Q.     By whom are you employed and what is your position?**

11 A.     I am employed by Florida Power and Light Company (“FPL”) as  
12           Senior Director of Wholesale Operations in the Energy Marketing  
13           and Trading Division.

14 **Q.     Did you previously submit direct testimony in this proceeding?**

15 A.     Yes.

16 **Q.     Are you sponsoring any rebuttal exhibits in this case?**

17 A.     No.

18 **Q.     What is the purpose of your rebuttal testimony?**

19 A.     The primary purpose of my testimony is to urge caution about  
20           moving forward with a risk-responsive hedging approach based on  
21           the limited support and evidence contained in the testimonies of  
22           Staff witnesses Michael A. Gettings and Mark Anthony Cicchetti.  
23           In addition, I will rebut the testimony of OPC witness Daniel J.

1 Lawton and his flawed contentions that hedging does not provide a  
2 benefit to customers and should be discontinued.

3 **Q. Please summarize your rebuttal testimony.**

4 A. My rebuttal testimony expresses concerns regarding the conclusion  
5 drawn by Staff witnesses Gettings and Cicchetti that risk-responsive  
6 hedging strategies are superior to fixed-percentage strategies.  
7 Witness Gettings has not provided any meaningful detail regarding  
8 the calculations he presents to support this conclusion. He has not  
9 included in either his narrative testimony or exhibits the specific data  
10 and calculations that would be necessary to properly evaluate the  
11 risk-responsive hedging approach. Based on this incomplete  
12 analysis, witness Cicchetti's recommendation that the Commission  
13 implement a risk-responsive hedging protocol because the analysis  
14 supposedly shows that it would be superior to a fixed-percentage  
15 approach and help limit losses to customers is premature.

16  
17 While FPL agrees with witnesses Gettings and Cicchetti that  
18 hedging has been and can continue to be beneficial to customers in  
19 reducing their exposure to fuel price volatility, FPL is concerned that  
20 implementing a risk-responsive hedging strategy today would not be  
21 appropriate without a full and transparent evaluation. If there is  
22 merit in witness Gettings' proposal, then a full review of all of the  
23 parameters and calculations used in his analysis should be

1 conducted. Furthermore, a more in-depth discussion regarding how  
2 risk-responsive parameters are defined and how those parameters  
3 fit into the framework of the existing Hedging Guidelines would be  
4 necessary.

5  
6 Witness Lawton's testimony reiterates the arguments for  
7 discontinuing hedging that the Commission rejected last year. He  
8 cites the Energy Information Administration's ("EIA's") Short Term  
9 Energy Outlook Publication for the proposition that natural gas  
10 prices are low and stable, but the very same publication shows a  
11 significant range between the prices at the upper and lower 95%  
12 confidence levels, with more than twice the exposure to price  
13 increases than there is to price decreases. This volatility and the  
14 asymmetry of its distribution suggests that hedging remains  
15 beneficial for customers.

16  
17 Finally, witness Lawton also touts a fuel cost recovery mechanism  
18 used by Entergy Texas Inc. ("ETI") as an alternative to hedging, but  
19 once the mechanism's mathematical calculations are understood, it  
20 becomes clear that the end result is a projection of fuel costs based  
21 on NYMEX forward curve settlement prices that is very similar to  
22 how FPL projects unhedged fuel costs. The ETI mechanism offers  
23 none of the volatility protection afforded by Florida's hedging

1 program.

2

3

**STAFF WITNESSES GETTINGS AND CICCHETTI**

4 **Q. In your opinion, does witness Gettings' testimony provide**  
5 **sufficient detail to support his conclusion that implementing a**  
6 **risk-responsive hedging strategy would provide superior**  
7 **results to a fixed-percentage approach?**

8 A. No. First, to be clear, FPL's intent is not to discredit the risk-  
9 responsive hedging approach presented by witness Gettings. FPL  
10 agrees that it is intuitively appealing and may have promise.  
11 However, FPL is concerned that implementing a risk-responsive  
12 approach based solely on the limited information presented by  
13 witness Gettings would be premature. His conclusion is based on  
14 simulations that he ran for the period from 2002 through 2011,  
15 utilizing forward prices and both risk-responsive and fixed-  
16 percentage hedge strategies.

17

18 Unfortunately, witness Gettings fails to provide the set of risk-  
19 responsive decision rules (parameters) he utilized in the simulation  
20 or the detailed calculations behind the graph he provided in Table 6  
21 on page 22 of his testimony. Nor does he provide an adequate  
22 justification for excluding the most recent four full years of available  
23 data (i.e., 2012-2015) from his analysis. Thus, while the results



1 appear promising, FPL would need to have a better understanding  
2 of his detailed decision rules and the calculations he performed in  
3 order to fully evaluate the simulations.

