S&P Global Corporate Ratings Matrix

Business Risk and Financial Risk Profile Matrix

--Financial risk profile--

Business risk						@ /Line1.
profile	1 (minimal)	2 (modest)	1 (minimal) 2 (modest) 3 (intermediate) 4 (significant) 5 (aggressive) leveraged)	4 (significant)	5 (aggressive)	o (nigniy leveraged)
1 texpellenti	393 '984	e e	т т	. o	ppp	020- pp+
2/strong	33/33	14 - 10 10 - 4-10	4bbb+	qqq	s QQ	35
3 isatisfactory:	3/3~	- aqq	-440, 444	+qq:-qqq	84	ż,
ې زوغاند	-પંદાય, પઉસ	Phi:	F49	bb	- q q	۵
ร์ (พอลนา	⊅QQ	bby	95	bb-	p+	-d:0
8 (vulnerable:	. C) G	-qq	-460	č	a.	مُ

Source: S&P Global - How We Rate Nonfinancial Corporate Entities - April 2019

Financial Risk Indactiave Ratios - Corporates

Cash Flow/Leverage Analysis Ratios--Medial Volatility

	Core	Core ratios	ā	ratios	Supplem	Supplementary payback ratios	k ratios
	FFO/debt (%)	Debt/EBITDA (x)	FF0/cash interest (x)	EBITDA/interest	CFO/debt (%)	FOCF/debt (%)	DCF/debt (%)
Minimal	20+	less than 1.75	10.5+	14+	40+	30+	18+
Madest	35-50	1.75-2.5	7.5-10.5	9-14	27.5-40	.7.5-30	11-18
Internediate	23-35	2.5-3.5	5-7.5	8-9	5-9 18.5-27.5	9.5-17.5	6.5-11
Significant	13-23	3.5-4.5	3-5	2,75-5	2,75-5 10,5-18.5	5-9.5	2.5-6.5
Aggressive	9-13	4.5-5.5	1.75-3	1.75-2.75	7-10,5	0-5	(11)-2.5
Highly Ieveraged	Less than	Less than Greater than 9 5.5	Less than	Less than 1.75	Less than	Less than Less than 0	Less than

Source: S&P Global - Corporate Methodology - November 2013

PEOPLES GAS SYSTEM, INC. DOCKET NO. 20230023-GU OPC'S FIRST REQUEST FOR PODS FILED: MAY 11, 2023

Moody's Key Financial Metrics

Cas	A 100	京	< 1%	(%5) >	< (5%)	275%	×75%
ක	10x · 2.0x	18.5%	1% - 5%	%0 - (%5)	(5%) · 0%	85% - 75%	67% - 75%
8	2.04 - 3.02	5% - 13%	5% - 11%	%65 - %Q	9% - 7%	55% - 65%	59%·67%
es Es	3 Ox - 4.5x	13% - 22%	11% - 19%	9% - 17%	7% - 15%	45% - 55%	50% - 59%
ব	4.5x-60x	22% - 30%	19% - 27%	17% - 25%	15% - 23%	35% - 45%	40% - 50%
e e	6 Ox - 8 Ox	30% - 40%	27% - 38%	25% . 35%	23% - 34%	25% - 35%	29% - 40%
e.c.	×0 8 ≥	z 40%	38%	235%	34%	× 25%	50€ >
		Standard Grid	Low Business Risk Grid	Standard Grid	Low Business Face God	Standard Grid	Low Business Rist Crid
Sub- Factor Weighting	7.50%	15 00%		30 Ot		7.50%	
Welghting 40%	CFO pre-WC + Interest / Interest	CFO pre-WC / Debt		CFO pre-WC - Dividends / Debt		Debt / Capitalization	

Source: Moody's Investors Service - Regulated Electric and Gas Utilities Rating Methodology - June 2017

PEOPLES GAS SYSTEM, INC. DOCKET NO. 20230023-GU OPC'S FIRST REQUEST FOR PODS FILED: MAY 11, 2023

Appendix A: Regulated Electric and Gas Utilities Methodology Factor Grid

Factor 1a: Legislative and Judicial Underpinnings of the Regulatory Framework (12.5%)

Usily regulation cours under a fully developed framework that is mitional in scope based outergelien framework that provide returning, an unquestioned course, and the provide returning an unquency life cases by invastments, an underned life cases by invastments, which utilities will be reguled and perceptions enthed an operation of the cases of the mame in which utilities will be reguled and perception enthed and perception of the cases of comprehended and perception of the cases of the mame in which utilities will be reguled and perception of the cases of

Baa

Till best credity quality in general and sufficiently supportive.

