State of Florida

pscSEAL

 

Public Service Commission

Capital Circle Office Center ● 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850

-M-E-M-O-R-A-N-D-U-M-

 

DATE:

November 17, 2026

TO:

Office of Commission Clerk (Teitzman)

FROM:

Office of the General Counsel (Crawford)  JSC

Division of Engineering (Brown)  LVK

RE:

Docket No. 20260045-EI – Formal complaint of Justin Gage against Duke Energy Florida, LLC for alleged violations of Commission rules, orders, and statutes governing electric utility safety standards, compliance certifications, and truthfulness in Commission filings.

AGENDA:

12/01/26 – Regular Agenda – Motion to Dismiss – Oral Argument not requested; participation is at the discretion of the Commission

COMMISSIONERS ASSIGNED:

All Commissioners

PREHEARING OFFICER:

Clark

CRITICAL DATES:

None

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

None

 

 Case Background

On October 17, 2025, Mr. Justin Gage (Mr. Gage) filed Informal Complaint No 1488062E, alleging that a PME-4 switchgear unit[1] administered by Duke Energy Florida, LLC (DEF) located near his house was out of compliance with the National Electrical Safety Code (NESC). In particular, Mr. Gage alleged that the PME-4 unit had missing or improper safety stickers, was improperly sealed at the base, and that the door of the unit was too close to nearby bushes to be fully opened.  

Mr. Gage had previously been in contact with DEF regarding the PME-4. On September 4, 2025, Mr. Gage reported that a loud boom had come from the PME-4. A DEF technician arrived onsite and confirmed that Mr. Gage had power. At that time Mr. Gage raised his concerns with the PME-4 with the technician. The technician told Mr. Gage that his concerns would be investigated and put a safety sticker on the unit. A DEF investigation found that the PME-4 was in compliance with the NESC and that Mr. Gage was not served by that PME-4 but by a nearby transformer. Mr. Gage then filed an informal complaint with the Commission under Rule 25-22.032, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.).

While the informal complaint was being processed at the Commission, Mr. Gage also filed a complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). OSHA reached out to DEF about the complaint and a DEF Supervisor and Safety Professional examined the PME-4 on November 25, 2025. They found no OSHA or NESC violations. On or about that date, DEF removed the bushes that were near the PME-4. In early December, OSHA informed Mr. Gage that his case was being closed because the bushes were removed.

On January 6, 2026, Commission engineering safety staff examined the PME-4 unit and found no violations of the NESC. Mr. Gage was unsatisfied and the matter was referred to the Commission’s Process Review Team (PRT) for review. In March, Commission staff advised Mr. Gage that his informal complaint had been reviewed by the PRT, and it did not appear that DEF had violated any Commission statutes, rules, orders, or its tariff in its handling of the matter, and that the Commission did not have jurisdiction to award damages.

On March 27, 2026, Mr. Gage filed a formal complaint against DEF under Rule 25-22.036(3)(b), F.A.C., alleging the same material facts contained in his informal complaint. The formal complaint asserts that the PME-4 unit was out of compliance with the NESC from September 2025 to December 2025. Mr. Gage further alleged that DEF made false or misleading statements to the Commission regarding the PME-4’s compliance, and that Commission staff failed to properly review his informal complaint. DEF moved to dismiss the formal complaint, arguing that the complaint failed to contain competent substantial evidence that any action taken by DEF constitutes a violation of any applicable statute, rule, Commission order, or the company tariff. Mr. Gage filed a response to the motion to dismiss, asserting that the complaint sets forth photographic evidence of NESC violations.[2]

The motion to dismiss the formal complaint was presented at the Commission’s On July 7, 2026, Agenda Conference. The Commissioners agreed with staff’s recommendation that DEF did not appear to violate a statute, rule, order, or applicable provision of DEF’s Commission-approved tariff. The Commission denied DEF’s motion to dismiss, and also denied Mr. Gage’s formal complaint, by proposed agency action (PAA) Order PSC-2026-0259-PAA-EI, issued July 24, 2026.

On July 30, 2026, Mr. Gage timely filed a petition for formal administrative hearing and protest of PAA Order PSC-2026-0259-PAA-EI,[3] alleging substantial interests affected and disputed material facts. On August 19, 2026, DEF filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition,[4] to which Mr. Gage filed a response on August 25, 2026.[5] No request for oral argument was made.[6] Staff believes oral argument is not necessary, as the pleadings are sufficient on their face to enable the Commission to make a decision; however, if the Commission wishes to hear oral argument on this item, staff recommends allowing three minutes per side.

This recommendation addresses whether DEF’s Motion to Dismiss the PAA protest should be granted. The Commission has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Section 366.04, Florida Statutes (F.S.).

 


Discussion of Issues

Issue 1: 

 Should the Commission grant DEF’s Motion to Dismiss?

