Discussion
of Issues
Issue 1:
Should the Joint Request for Oral Argument be
granted?
Recommendation:
No. Staff believes that the information in the Joint
Motion for Reconsideration is sufficient for the Commission to make an informed
decision, and that the movants have not shown with particularity a reason why
oral argument would assist the Commission in understanding and evaluating the
issues to be decided. If the Commission chooses to grant the Joint Request for
Oral Argument, staff believe that ten minutes per side for oral argument would
be sufficient. (Stiller, Sparks)
Staff Analysis:
Legal Standard
Rule 25-22.0022(1), F.A.C., allows a party to request oral
argument before the Commission on a motion for reconsideration. This request
must be filed concurrently with the motion for reconsideration, and must state
with particularity why oral argument would aid the Commission in understanding
and evaluating the issues to be decided. Granting or denying oral argument is
within the Commission’s sole discretion. Rule 25-22.0022(3), F.A.C.
Positions of the Parties
The Non-Signatories assert that oral argument would aid
the Commission in understanding the “novel and recent” issues raised in the
Joint Motion, which they assert are of great public importance. The
Non-Signatories also posit that argument would allow them to provide context
and to be available to answer any questions.
FPL counters that the Non-Signatories have not stated with
particularity which issues in the Joint Motion are novel or recent, and have
failed to make the threshold demonstration for the Commission to allow oral
argument.
Analysis
The information in the Joint Motion for Reconsideration is
sufficient for the Commission to make an informed decision. The movants have
not shown with particularity a reason why oral argument would assist the
Commission in understanding and evaluating the issues to be decided.
Conclusion
Staff recommends that the Joint Request be denied. If the
Joint Request is granted, the Commission should allow no more than 10 minutes
per side for oral argument.
Issue 2:
Should the Joint Motion for Reconsideration of Final
Order be granted?
Recommendation:
Staff recommends that the Joint Motion for
Reconsideration of Final Order be granted in part and denied in part as set
forth below. (Stiller, Sparks)
Staff Analysis:
Legal Standard
The
Joint Motion raises five issues, each of which will be addressed in turn below.
1. Stochastic
Loss of Load Probability
The stochastic loss of load probability (SLOLP)
refers to the output of a methodology (stochastic) used to calculate the
likelihood (probability) that a utility will not be able to provide sufficient
electricity to all ratepayers for some period of time (loss of load). The SLOLP
is expressed as a percentage or fraction reflecting expected occurrence per
year(s). In its as-filed case, FPL relied upon the SLOLP to demonstrate that
anticipated losses of load justified a need for the requested generation and
storage capacity additions. FPL did not expressly rely upon the SLOLP as
support for the solar generation and battery storage additions contained in the
2025 SSA. The 2025 SSA did not specify a particular methodology – SLOLP or otherwise
– that will be used to support future resource additions in 2027, 2028, and
2029.
Positions
of the Parties
In
the Joint Motion, the Non-Signatories disagree with the premise that the SLOLP
was not the foundation for the battery and solar additions approved in the 2025
SSA. The Non-Signatories argue that, whether expressly mentioned or not, the
SLOLP is the only methodology in the record that could possibly support FPL’s
requests in the 2025 SSA. The Non-Signatories emphasize that 70 pages of FEL’s post-hearing
brief was dedicated to demonstrating the inadequacy of SLOLP to support
“billions of dollars in battery storage and solar facilities in 2025, 2026, and
2027.”
The Non-Signatories argue that the Final Order overlooks their lengthy
arguments that the SLOLP submitted and relied upon in this proceeding was based
on biased inputs and, therefore, is not competent substantial evidence. The
Non-Signatories further argue that the Final Order also overlooks the lack of
evidence in this record regarding the general validity of the methodology.