Whites credit quality in general and sufficiently forwardbeing 50 as to address problems before they occurred.

There is an indiquentate that greater and the utility should

RATING METHODOLOGY: REGULATED ELECTRIC AND GAS I

Factor 1b: Consistency and Predictability of Regulation (12.5%)

Basa The issuer's interaction with the regulator has led to an adequate track record. The regulator is generally consistent and predictable, but there may some evidence of inconsistency or unpredictability from time to time, or decisions may at times be politically charged. However, instances of less credit supportive decisions are based on reasonable application of existing rules and statutes and are not overly punitive. We expect these conditions to continue.		
The issuer's interaction with the regulator has led to a track record of largely predictable and consistent decisions. The regulator may be somewhat less credit supportive of utilities in general, bur has been quire credit supportive of the issuer in most circumstances. We expect these conditions to continue.	Caa	We expect that regulatory decisions will be highly unpredictable and frequently be highly unpredictable and frequently deverse, based either on the issue's tract record of interaction with regulators or other governing bodies, or our viewthat decisions will move in this direction. Alternately, decisions may have credit supportive aspects, but may often be unenforceable. The regulator's authority may have been seriously eroded by legislative or political action. The regulator may consistently ignore the framework to the detriment of the issuer.
The issuer's interaction with the regulator has a led to a considerable track record of predominantly predictable and consistent decisions. The regulator is mostly credit supportive of utilities in generaland in almost all instances has been highly credit supportive of the issuer. We expect these conditions to continue.	æ	We expect that regulatory decisions will be largely unpredictable or even somewhat arbitrary, based either on the issuer's track record of interaction with regulators or other governing bodies, or our view that decisions will move in this direction. Howeve, we expect that the issuer will ultimately be able to obtain support when it encounters financial stress, albeit with material or more extended delays, Atternately, the regulator is untested, lacks a consistent track record, or is undergoing substantial change. The regulator's authority may be eroded on frequent occasions by legislative or political action. The regulator may more frequently ignore the framework in a manner detrimental to the issuer.
The issuer's interaction with the regulator has led to a strong, lengthy track record of predictable, consistent and favorable decisions. The regulator is highly credit supportive of the issuer and utilities in general. We expect these conditions to continue.	Ба	We expect that regulatory decisions will demonstrate considerable inconsistency or unpredictability or that decisions will be politicially charged, based aither on the issuer's track record of interaction with regulators or other governing bodies, or our view that decisions will move in this direction. The regulator may have a history of its scredit supportive regulatory decisions with respect to the issuer, but we expect that the issuer will be able to obtain support when it encounteer financial stress, with some potentiality material delays. The regulator's authority may be exorded at times by legislative or political action. The regulator may not follow the framework for

Factor Za: Timeliness of Recovery of Operating and Capital Costs (12.5%)