4 **Q. Has FPL attempted to apply witness Gettings' risk-responsive  
5 methodology to FPL's own hedging framework to evaluate how  
6 the different strategy would work?**

7 A. Yes. FPL attempted to test witness Gettings' methodology by  
8 applying the risk-responsive hedging principles he describes in his  
9 testimony and in his paper titled, "*Natural Gas Utility Hedging  
10 Practices and Regulatory Oversight*" that he prepared for the  
11 Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission in July 2015 to  
12 three historical months (February 2014, August 2015, and August  
13 2016). FPL then compared those results to the actual results of its  
14 fixed-percentage hedge program for the three months.

15 **Q. What are the results of FPL's analysis?**

16 A. First, it is important to note that FPL was not able to perform a  
17 complete analysis of witness Gettings' risk-responsive approach due  
18 to his failure to provide specific input data and the absence of any  
19 technical justifications for the parameters he established, such as  
20 action boundaries, the initial hedge ratio, and the maximum hedge  
21 ratio. In the absence of that information, FPL defined three separate  
22 cases for each month with varying decision parameters within the  
23 general framework provided by witness Gettings. This methodology

1 created three separate risk-responsive cases for each month tested,  
2 that FPL compared to its actual fixed-percentage results for each  
3 month.

4  
5 The results of FPL's analysis showed that the risk-responsive  
6 approach did not always outperform FPL's fixed-percentage  
7 approach. For example, the results of FPL's analysis for February  
8 2014 showed that FPL's fixed-percentage strategy was superior to  
9 all three risk-responsive cases by a minimum of nearly \$11 million.  
10 For the August 2015 analysis, FPL's actual results of its fixed-  
11 percentage strategy were worse than the best risk-responsive case  
12 by approximately \$19 million. Finally, FPL's analysis for August  
13 2016 showed that its fixed-percentage strategy ranked second of  
14 the four cases, coming in at slightly more than \$3.5 million higher in  
15 costs as compared to the best risk-responsive case, but nearly \$13  
16 million lower in cost than the least effective risk-responsive case.

17 **Q. Do these results mean that implementing risk-responsive**  
18 **hedging strategies could not prove to be an appropriate course**  
19 **of action?**

20 A. No. As I stated previously, the results that witness Gettings  
21 provides appear promising. On the other hand, FPL's analysis  
22 clearly underscores the sensitivity of the risk-responsive approach to  
23 the decision parameters that are set, which highlights FPL's

1 concerns related to the lack of detail provided by witness Gettings  
2 on how he arrived at his results. Prior to making the significant  
3 change in hedging that would result from mandating a risk-  
4 responsive approach, a deeper dive into the technical details and  
5 rationale for setting discretionary parameters should be completed  
6 in a transparent manner. All parties must fully understand the risk-  
7 responsive approach, including the pros and cons of this strategy.  
8 Implementing this strategy prior to a thorough review and  
9 understanding is premature.

10 **Q. On page 14 (Lines 6 through 11) of his testimony, witness**  
11 **Cicchetti indicates that while Staff was conducting research**  
12 **regarding financial hedging of fuel costs by regulated utilities,**  
13 **they became aware of risk-responsive hedge strategies and**  
14 **that an “analysis of the risk-responsive hedging strategies**  
15 **indicated they are superior to the typical targeted-volume**  
16 **approach generally practiced by regulated investor-owned**  
17 **utilities and should help minimize potential losses to**  
18 **customers.” Does witness Cicchetti present or discuss any**  
19 **analysis in support of that conclusion?**

20 **A.** No. Witness Cicchetti presumably has data that clearly supports the  
21 conclusion that risk-responsive hedging strategies are superior to a  
22 fixed-percentage approach, but his testimony does not provide or  
23 discuss that data. In the absence of further information, it is not

1 possible at this time for FPL to evaluate his conclusion.

2 **Q. In his Exhibit MAC-4, witness Cicchetti provides a summary of**  
3 **the results from a hedging practices survey that was**  
4 **conducted by the Commission's Division of Industry**  
5 **Development and Market Analysis ("IDM") on other state**  
6 **commissions. From the list of respondents, do the survey**  
7 **results indicate that other states have mandated the**  
8 **implementation of a risk-responsive hedging strategy?**

9 A. No. As described in witness Cicchetti's testimony, twelve states  
10 responded to the survey, and none of those respondents has  
11 mandated a risk-responsive hedging strategy. In fact, risk-  
12 responsive hedging strategies are not mentioned in any of the  
13 summaries provided by witness Cicchetti.