Specifically
as to the 2025-2027 battery additions, the Non-Signatories contend that the
only finding in the Final Order regarding SLOLP is “the unhelpful tautology”
that the battery additions will provide additional capacity. As to the solar
facilities, the Non-Signatories contend that the Final Order mentions the SLOLP
only as it relates to future proceedings and two tariffs, and makes no findings
that the solar facilities are needed or the most cost-effective method of
generation.
FPL
responds that the entirety of the Non-Signatory protest on this issue is pure
reargument and, as a matter of law, should be disregarded for failing to meet
the threshold for reconsideration. FPL continues that the Non-Signatories’
arguments are legally misplaced in light of the specific standard for
Commission consideration of settlement agreements set forth by the Florida
Supreme Court in Floridians Against
Increased Rates, Inc. v. Clark, 371 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 2023) (hereinafter FAIR). FPL asserts that the key
directive from the Court in FAIR
relative to the Joint Motion is that “while the Commission need not resolve
every issue independently in its final order when it is reviewing a settlement
agreement, it must nonetheless discuss the major elements of the settlement
agreement and explain why it is in the public interest.” 371 So. 2d at 912
(internal quotations and citations omitted). FPL then argues that the
Commission was under no obligation to address SLOLP because it was not
identified as a major element, and is otherwise generally subsumed in the
Commission’s discussion of the public interest. FPL concludes that the
Commission fully explained all bases for finding the 2025 SSA to be in the
public interest in its Final Order.
Analysis
FEL
spent considerable time at the Final Hearing cross-examining witnesses about
the SLOLP in general, the inputs to the model provided by FPL, and the outputs
as they related to time of day and solar production. FEL spent a corresponding
portion of its post-hearing brief on these same issues. While the importance
assigned to the SLOLP by FEL at the hearing and in its brief may correspond to
its importance to the resource plan contained in FPL’s as-filed case, this
importance does not carry over to the 2025 SSA.
The 2025 SSA itself is not based on and in no
way required the Commission’s endorsement of the SLOLP or the stochastic
methodology. The battery storage and solar additions authorized in the 2025 SSA
were not justified based on the SLOLP. Furthermore, as the Commission found in
the Final Order, “[u]nlike FPL’s initial petition which
specified the use of FPL’s newly proposed (Stochastic Loss of Load Probability
or SLOLP) resource planning methodology, the 2025 SSA does not specify the
methodology.”
Accordingly, the SLOLP was not identified as a major element and was not
directly relevant to the Commission’s approval of the 2025 SSA. There was
nothing for the Commission to overlook with respect to a methodology it did not
rely upon.
The
Commission approved the battery storage and solar generation additions
contested by the Non-Signatories in the Final Order as part of Major Element 3,
“2026 & 2027 Base Rate Adjustments.” The reasons for approval are set forth
in the Final Order, and do not include any reliance on the SLOLP. To the extent
the Joint Motion requests that the Commission reconsider its approval, staff
believes such is pure reargument of litigated and decided issues, and beyond
the scope of a motion for reconsideration.
Conclusion
Because the
Non-Signatories failed to identify a point of fact or law overlooked by the
Commission in rendering its order, staff recommends that Section
I of the Joint Motion titled “The SLOLP” be denied.
2. FPL’s FEECA Performance
As
required by Section 366.82(10), F.S.,
the Commission considered FPL’s performance under the Florida Energy Efficiency
and Conservation Act (FEECA) and included appropriate findings in the Final
Order.
After these findings, the Commission notes that “[n]o party submitted prefiled
testimony on this topic or FPL’s FEECA compliance.”
Positions
of the Parties
The Non-Signatories take issue with the
sentence quoted immediately above, and state that FEL jointly submitted
prefiled testimony on this topic, “and further that FEL cross-examined the
Company-designated witness on the subject of FPL’s FEECA performance at hearing
and admitted an additional exhibit on this topic . . . .”
The Non-Signatories assert that the Commission overlooked the record evidence and
failed to make findings regarding FPL’s FEECA performance in its Final Order.