į	Fuel, purchassed power and all other highlyvariable expenses are generally recovered through mechanisms incorporating delays of less than one year, although some rapid increases in costs mapbe delayed longer where such deferrals do not place financial stress on the utility, incremental capital investments may be recovered primarily through general rate cases with moderate lag, with some through tartiff formulas. Alternately, there may be formula rates that are untested or unclear. Potentially greater tandency for delays due to regulatory intervention, although this will generally be fimiled to rates related to large capital projects or rapid increases in operating costs.	
ব	Automatic cost recovery mechanisms provide full and reasonably timely recovery of fuel, purchased power and all other highly variable operating expenses. Material capital investments may be made under tariff formulas or other rate-making permitting reasonably contemporaneous returns, or may be submitted under other types of filings that provide recovery of cost of capital with minimal delay. Instances of regulatory challenges that delay rate increases or cost recovery are generally related to large, unexpected increases in sizeable construction projects. By statute or by practice, general rate cases are reasonably efficient, primarily focused on an impartial raview, of a reasonable duration before rates (either permanent or non-retundable interim rates) can be collected, and permit inclusion of important forward -looking costs.	200
Aa	Tariff formulas and automatic cost recovery mechanisms provide full and highly timely recovery of all operating costs and essentially contemporaneous or near-contemporaneous return on most incremental capital investments, with minimal challenges by regulators to companies' cost assumptions. By statute and by practice, general rate cases are efficient, focused on an impartial review, of a very reasonable unation appealable interim rates can be collected, and primarily permit inclusion of forward-looking costs.	ED.
Asa	Tariff formulas and automatic cost recovery mechanisms provide full and highly timely recovery of all operating costs and essentially contemporaneous return on all incremental deaplal investments, with statutory provisions in place to practude the possibility of challenges to rate increases or cost recovery mechanisms. By statute and bactice, general rate cases are efficient, focused on an imparital raview, quick, and permit inclusion of fully forward -Looking costs.	Ba

Can	The expectation that fuel, purchased power or other highly variable expenses will be recovered may be subject to extensive delays due to second-guessing of spending decisions by regulators or due to political intervention. Recovery of costs related to capital investments may be uncertain, subject to delays that are extensive, or that may be likely to discourage even necessary investment.
	d The expectation that fatel, purchased power or other height variable expenses will be recovered maybe subject to material delays due to second-guessing of spending decisions by regulators or due to political intervention. by regulators or due to political intervention. by regulators or due to political intervention. investments may be subject to delays that are material to the issuer, or may be likely to discourage some important investment.

Note: Tariff formulas include formula rate plans as well as trackers and riders related to capital investment.

power or other highly variable expenses will eventually be recovered with delays that will not place material financial stress on the utility, but there may be some evidence of an unwillingness by regulators to make timely rate changes to address volatility in fuel, or purchased power, or other market-sensitive expenses. Recovery of costs related to capital investments may be subject to delays that are somewhat lengthy, but not so pervasive as to be expected to discourage important investments.

RATING METHODOLOGY REGULATED ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILITIES

JUNF 23, 2017

There is an expectation that fuel, purchased

Factor 2b: Sufficiency of Rates and R	Sates and Returns (12.5%)		
सेलक	As	a	Баа
Sufficiency of rates to cover costs and attract capital is (and will continue to be) unquestioned.	Rates are (and we expect will continue to be) set at a level that permits full cost recovery and a fair return on all investments, with minimal challenges by regulators to companies' cost assumptions. This will translate to returns (measured in relation to equity, total assets, rate base or regulatory asset value, as applicable) that are strong relative to global peers.	Rates are (and we expect will continue to be) set at a level that generally provides full cost recovery and a fair return on investments, with limited instances of regulatory challenges and disallowances. In general, this will translate to returns (measured in relation to equity, total assets, rate base or regulatory asset assets, rate base or regulatory asset assets, rate base or regulatory asset above a warage relative to global peers, but may at times be average.	Rates are (and we expect will continue to be) set at alevel that generally provides full operating cost recovery and a mostly fair rectum on investments, but there may be somewhat more return on investments, but there may be somewhat more instances of regulatory challenges and disallowances, although ultimate rate outcomes aresulficient to attract capital without difficulty, in general, this will translate to returns (measured in relation to equity, total assets, rate base or regulatory asset value, as applicable) that are average relative to global peers, but may at times be somewhat below average.
Ва	RS.	Caa	
Rates are (and we expect will continue to be) set at a level that generally provides recovery of most operating costs but return on invastments may be less predictable, and there may be decidedly more instances of regulatory challenges and disallowances, but ultimate rate outcomes are generally sufficient to attract capital. In general, this will translate to returns (measured in relation to equity, total assets, rate base or regulatory asset value, as applicable, that are generally below average relative to global peets, or where allowed returns are average but difficult to earn. Alternately, the tariff formula may not take into account all cost components and/or remuneration of investments may be unclear or at times unfavorable.	We expect rates will be set at a level that at times fails to provide recovery of costs other than each octs, and regulators may engage in somewhat arbitrary second-guessing of spending decisions or deny rate increases related to funding ongoing operations based much more on politics than on purdency reviews. Return on investments may be set at levels that discourage investments may be set at levels that discourage investments when expect that rate outcomes may be difficult or uncertain, negatively affecting continued access to capital. Alternately, the tariff formula may fail to take into account significant cost components other into account significant cost components other investments may be generally unfavorable.	We expect rates will be set at a level that often fails to provide recovery of cash costs makerial costs, and recovery of cash costs may also be at risk. Regulators may engage in more arbitrary second-guessing of sperding decisions or deny rate increases related to funding ongoing operations based primarily on politics. Return on investments may be set at levels that discourage necessary maintenanca investment. We expect that rate outcomes may often be punitive or highly uncertain, with a markedly negative impact on access to capital. Alternately, the tariff formula may fail to take into account significant cash cost components, and/or remuneration of investments may be primarily unfavorable.	