14

15 Particularly telling is the fact that the Washington Utilities and  
16 Transportation Commission has not mandated the implementation  
17 of a risk-responsive hedging program. Presumably, witness  
18 Gettings has been working with the Washington Commission on  
19 risk-responsive hedging since July 2015. The apparent reluctance  
20 of that commission to move quickly toward a risk-responsive  
21 approach reinforces my opinion that implementation of risk-  
22 responsive hedging without careful vetting would be premature.  
23 Clearly, this type of hedging program would be a significant

1 departure from this Commission's current approach and, if a change  
2 is warranted, it will take time to properly implement.

3 **Q. Does FPL have any other concerns regarding the risk-**  
4 **responsive hedging approach?**

5 A. Yes. If the Commission were to decide that the utilities should adopt  
6 a risk-responsive approach, the implementation of this approach  
7 should take place within the framework of the existing Hedging  
8 Guidelines that were approved in Order No. PSC-08-0667-PAA-EI  
9 issued on October 8, 2008. The Commission and the IOUs worked  
10 hard to establish hedging guidelines that provide a comprehensive  
11 framework for hedging. These guidelines and the requirements  
12 contained therein give the IOUs confidence that if they execute  
13 hedging activities in accordance with their approved Risk  
14 Management Plans, they will not be second-guessed about those  
15 activities later.

16  
17 To provide this same degree of confidence for the implementation of  
18 a risk-responsive hedging approach, key parameters that may  
19 significantly impact results, such as the initial hedge ratio, action  
20 boundaries, hedging increments, the max hedge ratio and  
21 appropriate contingent actions, should be clearly spelled out in each  
22 utility's Risk Management Plan. Once these parameters are defined  
23 in the Risk Management Plan, the utility should be deemed prudent

1 if it implements its hedging program in accordance with the defined  
2 parameters.

3 **Q. What does FPL suggest is the appropriate course of action for  
4 this Commission to evaluate risk-responsive hedging?**

5 A. FPL believes that it would be appropriate for the Commission to hold  
6 a series of workshops in which Staff, the Florida IOUs and other  
7 interested parties could address, first, whether the risk-responsive  
8 approach is indeed likely to outperform the existing fixed-percentage  
9 approach in a sufficiently wide range of fuel-price scenarios and  
10 decision parameters to warrant adopting it; and, if so, how it could  
11 be effectively implemented and monitored in a manner that protects  
12 customers and the IOUs alike.

13 **Q. On page 15, Line 25 through page 16, Line 4, witness Cicchetti  
14 states that FPL's, DEF's and TECO's 2017 Risk Management  
15 Plans do not reflect the modifications proposed in the Joint  
16 Petition by Investor-Owned Utilities for Approval of  
17 Modifications to the Risk Management Plans ("Joint Petition")  
18 filed on April 22, 2016 in Docket No. 160096-EI. Is this  
19 statement correct for FPL?**

20 A. No. FPL has modified its 2017 Risk Management Plan consistent  
21 with the modifications proposed in the Joint Petition by Investor-  
22 Owned Utilities for Approval of Modifications to Risk Management  
23 Plans filed on April 22, 2016 in Docket No. 160096-EI. Specifically,

1 FPL's 2017 Risk Management Plan for 2018 procurement reflects a  
2 25% reduction of natural gas hedges from the target approved in  
3 FPL's 2016 Risk Management Plan and FPL's 2017 Risk  
4 Management Plan reflects a limit on the future time horizon over  
5 which hedges may be placed.

6 **Q. On page 14 (Lines 19 through 23) of his testimony, witness**  
7 **Cicchetti recommends that the Commission implement the**  
8 **modifications requested in the Joint Petition by the IOUs to**  
9 **their respective 2017 Risk Management Plans on a transitional**  
10 **basis until a risk-responsive hedging protocol can be**  
11 **implemented. Does FPL agree with this approach?**

12 **A.** Yes. FPL believes that it would be reasonable for the Commission  
13 to approve FPL's 2017 Risk Management Plan and thus allow FPL  
14 to place hedges in 2017 consistent with it, while the Commission  
15 could proceed if it wishes with workshops to discuss the risk-  
16 responsive approach and its potential implementation.

17

18 **OPC WITNESS LAWTON**

19 **Q. Witness Lawton recommends the elimination of financial**  
20 **natural gas hedging for many reasons, including substantial**  
21 **hedging losses, current and projected stable market prices,**  
22 **and the current fuel factor design and mid-course correction**  
23 **mechanism. Do you agree with his assessment?**

1 A. No. Witness Lawton has essentially provided the same arguments  
2 in testimony that he provided in last year's proceeding. In fact, he  
3 has included his prior testimony as an exhibit to his current  
4 testimony, and it comprises the majority of the pages that he filed.  
5 The Commission did not find his arguments to be persuasive in that  
6 proceeding and should not find them so in this proceeding.