FPL counters that this single sentence
is, at most, a “non-material drafting quibble” that does not affect the Final
Order. FPL continues that the Final Order considered the Company’s FEECA
performance, and that no substantive matter was overlooked. FPL notes that it
submitted prefiled testimony and briefed the subject of its FEECA performance.
Analysis
Staff believes the Non-Signatories’
argument that the Final Order overlooked the fact that prefiled testimony was
submitted is well-founded. The finding in the Final Order with which issue is
taken incorrectly states only that no prefiled testimony was submitted
regarding FEECA compliance. FEL submitted the following prefiled testimony of
Florida Rising witness Marcelin:
In
2023, FPL failed to achieve any of the energy-efficiency goals for the residential
sector as set by the Florida Public Service Commission. In 2024, FPL achieved
the GWh energy savings goal for the residential sector, which, for our members,
is the most important goal as this is the goal that helps our members save
money on their electricity bills, but did not achieve the summer or winter peak
MW savings goal for the residential sector. Compared to national averages,
their savings are still rather small.
While this reference does not
mention FEECA, it does contain the phrase “energy-efficiency goals.” Further,
as noted in its Response to the Joint Motion, FPL submitted prefiled testimony
regarding FEECA.
Staff believes the Final Order’s
statement that there is no prefiled testimony regarding FEECA compliance
overlooks the mention of energy-efficiency in the prefiled testimony of FEL
witness Marcelin quoted above. Staff also believes that same statement
overlooks the prefiled testimony on FEECA submitted by FPL witness Nichols.
Accordingly, staff recommends that the Joint Motion be granted in this respect,
and that the Final Order be amended as follows:
No party FPL
and FEL submitted prefiled testimony on the topic of FPL’s FEECA
compliance. FEL witness Marcelin stated that FPL failed to achieve any
energy efficiency goals for 2023 and did not achieve the summer or winter peak
MW savings goal for the residential sector in 2024. FPL witness Nichols
testified that FPL reduced energy consumption by implementing various DSM
measures, thereby saving ratepayers money and eliminating the need to construct
new generation.
Staff does not concur with the Non-Signatories’
argument that additional findings regarding FEECA performance are warranted.
The Final Order contains findings regarding the most recent approval of FPL’s
demand-side management plan, the demand and energy savings programs in the
plan, how these programs are available to eligible customers on a voluntary
basis, and how goal achievement varies year-by-year.
Staff believes that the Commission’s consideration of FEECA in this Final Order
is consistent with Section 366.82(10), F.S..
Conclusion
Staff recommends that Section II of
the Joint Motion titled “FPL’s FEECA Performance” be granted with respect to
the prefiled testimony regarding FEECA, and that the Final Order be amended as
noted immediately above. Staff recommends that Section II of the Joint Motion
be denied in all other respects.
3. Cost
of Service Legal Obligations
Section 366.06(1), F.S., requires
that the Commission, “to the extent practicable, consider the cost of providing
service to the class, as well as . . .
the consumption and load characteristics of the various classes of customers”
as part of its analysis in setting fair, just, and reasonable rates.
Five cost of service studies were submitted by the parties and entered into the
record of this proceeding. Each study reached different results. The rates the
Commission ultimately approved in the 2025
Settlement reflect compromise among competing parties who submitted the various
studies and, accordingly, do not correspond precisely to any one of the
studies.
Positions of the Parties
The
Non-Signatories assert that the Commission found as follows:
Not only is one specific cost of
service study not required . . . [o]ur duty is to determine whether the
resulting allocation results in rates that are fair, just and reasonable, and
is in the public interest.
The Non-Signatories then argue that
this “finding” demonstrates that “[t]he Commission has overlooked its
specific statutory duty to consider the cost of providing service to each customer
class and has instead relied on a methodology that is not supported by any
competent, substantial evidence of record.”