ractor 3: Dive	Factor 3: Diversification (10%)			
Welghting 10%	Sub-Factor Weighting Aaa	Aa	অ	, r
Market Position	5% * A very high degree of multinational and regional diversity in terms of regulatory regimes and/or service teritory economies.	Material operations in three or more nations or substantial geographic regions providing very good diversity of regulatory regimes and/or service territory economies.	Material operations in two to three nations, states, provinces or regions that provide good diversity of regulatory regimes and service tentiory economies. Alternately, operates within a single regulatory regime with low volatifity, and the service tentiory economy is robust, has a very high degree of diversity and has demonstrated resilience in economic coptes.	May operate under a single regr volatility, or where muttiple re providingmuch diversity. The s some concentration and cyclical can absorb reasonably fore
Generation and Fuel Diversity	5% ** A high degree of diversity in terms of generation and/or itell sources such that the utility and rate-payers are well insulated from commodity price changes, no generation concentration, and very low exposures to Challenged or Threatened Sources (see definitions below).	of Very good diversification in terms In of generation and/or thei cources such that the utility and rate- payers are affected only minimally by commodity price changes, little generation concentration, and low exposures to Challenged or Threatened Sources.	Good diversification in terms of generation and/or fuel sources such that the utility and rate-payers have only modest exposure to commodity price dianges; however, may have some concentration in a source that is neither Challeuged nor Threatened. Exposure to Threatened Sources; is low. While there may be some exposure to Challenged Sources, it is not a cause for contenn.	Adequate diversification in terms of generation and/or fuel sources such that the utility and rate-payers have moderate exposure to commodity price changes; however, may have some conventration in a source trial is Challenged. Exposure to Threatened Sources is moderate, while exposure to Challenged Sources is manageable.
	Sub-Factor Weighting Ba	ස		Dafriléine
Market Position	5% * Operates in a market area with somewhat greater concentration and Ordizality in the service territory occupanty and/or exposure to storms and other natural disasters, and thus less resilience to absorbing reasonably foreseeable increases in utility rates. May show somewhat greater volatility in the regulatory regime(s).	Operates in a limited manket area of with marketal concentration and more severe cyclicality in service is territory seconomy such that cycles is are of marketally longer duration or easonably foreseable increases in utility rates could present a malerial challenge to the economy. Service territory may have geographic concentration that limits its resilience to storms and circles in service territory may have geographic concentration that limits its resilience to storms and circle in a manual disasters, or may be an emerging market. May show decided volatify in the regulatory regime(s).	Operates in a concentrated economicservice territory with pronounced concentration, macroeconomic risk factors, and/or exposure to ratural disasters.	Challenged Sources are generation plants that face higher but not insurmountable economic hurdes resulting from penalities or taxes outther operation, or from environmental ungodes that are required or likely to be required. Some examples are carbonemistis or coatists to operate, and plants that must buy emission or cells to operate, and plants that must buy environmental equipment to confirms to operate, in each where the taxes/cells/upgandes are sufficient to have a material impact on those plants' competitiveness relative to other generation types or on the utility's rates, but where the impact is not so severe as to be likely require plant closure.
Generation and Fuel Diversity	5% ** Modest diversification in generation and of netsconces such that the utility or rate, popers have greate exposure to commodity price changes. Exposure to Challenged and Threatened Sources may be more pronounced, but the utility will be able to access alternative sources without tindue financial stress.	Operates with little diversification in generation and/or fuel sources such that the utility or rate-payers have high exposure to commodify of price changes. Exposure to Challenged and Threatened Sources may be high, and accessing attendate sources may be challenging and causes more financial stress, but ultimately feasible.	Operates with high concentration in generation and/or fuel sources such that the utility or rate-payers have expounder to commodify price shocks. Exposure to Challenged and Threstened Sources may be very high, and accessing alternate sources may be highly uncertain.	Threatened Sources are generation plants that are not currently able to operate due to major unplanned outages or issues with licensing or orbite regulatory complience, and plants that are highly likely to be required to de- activate, whether due to the effectiveness of currently existing or expected rules and regulations or due to examine challenges. Some recentral examples would include cost life op plants in the US that are not economic to reto-fit to meet mercury and air toxics standards, plants that cannot meet thereforce date of those standards, muchen plants in plant that have not been licensed to re-start after the Evdushima Dai-Lini accident, and muchen plants that are required to be phased out