Recommendation: 

 Yes, the Commission should grant DEF’s Motion to Dismiss, and Mr. Gage’s PAA protest should be dismissed without prejudice. Any amended petition protesting Order No. PSC-2026-0259-PAA-EI should be filed no later than 14 days following the issuance of the Commission’s order. If no amended protest is timely filed, or if the amended complaint fails to state an appropriate cause of action as set forth below, Order No. PSC-2026-0259-PAA-EI should be reinstated and made final by issuance of a consummating order. (Rauch, Crawford)

Staff Analysis: 

 

Legal Standard

To sustain a motion to dismiss, the moving party must show that, accepting all allegations as true, the petition fails to state a cause of action for which relief may be granted. Varnes v. Dawkins, 624 So. 2d 349, 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). The moving party must specify the grounds for the motion to dismiss, and all material allegations must be construed against the moving party in determining if the petitioner has stated the necessary allegations. A determination of the petition’s sufficiency is confined to the petition and the documents incorporated therein and the grounds asserted in the motion to dismiss. Id. All allegations in the petition must be viewed as true and in the light most favorable to the petitioner in order to determine whether there is a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. Id. The dismissal of a petition shall, at least once, be without prejudice to petitioner's filing a timely amended petition curing the defect, unless it conclusively appears from the face of the petition that the defect cannot be cured.[7]

Under Rule 25-22.029(3), F.A.C., one whose substantial interests may or will be affected by the Commission’s proposed action may file a petition for a Section 120.569 or 120.57, F.S., hearing, in the form provided by Rule 28-106.201, F.A.C. Any such petition shall be filed within the time stated in the notice issued pursuant to subsection (1) of the rule, and shall identify the particular issues in the proposed action that are in dispute.

The rule should be read in concert with the standard for participation in a formal administrative proceeding, under the two-prong standing test set forth in Agrico Chemical Company v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 406 So. 2d 478, 482 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). The petitioner must show that (1) he will suffer injury in fact that is of sufficient immediacy to entitle him to a Section 120.57, F.S., hearing and (2) the substantial injury is of a type or nature that the proceeding is designed to protect. The first aspect of the test deals with the degree of injury. The second deals with the nature of the injury. The “injury in fact” must be both real and immediate and not speculative or conjectural. International Jai-Alai Players Assn. v. Florida Pari-Mutuel Commission, 561 So. 2d 1224, 1225-26 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). See also Village Park Mobile Home Assn., Inc. v. State Dept. of Business Regulation, 506 So. 2d 426, 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), rev. den., 513 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1987) (speculation on the possible occurrence of injurious events is too remote).

Petition for Formal Administrative hearing and Protest of PAA

 

Mr. Gage’s formal Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing and Protest of PAA asserts that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing relating to disputed issues of material fact that affect substantial interests. Mr. Gage states six (6) examples of affected interests: risk of delayed or unsafe emergency response, increased risk of electrical hazards, inability to inspect and maintain equipment, safety of utility workers affecting nearby residents, exposure to consequences of equipment failure, and the historical condition does not nullify his current condition. To support these claims, Mr. Gage supplied photographs purporting to show the violations with explanatory text and materials from the July 7, 2026 Commission meeting.

DEF’s Motion to Dismiss

DEF’s Motion to Dismiss states that the Petitioner “failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted,” and that the Commissioners “supported Staff’s Recommendation and noted no violations were found.” DEF states that it has repeatedly inspected the PME-4 and have found no NESC violations. DEF further states that it has never made false or misleading statements to the Commission regarding the inspections of the PME-4. Mr. Gage’s response to DEF’s Motion to Dismiss reiterates the claims made in the formal complaint about the physical condition of the PME-4.

Analysis

The Commission has previously held pro se litigants, such as Mr. Gage, to a relaxed pleading standard, in order to prevent delay and promote resolution of litigants’ claims. The Comission is asked to consider whether Mr. Gage’s request for hearing presents sufficient allegations to demonstrate that his substantial interests are affected, and therefore warrant a hearing. Viewing the allegations raised in it as true and in the light most favorable to the petitioner, staff recommends that the request for hearing fails to demonstrate a cause of action upon which relief should be granted.

Mr. Gage’s complaint alleges safety concerns relating to an approximately three-month period in which the DEF switchgear unit had missing or improper safety stickers, was improperly sealed at the base, and that the door of the unit was too close to nearby bushes to be fully opened. Mr. Gage concedes that the condition was remedied many months ago, but contends that his interests are nevertheless adversely affected by the Commission’s denial of his complaint. As referenced above, his alleged interests are: (1) risk of delayed or unsafe emergency response, (2) increased risk of electrical hazards near his home, (3) risk from DEF’s inability to inspect and maintain its equipment, (4) improper conditions affecting the safety of utility workers and nearby residents, (5) the potential that a future equipment failure could affect his ability to safely occupy his home, and (6) that even though DEF has corrected the access and clearance condition, his substantial interests were affected for the three months that the switchgear unit was impeded by vegetation.