FPL responds that the cost of service
studies were considered, no point of law or fact was overlooked, and the Joint
Motion on this point is reargument that should be rejected.
Analysis
The Non-Signatories’ argument is
founded on two phrases taken from a much larger paragraph. The full paragraph
is set forth below, with the two selected phrases underscored.
The revenue requirement allocation in
the 2025 SSA is not the result of one specific cost of service study. The
revenue requirement allocation is the result of negotiations in a complex
docket with five cost of service studies, each with its own assumptions,
methodologies, inputs, and conclusions. In this context, it stands to reason
that the negotiated outcome would not be the result of one agreed-upon study,
but would rather be based on inputs from more than one cost of service study. Not
only is one specific cost of service study not required, the parity results
of the revenue allocation under the proposed settlement are within the ranges
of parity under each cost of service methodology presented and are reasonable. Our
duty is to determine whether the resulting allocation results in rates that are
fair, just, and reasonable, and is in the public interest when considered
as part of the 2025 SSA as a whole. That determination is set forth at the
conclusion of this Order.
Staff notes that the sentence that
immediately precedes the first underscored phrase clearly states that the
Commission considered the cost of providing
service to each class as set forth in five cost of service studies. The
Commission ultimately approved rates by class
that fall within the ranges of parity established by studies of record, all of
which are competent substantial evidence. Staff
believes the Commission has “to
the extent practicable, consider[ed] the cost of providing service to the
class,” consistent with section 366.06(1), F.S.
Staff does not agree with the
Non-Signatories’ implicit argument that a settlement must be based on one
cost-of-service study of record, or that the settling parties must necessarily
undertake a new study during settlement negotiations. The introductory
statutory phrase “to the extent practicable” and the directive “consider” the
cost of providing service to the classes recognize the discretion inherent in
ratemaking.
The Commission properly exercised its discretion in considering all cost of
service studies, to the extent practical and in the context of a settlement
agreement, and approving the 2025 SSA.
Conclusion
Because the Non-Signatories failed to identify a point of
fact or law overlooked by the Commission in rendering its order, staff recommends that Section III of the Joint Motion titled “Cost of
Service Legal Obligations” be denied.
4. New
Evidence
The final hearing in this docket was conducted pursuant to
the procedures set forth in Section 120.57(1), F.S. The record in such a case
consists of the following:
1. All
notices, pleadings, motions, and intermediate rulings.
2. Evidence
admitted.
3. Those
matters officially recognized.
4. Proffers
of proof and objections and rulings thereon.
5. Proposed
findings and exceptions.
6. Any
decision, opinion, order, or report by the presiding officer.
7. All
staff memoranda or data submitted to the presiding officer during the hearing
or prior to its disposition, after notice of the submission to all parties,
except communications by advisory staff as permitted under s. 120.66(1), if
such communications are public records.
8. All
matters placed on the record after an ex parte communication.
9. The
official transcript.
Section 120.57(1)(f), F.S. This record is created during an
administrative proceeding and is closed when the final hearing adjourns. See Department of Transp. v. J.W.C. Company,
Inc., 396 So. 2d 778, 786 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). An agency is not
specifically authorized by Chapter 120, F.S., to receive additional evidence
after the hearing has concluded and the record has closed. See Lawnwood Medical Center,
Inc. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 678 So. 2d 421, 425 (Fla. 1st DCA
1996).
The
Commission conducted the final hearing in this rate case on October 6-10
and 13-16, 2025. The Commission admitted 862 exhibits and
took official recognition of numerous documents. A transcript of the final
hearing was filed in this docket. Staff filed a summary in the docket for Commission
consideration before the special agenda conference on the 2025 SSA on November
20, 2025. All of these matters of record were before the
Commission when they voted to approve the 2025 SSA.