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PEOPLES GAS SYSTEM, INC. DOCKET NO. 20230023-GU OPC'S FIRST REQUEST FOR PODS FILED: MAY 11, 2023

Factor 4: Financial Strength									
Weighting 40%	Sub-Factor Weighting		Aaa	Ås	*	10 15 163	60 20	pt.	e e
CFO pre-WC+Interest / Interest	7.5%		X8 A	x8- x9	4.5x - 6x	3x - 4.5x	Zx-3x	lx - 2x	4. k
		Standard Grid	≥ 40%	30% - 40%	22%-30%	13% - 22%	5% - 13%	1% - 5%	× 1%
CFO pre-WC / Debt	15%								
		Low Business Risk Grid ≥ 38%	≥38%	27%-38%	19% - 27%	11%-19%	5% - 11%	1%-5%	×1%
		Standard Grid	≥35%	25%-35%	17% - 25%	9% - 17%	%6-%0	(5%) - 0%	< (5%)
CFO pre-WC - Dividends / Debt	¥01								(Care)
		Low Business Risk Grid ≥ 34%	×34%	23% -34%	15%-23%	7%-15%	0%-7%	(5%) ~ 0%	< (5%)
		Standard Grid	< 25%	25% - 35%	35% - 45%	45% - 55%	55% - 65%	65% - 75%	>75%
Debt / Capitalization	7.5%	THE PARTY OF THE P							
		Low Business Risk Grid < 29%	< 29%	29% - 40%	40% - 50%	50% - 59%	59% - 67%	67% - 75%	≥ 75%

RATING METHODOLOGY: REGULATED ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILITIES

4 IUNE 23, 2017

Fitch Key Rating Factors

Key Rating Factors

Sector risk profile	п	Financial profile
Country risk	e	Cash flow and profitability
Management strategy/governance	0	Financial structure
Group structure	6-	Financial floxebith
Business profile		And the second s
Source: Firch Ratings		