Mr. Gage does not allege in his complaint or request for hearing that there was an interruption of his electric service, or harm to his person or property,[8] due to the overgrowth of vegetation or condition of the switchgear unit. The interests he presents are a generalized concern for his safety, the safety of his  neighbors, and the safety of DEF personnel. These alleged injuries are too speculative, indirect, and not of sufficient immediacy to confer standing to request an administrative hearing under Section 120.57, F.S.[9]

In dismissing Mr. Gage’s formal complaint, the Commission considered whether to exercise its safety jurisdiction for the three-month period while the switchgear unit was out of compliance, and declined to do so: “We find that DEF did not violate the NESC. Multiple inspections by DEF technicians and Commission staff failed to find any violations of the NESC.” Order No. PSC-2026-0259-PAA-EI, p. 4. If the Commission had found a safety violation, the appropriate remedy would be to require DEF to bring the equipment into compliance; however, this was the case before Mr. Gage filed his formal complaint. Under 366.04(6), F.S., the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce safety standards for transmission and distribution facilities of all public electric utilities, cooperatives organized under the Rural Electric Cooperative Law, and electric utilities owned and operated by municipalities. Staff recommends that a customer has no organic or statutory right under Florida law to require the Commission to enforce its safety jurisdiction under these circumstances, for a limited period of alleged non-compliance, when the compliance issue has long since been remedied, and no harm to the petitioner due to the non-compliance has been demonstrated.

Mr. Gage has not established a historical, present, or future injury-in-fact resulting from the period of alleged non-compliance. His generalized concerns regarding safety are speculative and conjectural, and not the type of injury a Section 120.57, F.S., hearing is designed to protect. Therefore, the request for hearing fails to satisfy the requirements under Agrico. Even viewing all allegations in the request for hearing as true and in the light most favorable to the petitioner, the request for hearing fails to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted in an administrative hearing. Therefore, staff recommends that DEF’s Motion to Dismiss Mr. Gage’s request for hearing on PAA Order PSC-2026-0259-PAA-EI should be granted. Under Section 120.569(2)(c), F.S., the dismissal of a petition shall, at least once, be without prejudice to petitioner's filing a timely amended petition curing the defect, unless it conclusively appears from the face of the petition that the defect cannot be cured. Staff recommends that Mr. Gage’s request for hearing should be dismissed without prejudice.

Conclusion

The Commission should grant DEF’s Motion to Dismiss, and Mr. Gage’s request for hearing should be dismissed without prejudice. Any amended petition protesting Order No. PSC-2026-0259-PAA-EI should be filed no later than 14 days following the issuance of the Commission’s order. If no amended request for hearing is timely filed, or if the amended request for hearing fails to state an appropriate cause of action as set forth above, Order No. PSC-2026-0259-PAA-EI should be reinstated and made final by issuance of a consummating order.


Issue 2: 

 Should this docket be closed?

Recommendation: 

 Yes. If the Commission approves staff’s recommendation in Issue 1, the docket should remain open to allow the opportunity to file an amended request for hearing on Order No. PSC-2026-0259-PAA-EI. If no amended request for hearing is timely filed, or if the amended request for hearing fails to state an appropriate cause of action, the docket should be closed upon the issuance of a consummating order. If a valid request for hearing is timely filed, the docket should remain open in order to conduct an administrative hearing. (Rauch, Crawford)

Staff Analysis: 

 If the Commission approves staff’s recommendation in Issue 1, the docket should remain open to allow the opportunity to file an amended request for hearing to Order No. PSC-2026-0259-PAA-EI. If no amended request for hearing is timely filed, or if the amended request for hearing fails to state an appropriate cause of action, the docket should be closed upon the issuance of a consummating order. If a valid request for hearing is timely filed, the docket should remain open in order to conduct an administrative hearing.

 



[1] A switchgear is composed of electrical disconnect switches, fuses, or circuit breakers used to control, protect, and isolate electrical equipment.

[2] Mr. Gage’s OSHA complaint and the referenced photographs are attached to his formal complaint, Document No. 01812-2026, filed March 27, 2026, in Docket No. 20260045-EI.

[3] Document No. 04793-2026

[4] Document No. 05314-2026

[5] Document No. 05766-2026

[6] Rule 25-22.0022(1) and (7)(a), F.A.C., provides that the failure to timely request oral argument on dispositive motions (including motions to dismiss) constitutes waiver thereof. However, Rule 25-22.0022(1) and (7)(b), F.A.C., provides that the Commission has the discretion to request oral argument on a dispositive motion if it decides that oral argument would aid in the understanding and disposition of matter.

[7] Section 120.569(2)(c), F.S.

[8] Staff notes that the Commission does not have equity jurisdiction; had allegations of personal injury or property damage been made, the Commission would not have jurisdiction to address such claims.

[9] See Order No. 18868, issued February 16, 1988 (protest petition dismissed without prejudice where alleged injury was insufficient to confer standing), and Order No. 19140, issued April 13, 1988 (amended protest dismissed for continued failure to demonstrate substantial interests will be affected; PAA order finalized), in Docket No. 870816-EU, In re: Joint Petition for Approval of Territorial Agreement between Florida Power and Light Company and Peace River Electric Cooperative, Inc.