One of the
mechanisms in the 2025 SSA that the Commission approved
in the Final Order is a “Rate Stabilization Mechanism” (RSM). The RSM is
replacing a similar FPL mechanism known as the “Reserve Surplus Amortization
Mechanism” (RSAM). The Commission found as following
regarding the RSM in the Final Order:
The
RSM will function almost identically to the RSAM. The RSM will be funded in the
estimated amount of $1.452 billion using the following . . . Any remaining
balance in FPL’s existing RSAM as of January 1, 2026, estimated to be $153.5
million . . . .
This estimated
$153.5 million is referred to as the “carryover.”
Because the
carryover was an estimated amount, the Final Order recited the following
procedural commitment from the 2025 SSA:
Pursuant
to the 2025 SSA, FPL will file an attachment to its monthly earnings
surveillance report for December 2025 showing the final RSAM amount that will
carry over to the TSM as well as the amount associated with the 2025 battery
storage-related ITC. The sum of the $1.155 billion unprotected deferred tax
liability, the final RSAM residual amount, and the final amount to the 2025
ITCs shall constitute the ‘RSM amount.’
Positions of the
Parties
The Non-Signatories assert that the Final Order overlooked
certain facts regarding the ultimate amount of the carryover and seek
reconsideration on this issue. In support of their argument, the Non-Signatories
attached the following materials to the Joint Motion:
(1) FPL’s
November 2025 earnings surveillance report, filed with the Commission clerk on
January 15, 2026 (Attachment A to Joint Motion).
(2) Transcript
of prepared remarks presented at FPL’s Fourth Quarter and Full-Year 2025
Earnings Conference Call, conducted January 27, 2026 (Attachment B to Joint
Motion).
(3) FPL’s
October 2025 earnings surveillance report, filed with the Commission clerk on December
15, 2025 (Attachment C to the Joint Motion).
The Non-Signatories assert that “[t]he Final Order overlooks
that, based on this newly-available earning surveillance report, this
[carryover] is likely to be a gross underestimate with the actual carryover
likely to be at least double and possibly triple that amount.” Joint Motion at
11.
FPL responds that the Non-Signatories are again rearguing
their case against the RSM. FPL asserts that these arguments were made at the
final hearing and in post-hearing briefs and should not be heard here. FPL continues
that the Final Order finds that the carryover is an estimate and establishes
the procedure for that amount to be made certain. FPL further argues that rate
cases are based on forecasts and estimates, and that allowing such matters to
be revisited with new evidence would establish an unworkable precedent and
result in a never-ending process. FPL concludes by noting that allowing the
consideration of post-hearing evidence could raise due process concerns.
Analysis
The carryover was never represented to be an amount
certain. The Final Order acknowledged this uncertainty when the
Commission found that the carryover is “estimated to be
$153.5 million.” By including “estimated,”
the Final Order expressly noted the fact that carryover may be larger (or
smaller) than $153.5 million. The Non-Signatories nonetheless argue that
the Commission should grant
reconsideration because subsequent events show that the
$153.5 amount in the Final Order is “a gross underestimate.”
A difference between an estimate and a final amount proves only that the
former was, indeed, an estimate. The degree of difference does not necessarily
mean a fact was overlooked when making the initial estimate. This rings
especially true when the facts that were allegedly overlooked did not exist
when the estimate was made.
As noted above, the Final Order requires that FPL file an
attachment to its monthly earnings surveillance report for December 2025
showing the final RSAM amount. In support of the Joint Motion, the
Non-Signatories submitted additional materials not mentioned in the Final Order
related to both the carryover and FPL’s return on equity. These materials were
not introduced into evidence at the final hearing and are not part of the
record. Staff notes that these materials did not exist when the Commission made
its decision in November 2025. For all of these reasons, this new evidence is
not appropriate to consider on a motion for reconsideration. Stewart Bonded Warehouse, Inc.
v. Bevis, 294 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 1974) (reconsideration must be
based upon specific factual matters set forth in the record).