Source: Fitch Ratings - Corporate Rating Criteria - December 2020

FitchRatings

CORPORATES - SECTOR NAVIGATOR

Sector-Specific Key Factors - US Utilities, Power and Gas

	Regulatory Environment	Market Position	Asset Base and Operations	Commodity Exposure
tating	Degree of Transparency and Predictability	Market Structure	Diversity of Assets	Ability to Pass Through Changes in Fuel
iā	na.	na.	អង	ha
	Track record of transparent and predictable regulation	Well-established market structure with complete transparency in price-setting mechanisms,	High-quality and for large-scale diversified assets.	Complete pass-timough of commodity costs.
ado	Generally transparent and predictable regulation with finited political interference.	Established market structure but some level of uncertainty in price-setting mechanisms.	Good quality end/or reasonable scale diversified assets.	Limited exposure to changes in commodity costs.
ab	Poor or uncertain track record of regulation and high political interference.	Still evolving market structure and uncertain price- setting mechanisms.	Small size and limited diversification.	Inability to pass through all changes in commodity costs.
,	Hostile regulatory or political jurisdiction or frequent regulatory interference in market-based mechanisms.	High risk to market structure from regulatory or positical interference.	Low quality, small size and highly concentrated assets.	High exposure to commodity pace changes.
icc	Regulatory framework formally or informally abandoned, with substantial uncertainty around future mechanisms.	Market framework formally or informally abandoned, with substantial uncertainty around future mechanisms.	na.	Substantial cash impairments crystalized or about to as a result of the failure of denvative and physica hedging measures.
	Timeliness of Cost Recovery	Consumption Growth Trend	Operations Reliability and Cost Competitiveness	Underlying Supply Mix
15	na.	ла	RB.	ΠÆ
1	Minimalisg to recover capital and operating costs,	Economically vibrant market or service territory with strong sales growth.	Track record of retable, fow-cost operations.	Extremely low cost and Fexible supply.
obb	Marke are lag to recover capital and operating costs.	Customer and usage growth in line with industry averages.	Refability and cost of operations at par with industry	Leave-robbe costs and modernie fisolophy of supply
ıb	Significant lag to recover capital and operating costs.	Exposure to declining usage or volumes or self- generation.	Below-average system reliability and cost specifice.	High variable costs and lamited tlexibility of supply:
	Material delays in recovering capital and operating costs.	Rapidly shrinking market or service territory and falling unit consumption.	Poor system reliability and disadvantageous cost structure.	Extreme variability in costs and minimal flexibility of supply.
00	Regulatory framework formely or informally abandoned with substantial uncertainty around future mechanisms.	Customer base, key personnel or metarial operational facilities experiencing a level of flux dust significantly impairs cash generation.	Subject to advanced regulatory intervention with material racks for concession ownership preservation of capital structure.	Substantial cash impairments crystalized or about to as a result of the failure of supply purchasing strategies.
	Trend in Authorized ROEs	CustomerMix	Exposure to Environmental Regulations	Hedging Strategy
ā	n.a.	na	na	na
	Above-average authorized ROL.	Favorable customer mix	No exposure to environmental regulations.	Highly captive supply and customer base.
bb	Average authorized ROE.	l ass diversified customer base	Limited or manageable exposure to environmental regulations.	Long-term supply and sales contracts with creditworthy counterparties.
b	Significantly below-average authorized ROC	High concentration of customers in cyclical industries.	Significant exposure to environmental regulations	Medium-term hedging strategy for supply and sales
	Absence of regulatory ROE.	High concentration to risky less creditworthy customers.	Merchant generator with a material exposure to highly policiting technology.	Minimal hodging of supply and sales or nightly speculative Dading positions.
oc	Regulatory framowork formally or Informally abandoned, with substantial uncertainty around future mechanisms.	Substantial cash impalment crystalized or about to, the to counterparty failures, including systemic collection failures.	Substantial cash impairment crystalized, or about to, due to multiple, puritive environmental cost burdens.	Substantial cash impairments crystalized or about to as a result of the failure of derivative and physical hedging measures.
	Mechanisms Available to Stabilize Cash Flows	Geographic Location	Capital and Technological Intensity of Capex	neckus meanus.
)	na	na	na.	
	Receives fully insulated from variability in consumption,	Favorable location or high geographic diversity.	Low levels of servestment requirements	
ab	Revenues particly insulated from variability in consumption.	Banefic'el location or reasonable locational diversity.	Moderate re swash cents rensinar ents in established technologies.	
•	Revenues fully exposed to variability in consumption.	High sensitivity to extreme weather or disaster disruptions.	Roinvestment concentrated in capital-intensive or unproxen lechnologies	
	Revenues fully exposed to declining consumption.	High exposure to event risk.	High exposure to execution risk for projects involving large outlays or unproven technologies.	
r	Regulatory farmswork formally or informally abandoned with substantial discertainly around falue mechanisms.	Concentration in one location with disruptive economic or logistical characteristics impairing either operation or class collections	Substantial cash Impairment crystalized, or about to, due to the failure or cost over-lan of a major project.	
	Mechanisms Supportive of Creditworthiness	Supply Demand Dynamics	a in an analysis kidger	A AND A STATE OF STAT
	na	na		774 AVI (4)
	Effective regulatory ring-fencing	Beneficial outlook for prices/retes		
ıb	Effective regulatory ring-fencing or minimum	Moderately favorable outlook for prices/rates		
	Effective regulatory ring-foncing or minimum creditworthiness requirements. Limited regulatory ring-fencing or manimum creditworthiness regulatory ring-fencing or manimum.	Moderately favorable outlook for prices/rates. Uncertain outlook for prices/rates.		
	Effective regulatory risp-fencing or minimum creditworthiness requirement. United regulatory ring-fencing or minimum creditworthiness requirements. Absence of minimum creditworthiness requirements.	Moderately favorable outlook for prices/rates. Uncertain outlook for prices/rates. Extremely unfavorable outlook for prices/rates.		