7  
8 Witness Lawton makes very general observations and broad  
9 statements regarding stable market prices and reduced volatility  
10 without providing supporting data. For example, he provides the  
11 EIA's forecast of \$2.87/MMBtu for the average Henry Hub price in  
12 2017 and EIA's prediction of "low stable natural gas prices over the  
13 short-run forecast." He goes on to state that "price volatility is not  
14 expected to be an issue," without providing any factual support.

15  
16 In the same Short-Term Energy Outlook publication that included  
17 the forecast price of \$2.87/MMBtu, the EIA also provided an  
18 analysis of that forecast's upper and lower 95% confidence  
19 intervals. The corresponding upper and lower limits are  
20 \$5.40/MMBtu and \$1.80/MMBtu, respectively. This is a substantial  
21 price range, which demonstrates that, contrary to witness Lawton's  
22 claim that volatility is not an issue, volatility remains an issue in the  
23 natural gas market. FPL provided a similar analysis for 2018 natural



1 gas prices in response to OPC's Third Request for Production of  
2 Documents No. 4, which further confirmed that volatility remains in  
3 the natural gas market.

4 **Q. Staff witnesses Gettings and Cicchetti observe that natural gas**  
5 **prices are lognormally distributed, meaning that the magnitude**  
6 **of significant cost increases tends to be much greater than the**  
7 **magnitude of significant cost decreases. Does the EIA data**  
8 **that you referenced above illustrate this asymmetry?**

9 A. Yes. In simple terms, the EIA's analysis shows that, based on an  
10 expected average price of \$2.87/MMBtu, one could be 95%  
11 confident that average prices would be higher than \$1.80/MMBtu  
12 and lower than \$5.40/MMBtu. The asymmetry between these lower  
13 and upper limits is readily apparent: the lowest probable average  
14 price is \$1.07/MMBtu below the expected average price, while the  
15 highest probable average price is \$2.53/MMBtu higher than the  
16 average expected price. I made this same point in my rebuttal  
17 testimony in last year's proceeding. Finally, it is worth noting that  
18 both witnesses Gettings and Cicchetti point to an additional  
19 asymmetry that supports the value of hedging: customers derive  
20 greater value from hedging cost mitigation than they forego from  
21 hedging losses.

22

23

1 **Q. On pages 17 and 18 of his testimony, witness Lawton presents**  
2 **what he describes as a financial hedging alternative based on**  
3 **an example of how ETI calculates its bi-annual fuel factor. Is**  
4 **the ETI methodology a valid alternative to hedging?**

5 A. No. In fact, the mathematical consequence of the ETI methodology  
6 is almost identical to the methodology that FPL currently uses to set  
7 its fuel factors on an annual basis. In examining the relevant steps  
8 of the nine-step process that witness Lawton describes, it appears  
9 that ETI takes its actual natural gas costs for the prior twelve months  
10 and then multiplies those costs by a market factor that is the ratio of  
11 the next 12 months NYMEX settlement prices and the prior 12  
12 months NYMEX settlement prices. The result of this calculation  
13 yields projected fuel costs for the next six months that are based on  
14 NYMEX settlement prices.

15  
16 FPL also utilizes NYMEX forward curve settlement prices to  
17 calculate its projected natural gas costs for the following year. For  
18 example, FPL's 2017 Projection Filing is based on monthly NYMEX  
19 settlement prices for 2017 as of the close of business on August 1,  
20 2016. So, at the end of the day, ETI is setting its fuel factors on the  
21 basis of NYMEX settlement prices, just the same as FPL does.  
22 Unfortunately, ETI stops there, while FPL does not. Setting a fuel  
23 factor based on NYMEX forward curve settlement prices, regardless

1 of the mathematical steps taken to get there, does not provide any  
2 protection against the volatility that exists between the forward  
3 curves and actual spot prices that will prevail when the fuel is  
4 actually purchased. It is no alternative to hedging.

5 **Q. On page 19 of his testimony, witness Lawton goes on to claim**  
6 **that ETI customers have no risk of suffering hedging losses.**

7 **What is your reaction to this statement?**

8 A. This statement is true but misleading. ETI customers have no risk  
9 of suffering hedging losses, because the ETI approach doesn't  
10 provide any of the volatility mitigation that is achieved by hedging.  
11 Witness Lawton fails to mention that ETI customers bear 100% of  
12 the risk if prices increase.

13 **Q. Does this conclude your testimony?**

14 A. Yes it does.