The case cited by the Non-Signatories in support of their
request to reopen or supplement the record with their newly-discovered evidence
is readily distinguishable. At issue in Florida
Department of Corrections v. Provin was whether the Career Service
Commission (CSC) erred in receiving new evidence in support of a motion for
rehearing. 515 So.2d 302, 306 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). The court found that the
statute regarding CSC proceedings and agency rule on rehearing afforded the CSC
“broad discretion,”
and that the agency was acting consistently with prior orders on rehearing in
receiving new evidence. Id. Notably,
the new evidence that was introduced existed at the time of the hearing, but
was not introduced into the record. The agency determined, and the court
affirmed, that the party’s lack of due diligence in seeking to have the
evidence admitted at the initial hearing was not a bar to its admission on
rehearing. Id. at 306.
The statute and rules at issue in Provin are specific to the CSC. Unlike the Commission’s rule for
reconsideration, the CSC’s rehearing rule allowed for that commission to
consider whether the decision was based on fraud, collusion, deceit, or
mistake. The court noted that the CSC “has interpreted the rule as permitting it to reconsider its earlier
final order, even if its reconsideration
was based upon factors earlier considered when reaching its initial order.”
Id. (emphasis added). Unlike
the CSC, the Commission has never applied its reconsideration
rule to allow such reargument. Additionally, in Provin, the evidence sought to be introduce existed at the time of
the hearing. The evidence the Non-Signatories rely on in support of
reconsideration in this docket did not exist at the time of the final hearing
in this docket.
The invitation by the Non-Signatories for the
Commission to reopen the record and consider more recent earnings
surveillance reports could be expected to result in a reciprocal request from
FPL to admit countervailing evidence and testimony. Another earnings report
would be available with every month that passes, repeatedly creating new
evidence. Opening the door to recurring adjustments and reconsideration based
on monthly reports would create “a never-ending process” that the Administrative
Procedure Act does not envision,
and would eliminate the efficiencies sought to be achieved by the RSM and the
four-year rate plan.
Perhaps the closest analogy to the instant situation is
the Order on Reconsideration and Revising Implementation in Order No.
PSC-97-0637-FOF-TL, issued June 3, 1997, in Docket No. 961153-TL, In re Petition for Numbering Plan Relief for
904 area code, by BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., cited by the
Non-Signatories in the Joint Motion. At the agenda conference where the
decision was to be made in that docket, the Commission debated whether to delay
the vote in order to hear whether the North American Numbering Council (NANC)
would object to the proposed action. Id.
at 3. The Commission decided to not defer, opting instead to make a decision
“and then the administrator and the NANC could respond.” Id. The NANC responded and the Commission, consistent with the
statements made prior to the initial approval, voted on its own motion to
reopen the record, consider the response, and reconsider the prior final order.
In this docket, the Commission was
made aware that the carryover was an estimate. The
Commission voted to approve the carryover as an estimate, and directed
that FPL make a specific follow-up filing to fix an amount certain for the carryover.
Consistent with the direction in the Final Order, FPL made the required filing.
Like with the numbering plan docket discussed in the preceding paragraph, the
Commission established a specific process to be followed after the initial
approval. In this case, the process involved a post-hearing filing. In the
docket discussed above, the process involved reopening the record. These
processes were styled to particular cases based on specific facts, and are not
interchangeable.
Conclusion
Because the Non-Signatories failed to identify a point of
fact or law in the record that was overlooked by the Commission in rendering its
order, staff
recommends that Section IV of the Joint Motion titled “New Evidence on Funding
for RSM and FPL ROE” be denied.
5. Final
Order / Commission Decision
The Commission met on November 20, 2025,
at a special agenda conference to consider the 2025 SSA. Because these
discussions are post-hearing, participation is limited to the Commission and
staff under Rule 25-22.0021(6), F.A.C.. Staff presented a Summary and Overview
document. All five Commissioners spoke to various aspects of the 2025 SSA. At
the end of their deliberations, the Commission voted
unanimously to approve the 2025 SSA.