FitchRatings

CORPORATES - SECTOR NAVIGATOR

Financial Profile Key Factors — US Utilities, Power and Gas

	Profitability	Financial Structure	Financial Flexibility
Rating	Free Cash Flow	FFO Leverage	Financial Discipline
aa	na	na	Publicly annuanced conservative finencial policy. Trads record of strict compliance
	Structurally neutral to positive FCF across the Investment cycle.	35 _k	Clear commitment formaintain a conservative policy with only modest deviations allowed.
фЬ	Structurally neutral to negative FCF across the investment cycle.	5Ωx	Less conservative policy, but generally applied consistently
bb	Structurally negative FCF across the kwestment cycle.	6.5x	Financial policies in place but flexibility in applying them could lead to temporarily exceeding downgrade guidelines.
b	Structurally heavily negative FCF across the investment cycle.	7.0x	No financial policy or track record of ignoring it Opportunistic behavior
coc	Negative FCF burden greater than all projected regulatory parameters, and negative operational cash flow the form.	>9.0x	Financial management has lost much of its discipline, and subject to frequent, sudden changes consistent with a crisis environment.
	Volatility of Profitability	Total Debt with Equity Credit/Op. EBITDA	Liquidity
90	na	na	Very confortable liquidity, no need to use extensel funding in the next 24 months over- under a several stress scenario. Well-spread nebt maturity Diversitied sources of funding.
n .	Higher stability and predictability of profits relative to utility peers.	3.25x	Very comfortable liquidity. No need to use external funding in the next 12 months even under a severe stress scenario. Well-spread debt maturity schedule, Diversified sources of Austing.
bbb	Stability and predictability of profes in line with utility peers.	3.75x	One-year Equipility ratio above 1.25x Well-spread maturity schedule of debt but funding may be less diversified.
b	Lower statistry and precistability of profits relative to utility peers.	4.75x	Liquidity ratio anxind 1.0x. Less amount debt maturity or concentrated funding.
•	Stability and predictability of profits viewed as negative outliers relative to utility peers.	5.0x	Equidity-alio below 1.0s. Overly relant on one funding source.
00	Volability of profits greater than corned bounds of volatility for corporate sector as a whole.	>8,fix	No near-term prospect of recovery in liquidity score above 1.0x AI /most funding sources subject to material execution risk.
			FFO Interest Coverage
à		7,000	ha
			5.5x
ob			4.5x
,		•	3.5x
			2.0λ
œ			Net FCF debt service cover below 1 0x Al/most funcing sources subject to material execution risk.