Positions of the
Parties
The Non-Signatories contend that “the Final Order overlooked
the point of law that the Final Order fails to accurately memorialize the
Commission’s November 20, 2025, public discussion and explanation of its
decision that the [2025 SSA] was in the public interest and results
in fair, just, and reasonable rates.”
The Non-Signatories’ contention in the Joint Motion is that the Final Order
errs in not simply reciting verbatim the statements the
Commission made at the November special agenda
conference. Because the Final Order contains words not spoken by any
Commissioner at the special agenda conference, the Non-Signatories
characterize it as Staff’s “reimagining” or “reconstruction” of the
Commission’s “insufficient lip-service to the requirements of Florida law”
at the November special agenda conference. The position of the Non-Signatories
is that “the Commission must discuss its consideration of the
competing arguments of the major elements and supply a reasonable explanation,
given the arguments, of how the evidence led to that decision.”
FPL responds that the Non-Signatories’ argument lacks legal
support and is contrary to decades of Commission practice. FPL contends that
the binding legal precedent from the Florida Supreme Court requires that the
final order contain detailed findings, and that the same precedent contains no
requirement for the final order to strictly follow oral statements made by one
or more Commissioners.
Analysis
The Non-Signatories cite no law in support of their argument
that boards or commissions must dictate the entire content of their final
orders from the dais. Staff is aware of no such precedent.
With respect to this Commission, the Florida Supreme Court has instructed that
“a reasonable explanation, given the arguments, of how the
evidence led to that decision” must be included in a final order. FAIR, 371 So. 3d at 922. Staff does not
read this precedent from the Court as standing for the proposition that the
Commission must dictate verbatim
from the bench the precise words that must be included in a final order, or
that the Commission must engage in detailed
wordsmithing of a written order from the bench.
Nor does the
case law cited by the Non-Signatories compel such a process. That case law
instructs that “[o]ral pronouncements of an agency at a duly noticed hearing
control over a written order which is inconsistent with those pronouncements.” Verlini v. Department of Health, 853 So.
2d 481, 483 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). The court in Verlini held that relief was appropriate because the agency
“enter[ed] a written final order which conflicts with its oral pronouncement.” Id. at 484. In reaching this conclusion,
the court in Verlini relied on Ulano v. Anderson, 626 So.2d 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). In Ulano, the court granted relief
upon a finding that “the trial judge made a
series of oral pronouncements indicating that Dr. Ulano would recover . . .
[and subsequently] entered a written final judgment in favor of Dr.
Anderson, denying Dr. Ulano any recovery whatsoever.” 626 So.2d at 1112. In these cases and numerous others,
the inconsistency between the oral pronouncement and the written final order
was not length or number of words, it was an actual conflict or material
difference.
There is no such conflict or material difference
between the Final Order and the Commission’s statements at the November 2025
special agenda conference. The Final Order did not overlook this law, or the
facts at the November 2025 special agenda conference.
Conclusion
Because the Non-Signatories failed to identify a point of
fact or law overlooked by the Commission in rendering its order, staff
recommends that Section V of the Joint Motion titled “The Final Order Fails to
Accurately Memorialize the Commission November 20, 2025 Public Discussion and
Explanation for the Commission’s Decision that the SIP Agreement is in the
Public Interest and Result, in Fair, Just, and Reasonable Rate” be denied.
Issue 3:
Should this docket be closed?
Recommendation:
No. This docket should remain open while the appeals
filed by OPC, FAIR, and FEL are pending with the Florida Supreme Court.
(Stiller, Sparks)
Staff Analysis:
OPC, FAIR, and FEL have each filed notices of appeal
with the Florida Supreme Court. This docket should remain open while the
appeals filed by OPC, FAIR, and FEL are pending with the Florida Supreme Court.
